ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.
Python active-directorycloud-securitydefensive-validationfastapigood-first-issuemitre-attackopsecreactred-teamreportingsecurity
fix(security): disable cloud.phantom_token - fake PRT implementation, vault contamination risk (MOD-049)
Mafifrizi4ea01a872fff
diff --git a/AUDIT_PROGRESS.md b/AUDIT_PROGRESS.mdnew file mode 100644index 0000000..ffc5112--- /dev/null+++ b/AUDIT_PROGRESS.md@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@+# ARES Autonomous Patching Progress++Tracking file for verified findings, reproduction tests, applied fixes, test suite outcomes, and residual risks.++| ID | Item | Status | Test Result | Changed Files | Notes |+|---|---|---|---|---|---|+| NEW-01 | SSO Local Account Takeover | FIXED | PASSED (15/15 SSO tests) | `ares/db/database.py`, `ares/db/postgres.py`, `ares/api/server.py`, `tests/unit/test_sso_account_takeover.py` | Isolated SSO JIT provisioning by auth_provider & org_id, blocked takeover of local users |+| ID-001 | Persistence Pipeline C-LIVE Non-Debug | GUGUR (FALSE POSITIVE) | Tidak terbukti / non-reproducible | - | `_finalize_committed_module_result` menangani persistensi findings, loot, runs, dan audit secara komprehensif |+| NEW-03 | Scope Contamination on upsert_host | FIXED | PASSED (2/2 unit tests) | `ares/api/server.py`, `ares/core/engine.py`, `tests/unit/test_scope_contamination.py` | Menambahkan validasi `campaign.is_in_scope()` sebelum `db.upsert_host` di auto-upsert dan `_persist_runtime_hosts` |+| NEW-02 | WebSocket Expiry at T+15min | FIXED | PASSED (Unit repro + 46/46 WS tests) | `ares/db/database.py`, `ares/db/postgres.py`, `tests/unit/test_api_endpoints.py`, `tests/unit/test_websocket_ticket_lifecycle.py`, `tests/unit/test_websocket_expiry_repro.py` | Validasi authority sesi aktif (`refresh_token_families`) tanpa memutus paksa WebSocket saat masa 15 menit access token terlewati |+| ID-004 | Campaign Lifecycle valid_uuid | FIXED | PASSED (Unit repro + lifecycle tests) | `ares/db/database.py`, `ares/db/postgres.py`, `tests/unit/test_campaign_lifecycle_slug.py` | Symmetrical SHA-256 target UUID derivation for slug campaigns, unblocking clean deletion across SQLite and Postgres |+| NEW-04 | Plan Children decision_ordinal | GUGUR (FALSE POSITIVE) | Tidak terbukti / non-reproducible | - | Tuple derivasi UUID attempt dijamin unik oleh `stage_ordinal`, `module_ordinal`, dan `occurrence` |+| NEW-05 | GoalEngine SDK Quickstart Reference | RESOLVED | PASSED (Clean docs/import) | `ares/__init__.py` | Updated quickstart docstring to reference active AresEngine instead of legacy GoalEngine |+| ID-013 | Substring Matching SSO Role Mapping | GUGUR (FALSE POSITIVE) | Tidak terbukti / non-reproducible | - | Pengecekan `frozenset` adalah exact equality, bukan substring matching |+| ID-014 | Timing Attack Token/Signature Digest | GUGUR (FALSE POSITIVE) | Tidak terbukti / non-reproducible | - | Seluruh pembandingan token dan digest kriptografis menggunakan `hmac.compare_digest` |+| MOD-005 | Fictitious Implementation & Vault Contamination on ad.ghost_forge | MITIGATED (disabled) - keputusan final pending | PASSED (Unit repro + API & staged tests) | `ares/modules/ad/ghost_forge.py`, `ares/modules/base.py`, `ares/core/plugin/loader.py`, `ares/core/engine.py`, `ares/cli/typer_main.py`, `ares/api/server.py`, `ares/core/execution_chains.py`, `tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py`, `tests/unit/test_api_endpoints.py` | Dinonaktifkan sementara dari pipeline produksi (`ENABLED = False`). Disaring keluar dari katalog `ModuleRegistry` (`list_metadata`, `all`, `by_category`), endpoint API `/modules`, CLI `ares module list`, dan production execution chains. Invokasi langsung via class, engine (`run_module`), atau HTTP API gagal deterministik dengan pesan error eksplisit "module disabled: implementation incomplete, see MOD-005" tanpa koneksi jaringan, tanpa finding, dan tanpa kontaminasi vault. |+| MOD-004 | ad.coerce listener_ip unvalidated against scope | DIKONFIRMASI VALID (TERBUKTI) | Audit verified (Zero scope guard on listener_ip) | Menunggu remedi | Engine `_extract_all_targets` hanya mengekstrak `_TARGET_KEYS` yang tidak memuat `listener_ip` atau `listener`. Potensi pemaksaan otentikasi ke listener luar scope. |+| MOD-006 | Key mismatch ArtifactNormalizer vs hashes | FIXED (Dual-Read Fallback) | PASSED (17/17 pipeline tests) | `ares/normalize/artifacts.py`, `tests/unit/test_artifact_normalizer_pipeline.py` | Implementasi Dual-Read Fallback di `ArtifactNormalizer` (`_normalize_*`) dan 5 handler P0 (`cleartext_credentials`, `cracked_credentials`, `laps_passwords`, `kerberos_tickets`, `open_ports`). Memulihkan 70% data loss tanpa breaking change pada modul. |+| MOD-009 | ad.adcs scope bypass on CA HTTP enrollment | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`adcs.py:1111`) | Menunggu remedi | `_submit_csr_to_ca` menghubungi `ca_host` via HTTP tanpa `before_request(ca_host)`. |+| MOD-010 | ad.sccm scope bypass on DCOM & PXE port probe | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`sccm.py:477, 561`) | Menunggu remedi | Query WMI ke site server dan probe port 4011/67 ke distribution points dilakukan tanpa `before_request`. |+| MOD-011 | lateral.ntlm_relay mass out-of-scope port probe | TERBUKTI (CRITICAL) | Audit verified (`ntlm_relay.py:486`) | Menunggu remedi | Loop `_check_relay_targets` membuka socket port 445 ke 50 host AD tanpa memeriksa apakah host berada dalam scope. |+| MOD-012 | lateral.ntlm_relay persistent machine account & DACL without teardown | TERBUKTI (CRITICAL) | Audit verified (`ntlm_relay.py:782-848`) | Menunggu remedi | Akun mesin `ARESXXXXXX$` dan DACL RBCD dibuat di AD tanpa handler cleanup/finally, meninggalkan backdoor permanen di domain target (melanggar Rule 4). |+| MOD-013 | lateral.ntlm_relay fictitious S4U impersonation claim | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`ntlm_relay.py:944-965`) | Menunggu remedi | Mengklaim S4U impersonasi Administrator, padahal hanya meminta TGS biasa untuk akun mesin dan menyimpan tiket mesin sebagai `[email protected]` (melanggar Rule 1). |+| MOD-014 | lateral.mssql scope bypass on UNC coercion listener & linked server | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`mssql.py:321, 485`) | Menunggu remedi | `listener_ip` pada `xp_dirtree` dan `linked_server` pada dynamic SQL execution tidak divalidasi terhadap scope campaign. |+| MOD-015 | lateral.smb_relay omission scope check on primary loop | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`smb_relay.py:343`) | Menunggu remedi | Loop SMB audit mengirim negotiate packet tanpa memanggil `await self.before_request(target, "smb")`. |+| MOD-016 | ad.sccm cleartext credential evaporation & DPAPI misleading | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`sccm.py:300, 521`) | Menunggu remedi | NAA DPAPI encrypted blob dilaporkan sebagai `cleartext_credentials`, tidak ada normalizer handler, dan tidak disimpan ke vault. |+| MOD-017 | network.pivot scope bypass on remote_host & subnets | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`infrastructure.py:283-376`) | Menunggu remedi | `establish_local_forward` tidak memvalidasi `remote_host` atau `reachable_subnets` terhadap `campaign.is_in_scope()`. |+| MOD-018 | network.pivot teardown omission on background SSH processes | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`pivot.py:343-359`) | Menunggu remedi | `PivotModule.teardown()` tidak pernah dipanggil di engine lifecycle, meninggalkan proses tunnel background yatim (melanggar Rule 4). |+| MOD-019 | network.pivot fictitious implementation & phantom active status | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`infrastructure.py:260-265, 368-370`) | Menunggu remedi | Jika backend asyncssh/ssh tidak ada, tunnel ditandai ACTIVE dan finding palsu diterbitkan (melanggar Rule 1). |+| MOD-020 | lateral.ssh_pivot fictitious SOCKS5 proxy implementation | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`modules.py:1332-1356`) | Menunggu remedi | `establish_socks5` mengembalikan dict proxy padahal `move()` mengabaikan port dan menutup koneksi (melanggar Rule 1). |+| MOD-021 | lateral.rdp false-positive execution claim on open port | TERBUKTI (CRITICAL) | Audit verified (`modules.py:1448-1517`) | Menunggu remedi | Port 3389 terbuka memicu status success dan finding CRITICAL lateral movement berhasil tanpa otentikasi (melanggar Rule 1). |+| MOD-022 | exfil.staged_collection workstation egress disruption & false target attribution | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`staged_collection.py:44-89, 356-378`) | Menunggu remedi | Mengirim HTTP HEAD dari workstation operator ke cloud publik tanpa scope guard dan mengatribusikannya ke target host. |+| MOD-023 | exfil.staged_collection phantom staging pipeline & 100% data loss | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`staged_collection.py:388-389`) | Menunggu remedi | Parameter `destination` wajib tapi tidak pernah dipakai; `files_staged` tidak pernah diisi sehingga output file kosong. |+| MOD-024 | network.port_scan CIDR parsing incompatibility & socket failure | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`port_scan.py:324, 271`) | Menunggu remedi | Mengklaim mendukung CIDR namun passing CIDR langsung ke `asyncio.open_connection` memicu `getaddrinfo` error. |+| MOD-025 | windows.lsass_dump teardown omission on transfer exception & orphaned files | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`lsass_dump.py:655-688, 700-720`) | Menunggu remedi | Kegagalan transfer SMB meninggalkan file lokal tanpa secure cleanup; login failure pada tasklist meninggalkan `ARESPID*.txt` di target (melanggar Rule 4). |+| MOD-026 | windows.lsass_dump phantom capability claim & incomplete ticket extraction | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`lsass_dump.py:77, 463, 782-805`) | Menunggu remedi | Mengklaim capability `kerberos_tickets` namun parser pypykatz hanya membaca NTLM dan hardcode tickets kosong `[]` (melanggar Rule 1). |+| MOD-027 | windows.lsa_secrets plaintext unredacted NTLM & DCC2 hashes in evidence | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`lsa_secrets.py:383, 431`) | Menunggu remedi | Raw password hashes disimpan unredacted di `Finding.evidence["hashes"]` memicu kebocoran hash di log audit (pola MOD-007). |+| MOD-028 | windows.lsa_secrets LSA secrets & cached creds pipeline evaporation (100% data loss) | FIXED | PASSED (20/20 pipeline tests) | `ares/normalize/artifacts.py`, `tests/unit/test_artifact_normalizer_pipeline.py` | Menambahkan handler `_normalize_lsa_secrets` (CredentialArtifact `lsa_secret`) dan `_normalize_cached_domain_credentials` (CredentialArtifact `cached_domain`, `cracked=False`) di `ArtifactNormalizer`. Routing untuk capability `lsa_secrets`, `windows.lsa_secrets`, `cached_credentials`, `cached_domain_credentials`. Data loss teratasi. |+| MOD-029 | windows.dpapi fictitious cleartext decryption & false CRITICAL finding | MITIGATED (disabled) - implementasi real pending | PASSED (Unit repro + staged & feasibility tests) | `ares/modules/windows/dpapi.py`, `tests/unit/test_disabled_modules_batch4.py`, `tests/unit/test_roadmap_modules.py`, `tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py`, `tests/unit/test_defense_feasibility_matrix.py` | Dinonaktifkan dari pipeline produksi (`ENABLED = False`, `DISABLED_REASON`). Guard eksplisit pada `run()`, `execute()`, `validate()`, dan `assess_feasibility()` mencegah kontaminasi vault dan false CRITICAL findings. |+| MOD-030 | windows.token_impersonation fictitious privilege escalation confirmation & heuristic over-claiming | MITIGATED (disabled) - implementasi real pending | PASSED (Unit repro + staged & feasibility tests) | `ares/modules/windows/token_impersonation.py`, `tests/unit/test_disabled_modules_batch4.py`, `tests/unit/test_windows_resilience.py`, `tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py`, `tests/unit/test_defense_feasibility_matrix.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_safety_remediation.py` | Dinonaktifkan dari pipeline produksi (`ENABLED = False`, `DISABLED_REASON`). Guard eksplisit pada `run()`, `execute()`, `validate()`, dan `assess_feasibility()` mencegah kontaminasi vault dan false CRITICAL findings. |+| MOD-031 | credential.ssh_spray scope guard, rate limiting, and jitter omission | FIXED | PASSED (Unit repro + scope enforcement tests) | `ares/modules/credential/ssh_spray.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_ssh_spray.py` | Menambahkan `await self.before_request(target, "ssh")` di awal loop koneksi `run()` untuk penegakan scope Layer 1, rate limiting, dan OPSEC jitter. |+| MOD-032 | credential.reuse out-of-scope Microsoft cloud probing & false attribution on RFC1918 targets | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`reuse.py:35-90, 256-269`) | Menunggu remedi | Mengirim HTTP POST ke `login.microsoftonline.com` sebelum `before_request`. Error 400 dari Microsoft ditafsirkan sebagai "Device Code Flow Permitted" menghasilkan false finding MEDIUM pada target lokal (melanggar Rule 1 dan Rule 4, pola MOD-022). |+| MOD-033 | valid_credentials pipeline evaporation & type incoherence across credential modules | FIXED | PASSED (20/20 pipeline tests) | `ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.py`, `ares/modules/credential/ssh_spray.py`, `ares/modules/credential/pass_the_hash.py`, `ares/modules/credential/reuse.py`, `ares/normalize/artifacts.py`, `tests/unit/test_artifact_normalizer_pipeline.py` | Standardisasi output `valid_credentials` ke `list[dict]` dengan field standar (`username`, `password`, `target`, `port`, `method`, `protocol`, `privilege`, `domain`). Menambahkan handler `_normalize_valid_credentials` di `ArtifactNormalizer`. Password plaintext dipertahankan di raw pipeline, masking di layer reporting. |+| MOD-034 | credential.golden_ticket orphaned sensitive ccache artifacts on operator machine | FIXED | PASSED (Unit repro + teardown tests) | `ares/modules/credential/golden_ticket.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_golden_ticket.py` | Menambahkan blok `finally` dengan `os.unlink(ccache_path)` untuk cleanup ccache. Tiket disimpan dalam bentuk bytes di memori (`ticket_bytes`) alih-alih path file, menghilangkan artefak sensitif di disk operator. |+| MOD-035 | credential.golden_ticket fictitious fallback TGT ticket construction | FIXED | PASSED (Unit repro + fallback blocked tests) | `ares/modules/credential/golden_ticket.