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"""
Detection Pack v1 - Part 3 / Application (40 new specs)
=======================================================
Native application-layer detection rules covering web-app attacks, SaaS
collaboration tools, DevOps/CI pipelines and API misuse. These extend the
application rules in ``detection_specs.APPLICATION`` (~25 stable rules).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from detection_specs_part3_helpers import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
FP_PENTEST,
FP_TUNING,
S,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Web-app attacks (15)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WEB_APP_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="app-ssti-pattern",
name="Server-Side Template Injection Pattern In Request",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "body_contains_any": ["{{7*7}}", "${7*7}", "{%7*7%}", "<%= 7*7 %>"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-xxe-pattern",
name="XML External Entity Reference In Request Body",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "body_contains_any": ["<!ENTITY", 'SYSTEM "file://', 'SYSTEM "http://']},
fp=["Approved XML SOAP integration"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-nosql-injection",
name="NoSQL Injection Operator In Request",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "body_contains_any": ['$ne":', '$gt":', '$where":', '$regex":']},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-graphql-introspection",
name="GraphQL Introspection Query Against Production",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1213"],
product="api-gateway",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "uri": "/graphql", "body_contains": "__schema", "environment": "prod"},
fp=["Approved schema documentation generator"],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
S(
slug="app-graphql-deep-recursion",
name="GraphQL Query With Excessive Recursion Depth",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1499"],
product="api-gateway",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "uri": "/graphql", "query_depth_gt": 10},
fp=["Sanctioned bulk export"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="app-jndi-log4shell",
name="JNDI LDAP Lookup Pattern (Log4Shell-Style)",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "any_header_value_contains_any": ["${jndi:ldap://", "${jndi:rmi://", "${jndi:dns://"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-spring4shell-pattern",
name="Spring4Shell Class Loader Manipulation Pattern",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "body_contains_any": ["class.module.classloader", "class.classLoader"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-deserialization-rce-marker",
name="Java/.NET Deserialization Marker In Body",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1059"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "body_contains_any": ["rO0AB", "AAEAAAD/////AQAAAAAAAAAM", "TypeObject"]},
fp=["Inter-service signed payload (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-cookie-tampered-hmac",
name="Session Cookie Failed HMAC Verification",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1185"],
product="application",
service="auth",
when={"event_type": "session_validate", "hmac_valid": False},
fp=["Stale cookie after key rotation"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="app-account-enum-reset",
name="High Volume Of Password Reset Requests From Single IP",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1110"],
product="application",
service="auth",
when={"event_type": "password_reset_request", "count_5min_per_ip_gt": 30},
fp=["Internal load test"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="app-websocket-origin-bypass",
name="WebSocket Upgrade From Cross-Origin Header",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="application",
service="ws",
when={"event_type": "ws_upgrade", "origin_matches_allowed_list": False},
fp=["Newly added integration partner (update allow-list)"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-crlf-header-injection",
name="CRLF Sequence In HTTP Header Value",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="waf",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "any_header_value_contains_any": ["%0d%0a", "\\r\\n"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="app-subdomain-takeover-cname",
name="CNAME Pointing To Deleted SaaS Tenant",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1583.001"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={
"event_type": "dns_response",
"qtype": "CNAME",
"target_endswith_any": [".herokudns.com", ".github.io", ".azurewebsites.net"],
"target_resolves": False,
},
fp=["Pending tenant migration (verify ticket)"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="app-cors-wildcard-with-creds",
name="CORS Response With Wildcard Origin And Credentials Allowed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="application",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_response", "header_access_control_allow_origin": "*", "header_access_control_allow_credentials": "true"},
fp=["Public unauthenticated API"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="app-csp-disabled",
name="Content-Security-Policy Header Removed From Production Response",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="application",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_response", "csp_header_present": False, "environment": "prod"},
fp=["Public marketing pages exempt from CSP"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DevOps / CI / supply-chain (12)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEVOPS_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="app-ci-workflow-modified-by-non-owner",
name="CI Workflow Modified By Account Without CODEOWNER Approval",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="github",
service="repo",
when={"event_type": "push", "path_contains": ".github/workflows/", "approver_role_neq": "codeowner"},
fp=["Bootstrap of new repository"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-self-hosted-runner-external",
name="Self-Hosted Runner Registered From External IP",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="github",
