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id: hunt-encoded-powershell-command
name: PowerShell invoked with a base64-encoded command
description: |
Management platforms run encoded PowerShell as a matter of course. The same command line under an ordinary user account rarely has a benign explanation.
version: 1.0.0
severity: high
category: endpoint
tags:
- mitre.attack.t1059.001
- hunt.endpoint
log_sources:
- sysmon
schedule:
enabled: true
interval_minutes: 60
jitter_seconds: 60
hypothesis:
question: |
Was PowerShell run with an encoded command by a non-administrative account?
indicators:
- field: "source"
equals: "sysmon"
- field: "EventID"
in: [1]
- field: "CommandLine"
regex: "(?i)-(e|en|enc|encodedcommand)\\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}"
- field: "userIsAdministrator"
equals: false
expected:
positive_incident_id: INC-HUNT-026
positive_template_id: hunt-encoded-powershell-command
min_match_score: 0.8
negative_incident_id: INC-HUNT-026-NEG
# The negative inverts userIsAdministrator, the clause this hunt is about,
# and holds every other field constant. A negative that differed in the
# log source would pass without testing anything.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
author: AiSOC
created: '2026-09-27'
modified: '2026-09-27'