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ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.

docs: synchronize module catalog counts, architecture diagrams, and links

Mafifrizi080035ec7c68
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index f28fab8..6e5542b 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
Traditional penetration testing is fundamentally flawed: it is expensive, episodic, point-in-time, and leaves organizations blind to newly introduced misconfigurations and emerging adversary tradecraft. Meanwhile, automated vulnerability scanners overwhelm SOC teams with thousands of hypothetical CVEs without demonstrating exploitability or multi-stage lateral attack paths.
-**ARES bridges this gap.** Built from the ground up for modern enterprise infrastructure, ARES delivers an **operator-directed red team engagement platform** that models real-world threat actors. By combining deterministic application-layer ScopeGuard fail-closed enforcement, adaptive OPSEC noise profiling, an interactive directed acyclic graph (DAG) attack solver, and 69 production execution modules covering 60+ mapped adversary techniques across MITRE ATT&CK, ARES allows security teams to prove vulnerability exploitability, locate shortest compromise paths to Active Directory Crown Jewels, and generate executive-ready deliverables with zero operational downtime.
+**ARES bridges this gap.** Built from the ground up for modern enterprise infrastructure, ARES delivers an **operator-directed red team engagement platform** that models real-world threat actors. By combining deterministic application-layer ScopeGuard fail-closed enforcement, adaptive OPSEC noise profiling, an interactive directed acyclic graph (DAG) attack solver, and 66 active production execution modules (70 total catalogued) covering 60+ mapped adversary techniques across MITRE ATT&CK, ARES allows security teams to prove vulnerability exploitability, locate shortest compromise paths to Active Directory Crown Jewels, and generate executive-ready deliverables with zero operational downtime.
---
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ The ARES Platform features a high-performance, responsive operator dashboard eng
---
-### 4. Modular Adversary Orchestration (30+ Execution Modules, 60+ Techniques)
+### 4. Modular Adversary Orchestration (66 Active Modules, 60+ Techniques)
*Extensive catalog of weaponized adversary techniques aligned with the MITRE ATT&CK enterprise matrix.*
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ The ARES Platform features a high-performance, responsive operator dashboard eng
- **The Problem Solved**: Replaces unvalidated, unreliable GitHub scripts with typed, reproducible, and auditable adversary modules.
- **Key Capabilities**:
- - **Comprehensive Vector Coverage**: 30+ production execution modules covering 60+ mapped adversary techniques across Active Directory (`ad.kerberoast`, `ad.adcs`, `ad.enum_users`), Windows (`windows.uac_bypass`, `windows.lsass_dump`), Linux, Cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP), and Network infrastructure.
+ - **Comprehensive Vector Coverage**: 66 active production execution modules (70 total catalogued) covering 60+ mapped adversary techniques across Active Directory (`ad.kerberoast`, `ad.adcs`, `ad.enum_users`), Windows (`windows.uac_bypass`, `windows.lsass_dump`), Linux, Cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP), and Network infrastructure.
- **Streamlined Execution Panel**: Clean execution view with persistent field labels, demoted low-weight dependency hints, and focused on-submit validation replacing intrusive default warning cards.
- **Dynamic Typed Schemas**: UI forms are generated dynamically from Python Pydantic models with strict validation.
- **Dry-Run Safety Engine**: Validate target responsiveness, parameters, and expected outcome before transmitting offensive traffic.
