Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
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# AiSOC Environment Variables
# Copy this file to .env and fill in your values
#
# ╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
# ║ YOU DO NOT HAVE TO EDIT THIS FILE TO GET A WORKING STACK. ║
# ║ ║
# ║ make up creates .env from this template and fills the fifteen ║
# ║ generated secrets with real random values — the ║
# ║ credential vault key, the session signing key, five ║
# ║ service-to-service credentials, the realtime and ║
# ║ metrics tokens, and four datastore passwords. The list ║
# ║ lives in scripts/ensure_env.py; this comment does not ║
# ║ repeat it, because a second copy is a second thing to ║
# ║ go stale. ║
# ║ make env does only that, if you want to look before you start. ║
# ║ ║
# ║ They ship EMPTY here rather than as `replace-me-…` prose. A ║
# ║ placeholder is not a neutral default: a non-empty AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY ║
# ║ that is not a valid Fernet key made every connector save answer HTTP 500, ║
# ║ so copying this template used to break the product while skipping the copy ║
# ║ left it working. `scripts/check_env_placeholders.py` now fails on any ║
# ║ placeholder shipped here, and `make doctor` reports them in your .env. ║
# ║ ║
# ║ Optional, and worth setting: ║
# ║ OPENAI_API_KEY a hosted provider key for better AI triage. CORE ║
# ║ ships a local model, so this is an upgrade, not a ║
# ║ requirement — see "AI / LLM" below. ║
# ║ ║
# ║ The datastore passwords are generated too, so there is no shared default ║
# ║ left for you to change. ║
# ╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
# ─── Image Pinning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Tag pulled by every `image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-*:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}`
# in docker-compose.yml. Docker pulls this tag on first boot and skips the
# local build (~90 s vs ~15 min). Pin to a release tag (e.g. v12.0.0) for
# reproducible deploys; leave as `latest` to track the newest release.
AISOC_VERSION=latest
# What `pull_policy:` resolves to for every first-party image. `missing` means
# "use what is local if there is one", which is right for an immutable release
# tag and wrong for `latest`, which is republished on every merge — so
# `make up` refreshes the images itself whenever AISOC_VERSION names a moving
# tag, and skips it when the tag is pinned.
#
# Set this to `never` on an air-gapped host: Compose then refuses to contact a
# registry, and `make up` skips its refresh for the same reason. `always` makes
# Compose itself re-check on every container start.
# AISOC_PULL_POLICY=never
# ─── Core Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# `development` enables the dev auth bypass in services/api/app/api/v1/dev_auth.py.
# Set `production` for anything network-reachable; docker-compose.yml reads this
# value, so changing it here is enough.
# Production is the default because the value of this variable used to
# decide whether an uncredentialed request was served as an administrator.
# For the developer conveniences, layer the overlay rather than editing
# this line: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f infra/compose/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
ENVIRONMENT=production
LOG_LEVEL=info
# HS256 signing key for console sessions, shared by the API and the connectors
# service. Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py` — see the
# note on AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY below for why a placeholder is not used.
SECRET_KEY=
# Base URL `make bootstrap` prints as the sign-in address, and the origin the
# console is reached on. Leave it at the default for a laptop; set it to the
# address operators actually browse to for anything else, or the printed
# credential arrives with the wrong URL beside it.
AISOC_CONSOLE_URL=http://localhost:3000
# ─── Where the stack is reachable from ────────────────────────────────────────
# Every host port is published to 127.0.0.1 by default, which is right for a
# laptop and fatal for a server: nothing outside the machine can reach it,
# including the browser you meant to use.
#
# Set this to publish the console on all interfaces. It is the only port a
# browser needs — the console proxies to the API, the agents service and the
# realtime gateway over the internal network — so the datastores and the
# development passwords in this file stay on loopback.
#
# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
#
# Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front before exposing it to a network
