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# AiSOC — production compose.
#
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
#
# This is the file `apps/docs/docs/deployment/docker.md` has pointed at since
# the deployment page was written. It did not exist, which is what discussion
# #629 reported: the documented production command failed on a missing file,
# and the only stack an operator could actually start was the development one,
# where `ENVIRONMENT` defaults to `development` and
# `services/api/app/api/v1/dev_auth.py` resolves an unauthenticated request to
# a demo user whose role is `admin`.
#
# It is an overlay over `docker-compose.yml`, so there is exactly one
# definition of every service and this file holds only what production changes.
# A standalone copy would have drifted from the base within a release, which is
# the failure this repository keeps finding.
#
# It was written with the Compose Spec `include` directive and a single `-f`.
# That does not work: `include` imports a model, and overriding a service it
# imported is rejected with `services.<name> conflicts with imported resource`.
# `infra/compose/docker-compose.dev.yml` had the same shape and has since
# moved to a two-`-f` overlay for the same reason — it could never have
# carried an override, which is why it carried nothing.
# Measured rather than assumed — `-f docker-compose.prod.yml` alone fails on
# Compose v2.29.7 and v2.39.4 and resolves only on 5.1.3, so the documented
# production command worked on almost no installation. Two `-f` flags are the
# ordinary override form and resolve identically on all three.
#
# WHAT THIS FILE GUARANTEES
#
# * The authentication bypass is unreachable. `ENVIRONMENT` and `AISOC_DEV_MODE`
# are fixed values here, not interpolated, so no `.env` can re-enable them.
# * Nothing starts on a default credential. Every secret uses `${VAR:?...}`,
# which makes Compose refuse to start and name the variable rather than
# starting on nothing — and, because `:?` rejects an *empty* variable and
# cannot look at a value, `preflight-secrets` below runs ahead of every
# other service and refuses the literals this repository publishes. Until
# it existed this bullet was false: `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the
# development default is a published literal}` accepted `aisoc_dev_secret`,
# which is what `.env.example` shipped.
# * No datastore is reachable from the host. Postgres, Redis, Kafka and
# Qdrant publish no ports at all; the console and the ingest endpoint are
# the only things bound, and they bind to loopback unless you set
# AISOC_BIND_ADDR deliberately (put a TLS-terminating proxy in front —
# see docs/runbooks/HARDENING.md section 2).
#
# WHAT IT DOES NOT DO
#
# TLS, secret rotation, network policies, audit-log forwarding and backups
# are not in a compose file. `docs/runbooks/HARDENING.md` is the checklist
# and this file is the starting posture, not the finished one.
services:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The value check `${VAR:?}` cannot do.
#
# Compose's `:?` operator rejects an unset or empty variable. It cannot look
# at a value, so `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the development default is a
# published literal}` accepted `aisoc_dev_secret` — the exact literal its own
# message names, shipped in `.env.example` and defaulted to in
# `docker-compose.yml`. Every guard below had the same hole, so the guarantee
# in this file's header held for none of them.
#
# This runs first and every other service waits for it to exit 0.
# `scripts/check_published_secrets.py` derives the refused values from the
# tree — the `${VAR:-literal}` defaults in the compose files, the non-empty
# values in `.env.example`, and INSECURE_SECRET_KEY_DEFAULTS — so a default
# added later is refused without anyone remembering to list it here.
#
# Every `${VAR:?}` variable in this file is repeated below. That is what
# gets it into the container's environment, and `--check` fails when a guard
# exists that the preflight never sees.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
preflight-secrets:
image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-core-api:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
pull_policy: missing
container_name: aisoc-preflight-secrets
restart: "no"
entrypoint: ["python3", "/repo/scripts/check_published_secrets.py", "--check-env"]
