ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.
Python active-directorycloud-securitydefensive-validationfastapigood-first-issuemitre-attackopsecreactred-teamreportingsecurity
fix: preserve Windows temp artifact access during ACL hardening
Mafifrizi3b32966050b8
diff --git a/ares/core/security.py b/ares/core/security.pyindex f6adb96..6614deb 100644--- a/ares/core/security.py+++ b/ares/core/security.py@@ -402,26 +402,115 @@ _ARTIFACT_LOCK = threading.Lock()_GLOBAL_SCOPE = "_GLOBAL"-def _restrict_windows_acl(path: str, *, is_dir: bool = False) -> None:- """Best-effort owner-only ACL restriction for Windows temp artifacts."""+def _restrict_windows_acl(+ path: str,+ *,+ is_dir: bool = False,+ require_success: bool = False,+) -> bool:+ """Best-effort owner-only ACL restriction for Windows temp artifacts.++ Returns True when the ACL was hardened. If hardening fails, the default is+ to preserve a usable temp artifact and log the failure; callers that need+ fail-closed behavior can pass require_success=True.+ """+ import csvimport getpassimport osimport subprocessif os.name != "nt":- return+ return True- user = os.environ.get("USERNAME") or getpass.getuser()- grant = f"{user}:{'(OI)(CI)F' if is_dir else 'F'}"- try:- subprocess.run(- ["icacls", path, "/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", grant],+ def _run_icacls(args: list[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:+ return subprocess.run(+ ["icacls", path, *args],capture_output=True,check=False,text=True,+ timeout=10,+ )++ def _current_principal() -> str:+ try:+ completed = subprocess.run(+ ["whoami", "/user", "/fo", "csv", "/nh"],+ capture_output=True,+ check=False,+ text=True,+ timeout=10,+ )+ if completed.returncode == 0 and completed.stdout.strip():+ rows = list(csv.reader(completed.stdout.splitlines()))+ if rows and len(rows[0]) >= 2 and rows[0][1].strip():+ return f"*{rows[0][1].strip()}"+ except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):+ pass++ username = os.environ.get("USERNAME") or getpass.getuser()+ domain = os.environ.get("USERDOMAIN", "").strip()+ return f"{domain}\\{username}" if domain and username else username++ def _warn(event: str, completed: subprocess.CompletedProcess[str] | None = None) -> None:+ logger.warning(+ event,+ path=path,+ returncode=getattr(completed, "returncode", None),+ stdout=(getattr(completed, "stdout", "") or "")[:300],+ stderr=(getattr(completed, "stderr", "") or "")[:300],)- except OSError as exc:- logger.debug("credential_artifact_acl_restrict_failed", path=path, error=str(exc))++ def _fail(event: str, completed: subprocess.CompletedProcess[str] | None = None) -> bool:+ _warn(event, completed)+ if require_success:+ raise PermissionError(f"{event}: unable to harden ACL for {path!r}")+ return False++ principal = _current_principal()+ grant = f"{principal}:{'(OI)(CI)F' if is_dir else 'F'}"+ try:+ grant_result = _run_icacls(["/grant:r", grant])+ except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:+ logger.warning("credential_artifact_acl_grant_failed", path=path, error=str(exc))+ if require_success:+ raise PermissionError(f"unable to grant owner ACL for {path!r}") from exc+ return False+ if grant_result.returncode != 0:+ return _fail("credential_artifact_acl_grant_failed", grant_result)++ try:+ inherit_result = _run_icacls(["/inheritance:r"])+ except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:+ logger.warning("credential_artifact_acl_inheritance_failed", path=path, error=str(exc))+ try:+ _run_icacls(["/inheritance:e"])+ _run_icacls(["/grant:r", grant])+ except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as restore_exc:+ logger.warning(+ "credential_artifact_acl_restore_failed",+ path=path,+ error=str(restore_exc),+ )+ if require_success:+ raise PermissionError(f"unable to remove inherited ACL for {path!r}") from exc+ return False+ if inherit_result.returncode != 0:+ try:+ restore_result = _run_icacls(["/inheritance:e"])+ if restore_result.returncode != 0:+ _warn("credential_artifact_acl_restore_failed", restore_result)+ restore_grant_result = _run_icacls(["/grant:r", grant])+ if restore_grant_result.returncode != 0:+ _warn("credential_artifact_acl_restore_failed", restore_grant_result)+ except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as restore_exc:+ logger.warning(+ "credential_artifact_acl_restore_failed",+ path=path,+ error=str(restore_exc),+ )+ return _fail("credential_artifact_acl_inheritance_failed", inherit_result)++ return Truedef secure_mkstemp(diff --git a/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.py b/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.pyindex eccc791..d48cd4f 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.py@@ -124,6 +124,21 @@ class TestCleanupGuarantee:with _ARTIFACT_LOCK:_CREDENTIAL_ARTIFACTS.clear()+ def test_secure_mkstemp_reopenable_after_close(self):+ """Windows ACL hardening must not make the temp file unusable."""+ from ares.core.security import secure_mkstemp, cleanup_credential_artifacts+ self._reset_tracking()++ p, fd = secure_mkstemp(suffix=".ccache", campaign_id="reopen-test")+ os.close(fd)+ try:+ with open(p, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:+ f.write("ticket data")+ with open(p, encoding="utf-8") as f:+ assert f.read() == "ticket data"+ finally:+ cleanup_credential_artifacts("reopen-test")+def test_cleanup_always_runs_on_success(self):"""Cleanup works after successful operation."""from ares.core.security import secure_mkstemp, cleanup_credential_artifacts