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_golden_ticket.py` | Fallback `CCache.fromKRBCRED` dihapus. Jika impacket tidak tersedia, modul melempar `ModuleExecutionError` eksplisit tanpa menghasilkan finding atau menulis ke vault. Impacket menjadi hard dependency. |+| MOD-036 | credential.ticket_converter output key mismatch & pipeline evaporation | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`ticket_converter.py:66, 274`) | Menunggu remedi | Deklarasi output `converted_ticket` sedangkan output `run()` menghasilkan `converted_ticket_b64`. Tidak ada handler di `ArtifactNormalizer`, data tiket konversi hilang dari pipeline. |+| MOD-037 | SSH connection leak — asyncssh conn never closed across 4 Linux modules | FIXED | PASSED (12/12 asyncssh teardown tests + safety suite) | `ares/modules/linux/privesc.py`, `ares/modules/linux/service_hijack.py`, `ares/modules/linux/ld_preload.py`, `ares/modules/linux/nfs_escape.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_mod037_ssh_teardown.py` | Koneksi asyncssh dibungkus try/finally dan ditutup via `conn.close()` / `wait_closed()` di seluruh 4 modul Linux (`linux.privesc`, `linux.service_hijack`, `linux.ld_preload`, `linux.nfs_escape`). |+| MOD-038 | linux.privesc _check_writable_path reads OPERATOR filesystem instead of target | FIXED | PASSED (7/7 test_modules tests) | `ares/modules/linux/privesc.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_modules.py` | `_check_writable_path` diubah mengeksekusi shell command di target via remote runner alih-alih membaca `os.environ`/`os.access` operator. Finding dan evidence diatribusikan secara akurat ke remote target_host. |+| MOD-039 | linux.container weak heuristic for host network namespace detection | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`container.py:332`) | Menunggu remedi | Heuristik `len(lines) > 50` pada `/proc/net/tcp` untuk mendeteksi `--net=host` sangat lemah. Container dengan koneksi banyak (scanning, proxying) memicu false-positive HIGH finding (melanggar Rule 1, pola MOD-021). |+| MOD-040 | linux.container unhandled outputs container_escape_vectors & k8s_rbac_findings | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`container.py:56, 187-188`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak Normalizer) | Capability `container_escape_vectors` dan `k8s_rbac_findings` tidak memiliki handler di `ArtifactNormalizer`. Data hilang dari `ArtifactStore`. Handler normalizer pending, masuk batch fix serentak normalizer. |+| MOD-041 | linux.samba_secrets unhandled outputs machine_account_hash & samba_secrets | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`samba_secrets.py:66, 256-264`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak Normalizer) | Capability `machine_account_hash` dan `samba_secrets` tidak memiliki handler di `ArtifactNormalizer`. Extracted NTLM hashes tidak terserap ke `ArtifactStore`. Handler normalizer pending, masuk batch fix serentak normalizer. |+| MOD-042 | linux.samba_secrets plaintext NTLM hash in Finding.evidence & EvidenceRecord | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`samba_secrets.py:197, 216`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak Hash Masking) | NTLM hash unredacted disimpan di `Finding.evidence["ntlm_hash"]` dan `EvidenceRecord.data["ntlm_hash"]`. Masuk batch fix serentak hash masking — pola identik MOD-007 dan MOD-027. |+| MOD-043 | linux.ccache_hunt phantom ticket extraction & empty vault secret injection on Keyring/KCM | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`ccache_hunt.py:320-366, 167-189`) | Menunggu remedi | Pemindaian `/proc/keys` dan socket KCM tidak mengambil byte tiket nyata, namun modul menerbitkan finding CRITICAL/HIGH dan menyimpan string kosong `""` ke `AresVault` sebagai tiket Kerberos (melanggar Rule 1 dan Rule 4). |+| MOD-044 | linux.keytab_abuse unhandled outputs machine_credentials & kerberos_keys (100% data loss) | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`keytab_abuse.py:65, 271-280`) | Menunggu remedi | Kunci simetris Kerberos (AES-256, RC4) tidak memiliki handler di `ArtifactNormalizer` dan tidak dicatat ke `ArtifactStore`. Modul juga menuliskan `raw["entries"]` alih-alih nama output yang dideklarasikan. |+| MOD-045 | linux.sssd_harvest SHA-512 crypt hashes inverted to CLEARTEXT & 100% normalizer data loss | FIXED | PASSED (19/19 tradecraft tests) | `ares/modules/linux/sssd_harvest.py`, `ares/credential/vault.py`, `ares/modules/credential/crack.py`, `tests/unit/modules/test_linux_ad_tradecraft.py` | Menambahkan HASH dan KERBEROS ke CredentialType enum. Mengimplementasikan _infer_credential_type di sssd_harvest untuk mengklasifikasikan hash Linux ($6$, $y$, $5$, $2b$, $1$) ke CredentialType.HASH dan dual-write standard output keys (users, domain_users, hashes, cached_hashes, credentials, accounts). |+| MOD-046 | persistence.scheduled_task zero teardown on remote scheduled task & registry run key | TERBUKTI (CRITICAL) | Audit verified (`scheduled_task.py:69-100, 405-435`) | Menunggu remedi (CRITICAL DEFERRED) | Modul mendaftarkan Scheduled Task dan menulis Registry Run Key tanpa method `teardown()` atau cleanup