ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.
Python active-directorycloud-securitydefensive-validationfastapigood-first-issuemitre-attackopsecreactred-teamreportingsecurity
"""
ARES MITRE ATT&CK Technique Library
Complete mapping of all ARES modules to MITRE ATT&CK techniques.
Provides:
- TechniqueLibrary: queryable technique database (ATT&CK Enterprise)
- TechniqueMapper: maps module IDs ↔ technique IDs
- CoverageReport: generates attack coverage heatmap per tactic
- SimulationPlan: produces purple team simulation plan from techniques
Usage:
lib = TechniqueLibrary()
t = lib.get("T1558.003") # Kerberoasting
t.tactic # "Credential Access"
t.detection # detection guidance
t.mitigations # list of mitigations
mapper = TechniqueMapper()
techniques = mapper.for_module("ad.kerberoast")
modules = mapper.modules_for_technique("T1558.003")
report = CoverageReport(mapper)
report.coverage_by_tactic() # {"Credential Access": 0.72, ...}
report.to_html() # full heatmap HTML
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
@dataclass
class Technique:
"""A single MITRE ATT&CK technique or sub-technique."""
technique_id: str # e.g. T1558.003
name: str
tactic: str # primary tactic
tactics: list[str] # all applicable tactics
description: str
platforms: list[str] # Windows | Linux | macOS | Cloud | etc.
permissions: list[str] # permissions required
data_sources: list[str] # data sources for detection
detection: str # detection guidance
mitigations: list[str] # mitigation IDs / descriptions
is_subtechnique: bool = False
parent_id: str = "" # parent technique if subtechnique
url: str = ""
severity: str = "high" # ares-internal severity for reporting
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"id": self.technique_id,
"name": self.name,
"tactic": self.tactic,
"tactics": self.tactics,
"description": self.description,
"platforms": self.platforms,
"detection": self.detection,
"mitigations": self.mitigations,
"severity": self.severity,
"url": self.url,
}
# ── Technique database ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Selected ATT&CK Enterprise v14 techniques relevant to ARES modules
_TECHNIQUES: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
# ── Credential Access ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
{
"id": "T1649",
"name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access systems. ADCS ESC1-ESC8 misconfigurations allow low-privileged users to obtain certificates as Domain Admin.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", "Windows Registry"],
"detection": "Monitor for certificate enrollment events (Event ID 4886/4887). Alert on certificate requests with UPN SANs differing from requestor. Review certificate template permissions.",
"mitigations": ["Audit certificate template permissions", "Disable enrollee-supplied SAN", "Enable CA Manager Approval", "Monitor for certipy/Certify tool usage"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/",
},
{
"id": "T1187",
"name": "Forced Authentication",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information. PetitPotam, PrinterBug, and DFSCoerce force Windows hosts to authenticate to attacker-controlled systems.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Network Traffic", "File: File Access"],
"detection": "Monitor for MS-EFSRPC EfsRpcOpenFileRaw calls. Alert on Spooler RPC connections from unexpected sources. Monitor for Event ID 4624 with unexpected source IPs.",
"mitigations": ["Disable Print Spooler on DCs", "Apply MS-EFSRPC patches (KB5005413)", "Enable Protected Users group for all privileged accounts"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/",
},
{
"id": "T1003.001",
"name": "OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump is the most common technique.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["SYSTEM"],
"data_sources": ["Process: Process Access", "Windows Registry"],
"detection": "Monitor Sysmon Event ID 10 (Process Access) for LSASS. Alert on rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump pattern. Enable Credential Guard.",
"mitigations": ["Enable Windows Credential Guard", "Disable WDigest authentication", "Enable Protected Process Light (PPL) for LSASS", "Deploy EDR with LSASS protection"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/",
},
{
"id": "T1555.004",
"name": "Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. DPAPI-protected credentials include Windows Vault entries, browser saved passwords, WiFi PSK, and RDP saved credentials.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["File: File Access", "Process: OS API Execution"],
"detection": "Monitor access to %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Credentials and Chrome Login Data. Alert on CryptUnprotectData API calls from unexpected processes.",
"mitigations": ["Enable Credential Guard", "Use hardware-backed credential storage", "Disable browser password saving via enterprise policy"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/",
