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-- Asset and identity context that changes the queue order.
--
-- Gap-closure wave 11.
--
-- `assets.criticality` is a free-text string that reaches a prompt and
-- a sort order and nothing else. Two alerts of equal severity, one on
-- a domain controller and one on a meeting-room display, arrive in the
-- queue in the order they were raised — and an analyst finds out which
-- is which by reading the hostname.
--
-- Three things were missing, and the third is the one that makes the
-- other two actionable.
--
-- **A score, not a label.** "high" cannot be multiplied by anything.
-- Prioritisation needs a number, and the number has to be derived from
-- the label rather than typed alongside it, or the two drift.
--
-- **Privileged accounts.** No such field exists anywhere. An alert on
-- a service account with domain-admin rights is not the same alert as
-- one on a contractor's laptop login, and nothing in the schema could
-- say so.
--
-- **Vulnerability context from the tenant's own inventory.**
-- `asset_vulnerabilities` exists and is read only by the enrichment
-- response — so "is this host running something on the KEV catalogue"
-- is answerable from data already held and is not asked.
--
-- And `alert_asset_correlations` (migration 013) has had **zero
-- readers and zero writers** since it was created. It is the join that
-- makes all of the above reachable from an alert, which is why it is
-- wired here rather than deleted.
-- ── Identity privilege ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS identity_privilege (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- The principal as the log sources name it. Lowercased by the
-- application before write: `SVC-Backup` and `svc-backup` are one
-- account, and two rows would make the lookup depend on which
-- connector happened to report first.
principal TEXT NOT NULL,
-- Standing privilege the account holds. Separate from `is_admin`
-- because the useful question is usually "how much", not "yes or
-- no" — a break-glass account and a helpdesk password-reset role
-- are both privileged and not equally so.
privilege_tier TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'standard',
-- A service account behaves differently from a human one: no
-- interactive logons, predictable hours, and a compromise usually
-- means a stolen key rather than a phished password.
is_service BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
is_break_glass BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
source TEXT,
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
UNIQUE (tenant_id, principal)
);
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'ck_identity_privilege_tier') THEN
ALTER TABLE identity_privilege
ADD CONSTRAINT ck_identity_privilege_tier
CHECK (privilege_tier IN ('standard', 'elevated', 'admin', 'domain_admin'));
END IF;
END
$$;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_identity_privilege_tenant ON identity_privilege (tenant_id, principal);
ALTER TABLE identity_privilege ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE identity_privilege FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON identity_privilege;
CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON identity_privilege
USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id());
-- ── Effective priority on the alert ────────────────────────────────────────
--
-- Stored rather than computed at read time, for two reasons. The queue
-- sorts on it and a computed sort over a join is the thing that makes
-- a queue slow at exactly the moment it is busiest; and an analyst
-- asking "why was this top of my queue" needs the answer that applied
-- *then*, not the one today's CMDB produces.
ALTER TABLE alerts ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS priority_score INTEGER;
ALTER TABLE alerts ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS priority_rationale JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]'::jsonb;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_alerts_priority
ON alerts (tenant_id, priority_score DESC NULLS LAST, created_at DESC);
COMMENT ON COLUMN alerts.priority_score IS
'Severity weighted by asset criticality, identity privilege and known-exploited '
'vulnerability exposure. NULL means not yet scored — distinct from 0, which means '
'scored and genuinely low.';
COMMENT ON COLUMN alerts.priority_rationale IS
'Each factor that moved the score, with its contribution. An ordering a person '
'cannot interrogate is one they stop trusting the first time it surprises them.';
-- ── Make the correlation table reachable ───────────────────────────────────
--
-- `alert_asset_correlations` has had no reader and no writer since
-- migration 013. The index below is what the scorer needs to resolve
-- an alert's assets without a sequential scan.
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_aacorel_asset_lookup
ON alert_asset_correlations (tenant_id, alert_id, asset_id);
COMMENT ON TABLE alert_asset_correlations IS
'Which assets an alert touches. Created in migration 013 and unread until wave 11 — '
'it is the join that makes asset criticality reachable from an alert at all.';