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"""
Detection Pack v1 - Part 3 / Cloud (150 new specs)
==================================================
Native cloud detection rules covering AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and a small
multi-cloud bucket. These extend the 40 stable cloud rules in `detection_specs.CLOUD`
to a total of 190 native cloud detections.
Authoring rules
---------------
* Use the ``S()`` helper from ``detection_specs_part3_helpers`` so every spec
auto-generates positive/negative fixtures from a flat ``match_when`` clause.
For nested ``any_of`` / ``all_of`` clauses you must pass explicit fixtures.
* Slugs prefixed with ``aws-``, ``azure-``, ``gcp-``, ``k8s-`` or ``cloud-``
follow the convention used in ``detection_specs.CLOUD``. New slugs MUST NOT
collide with existing ones.
* Severity guidance:
* critical : direct credential or data compromise / persistence with broad
blast radius.
* high : strong indicator of a single-tenant attack technique.
* medium : posture / mis-configuration / suspicious-but-tunable behaviour.
* low : noisy or intel-only signals.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from detection_specs_part3_helpers import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
FP_AUTOMATION,
FP_BACKUP,
FP_BREAK_GLASS,
FP_FORENSIC,
FP_TUNING,
S,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AWS (60 rules)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWS_RULES: list[dict] = [
# ---- IAM (15) ----
S(
slug="aws-iam-attach-administrator-access",
name="AWS IAM AdministratorAccess Policy Attached",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004", "t1098"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={
"event_name_in": ["AttachUserPolicy", "AttachRolePolicy", "AttachGroupPolicy"],
"policy_arn": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess",
},
fp=["IAM bootstrap during account vending", FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-key-rotation-skipped",
name="AWS IAM Access Key Older Than 365 Days",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "ListAccessKeys", "key_age_days_gt": 365},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION, "Service-account key intentionally pinned"],
playbook="tpl-credential-hygiene",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-mfa-disabled-on-priv-user",
name="AWS IAM MFA Removed From Privileged User",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1556.006"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "DeactivateMFADevice", "target_user_priv": True},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS, "Token rotation procedure"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-role-trust-broadened-wildcard",
name="AWS IAM Role Trust Policy Allows Principal '*'",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1078.004", "t1098.001"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "trust_principal": "*"},
fp=["Sandbox / training account by design"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-policy-version-set-default-broad",
name="AWS IAM Policy Version Set With Wildcard Action",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "policy_action": "*", "policy_resource": "*"},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-permissions-boundary-removed",
name="AWS IAM Permissions Boundary Removed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary"},
fp=["Boundary refactor (tracked in change ticket)"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-saml-provider-modified",
name="AWS IAM SAML Provider Updated",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name_in": ["UpdateSAMLProvider", "CreateSAMLProvider"]},
fp=["IdP migration (must be ticketed)", FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-cross-account-role-broad-trust",
name="AWS IAM Role Trusts Foreign Account Root",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "CreateRole", "trust_principal_endswith": ":root", "trust_principal_external": True},
fp=["Approved partner integration"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-anonymous-role-trust",
name="AWS IAM Role Trusts Anonymous Federation",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "CreateRole", "trust_principal_in": ["anonymous", "AllUsers"]},
fp=[],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-create-user-burst",
name="AWS IAM CreateUser Burst",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1136.003"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "CreateUser", "events_per_minute_gt": 10},
fp=["Bulk onboarding window", FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-account-summary-recon",
name="AWS IAM GetAccountSummary Recon Burst",
severity="low",
mitre=["t1087.004"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name_in": ["GetAccountSummary", "GetAccountAuthorizationDetails"], "events_per_minute_gt": 5},
fp=["IAM Access Analyzer routine"],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-list-keys-recon",
name="AWS IAM ListAccessKeys Recon Across Users",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1087.004"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "ListAccessKeys", "distinct_users_per_minute_gt": 20},
fp=["Compliance audit job"],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-login-profile-created-existing-user",
name="AWS IAM Login Profile Added To Existing User",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.001"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "CreateLoginProfile", "user_existed": True},
fp=["Migrating service account to interactive use"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-access-key-created-other-user",
name="AWS IAM Access Key Created For Another User",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.001"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name": "CreateAccessKey", "actor_eq_target": False},
fp=["Helpdesk ticket (must be linked)"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="aws-iam-policy-with-notaction",
name="AWS IAM Policy Created With NotAction Wildcard",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="aws",
