Skip to content

armgit / AiSOC

Public Imported from GitHub
0

Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

12.3 KB
Raw Blame

AiSOC v8 — progress tracker

Last updated: 2026-09-29 Current release: v13.0.0 (2026-09-29) · Next: unscheduled. Packaging is no longer named against a version: it slipped v8.0 to v8.1 to v8.2 for the same reason each time, and the blocker is registry credentials rather than code. Each major since v10.0 has been a major for the same kind of reason — upgrading requires an operator action — not because the v8 line is superseded. See the per-version sections of CHANGELOG.md for what each one closed and what it knowingly left open.

This tracker is the at-a-glance view of what has landed across the v8 line and what is still open. It is deliberately short and dated. When it disagrees with the tree, the tree wins — and the tracker is the thing to fix.

A note on this file's history. It sat unchanged from 2026-06-27 through the v8.0 release, describing four wave-1 tasks as "in flight" months after they merged and naming a loose end that had already landed. README.md linked here for "v8.1 packaging work in flight" and a reader found a June snapshot with no packaging in it. A tracker that is not updated is worse than no tracker, because it is read as current.

Its root-level predecessor AISOC_V8_PROGRESS.md is the sharper version of the same lesson, and the reason issue #362 was closed rather than refreshed. That issue existed so the wave-2 backlog would be readable "without needing to read AISOC_V8_PROGRESS.md", and pointed at the file anyway — a link that has returned 404 since 2026-06-30, when #368 deleted the root tracker and created this one in the same commit. Every item #362 listed is now recorded here (wave-2, in the table below) or in ROADMAP.md (wave-3). Re-auditing before closing it was worth doing rather than assuming: one gap it named — Lacework having no config-snapshot writer — was recorded in neither file and is migrated into the T1.2 row below, and the T3.6 row was itself wrong, still listing a durable approval store that had already landed. A tracking issue for a release four majors old is a tracker nobody reads; this file is the one to keep current.


v8.0 — shipped 2026-09-22

Released as close the loop: connecting capabilities the codebase already contained but never called. The recurring finding, which repeated a dozen times, was the mechanism exists, is unit-tested, and has no caller on the path that needs it — a passing test on an uncalled function is indistinguishable from a working feature until someone traces the call graph.

Full inventory: [8.0.0] in CHANGELOG.md.

Post-v8.0 — the credibility floor and four pillars

Landed on main between the v8.0 tag and the v8.1 cut (#696, #697, #707, #713, #715, #717).

The floor came first because four docs described controls that did not exist. Each was corrected and then implemented, so the claim could return honestly. Then the four pillars: context graph (Neo4j schema v1.1 plus real migration runners for all three non-Postgres stores), recursive investigation (run_with_tools had zero production callers), the per-capability action contract, and a SOC-agent benchmark a third party can run against their own agent.

Claim-to-gate matrix at the v8.0 cut: 108 rows — 99 GATED / 9 PARTIAL / 0 NO GATE. That is a record of where v8.0 landed, not the current tally; the matrix has grown since. Recount with python3 scripts/check_claim_gate_matrix.py; do not quote a remembered figure.

Of the twelve hardening phases, Phase 4 is the only one unchecked, and deliberately: what remains is a funded provider key for the live-agent eval, not code.


v8.1 — shipped 2026-09-23

Wave-2 features (issue #362)

Each item is audited against the tree before any code is written, because the v8.0 lesson is that a capability is often already present and merely unwired. Status is filled in from that audit rather than from the original ticket.

The audit found the backlog wrong in both directions: two items were already built, and four had the capability present with the path that feeds it broken. That is the same shape v8.0 found a dozen times — the mechanism exists, is tested, and has no caller on the path that needs it — so auditing against the tree before writing code is now the first step of a wave rather than an optional one.

T-ID Item What the audit found Done
T1.2 Versioned config-snapshot writers, Neo4j :CONFIGURED_AS {ts} The Neo4j writer is fully built. The Go provider called a route nobody serves, and could not have called the real one (it has no vault), so snapshots silently never ran while reporting themselves enabled. is_current / valid_from / valid_to were declared and never written, so the documented O(1) lookup matched zero edges. partial — Lacework has no get_resource_config, so three of the four providers the ticket named are covered. Five connectors implement it (AWS Security Hub, Azure Defender, GCP SCC, GitHub, Okta); lacework.py is registered and does not. AISOC_SNAPSHOT_ENABLED is also off by default and no compose file sets it, so this runs on operator opt-in only.
T2.3 LLMInputContract across every sub-agent Real and fail-closed in services/agents, covering 15 of 16 call sites. services/api had no contract at all across seven endpoints, and the module described as living there did not exist. The no-bypass gate could not see a raw-HTTP LLM call. yes
T3.2 Effective-permissions resolvers (Azure / GCP / Okta / GWS) Already shipped — all five exist, are registered and report coverage: "full". The gap is the snapshot, not the resolver: no connector answers __posture_snapshot__, so four of five return 412. Docstrings still called them scaffolds. audited; gap gated
T3.3 Attack-chain ranking + timeline UI Grouping (fusion, Redis) and weighted ranking (API, Postgres) both exist as independent implementations that never exchange data. AttackChainPanel and AttackStory.tsx are honest about empty states; InvestigationTimeline.tsx rendered a fabricated investigation with no demo gate. partial — fabrication gated, the two implementations remain separate
T3.5 Business-context rule engine Already shipped, and the v8.0 Postgres fix is real. But the two evaluators disagreed on not, so one console-accepted rule silently discarded that tenant's entire rule set at triage, suppressions included. yes
T3.6 ChatOps coverage Every piece existed; three had no caller. Slack Block Kit approvals worked only as a reply to the analyst's own slash command, the Teams card factory had zero senders, and the signed email link pointed at a route that did not exist. Worse: approvals authorized nobody. partial — authorization, the email route and the durable approval store are all done; the Teams proactive card push remains. The durable store was recorded here as outstanding after it had landed: PostgresTimerStore is wired at services/slack-bot/app/main.py behind migration 062_approval_timers.sql. The genuine remainder is narrower than "Teams" — approval_card() in services/teams-bot/app/cards.py has no caller outside its own tests, and services/teams-bot/app/main.py exposes only inbound routes, so there is no outbound path for an Adaptive Card. The proactive Teams path that does exist (services/actions/app/executors/chatops.py) sends a legacy Connector Card.

