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"""
Detection Pack v1 - Part 3 / Network (50 new specs)
===================================================
Native network detection rules covering DNS, HTTP/TLS, tunnels, lateral
movement, authentication-protocol abuse and exfiltration patterns. These
extend the network rules in ``detection_specs.NETWORK`` (~30 stable rules).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from detection_specs_part3_helpers import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
FP_AUTOMATION,
FP_PENTEST,
S,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DNS (12)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DNS_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="net-dns-newly-registered-domain",
name="DNS Query For Newly Registered Domain (NRD)",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1071.004"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_query", "domain_age_days_lt": 7},
fp=["Brand-new SaaS launch (rare; verify business need)"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-idn-homoglyph",
name="DNS Query For Homoglyph Of Internal Brand",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1583.001"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_query", "homoglyph_score_gt": 0.85},
fp=["Authorized brand-protection scan"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-nxdomain-spike",
name="High Volume Of NXDOMAIN Responses From Single Host",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1568.002"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_response", "rcode": "NXDOMAIN", "count_5min_gt": 200, "src_role": "endpoint"},
fp=["Malformed in-house tooling (educate)"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-any-query-spike",
name="DNS Query Type ANY Volume From Single Host",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1018"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_query", "qtype": "ANY", "count_5min_gt": 50},
fp=["Approved DNS audit run"],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-dga-shannon",
name="DNS Query With High-Entropy Subdomain (DGA Indicator)",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1568.002"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_query", "subdomain_entropy_gt": 4.0, "subdomain_length_gt": 16},
fp=["CDN with hashed hostnames (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-large-txt-response",
name="Large DNS TXT Response (Possible C2)",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1071.004"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_response", "qtype": "TXT", "response_size_bytes_gt": 512},
fp=["DKIM/SPF audit"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="dns-txt-record",
name="DNS TXT Response Over 250 Bytes From Non-Resolver Host",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1071.004", "t1048.003"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_response", "qtype": "TXT", "response_size_bytes_gt": 250, "src_role_not_in": ["resolver"]},
fp=["Approved DNS telemetry or resolver health checks"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-tunnel-pattern-len",
name="DNS Tunnel Indicator: Long Hex Subdomain Sequence",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1071.004"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_query", "subdomain_hex_ratio_gt": 0.9, "subdomain_length_gt": 30},
fp=["DNSSEC validation lookups"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-doh-non-resolver",
name="DNS-Over-HTTPS Egress To Non-Sanctioned Resolver",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1572"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={
"event_type": "tls_session",
"destination_port": 443,
"sni_endswith_any": ["dns.adguard.com", "cloudflare-dns.com", "dns.google"],
"sanctioned_doh": False,
},
fp=["Engineer with personal DoH config (educate)"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-dot-non-resolver",
name="DNS-Over-TLS Egress To Public IP",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1572"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "destination_port": 853, "destination_is_internal": False},
fp=["Approved upstream resolver"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-tor-onion",
name="DNS Query For .onion Address",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1090.003"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_query", "domain_endswith": ".onion"},
fp=["Threat-intel research workstation (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-fast-flux",
name="DNS Fast-Flux Pattern (Many A Records, Short TTL)",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1568.001"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_response", "answer_count_gt": 8, "ttl_seconds_lt": 60},
fp=["Major CDN edge"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-dns-rebinding",
name="DNS Rebinding Indicator (Public→RFC1918 In Same TTL Window)",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1090"],
product="dns",
service="resolver",
when={"event_type": "dns_response", "rebinding_detected": True},
fp=["IPv6 transition technologies"],
playbook="tpl-initial-access",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# HTTP / TLS (12)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP_TLS_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="net-http-connect-public-ip",
name="HTTP CONNECT Method Toward Public IP",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1090"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "method": "CONNECT", "destination_is_internal": False},
fp=["Sanctioned outbound proxy (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-http-userag-powershell",
name="HTTP User-Agent Matches PowerShell Default",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1071.001"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "user_agent_contains": "WindowsPowerShell"},
fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-http-userag-curl-internal",
name="curl/wget User-Agent From Workstation Subnet",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1071.001"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "user_agent_startswith_any": ["curl/", "Wget/"], "src_role": "workstation"},
fp=["Engineer ad-hoc workflow"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-http-host-header-ip",
name="HTTP Host Header Is IP Literal",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1071.001"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "host_is_ip_literal": True},
