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## AiSOC audit.rules profile (Linux auditd) — v1.0.0
##
## Drop this file at /etc/audit/rules.d/99-aisoc.rules and reload
## with `augenrules --load`. Every rule names its bucket via a
## ``-k aisoc_*`` key so the AiSOC `auditd` connector can map the
## event to a severity tier (see services/connectors/app/connectors/auditd.py
## for the mapping table).
##
## Severity buckets (matched by key prefix):
## aisoc_critical_* -> high
## aisoc_priv_esc_* -> medium
## aisoc_persistence_* -> medium
## aisoc_exec -> medium
## aisoc_watch_* -> low
## aisoc_audit_* -> low
##
## Coverage targets (in priority order):
## 1. execve from /tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp (post-exploit staging)
## 2. writes to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d
## 3. SSH config + authorized_keys tampering
## 4. Cron / systemd persistence
## 5. Kernel module load / removal
## 6. ptrace, mount, finit_module / init_module
## 7. Audit subsystem self-tampering (auditctl -D, -e 0)
##
## We deliberately do NOT enable a blanket exec catch-all. Every
## execve on a busy host produces ~10-50 records/second; that
## overwhelms the file_tail connector and obscures real signal.
## Operators who want full execve coverage can append:
##
## -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k aisoc_exec
##
## ...and accept the volume.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 1: reset everything we know about so the policy is
## deterministic across reloads. Comment this out if you're
## layering AiSOC on top of an existing CIS / STIG ruleset.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-D
-b 8192
--backlog_wait_time 60000
-f 1
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 2: high-signal execve from staging directories.
## Suppresses /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm execs which almost never
## have a legitimate origin in production.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F dir=/tmp -F success=1 -k aisoc_critical_exec_tmp
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F dir=/var/tmp -F success=1 -k aisoc_critical_exec_tmp
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F dir=/dev/shm -F success=1 -k aisoc_critical_exec_tmp
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F dir=/tmp -F success=1 -k aisoc_critical_exec_tmp
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F dir=/dev/shm -F success=1 -k aisoc_critical_exec_tmp
## memfd_create -> execve is the canonical fileless-malware pattern.
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S memfd_create -k aisoc_critical_memfd
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 3: identity / credential file watches.
## Any write to these is a high-confidence signal in steady-state.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k aisoc_critical_identity_write
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k aisoc_critical_identity_write
-w /etc/group -p wa -k aisoc_critical_identity_write
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k aisoc_critical_identity_write
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k aisoc_critical_sudoers_write
-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k aisoc_critical_sudoers_write
-w /etc/pam.d/ -p wa -k aisoc_critical_pam_write
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 4: SSH server + user key tampering.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-w /etc/ssh/sshd_config -p wa -k aisoc_critical_ssh_config
-w /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ -p wa -k aisoc_critical_ssh_config
-w /root/.ssh/authorized_keys -p wa -k aisoc_critical_authorized_keys
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 5: persistence (cron, systemd, init.d, profile.d).
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-w /etc/crontab -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /etc/cron.d/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /etc/cron.hourly/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /etc/cron.daily/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /etc/cron.weekly/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /etc/cron.monthly/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /var/spool/cron/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_cron
-w /etc/systemd/system/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_systemd
-w /lib/systemd/system/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_systemd
-w /etc/init.d/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_initd
-w /etc/profile -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_profile
-w /etc/profile.d/ -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_profile
-w /etc/rc.local -p wa -k aisoc_persistence_rclocal
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 6: kernel module / privilege escalation primitives.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -k aisoc_priv_esc_module_load
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S finit_module -k aisoc_priv_esc_module_load
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -k aisoc_priv_esc_module_load
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -k aisoc_priv_esc_ptrace
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -k aisoc_priv_esc_mount
-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k aisoc_priv_esc_module_load
-w /sbin/rmmod -p x -k aisoc_priv_esc_module_load
-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k aisoc_priv_esc_module_load
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 7: audit subsystem self-tampering.
## Detection rule det-endpoint-147 (linux-auditctl-disable.yaml)
## already pivots on `exe ENDSWITH "/auditctl"`; this watch makes
## the same signal available without an execve catch-all.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-w /etc/audit/ -p wa -k aisoc_audit_self_tamper
-w /etc/libaudit.conf -p wa -k aisoc_audit_self_tamper
-w /sbin/auditctl -p x -k aisoc_audit_self_tamper
-w /sbin/auditd -p x -k aisoc_audit_self_tamper
-w /var/log/audit/ -p wa -k aisoc_audit_log_write
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 8: low-signal watches (still useful for retro hunts).
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k aisoc_watch_hosts
-w /etc/resolv.conf -p wa -k aisoc_watch_dns
-w /etc/nsswitch.conf -p wa -k aisoc_watch_nss
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
## Step 9: lock the configuration so a foothold can't `auditctl -e 0`
## without rebooting. Keep this LAST — every rule below it is
## ignored after `-e 2` is applied.
##
## Comment this out during initial rollout so you can iterate; turn
## it on once your fleet is stable.
## ---------------------------------------------------------------
# -e 2