otomatis. Backdoor autorun tertinggal permanen pada host target klien (melanggar Rule 4). |+| MOD-047 | persistence.scheduled_task inverted dry_run=True default & unhandled RPC disconnect | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`scheduled_task.py:549, 415-435`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak) | `RegistryRunKeyPersistence.run()` secara default `dry_run=True`, memicu false success finding tanpa eksekusi. `_rrp_set_run_key` tidak memiliki `try/finally` untuk menutup koneksi DCE/RPC saat query gagal. |+| MOD-048 | persistence.wmi_subscription broken binding cleanup & truthy persistence_established on failure | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`wmi_subscription.py:353, 384-394`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak) | Fungsi `cleanup()` mengabaikan penghapusan binding WMI (`name_key=None`). `raw["persistence_established"]` diisi nama subskripsi (string truthy) bahkan saat instalasi gagal, memicu false positive. |+| MOD-049 | cloud.phantom_token fictitious PRT hijack implementation, zero network I/O & synthetic vault contamination | MITIGATED (disabled) | PASSED (Unit tests & registry validation) | `ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py`, `tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py` | Modul dinonaktifkan (`ENABLED = False`) dengan fail-fast guards di `assess_feasibility()`, `validate()`, `execute()`, dan `run()`, serta excluded dari active engine registry untuk mencegah suntikan kredensial/token PRT fiktif ke `AresVault` (implementasi real pending). |+| MOD-050 | cloud.identity_federation_abuse scope bypass on on-premises ADFS probing via raw HTTP | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`identity_federation.py:264-266, 505-540`) | Menunggu remedi | Modul mengirimkan HTTP request ke target `adfs_url` on-premises dengan `verify=False` tanpa validasi scope campaign dan tanpa memanggil `await self.before_request(adfs_url)` (melanggar Rule 1 dan Rule 4, pola MOD-004/009). |+| MOD-051 | cloud.identity_federation_abuse unhandled outputs federation_trusts, golden_saml_paths, oauth_tokens, pivot_paths (100% data loss) | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`identity_federation.py:77, 356-358`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak Normalizer) | Keempat capability output yang dideklarasikan tidak memiliki handler di `ArtifactNormalizer`. Data pemetaan trust federasi dan Golden SAML hilang permanen dari `ArtifactStore`. |+| MOD-052 | cloud.aws_privesc type confusion mismatch: aws_findings with list[Finding] overwrites S3 normalizer | TERBUKTI (HIGH) | Audit verified (`aws_privesc.py:80, 340-341`) | Menunggu remedi (Batch Fix Serentak Normalizer) | Modul menuliskan `list[Finding]` ke `raw["aws_findings"]`. Normalizer `_normalize_cloud` mengharapkan struktur dictionary S3 (`raw["s3"]["public_buckets"]`) dari modul `cloud.aws`, menghasilkan 0 artifact dan hilangnya seluruh jalur eskalasi hak akses IAM dari `ArtifactStore`. |+| MOD-053 | cloud.aws_privesc & cloud.identity_federation_abuse unvalidated AWS account/tenant scope & generic host attribution | TERBUKTI (MEDIUM) | Audit verified (`aws_privesc.py:331`, `identity_federation.py:1046, 1074`) | Menunggu remedi | Modul mengeksekusi query API AWS/Azure tanpa memverifikasi apakah AWS Account ID atau Tenant ID berada dalam batasan otorisasi scope campaign. Finding diatribusikan ke string generik (`host="aws"` atau `"azure_ad"`). |++---++## CRITICAL DEFERRED — BUTUH FIX SEBELUM PRODUCTION USE++### [MOD-012] Persistent Backdoor Machine Account & DACL Injection on `lateral.ntlm_relay`+- **Severity**: **CRITICAL**+- **Status Keputusan**: **DEFERRED (Tercatat, remedi dilakukan serentak pasca-audit seluruh batch)**+- **Operasional Policy Flag**:+ > ⚠️ **PERINGATAN OPERATOR**: **JANGAN gunakan `lateral.ntlm_relay` di engagement produksi sampai MOD-012 diperbaiki.**+- **Ringkasan Teknis**:+ Pada method `_rbcd_attack()` (`ares/modules/lateral/ntlm_relay.py:782-848`), modul membuat akun mesin baru di domain target (`ARESXXXXXX$`) via LDAP dan menimpa atribut `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` pada objek komputer target untuk memberikan hak delegasi Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD). Seluruh proses penulisan objek Active Directory ini dilakukan **tanpa blok `finally` atau handler cleanup/teardown**.+- **Skenario Bahaya Konkret (Engagement Risk)**:+ Bila modul ini dieksekusi dalam engagement nyata terhadap Active Directory klien:+ 1. Jika eksekusi gagal pada fase S4U, terjadi timeout jaringan, koneksi KDC terputus, atau operator meng-cancel campaign di tengah jalan, akun mesin `ARESXXXXXX$` dan atribut DACL delegasi RBCD akan **tertinggal permanen di database Active Directory klien**.+ 2. Akun mesin liar ini menjadi persistent backdoor yang tidak terkelola, memicu alert compliance audit domain klien, dan secara langsung melanggar SLA engagement serta **Rule 4 ARES (Zero Collateral & Guaranteed Teardown)**.