service="iam",
when={"event_name_in": ["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"], "policy_uses_notaction": True},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
# ---- S3 / EBS (8) ----
S(
slug="aws-s3-block-public-access-disabled",
name="AWS S3 Block Public Access Disabled",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="aws",
service="s3",
when={"event_name_in": ["PutBucketPublicAccessBlock", "DeletePublicAccessBlock"], "block_public_acls": False},
fp=["Static site bucket explicitly public"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="aws-s3-bucket-policy-allows-anonymous",
name="AWS S3 Bucket Policy Allows Principal '*'",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="aws",
service="s3",
when={"event_name": "PutBucketPolicy", "policy_principal": "*"},
fp=["Public download bucket (documented)"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="aws-s3-replication-to-foreign-account",
name="AWS S3 Replication Configured To External Account",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1537"],
product="aws",
service="s3",
when={"event_name": "PutBucketReplication", "destination_account_external": True},
fp=["Approved cross-account DR pipeline"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="aws-s3-server-access-logging-disabled",
name="AWS S3 Server Access Logging Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1562.008"],
product="aws",
service="s3",
when={"event_name": "PutBucketLogging", "logging_enabled": False},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION, "Decommissioned bucket"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-s3-object-lock-disabled",
name="AWS S3 Object Lock / Retention Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="aws",
service="s3",
when={"event_name_in": ["PutObjectLockConfiguration", "PutObjectRetention"], "retention_disabled": True},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="aws-s3-mass-deleteobject",
name="AWS S3 Mass DeleteObject Burst",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="aws",
service="s3",
when={"event_name": "DeleteObject", "objects_per_minute_gt": 1000},
fp=["Lifecycle policy run", FP_BACKUP],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="aws-ebs-snapshot-shared-foreign",
name="AWS EBS Snapshot Shared With Foreign Account",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1537"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "ModifySnapshotAttribute", "shared_account_external": True},
fp=["Approved DR copy"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="aws-ami-shared-public",
name="AWS AMI Shared Publicly",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1537"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "ModifyImageAttribute", "ami_made_public": True},
fp=["Marketplace publishing workflow"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
# ---- EC2 / VPC (8) ----
S(
slug="aws-ec2-imds-v1-allowed",
name="AWS EC2 Instance Launched With IMDSv1 Allowed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1552.005"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "RunInstances", "imds_v1_allowed": True},
fp=["Legacy AMI (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-ec2-key-pair-imported",
name="AWS EC2 Key Pair Imported",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1098.004"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "ImportKeyPair"},
fp=["Bootstrap of golden image", FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="aws-ec2-disable-api-stop-revoked",
name="AWS EC2 DisableApiStop Protection Revoked",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "ModifyInstanceAttribute", "attribute": "disableApiStop", "value": False},
fp=["Decommissioning workflow"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="aws-ec2-userdata-modified-running",
name="AWS EC2 UserData Modified On Running Instance",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1059.001", "t1059.004"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "ModifyInstanceAttribute", "attribute": "userData", "instance_state": "running"},
fp=["Approved cloud-init re-run"],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="aws-vpc-route-to-internet-gateway",
name="AWS VPC Default Route Pointed At New IGW",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1090"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "CreateRoute", "destination_cidr": "0.0.0.0/0", "target_type": "internet-gateway"},
fp=["New public subnet provisioning"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="aws-security-group-rule-add-22-from-anywhere",
name="AWS SG Rule Allows SSH From 0.0.0.0/0",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress", "ip_protocol": "tcp", "from_port": 22, "to_port": 22, "cidr": "0.0.0.0/0"},
fp=["Bastion/jump-host with MFA"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-security-group-rule-add-3389-from-anywhere",
name="AWS SG Rule Allows RDP From 0.0.0.0/0",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress", "ip_protocol": "tcp", "from_port": 3389, "to_port": 3389, "cidr": "0.0.0.0/0"},
fp=["Lab account by design"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-vpc-peering-cross-org",
name="AWS VPC Peering Connection Across Organizations",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="aws",
service="ec2",
when={"event_name": "CreateVpcPeeringConnection", "peer_account_external": True},
fp=["Approved partner network"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
# ---- RDS (5) ----
S(
slug="aws-rds-publicly-accessible-true",
name="AWS RDS Instance Modified To Publicly Accessible",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="aws",
service="rds",
when={"event_name_in": ["CreateDBInstance", "ModifyDBInstance"], "publicly_accessible": True},
fp=["Lab/demo workload only"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="aws-rds-snapshot-shared",
name="AWS RDS Snapshot Shared With Other Account",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1537"],
product="aws",
service="rds",
when={"event_name": "ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute", "shared_account_external": True},