fp=["Internal microservice without DNS"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-tls-old-client-version",
name="TLS Client Offered TLS 1.0 Or 1.1",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1573.002"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "client_version_in": ["TLSv1.0", "TLSv1.1"]},
fp=["Legacy line-of-business app (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="net-tls-no-sni",
name="HTTPS Connection To IP Without SNI",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1573.002"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "sni_present": False, "destination_is_internal": False},
fp=["IoT device with broken TLS stack"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-tls-self-signed-egress",
name="Self-Signed Certificate Presented On Public IP",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1573.002"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "cert_self_signed": True, "destination_is_internal": False},
fp=["Misconfigured small SaaS vendor"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-tls-suspicious-cipher",
name="TLS Negotiated Weak Cipher Suite",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1600.001"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "negotiated_cipher_contains_any": ["NULL", "EXPORT", "RC4", "DES"]},
fp=["Legacy device support"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="net-jarm-cobalt-strike",
name="JARM Fingerprint Matches Known Cobalt Strike Profile",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1573.002"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={
"event_type": "tls_session",
"jarm_in": [
"07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1",
"07d19d12d21d21d00042d43d00043d4f51b7c8b9af6b1c7c2a3d4e5f6a7b8c9",
],
},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-jarm-sliver",
name="JARM Fingerprint Matches Known Sliver Profile",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1573.002"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "jarm_in": ["3fd3fd0003fd3fd03fd3fd3fd3fd3fd3a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-http-gzip-mime-mismatch",
name="HTTP Response MIME And Content-Encoding Mismatch",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1027"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={
"event_type": "http_response",
"mime_type_in": ["application/octet-stream"],
"content_encoding": "gzip",
"filename_endswith_any": [".jpg", ".png", ".gif"],
},
fp=["Misconfigured CDN"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-http-large-post-from-workstation",
name="Large HTTP POST From Workstation To Public IP",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1041"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={
"event_type": "http_request",
"method": "POST",
"request_size_bytes_gt": 50000000,
"src_role": "workstation",
"destination_is_internal": False,
},
fp=["Sanctioned cloud upload"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tunnels / proxy (8)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TUNNEL_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="net-ssh-reverse-tunnel",
name="Outbound SSH With -R Reverse-Tunnel Flag",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1572"],
product="proxy",
service="ssh",
when={"event_type": "ssh_command", "argv_contains": "-R"},
fp=["Engineer working with vendor"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-tor-egress-corp",
name="Tor Connection From Corporate Workstation",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1090.003"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "destination_in_known_tor_relay": True, "src_role": "workstation"},
fp=["Threat-intel research workstation"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-icmp-large-payload",
name="ICMP Echo With Unusually Large Payload",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1095"],
product="proxy",
service="icmp",
when={"event_type": "icmp", "payload_size_bytes_gt": 1024},
fp=["MTU diagnostic"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-gre-from-non-network-device",
name="GRE Tunnel Initiated By Non-Network Host",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1572"],
product="proxy",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "flow", "protocol_number": 47, "src_role_in": ["workstation", "server"]},
fp=["Approved overlay agent"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-wireguard-handshake-from-user",
name="WireGuard Handshake From User Workstation",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1572"],
product="proxy",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "flow", "destination_port": 51820, "src_role": "workstation"},
fp=["Approved corporate VPN tier"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-vpn-from-datacenter",
name="Corporate VPN Login Originating From Datacenter ASN",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1078.004"],
product="vpn",
service="auth",
when={"event_type": "vpn_auth", "src_asn_type": "hosting"},
fp=["Mobile carrier identified as hosting (false positive)"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="net-tor-introduction-onion",
name="Tor Introduction To Hidden Service From Corp Host",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1090.003"],
product="proxy",
service="tls",
when={"event_type": "tor_circuit_intro", "circuit_purpose": "HS_CLIENT_INTRO"},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-cloudflared-tunnel-egress",
name="Cloudflared Tunnel Started From Workstation",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1572"],
product="proxy",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "tls_session", "sni_endswith_any": ["argotunnel.com", "tcp.cfargotunnel.com"], "src_role": "workstation"},
fp=["Authorized engineering tunnel"],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Lateral / SMB / RPC (10)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LATERAL_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="net-smbv1-egress",
name="SMB Version 1 Negotiated In Network Flow",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1021.002"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "smb_negotiate", "dialect": "SMB 1.0"},
fp=["Legacy printer / NAS (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
),
S(
slug="net-smb-write-netlogon",