},
{
"id": "T1558.001",
"name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may forge Kerberos TGTs using the krbtgt account NTLM hash. Also covers Kerberos delegation abuse (RBCD, S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy) to obtain service tickets impersonating privileged users.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User", "Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request"],
"detection": "Monitor for Kerberos tickets with unusual PAC contents or extended lifetimes. Alert on msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity modifications. Track S4U2Self requests.",
"mitigations": ["Rotate krbtgt TWICE with 12h interval", "Enable Kerberos armoring (FAST)", "Audit RBCD configurations", "Use Protected Users security group"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/",
},
{
"id": "T1558",
"name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may steal or forge Kerberos tickets to maintain persistence and move laterally in an environment.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request", "Windows Registry"],
"detection": "Monitor for Kerberos traffic anomalies (RC4 TGS requests when AES is expected). Alert on AS-REP responses for accounts with no pre-auth disabled. Track TGS request volume spikes.",
"mitigations": ["M1041 - Encrypt sensitive information", "M1026 - Privileged Account Management", "Enable AES-only Kerberos encryption"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/",
},
{
"id": "T1558.003",
"name": "Kerberoasting",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries request Kerberos TGS tickets for services and crack them offline to recover service account passwords.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request"],
"detection": "Monitor for 4769 events with RC4 encryption. Detect unusual TGS volume from non-service accounts. Alert on hashcat/john execution on endpoints.",
"mitigations": ["Use strong random passwords (25+ chars) for service accounts", "Use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)", "Enable AES-256 Kerberos encryption"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/",
},
{
"id": "T1558.004",
"name": "AS-REP Roasting",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries request AS-REP hashes for accounts with pre-authentication disabled, without any credentials.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["None"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request"],
"detection": "Monitor for EventID 4768 (Kerberos Auth Ticket Request) without pre-auth for accounts that should require it. Alert on 4625 and 4768 from unexpected sources.",
"mitigations": ["Enforce Kerberos pre-authentication on all accounts", "Audit accounts with DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH flag", "Use Microsoft ATA / Defender for Identity"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/",
},
{
"id": "T1003",
"name": "OS Credential Dumping",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login information.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["Administrator", "SYSTEM"],
"data_sources": ["Process: OS API Execution", "File: File Access"],
"detection": "Monitor LSASS access (EventID 10 Sysmon). Alert on mimikatz signatures. Detect unusual NTDS.dit or SAM access.",
"mitigations": ["M1043 - Credential Access Protection (RunAsPPL)", "M1027 - Password Policies", "M1026 - Privileged Account Management"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/",
},
{
"id": "T1003.006",
"name": "DCSync",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries abuse AD replication protocol to request password hashes from DCs, simulating a domain controller.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["Administrator", "Domain Controller"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access", "Network Traffic"],
"detection": "Monitor for 4662 events on domain objects with 'Replicating Directory Changes' rights. Alert on unusual sources requesting replication. Defender for Identity has built-in DCSync detection.",
"mitigations": ["Restrict Replicating Directory Changes rights", "Enable Protected Users group", "Deploy Defender for Identity"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/",
},
{
"id": "T1110",
"name": "Brute Force",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts without proper authorization.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "IaaS", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Authentication: Authentication Log", "Application Log"],
"detection": "Monitor failed authentication logs. Alert on 4625 spikes. Detect spray patterns (same password across many accounts). Enable account lockout policies.",