fp=["DR copy to disaster account"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="aws-rds-iam-auth-disabled",
name="AWS RDS IAM Authentication Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="aws",
service="rds",
when={"event_name": "ModifyDBInstance", "iam_database_authentication_enabled": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-rds-master-password-reset",
name="AWS RDS Master User Password Reset",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="aws",
service="rds",
when={"event_name": "ModifyDBInstance", "master_user_password_changed": True},
fp=["Scheduled rotation"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-rds-deletion-protection-disabled",
name="AWS RDS Deletion Protection Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="aws",
service="rds",
when={"event_name": "ModifyDBInstance", "deletion_protection": False},
fp=["Planned decommission"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
# ---- Lambda (4) ----
S(
slug="aws-lambda-add-permission-anonymous",
name="AWS Lambda AddPermission Allows Principal '*'",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="aws",
service="lambda",
when={"event_name": "AddPermission", "principal": "*"},
fp=["Public webhook endpoint by design"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-lambda-env-var-secret-pattern",
name="AWS Lambda Env Var Contains Secret Pattern",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1552.001"],
product="aws",
service="lambda",
when={"event_name_in": ["CreateFunction", "UpdateFunctionConfiguration"], "env_secret_pattern": True},
fp=["Local-only fixture / unit-test value"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-lambda-create-url-public",
name="AWS Lambda Function URL With AuthType=NONE",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1190"],
product="aws",
service="lambda",
when={"event_name": "CreateFunctionUrlConfig", "auth_type": "NONE"},
fp=["Public ingest endpoint by design"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-lambda-runtime-deprecated",
name="AWS Lambda Function Uses Deprecated Runtime",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="aws",
service="lambda",
when={"event_name": "CreateFunction", "runtime_in": ["nodejs10.x", "nodejs12.x", "python2.7", "python3.6"]},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-vulnerability",
),
# ---- EKS / ECS (6) ----
S(
slug="aws-eks-cluster-public-endpoint",
name="AWS EKS Cluster API Endpoint Made Public",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="aws",
service="eks",
when={
"event_name_in": ["CreateCluster", "UpdateClusterConfig"],
"endpoint_public_access": True,
"public_access_cidrs_contains": "0.0.0.0/0",
},
fp=["Lab cluster"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-eks-fargate-profile-default-ns",
name="AWS EKS Fargate Profile Targets default Namespace",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="aws",
service="eks",
when={"event_name": "CreateFargateProfile", "namespace": "default"},
fp=["Greenfield cluster"],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="aws-ecs-task-privileged",
name="AWS ECS Task Definition With privileged=true",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1611"],
product="aws",
service="ecs",
when={"event_name": "RegisterTaskDefinition", "privileged": True},
fp=["Sysdig / debugger task"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="aws-ecs-execute-command-enabled",
name="AWS ECS ExecuteCommand Enabled On Service",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1059"],
product="aws",
service="ecs",
when={"event_name_in": ["CreateService", "UpdateService"], "enable_execute_command": True},
fp=["Debugging window"],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="aws-ecr-repo-publicly-readable",
name="AWS ECR Repository Policy Public",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1525"],
product="aws",
service="ecr",
when={"event_name": "SetRepositoryPolicy", "policy_principal": "*"},
fp=["Public images repo"],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
S(
slug="aws-ecr-image-scan-disabled",
name="AWS ECR Image Scan-On-Push Disabled",
severity="low",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="aws",
service="ecr",
when={"event_name": "PutImageScanningConfiguration", "scan_on_push": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-vulnerability",
),
# ---- KMS / Secrets (4) ----
S(
slug="aws-kms-key-policy-anonymous",
name="AWS KMS Key Policy Allows Principal '*'",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1552.001"],
product="aws",
service="kms",
when={"event_name": "PutKeyPolicy", "policy_principal": "*"},
fp=[],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-kms-schedule-key-deletion",
name="AWS KMS ScheduleKeyDeletion Used",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="aws",
service="kms",
when={"event_name": "ScheduleKeyDeletion"},
fp=["Decommissioning"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="aws-secretsmanager-mass-getsecret",
name="AWS SecretsManager Mass GetSecretValue",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1552.001"],
product="aws",
service="secretsmanager",
when={"event_name": "GetSecretValue", "distinct_secrets_per_minute_gt": 30},
fp=["Bootstrap of new microservice"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="aws-ssm-parameter-secure-no-kms",
name="AWS SSM SecureString Parameter Created Without KMS",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1552.001"],
product="aws",
service="ssm",
when={"event_name": "PutParameter", "type": "SecureString", "key_id": None},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
# ---- CloudTrail / Config / GuardDuty / Org (5) ----
S(
slug="aws-config-recorder-stopped",
name="AWS Config Recorder Stopped",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1562.008"],
product="aws",
service="config",
when={"event_name": "StopConfigurationRecorder"},
fp=["Account decommission"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-guardduty-detector-deleted",
name="AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="aws",
service="guardduty",
