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"""Wave 4 — invoking-identity authorization (W4.2 least-privilege, W4.3 route
auth, W4.4 bound approval / separation of duties)."""
from __future__ import annotations
from uuid import uuid4
import pytest
from app.core.config import get_settings
from app.models.action import ActionPrincipal, ActionRequest, ActionType
from app.security.authz import (
ActionAuthzError,
authorize_action,
authorize_approver,
has_action_permission,
)
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
_TENANT = uuid4()
def _principal(perms, *, tenant=None, uid="u1"):
return ActionPrincipal(user_id=uid, tenant_id=tenant, permissions=perms)
def _request(action_type, principal=None, tenant=None):
return ActionRequest(
incident_id=uuid4(),
tenant_id=tenant or _TENANT,
action_type=action_type,
target="host-1",
principal=principal,
)
# ── W4.2 permission model ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_permission_tiers_and_wildcards():
assert has_action_permission(["actions:execute:high"], "actions:execute:low")
assert has_action_permission(["actions:execute:medium"], "actions:execute:medium")
assert not has_action_permission(["actions:execute:low"], "actions:execute:high")
assert has_action_permission(["actions:*"], "actions:execute:high")
assert has_action_permission(["*"], "actions:execute:medium")
assert not has_action_permission([], "actions:execute:low")
def test_authorize_action_allows_with_sufficient_permission():
req = _request(ActionType.ISOLATE_HOST, _principal(["actions:execute:high"], tenant=_TENANT))
authorize_action(req, require_principal=True) # no raise
def test_authorize_action_denies_insufficient_permission():
req = _request(ActionType.ISOLATE_HOST, _principal(["actions:execute:low"]))
with pytest.raises(ActionAuthzError):
authorize_action(req, require_principal=True)
def test_authorize_action_denies_tenant_mismatch():
req = _request(ActionType.NOTIFY_SLACK, _principal(["actions:*"], tenant=uuid4()))
with pytest.raises(ActionAuthzError):
authorize_action(req, require_principal=True)
def test_authorize_action_principal_optional_unless_required():
req = _request(ActionType.ISOLATE_HOST, principal=None)
authorize_action(req, require_principal=False) # legacy/system path: allowed
with pytest.raises(ActionAuthzError):
authorize_action(req, require_principal=True)
# ── W4.4 bound approval / separation of duties ─────────────────────────────
def test_approver_must_hold_permission():
record = {"action_type": ActionType.ISOLATE_HOST.value, "requested_by_user_id": "requester"}
with pytest.raises(ActionAuthzError):
authorize_approver(record, _principal(["actions:execute:low"], uid="approver"))
authorize_approver(record, _principal(["actions:execute:high"], uid="approver")) # ok
def test_approver_cannot_be_requester():
record = {"action_type": ActionType.ISOLATE_HOST.value, "requested_by_user_id": "same-user"}
with pytest.raises(ActionAuthzError):
authorize_approver(record, _principal(["actions:execute:high"], uid="same-user"))
# ── W4.3 route auth ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _client(monkeypatch, **env):
for key in ("AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN", "AISOC_DEV_MODE", "AISOC_ACTIONS_REQUIRE_PRINCIPAL"):
monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False)
for key, value in env.items():
monkeypatch.setenv(key, value)
get_settings.cache_clear()
from app.api.router import router
app = FastAPI()
app.include_router(router)
return TestClient(app)
_BODY = {
"incident_id": str(uuid4()),
"tenant_id": str(_TENANT),
"action_type": "isolate_host", # approval-required → no auto-execution
"target": "host-1",
}
def test_route_requires_token_when_configured(monkeypatch):
client = _client(monkeypatch, AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN="s3cr3t", AISOC_DEV_MODE="false")
assert client.post("/actions", json=_BODY).status_code == 401
ok = client.post("/actions", json=_BODY, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer s3cr3t"})
assert ok.status_code != 401
def test_route_is_not_open_in_dev_without_token(monkeypatch):
"""GHSA-g4h7-p63q-r8r4. This asserted 200 and was the vulnerability.
Dev mode is not a reason to skip authentication on a route that dispatches
containment, because dev mode is on by default in the shipped compose file
and the token it looks for was never generated.
"""
client = _client(monkeypatch, AISOC_DEV_MODE="true")
assert client.post("/actions", json=_BODY).status_code == 503
def test_route_fails_closed_in_prod_without_token(monkeypatch):
client = _client(monkeypatch, AISOC_DEV_MODE="false")
assert client.post("/actions", json=_BODY).status_code == 503
def teardown_module(_module):
get_settings.cache_clear()