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armgit / AiSOC

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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

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Walkthrough — aws-credential-exfil

AWS credential exfiltration. Long-lived IAM access keys belonging to a CI service account (ci-svc-prod) are used from an ASN the workload has never previously contacted, immediately followed by s3:ListBuckets + bulk s3:GetObject against a tagged-confidential bucket.

Run it

# Offline simulator:
aisoc-sandbox demo --scenario aws-credential-exfil

# Real stack (after `make up`, with `pip install -e packages/aisoc-cli`):
aisoc submit examples/alerts/aws-credential-exfil.json

What the agent does, step by step

Step 0 · DetectAgent · detect

Three CloudTrail events ingest as a single fused incident — the AWS GuardDuty + native AiSOC detections both fire on the UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/AnomalousASN pattern. Fusion deduplicates the three events and lifts the alert to severity=critical because the bucket carries the Classification=Confidential tag.

Step 1 · TriageAgent · triage

The graph walk identifies that ci-svc-prod is a long-lived service account whose key has never rotated, and that the access pattern (sts:GetCallerIdentity → s3:ListBuckets → bulk s3:GetObject) matches three public access-key-leak postmortems from Q1 2026.

Decision: Confidence high (100/100).

Step 2 · HuntAgent · hunt

Sweeps the last 24 h for any other API calls from 198.51.100.77 or using AKIAEXAMPLE7QWERTY. The hunt confirms the key has been used from exactly one new IP and against exactly one new bucket — clean exfil signature, no broader compromise yet.

Step 3 · RespondAgent · respond

Proposes a five-action containment burst — every action sits inside the human_approval_required gate because severity is critical:

  • iam.access_key.deactivate({"access_key_id": "AKIAEXAMPLE7QWERTY"})
  • iam.user.attach_deny_policy({"user": "ci-svc-prod"})
  • s3.bucket.block_public_access({"bucket": "acme-prod-customer-pii"})
  • case.create(...) at severity critical
  • case.notify({"channel": "pagerduty", "service": "soc-tier1"})

What the analyst would do next

  1. Approve iam.access_key.deactivate from the responder PWA. The deny policy can wait until the on-call confirms there's no automated rotation in flight.
  2. Look at the bucket's s3:GetObject audit log for the full set of objects accessed — the alert shows one specific object, but the additionalEventData.totalObjectsListedInWindow=4137 suggests the actor was iterating.
  3. Trigger the secrets-rotation playbook for every IAM key issued in the last 90 days.
  4. Open a separate case for ci-svc-prod itself — long-lived keys on a CI account is the root cause, and the org should migrate to short-lived OIDC tokens.