service="actions",
# `runner_register` is not in GitHub's vocabulary; registrations are
# `org.register_self_hosted_runner` / `repo.register_self_hosted_runner`.
# `ip_is_internal` is derived by the engine from `src_ip` (which the
# connector maps from the audit entry's `actor_ip`); when the org
# does not disclose IPs the field is absent and the rule stays
# silent — unknown is not external (issue #1545).
when={
"action_in": ["org.register_self_hosted_runner", "repo.register_self_hosted_runner"],
"ip_is_internal": False,
},
fp=["Approved partner-hosted runner"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
# Explicit fixtures carry the source IP rather than the derived
# boolean, so fixture replay exercises the derivation itself.
positive={"action": "org.register_self_hosted_runner", "src_ip": "203.0.113.9", "actor": "proof-actor"},
negative={"action": "org.register_self_hosted_runner", "src_ip": "10.20.30.40", "actor": "proof-actor"},
),
S(
slug="app-build-signing-key-rotated",
name="Build Artifact Signing Key Rotated Outside Maintenance Window",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1554"],
product="ci",
service="signing",
when={"event_type": "key_rotation", "in_change_window": False},
fp=["Emergency key rotation (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-helm-chart-untrusted-repo",
name="Helm Install From Unknown Chart Repository",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1195.002"],
product="kubernetes",
service="helm",
when={"event_type": "helm_install", "repo_url_endswith_in_allow_list": False},
fp=["Pilot of new vendor chart"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-terraform-destroy-prod",
name="terraform destroy Run Targeting Production Workspace",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="terraform",
service="cli",
when={"event_type": "terraform_run", "command": "destroy", "workspace_in": ["prod", "production"]},
fp=["Authorised infra teardown"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="app-secret-published-to-slack",
name="Newly Created Secret Has Slack Webhook Pattern",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="vault",
service="secrets",
when={"event_type": "secret_create", "value_contains": "hooks.slack.com/services/"},
fp=["Approved alerting webhook"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="app-deploy-key-added-github",
name="SSH Deploy Key Added To GitHub Repository",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1098.004"],
product="github",
service="repo",
# GitHub's audit log has no deploy_key.* category: a deploy-key add
# is logged as `public_key.create` ("An SSH key was added to a user
# account or a deploy key was added to a repository"). The repo slug
# is what marks the deploy-key case — a user SSH-key add carries no
# repo, and the matcher treats a missing field as no match. `action`
# rather than `event_type` because the connector prefixes the latter
# (`github.{action}`); the raw audit entry's own key is the stable
# one (issue #1545).
when={"action": "public_key.create", "repo_contains": "/"},
fp=["Sanctioned automation onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
positive={"action": "public_key.create", "repo": "example-org/payments-core", "actor": "[email protected]"},
# The negative is the other thing public_key.create genuinely logs:
# a user SSH-key add, which carries no repo at all. Explicit because
# the auto-negative flips the repo *value* and the vocabulary's
# alternatives are repo slugs, every one of which still contains "/".
negative={"action": "public_key.create", "actor": "[email protected]"},
),
S(
slug="app-npm-package-publish-new-account",
name="NPM Package Published From New Account",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1195.002"],
product="npm",
service="registry",
when={"event_type": "package_publish", "publisher_account_age_days_lt": 14, "package_visibility": "public"},
fp=["New maintainer onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-pypi-package-publish-new-ip",
name="PyPI Package Published From New IP",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1195.002"],
product="pypi",
service="registry",
when={"event_type": "package_publish", "publisher_ip_seen_before": False},
fp=["New maintainer onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-docker-insecure-registry-flag",
name="Docker Daemon Started With --insecure-registry Flag",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1195.002"],
product="docker",
service="dockerd",
when={"event_type": "daemon_config", "insecure_registries_count_gt": 0},
fp=["Internal mirror without TLS (deprecated, must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-image-critical-cve-pushed",
name="Container Image With Critical CVE Pushed To Prod Registry",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1525"],
product="container-registry",
service="scan",
when={"event_type": "scan_result", "cvss_max_gte": 9.0, "registry_environment": "prod"},
fp=["Approved exception (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="app-protected-branch-disabled",
name="Branch Protection Disabled On Protected Branch",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.004"],
