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-- SSO connections: where an assertion's tenant and role mapping come from.
--
-- Parity plan 4.1.
--
-- The tenant is the whole reason this table exists. Both SSO handlers used
-- to issue a token with no tenant at all, and the obvious fix (read it from
-- the assertion) is the wrong one: an identity provider that can name its
-- own tenant can name somebody else's. So the tenant is a property of the
-- *connection*, which an administrator configured, and the assertion only
-- says who the person is.
--
-- Group mapping lives here for the same reason. An IdP group confers a role
-- only because an administrator in this deployment said it should.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_connections (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
provider TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (provider IN ('oidc', 'saml')),
-- The OIDC issuer URL, or the SAML entity id. Unique across the
-- deployment: two tenants cannot claim the same issuer, or an assertion
-- would be ambiguous about which tenant it provisions into.
issuer TEXT NOT NULL,
display_name TEXT,
enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-- IdP group name to AiSOC role. `admin` and `platform_admin` are
-- refused at the application layer: v14.0.0 made them unreachable from
-- every API route so that only `bootstrap_admin` can mint one, and a
-- group mapping would be a way back in.
group_role_mapping JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
-- What a user with no mapped group gets. The least-privileged role
-- rather than nothing, because a user who authenticated and can then
-- see nothing reads as a broken integration.
default_role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'viewer',
-- Accepted by URL or by file, which the plan requires. Both nullable:
-- an OIDC connection needs neither.
metadata_url TEXT,
metadata_xml TEXT,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
-- One connection per issuer, deployment-wide. Not per tenant: that would
-- let a second tenant register the same issuer and race the first for every
-- sign-in.
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_connections_issuer_idx
ON aisoc_sso_connections (provider, issuer);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_connections_tenant_idx
ON aisoc_sso_connections (tenant_id);
ALTER TABLE aisoc_sso_connections ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE aisoc_sso_connections FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON aisoc_sso_connections;
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON aisoc_sso_connections
-- The unbound arm is required and is the point: the SSO callback runs
-- *before* there is a tenant to bind, because resolving this row is
-- what decides the tenant. Without it the lookup would return nothing
-- and every sign-in would fail with "no connection configured".
USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
-- Writes stay bound: a tenant configures its own connection.
WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id());
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON aisoc_sso_connections TO aisoc_app;
END IF;
END
$$;