# Read-only, and the whole tree rather than the four files the harvest
# happens to read today: a hand-listed mount is another list that stops
# matching the code, and the failure mode is the check quietly reading
# less than it thinks it does. `AISOC_REPO_ROOT` is how `gate_toolkit`
# is pointed at a tree without shelling out to git, which this image
# does not carry.
volumes:
- .:/repo:ro
environment:
AISOC_REPO_ROOT: /repo
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD — the development default is a published literal}
AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:?set AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD — the development default is a published literal}
REDIS_PASSWORD: ${REDIS_PASSWORD:?set REDIS_PASSWORD}
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?set SECRET_KEY — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:?set AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:?set AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET — run `make env` to generate it}
REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:?set REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
METRICS_TOKEN: ${METRICS_TOKEN:?set METRICS_TOKEN — guards /metrics outside development; `openssl rand -hex 32`}
JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:?set JWT_SECRET — signs SAML/OIDC sessions}
NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?set NEO4J_PASSWORD}
CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:?set CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}
GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?set GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD — required for the monitoring profile}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Data plane. No published ports: in the development stack these are bound to
# 127.0.0.1 so a developer can attach a client, which is reasonable there and
# is an attack surface here. `ports: []` overrides the base list rather than
# appending to it.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
postgres:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD — the development default is a published literal}
# The DML-only runtime role the services connect as, so the row-level
# security policies actually apply to them. Separate from the owner
# password above and rotated the same way.
AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:?set AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD — the development default is a published literal}
redis:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
zookeeper:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
kafka:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
qdrant:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Application services. `ENVIRONMENT` and `AISOC_DEV_MODE` are literals on
# purpose: an interpolated value here would let a stray `.env` put a
# production deployment back into the environment where the auth bypass
# lives, which is the defect this file exists to make impossible.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
api:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ENVIRONMENT: production
AISOC_DEV_MODE: 0
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:?set AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}
DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:?set AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/aisoc
DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?set POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/aisoc
REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:?set REDIS_PASSWORD}@redis:6379/0
# `make env` generates all of these. They are required rather than
# defaulted because a service that starts without one either serves
# unauthenticated or signs with a key published in this repository —
# both were reported vulnerabilities, fixed in v12.0.0.
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?set SECRET_KEY — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:?set AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
# Verified by `alert_writeback.service_token_valid`, which reads this
# and only this. Unset, every internal context route the agents service
# calls refuses it, and triage silently runs without organisation
# memory, tenant skills, dispositions, identity or runbooks.
AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:?set AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET — run `make env` to generate it}
REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:?set REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
# The remaining two secrets `enforce_secure_defaults` hard-fails on, and
# the reason this stack could not boot at all: `ENVIRONMENT: production`
# above turns every entry in `warn_if_insecure_defaults` into a refusal,
# and these two were the only ones no service block passed through. The
# API crash-looped on
#
# InsecureProductionDefaultsError: Refusing to boot in production with
# insecure defaults:
# - METRICS_TOKEN is empty in a non-development environment
# - JWT_SECRET is empty or set to the well-known placeholder
#
# while compose reported the stack up. Declaring them here is what makes
# the refusal arrive the way the rest of this file's do — before anything
# starts, naming the variable — rather than as a restart loop behind a
# console that is already listening.
#
# `make env` deliberately does not generate METRICS_TOKEN: a token set
# anywhere overrides the development exemption on /metrics, so writing
# one into every `.env` would close the scrape endpoint on development
# stacks whose Prometheus sends no credential. It is a production secret,
# set deliberately here.
METRICS_TOKEN: ${METRICS_TOKEN:?set METRICS_TOKEN — guards /metrics outside development; `openssl rand -hex 32`}
JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:?set JWT_SECRET — signs SAML/OIDC sessions; the same value ingest-worker takes below}
ingest-worker:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !override ["${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8081:8080"]
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
# Both keys, because `envmode.Current()` reads ENV first and the base
# file's ENV is what shadowed an operator's ENVIRONMENT before this.
ENV: production
ENVIRONMENT: production
# Required outside development by
# services/ingest/internal/config/config.go. This is the service that
# accepts events off the network, so it is the last one that should be
# allowed to start without a signing secret.
JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:?set JWT_SECRET — ingest refuses to start without it outside development}
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN}
AISOC_NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?set NEO4J_PASSWORD}
fusion:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ENVIRONMENT: production
AISOC_DEV_MODE: 0
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN}
CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:?set CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}
agents:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ENVIRONMENT: production