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ The ARES Platform features a high-performance, responsive operator dashboard eng
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Overview** | Executive health, telemetry counters, finding severity metrics. | Single Pane | All Stakeholders |
| **Campaigns** | Scope whitelisting, noise profiles, encrypted credential vault. | `List`, `Scope`, `Findings` | Team Lead, Operator |
-| **Modules** | 69 module catalog (60+ techniques), parameter input forms, execution console. | `Catalog`, `Run Panel`, `Results` | Operator |
+| **Modules** | 66 active module catalog (70 total, 60+ techniques), parameter input forms, execution console. | `Catalog`, `Run Panel`, `Results` | Operator |
| **Reports** | Deliverable builder, evidence packages, Report Library lifecycle. | `Generate`, `Library` | Operator, Reporter |
| **Graph** | Cobalt Strike pivot topology, lateral movement tracking, Beacon session dock. | `Live Campaign`, `Demo Sample`, `Beacon Console` | Operator, Recon |
| **Templates** | Repeatable engagement playbooks and multi-stage workflow plans. | `Templates`, `Plan Builder` | Team Lead, Operator |
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ ARES follows a strict defense-in-depth architecture separating presentation, exe
```mermaid
flowchart TB
subgraph Client["Presentation Layer (Operator Enclave)"]
- UI["React 19 Dashboard<br>(Vite + TypeScript)"]
+ UI["React 18 Dashboard<br>(Vite + TypeScript)"]
Mesh["Dynamic Architectural Grid<br>(Canvas 2D Engine)"]
WSClient["WebSocket Client<br>(Real-Time Telemetry Stream)"]
end
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ flowchart TB
end
subgraph Core["ARES Core Engine & Governance"]
- ScopeFirewall["Scope Firewall & Egress Filter<br>(OS Kernel Filtering & Transport Sockets)"]
+ ScopeFirewall["Scope Firewall & Transport Egress Hook<br>(In-Process Transport & OS Packet Filtering)"]
Governor["OPSEC Noise Governor<br>(Adaptive Jitter & Throttling)"]
Orchestrator["Module Execution Orchestrator<br>(Worker Thread Pool)"]
AutoPlanner["Goal-Directed Strategy Engine<br>(DAG Heuristics / Planner)"]
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ flowchart TB
## Adversary Techniques & MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
-ARES implements 30+ production execution modules mapping to 60+ adversary techniques across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Framework:
+ARES implements 66 active production execution modules (70 total catalogued) mapping to 60+ adversary techniques across the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Framework:
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
@@ -477,10 +477,10 @@ ARES implements 30+ production execution modules mapping to 60+ adversary techni
└─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┘
```
-- **Active Directory & Kerberos Suites (Windows & Linux)**: Full SPN discovery, Kerberoasting (`ad.kerberoast`), AS-REP Roasting, ADCS Certificate Template abuse and forged persistence (`ad.adcs`, `ad.ghost_forge`), DCSync account replication, and BloodHound data generation.
+- **Active Directory & Kerberos Suites (Windows & Linux)**: Full SPN discovery, Kerberoasting (`ad.kerberoast`), AS-REP Roasting, ADCS Certificate Template abuse and enrollment checks (`ad.adcs`; `ad.ghost_forge` retained as disabled audit stub), DCSync account replication, and BloodHound data generation.
- **Linux Active Directory Tradecraft (RFC-ARES-2026-001)**: Native, zero-subprocess post-exploitation suite targeting Linux domain members: SSSD cache harvesting (`linux.sssd_harvest`), pure-Python Kerberos ccache ticket hunting (`linux.ccache_hunt`), keytab parsing & Silver Ticket generation (`linux.keytab_abuse`), Samba machine secrets extraction (`linux.samba_secrets`), and bidirectional ccache <-> kirbi ticket transcoding (`credential.ticket_converter`).
- **Endpoint Posture Checkers**: Windows UAC Bypass methods, registry key persistence inspection, Linux container breakouts, and Sudo privilege enumeration.
-- **Cloud Control Plane**: Multi-cloud identity auditing across AWS IAM, Azure Active Directory / Entra ID role assignments, GCP IAM bindings, and Hybrid PRT/Token hijacking (`cloud.phantom_token`).
+- **Cloud Control Plane**: Multi-cloud identity auditing across AWS IAM, Azure Active Directory / Entra ID role assignments, GCP IAM bindings, and Hybrid PRT/Token review (`cloud.phantom_token` retained as disabled audit stub).
---
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ Unlike basic MCP servers that expose raw endpoints to LLMs without guardrails, A
For operators or developers connecting Cursor, Claude Desktop, or Windsurf to ARES:
1. **Verify Subsystem Readiness (`doctor`)**:
- Ensure all core subsystems (Protocol Engine, 9 Tools, 3 Resources, 3 Prompts, 62 Modules, Security Gates) report `PASS`:
+ Ensure all core subsystems (Protocol Engine, 9 Tools, 3 Resources, 3 Prompts, 62 Descriptors, Security Gates) report `PASS`:
```powershell
.\mcp.bat doctor
```
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ For operators or developers connecting Cursor, Claude Desktop, or Windsurf to AR
5. **Issue Your First Command to the AI Agent**:
Open Cursor Composer / Chat (`Ctrl + I` or `Ctrl + L`), and try this prompt:
- > *"Check active campaign status, verify scope for target 10.0.1.50, and stage a dry-run of module ad_kerberoast."*
+ > *"Check active campaign status, verify scope for target 10.0.1.50, and stage a dry-run of module ad.kerberoast."*
For in-depth architecture, the 7 security invariants, CLI scriptability (`--json`), POSIX exit codes, and operational tool schemas, see [**ARES MCP Gateway & Product-Grade CLI Specification**](docs/mcp-server.md).