"mitigations": ["M1036 - Account Use Policies (lockout)", "M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication", "M1027 - Password Policies"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/",
},
# ── Discovery ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
{
"id": "T1087",
"name": "Account Discovery",
"tactic": "Discovery",
"tactics": ["Discovery"],
"description": "Adversaries enumerate accounts in an Active Directory environment.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Process: Process Creation", "Network Traffic", "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access"],
"detection": "Monitor LDAP queries for user enumeration. Alert on net user /domain commands. Detect unusual DirectorySearcher usage.",
"mitigations": ["M1028 - Operating System Configuration", "M1018 - User Account Management"],
"severity": "low",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/",
},
{
"id": "T1087.002",
"name": "Domain Account",
"tactic": "Discovery",
"tactics": ["Discovery"],
"description": "Adversaries enumerate domain user accounts via LDAP, net commands, or PowerShell.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content"],
"detection": "Monitor EventID 4661, LDAP traffic for broad user enumeration queries. Alert on objectClass=user queries returning large result sets.",
"mitigations": ["Restrict LDAP queries", "Monitor LDAP audit logs", "Use LDAP signing"],
"severity": "low",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/",
},
{
"id": "T1018",
"name": "Remote System Discovery",
"tactic": "Discovery",
"tactics": ["Discovery"],
"description": "Adversaries enumerate remote systems in a network.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Process: Process Creation"],
"detection": "Monitor ARP cache, LDAP computer enumeration, ping sweeps. Alert on unusual LDAP objectClass=computer queries.",
"mitigations": ["Network segmentation", "Firewall rules limiting ping and discovery protocols"],
"severity": "low",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/",
},
{
"id": "T1201",
"name": "Password Policy Discovery",
"tactic": "Discovery",
"tactics": ["Discovery"],
"description": "Adversaries discover password policies to determine the optimal attack strategy.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access"],
"detection": "Monitor for net accounts /domain and LDAP queries against Default Domain Policy.",
"mitigations": ["M1028 - Operating System Configuration"],
"severity": "info",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/",
},
{
"id": "T1222",
"name": "File and Directory Permissions Modification",
"tactic": "Defense Evasion",
"tactics": ["Defense Evasion"],
"description": "Adversaries modify file/directory permissions to evade detection or maintain persistence.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User", "Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["File: File Metadata"],
"detection": "Monitor ACL changes on sensitive objects. Alert on icacls/chmod for critical paths.",
"mitigations": ["M1022 - Restrict File and Directory Permissions"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/",
},
{
"id": "T1222.001",
"name": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification",
"tactic": "Defense Evasion",
"tactics": ["Defense Evasion"],
"description": "Adversaries modify NTFS ACLs using icacls, takeown, or Set-Acl to prevent access or evade detection.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["User", "Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification"],
"detection": "Alert on EventID 4670 for sensitive objects. Monitor WriteDACL usage on AD objects.",
"mitigations": ["Restrict WriteDACL permission on AD objects"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/001/",
},
# ── Lateral Movement ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
{
"id": "T1021",
"name": "Remote Services",
"tactic": "Lateral Movement",
"tactics": ["Lateral Movement"],
"description": "Adversaries use valid accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["Administrator", "User"],
"data_sources": ["Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Network Traffic"],
"detection": "Monitor for unusual remote service logons. Alert on 4624 Type 3/10 from unexpected sources.",
"mitigations": ["M1035 - Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "M1032 - MFA"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/",
},
{
"id": "T1021.001",
"name": "Remote Desktop Protocol",
"tactic": "Lateral Movement",
"tactics": ["Lateral Movement"],
"description": "Adversaries use RDP to move laterally across systems.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["Administrator", "User"],
"data_sources": ["Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Network Traffic"],
"detection": "Monitor EventID 4624 Type 10. Alert on RDP from non-standard sources. Enable RDP logging.",
"mitigations": ["Network segmentation", "M1035 - Limit access", "M1032 - MFA"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/",