when={"event_name": "DeleteDetector"},
fp=["Region pruning approved"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-securityhub-disabled",
name="AWS SecurityHub DisableSecurityHub",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="aws",
service="securityhub",
when={"event_name": "DisableSecurityHub"},
fp=["Account decommission"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-cloudtrail-event-selector-narrowed",
name="AWS CloudTrail Event Selector Narrowed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1562.008"],
product="aws",
service="cloudtrail",
when={"event_name": "PutEventSelectors", "selector_includes_management_events": False},
fp=["Cost-optimisation work"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-organizations-account-removed",
name="AWS Organizations Account Removed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="aws",
service="organizations",
when={"event_name_in": ["RemoveAccountFromOrganization", "LeaveOrganization"]},
fp=["Approved account divestiture"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
# ---- Misc AWS (5) ----
S(
slug="aws-route53-domain-transfer-out",
name="AWS Route53 Domain Transfer Out",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1583.001"],
product="aws",
service="route53domains",
when={"event_name": "TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount"},
fp=["Account merger workflow"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="aws-cloudfront-origin-changed",
name="AWS CloudFront Origin Changed Mid-Service",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1565.002"],
product="aws",
service="cloudfront",
when={"event_name": "UpdateDistribution", "origin_changed": True, "distribution_age_days_gt": 30},
fp=["Approved migration"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="aws-waf-web-acl-disassociated",
name="AWS WAF Web ACL Disassociated",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="aws",
service="wafv2",
when={"event_name": "DisassociateWebACL"},
fp=["Re-association in same window"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="aws-sns-topic-public-subscribe",
name="AWS SNS Topic Policy Allows Anonymous Subscribe",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="aws",
service="sns",
when={"event_name": "SetTopicAttributes", "policy_principal": "*"},
fp=["Public notifications topic"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="aws-sqs-queue-public-policy",
name="AWS SQS Queue Policy Allows Principal '*'",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="aws",
service="sqs",
when={"event_name": "SetQueueAttributes", "policy_principal": "*"},
fp=["Public webhook ingestion"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Azure / M365 (35 rules)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AZURE_RULES: list[dict] = [
# ---- Entra / AAD (12) ----
S(
slug="azure-ad-app-consent-grant",
name="Entra ID Admin Consent Granted To App",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1528"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Consent to application", "consent_type": "AllPrincipals"},
fp=["Sanctioned SaaS rollout"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-app-credential-added-out-of-hours",
name="Entra ID App Credential Added Outside Business Hours",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.001"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Add service principal credentials", "is_business_hours": False},
fp=["On-call engineer rotation"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-conditional-access-bypass-rule",
name="Entra ID Conditional Access Rule Excludes Privileged User",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Update policy", "policy_excludes_priv_user": True},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-mfa-method-removed-priv",
name="Entra ID MFA Method Removed From Privileged User",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1556.006"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={
"operation_name_in": ["User registered security info", "User deleted security info"],
"target_user_priv": True,
"method_removed": True,
},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-pim-role-eligibility-self-assigned",
name="Entra ID PIM Role Eligibility Self-Assigned",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Add eligible member to role", "actor_eq_target": True},
fp=["Bootstrap by Global Admin"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-app-permissions-graph-read-write-all",
name="Entra ID App Granted Directory.ReadWrite.All",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1098.003"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={
"operation_name": "Update application",
"permissions_added_contains_any": ["Directory.ReadWrite.All", "RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory"],
},
fp=["Approved IAM tooling"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-bulk-user-creation",
name="Entra ID Bulk User Creation Burst",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1136.003"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Add user", "events_per_minute_gt": 25},
fp=["Bulk onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-named-location-removed",
name="Entra ID Trusted Named Location Removed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Delete named location"},
fp=["Office relocation project"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-legacy-auth-allowed",
name="Entra ID Legacy Authentication Re-Enabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Update policy", "block_legacy_auth": False},
fp=["Migration of legacy app"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-bulk-license-assignment",
name="Entra ID Bulk License Assignment",
severity="low",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Change user license", "events_per_minute_gt": 50},
fp=["Bulk onboarding"],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-admin-consent-workflow-disabled",
name="Entra ID Admin Consent Workflow Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name": "Set Company Information", "admin_consent_workflow": False},
