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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

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"""
Detection Pack v1 - Part 3 / Network (50 new specs)
===================================================

Native network detection rules covering DNS, HTTP/TLS, tunnels, lateral
movement, authentication-protocol abuse and exfiltration patterns. These
extend the network rules in ``detection_specs.NETWORK`` (~30 stable rules).
"""

from __future__ import annotations

from detection_specs_part3_helpers import (  # type: ignore[import-not-found]
    FP_AUTOMATION,
    FP_PENTEST,
    S,
)

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DNS (12)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DNS_RULES: list[dict] = [
    S(
        slug="net-dns-newly-registered-domain",
        name="DNS Query For Newly Registered Domain (NRD)",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1071.004"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_query", "domain_age_days_lt": 7},
        fp=["Brand-new SaaS launch (rare; verify business need)"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-idn-homoglyph",
        name="DNS Query For Homoglyph Of Internal Brand",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1583.001"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_query", "homoglyph_score_gt": 0.85},
        fp=["Authorized brand-protection scan"],
        playbook="tpl-initial-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-nxdomain-spike",
        name="High Volume Of NXDOMAIN Responses From Single Host",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1568.002"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_response", "rcode": "NXDOMAIN", "count_5min_gt": 200, "src_role": "endpoint"},
        fp=["Malformed in-house tooling (educate)"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-any-query-spike",
        name="DNS Query Type ANY Volume From Single Host",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1018"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_query", "qtype": "ANY", "count_5min_gt": 50},
        fp=["Approved DNS audit run"],
        playbook="tpl-discovery",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-dga-shannon",
        name="DNS Query With High-Entropy Subdomain (DGA Indicator)",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1568.002"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_query", "subdomain_entropy_gt": 4.0, "subdomain_length_gt": 16},
        fp=["CDN with hashed hostnames (allow-listed)"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-large-txt-response",
        name="Large DNS TXT Response (Possible C2)",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1071.004"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_response", "qtype": "TXT", "response_size_bytes_gt": 512},
        fp=["DKIM/SPF audit"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="dns-txt-record",
        name="DNS TXT Response Over 250 Bytes From Non-Resolver Host",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1071.004", "t1048.003"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_response", "qtype": "TXT", "response_size_bytes_gt": 250, "src_role_not_in": ["resolver"]},
        fp=["Approved DNS telemetry or resolver health checks"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-tunnel-pattern-len",
        name="DNS Tunnel Indicator: Long Hex Subdomain Sequence",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1071.004"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_query", "subdomain_hex_ratio_gt": 0.9, "subdomain_length_gt": 30},
        fp=["DNSSEC validation lookups"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-doh-non-resolver",
        name="DNS-Over-HTTPS Egress To Non-Sanctioned Resolver",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1572"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={
            "event_type": "tls_session",
            "destination_port": 443,
            "sni_endswith_any": ["dns.adguard.com", "cloudflare-dns.com", "dns.google"],
            "sanctioned_doh": False,
        },
        fp=["Engineer with personal DoH config (educate)"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-dot-non-resolver",
        name="DNS-Over-TLS Egress To Public IP",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1572"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "destination_port": 853, "destination_is_internal": False},
        fp=["Approved upstream resolver"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-tor-onion",
        name="DNS Query For .onion Address",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1090.003"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_query", "domain_endswith": ".onion"},
        fp=["Threat-intel research workstation (allow-listed)"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-fast-flux",
        name="DNS Fast-Flux Pattern (Many A Records, Short TTL)",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1568.001"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_response", "answer_count_gt": 8, "ttl_seconds_lt": 60},
        fp=["Major CDN edge"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dns-rebinding",
        name="DNS Rebinding Indicator (Public→RFC1918 In Same TTL Window)",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1090"],
        product="dns",
        service="resolver",
        when={"event_type": "dns_response", "rebinding_detected": True},
        fp=["IPv6 transition technologies"],
        playbook="tpl-initial-access",
    ),
]