# you do not control. See apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.
# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
# Moves EVERY published port, datastores included. Only for an isolated
# network: it hands Postgres, Redis, Kafka and Neo4j — with the development
# passwords in this file — to anything that can route to the host.
# AISOC_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
# Whether this deployment is a demo. Read at run time by both the API and the
# console, and reported at GET /api/runtime-config so it can be checked from
# outside rather than inferred from the page. Leave false unless you are
# running a public demo; `make demo` is the opt-in that loads synthetic data.
AISOC_DEMO_MODE=false
# Shared HS256 secret used ONLY for short-lived realtime WS/SSE tickets
# (Issue #239). The API mints tickets at `POST /api/v1/realtime/ticket` and the
# Node realtime service (`services/realtime`) verifies them on every WebSocket
# upgrade and SSE request — both sides MUST read the same value. This is
# intentionally separate from SECRET_KEY so the realtime edge can be rotated
# independently and a leaked ticket can never forge a full API session.
#
# `make up` generates this. There is no development fallback any more: both
# sides used to fall back to a constant committed to this repository, and no
# manifest passed either the real secret or the variable the production check
# read, so that constant was the effective key in every deployment. Unset, the
# ticket endpoint fails closed (503) and realtime rejects every connection.
AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET=
# HS256 key for the session tokens the SAML and OIDC callbacks issue, and the
# bearer that guards /metrics. Both are generated by `make env`. The API
# refuses to boot without them now that ENVIRONMENT defaults to production:
# in a development-class environment `enforce_secure_defaults` only warns,
# which is why neither was generated before.
JWT_SECRET=
METRICS_TOKEN=
# Time-to-live (seconds) for minted realtime tickets. Kept short so a leaked
# ticket is only briefly useful; the frontend re-mints on every (re)connect.
# Clamped to a 60s ceiling by the ticket endpoint regardless of this value.
AISOC_REALTIME_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS=60
# Application-layer encryption key for connector credentials and other
# secret payloads stored in Postgres.
#
# LEAVE THIS EMPTY. `make up`, `make env` and `./install.sh` all run
# `scripts/ensure_env.py`, which writes a freshly generated key here the first
# time. Generating it by hand works too:
# python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
#
# It ships empty rather than as a `replace-me-…` string on purpose. A non-empty
# value that is not a valid Fernet key is *worse* than no value: the vault takes
# its development path only when the key is empty, so a placeholder reached
# `Fernet()`, raised, and turned every connector save into an HTTP 500 —
# minutes after `cp .env.example .env`, with nothing linking the two. Empty is a
# value the vault understands.
#
# Treat a real value like a database password: never commit it, never reuse it
# across environments, never share it.
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY=
# Comma-separated list of previous credential keys to support zero-downtime
# rotation. Leave blank unless you are mid-rotation.
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM=
# Internal URL the API uses to reach the connectors microservice for
# catalog lookups and "Test connection" actions in the click-and-connect
# wizard. ``http://connectors:8003`` is correct for docker-compose;
# use ``http://localhost:8088`` when running the API on the host while
# connectors is exposed via the docker-compose port forward.
CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL=http://connectors:8003
CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=15
# ─── Database ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Two roles, and the distinction is load-bearing rather than tidy.
#
# aisoc owner. Superuser (the postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER one),
# owns every table, applies the migration chain. No service
# connects as it.
# aisoc_app runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, so
# that the schema's row-level-security policies apply to it. A
# superuser ignores those policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL
# SECURITY, which is why running the services as `aisoc` left all
# 92 of them filtering nothing.
#
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is the owner's; AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD is the runtime role's.
