A local-first multi-agent app development platform, built on PenguinHarness
test(plugins,ci): DSH 的 live 套件在 Windows 上也真跑(会话 shell 走 pwsh)
lmlihengb7933f58ddc5
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.ymlindex ac106603..c33b8c27 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml@@ -293,6 +293,9 @@ jobs:build: "@lmliheng/penguin-desktop...,@lmliheng/penguin-cli..."tests: >-pnpm -r --filter '!@lmliheng/penguin-core' --filter '!@lmliheng/penguin-server' test+ # ADELIE_MUST_RUN, as on ubuntu and macOS: the DSH live suite must run here+ # (through pwsh, see plugins/sandbox-dsh test/live.test.ts).+ must_run: sandbox-dshsteps:- uses: actions/checkout@v5- uses: ./.github/actions/setup@@ -315,6 +318,8 @@ jobs:# regression fails both attempts.- name: Unit tests (vitest)shell: bash+ env:+ ADELIE_MUST_RUN: ${{ matrix.must_run }}run: |${{ matrix.tests }} && exit 0echo "::warning::vitest failed on Windows; retrying once (see the pool-teardown note in ci.yml)"diff --git a/plugins/sandbox-dsh/test/live.test.ts b/plugins/sandbox-dsh/test/live.test.tsindex 15c572c2..5dd67090 100644--- a/plugins/sandbox-dsh/test/live.test.ts+++ b/plugins/sandbox-dsh/test/live.test.ts@@ -18,8 +18,17 @@ import type { SandboxProvider } from "@lmliheng/penguin-core/plugin";import { loadDshAdaptor } from "../src/index.js";import { mustRun } from "../../../scripts/must-run.mjs";-const ws = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), "penguin-dsh-live-"));-const outsideProbe = path.join(homedir(), `penguin-dsh-live-${process.pid}.txt`);+const win32 = process.platform === "win32";++// Windows probes run through pwsh: the ACL runner cannot start the default bash (see+// windows-shells.test.ts). Set before the adaptor loads: core resolves the shell once per process.+// TODO(win32): a DSH-confined bash is not guaranteed on Windows until the runner starts an MSYS bash.+if (win32) process.env.ADELIE_SHELL = "pwsh";++const ws = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), "adelie-dsh-live-"));+const outsideProbe = path.join(homedir(), `adelie-dsh-live-${process.pid}.txt`);+/** What the background child writes inside the Workspace: proof it ran at all. */+const backgroundMarker = path.join(ws, "bg-inside.txt");let loadError = "the DSH adaptor did not load";const provider: SandboxProvider | null = await loadDshAdaptor().catch((err: unknown) => {@@ -35,13 +44,13 @@ const cannotOpen =? loadError: (() => {try {- provider.confine(["true"], { mode: "workspace-write", workspaceRoot: ws });+ // An absolute program: on Windows a bare `true` is refused, as no PATH entry has it.+ provider.confine([process.execPath], { mode: "workspace-write", workspaceRoot: ws });return null;} catch (err) {return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);}})();-const usable = mustRun("sandbox-dsh", cannotOpen);const mgr = new CommandSessionManager({confineSpawn: () => (argv, opts) =>@@ -59,13 +68,43 @@ async function run(cmd: string): Promise<{ code: number | null; out: string }> {return { code: session.exit?.code ?? null, out };}-/**- * The denial DIALECT depends on which rung the chain selected — EROFS text under- * bwrap's read-only binds, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under Seatbelt, and the- * Windows ACL runner's own wording. That is exactly why ConfinedArgv carries- * denialSignatures; assert the effect plus a denial in any dialect, never one rung's.- */-const DENIED = /permission denied|read-only file system|operation not permitted|access is denied/i;+/** A PowerShell single-quoted literal. */+const ps = (value: string) => `'${value.replaceAll("'", "''")}'`;++/** A file outside the workspace every gated host can read (macOS has no /etc/hostname). */+const readProbe = win32 ? process.execPath : "/etc/hosts";++// One probe per test, in the session shell's dialect. The background child writes a marker+// inside the Workspace first, so a child that never ran cannot pass for a confined one.+const probes = win32+ ? {+ insideAndRead: `$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'; Set-Content -LiteralPath inside.txt -Value confined-ok; Get-Content -LiteralPath inside.txt; $null = Get-Content -AsByteStream -TotalCount 1 -LiteralPath ${ps(readProbe)}; 'READ_OK'`,+ writeOutside: `try { Set-Content -LiteralPath ${ps(outsideProbe)} -Value leak -ErrorAction Stop } catch { $_.Exception.Message }`,+ backgroundOutside: `Start-Process -FilePath cmd.exe -ArgumentList ${ps(`/d /c echo bg > "${backgroundMarker}" & echo bg > "${outsideProbe}"`)} -NoNewWindow -Wait; 'done'`,+ writeWorkspace: `try { Set-Content -LiteralPath ro-probe.txt -Value x -ErrorAction Stop } catch { $_.Exception.Message }`,+ writeOutsideUnconfined: `Set-Content -LiteralPath ${ps(outsideProbe)} -Value unconfined`,+ }+ : {+ insideAndRead: `echo confined-ok > inside.txt && cat inside.txt && head -c 1 ${readProbe} > /dev/null && echo READ_OK`,+ writeOutside: `echo leak > ${JSON.stringify(outsideProbe)} 2>&1; echo exit=$?