fp=["Tenant config refactor"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-ad-self-service-pwd-reset-policy-modified",
name="Entra ID SSPR Policy Weakened",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="azure",
service="entra-audit",
when={"operation_name_in": ["Update password reset policy", "Disable password reset policy"]},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
# ---- ARM (8) ----
S(
slug="azure-arm-policy-assignment-deleted",
name="Azure Policy Assignment Deleted",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "policyAssignments/delete", "scope_root": True},
fp=["Policy refactor"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-blueprint-deleted",
name="Azure Blueprint Assignment Removed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "blueprintAssignments/delete"},
fp=["Subscription decommission"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-role-assignment-owner-tenant",
name="Azure Role Assignment Owner At Tenant Scope",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "roleAssignments/write", "role": "Owner", "scope_root": True},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-locks-removed-bulk",
name="Azure ResourceGroup Locks Removed In Bulk",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "locks/delete", "events_per_minute_gt": 10},
fp=["Decommission project"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-diagnostic-settings-deleted",
name="Azure Diagnostic Settings Deleted",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1562.008"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "diagnosticSettings/delete"},
fp=["Log pipeline migration"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-mass-resource-modify",
name="Azure Mass Resource Modify Burst",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith_any": ["/write", "/delete"], "events_per_minute_gt": 200},
fp=["IaC pipeline run"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-management-group-removed",
name="Azure Management Group Removed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "managementGroups/delete"},
fp=["Org restructure"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="azure-arm-subscription-transferred",
name="Azure Subscription Transferred",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_contains": "subscriptions/transfer"},
fp=["Approved EA migration"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
# ---- Storage (5) ----
S(
slug="azure-storage-blob-anonymous-read",
name="Azure Storage Container Allows Anonymous Read",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "blobServices/containers/write", "public_access_in": ["Container", "Blob"]},
fp=["Static-site container by design"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="azure-storage-account-firewall-disabled",
name="Azure Storage Account Firewall Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "storageAccounts/write", "default_action": "Allow"},
fp=["Public datalake by design"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="azure-storage-shared-key-issued",
name="Azure Storage Shared Access Signature Generated With Long TTL",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_contains": "ListKeys", "ttl_days_gt": 365},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="azure-storage-immutability-removed",
name="Azure Storage Immutability Policy Removed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "immutabilityPolicies/delete"},
fp=["Retention review"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="azure-storage-soft-delete-disabled",
name="Azure Blob Soft Delete Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1490"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "blobServices/write", "delete_retention_enabled": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
# ---- Key Vault (5) ----
S(
slug="azure-keyvault-purge-protection-disabled",
name="Azure Key Vault Purge Protection Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="azure",
service="keyvault",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "vaults/write", "enable_purge_protection": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="azure-keyvault-secret-mass-get",
name="Azure Key Vault Mass GetSecret",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1552.001"],
product="azure",
service="keyvault",
when={"operation_name": "SecretGet", "distinct_secrets_per_minute_gt": 30},
fp=["App boot"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="azure-keyvault-access-policy-broadened",
name="Azure Key Vault Access Policy Adds Permission '*'",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="azure",
service="keyvault",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "vaults/accessPolicies/write", "permissions_contains": "all"},
fp=[],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="azure-keyvault-firewall-allow-all",
name="Azure Key Vault Network ACL Allows All",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="azure",
service="keyvault",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "vaults/write", "default_action": "Allow"},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="azure-keyvault-key-export-allowed",
name="Azure Key Vault Key Export Attribute Set",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1552"],
product="azure",
service="keyvault",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "keys/create", "exportable": True},
fp=["Approved cross-region migration"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
# ---- AKS / Compute (5) ----
S(
slug="azure-aks-cluster-public-fqdn",
name="Azure AKS Cluster API With Public FQDN",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "managedClusters/write", "private_cluster": False, "authorized_ip_ranges_empty": True},
fp=["Lab"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="azure-aks-rbac-disabled",
name="Azure AKS Cluster RBAC Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "managedClusters/write", "enable_rbac": False},
fp=["Lab"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="azure-vm-runcommand",