# Both are interpolated by docker-compose.yml, so changing them here rotates
# them across the stack. They are deliberately different values: they are
# different privilege levels.
#
# Empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`, like the secrets
# above. This file used to ship `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=aisoc_dev_secret`, and
# `docker-compose.prod.yml` guarded it with
# `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the development default is a published literal}` —
# a guard that rejects an *empty* variable and cannot look at a value, so the
# one input its message named was the one input it accepted. A production
# stack booted on a password printed in this repository while the file said
# it could not. `preflight-secrets` in that file now refuses the value, and
# shipping these empty means a fresh install never has one to refuse.
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=
AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD=
# What every service connects as.
DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc
# DDL only: `python -m app.scripts.run_migrations` uses this and nothing else
# does. Leave it unset and migrations fall back to DATABASE_URL, which is
# correct for a deployment that has not split the roles and fails loudly
# ("permission denied for schema public") on one that has.
# aisoc-db-role: owner — the migration chain applies DDL; the runtime role holds none
DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc
# Generated alongside the Postgres pair, and referenced rather than repeated:
# these two used to spell the password out inside the DSN, so rotating
# REDIS_PASSWORD left a stale copy here that still worked.
REDIS_PASSWORD=
CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=
REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@localhost:6379/0
CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}@localhost:8123/aisoc
# ─── Messaging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS=localhost:9092
# ─── Search ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
OPENSEARCH_URL=http://localhost:9200
QDRANT_URL=http://localhost:6333
# ─── AI / LLM ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Empty, and empty is a working configuration: CORE ships Ollama with a small