AISOC_DEV_MODE: 0
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN}
AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN}
# The same value the api service declares above. Eight modules here
# present it; the API verifies it without falling back.
AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN}
NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?set NEO4J_PASSWORD}
actions:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ENVIRONMENT: production
AISOC_DEV_MODE: 0
# Without this the service answers 503 on every mutating route, which is
# the intended failure introduced in v12.0.0 — it previously served
# isolate_host and run_script to anything that could reach the port.
AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN}
connectors:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ENVIRONMENT: production
AISOC_DEV_MODE: 0
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:?set AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY}
AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:?set AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN}
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?set SECRET_KEY}
threatintel:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ENVIRONMENT: production
AISOC_DEV_MODE: 0
NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?set NEO4J_PASSWORD}
realtime:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
# Unset, the edge rejects every connection and /internal/* answers 503.
# Both used to fall back: the ticket verifier to a constant committed to
# this repository, and the internal guard to "authorized".
AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:?set AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET — run `make env` to generate it}
REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:?set REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN — run `make env` to generate it}
litellm:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
ollama:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
# Declared here only to take the preflight dependency. It is the one service
# the base file defines that this overlay otherwise has nothing to say about,
# and a single service that starts ahead of the credential check is the hole
# the check exists to close.
ollama-pull:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
# The MCP server (depth 9.1), a `--profile mcp` opt-in that is off by
# default. It publishes 8096 in the base file for local clients; in
# production it is unpublished like every other upstream, because the
# console does not proxy it and an operator who wants an external MCP
# endpoint exposes it deliberately. It authorizes every call from the
# credential in the request (no static key — `check_mcp_over_http.py`
# enforces that), so the credential check still gates its start.
mcp:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
# The console. Demo mode is inlined at build time by Next, so this asserts
# the runtime side only; pull the `latest` tag rather than a `-demo` one.
web:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
NODE_ENV: production
AISOC_DEMO_MODE: "false"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# `full`-profile stores. They do not run in a CORE deployment, but the base
# file gives every service a default that points at the published dev
# credential, so `--profile full` would start Neo4j and ClickHouse on a
# password anyone can read. Required here rather than defaulted, and required
# on the services that dial them so the two cannot disagree.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
neo4j:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
NEO4J_AUTH: neo4j/${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?set NEO4J_PASSWORD — required for the full profile}
clickhouse:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:?set CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD — required for the full profile}
opensearch:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
# Kafka UI browses every topic with no authentication of its own. It is
# useful while developing and is not something to run beside production data,
# so it is moved onto a profile nothing here activates: `--profile full` no
# longer starts it. An operator who wants it can still ask for it by name.
kafka-ui:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
profiles: !override ["debug-ui"]
ports: !reset []
# `no`, not `unless-stopped`: this is a tool you bring up to look at
# something and shut down again. Restarting it on boot would quietly leave
# an unauthenticated topic browser running next to production data.
restart: "no"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# HARDENING.md section 2 — transport and network surface.
#
# Profiled services that bind a host port in the development file. The
# console and the ingest endpoint are the only things that need to be
# reachable: apps/web/next.config.js proxies every upstream server-side, so
# a browser only ever talks to `web`. Reach these with `docker compose exec`
# for debugging, or publish one deliberately in a local override.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
alertmanager:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
enrichment:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
honeytokens:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
# Opt-in ack-clock bridge (profile `escalations`). No ports in the base
# file, so nothing to reset; it only needs to wait for the credential
# preflight like every other service.
escalations:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
osquery-tls:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
otel-collector:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
prometheus:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
purple-team:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
slack-bot:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
teams-bot:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
# Same treatment as its sibling: the base file publishes a port for
# local work, and in production only the console and ingest are
# reachable from the host. `!reset` rather than an empty list, because
# a plain override appends.
ports: !reset []
tempo:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
ueba:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
# HARDENING.md section 5 — observability and audit.
#
# Grafana defaults to admin/admin in the development file. Required here, so
# `--profile monitoring` cannot start a dashboard over production telemetry
# on a password printed in its own documentation.
grafana:
depends_on:
preflight-secrets:
condition: service_completed_successfully
ports: !reset []
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?set GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD — required for the monitoring profile}