diff --git a/docs/README.md b/docs/README.md
index 646f8c6..faf1e34 100644
--- a/docs/README.md
+++ b/docs/README.md
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ ARES decouples policy enforcement, orchestration, data storage, and presentation
| |
+------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
| ATTACK MODULES | | PERSISTENCE LAYER |
-| 69 Built-in Attack Modules | | AresDatabase (SQLite / PG) |
-| 81 Capability Bindings | | AES-256-GCM Vault Encryption |
-| Safe Preview & Execution | | Alembic Migrations (Head 0011) |
+| 66 Active Attack Modules | | AresDatabase (SQLite / PG) |
+| (70 Total in Catalog) | | AES-256-GCM Vault Encryption |
+| 81 Capability Bindings | | Alembic Migrations (Head 0011) |
+------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
```
diff --git a/docs/api-reference.md b/docs/api-reference.md
index 85cfe03..c4d09c2 100644
--- a/docs/api-reference.md
+++ b/docs/api-reference.md
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ Hot-reload attack modules in-memory from builtin and external module sources. St
{
"status": "ok",
"reloaded": true,
- "module_count": 64
+ "module_count": 66
}
```
diff --git a/docs/architecture.md b/docs/architecture.md
index 252d041..dcfc5ee 100644
--- a/docs/architecture.md
+++ b/docs/architecture.md
@@ -45,11 +45,16 @@ ARES is **not** a C2 framework. It does not include implants, beacons, or persis
┌───────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MODULE LAYER │
│ BaseModule (validate → execute → report) │
-│ ├── ares/modules/ad/ (7 modules) │
-│ ├── ares/modules/linux/ (2 modules) │
-│ ├── ares/modules/cloud/ (3 modules: AWS/Azure/GCP) │
-│ ├── ares/lateral/ (5 modules) │
-│ └── ares/modules/reporting/ (report generator) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/ad/ (14 modules: 13 active, 1 dis.)│
+│ ├── ares/modules/linux/ (10 modules) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/cloud/ (7 modules: 6 active, 1 dis.) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/lateral/ (9 modules) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/windows/ (8 modules: 6 active, 2 dis.) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/credential/ (7 modules) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/network/ (6 modules) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/exfil/ (3 modules) │
+│ ├── ares/modules/persistence/(3 modules) │
+│ └── ares/modules/{edr,opsec,ai,recon,reporting}/ (6 modules)│
└───────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌───────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
diff --git a/docs/examples/github_discussion_linux_ad_rfc.md b/docs/examples/github_discussion_linux_ad_rfc.md
index fb66da8..1232fc1 100644
--- a/docs/examples/github_discussion_linux_ad_rfc.md
+++ b/docs/examples/github_discussion_linux_ad_rfc.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
Modern enterprise hybrid networks increasingly deploy Linux hosts (CI/CD build nodes, container hosts, database clusters, identity proxies) as domain members integrated with Active Directory via **SSSD (`realmd`)** and **Winbind/Samba**. While Windows AD attack vectors (Pass-the-Hash, DPAPI, LSASS injection) have mature offensive tooling, Linux domain members remain an under-researched, high-value blindspot.
-We have published a formal technical specification: **[RFC 001: Linux Active Directory Tradecraft](docs/research/linux-active-directory-tradecraft.md)**, establishing an open architecture for native, high-performance, non-destructive post-exploitation modules in ARES.
+We have published a formal technical specification: **[RFC 001: Linux Active Directory Tradecraft](https://github.com/Mafifrizi/ARES/blob/main/docs/research/linux-active-directory-tradecraft.md)**, establishing an open architecture for native, high-performance, non-destructive post-exploitation modules in ARES.