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# HTTP / TLS (12)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP_TLS_RULES: list[dict] = [
    S(
        slug="net-http-connect-public-ip",
        name="HTTP CONNECT Method Toward Public IP",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1090"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={"event_type": "http_request", "method": "CONNECT", "destination_is_internal": False},
        fp=["Sanctioned outbound proxy (allow-listed)"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-http-userag-powershell",
        name="HTTP User-Agent Matches PowerShell Default",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1071.001"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={"event_type": "http_request", "user_agent_contains": "WindowsPowerShell"},
        fp=[FP_AUTOMATION],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-http-userag-curl-internal",
        name="curl/wget User-Agent From Workstation Subnet",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1071.001"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={"event_type": "http_request", "user_agent_startswith_any": ["curl/", "Wget/"], "src_role": "workstation"},
        fp=["Engineer ad-hoc workflow"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-http-host-header-ip",
        name="HTTP Host Header Is IP Literal",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1071.001"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={"event_type": "http_request", "host_is_ip_literal": True},
        fp=["Internal microservice without DNS"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-tls-old-client-version",
        name="TLS Client Offered TLS 1.0 Or 1.1",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1573.002"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "client_version_in": ["TLSv1.0", "TLSv1.1"]},
        fp=["Legacy line-of-business app (allow-listed)"],
        playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-tls-no-sni",
        name="HTTPS Connection To IP Without SNI",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1573.002"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "sni_present": False, "destination_is_internal": False},
        fp=["IoT device with broken TLS stack"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-tls-self-signed-egress",
        name="Self-Signed Certificate Presented On Public IP",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1573.002"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "cert_self_signed": True, "destination_is_internal": False},
        fp=["Misconfigured small SaaS vendor"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-tls-suspicious-cipher",
        name="TLS Negotiated Weak Cipher Suite",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1600.001"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "negotiated_cipher_contains_any": ["NULL", "EXPORT", "RC4", "DES"]},
        fp=["Legacy device support"],
        playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-jarm-cobalt-strike",
        name="JARM Fingerprint Matches Known Cobalt Strike Profile",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1573.002"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={
            "event_type": "tls_session",
            "jarm_in": [
                "07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1",
                "07d19d12d21d21d00042d43d00043d4f51b7c8b9af6b1c7c2a3d4e5f6a7b8c9",
            ],
        },
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-jarm-sliver",
        name="JARM Fingerprint Matches Known Sliver Profile",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1573.002"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "jarm_in": ["3fd3fd0003fd3fd03fd3fd3fd3fd3fd3a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1"]},
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-http-gzip-mime-mismatch",
        name="HTTP Response MIME And Content-Encoding Mismatch",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1027"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={
            "event_type": "http_response",
            "mime_type_in": ["application/octet-stream"],
            "content_encoding": "gzip",
            "filename_endswith_any": [".jpg", ".png", ".gif"],
        },
        fp=["Misconfigured CDN"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-http-large-post-from-workstation",
        name="Large HTTP POST From Workstation To Public IP",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1041"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={
            "event_type": "http_request",
            "method": "POST",
            "request_size_bytes_gt": 50000000,
            "src_role": "workstation",
            "destination_is_internal": False,
        },
        fp=["Sanctioned cloud upload"],
        playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
    ),
]


