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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

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"""Indicator grounding and factual support for a decisive claim are different things.

`score_groundedness` answers one question: what fraction of the concrete
indicators the model asserted — IPs, hashes, CVEs, techniques, domains —
appear in the evidence it was given. That is a real measurement and it stays.

It is not a measurement of whether the *conclusion* is supported, and the gap
between the two is the shape an auto-closure gets wrong. A rationale that
reuses the alert's own source IP and then says "198.51.100.14 is our approved
vulnerability scanner, covered by change CHG0049112" scores a perfect 1.0 on
indicator grounding: every indicator it cites is in the evidence. The claim
that licenses closing the alert — that the activity was authorized — is
supported by nothing at all, and neither the scanner nor the change record
appears anywhere in what the model was shown.

So these tests hold two properties apart:

* an indicator-grounded rationale can still be unsupported, and must not close;
* a genuinely evidenced authorization claim must still close, because a check
  that refuses the legitimate case is a check somebody turns off.

Every case here is a rationale string and an evidence dict. No model is
called: the question is what the gate does with text, and a model in the loop
would make the test measure the model instead.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import pytest
from app.confidence.claim_support import ClaimKind, score_claim_support
from app.confidence.groundedness import score_groundedness

#: The evidence an ordinary scan alert carries. Deliberately contains the IP
#: the rationales below cite, so indicator grounding is 1.0 throughout and
#: cannot be what separates the cases.
SCAN_EVIDENCE = {
    "rule_id": "net-portscan-horizontal",
    "src_ip": "198.51.100.14",
    "dst_ip": "203.0.113.7",
    "ports_contacted": 1024,
    "device": {"hostname": "fw-edge-01"},
}

#: The same alert, with the authorization the rationale claims actually
#: recorded in the telemetry. This is the case that must still close.
SCAN_EVIDENCE_WITH_APPROVAL = {
    **SCAN_EVIDENCE,
    "change_ticket": "CHG0049112",
    "approved_by": "security-engineering",
    "maintenance_window": "2026-10-27T01:00:00Z/2026-10-27T05:00:00Z",
}


def test_indicator_grounding_cannot_see_an_unsupported_authorization_claim() -> None:
    """The premise. If this ever fails, the rest of the file is measuring nothing."""
    rationale = "Traffic from 198.51.100.14 to 203.0.113.7 is our approved vulnerability scanner, authorized under change CHG0049112."

    grounding = score_groundedness(rationale, str(SCAN_EVIDENCE))

    assert grounding.score == 1.0
    assert grounding.hallucinated == []


def test_unsupported_authorization_claim_is_not_supported() -> None:
    rationale = "Traffic from 198.51.100.14 is our approved vulnerability scanner, authorized under change CHG0049112."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, SCAN_EVIDENCE)

    assert result.scored
    assert result.blocks_auto_close
    assert {c.kind for c in result.unsupported} & {ClaimKind.AUTHORIZATION}


def test_unsupported_maintenance_claim_is_not_supported() -> None:
    rationale = "This ran inside the scheduled maintenance window, so the reboot is expected and routine."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, SCAN_EVIDENCE)

    assert result.blocks_auto_close
    assert {c.kind for c in result.unsupported} & {ClaimKind.MAINTENANCE}


def test_evidenced_authorization_claim_is_supported() -> None:
    """The legitimate case must pass, or the gate gets switched off within a week."""
    rationale = "Traffic from 198.51.100.14 is authorized under change CHG0049112, approved by security-engineering."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, SCAN_EVIDENCE_WITH_APPROVAL)

    assert result.scored
    assert not result.blocks_auto_close
    assert result.supported
    assert not result.unsupported


def test_contradicted_claim_is_worse_than_unsupported_and_is_reported_separately() -> None:
    """Evidence that explicitly denies the claim is a different finding from silence."""
    evidence = {**SCAN_EVIDENCE, "change_ticket": "none", "approved": False}
    rationale = "This is approved activity under an existing change record."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, evidence)

    assert result.blocks_auto_close
    assert result.contradicted
    assert "change_ticket" in result.reason or "approved" in result.reason


def test_a_rationale_with_no_decisive_claim_is_not_scored() -> None:
    """Not scored is not a score of zero.