product="github",
service="repo",
# Both are documented audit actions, but the connector emits
# `event_type=github.{action}`, so clausing the unprefixed values on
# `event_type` could never match. The raw entry's `action` key is
# visible to the engine and carries them unprefixed (issue #1545).
when={"action_in": ["protected_branch.policy_override", "protected_branch.destroy"]},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SaaS / collaboration (12)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAAS_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="app-salesforce-mass-export",
name="Salesforce Mass Data Export Initiated",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="salesforce",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "DataExport", "row_count_gt": 100000},
fp=["Approved data migration"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-salesforce-sandbox-refresh-anomaly",
name="Salesforce Sandbox Refreshed Outside Change Window",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="salesforce",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "SandboxRefresh", "in_change_window": False},
fp=["Emergency sandbox refresh (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="app-workday-bank-info-changed",
name="Workday Banking Info Changed Without HR Ticket",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="workday",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "BankAccountChange", "linked_ticket": False},
fp=["Self-service change with valid step-up auth"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="app-zoom-recording-shared-external",
name="Zoom Cloud Recording Shared Externally",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="zoom",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "recording_share", "share_type": "external"},
fp=["Customer-facing webinar recording"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-box-public-link-mass-create",
name="Box Created Many Public Links In Short Window",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1567.002"],
product="box",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "shared_link.create", "access": "open", "count_5min_per_user_gt": 20},
fp=["Marketing campaign content drop"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-notion-workspace-export",
name="Notion Workspace Exported By Non-Admin",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="notion",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "workspace.export", "actor_is_admin": False},
fp=["Approved knowledge migration"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-confluence-space-export-bulk",
name="Confluence Bulk Space Export",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="confluence",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "space.export", "size_bytes_gt": 524288000},
fp=["Approved knowledge migration"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-servicenow-record-export-bulk",
name="ServiceNow Bulk Record Export",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="servicenow",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "record_export", "row_count_gt": 50000},
fp=["Approved reporting workflow"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-slack-file-shared-external",
name="Slack File Shared To External Channel",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1567.002"],
product="slack",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "file_shared", "channel_type": "external"},
fp=["Approved partner connect channel"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-slack-channel-public-conversion",
name="Slack Private Channel Converted To Public",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1213"],
product="slack",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "channel_convert_to_public"},
fp=["Approved transparency policy"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="app-onedrive-anonymous-link-sensitive",
name="OneDrive Anonymous Sharing Link Created For Sensitive File",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1567.002"],
product="m365",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "AnonymousLinkCreated", "sensitivity_label_in": ["Confidential", "Highly Confidential"]},
fp=["Approved external review"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="app-sharepoint-guest-tenantwide",
name="SharePoint Tenant-Wide Guest Access Enabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="m365",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "TenantSettingChanged", "setting": "SharingCapability", "value": "ExternalUserSharingOnly"},
fp=["Approved tenant-level policy update"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# API misuse (1)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
API_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="app-graphql-mutation-anonymous",
name="GraphQL Mutation Executed By Anonymous Caller",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="api-gateway",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "graphql_op", "op_type": "mutation", "actor_authenticated": False},
fp=["Public mutation endpoint (allow-listed: subscribe / contact)"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AI / LLM-usage audit rules (Phase D2)
#
# The AI/LLM-usage audit connector (services/connectors/app/connectors/
# llm_usage.py) pulls OpenAI + Anthropic org audit logs and emits events with
# a top-level ``event_type`` like ``openai.api_key.created`` /
# ``anthropic.member.added``. These rules turn the high-signal ones into
# detections — the SaaS-AI governance surface the leading platforms emphasise.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LLM_USAGE_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="llm-api-key-created",
name="LLM Provider API Key Created",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".api_key.created"},