},
{
"id": "T1021.002",
"name": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares",
"tactic": "Lateral Movement",
"tactics": ["Lateral Movement"],
"description": "Adversaries use SMB to copy files or tools to remote systems and execute them.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["Network File Share: Network Share Access", "Process: Process Creation"],
"detection": "Monitor SMB access to admin shares (ADMIN$, C$). Alert on EventID 5140, 5145.",
"mitigations": ["M1035 - Limit Access to Resource Over Network", "Disable unnecessary admin shares"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/",
},
{
"id": "T1021.004",
"name": "SSH",
"tactic": "Lateral Movement",
"tactics": ["Lateral Movement"],
"description": "Adversaries use SSH to move laterally across systems.",
"platforms": ["Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "Network Traffic"],
"detection": "Monitor SSH authentication logs (/var/log/auth.log). Alert on key-based auth from unexpected sources.",
"mitigations": ["M1042 - Disable or Remove Feature or Program", "Restrict SSH to known hosts"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/",
},
{
"id": "T1021.006",
"name": "Windows Remote Management",
"tactic": "Lateral Movement",
"tactics": ["Lateral Movement"],
"description": "Adversaries use WinRM to execute commands on remote Windows systems.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["Network Traffic", "Process: Process Creation"],
"detection": "Monitor for unusual WinRM connections (port 5985/5986). Alert on PowerShell remoting from unexpected sources.",
"mitigations": ["Disable WinRM where not required", "Network segmentation on ports 5985/5986"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/",
},
{
"id": "T1047",
"name": "Windows Management Instrumentation",
"tactic": "Execution",
"tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"],
"description": "Adversaries use WMI to execute commands on remote systems or locally.",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["Process: Process Creation", "WMI: WMI Creation"],
"detection": "Monitor Sysmon EventID 19/20/21 (WmiActivity). Alert on Win32_Process.Create from suspicious callers.",
"mitigations": ["M1026 - Privileged Account Management", "Network segmentation on DCOM ports"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/",
},
{
"id": "T1569.002",
"name": "Service Execution",
"tactic": "Execution",
"tactics": ["Execution"],
"description": "Adversaries create or modify a service to execute malicious payloads (e.g., PsExec-style).",
"platforms": ["Windows"],
"permissions": ["Administrator", "SYSTEM"],
"data_sources": ["Process: Process Creation", "Windows Registry"],
"detection": "Alert on EventID 7045 (new service install), 7036 (service start). Monitor SCM access from unusual sources.",
"mitigations": ["M1022 - Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1026 - Privileged Account Management"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/",
},
# ── Privilege Escalation ──────────────────────────────────────────────
{
"id": "T1548",
"name": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism",
"tactic": "Privilege Escalation",
"tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"],
"description": "Adversaries bypass elevation controls to run with higher privileges.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User", "Administrator"],
"data_sources": ["Process: Process Creation", "Command: Command Execution"],
"detection": "Monitor for UAC bypass patterns, sudo abuse, SUID exploitation.",
"mitigations": ["M1047 - Audit", "Enable UAC prompt for all elevation"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/",
},
{
"id": "T1611",
"name": "Escape to Host",
"tactic": "Privilege Escalation",
"tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"],
"description": "Adversaries break out of a containerized environment to access the underlying host.",
"platforms": ["Containers"],
"permissions": ["Administrator", "User", "root"],
"data_sources": ["Container: Container Creation", "Process: Process Creation"],
"detection": "Alert on privileged container creation. Monitor for docker.sock access from containers. Detect --privileged flag.",
"mitigations": ["M1048 - Application Isolation and Sandboxing", "Avoid privileged containers"],
"severity": "critical",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/",
},
# ── Cloud ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
{
"id": "T1078",
"name": "Valid Accounts",
"tactic": "Initial Access",
"tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"],
"description": "Adversaries use valid credentials to maintain access and evade detection.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "IaaS", "Azure AD", "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Authentication: Authentication Log", "Logon Session"],