name="SMB Write To NETLOGON Share",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1570"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "smb_write", "share_name": "NETLOGON"},
fp=["AD admin GPO push from PAW"],
playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
),
S(
slug="net-smb-write-sysvol",
name="SMB Write To SYSVOL Share From Non-DC",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1570"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "smb_write", "share_name": "SYSVOL", "src_role_neq": "domain-controller"},
fp=["Authorised AD migration tool"],
playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
),
S(
slug="net-ntlm-relay-pattern",
name="NTLM Relay Indicator (Same Challenge Reused Across Hosts)",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1557.001"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "ntlm_auth", "challenge_reused_across_hosts": True},
fp=["NTLM relay tested in lab"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="net-rpc-remote-registry",
name="RPC Remote Registry Write From Workstation Subnet",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1112"],
product="firewall",
service="rpc",
when={"event_type": "rpc_call", "interface": "winreg", "operation": "BaseRegSetValue", "src_role": "workstation"},
fp=["IT remote support tool"],
playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
),
S(
slug="net-rpc-task-scheduler-remote",
name="RPC Task Scheduler Create From Workstation",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1053.005"],
product="firewall",
service="rpc",
when={"event_type": "rpc_call", "interface": "atsvc", "src_role": "workstation"},
fp=["IT remote support tool"],
playbook="tpl-persistence",
),
S(
slug="net-winrm-ssl-from-workstation",
name="WinRM HTTPS From Workstation To DC",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1021.006"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={
"event_type": "flow",
"destination_port_in": [5985, 5986],
"src_role": "workstation",
"destination_role": "domain-controller",
},
fp=["Authorised AD admin from PAW"],
playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
),
S(
slug="net-cobalt-strike-named-pipe",
name="Cobalt Strike Default Named Pipe Pattern",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1573.002"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "smb_pipe", "pipe_name_in": ["msagent_", "MSSE-", "postex_", "status_"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-sliver-named-pipe",
name="Sliver Default Named Pipe Pattern",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1573"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "smb_pipe", "pipe_name_startswith": "sliver_"},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
S(
slug="net-empire-default-uri",
name="Empire C2 Default URI Pattern Observed",
severity="critical",
mitre=["t1071.001"],
product="proxy",
service="http",
when={"event_type": "http_request", "uri_endswith_any": ["/admin/get.php", "/news.php", "/login/process.php"]},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth / protocol abuse (5)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUTH_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="net-kerberos-rc4-ticket",
name="Kerberos Service Ticket Issued With RC4 Encryption",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1558.003"],
product="windows",
service="kerberos",
when={"event_id": 4769, "ticket_encryption_type": "0x17"},
fp=["Legacy app forced RC4 (allow-listed)"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="net-kerberos-pre-auth-disabled",
name="Kerberos Account With Pre-Auth Disabled Used",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1558.004"],
product="windows",
service="kerberos",
when={"event_id": 4768, "preauth_required": False},
fp=["Legacy SCM service account (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="net-radius-pap-clear",
name="RADIUS Authentication Used PAP (Cleartext Password)",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1110"],
product="radius",
service="auth",
when={"event_type": "radius_auth", "auth_method": "PAP"},
fp=["Legacy device that only supports PAP (must be ticketed)"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="net-ldap-signing-disabled",
name="LDAP Signing Disabled On Domain Controller",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1557.001"],
product="windows",
service="ldap",
when={"event_id": 2889, "ldap_signing_required": False},
fp=["Vendor agent that doesn't sign (deprecated)"],
playbook="tpl-credential-access",
),
S(
slug="net-ldap-bloodhound-pattern",
name="LDAP Search Pattern Matches BloodHound Collection",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1087.002"],
product="windows",
service="ldap",
when={
"event_type": "ldap_search",
"filter_contains_any": ["objectCategory=group", "objectClass=user", "trustedDomain"],
"search_count_5min_gt": 100,
},
fp=[FP_PENTEST],
playbook="tpl-discovery",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Exfil / wireless / misc (3)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXFIL_WIRELESS_RULES: list[dict] = [
S(
slug="net-icmp-high-entropy-payload",
name="ICMP Echo With High-Entropy Payload",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1095"],
product="firewall",
service="netflow",
when={"event_type": "icmp", "payload_entropy_gt": 7.5, "payload_size_bytes_gt": 64},
fp=["MTU diagnostic"],
playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
),
S(
slug="net-dhcp-starvation",
name="DHCP Starvation: Rapid Lease Churn From Single MAC Range",
severity="high",
mitre=["t1498"],
product="firewall",
service="dhcp",
when={"event_type": "dhcp", "leases_per_minute_per_relay_gt": 200},
fp=["Conference / event Wi-Fi"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
S(
slug="net-stp-topology-change-from-edge",
name="STP Topology Change Advertised By Edge Port",
severity="medium",
mitre=["t1498"],
product="switch",
service="stp",
when={"event_type": "stp_tcn", "ingress_port_role": "edge"},
fp=["Approved network change"],
playbook="tpl-impact",
),
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Aggregate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NETWORK_EXTRA: list[dict] = DNS_RULES + HTTP_TLS_RULES + TUNNEL_RULES + LATERAL_RULES + AUTH_RULES + EXFIL_WIRELESS_RULES
__all__ = [
"NETWORK_EXTRA",
"DNS_RULES",
"HTTP_TLS_RULES",
"TUNNEL_RULES",
"LATERAL_RULES",
"AUTH_RULES",
"EXFIL_WIRELESS_RULES",
]