ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.
Python active-directorycloud-securitydefensive-validationfastapigood-first-issuemitre-attackopsecreactred-teamreportingsecurity
import json
import zipfile
import pytest
from ares.graph.attack_graph import AttackGraph
@pytest.fixture
def sample_bloodhound_data():
"""Generates standard BloodHound CE (v5) / legacy compatible data dictionary."""
domain_sid = "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333"
attacker_sid = f"{domain_sid}-1101"
victim_sid = f"{domain_sid}-1102"
da_group_sid = f"{domain_sid}-512"
dc_sid = f"{domain_sid}-1000"
ws_sid = f"{domain_sid}-1001"
users_data = {
"meta": {"type": "users", "count": 2},
"data": [
{
"ObjectIdentifier": attacker_sid,
"Properties": {
"name": "[email protected]",
"domain": "CORP.LOCAL",
"domainsid": domain_sid,
"admincount": False,
"enabled": True,
},
"Aces": [],
},
{
"ObjectIdentifier": victim_sid,
"Properties": {
"name": "[email protected]",
"domain": "CORP.LOCAL",
"domainsid": domain_sid,
"admincount": False,
"enabled": True,
},
"Aces": [
{
"PrincipalSID": attacker_sid,
"PrincipalType": "User",
"RightName": "GenericAll",
"IsInherited": False,
}
],
},
],
}
groups_data = {
"meta": {"type": "groups", "count": 1},
"data": [
{
"ObjectIdentifier": da_group_sid,
"Properties": {
"name": "DOMAIN [email protected]",
"domain": "CORP.LOCAL",
"domainsid": domain_sid,
"admincount": True,
},
"Members": [
{
"MemberId": victim_sid,
"MemberType": "User",
}
],
"Aces": [],
}
],
}
computers_data = {
"meta": {"type": "computers", "count": 2},
"data": [
{
"ObjectIdentifier": dc_sid,
"Properties": {
"name": "DC01.CORP.LOCAL",
"domain": "CORP.LOCAL",
"domainsid": domain_sid,
"isdc": True,
"enabled": True,
},
"Aces": [
{
"PrincipalSID": da_group_sid,
"PrincipalType": "Group",
"RightName": "GenericAll",
"IsInherited": False,
}
],
},
{
"ObjectIdentifier": ws_sid,
"Properties": {
"name": "WS01.CORP.LOCAL",
"domain": "CORP.LOCAL",
"domainsid": domain_sid,
"isdc": False,
"enabled": True,
},
"LocalAdmins": {
"Collected": True,
"FailureReason": None,
"Results": [
{
"ObjectIdentifier": attacker_sid,
"ObjectType": "User",
}
],
},
"Sessions": {
"Collected": True,
"FailureReason": None,
"Results": [
{
"UserId": victim_sid,
"ComputerId": ws_sid,
}
],
},
"Aces": [],
},
],
}
domains_data = {
"meta": {"type": "domains", "count": 1},
"data": [
{
"ObjectIdentifier": domain_sid,
"Properties": {
"name": "CORP.LOCAL",
"domain": "CORP.LOCAL",
},
"Aces": [
{
"PrincipalSID": victim_sid,
"PrincipalType": "User",
"RightName": "DCSync",
"IsInherited": False,
}
],
}
],
}
return {
"users": users_data,
"groups": groups_data,
"computers": computers_data,
"domains": domains_data,
}
def test_bloodhound_ingest_sid_resolution_attack_path(tmp_path, sample_bloodhound_data):
"""
Empirically verifies that BloodHound ACEs referencing SIDs resolve
to canonical user/group nodes, correctly forming the attack path to DA.
"""
u_file = tmp_path / "users.json"
g_file = tmp_path / "groups.json"
u_file.write_text(json.dumps(sample_bloodhound_data["users"]), encoding="utf-8")
g_file.write_text(json.dumps(sample_bloodhound_data["groups"]), encoding="utf-8")
ag = AttackGraph()
res = ag.ingest_bloodhound(str(tmp_path))
assert res["nodes_added"] > 0
assert res["edges_added"] > 0
# Shortest path from ATTACKER to Domain Admins must succeed
path = ag.shortest_path_to_da("user:[email protected]")
assert path is not None
assert path["path_length"] == 3
assert path["start"] == "[email protected]"
assert path["end"] == "DOMAIN [email protected]"
# Ensure steps detail the hops accurately
assert path["steps"][0]["from"] == "[email protected]"
assert path["steps"][0]["to"] == "[email protected]"
assert path["steps"][1]["from"] == "[email protected]"
assert path["steps"][1]["to"] == "DOMAIN [email protected]"
def test_bloodhound_ingest_sessions_and_local_admins(tmp_path, sample_bloodhound_data):
"""
Verifies that LocalAdmins (AdminTo) and active sessions (HasSession)
are ingested and allow path traversal from compromised workstation to DA.
"""
for name, data in sample_bloodhound_data.items():
(tmp_path / f"{name}.json").write_text(json.dumps(data), encoding="utf-8")
ag = AttackGraph()
res = ag.ingest_bloodhound(str(tmp_path))
assert res["nodes_added"] > 0
assert res["edges_added"] > 0
# WS01 should have admin_to edge from ATTACKER
attacker_node = "user:[email protected]"
ws_node = "computer:WS01.CORP.LOCAL"
victim_node = "user:[email protected]"
assert ag._g.has_edge(attacker_node, ws_node)
edge_data = ag._g.get_edge_data(attacker_node, ws_node)
assert edge_data.get("label") == "admin_to"
# WS01 should have has_session edge to VICTIM
assert ag._g.has_edge(ws_node, victim_node)
session_edge = ag._g.get_edge_data(ws_node, victim_node)
assert session_edge.get("label") == "has_session"
def test_bloodhound_zip_archive_ingestion(tmp_path, sample_bloodhound_data):
"""
Verifies that a SharpHound .zip archive is transparently ingested without extraction.
"""
zip_path = tmp_path / "bloodhound_collection.zip"
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
for name, data in sample_bloodhound_data.items():
zf.writestr(f"{name}.json", json.dumps(data))
ag = AttackGraph()
res = ag.ingest_bloodhound(str(zip_path))
assert res["nodes_added"] > 0
assert res["edges_added"] > 0
assert res["file_count"] == 4
path = ag.shortest_path_to_da("user:[email protected]")
assert path is not None
assert path["end"] == "DOMAIN [email protected]"
def test_bloodhound_two_pass_order_independence(tmp_path, sample_bloodhound_data):
"""
Verifies that file ordering does not break SID resolution:
groups.json loaded before users.json must still connect perfectly.
"""
folder = tmp_path / "inverted_order"
folder.mkdir()
# Name files so groups sorts first
(folder / "01_groups.json").write_text(json.dumps(sample_bloodhound_data["groups"]), encoding="utf-8")
(folder / "02_users.json").write_text(json.dumps(sample_bloodhound_data["users"]), encoding="utf-8")
ag = AttackGraph()
res = ag.ingest_bloodhound(str(folder))
assert res["file_count"] == 2
path = ag.shortest_path_to_da("user:[email protected]")
assert path is not None
assert path["start"] == "[email protected]"
assert path["end"] == "DOMAIN [email protected]"