# local model, so a default install does real AI triage with no key at all. Set
# a hosted provider key here to upgrade the quality — the gateway picks it up
# and routes the aliases to the hosted model instead.
#
# It is empty rather than `sk-your-…-here` because a bogus key is not the same
# as no key: the gateway would send it upstream, get a 401, and the deployment
# would look configured while producing nothing.
OPENAI_API_KEY=
# OPENAI_MODEL affects the "explain this alert" / BYOK path only. Task workloads
# (triage, recon, investigation, copilot, summary, report, NL) request a logical
# alias instead — see the LLM gateway block below.
#
# It ships as an alias, not a concrete model, because the default deployment
# routes through the bundled gateway and the gateway 400s anything
# infra/litellm/config.yaml does not define. It used to read
# `gpt-4-turbo-preview`, which no gateway config here has ever defined, and the
# auto-triage worker treated it as a per-tenant BYOK override — so it replaced
# `aisoc-triage` on the highest-volume path in the product.
# scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py fails the build if this names a model the
# gateway does not define. Set a concrete model only when calling a provider
# directly (see "ENABLE LIVE LLM" option (b) below).
OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary
# ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ───────────────────────────────────────
# Since #478 AiSOC asks for a logical task alias (aisoc-triage,
# aisoc-investigation, …) for every live LLM call — there is no hardcoded default
# model. The alias → real-model map lives in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so you
# swap local/hosted models there without changing AiSOC. The gateway service is
# defined in docker-compose.yml.
#
# Key that AiSOC uses to authenticate to the gateway (also LiteLLM's admin key):
LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=sk-aisoc-local
# In-network URL of the gateway. docker-compose.yml sets this on the api and
# agents services, and both resolvers READ it — `resolve_base_url()` returns it
# for any aisoc-<role> alias, and `resolve_api_key()` returns LITELLM_MASTER_KEY
# to pair with it. That wire was missing: compose set this variable, the
# resolvers deliberately ignored it in favour of OPENAI_BASE_URL (which nothing
# set), and so the product's headline capability could not reach a model in the
# default deployment.
LLM_GATEWAY_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1
#
# How long the gateway waits on ONE generation before giving up, in seconds.
# 60 used to be a literal inside infra/litellm/config.yaml, so raising it meant
# editing a mounted file. The bundled 3B model doing CPU-only inference can
# exceed 60s on a long generation, and every call then fails while Settings →
# Deployment & AI still reports the provider as configured. That panel now says
# "Degraded" when recent calls are failing — this is the knob to turn.
AISOC_LITELLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT=60
#
# ENABLE LIVE LLM:
# (a) Through the gateway — the default, and already wired. Put your real
# provider key in OPENAI_API_KEY above (the gateway reads it) and bring up
# the `full` profile, which is where the litellm service lives:
# docker compose --profile full up -d
# Nothing else to set. To point at a gateway somewhere else, or to send a
# different bearer, set OPENAI_BASE_URL/OPENAI_API_KEY and they win.
# (b) Direct to a provider, no gateway — pin each task role to a concrete
# model. A concrete pin is NOT rerouted to the gateway, so this keeps
# working with LLM_GATEWAY_URL set:
# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini
# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_INVESTIGATION=gpt-4o
# OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini # the BYOK/explain path, direct too
# With neither configured, AiSOC uses its deterministic offline path — which
# reports zero model calls and zero tokens rather than pretending to triage.
# ─── Threat Intelligence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Open-source / community feeds (work out of the box, no key required for some)
TAXII_FEEDS=https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/taxii/,enterprise-attack,,
MISP_URL=
MISP_API_KEY=
OTX_API_KEY=
# OpenCTI — GraphQL API of a running OpenCTI platform (6.x/7.x).
# Works with an internal deployment (RFC1918) or a public instance;
# under AIRGAP_MODE=strict a public URL is skipped unless allowlisted.
OPENCTI_URL=
OPENCTI_TOKEN=
OPENCTI_VERIFY_SSL=true
OPENCTI_POLL_INTERVAL=1800
CISA_KEV_ENABLED=true
ABUSE_CH_ENABLED=true
# Free / freemium enrichment (recommended for everyone)
VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY=
ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=
GREYNOISE_API_KEY=
SHODAN_API_KEY=
URLSCAN_API_KEY=
IPINFO_API_TOKEN=
# ─── Commercial threat intelligence (optional) ────────────────────────────────
# Cyble Vision — actor, malware, vulnerability, dark-web, brand-risk feeds
# Provision a key from https://cyble.com/cyble-vision/
CYBLE_VISION_API_KEY=
CYBLE_VISION_BASE_URL=https://api.cyble.com/v2
CYBLE_VISION_TENANT_ID=
CYBLE_VISION_FEEDS=indicators,actors,vulnerabilities,leaks,brand
CYBLE_HUNT_API_KEY=
# Recorded Future
RECORDED_FUTURE_API_KEY=
# Mandiant Threat Intelligence (formerly FireEye iSIGHT)
MANDIANT_API_KEY=
MANDIANT_API_SECRET=
# Crowdstrike Falcon Intelligence (separate from the EDR connector)
CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_ID=
CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_SECRET=
# Anomali ThreatStream
ANOMALI_USERNAME=
ANOMALI_API_KEY=
ANOMALI_BASE_URL=https://api.threatstream.com
# IBM X-Force Exchange
XFORCE_API_KEY=
XFORCE_API_PASSWORD=
# Flashpoint
FLASHPOINT_API_KEY=
# Intel 471
INTEL471_USERNAME=
INTEL471_API_KEY=
# DomainTools Iris
DOMAINTOOLS_USERNAME=
DOMAINTOOLS_API_KEY=
# RiskIQ / Microsoft Defender External ATP
RISKIQ_USERNAME=
RISKIQ_API_KEY=
# ─── Outbound egress (SSRF guard) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# Connector egress (test, resource reads, scheduled polls), webhook
# destinations and playbook http_request/notify steps are all validated by the
# SSRF guard; by default it refuses loopback, private ranges, link-local and
# the cloud-metadata endpoints. These knobs reach the api, connectors and
# agents services from this one file.
#
# Re-admit on-prem systems on RFC1918 private ranges (never loopback, never
# cloud metadata):
AISOC_SSRF_ALLOW_PRIVATE=
# Re-admit exact hostnames (comma-separated, matched exactly — no wildcards,
# no CIDR; the cloud-metadata blocklist still applies):
AISOC_SSRF_ALLOW_HOSTS=
# Deny additional hosts or IPs on top of the built-in blocklist:
AISOC_SSRF_EXTRA_BLOCKED_HOSTS=
# ─── Connectors ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# CrowdStrike Falcon
CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID=
CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET=
CROWDSTRIKE_BASE_URL=https://api.crowdstrike.com
# Splunk
SPLUNK_HOST=
SPLUNK_PORT=8089
SPLUNK_TOKEN=
SPLUNK_SCHEME=https
SPLUNK_VERIFY_SSL=true
# AWS Security Hub
AWS_REGION=us-east-1
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
# Okta
OKTA_DOMAIN=
OKTA_API_TOKEN=
# Microsoft Sentinel
AZURE_TENANT_ID=
AZURE_CLIENT_ID=
AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET=
AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=
AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP=
AZURE_WORKSPACE_NAME=
# ─── Frontend ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Where the console proxies browser requests. The browser itself never uses