    A rationale that reasons from the telemetry and claims no authorization
    has nothing for this check to trace, and reporting that as 0.0 would read
    as "every claim it made was unsupported".
    """
    rationale = "1024 destination ports were contacted from a single source in under a minute, which matches horizontal scanning."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, SCAN_EVIDENCE)

    assert not result.scored
    assert result.score is None
    assert not result.blocks_auto_close


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "rationale",
    [
        "There is no evidence that this activity was authorized.",
        "I could not confirm whether this was approved maintenance.",
        "If this were a scheduled scan the pattern would match, but nothing in the telemetry says so.",
        "No change ticket is referenced anywhere in the evidence.",
    ],
)
def test_hedged_or_negated_mentions_are_not_claims(rationale: str) -> None:
    """A rationale saying it could *not* establish authorization is doing its job.

    Counting those as unsupported claims would flag the most careful outputs
    the model produces, which is the pattern-too-broad failure that gets a
    security control disabled.
    """
    result = score_claim_support(rationale, SCAN_EVIDENCE)

    assert not result.blocks_auto_close
    assert not result.unsupported


def test_first_party_context_can_support_a_claim_the_alert_payload_cannot() -> None:
    """A tenant's own recorded decision is traceable evidence, and is not in the payload.

    "Analysts have closed this signature as approved scanning nine times" is
    exactly the institutional memory this platform compiles, and it arrives in
    the prompt outside the untrusted-evidence fence. Refusing it would make
    the check punish the one context that is genuinely authoritative.
    """
    rationale = "This is sanctioned scanning: the tenant's analysts have repeatedly recorded it as approved."
    context = "Recent analyst decisions: benign_true_positive x9 — reason: approved internal vulnerability scanning window."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, SCAN_EVIDENCE, supporting_context=context)

    assert result.scored
    assert not result.blocks_auto_close


def test_untrusted_free_text_is_not_an_approval_record() -> None:
    """Support comes from evidence *keys*, never from prose in a value.

    This is the security property the check turns on. A connector-supplied
    string field is attacker-influenced — it is why the prompt fences evidence
    at all — so reading "approved by security" out of a log line would let
    anyone who can write into a field authorize their own activity, through
    the very control meant to stop them.
    """
    evidence = {**SCAN_EVIDENCE, "note": "approved by security-engineering, authorized under change CHG0049112"}
    rationale = "This is approved activity, authorized under change CHG0049112."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, evidence)

    assert result.blocks_auto_close


def test_an_approval_record_covers_the_tool_named_alongside_it() -> None:
    """Naming the tool is specificity, not a second claim needing its own record.

    Requiring a separate `red_team` field before accepting "an approved
    red-team engagement under CHG0049112" would withhold a closure the
    evidence plainly supports, which is how a check earns a reputation for
    false positives and gets switched off.
    """
    evidence = {**SCAN_EVIDENCE, "change_ticket": "CHG0049112", "approved_by": "security-engineering"}
    rationale = "An approved red-team engagement, covered by change ticket CHG0049112."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, evidence)

    assert not result.blocks_auto_close


def test_a_change_id_the_evidence_does_not_carry_is_never_supported() -> None:
    """A specific reference to a record that does not exist is the clearest case."""
    evidence = {**SCAN_EVIDENCE, "change_ticket": "CHG0041122"}
    rationale = "Covered by change CHG0049112."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, evidence)

    assert result.blocks_auto_close
    assert {c.kind for c in result.unsupported} == {ClaimKind.CHANGE_RECORD}


def test_a_prior_review_claim_is_not_covered_by_a_change_record() -> None:
    """ "An analyst closed this before" is a different assertion from "it was approved"."""
    evidence = {**SCAN_EVIDENCE, "change_ticket": "CHG0049112", "approved_by": "security-engineering"}
    rationale = "An analyst has reviewed this signature and closed it as a known false-positive."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, evidence)

    assert result.blocks_auto_close
    assert {c.kind for c in result.unsupported} == {ClaimKind.PRIOR_REVIEW}


def test_supporting_context_does_not_rescue_a_contradicted_claim() -> None:
    """Explicit denial in the evidence outranks a general prior."""
    evidence = {**SCAN_EVIDENCE, "approval_status": "revoked"}
    rationale = "This is approved scanning activity."
    context = "Recent analyst decisions: benign_true_positive x9 — reason: approved internal vulnerability scanning window."

    result = score_claim_support(rationale, evidence, supporting_context=context)

    assert result.blocks_auto_close
    assert result.contradicted