+ 3. Pembersihan hanya dapat dilakukan melalui intervensi manual oleh Domain Admin klien.+- **Estimasi Scope Perbaikan**:+ 1. Baca dan simpan nilai asli `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` sebelum melakukan modifikasi LDAP.+ 2. Bungkus rantai eksekusi RBCD dalam blok `try ... finally`.+ 3. Di dalam blok `finally`:+ - Pulihkan atribut `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` ke nilai semula (atau kosongkan jika sebelumnya tidak ada).+ - Hapus akun mesin yang dibuat (`conn.delete(machine_dn)`).+ - Tangani logging error cleanup secara defensif agar tidak menutupi exception asli.++### [MOD-046] Zero Teardown on Remote Scheduled Task & Registry Run Key Persistence on `persistence.scheduled_task`+- **Severity**: **CRITICAL**+- **Status Keputusan**: **DEFERRED — fix setelah semua batch selesai**+- **Operasional Policy Flag**:+ > ⚠️ **PERINGATAN OPERATOR**: **JANGAN gunakan `persistence.scheduled_task` dan `persistence.wmi_subscription` di engagement produksi sampai teardown diperbaiki.**+ > Eksekusi modul ini akan meninggalkan Scheduled Task Windows, Registry Run Key, dan WMI subscription secara permanen di host target tanpa kemampuan cleanup via ARES.+- **Ringkasan Teknis**:+ Modul mendaftarkan task scheduler via RPC (`_tsch_register_sync`) dan menulis autorun registry (`_rrp_set_run_key`) tanpa menyediakan method `teardown()` atau fail-safe cleanup context manager. Backdoor eksekusi otomatis tertinggal secara permanen di sistem target klien.+- **Scope Fix yang Diperlukan**:+ 1. `persistence.scheduled_task`: implementasi `teardown()` yang menghapus scheduled task (`hSchRpcDeleteTask`) dan registry run key (`hBaseRegDeleteValue`) via WMI/RPC yang sama.+ 2. `persistence.wmi_subscription`: fix `cleanup()` tuple bug (MOD-048) dan verifikasi `__FilterToConsumerBinding` benar-benar dihapus.+ 3. Kedua modul perlu menyimpan identifier artifact yang dibuat (task name, key path, subscription name) ke raw output dan vault supaya `teardown()` bisa menemukan dan menghapusnya.++---++## MILESTONE: KEY CONVENTION STANDARDIZATION COMPLETED++- **Dokumen Referensi**: [`KEY_CONVENTION_STANDARD.md`](file:///c:/Users/ASUS/Desktop/ARES/KEY_CONVENTION_STANDARD.md)+- **Status**: **STANDARD ESTABLISHED & READY FOR SIMULTANEOUS FIX EXECUTION**+- **Ringkasan Keputusan Arsitektural**:+ 1. Standar kanonikal tunggal ditetapkan untuk seluruh 9 capability normalizer dan 15 modul terdampak (misal `hashes`, `users`, `computers`, `spns`, `target`, `misconfigs`).+ 2. Kebijakan **Dual-Write Policy** ditetapkan pada modul dan **Dual-Read Fallback** pada normalizer untuk menjamin **Zero Breaking Change** terhadap API eksternal dan UI dashboard.+ 3. Kategori unhandled outputs telah dipetakan dengan prioritas [P0] HARUS ADA (5 capability kritis: `cleartext_credentials`, `cracked_credentials`, `laps_passwords`, `kerberos_ticket`, `open_ports`), [P1] SEBAIKNYA ADA, dan [P2] BISA DITUNDA.+ 4. Strategi eksekusi **Opsi A (Normalizer Dual-Read First)** dipilih sebagai alur implementasi resmi yang aman tanpa risiko regresi.++---++## BATCH FIX SERENTAK DEFERRED NOTES (Batch 6)++### [MOD-040] Unhandled Outputs `container_escape_vectors` & `k8s_rbac_findings` on `linux.container`+- **Severity**: **MEDIUM**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak normalizer)**+- **Catatan**: Output capability tidak memiliki handler di `ArtifactNormalizer`. Terdaftar di `NORMALIZER_CONTRACT_AUDIT.md`. Akan difix serentak bersama capability normalizer pending lainnya.++### [MOD-041] Unhandled Outputs `machine_account_hash` & `samba_secrets` on `linux.samba_secrets`+- **Severity**: **HIGH**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak normalizer)**+- **Catatan**: Machine account hash dan secrets TDB tidak terserap ke `ArtifactStore`. Terdaftar di `NORMALIZER_CONTRACT_AUDIT.md`. Akan difix serentak bersama normalizer hash ingestion.++### [MOD-042] Plaintext NTLM Hash in Finding.evidence & EvidenceRecord on `linux.samba_secrets`+- **Severity**: **HIGH**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak hash masking)**+- **Catatan**: Pola identik dengan MOD-007 (`ad.kerberoast`) dan MOD-027 (`windows.lsa_secrets`). Hash NTLM diekspos unredacted di `evidence`. Akan difix serentak dengan pola masking kanonikal di seluruh layer reporting/evidence.++---++## BATCH FIX SERENTAK DEFERRED NOTES (Batch 7)++### [MOD-043] Phantom Ticket Extraction & Empty Vault Secret Injection on `linux.ccache_hunt`+- **Severity**: **HIGH**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak)**+- **Catatan**: Scanning `/proc/keys` dan socket KCM menghasilkan finding dan menyimpan empty string `""` ke `AresVault`. Akan difix serentak pasca-audit.