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armgit / AiSOC

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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

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Connector Least-Privilege Scopes

Phase 1.6 of the world-class program. Because a vault compromise pivots into every connected system, each connector credential must be granted the minimum scope it needs — read/telemetry for detection, plus only the specific write scopes for any SOAR action the operator enables.

Principle: grant read/audit scopes by default; add a containment scope only when the matching autonomous action is enabled for that connector, and prefer resource-scoped policies over account-wide ones.

This is the living reference; a representative set of the highest-impact connectors is documented below. Contributions adding a connector must include its minimum-scope row (enforced narratively in review; a scope-audit gate is tracked for Phase 10's conformance suite).

AWS (CloudTrail / GuardDuty / Security Hub)

  • Read/detect: cloudtrail:LookupEvents, guardduty:GetFindings, guardduty:ListFindings, securityhub:GetFindings.
  • Contain (only if enabled): ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress/RevokeSecurityGroupIngress scoped to a quarantine SG; iam:UpdateAccessKey scoped to the target user path.
  • Do NOT grant: *:*, iam:CreateUser, org-wide admin.

Okta

  • Read/detect: okta.logs.read, okta.users.read, okta.sessions.read.
  • Contain (only if enabled): okta.users.manage limited to session-revocation / suspend; scope to a non-admin group where possible.
  • Do NOT grant: super-admin API token.

CrowdStrike Falcon

  • Read/detect: Detections READ, Hosts READ, Event streams READ.
  • Contain (only if enabled): Host containment WRITE (network-contain), Real Time Response only if host-isolation playbooks are enabled.
  • Do NOT grant: Falcon administrator, API client management.

GitHub

  • Read/detect: read:audit_log (org), repo:read metadata, read:org.
  • Contain (only if enabled): admin:org is over-scoped — prefer fine-grained tokens limited to the specific repos/actions (e.g. revoke a compromised deploy key).
  • Do NOT grant: classic PAT with full repo + admin:org unless a specific action requires it.

Splunk / Elastic (SIEM)

  • Read/detect: search/query role on the relevant indexes only.
  • Contain: SIEM connectors are read-oriented; no write scope unless a notable-update action is enabled.
  • Do NOT grant: admin/sc_admin.

Audit

Until the Phase 10 conformance gate lands, review every connector PR against this principle and record the connector's minimum scope in its docs page under apps/docs/docs/connectors/<id>.md. The vault threat model that motivates this is in platform-threat-model.md.