"detection": "Correlate login anomalies (unusual time, location, device). Detect credential stuffing.",
"mitigations": ["M1032 - Multi-factor Authentication", "M1036 - Account Use Policies"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/",
},
{
"id": "T1530",
"name": "Data from Cloud Storage",
"tactic": "Collection",
"tactics": ["Collection"],
"description": "Adversaries access data from cloud storage objects (S3, Azure Blob, GCS).",
"platforms": ["IaaS", "Google Workspace"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access"],
"detection": "Monitor S3/GCS/Azure storage access logs for unusual patterns. Alert on public bucket access.",
"mitigations": ["M1022 - Restrict File and Directory Permissions", "M1041 - Encrypt Sensitive Information"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/",
},
{
"id": "T1552",
"name": "Unsecured Credentials",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries search for credentials in files, environment variables, or cloud metadata.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "IaaS", "Azure AD"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["File: File Access", "Process: Process Creation"],
"detection": "Monitor for credential file access patterns. Alert on cloud metadata endpoint access.",
"mitigations": ["Avoid storing credentials in code/config", "Use secrets manager", "IMDSv2"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/",
},
{
"id": "T1090",
"name": "Proxy",
"tactic": "Command and Control",
"tactics": ["Command and Control"],
"description": "Adversaries use proxies to disguise C2 traffic or route through intermediary systems.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS", "Network"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow"],
"detection": "Monitor for SOCKS proxy indicators. Alert on unexpected SSH tunneling. Detect encrypted traffic on non-standard ports.",
"mitigations": ["Network segmentation", "Monitor and restrict proxy usage"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/",
},
{
"id": "T1090.001",
"name": "Internal Proxy",
"tactic": "Command and Control",
"tactics": ["Command and Control"],
"description": "Adversaries use internal proxies to relay C2 traffic through compromised hosts.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow"],
"detection": "Monitor for SOCKS proxy connections. Alert on unusual port forwarding configurations.",
"mitigations": ["Network segmentation", "Endpoint detection for proxy tools"],
"severity": "medium",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001/",
},
{
"id": "T1135",
"name": "Network Share Discovery",
"tactic": "Discovery",
"tactics": ["Discovery"],
"description": "Adversaries enumerate network shares on remote systems.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "macOS"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Network Traffic", "Process: Process Creation"],
"detection": "Monitor net view commands, NetShareEnum API calls. Alert on broad share enumeration.",
"mitigations": ["Restrict file/printer sharing", "Remove unnecessary shares"],
"severity": "low",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/",
},
{
"id": "T1528",
"name": "Steal Application Access Token",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries acquire application access tokens to authenticate to protected cloud services and APIs.",
"platforms": ["Windows", "Linux", "Cloud"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Cloud Service: Cloud Service Authentication"],
"detection": "Monitor for unexpected token issuance, anomalous IP usage of session tokens, and PRT extraction.",
"mitigations": ["Conditional Access policies", "Continuous access evaluation"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/",
},
{
"id": "T1606",
"name": "Forge Web Credentials",
"tactic": "Credential Access",
"tactics": ["Credential Access"],
"description": "Adversaries forge web credentials such as SAML tokens, cookies, or OAuth refresh tokens to bypass MFA and hijack sessions.",
"platforms": ["Cloud", "SaaS"],
"permissions": ["User"],
"data_sources": ["Authentication Logs", "Token Issuance Telemetry"],
"detection": "Detect signing key abuse, irregular token issuance without matching authentication events.",
"mitigations": ["Hardware-backed security keys", "Token lifetime restrictions"],
"severity": "high",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/",
},
]
class TechniqueLibrary:
"""
Queryable MITRE ATT&CK technique database.
Covers all techniques used by ARES modules.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._by_id: dict[str, Technique] = {}
self._by_tactic: dict[str, list[Technique]] = {}
self._load()
def _load(self) -> None:
for entry in _TECHNIQUES:
tech = Technique(
technique_id = entry["id"],
name = entry["name"],
tactic = entry["tactic"],
tactics = entry["tactics"],
description = entry["description"],
