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-- Bind an identity-provider subject to the local account it signs in as.
--
-- GHSA-qjjc-q2h2-56cg. `provision_user` selected the local account with
-- `WHERE tenant_id = :t AND lower(email) = lower(:e)`, and nothing in the OIDC
-- path required `email_verified` -- the word appeared nowhere in `oidc.py` or
-- `sso_provisioning.py`. So an attacker able to authenticate to the tenant's
-- configured identity provider with an account carrying a victim's unverified
-- email received an access token minted for the victim's local id, and with
-- database-backed RBAC the API then resolved the *victim's* `user_roles`.
--
-- Why the binding is per connection, not per tenant
-- -------------------------------------------------
-- `provision_user`'s docstring explains why matching was on email at all, and
-- the reason is good: an organisation that moves from one identity provider to
-- another keeps its email addresses and would otherwise get a second account
-- for every person. Binding on `(connection_id, subject)` keeps that true. An
-- IdP migration is a new connection, so its bindings start empty and everyone
-- re-claims their own account by verified email on first sign-in. Within one
-- connection a second subject presenting a bound account's address is either a
-- provider recycling addresses or an attacker, and neither should win quietly.
--
-- `subject` is text and not a uuid: OIDC says `sub` is a case-sensitive string
-- up to 255 ASCII characters, and SAML NameIDs are routinely longer and are
-- not uuids either.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_identities (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- The SSO connection this subject was asserted by. Not a foreign key to
-- `aisoc_sso_connections` on purpose: deleting a connection must not
-- silently drop the bindings that record who claimed which account, and an
-- operator who re-creates a connection gets a new id and therefore a clean
-- re-claim, which is the migration path above.
connection_id UUID NOT NULL,
subject TEXT NOT NULL,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-- What the provider asserted at bind time, kept for an auditor asking how
-- this account came to be claimed.
bound_email TEXT NOT NULL,
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
last_seen_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
-- One subject per connection, and one account per subject.
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_identities_subject
ON aisoc_sso_identities (connection_id, subject);
-- And the other direction: one account may be claimed by at most one subject
-- on a given connection. Without this, two subjects could each bind to the
-- same user and both would resolve -- which is the vulnerability wearing a
-- different hat.
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_identities_account
ON aisoc_sso_identities (connection_id, user_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_sso_identities_tenant
ON aisoc_sso_identities (tenant_id);
COMMENT ON TABLE aisoc_sso_identities IS
'Binds an IdP subject to the local account it signs in as, per SSO connection. '
'Closes GHSA-qjjc-q2h2-56cg: before this, an unverified email claim could select '
'any existing account in the tenant.';
DO $$
BEGIN
EXECUTE 'ALTER TABLE aisoc_sso_identities ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY';
EXECUTE 'ALTER TABLE aisoc_sso_identities FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY';
EXECUTE 'DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON aisoc_sso_identities';
EXECUTE
'CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON aisoc_sso_identities '
'USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL) '
'WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id())';
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
EXECUTE 'GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON aisoc_sso_identities TO aisoc_app';
END IF;
END
$$;