Release integrity

Item Status
Changelog backfill for the post-v8.0 wave (#682–#719) done
RELEASES.md brought up to v8.0.0 (it still announced v7.6.0) done
ROADMAP.md — "v8.0 — Planned" section, stale matrix count done
This tracker done
Codespaces quickstart (#716) done
arm64 service images (Apple Silicon could not pull any of them) done
Screencast + hero.gif assets moved to v8.2 — recording needs a stack to point a browser at, and the hosted OSS demo is down pending a billing action

v8.1.1 — shipped 2026-09-23

An adoption audit with no new capability, run against the whole repository: installability, architecture comprehension, data provenance, pipeline connectivity, and whether documented commands work. The headline finding is that ./install.sh started a compose file with no ingest service, no fusion service and Kafka disabled — so the most-followed path into the project did not run the project, and the console a reader saw had been populated by a seed script.

Item Status
install.sh runs make up (CORE) and then the golden pipeline done
tests/e2e/golden_pipeline/ + golden-pipeline.yml, verified to fail when broken done
scripts/doctor.sh / make doctor done
/livez + /readyz on services/ingest, dialling Kafka done
CORE as the default profile; ClickHouse / Neo4j / Qdrant / OpenSearch / enrichment / connectors to full done
Five fabricated-data surfaces gated behind demo mode; seed_demo.py refuses outside development done
054_alert_provenance.sql — is_synthetic on alerts done
scripts/project_stats.py --check — README figures derived from the tree done
docs/audit/REPOSITORY_REALITY.md done
docs/architecture/README.md rewritten around one event's journey done
docs/testing/CLEAN_INSTALL.md done
README rewritten for adoption done
Consolidated Makefile done
The three packages that could not be built at the v8.1.0 tag done
CrowdStrike has no normalizer profile and uses the generic one withdrawn — the wrong diagnosis. The connector does take the canonical path; the real faults were an unread behaviors[].user_name and a canonical field map that recognised only actor. Both fixed in v9.0 — see docs/audit/REPOSITORY_REALITY.md
OpenSearch is started by full and read by nothing withdrawn — checked against services/api, which holds no OpenSearch client, and never against services/threatintel, which uses one unconditionally. Retracted in docs/audit/REPOSITORY_REALITY.md under "Correction (v9.0)"

Not in v8.1 either: packaging

release.yml already builds, packs and would upload all eight packages on every tag. The repository's only secret is FLY_API_TOKEN — there is no NPM_TOKEN and no PyPI trusted publisher — so the upload steps skip with a warning by design rather than reddening the release.

This is an account action, not an engineering task. Naming it against a release that cannot perform it is the kind of claim the claim-to-gate matrix exists to prevent, so packaging is named against v8.2 and becomes a re-tag once the credentials exist. Registry name state at the v8.1 cut: npm aisoc, @aisoc/sdk and @aisoc/mcp are unclaimed; on PyPI aisoc is taken by an unrelated project, so the Python side ships as aisoc-sandbox, and aisoc-sandbox, aisoc-cli, aisoc-sdk, aisoc-plugin-sdk and aisoc-detections are all free. One-time setup: docs/operations/publishing.md.

Deferred by decision — both taken up in v9.0

  • Mobile responder console. Recorded here as "not started; no React Native code in the tree", which was true about React Native and misleading about the product: the responder console already existed as a PWA under apps/web/src/app/(responder)/, complete with a service worker, an offline approval queue and Web Push. apps/mobile shipped in v9.0 as a distribution channel on top of it. Its unit tests and type-check run in CI; no device build has been performed.
  • Plugin marketplace v3 (commercial plugins, revenue sharing). Taken up in v9.0. The signing and OCI foundations were real; publisher identity was a stub returning None, so a submitted plugin was never rejected for a bad signature, and there was no commerce code of any kind in the repository.

Both were labelled "deferred to v8.0" until that label went stale at the v8.0 tag.