platforms = entry["platforms"],
permissions = entry.get("permissions", []),
data_sources = entry.get("data_sources", []),
detection = entry["detection"],
mitigations = entry["mitigations"],
severity = entry.get("severity", "medium"),
is_subtechnique = "." in entry["id"],
parent_id = entry["id"].split(".")[0] if "." in entry["id"] else "",
url = entry.get("url", ""),
)
self._by_id[tech.technique_id] = tech
for tactic in tech.tactics:
self._by_tactic.setdefault(tactic, []).append(tech)
def get(self, technique_id: str) -> Technique | None:
return self._by_id.get(technique_id)
def by_tactic(self, tactic: str) -> list[Technique]:
return self._by_tactic.get(tactic, [])
def search(self, query: str) -> list[Technique]:
q = query.lower()
return [
t for t in self._by_id.values()
if q in t.technique_id.lower()
or q in t.name.lower()
or q in t.tactic.lower()
or q in t.description.lower()
]
def all_tactics(self) -> list[str]:
return sorted({
tac for t in self._by_id.values() for tac in t.tactics
})
def all(self) -> list[Technique]:
return list(self._by_id.values())
def __len__(self) -> int:
return len(self._by_id)
# ── Module → Technique mapping ────────────────────────────────────────────────
_MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAP: dict[str, list[str]] = {
# ── Active Directory ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"ad.enum_users": ["T1087.002", "T1201"],
"ad.enum_computers": ["T1018", "T1087.002"],
"ad.enum_spn": ["T1558.003", "T1087.002"],
"ad.enum_acl": ["T1222.001", "T1003.006"],
"ad.kerberoast": ["T1558.003"],
"ad.asreproast": ["T1558.004"],
"ad.dcsync": ["T1003.006"],
"ad.adcs": ["T1649"],
"ad.delegation_abuse": ["T1558.001", "T1134.001"],
"ad.coerce": ["T1187"],
"ad.laps_enum": ["T1552.004"],
"ad.sccm": ["T1078.002", "T1021.006"],
"ad.ghost_forge": ["T1649", "T1558"],
# ── Credential Access ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"credential.pass_the_hash": ["T1550.002"],
"credential.pass_spray": ["T1110.003"],
"credential.ssh_spray": ["T1110.003", "T1021.004"],
"credential.golden_ticket": ["T1558.001"],
"credential.reuse": ["T1078", "T1550.002"],
"credential.crack": ["T1110.002"],
# ── Lateral Movement ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"lateral.psexec": ["T1569.002", "T1021.002"],
"lateral.wmiexec": ["T1047"],
"lateral.dcom": ["T1021.003"],
"lateral.winrm": ["T1021.006"],
"lateral.ssh_pivot": ["T1021.004", "T1090.001"],
"lateral.rdp": ["T1021.001"],
"lateral.smb_relay": ["T1557.001"],
"lateral.ntlm_relay": ["T1557.001", "T1134.001"],
"lateral.mssql": ["T1505.001"],
# ── Persistence ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"persistence.scheduled_task": ["T1053.005"],
"persistence.wmi_subscription": ["T1546.003"],
"persistence.registry_run": ["T1547.001"],
# ── Exfiltration ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"exfil.smb_shares": ["T1039", "T1021.002"],
"exfil.secrets_scan": ["T1552"],
"exfil.staged_collection": ["T1074.002"],
# ── Windows Post-Exploitation ─────────────────────────────────────────────
"windows.lsa_secrets": ["T1003.002", "T1003.004"],
"windows.lsass_dump": ["T1003.001"],
"windows.dpapi": ["T1555.004", "T1555.003"],
"windows.token_impersonation": ["T1134.001"],
"windows.uac_bypass": ["T1548.002"],
"windows.applocker_bypass": ["T1218"],
"windows.registry_enum": ["T1012"],
"windows.scheduled_tasks_enum": ["T1053.005"],
# ── Linux ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"linux.privesc": ["T1548.001", "T1053.003"],
"linux.kernel_suggester": ["T1068"],
"linux.ld_preload": ["T1574.006"],
"linux.service_hijack": ["T1574.010"],
"linux.nfs_escape": ["T1611"],
"linux.container": ["T1611"],
# ── Cloud ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"cloud.aws": ["T1526", "T1530", "T1552.005", "T1580"],
"cloud.aws_privesc": ["T1078.004", "T1548", "T1098"],
"cloud.azure": ["T1526", "T1530", "T1580", "T1078.004"],
"cloud.gcp": ["T1526", "T1530", "T1552.005", "T1580"],
"cloud.azure_ad": ["T1528", "T1606"],
"cloud.phantom_token": ["T1528", "T1606"],
# ── Network ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"network.port_scan": ["T1046"],
"network.service_detect": ["T1046"],
"network.dns_enum": ["T1590.002"],
"network.http_fingerprint": ["T1595.002"],
"network.snmp_enum": ["T1046"],
"network.pivot": ["T1090.001", "T1021.004"],
# ── Recon & Reporting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"recon.fingerprint": ["T1082", "T1518.001"],
"reporting.report_gen": [], # no offensive technique - output only
# ── New strategic modules ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
"opsec.coverage_predictor": ["T1592"],
"edr.bypass_adaptive": ["T1562.001", "T1055", "T1027", "T1562.006"],
"cloud.identity_federation_abuse": ["T1606.002", "T1528", "T1550.001", "T1484.002"],
"ai.autonomous_planner": ["T1591"],
}
class TechniqueMapper:
"""Maps module IDs to MITRE techniques and vice versa."""
