Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
"""Application configuration for the AiSOC Actions service.
Loaded once at import time from environment (and optional ``.env``). Two settings
matter for the ChatOps user-verification flow added in Wave 1:
* ``AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY`` — the same Fernet key the API + connectors services
use. We only need it when the action payload itself ships an encrypted
``vault:v1:`` token (e.g. a Slack bot token persisted by the click-and-connect
connector flow). See ``app.security.credential_vault``.
* ``AISOC_API_BASE_URL`` + ``AISOC_API_SERVICE_TOKEN`` — used to call the
``services/api`` ``add_timeline_event`` endpoint when a ChatOps response lands.
We deliberately do **not** auto-generate credential keys here. The actions
service is internal infrastructure, so missing config should fail loud, not
silently invent ephemeral keys that would break decryption on restart.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from functools import lru_cache
from pydantic import Field
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
class ActionsSettings(BaseSettings):
model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
env_file=".env",
env_file_encoding="utf-8",
case_sensitive=True,
extra="ignore",
)
AISOC_API_BASE_URL: str = Field(
default="http://aisoc-api:8000",
description="Base URL of the services/api FastAPI app, e.g. http://aisoc-api:8000.",
)
AISOC_API_SERVICE_TOKEN: str = Field(
default="",
description=(
"API-key token (aisoc_…) used by services/actions to call services/api "
"endpoints that require cases:write. Mounted as a secret in production."
),
)
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: str = Field(
default="",
description=(
"Fernet key shared with services/api + services/connectors. Required "
"only when an action payload contains a vault:v1: ciphertext."
),
)
AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM: str = Field(
default="",
description="Comma-separated historical Fernet keys for transparent re-decryption.",
)
AISOC_FEATURE_CHATOPS_VERIFY: bool = Field(
default=True,
description="Master toggle for the Slack/Teams interactive user-verification action.",
)
# Depth 7.1 — mailbox remediation (search / purge / restore / sender
# block) across the recipients of a reported phishing message.
#
# **Off by default, unlike every flag above it.** A capability that
# reaches out of the platform and removes somebody's mail is not one an
# upgrade should silently acquire: an operator who upgrades AiSOC has
# consented to a new version, not to the platform being able to delete
# from every mailbox in their tenant. Turning it on is a deliberate act,
# and the arms say exactly that when it is off rather than simulating a
# purge — a dry run reporting a send or a purge that never happened is
# the defect that shipped in NotifySlackExecutor.
AISOC_FEATURE_MAILBOX_REMEDIATION: bool = Field(
default=False,
description=(
"Master toggle for mailbox remediation (search_mailboxes, purge_email, "
"restore_email, block_sender, unblock_sender). Off by default: enabling it "
"grants AiSOC the ability to remove mail from the tenant's mailboxes."
),
)
AISOC_CHATOPS_RESPONSE_SECRET: str = Field(
default="",
description=("HMAC secret used to sign ChatOps response tokens so we can verify a callback genuinely came from a message we sent."),
)
AISOC_CHATOPS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: int = Field(
default=900,
description="How long a verification prompt stays valid (default 15 min).",
)
AISOC_ACTIONS_PUBLIC_URL: str = Field(
default="http://localhost:8003",
description=(
"Externally-reachable base URL of services/actions. Used to build the callback links embedded in ChatOps verification messages."
),
)
# Wave 4 (W4.3) — bearer token that callers of the mutating action routes
# must present. When unset the routes are open only in dev mode; in
# production a missing token fails closed (503).
AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: str = Field(
default="",
description="Shared bearer token required on POST /actions + approve/reject. Mounted as a secret in production.",
)
AISOC_DEV_MODE: bool = Field(
default=False,
description="Canonical dev-mode flag. When true, unauthenticated action routes are permitted (never set in production).",
)
# Wave 4 (W4.2) — when true, every action MUST carry an authenticated
# principal (system-initiated principal-less calls are rejected).
AISOC_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_PRINCIPAL: bool = Field(
default=False,
description="Require a structured ActionPrincipal on every action request.",
)
# T3.6 — the *approval* path, which is separate from the request path
# above and defaults the other way. An approval with no identity cannot
# satisfy separation of duties at all, so a principal-less approval is not
# a legacy convenience, it is the control being absent. Slack and Teams
# approvals ran in exactly that state: the bot verified who clicked, then
# called approve with no approver.
AISOC_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_APPROVER: bool = Field(
default=True,
description="Refuse approve/reject calls that carry no resolvable approver identity.",
)
# Maps a verified ChatOps identity onto an authorization principal. JSON
# inline or `file:/path/to.json`. Unset means nobody can approve over
# ChatOps, which is the correct default for a control that was absent.
# See app/security/chatops_identity.py for the shape.
AISOC_CHATOPS_APPROVERS: str = Field(
default="",
description="JSON (or file: path) mapping platform user ids to approver principals.",
)
@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
def get_settings() -> ActionsSettings:
return ActionsSettings()