name="Azure VM RunCommand Invoked",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1059"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "virtualMachines/runCommand/action"},
fp=["Approved DevOps script"],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="azure-vm-extension-customscript",
name="Azure VM CustomScript Extension Installed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1059"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "extensions/write", "extension_type": "CustomScript"},
fp=["Cloud-init bootstrap"],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="azure-vm-disk-encryption-disabled",
name="Azure VM Disk Encryption Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="azure",
service="activity",
when={"operation_name_endswith": "encryptionExtensions/write", "encryption_enabled": False},
fp=["Data classification change"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# GCP (30 rules)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GCP_RULES: list[dict] = [
# ---- IAM (10) ----
S(
slug="gcp-iam-allusers-binding",
name="GCP IAM Binding Adds allUsers / allAuthenticatedUsers",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetIamPolicy", "added_member_in": ["allUsers", "allAuthenticatedUsers"]},
fp=["Public dataset by design"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-service-account-disable",
name="GCP Service Account Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1531"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "DisableServiceAccount"},
fp=["Decommissioning"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-service-account-actas-grant",
name="GCP iam.serviceAccountUser Grant",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetIamPolicy", "role_added": "roles/iam.serviceAccountUser"},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-token-creator-grant",
name="GCP iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator Grant",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetIamPolicy", "role_added": "roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator"},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-billing-admin-grant",
name="GCP roles/billing.admin Granted",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetIamPolicy", "role_added": "roles/billing.admin"},
fp=["Org bootstrap"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-org-policy-disabled",
name="GCP Organization Policy Constraint Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetOrgPolicy", "list_policy_all_values": "ALLOW"},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-service-account-key-mass-create",
name="GCP Service Account Key Burst",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1098.001"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "CreateServiceAccountKey", "events_per_minute_gt": 5},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-grant-from-foreign-domain",
name="GCP IAM Binding To External Domain",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1199"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetIamPolicy", "added_member_external_domain": True},
fp=["Approved partner identity"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-impersonation-burst",
name="GCP Service Account Impersonation Burst",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "GenerateAccessToken", "distinct_targets_per_minute_gt": 10},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="gcp-iam-conditional-binding-removed",
name="GCP IAM Conditional Binding Removed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "SetIamPolicy", "condition_removed": True},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
# ---- GCS (6) ----
S(
slug="gcp-gcs-bucket-iam-allusers",
name="GCS Bucket IAM Granted To allUsers",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={
"method_name_endswith_any": ["storage.setIamPermissions", "storage.buckets.update"],
"added_member_in": ["allUsers", "allAuthenticatedUsers"],
},
fp=["Public CDN bucket by design"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gcs-uniform-access-disabled",
name="GCS Uniform Bucket-Level Access Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "storage.buckets.update", "uniform_bucket_level_access": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gcs-mass-delete",
name="GCS Mass Object Delete Burst",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name": "storage.objects.delete", "events_per_minute_gt": 1000},
fp=["Lifecycle rule"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gcs-bucket-retention-removed",
name="GCS Bucket Retention Policy Removed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "storage.buckets.removeRetentionPolicy"},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gcs-versioning-disabled",
name="GCS Object Versioning Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1490"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "storage.buckets.update", "versioning_enabled": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gcs-cors-wildcard",
name="GCS Bucket CORS Wildcard Origin",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "storage.buckets.update", "cors_origin": "*"},
fp=["Public API by design"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
# ---- GKE (5) ----
S(
slug="gcp-gke-rbac-anonymous",
name="GKE Cluster Anonymous Auth Enabled",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "clusters.update", "anonymous_auth": True},
fp=[],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gke-private-cluster-disabled",
name="GKE Cluster Private Cluster Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "clusters.update", "private_cluster": False, "authorized_networks_empty": True},
fp=["Lab cluster"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gke-workload-identity-disabled",
name="GKE Workload Identity Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "clusters.update", "workload_identity_config": None},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gke-shielded-nodes-disabled",
name="GKE Shielded Nodes Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "clusters.update", "shielded_nodes": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="gcp-gke-binary-auth-disabled",