fp=["Planned key rotation (change ticket)", "New service onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-account-compromise",
),
S(
slug="llm-admin-key-created",
name="LLM Provider Admin API Key Created",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".api_key.created", "key_scope": "admin"},
fp=["Documented break-glass admin key issuance"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="llm-member-added-owner",
name="LLM Provider Owner Role Granted",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.003"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".member.added", "role": "owner"},
fp=["Approved org owner change"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="llm-logging-disabled",
name="LLM Provider Audit Logging Disabled",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1562.008"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_contains": "logging", "action": "disabled"},
fp=["Vendor maintenance window (documented)"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="llm-mfa-disabled",
name="LLM Provider MFA Requirement Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_contains": "mfa", "action": "disabled"},
fp=["Approved auth-policy change"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="llm-anthropic-workspace-created",
name="Anthropic Workspace Created",
severity="low",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="anthropic",
service="audit",
when={"event_type": "anthropic.workspace.created"},
fp=["Planned workspace provisioning"],
playbook="tpl-triage",
),
S(
slug="llm-service-account-created",
name="LLM Provider Service Account Created",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1136.003"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".service_account.created"},
fp=["New automation onboarding (change ticket)"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
# Wave-2 7.4. Four rules on the providers wave-2 7.1 added, each
# clausing only on a field the connector really emits at the top
# level — which is the whole lesson of the GitHub pass, where 1 of 12
# rules fired on real connector output because the rest claused on
# names nothing produced. Every one of these is replayed through
# `LlmUsageConnector.normalize()` and the real engine in
# `services/fusion/tests/test_ai_rule_pack_replay.py`.
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
S(
slug="llm-copilot-content-exclusion-changed",
name="Copilot Content Exclusion Changed",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="github_copilot",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".copilot.content_exclusion_changed"},
fp=["Exclusion list edited as part of an approved repository onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
description=(
"Content exclusion is the control that stops a coding assistant reading the "
"paths an organisation has declared off limits — key material, customer data, "
"anything it has decided a model must not see. A change to it is a change to "
"that boundary, and it is made in a settings page rather than in a pull "
"request, so nothing else reviews it."
),
),
S(
slug="llm-copilot-agent-mcp-config-changed",
name="Hosted Coding Agent MCP Server List Changed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1195"],
product="github_copilot",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".copilot.swe_agent_mcp_config_updated"},
fp=["A reviewed addition of an internal MCP server"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
description=(
"The MCP server list decides what a hosted coding agent can reach and what it "
"is told. Adding a server is adding a party that can instruct the agent, which "
"is a scope change rather than a settings change — and the agent runs on the "
"provider's infrastructure, so no endpoint control sees the result."
),
),
S(
slug="llm-ai-app-granted-write-scope",
name="AI Application Consented a Write Scope",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.001"],
product="entra_consent",
service="audit",
when={
"event_type_endswith": ".consent_to_application",
# `granted_scopes`, the name the connector promotes. A bare
# `scopes` collided with GitHub's token scopes in the
# detection-field gate's union-of-all-connectors namespace.
"granted_scopes_has_any": [
"Mail.ReadWrite",
"Mail.Send",
"Files.ReadWrite.All",
"Sites.ReadWrite.All",
"Directory.ReadWrite.All",
"User.ReadWrite.All",
],
},
fp=["An AI application approved through the organisation's own review process"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
description=(
"A consent grant handing an AI application the ability to change a mailbox, a "
"drive, a site or the directory itself. The read equivalent is an exposure; "
"this one can act. The decisive field is the granted scope, which the "
"connector lifts out of the free-text consent property — a grant whose scopes "
"stay buried is indistinguishable from one that was granted nothing."
),
),
S(
slug="llm-copilot-bulk-resource-access",
name="AI Assistant Interaction Touched Many Resources at Once",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="microsoft_copilot",
service="audit",
when={
"event_type_endswith": ".CopilotInteraction",
"accessed_resource_count_gte": 25,
},
fp=[
"A summarisation task over a large shared folder, run deliberately",
"A migration or audit the owner initiated",
],
playbook="tpl-data-exfil",
description=(
"One assistant turn that read a large number of distinct resources. An "
"assistant with a user's full grant is an exfiltration path that authenticates "
"as that user and looks like ordinary application traffic; volume in a single "
"interaction is the shape that separates answering a question from sweeping a "
"drive."