# these: the bundle calls same-origin paths like /api/v1/alerts and the Next.js
# server forwards them, which is why one image works on localhost, on a LAN
# address and behind a reverse proxy without rebuilding, and why there is no
# CORS configuration to get wrong.
#
# The defaults are the Compose service names and are right for the bundled
# stack. Change them when the API lives somewhere else — a different Compose
# project, another host, or an existing deployment.
AISOC_API_URL=http://api:8000
AISOC_AGENTS_URL=http://agents:8084
AISOC_REALTIME_URL=http://realtime:4000
# NEXT_PUBLIC_* is NOT listed here on purpose.
#
# Next.js inlines every NEXT_PUBLIC_* value into the JavaScript bundle when the
# image is *built*, so setting one in this file has no effect on the image
# `docker compose up` pulls. This file used to list NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL,
# NEXT_PUBLIC_REALTIME_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL, which meant an operator
# pointing the console at their own host edited three variables, restarted,
# saw no change, and had nothing telling them the settings were inert. Use the
# three AISOC_*_URL values above; they are read at container start.
#
# To bypass the proxy and have the browser call another origin directly you
# have to rebuild the image with --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=… and take on
# the CORS configuration that comes with it.
# Override the docs site base URL (default: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs).
# Set this when serving docs from a custom domain like https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_DOCS_URL=https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs
# ─── Service-to-service auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Shared bearer token for backend services that are NOT reachable from the
# browser (connectors, purple-team, honeytokens, ueba). Those surfaces execute
# privileged work — purple-team can start adversary-emulation operations against
# live hosts — and they fail closed: with no token configured and AISOC_DEV_MODE
# unset, they answer 503 rather than serving the route openly.
#
# Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`. It is not optional
# in practice: the API presents it when it proxies the connector catalog and
# "Test connection" to the connectors service, so a blank value on one side and
# a configured secret on the other is a 401 the wizard used to report as the
# bare string "Connection test failed".
#
# `ingest` and `connectors` use it for the same purpose on the push path, and
# there AISOC_DEV_MODE does NOT cover it: POST /v1/ingest is a write into
# tenant-owned data and has no dev-mode shortcut. A direct curl/script push
# uses a per-tenant token from `make ingest-token` instead and needs nothing
# here. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN=
#
# The actions service gets its own, because it is the one that can isolate a
# host or disable an account and should not share a credential with the
# read-mostly services above. `make up` generates it. Without it the actions
# service answers 503 on every mutating route, which is deliberate: it used to
# answer 200 to anyone who could reach the port.
AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
#
# The agents service gets its own too, and it is the one that could not fall
# back: eight modules in `services/agents` present it as
# `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context routes, and
# `service_token_valid` on the API verifies THIS variable and no other — it
# does not accept AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN. Nothing generated it and no manifest
# passed it, so organisation memory, tenant skills, recent dispositions,
# identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP toolset, the playbook
# action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off on every default install, each
# logging a `no_service_token` warning and returning an empty result that
# reads exactly like "this tenant has none".
#
# The same value is verified in the other direction: the API posts a replay to
# the agents service as a bearer, and `app.security.tenant_scope` resolves
# `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` ahead of the shared one. `make up` generates it
# and compose passes it to both.
AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# The bearer a peer service presents to the API. The agents service uses it for
# the customer tools, the eleven lake pivots and the hunting agent, and names
# the tenant it is acting for on `X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID` beside it. Those three
# previously read `AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY`, which nothing ever set, so they
# answered "could not check" on every deployment. `make up` generates it.
AISOC_API_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out routes (API/agents -> realtime),