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tunnels / proxy (8)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TUNNEL_RULES: list[dict] = [
    S(
        slug="net-ssh-reverse-tunnel",
        name="Outbound SSH With -R Reverse-Tunnel Flag",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1572"],
        product="proxy",
        service="ssh",
        when={"event_type": "ssh_command", "argv_contains": "-R"},
        fp=["Engineer working with vendor"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-tor-egress-corp",
        name="Tor Connection From Corporate Workstation",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1090.003"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "destination_in_known_tor_relay": True, "src_role": "workstation"},
        fp=["Threat-intel research workstation"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-icmp-large-payload",
        name="ICMP Echo With Unusually Large Payload",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1095"],
        product="proxy",
        service="icmp",
        when={"event_type": "icmp", "payload_size_bytes_gt": 1024},
        fp=["MTU diagnostic"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-gre-from-non-network-device",
        name="GRE Tunnel Initiated By Non-Network Host",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1572"],
        product="proxy",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "flow", "protocol_number": 47, "src_role_in": ["workstation", "server"]},
        fp=["Approved overlay agent"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-wireguard-handshake-from-user",
        name="WireGuard Handshake From User Workstation",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1572"],
        product="proxy",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "flow", "destination_port": 51820, "src_role": "workstation"},
        fp=["Approved corporate VPN tier"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-vpn-from-datacenter",
        name="Corporate VPN Login Originating From Datacenter ASN",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1078.004"],
        product="vpn",
        service="auth",
        when={"event_type": "vpn_auth", "src_asn_type": "hosting"},
        fp=["Mobile carrier identified as hosting (false positive)"],
        playbook="tpl-credential-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-tor-introduction-onion",
        name="Tor Introduction To Hidden Service From Corp Host",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1090.003"],
        product="proxy",
        service="tls",
        when={"event_type": "tor_circuit_intro", "circuit_purpose": "HS_CLIENT_INTRO"},
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-cloudflared-tunnel-egress",
        name="Cloudflared Tunnel Started From Workstation",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1572"],
        product="proxy",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "tls_session", "sni_endswith_any": ["argotunnel.com", "tcp.cfargotunnel.com"], "src_role": "workstation"},
        fp=["Authorized engineering tunnel"],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
]


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Lateral / SMB / RPC (10)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LATERAL_RULES: list[dict] = [
    S(
        slug="net-smbv1-egress",
        name="SMB Version 1 Negotiated In Network Flow",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1021.002"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "smb_negotiate", "dialect": "SMB 1.0"},
        fp=["Legacy printer / NAS (allow-listed)"],
        playbook="tpl-defense-evasion",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-smb-write-netlogon",
        name="SMB Write To NETLOGON Share",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1570"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "smb_write", "share_name": "NETLOGON"},
        fp=["AD admin GPO push from PAW"],
        playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-smb-write-sysvol",
        name="SMB Write To SYSVOL Share From Non-DC",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1570"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "smb_write", "share_name": "SYSVOL", "src_role_neq": "domain-controller"},
        fp=["Authorised AD migration tool"],
        playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-ntlm-relay-pattern",
        name="NTLM Relay Indicator (Same Challenge Reused Across Hosts)",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1557.001"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "ntlm_auth", "challenge_reused_across_hosts": True},
        fp=["NTLM relay tested in lab"],
        playbook="tpl-credential-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-rpc-remote-registry",
        name="RPC Remote Registry Write From Workstation Subnet",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1112"],
        product="firewall",
        service="rpc",
        when={"event_type": "rpc_call", "interface": "winreg", "operation": "BaseRegSetValue", "src_role": "workstation"},
        fp=["IT remote support tool"],
        playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-rpc-task-scheduler-remote",
        name="RPC Task Scheduler Create From Workstation",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1053.005"],
        product="firewall",
        service="rpc",
        when={"event_type": "rpc_call", "interface": "atsvc", "src_role": "workstation"},
        fp=["IT remote support tool"],
        playbook="tpl-persistence",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-winrm-ssl-from-workstation",
        name="WinRM HTTPS From Workstation To DC",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1021.006"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={
            "event_type": "flow",
            "destination_port_in": [5985, 5986],
            "src_role": "workstation",
            "destination_role": "domain-controller",
        },
        fp=["Authorised AD admin from PAW"],
        playbook="tpl-lateral-movement",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-cobalt-strike-named-pipe",
        name="Cobalt Strike Default Named Pipe Pattern",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1573.002"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "smb_pipe", "pipe_name_in": ["msagent_", "MSSE-", "postex_", "status_"]},
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-sliver-named-pipe",
        name="Sliver Default Named Pipe Pattern",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1573"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "smb_pipe", "pipe_name_startswith": "sliver_"},
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-empire-default-uri",
        name="Empire C2 Default URI Pattern Observed",
        severity="critical",
        mitre=["t1071.001"],
        product="proxy",
        service="http",
        when={"event_type": "http_request", "uri_endswith_any": ["/admin/get.php", "/news.php", "/login/process.php"]},
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-command-and-control",
    ),
]