),
),
S(
slug="llm-project-deleted",
name="LLM Provider Project Deleted",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="openai",
service="audit",
when={"event_type_endswith": ".project.archived"},
fp=["Planned project decommission"],
playbook="tpl-triage",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Aggregate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AI runtime detections — the customer's own agent / LLM / MCP estate.
#
# Distinct from LLM_USAGE_RULES above, and the distinction is the point. Those
# fire on an AI provider's *control plane*: who minted an API key, who was made
# an owner. Valuable, but it says nothing about what the agents did once
# running. These fire on runtime behaviour arriving from the `aisoc-ai-sdk`
# and the `ai-runtime` / `ai-finding` ingest templates.
#
# Every field below is one the SDK or a template actually emits. That is not a
# style note: the matcher does a flat `event.get(field)`, and 663 rules in this
# corpus were found matching on fields nothing produces — loaded by the engine,
# passing fixture replay (fixtures are synthesized from the rule), and unable
# to fire. `scripts/check_detection_fields.py` now gates that.
#
# Severity reflects what the signal means on its own, before triage. An agent
# reading a record it was designed to read is not an alert; an agent whose
# retrieved context tried to give it new instructions is.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AI_RUNTIME_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="ai-prompt-injection-detected",
name="Prompt Injection Detected in AI Agent Context",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1059"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"finding_type": "prompt_injection"},
fp=[
"Security team testing the guardrail with a known payload",
"A document legitimately quoting injection text, e.g. an awareness training page",
],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"A guardrail flagged instruction-override content reaching an agent's context. "
"Injection is the delivery mechanism for every other agent abuse, so this is "
"the earliest point at which the chain is visible."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-agent-excessive-agency",
name="AI Agent Took Action Beyond Its Granted Scope",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"finding_type": "excessive_agency"},
fp=["Agent scope widened without the policy being updated to match"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
description=(
"The agent invoked a capability outside the scope it was granted. Unlike a "
"compromised user, an agent has no intent to infer — a call outside its "
"declared tool set is either a policy gap or someone steering it."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-sensitive-data-egress",
name="Sensitive Data Left via an AI Agent",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1567"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"finding_type": "sensitive_data_egress"},
fp=["Approved data-processing workflow not yet added to the allowlist"],
playbook="tpl-data-exfil",
description=(
"A guardrail matched sensitive content on its way out through an agent. An "
"agent with retrieval access is an exfiltration path that authenticates as "
"itself and looks like normal application traffic."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-unapproved-model",
name="AI Agent Used an Unapproved Model",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"finding_type": "unapproved_model"},
fp=["Model newly approved but the inventory not yet updated"],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"An agent called a model outside the approved set. Often benign drift, but it "
"is also how data leaves a reviewed provider for an unreviewed one."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-tool-escalation",
name="AI Agent Escalated to a Higher-Privilege Tool",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1548"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"finding_type": "tool_escalation"},
fp=["Break-glass tool use during an incident, with a ticket"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="ai-shadow-agent-discovered",
name="Undeclared AI Agent Observed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"finding_type": "shadow_ai"},
fp=["A newly deployed agent that has not been registered yet"],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"Telemetry arrived from an agent absent from the inventory. Shadow AI is the "
"AI-estate equivalent of an unmanaged endpoint: it cannot be governed, and "
"its access is unreviewed."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-prompt-contained-credential",
name="Credential Material Present in an AI Prompt",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1552"],
product="ai_runtime",
service="runtime",
when={"prompt_secret_kinds_has_any": ["aws_access_key", "github_token", "openai_key", "private_key", "slack_token"]},
fp=["Security testing with a revoked key", "Developer pasting a sample key from documentation"],
playbook="tpl-account-compromise",
description=(
"A secret shape appeared in a prompt. Detected without the prompt content "
"ever being transmitted: the SDK reports which patterns matched while "
"sending only a digest, so this fires even under the default hashed "
"capture mode."