name="GKE Binary Authorization Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "clusters.update", "binary_authorization": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-supply-chain",
),
# ---- BigQuery (5) ----
S(
slug="gcp-bq-dataset-allusers-access",
name="BigQuery Dataset ACL Adds allUsers",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1530"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name": "datasetservice.update", "added_member_in": ["allUsers", "allAuthenticatedUsers"]},
fp=["Public dataset by design"],
playbook="tpl-data-exposure",
),
S(
slug="gcp-bq-mass-export",
name="BigQuery Mass Export Burst",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1567.002"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_in": ["jobservice.jobcompleted", "jobs.insert"], "job_type": "EXPORT", "events_per_minute_gt": 5},
fp=["Scheduled BI export"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="gcp-bq-cross-project-query",
name="BigQuery Query Across External Project",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1083"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name": "jobservice.jobcompleted", "referenced_project_external": True},
fp=["Cross-project analytics by design"],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
S(
slug="gcp-bq-table-deleted-recently-created",
name="BigQuery Table Deleted Within 1 Hour Of Creation",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name": "tableservice.delete", "table_age_minutes_lt": 60},
fp=["Test/CI run"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="gcp-bq-cmek-removed",
name="BigQuery Dataset CMEK Removed",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name": "datasetservice.update", "kms_key_removed": True},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
# ---- Compute / Networking (4) ----
S(
slug="gcp-compute-firewall-source-any-port-any",
name="GCP Firewall Rule 0.0.0.0/0 With Any Port",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "firewalls.insert", "source_ranges_contains": "0.0.0.0/0", "port_any": True},
fp=["Lab project"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="gcp-compute-instance-public-ip-attached",
name="GCP Compute Public IP Attached To Instance",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1133"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "instances.insert", "external_ip_attached": True, "label_internal": True},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="gcp-compute-os-login-disabled",
name="GCP Project OS Login Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "projects.setCommonInstanceMetadata", "metadata_oslogin": "FALSE"},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="gcp-compute-shielded-vm-disabled",
name="GCP Compute Shielded VM Disabled",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="gcp",
service="audit",
when={"method_name_endswith": "instances.update", "shielded_instance_config": False},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Kubernetes (15 rules) - cloud-agnostic
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
K8S_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="k8s-cluster-admin-binding-non-system",
name="Kubernetes cluster-admin ClusterRoleBinding For Non-System Subject",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1098.001"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={
"verb": "create",
"object_resource": "clusterrolebindings",
"role_ref_name": "cluster-admin",
"subject_namespace_not": "kube-system",
},
fp=["Bootstrap of new cluster"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="k8s-secret-mass-get",
name="Kubernetes Secret Mass Get",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1552.001"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "get", "object_resource": "secrets", "distinct_secrets_per_minute_gt": 30},
fp=["Operator boot"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="k8s-pod-exec-prod-namespace",
name="Kubernetes pods/exec In Production Namespace",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "create", "object_resource": "pods/exec", "object_namespace_in": ["prod", "production"]},
fp=["DFIR responder", FP_FORENSIC],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="k8s-pod-attach-prod-namespace",
name="Kubernetes pods/attach In Production Namespace",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "create", "object_resource": "pods/attach", "object_namespace_in": ["prod", "production"]},
fp=[FP_FORENSIC],
playbook="tpl-execution",
),
S(
slug="k8s-anonymous-system-unauth",
name="Kubernetes Request By system:anonymous",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"user_name": "system:anonymous", "response_status_code_lt": 400},
fp=["Healthz probe (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="k8s-rbac-wildcard-verb",
name="Kubernetes Role Created With Wildcard Verb",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb_in": ["create", "update"], "object_resource_in": ["roles", "clusterroles"], "rule_verbs_contains": "*"},
fp=["Operator chart"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="k8s-pod-host-pid-enabled",
name="Kubernetes Pod hostPID=true",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1611"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "create", "object_resource": "pods", "host_pid": True},
fp=["DaemonSet for monitoring"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="k8s-pod-host-network-enabled",
name="Kubernetes Pod hostNetwork=true",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1611"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "create", "object_resource": "pods", "host_network": True},
fp=["CNI / kube-proxy DaemonSet"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="k8s-pod-privileged-container",
name="Kubernetes Privileged Container Created",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1611"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "create", "object_resource": "pods", "privileged": True},
fp=["Sysdig / Falco DaemonSet"],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="k8s-validating-webhook-deleted",