`,+ backgroundOutside: `(sleep 0.2; echo bg > ${JSON.stringify(backgroundMarker)}; echo bg > ${JSON.stringify(outsideProbe)}) & wait; echo done`,+ writeWorkspace: "echo x > ro-probe.txt 2>&1; echo exit=$?",+ writeOutsideUnconfined: `echo unconfined > ${JSON.stringify(outsideProbe)}; echo exit=$?`,+ };++// A Windows host without pwsh (PowerShell 7) cannot run the probes, so cannot open the suite.+const shellReady =+ !win32 || (await run("'pwsh-' + $PSVersionTable.PSEdition")).out.trim() === "pwsh-Core";++const usable = mustRun(+ "sandbox-dsh",+ cannotOpen ?? (shellReady ? null : "the session shell is not pwsh (PowerShell 7)"),+);++// The denial dialect depends on the rung (EROFS, EACCES, EPERM, .NET's "Access to the path"):+// assert the effect plus a denial in any dialect, never one rung's.+const DENIED =+ /permission denied|read-only file system|operation not permitted|access is denied|access to the path .* is denied/i;afterAll(() => {mgr.dispose();@@ -73,55 +112,42 @@ afterAll(() => {rmSync(outsideProbe, { force: true });});-// skipIf(win32) is NOT a capability gate: the usability gate does open there — the ACL-// chain loads and the kernel denial fires (observed on CI as UTF-16 "Access is denied"-// from the runner). What is missing is a cmd-dialect probe set: these probes are POSIX-// shell (head, /etc/hosts, `(…) & wait`) and the assertions decode UTF-8. TODO(win32):-// a Windows probe set with UTF-16-tolerant denial matching, as its own change.-describe.skipIf(!usable || process.platform === "win32")(- "DSH adaptor live enforcement (host-gated)",- () => {- it("workspace-write: writes inside the workspace work, reads outside still work", async () => {- mode = "workspace-write";- // /etc/hosts, not /etc/hostname: the read probe must exist on every POSIX host the- // usability gate can open, and macOS has no /etc/hostname.- const r = await run(- "echo confined-ok > inside.txt && cat inside.txt && head -c 1 /etc/hosts > /dev/null && echo READ_OK",- );- expect(r.code).toBe(0);- expect(r.out).toContain("confined-ok");- expect(r.out).toContain("READ_OK");- });-- it("workspace-write: a write outside the workspace is denied by the kernel", async () => {- mode = "workspace-write";- const r = await run(`echo leak > ${JSON.stringify(outsideProbe)} 2>&1; echo exit=$?`);- expect(existsSync(outsideProbe)).toBe(false);- expect(r.out).toMatch(DENIED);- });-- it("workspace-write: background children are confined with the wrapped shell", async () => {- mode = "workspace-write";- const r = await run(- `(sleep 0.2 && echo bg > ${JSON.stringify(outsideProbe)}) & wait; echo done`,- );- expect(r.out).toContain("done");- expect(existsSync(outsideProbe)).toBe(false);- });-- it("read-only: even the workspace is not writable", async () => {- mode = "read-only";- const r = await run("echo x > ro-probe.txt 2>&1; echo exit=$?");- expect(existsSync(path.join(ws, "ro-probe.txt"))).toBe(false);- expect(r.out).toMatch(DENIED);- });-- it("the policy is read per spawn: dropping it lifts confinement on the next command", async () => {- mode = null;- const r = await run(`echo unconfined > ${JSON.stringify(outsideProbe)}; echo exit=$?`);- expect(r.code).toBe(0);- expect(existsSync(outsideProbe)).toBe(true);- rmSync(outsideProbe, { force: true });- });- },-);+describe.skipIf(!usable)("DSH adaptor live enforcement (host-gated)", () => {+ it("workspace-write: writes inside the workspace work, reads outside still work", async () => {+ mode = "workspace-write";+ const r = await run(probes.insideAndRead);+ expect(r.code).toBe(0);+ expect(r.out).toContain("confined-ok");+ expect(r.out).toContain("READ_OK");+ });++ it("workspace-write: a write outside the workspace is denied by the kernel", async () => {+ mode = "workspace-write";+ const r = await run(probes.writeOutside);+ expect(existsSync(outsideProbe)).toBe(false);+ expect(r.out).toMatch(DENIED);+ });++ it("workspace-write: background children are confined with the wrapped shell", async () => {+ mode = "workspace-write";+ const r = await run(probes.backgroundOutside);+ expect(r.out).toContain("done");+ expect(existsSync(backgroundMarker)).toBe(true);+ expect(existsSync(outsideProbe)).toBe(false);+ });++ it("read-only: even the workspace is not writable", async () => {+ mode = "read-only";+ const r = await run(probes.writeWorkspace);+ expect(existsSync(path.join(ws, "ro-probe.txt"))).toBe(false);+ expect(r.out).toMatch(DENIED);+ });++ it("the policy is read per spawn: dropping it lifts confinement on the next command", async () => {+ mode = null;+ const r = await run(probes.writeOutsideUnconfined);+ expect(r.code).toBe(0);+ expect(existsSync(outsideProbe)).toBe(true);+ rmSync(outsideProbe, { force: true });+ });+});