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth / protocol abuse (5)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUTH_RULES: list[dict] = [
    S(
        slug="net-kerberos-rc4-ticket",
        name="Kerberos Service Ticket Issued With RC4 Encryption",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1558.003"],
        product="windows",
        service="kerberos",
        when={"event_id": 4769, "ticket_encryption_type": "0x17"},
        fp=["Legacy app forced RC4 (allow-listed)"],
        playbook="tpl-credential-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-kerberos-pre-auth-disabled",
        name="Kerberos Account With Pre-Auth Disabled Used",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1558.004"],
        product="windows",
        service="kerberos",
        when={"event_id": 4768, "preauth_required": False},
        fp=["Legacy SCM service account (must be ticketed)"],
        playbook="tpl-credential-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-radius-pap-clear",
        name="RADIUS Authentication Used PAP (Cleartext Password)",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1110"],
        product="radius",
        service="auth",
        when={"event_type": "radius_auth", "auth_method": "PAP"},
        fp=["Legacy device that only supports PAP (must be ticketed)"],
        playbook="tpl-credential-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-ldap-signing-disabled",
        name="LDAP Signing Disabled On Domain Controller",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1557.001"],
        product="windows",
        service="ldap",
        when={"event_id": 2889, "ldap_signing_required": False},
        fp=["Vendor agent that doesn't sign (deprecated)"],
        playbook="tpl-credential-access",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-ldap-bloodhound-pattern",
        name="LDAP Search Pattern Matches BloodHound Collection",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1087.002"],
        product="windows",
        service="ldap",
        when={
            "event_type": "ldap_search",
            "filter_contains_any": ["objectCategory=group", "objectClass=user", "trustedDomain"],
            "search_count_5min_gt": 100,
        },
        fp=[FP_PENTEST],
        playbook="tpl-discovery",
    ),
]


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Exfil / wireless / misc (3)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXFIL_WIRELESS_RULES: list[dict] = [
    S(
        slug="net-icmp-high-entropy-payload",
        name="ICMP Echo With High-Entropy Payload",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1095"],
        product="firewall",
        service="netflow",
        when={"event_type": "icmp", "payload_entropy_gt": 7.5, "payload_size_bytes_gt": 64},
        fp=["MTU diagnostic"],
        playbook="tpl-exfiltration",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-dhcp-starvation",
        name="DHCP Starvation: Rapid Lease Churn From Single MAC Range",
        severity="high",
        mitre=["t1498"],
        product="firewall",
        service="dhcp",
        when={"event_type": "dhcp", "leases_per_minute_per_relay_gt": 200},
        fp=["Conference / event Wi-Fi"],
        playbook="tpl-impact",
    ),
    S(
        slug="net-stp-topology-change-from-edge",
        name="STP Topology Change Advertised By Edge Port",
        severity="medium",
        mitre=["t1498"],
        product="switch",
        service="stp",
        when={"event_type": "stp_tcn", "ingress_port_role": "edge"},
        fp=["Approved network change"],
        playbook="tpl-impact",
    ),
]


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Aggregate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NETWORK_EXTRA: list[dict] = DNS_RULES + HTTP_TLS_RULES + TUNNEL_RULES + LATERAL_RULES + AUTH_RULES + EXFIL_WIRELESS_RULES


__all__ = [
    "NETWORK_EXTRA",
    "DNS_RULES",
    "HTTP_TLS_RULES",
    "TUNNEL_RULES",
    "LATERAL_RULES",
    "AUTH_RULES",
    "EXFIL_WIRELESS_RULES",
]