++### [MOD-044] Unhandled Outputs `machine_credentials` & `kerberos_keys` on `linux.keytab_abuse`+- **Severity**: **HIGH**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak normalizer)**+- **Catatan**: Terdaftar di `NORMALIZER_CONTRACT_AUDIT.md`. Modul menghasilkan `raw["entries"]` dan `raw["silver_tickets"]`. Handler normalizer pending.++### [MOD-047] Inverted `dry_run=True` Default & Unhandled RPC Disconnect on `persistence.scheduled_task`+- **Severity**: **HIGH**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak)**+- **Catatan**: Default `dry_run=True` pada `RegistryRunKeyPersistence` dan unhandled `dce.disconnect()` pada `_rrp_set_run_key`. Akan difix serentak bersama teardown MOD-046.++### [MOD-048] Broken `__FilterToConsumerBinding` Cleanup & Truthy `persistence_established` on `persistence.wmi_subscription`+- **Severity**: **HIGH**+- **Status**: **DEFERRED (Masuk batch fix serentak)**+- **Catatan**: Tuple cleanup `("__FilterToConsumerBinding", None)` menyebabkan binding tidak terhapus, dan `raw["persistence_established"]` truthy pada status kegagalan. Akan difix serentak bersama MOD-046.+++diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py b/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.pyindex 0640ec4..93717b0 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import hashlibfrom typing import Anyfrom ares.core.campaign import Finding, Severity+from ares.core.errors import ModuleError, ModuleValidationErrorfrom ares.core.logger import audit, get_loggerfrom ares.modules.base import BaseModule, OpsecLevel, ModuleResultfrom ares.core.tracing import trace_module@@ -64,115 +65,50 @@ class PhantomTokenModule(BaseModule[PhantomTokenParams, ModuleResult]):MITRE_TECHNIQUES = ["T1528", "T1606"]MODULE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: int | None = 60PARAMS_MODEL = PhantomTokenParams+ ENABLED = False+ DISABLED_REASON = (+ "module disabled: PRT hijack not implemented, synthetic token injection risk (MOD-049)"+ )async def assess_feasibility(self, ctx: Any) -> Any:from ares.modules.base import FeasibilityReport- blockers: list[str] = []- score = 1.0- risk = "low"-- p = getattr(ctx, "params", {})- tenant = (p.get("tenant_id") if isinstance(p, dict) else getattr(p, "tenant_id", "")) or getattr(ctx, "target", "")- if not tenant:- blockers.append("No Azure AD / Entra ID tenant identifier specified")- score -= 0.5-- mode = (p.get("assessment_mode") if isinstance(p, dict) else getattr(p, "assessment_mode", "auto")) or "auto"- issuer = (p.get("federation_issuer") if isinstance(p, dict) else getattr(p, "federation_issuer", None))- if mode == "workload_identity" and issuer and not issuer.startswith("https://"):- blockers.append("Federation issuer must be a valid HTTPS OIDC authority")- score -= 0.3+ # MITIGATION (MOD-049): Module is temporarily disabled from execution pipeline.return FeasibilityReport(- feasible=len(blockers) == 0 and score >= 0.5,- score=max(0.0, min(1.0, score)),- risk_level=risk,- blockers=blockers,+ feasible=False,+ score=0.0,+ risk_level="high_noise",+ blockers=[self.DISABLED_REASON],recommended_alternatives=["cloud.azure_ad"],details={- "tenant_specified": bool(tenant),- "assessment_mode": mode,- "cae_ready": True,- "dpop_supported": getattr(p, "dpop_enforced", False),+ "disabled": True,+ "reason": self.DISABLED_REASON,},)async def validate(self, ctx: Any) -> None:- from ares.core.context import ExecutionContext- from ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationError- if not isinstance(ctx, ExecutionContext):- return- p = getattr(ctx, "params", {})- tenant = (p.get("tenant_id") if isinstance(p, dict) else getattr(p, "tenant_id", None)) or getattr(ctx, "target", "")- if not tenant:- raise ModuleValidationError(- "cloud.phantom_token requires 'tenant_id' (Tenant GUID or onmicrosoft domain).",- module_id=self.MODULE_ID,- field="tenant_id",- )- await super().validate(ctx)+ # MITIGATION (MOD-049): Fail fast with explicit error before parameter checks+ raise ModuleValidationError(+ self.DISABLED_REASON,+ module_id=self.MODULE_ID,+ )async def execute(self, ctx: ExecutionContext[PhantomTokenParams]) -> ModuleResult:- if isinstance(ctx.params, PhantomTokenParams):- p = ctx.params- elif isinstance(ctx.params, dict):- p = PhantomTokenParams.model_validate(ctx.params)- else:- p = PhantomTokenParams()-- kwargs = p.model_dump()- kwargs["dry_run"] = getattr(ctx, "dry_run", False)- if getattr(ctx, "target", None) and not kwargs.get("tenant_id"):- kwargs["tenant_id"] = ctx.target-- findings, raw = await self.run(**kwargs)-- if getattr(ctx, "dry_run", False):- if findings and hasattr(ctx, "emit_finding"):- f = findings[0]- ctx.emit_finding(- title=f.title,- severity=f.severity,- description=f.description,- mitre_technique=f.mitre_technique,- )- return ModuleResult(- status="dry_run",- module_id=self.MODULE_ID,- raw=raw,- )-- if findings and hasattr(ctx, "emit_finding"):- f = findings[0]- ctx.emit_finding(- title=f.title,- severity=f.severity,- description=f.description,- mitre_technique=f.mitre_technique,- mitre_tactic=f.mitre_tactic,- evidence=f.evidence,- remediation=f.remediation,- )-- simulated_device_id = raw.get("device_id", "")- if hasattr(ctx, "record_credential"):- ctx.record_credential(- username=f"{p.tenant_id}_prt_session",- secret=f"PRT_ESTSAUTH_{simulated_device_id}",- domain=p.tenant_id,- cred_type="token",- )-- return ModuleResult(- status="success",- findings=findings,- raw=raw,+ # MITIGATION (MOD-049): Disabled from execution pipeline to prevent fictitious findings+ # and vault contamination while final architectural decision is pending.