# sent as the x-internal-token header. `make up` generates it. The guard used
# to treat an unset value as authorized, and nothing set it.
REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN=
# Optional per-service overrides, if you'd rather not share one secret. Each
# is read ahead of AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN by the service it names, on both the
# presenting and the verifying side, so setting one narrows a single hop.
# `scripts/check_service_token_wiring.py` asserts every one of these that
# production code reads is listed here — four were not, which is how an
# operator would go looking for a variable the code uses and find nothing.
# AISOC_PURPLE_TEAM_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# AISOC_HONEYTOKENS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# AISOC_UEBA_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# AISOC_INGEST_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# AISOC_FUSION_SERVICE_TOKEN=
# AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN=
#
# Bearer the agents service presents to the ChatOps fan-out (slack-bot).
# Unset means no ChatOps notification is sent; the approval is still durable
# and visible in the console.
AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN=
# Retro-hunt sweeps: when a new indicator arrives, look back over history for
# anything that already matched it. Off by default -- a sweep reads a tenant's
# past events, which is both a cost and a privacy decision. Turning this on
# starts the consumer; each tenant must still opt in from its own settings
# (PUT /api/v1/retro-hunts/settings), so this switch alone sweeps nobody.
RETRO_HUNT_ENABLED=false
# ── Where the model runs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# `make up` runs the bundled model on CPU and needs none of these. They exist
# for the other three options; see apps/docs/docs/operations/where-the-model-runs.md
#
# make up-gpu bundled model on an NVIDIA GPU (Linux / Windows+WSL2)
# make up-host-llm an Ollama you already run (the only GPU path on a Mac)
# a hosted provider configured per tenant in the console (no variable here)
# How many NVIDIA devices `make up-gpu` exposes. `all` for every device.
AISOC_GPU_COUNT=1
# Where the gateway looks for a model. `make up-host-llm` sets this to the
# host's Ollama; set it yourself to point at another machine or an existing
# vLLM. Shipped commented out, not empty: compose reads this with `-`, not
# `:-`, so an empty value means "hosted provider" and the bundled model is
# never called (LiteLLM falls back to localhost:11434 inside its own
# container). Unset, the bundled service address applies.
# AISOC_LLM_API_BASE=http://ollama:11434
# Where the API's runtime probe asks "GPU or CPU?". Follows the above.
AISOC_OLLAMA_URL=
# ── Enterprise SSO (feature-flagged; everything here defaults OFF) ────────
# Master switch. Until this is true, /auth/oidc/login and /auth/saml/*
# answer 503 with a generic message and the login screen renders no SSO
# button. Set true only after a verified connection exists.
SSO_ENABLED=false
# oidc | saml — selects the flow the login button points at.
SSO_PROVIDER=oidc
# Label on the login button (e.g. "Sign in with Acme"). Max 80 chars.
SSO_LOGIN_LABEL=Continue with SSO
# Once SSO is on, set true to close password login for everyone except
# wildcard (admin) roles — the break-glass path stays open for them.
# Default false so enabling SSO can never lock anyone out unawares.
SSO_LOCAL_ADMIN_ONLY=false
# OIDC relying-party config (secrets are supplied at deploy time, never
# committed): issuer, client id, the callback registered at the IdP, and
# the client secret consumed by app/auth/oidc.py.
OIDC_ISSUER=
OIDC_CLIENT_ID=
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=
OIDC_REDIRECT_URI=
OIDC_SCOPES=openid email profile groups
# Claim carrying group names (Okta/Entra: groups; Keycloak: mapper name).
# Empty falls back to the standard spellings: groups/roles/memberOf.
SSO_GROUPS_CLAIM=
# Per-tenant policy (domain allowlist, JIT, group mode, mappings) lives on
# aisoc_sso_connections, managed via /api/v1/sso-connections by callers
# holding settings:write. Provisioning defaults there are viewer + first
# login only + JIT on; admin roles cannot be granted through any mapping.
# --- escalation bridge (escalations profile) ---
# Power Automate 'Post card in a chat or channel' webhook used by the
# ack-clock escalation bridge (services/escalations).
# https:// required — the bridge refuses any other scheme at startup.
AISOC_ESCALATION_TEAMS_URL=
# The address escalation cards link back to; defaults to the console's own
# default. Set it to this deployment's public console origin.
AISOC_CONSOLE_URL=http://localhost:3000