Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
-- Workload identity, API-key rotation, JIT elevation, ABAC conditions.
--
-- Gap-closure wave 13.
--
-- **One shared service token.** `AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN` is a single
-- string every internal caller presents. It cannot be attributed —
-- the audit trail says "a service" did it — it cannot be rotated
-- without restarting everything at once, and it cannot be scoped, so
-- the agents worker presents the same credential as the ingest
-- pipeline. One leaked log line is total internal access.
--
-- **API keys cannot be rotated in place.** The only path is create a
-- new one, update every caller, delete the old one — so rotation
-- means downtime and most people do not do it.
--
-- **No elevation.** A role is held permanently or not at all, so an
-- analyst who needs to isolate a host once either holds that
-- permission every day or waits for someone who does.
--
-- **Permissions are unconditional.** `cases:write` is true everywhere,
-- always, from any address. There is no way to say "from the
-- corporate network" or "during this incident".
-- ── Workload identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS workload_identities (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
-- Which service this credential belongs to. The whole point: the
-- audit trail can name `agents` rather than "a service".
service TEXT NOT NULL,
description TEXT,
-- Scopes this workload may use, which the shared token could not
-- express. The ingest pipeline does not need to dispatch actions.
scopes TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::text[],
-- Hashed, never stored in the clear. A secret readable from the
-- table it authenticates against is not a secret.
secret_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
secret_prefix TEXT NOT NULL,
-- Rotation without downtime needs two live secrets at once. The
-- previous one keeps working until `previous_expires_at`, so
-- callers roll over on their own schedule instead of all at the
-- same instant.
previous_hash TEXT,
previous_expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
UNIQUE (service, secret_prefix)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_workload_prefix ON workload_identities (secret_prefix) WHERE revoked_at IS NULL;
COMMENT ON TABLE workload_identities IS
'Per-service credentials replacing the single shared AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN, which '
'could not be attributed, scoped, or rotated without restarting everything at once.';
-- ── API-key rotation in place ──────────────────────────────────────────────
ALTER TABLE api_keys ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS previous_hash TEXT;
ALTER TABLE api_keys ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS previous_expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
ALTER TABLE api_keys ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS rotated_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
COMMENT ON COLUMN api_keys.previous_hash IS
'The superseded secret, honoured until previous_expires_at. Rotation used to mean '
'create, update every caller, delete — which is downtime, so most people never did it.';
-- ── Just-in-time elevation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS privilege_grants (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- What was granted, and only for a while. Permissions rather than
-- a role: elevating to `admin` to isolate one host grants the
-- wildcard, which is the opposite of least privilege.
permissions TEXT[] NOT NULL,
-- Why, in the requester's words, and who approved. An elevation
-- nobody has to justify is a role held permanently with extra
-- steps.
justification TEXT NOT NULL,
approved_by_id UUID REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
-- Bounded, and short. NOT NULL so a grant cannot be permanent by
-- omission, which is how every JIT system decays into standing
-- access.
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
-- What the elevation was for, so a review can ask whether it was
-- used for that.
case_id UUID,
alert_id UUID
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_privilege_grants_live
ON privilege_grants (tenant_id, user_id, expires_at)
WHERE revoked_at IS NULL;
COMMENT ON TABLE privilege_grants IS
'Time-boxed permission grants. Permissions rather than roles: elevating to admin to '
'isolate one host confers the wildcard, which is the opposite of least privilege.';
-- ── ABAC conditions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS permission_conditions (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- The permission this constrains. Conditions narrow; they never
-- grant. A condition that could grant would be a second
-- authorization system disagreeing with the first.
permission TEXT NOT NULL,
role TEXT,
-- Declarative so a condition can be added from the console without
-- a deploy, and so the evaluator is one audited function rather
-- than scattered checks.
condition JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
description TEXT,
enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_permission_conditions
ON permission_conditions (tenant_id, permission) WHERE enabled;
COMMENT ON TABLE permission_conditions IS
'Attribute conditions that narrow a permission. They never grant: a condition that '
'could grant would be a second authorization system disagreeing with the first.';
DO $$
DECLARE
t TEXT;
BEGIN
FOREACH t IN ARRAY ARRAY['privilege_grants', 'permission_conditions']
LOOP
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY', t);
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY', t);
EXECUTE format('DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON %I', t);
EXECUTE format(
'CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON %I '
'USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL) '
'WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id())',
t
);
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO aisoc_app', t);
END IF;
END LOOP;
-- Workload identities are deployment-wide, not tenant-scoped: a
-- service authenticates before any tenant is known.
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON workload_identities TO aisoc_app;
END IF;
END
$$;