We are opening this RFC to gather technical feedback, coordinate module implementations, and invite researchers and practitioners specializing in Linux offensive tradecraft and Active Directory internals to collaborate.
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ To ensure safety, stability, and detection-minimization:
### How to Get Involved
-1. Read the full technical specification: [`docs/research/linux-active-directory-tradecraft.md`](docs/research/linux-active-directory-tradecraft.md).
-2. Review our developer guide: [`docs/module-development.md`](docs/module-development.md) and [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md).
+1. Read the full technical specification: [`docs/research/linux-active-directory-tradecraft.md`](https://github.com/Mafifrizi/ARES/blob/main/docs/research/linux-active-directory-tradecraft.md).
+2. Review our developer guide: [`docs/module-development.md`](https://github.com/Mafifrizi/ARES/blob/main/docs/module-development.md) and [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](https://github.com/Mafifrizi/ARES/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md).
3. Drop a comment below with:
- Module you're interested in building or reviewing
- Edge cases or exotic configurations in your lab/enterprise experience
diff --git a/docs/modules.md b/docs/modules.md
index 1d4ddea..a0cdc65 100644
--- a/docs/modules.md
+++ b/docs/modules.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# ARES Modules Guide
-ARES ships with 69 built-in modules. The modules are not meant to be random
+ARES ships with 66 active built-in modules (70 total registered in catalog, with 4 disabled per security audit). The modules are not meant to be random
buttons. They are building blocks for an authorized engagement: create a
campaign, define scope, run safe validation first, collect findings, then
generate a report.
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ optional dependencies such as AD, cloud, container, Windows, and PDF extras.
| `ad.sccm` | Review SCCM/MECM abuse paths. |
| `ad.coerce` | High-noise coercion validation; use only with approval. |
| `ad.dcsync` | High-noise replication-rights validation; requires explicit authorization. |
-| `ad.ghost_forge` | Forge golden certificates via compromised ADCS CA private keys (ESC1-ESC8). |
+| `ad.ghost_forge` | *(Disabled per security audit: MOD-005)* Forge golden certificates via compromised ADCS CA private keys (ESC1-ESC8). |
### Credential
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ optional dependencies such as AD, cloud, container, Windows, and PDF extras.
| --- | --- |
| `credential.crack` | Offline hash cracking workflow from campaign artifacts. |
| `credential.pass_spray` | Password-spray validation with rate-limit awareness. |
+| `credential.ssh_spray` | Automated SSH credential testing against scoped hosts with rate limiting and lockout backoff. |
| `credential.golden_ticket` | Golden ticket validation in approved lab/engagement contexts. |
| `credential.pass_the_hash` | Authorized NTLM hash reuse validation. |
| `credential.reuse` | Credential reuse checks across discovered services. |
@@ -269,9 +270,9 @@ optional dependencies such as AD, cloud, container, Windows, and PDF extras.
| `windows.registry_enum` | Registry credential and configuration review. |
| `windows.scheduled_tasks_enum` | Scheduled task enumeration and exposure review. |
| `windows.uac_bypass` | UAC configuration audit. |
-| `windows.token_impersonation` | Token impersonation exposure validation. |
+| `windows.token_impersonation` | *(Disabled per security audit: MOD-030)* Token impersonation exposure validation. |
| `windows.lsass_dump` | LSASS exposure validation in approved contexts. |
-| `windows.dpapi` | DPAPI artifact review. |
+| `windows.dpapi` | *(Disabled per security audit: MOD-029)* DPAPI artifact review. |
| `windows.applocker_bypass` | AppLocker bypass posture review. |
| `windows.lsa_secrets` | LSA secrets exposure review. |
@@ -300,7 +301,7 @@ optional dependencies such as AD, cloud, container, Windows, and PDF extras.
| `cloud.azure_ad` | Azure AD service principal, device code, and guest review. |
| `cloud.gcp` | GCP IAM, GCS, and service account review. |
| `cloud.identity_federation_abuse` | SAML/OIDC and cross-cloud identity path review. |
-| `cloud.phantom_token` | Abuse Entra ID / Hybrid Azure AD Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) and session tokens. |
+| `cloud.phantom_token` | *(Disabled per security audit: MOD-049)* Abuse Entra ID / Hybrid Azure AD Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) and session tokens. |
### Network, Recon, Exfil, Persistence, OPSEC, AI