Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
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-- Detection-as-code lifecycle: ownership, expiry, versions, rollback.
--
-- Gap-closure wave 9.
--
-- Four gaps, and the first is a live authorization hole rather than a
-- missing feature.
--
-- **Separation of duties.** `detection_rule_proposals.proposed_by_id`
-- is written at creation and **never compared against the caller** at
-- `/decide`, so the author of a rule can approve their own rule. Every
-- other governance control in this product — action approval, playbook
-- dispatch, MSSP overrides — separates the two, and the detection
-- surface is the one that writes code into the engine.
--
-- **Promotion overwrites in place.** A promoted rule replaces the
-- previous body with no record of what it replaced, so "roll back the
-- rule we shipped on Tuesday" has no answer other than reconstructing
-- it from a pull request. A detection that starts firing on everything
-- at 02:00 is exactly when that matters.
--
-- **No owner and no expiry.** A rule written for a specific incident
-- three years ago is indistinguishable from one somebody maintains.
-- Both are the same row.
--
-- **No environment.** There is one state: live. A rule cannot be run
-- somewhere it does not page anybody first.
-- ── Ownership and lifecycle metadata ───────────────────────────────────────
ALTER TABLE detection_rules ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS owner_email TEXT;
ALTER TABLE detection_rules ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS owner_team TEXT;
-- Nullable on purpose. A rule with no expiry is permanent, which is a
-- legitimate choice for a well-understood detection; what was missing
-- is the *ability* to say otherwise, not a mandate.
ALTER TABLE detection_rules ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
ALTER TABLE detection_rules ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS review_due_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
-- dev → staging → production. A rule in `dev` is evaluated and its
-- matches recorded, and it pages nobody — which is what makes a
-- shadow run safe to do on live traffic.
ALTER TABLE detection_rules
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS environment TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'production';
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'ck_detection_rules_environment'
) THEN
ALTER TABLE detection_rules
ADD CONSTRAINT ck_detection_rules_environment
CHECK (environment IN ('dev', 'staging', 'production'));
END IF;
END
$$;
-- Shadow mode. Distinct from `environment` because a production rule
-- can be put in shadow during a tuning change without demoting it,
-- and a dev rule is in shadow by definition.
ALTER TABLE detection_rules ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS shadow_until TIMESTAMPTZ;
COMMENT ON COLUMN detection_rules.shadow_until IS
'While set and in the future the rule is evaluated and its matches recorded, '
'but it raises no alert. Independent of environment so a production rule can '
'be shadowed during a tuning change without being demoted.';
-- ── Version history, which is what makes rollback possible ─────────────────
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS detection_rule_versions (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
rule_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES detection_rules(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
tenant_id UUID REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- Monotonic per rule. Not a timestamp: two promotions in the same
-- second are ordinary during a tuning session, and "the version
-- before this one" must have exactly one answer.
version INTEGER NOT NULL,
rule_language TEXT NOT NULL,
rule_body TEXT NOT NULL,
severity TEXT,
environment TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'production',
-- Who put this version live, and who authored it. Both, because
-- separation of duties is only auditable if the pair is recorded.
promoted_by_id UUID REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
authored_by_id UUID REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
proposal_id UUID,
-- Set when this version was superseded. The live version is the one
-- with the highest `version` and a NULL here; a rollback writes a
-- *new* version whose body is an old one rather than deleting rows,
-- so the history of what was live when stays intact.
retired_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
rolled_back_from INTEGER,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
UNIQUE (rule_id, version)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_rule_versions_rule ON detection_rule_versions (rule_id, version DESC);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_rule_versions_tenant ON detection_rule_versions (tenant_id);
ALTER TABLE detection_rule_versions ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE detection_rule_versions FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON detection_rule_versions;
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON detection_rule_versions
-- The unbound arm covers the shipped corpus, whose rules belong to
-- no tenant and are readable by all of them.
USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR tenant_id IS NULL OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR tenant_id IS NULL);
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON detection_rule_versions TO aisoc_app;
END IF;
END
$$;
COMMENT ON TABLE detection_rule_versions IS
'Every body a rule has ever had live. Promotion used to overwrite in place, so '
'"roll back the rule we shipped on Tuesday" had no answer — which is exactly the '
'question asked at 02:00 when a detection starts firing on everything.';
-- ── Shadow-mode observations ───────────────────────────────────────────────
--
-- What a shadowed rule *would* have alerted on. Separate from `alerts`
-- so a shadow match cannot be mistaken for one, by a query or a person.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS detection_shadow_matches (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
rule_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES detection_rules(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
rule_version INTEGER,
event_id TEXT,
matched_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
event_excerpt JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_shadow_matches_rule ON detection_shadow_matches (rule_id, matched_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_shadow_matches_tenant ON detection_shadow_matches (tenant_id, matched_at DESC);
ALTER TABLE detection_shadow_matches ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE detection_shadow_matches FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON detection_shadow_matches;
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON detection_shadow_matches
USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id());
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON detection_shadow_matches TO aisoc_app;
END IF;
END
$$;
COMMENT ON TABLE detection_shadow_matches IS
'What a shadowed rule would have raised. A separate table rather than a flag on '
'alerts, so no query or person can mistake a shadow match for an alert.';