),
),
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
# Wave-2 7.4, the four targets Phase 7.3's baselines unblock.
#
# Each clauses on a `baseline_agent_*` or `baseline_gateway_key_*`
# derived field, which `services/fusion/app/services/baselines.py`
# computes per sub-principal and `scripts/check_detection_fields.py`
# knows about. Novelty and rate are properties of a *history*, so the
# stateless matcher cannot express them on its own — which is exactly
# why these four could not be written before 7.3 and were recorded as
# blocked rather than shipped clausing on fields nothing produced.
#
# Thresholds are stated as floors on an already-bounded score: rarity
# is in [0,1] and a z-score is in deviations, so the numbers below are
# readable without knowing the corpus.
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
S(
slug="ai-agent-new-high-risk-tool",
name="AI Agent Called a High-Risk Tool It Has Never Used",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1059"],
product="ai_runtime",
service="runtime",
when={
"tool_name_in": [
"execute_command",
"run_shell",
"write_file",
"delete_file",
"send_email",
"create_user",
"grant_permission",
"deploy",
"terraform_apply",
"database_write",
],
"baseline_agent_tool_rarity_gte": 0.95,
},
fp=[
"An agent whose scope was widened deliberately, with the change recorded",
"The first run after a deployment that added the tool",
],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
description=(
"An agent reached for a tool that changes an estate and has essentially no "
"history of using it. Novelty is per agent and not global: execute_command is "
"routine for a deployment bot and alarming for a summariser, and a count across "
"the estate cannot tell them apart. The high-risk list is the same one the AI "
"estate's exposure score reads, so an operator sees one definition of "
"'changes an estate' in both places."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-agent-guardrail-violation-rate",
name="Guardrail Violations Rose Sharply for One AI Agent",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="ai_guardrail",
service="runtime",
when={"outcome": "blocked", "baseline_agent_volume_z_gte": 3.0},
fp=[
"A newly tightened guardrail policy, where the rise is the policy and not the agent",
"A load test replaying blocked prompts",
],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"A single agent is being blocked far more often than its own history. One "
"guardrail violation is noise — a user phrasing something awkwardly — while a "
"rise against that agent's own baseline is someone probing for a phrasing that "
"gets through. Scored per agent rather than per tenant, because a busy estate's "
"total hides one agent's change completely."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-agent-token-spend-anomaly",
name="AI Agent Spend Far Above Its Own Baseline",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1496"],
product="ai_runtime",
service="runtime",
when={"baseline_agent_token_spend_z_gte": 4.0},
fp=[
"A deliberately larger job, such as a backfill or a bulk summarisation",
"A model change that raised the per-request cost for every agent",
],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"Cost is the signal that notices an agent being used for something other than "
"its job — an exfiltration loop, a stolen credential driving inference, or a "
"prompt that has started recursing. It reads the gateway's own billed figure "
"rather than recomputing one from token counts, so it cannot disagree with the "
"invoice. An unpriced request contributes nothing instead of a zero."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-gateway-key-spend-anomaly",
name="AI Gateway Key Spend Far Above Its Own Baseline",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1496"],
product="ai_runtime",
service="runtime",
when={"baseline_gateway_key_token_spend_z_gte": 4.0},
fp=["A key deliberately shared with a new workload"],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"The same question asked of the key rather than the agent, and the two are not "
"the same incident: a leaked key driving inference from outside the estate "
"moves the key's baseline while every agent on it looks ordinary. Both are "
"needed, which is why the baseline module keys on sub-principals rather than "
"on one chosen subject."
),
),
S(
slug="ai-agent-tool-call-failed-repeatedly",
name="AI Agent Tool Call Denied",
severity="low",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="ai_runtime",
service="runtime",
when={"outcome": "denied"},
fp=["Agent retry logic against a transiently unavailable tool"],
playbook="tpl-triage",
description=(
"A tool call was refused. Low on its own, and deliberately so — the value is "
"as a building block once the windowed engine can express 'N denials in M "
"minutes', which is the shape that distinguishes a probing agent from a "
"misconfigured one."
),
),
]
APPLICATION_EXTRA: list[dict] = WEB_APP_RULES + DEVOPS_RULES + SAAS_RULES + API_RULES + LLM_USAGE_RULES + AI_RUNTIME_RULES
__all__ = [
"APPLICATION_EXTRA",
"WEB_APP_RULES",
"DEVOPS_RULES",
"SAAS_RULES",
"API_RULES",
"LLM_USAGE_RULES",
"AI_RUNTIME_RULES",
]