def __init__(self, library: TechniqueLibrary | None = None) -> None:
self.library = library or TechniqueLibrary()
def for_module(self, module_id: str) -> list[Technique]:
"""Return all techniques associated with a module."""
ids = _MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAP.get(module_id, [])
return [t for t in (self.library.get(tid) for tid in ids) if t]
def modules_for_technique(self, technique_id: str) -> list[str]:
"""Return all module IDs that implement a technique."""
return [
mid for mid, tids in _MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAP.items()
if technique_id in tids
]
def coverage_for_modules(self, module_ids: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Compute MITRE ATT&CK coverage for a set of modules."""
covered_techniques: set[str] = set()
covered_tactics: set[str] = set()
for mid in module_ids:
for tech in self.for_module(mid):
covered_techniques.add(tech.technique_id)
covered_tactics.update(tech.tactics)
all_tactics = set(self.library.all_tactics())
all_techniques = len(self.library)
return {
"techniques_covered": sorted(covered_techniques),
"tactics_covered": sorted(covered_tactics),
"technique_count": len(covered_techniques),
"tactic_count": len(covered_tactics),
"technique_coverage": round(len(covered_techniques) / max(all_techniques, 1), 3),
"tactic_coverage": round(len(covered_tactics) / max(len(all_tactics), 1), 3),
"tactic_breakdown": {
tactic: [
t.technique_id for t in self.library.by_tactic(tactic)
if t.technique_id in covered_techniques
]
for tactic in covered_tactics
},
}
class CoverageReport:
"""Generates MITRE ATT&CK coverage heatmap from executed modules."""
TACTIC_ORDER = [
"Reconnaissance", "Resource Development", "Initial Access",
"Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation",
"Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery",
"Lateral Movement", "Collection", "Command and Control",
"Exfiltration", "Impact",
]
def __init__(self, mapper: TechniqueMapper) -> None:
self.mapper = mapper
self.library = mapper.library
def from_findings(self, findings: list[Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build coverage from campaign findings (each has mitre_technique field)."""
technique_ids: set[str] = set()
for f in findings:
tid = getattr(f, "mitre_technique", "") or ""
if tid:
technique_ids.add(tid)
covered: list[Technique] = [
t for t in (self.library.get(tid) for tid in technique_ids) if t
]
tactics_covered = {tac for t in covered for tac in t.tactics}
return {
"total_techniques": len(technique_ids),
"by_tactic": {
tactic: [t.to_dict() for t in covered if tactic in t.tactics]
for tactic in self.TACTIC_ORDER
if tactic in tactics_covered
},
}
def to_html_heatmap(self, coverage: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
"""Generate MITRE heatmap HTML fragment."""
rows: list[str] = []
by_tactic = coverage.get("by_tactic", {})
for tactic in self.TACTIC_ORDER:
techs = by_tactic.get(tactic, [])
color = "#ef4444" if techs else "#1e293b"
border = "border: 2px solid #ef4444;" if techs else ""
tech_tags = "".join(
f'<span style="background:#450a0a;color:#f87171;padding:2px 6px;'
f'border-radius:3px;font-size:.75rem;margin:2px;display:inline-block">'
f'{t["id"]}</span>'
for t in techs[:5]
)
empty_tags = "<span style='color:#475569;font-size:.75rem'>—</span>"
rendered_tags = tech_tags if techs else empty_tags
rows.append(
f'<div style="background:{color};{border}border-radius:6px;'
f'padding:8px 10px;min-width:140px">'
f'<div style="font-size:.72rem;color:#94a3b8;text-transform:uppercase;'
f'letter-spacing:.04em">{tactic}</div>'
f'{rendered_tags}'
f'</div>'
)
return (
'<div style="display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(150px,1fr));'
'gap:.5rem">' + "".join(rows) + "</div>"
)