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Connector Least-Privilege Scopes
Phase 1.6 of the world-class program. Because a vault compromise pivots into every connected system, each connector credential must be granted the minimum scope it needs — read/telemetry for detection, plus only the specific write scopes for any SOAR action the operator enables.
Principle: grant read/audit scopes by default; add a containment scope only when the matching autonomous action is enabled for that connector, and prefer resource-scoped policies over account-wide ones.
This is the living reference; a representative set of the highest-impact connectors is documented below. Contributions adding a connector must include its minimum-scope row (enforced narratively in review; a scope-audit gate is tracked for Phase 10's conformance suite).
AWS (CloudTrail / GuardDuty / Security Hub)
- Read/detect:
cloudtrail:LookupEvents,guardduty:GetFindings,guardduty:ListFindings,securityhub:GetFindings. - Contain (only if enabled):
ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress/RevokeSecurityGroupIngressscoped to a quarantine SG;iam:UpdateAccessKeyscoped to the target user path. - Do NOT grant:
*:*,iam:CreateUser, org-wide admin.
Okta
- Read/detect:
okta.logs.read,okta.users.read,okta.sessions.read. - Contain (only if enabled):
okta.users.managelimited to session-revocation / suspend; scope to a non-admin group where possible. - Do NOT grant: super-admin API token.
CrowdStrike Falcon
- Read/detect: Detections
READ, HostsREAD, Event streamsREAD. - Contain (only if enabled): Host containment
WRITE(network-contain), Real Time Response only if host-isolation playbooks are enabled. - Do NOT grant: Falcon administrator, API client management.
GitHub
- Read/detect:
read:audit_log(org),repo:readmetadata,read:org. - Contain (only if enabled):
admin:orgis over-scoped — prefer fine-grained tokens limited to the specific repos/actions (e.g. revoke a compromised deploy key). - Do NOT grant: classic PAT with full
repo+admin:orgunless a specific action requires it.
Splunk / Elastic (SIEM)
- Read/detect: search/query role on the relevant indexes only.
- Contain: SIEM connectors are read-oriented; no write scope unless a notable-update action is enabled.
- Do NOT grant: admin/
sc_admin.
Audit
Until the Phase 10 conformance gate lands, review every connector PR against this principle and record the connector's minimum scope in its docs page under apps/docs/docs/connectors/<id>.md. The vault threat model that motivates this is in platform-threat-model.md.