name="Kubernetes ValidatingWebhookConfiguration Deleted",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "delete", "object_resource": "validatingwebhookconfigurations"},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="k8s-mutating-webhook-suspicious-target",
name="Kubernetes MutatingWebhookConfiguration With External Endpoint",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb_in": ["create", "update"], "object_resource": "mutatingwebhookconfigurations", "webhook_url_external": True},
fp=["Approved policy controller"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="k8s-service-account-token-mount-default",
name="Kubernetes Pod Default ServiceAccount Token Mount",
severity="low",
mitre=["t1078"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "create", "object_resource": "pods", "service_account": "default", "automount_token": True},
fp=["Greenfield workload"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="k8s-impersonation-by-user",
name="Kubernetes Impersonate Privileged User",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1078.001"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb_contains": "impersonate", "impersonated_user_in": ["system:masters", "kubernetes-admin"]},
fp=[FP_FORENSIC],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="k8s-namespace-deletion-prod",
name="Kubernetes Production Namespace Deleted",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1485"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "delete", "object_resource": "namespaces", "object_name_in": ["prod", "production"]},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="k8s-network-policy-deleted-prod",
name="Kubernetes NetworkPolicy Deleted In Production",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1562.004"],
product="kubernetes",
service="audit",
when={"verb": "delete", "object_resource": "networkpolicies", "object_namespace_in": ["prod", "production"]},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Multi-cloud / SaaS-cloud (10 rules)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MULTI_CLOUD_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="cloud-cloudflare-zone-transfer",
name="Cloudflare Zone Transferred Out Of Account",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1583.001"],
product="cloudflare",
service="audit",
when={"action": "zone.transfer_out"},
fp=["Approved org migration"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="cloud-cloudflare-waf-rule-disabled",
name="Cloudflare WAF Rule Disabled",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1562.001"],
product="cloudflare",
service="audit",
when={"action_in": ["firewall_rule.disable", "waf_rule.disable"]},
fp=[FP_TUNING],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="cloud-cloudflare-access-policy-bypass",
name="Cloudflare Access Policy Bypass Granted",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="cloudflare",
service="audit",
when={"action": "access_policy.create", "decision": "bypass"},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="cloud-do-droplet-snapshot-shared",
name="DigitalOcean Droplet Snapshot Transferred",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1537"],
product="digitalocean",
service="api",
when={"action": "snapshot.transfer", "destination_account_external": True},
fp=["Approved DR copy"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="cloud-oci-iam-tenant-admin-binding",
name="OCI Tenant Administrators Group Membership Added",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="oci",
service="audit",
when={"event_name": "AddUserToGroup", "group": "Administrators", "compartment": "tenancy"},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-privilege-escalation",
),
S(
slug="cloud-multi-cross-cloud-mass-egress",
name="Multi-Cloud Cross-Cloud Mass Egress Burst",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1567"],
product="multi-cloud",
service="netflow",
when={
"src_cloud_in": ["aws", "azure", "gcp"],
"dst_cloud_in": ["aws", "azure", "gcp"],
"src_cloud_neq_dst_cloud": True,
"bytes_out_per_minute_gt": 1073741824,
},
fp=["Approved cross-cloud replication pipeline"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="cloud-iac-drift-bypassed",
name="Infra-As-Code Drift Bypassed With Manual Override",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1610"],
product="multi-cloud",
service="iac",
when={"action": "manual_override", "approver_in": ["self"], "out_of_hours": True},
fp=[FP_BREAK_GLASS],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="cloud-terraform-state-modified-direct",
name="Terraform State File Modified Outside Pipeline",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1565.001"],
product="multi-cloud",
service="iac",
when={"action": "state.modify", "actor_in_pipeline": False},
fp=["Manual recovery (incident-tracked)"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="cloud-saml-idp-trust-changed",
name="Cloud Provider SAML IdP Trust Changed",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1556"],
product="multi-cloud",
service="iam",
when={
"event_name_in": ["UpdateSAMLProvider", "Update federation configuration", "SetIdentityProvider"],
"metadata_url_changed": True,
},
fp=["IdP migration (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="cloud-org-rootmail-modified",
name="Cloud Provider Root/Owner Email Modified",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="multi-cloud",
service="iam",
when={"event_name_in": ["UpdateAccountEmail", "Update tenant primary contact", "ChangeRootMail"], "actor_eq_target": False},
fp=["Approved ownership transfer"],
playbook="tpl-account-manipulation",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Combined CLOUD extras
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLOUD_EXTRA: list[dict] = [
*AWS_RULES,
*AZURE_RULES,
*GCP_RULES,
*K8S_RULES,
*MULTI_CLOUD_RULES,
]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"AWS: {len(AWS_RULES)}")
print(f"Azure: {len(AZURE_RULES)}")
print(f"GCP: {len(GCP_RULES)}")
print(f"Kubernetes: {len(K8S_RULES)}")
print(f"Multi: {len(MULTI_CLOUD_RULES)}")
print(f"TOTAL: {len(CLOUD_EXTRA)}")