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armgit / ARES

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ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.

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Security Policy

Supported Versions

Version Supported
6.x Active security fixes
5.x End of life - upgrade to v6
< 5.0 End of life

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

How to report

Email: [email protected]

Include in your report:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Potential impact assessment
  • Any suggested mitigations (optional)

PGP: No project PGP key is currently published. Email first if encrypted coordination is required, and do not include sensitive exploit details until an encrypted channel has been agreed.

Response timeline

Milestone Target
Acknowledgment 48 hours
Initial assessment 5 business days
Fix development 30 days for critical, 90 days for medium
Public disclosure After fix is released + 7 days

We follow coordinated vulnerability disclosure.


Scope

In scope

  • Authentication bypass in the ARES API (ares/api/)
  • Credential exposure - vault encryption, log redaction failures
  • RBAC bypass - escalating from reporter to operator or team_lead
  • SQL injection or command injection in any module input handling
  • Scope guard bypass - running modules against out-of-scope targets
  • Dependency vulnerabilities with direct exploitability in ARES context

Out of scope

  • Issues in modules that require compromising the target first (by design - ARES is a red team tool)
  • Denial of service against the ARES API
  • Issues in [dev] optional dependencies
  • Social engineering

Security Design

API Response Data - Intentional Sensitive Output

EngineModuleResult.raw_output in API responses intentionally contains captured hashes, Kerberos tickets, and credentials. This is the core value of a red team tool - the operator needs this data to continue the engagement.

Protections applied to this data:

Protection Implementation
Authentication require_operator() - only authenticated operators can run modules
Authorization RBAC - reporter and recon roles cannot run credential modules
Transport HTTPS enforced via nginx TLS + HSTS
Caching Cache-Control: no-store on all API responses
Rate limiting Per-endpoint limits prevent bulk extraction
Audit log Every module_run_start and module_run_complete is logged with actor

Operators should treat ARES API responses with the same sensitivity as the data they contain - store engagement results in encrypted storage.

Security Design

Key security controls in ARES v6:

Control Implementation
Credential encryption AES-256-GCM (AEAD) with per-record PBKDF2-SHA256 salt (600,000 iterations)
Legacy encryption Configurable via ARES_LEGACY_SALT env var
JWT tokens HS256 default; RS256 supported via ARES_JWT_ALGORITHM=RS256
Token revocation JTI blacklist - logout immediately invalidates tokens
Scope enforcement ScopeGuard hard-stops all modules; fails closed
Log redaction Hashes, passwords, JWTs stripped from all structlog output
STEALTH enforcement HIGH_NOISE modules raise ModuleValidationError before any network call
Subprocess isolation Module crashes cannot affect the engine process
Input sanitization sanitize_ldap() and sanitize_hostname() at 48+ call sites

Known Security Considerations

This is a red team framework. It is designed to perform attacks against authorized targets. Deploying it in unauthorized environments is illegal.

Always:

  • Obtain written authorization before running any ARES module
  • Set scope via ares campaign create --targets <cidr> before running modules
  • Use --noise stealth for sensitive engagements
  • Rotate ARES_SECRET_KEY and ARES_ENCRYPTION_KEY between engagements

This policy was last updated: 2026-03-21