+ raise ModuleError(+ self.DISABLED_REASON,module_id=self.MODULE_ID,- execution_id=getattr(ctx, "execution_id", ""),)@trace_module("cloud.phantom_token")async def run(self, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:+ # MITIGATION (MOD-049): Disabled from execution pipeline to prevent fictitious findings+ # and vault contamination while final architectural decision is pending.+ raise ModuleError(+ self.DISABLED_REASON,+ module_id=self.MODULE_ID,+ )self._findings = []ctx = kwargs.get("ctx") or kwargstenant_id = str(ctx.get("tenant_id") or ctx.get("target") or "")diff --git a/tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py b/tests/unit/test_staged_modules.pyindex 2da8d00..e8c56fc 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_staged_modules.py@@ -18,39 +18,44 @@ from ares.modules.ad.ghost_forge import GhostForgeModuleclass TestPhantomTokenModule:def test_module_attributes(self):assert PhantomTokenModule.MODULE_ID == "cloud.phantom_token"+ assert PhantomTokenModule.ENABLED is False+ assert "MOD-049" in PhantomTokenModule.DISABLED_REASONassert "T1528" in PhantomTokenModule.MITRE_TECHNIQUESassert "T1606" in PhantomTokenModule.MITRE_TECHNIQUES- def test_dry_run_execution(self):+ def test_direct_run_raises_disabled_error(self):+ from ares.core.errors import ModuleError+ mod, _ = _make_module(PhantomTokenModule)+ with pytest.raises(ModuleError) as exc_info:+ _run(mod.run(+ tenant_id="corp.onmicrosoft.com",+ evaluate_cap_bypass=True,+ dry_run=False,+ ))+ assert "MOD-049" in str(exc_info.value)++ def test_execute_raises_disabled_error(self):+ from ares.core.errors import ModuleErrormod, _ = _make_module(PhantomTokenModule)ctx = _mock_ctx(params={"tenant_id": "corp.onmicrosoft.com"})- ctx.dry_run = True- res = _run(mod.execute(ctx))- assert res.status == "dry_run"- assert res.module_id == "cloud.phantom_token"- assert res.raw.get("tenant_id") == "corp.onmicrosoft.com"+ with pytest.raises(ModuleError) as exc_info:+ _run(mod.execute(ctx))+ assert "MOD-049" in str(exc_info.value)- def test_live_execution_findings(self):+ def test_validate_raises_disabled_error(self):+ from ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationErrormod, _ = _make_module(PhantomTokenModule)- ctx = _mock_ctx(params={"tenant_id": "corp.onmicrosoft.com", "evaluate_cap_bypass": True})- ctx.dry_run = False- res = _run(mod.execute(ctx))- assert res.status == "success"- assert len(res.findings) >= 1- assert res.findings[0].mitre_technique == "T1528"- assert res.raw.get("prt_valid") is True+ ctx = _mock_ctx(params={"tenant_id": "corp.onmicrosoft.com"})+ with pytest.raises(ModuleValidationError) as exc_info:+ _run(mod.validate(ctx))+ assert "MOD-049" in str(exc_info.value)- def test_direct_run_method(self):+ def test_assess_feasibility_reports_disabled(self):mod, _ = _make_module(PhantomTokenModule)- findings, raw = _run(mod.run(- tenant_id="corp.onmicrosoft.com",- evaluate_cap_bypass=True,- dry_run=False,- ))- assert len(findings) == 1- assert findings[0].mitre_technique == "T1528"- assert raw.get("prt_valid") is True- assert raw.get("tenant_id") == "corp.onmicrosoft.com"+ ctx = _mock_ctx(params={"tenant_id": "corp.onmicrosoft.com"})+ report = _run(mod.assess_feasibility(ctx))+ assert report.feasible is False+ assert any("MOD-049" in b for b in report.blockers)class TestGhostForgeModule:@@ -162,6 +167,7 @@ class TestGhostForgeModule:assert "ad.ghost_forge" not in loader.registrydef test_phantom_token_workload_identity_and_detection(self):+ from ares.core.errors import ModuleErrormod, _ = _make_module(PhantomTokenModule)ctx = _mock_ctx(params={"tenant_id": "corp.onmicrosoft.com",@@ -171,14 +177,9 @@ class TestGhostForgeModule:"generate_detection_rules": True,})ctx.dry_run = False- res = _run(mod.execute(ctx))- assert res.status == "success"- assert len(res.findings) >= 1- assert "Workload Identity Federation" in res.findings[0].title- assert res.raw.get("assessment_mode_applied") == "workload_identity"- assert res.raw.get("dpop_status") == "enforced"- assert any(l["loot_type"] == "detection_rule_kql" for l in res.raw["loot"])- assert any(l["loot_type"] == "detection_rule_sigma" for l in res.raw["loot"])+ with pytest.raises(ModuleError) as exc_info:+ _run(mod.execute(ctx))+ assert "MOD-049" in str(exc_info.value)def test_kerberoast_closed_loop_telemetry(self, monkeypatch):from ares.modules.ad.kerberoast import KerberoastModule