Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
"""The credential and tenant every API-to-connectors call must carry.
One helper, because three call sites each reached the connectors service their
own way and two of them reached it with nothing.
The far side
------------
`services/connectors/app/api/router.py` mounts its whole router behind
``Depends(require_console_or_service_auth)``. That dependency requires a
bearer credential, and when the credential is a *service* token it requires
the caller to declare which tenant it is acting for on
``X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID`` as well. An absent tenant there resolves to an **empty**
scope and refuses, rather than widening to every tenant.
What shipped
------------
Only the catalog proxy in ``app/api/v1/endpoints/connectors.py`` sent either.
* ``federated.py`` posted the unified query as ``client.post(url, json=...)``,
so **every federated search, the agent's federated tool and the retro-hunt
SIEM sweep were answered 401 by every SIEM**. The console reported no
results, which is indistinguishable from a SIEM that held none.
* ``case_fanout.py`` pushed cases and polled their status the same way.
Both were written after the catalog proxy was fixed, which is the shape this
module exists to stop: a fix applied where a report pointed, while its
siblings kept shipping.
Why the tenant is explicit
--------------------------
The connectors service holds every tenant's connector rows. A call that does
not name a tenant is not a call for all of them; it is a call whose scope
nobody decided. Passing it here makes the decision visible at every call site
and lets the far side refuse one that forgot.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import uuid
#: Header the connectors service reads to learn which tenant a service caller
#: is acting for. Spelled identically to ``TENANT_HEADER`` in the vendored
#: ``app/security/tenant_scope.py`` on both sides.
TENANT_HEADER = "X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID"
def service_token() -> str:
"""The shared secret this service presents to the connectors service.
Per-service override first, then the shared platform token, matching
``resolve_service_token`` in the vendored ``tenant_scope`` module that the
far side resolves its own copy with.
"""
specific = (os.getenv("AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN") or "").strip()
return specific or (os.getenv("AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN") or "").strip()
def connectors_headers(tenant_id: uuid.UUID | str | None) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Credential plus tenant assertion for one connectors-service call.
An empty token yields no ``Authorization`` header rather than an empty
one: the far side's refusal then says "missing bearer credential", which
names the deployment problem, instead of "invalid or missing credential",
which reads like a wrong secret.
"""
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
token = service_token()
if token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
if tenant_id is not None:
headers[TENANT_HEADER] = str(tenant_id)
return headers