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Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
"""Attribute conditions narrow a permission; elevation is time-boxed.
Gap-closure wave 13. `cases:write` was true everywhere, always, from
any address, so the only way to let an analyst isolate a host once was
to give them that power every day.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from app.security.abac import (
PrivilegeGrant,
effective_permissions,
evaluate_conditions,
)
NOW = datetime(2026, 3, 4, 14, 30, tzinfo=UTC)
class TestConditionsNarrow:
def test_an_address_inside_the_range_is_allowed(self) -> None:
result = evaluate_conditions(
[{"operator": "ip_in_cidr", "value": ["198.51.100.0/24"]}],
{"source_ip": "198.51.100.14"},
)
assert result.allowed
def test_an_address_outside_it_is_denied_by_name(self) -> None:
"""A bare 403 on an attribute condition is indistinguishable
from a missing role, and people debug the wrong thing."""
result = evaluate_conditions(
[{"operator": "ip_in_cidr", "value": ["198.51.100.0/24"]}],
{"source_ip": "203.0.113.9"},
)
assert not result.allowed
assert "203.0.113.9" in (result.denied_by or "")
def test_a_window_crossing_midnight_works(self) -> None:
"""The normal case for a night shift, so it is handled rather
than rejected."""
night = [{"operator": "time_between_utc", "value": ["22:00", "06:00"]}]
assert evaluate_conditions(night, {"now": NOW.replace(hour=23)}).allowed
assert evaluate_conditions(night, {"now": NOW.replace(hour=3)}).allowed
assert not evaluate_conditions(night, {"now": NOW.replace(hour=14)}).allowed
def test_every_condition_must_hold(self) -> None:
result = evaluate_conditions(
[
{"operator": "ip_in_cidr", "value": ["198.51.100.0/24"]},
{"operator": "mfa_satisfied", "value": True},
],
{"source_ip": "198.51.100.14", "mfa_satisfied": False},
)
assert not result.allowed
class TestTheFailClosedDecisions:
def test_a_condition_with_no_data_denies_rather_than_passes(self) -> None:
"""Treating it as satisfied would mean a caller who omits a
header is less constrained than one who sends it, which
inverts the control."""
result = evaluate_conditions(
[{"operator": "ip_in_cidr", "value": ["198.51.100.0/24"]}],
{},
)
assert not result.allowed
assert "could not evaluate" in (result.denied_by or "")
assert result.indeterminate
def test_an_unknown_operator_denies(self) -> None:
"""A condition nobody can evaluate is not a condition that
passes."""
result = evaluate_conditions([{"operator": "vibes_acceptable", "value": True}], {})
assert not result.allowed
assert "unknown operator" in (result.denied_by or "")
def test_indeterminate_can_be_made_permissive_deliberately(self) -> None:
"""Available, and not the default — so a deployment that wants
it has to say so."""
result = evaluate_conditions(
[{"operator": "ip_in_cidr", "value": ["198.51.100.0/24"]}],
{},
deny_on_indeterminate=False,
)
assert result.allowed
assert result.indeterminate
def test_no_conditions_at_all_allows(self) -> None:
"""The negative control. Conditions narrow; an unconditioned
permission must behave exactly as it did before."""
assert evaluate_conditions([], {"source_ip": "203.0.113.9"}).allowed
class TestTimeBoxedElevation:
def test_a_live_grant_adds_its_permissions(self) -> None:
effective = effective_permissions(
frozenset({"cases:read"}),
[PrivilegeGrant(permissions=("actions:isolate",), expires_at=NOW + timedelta(minutes=30))],
now=NOW,
)
assert "actions:isolate" in effective
assert "cases:read" in effective
def test_an_expired_grant_adds_nothing(self) -> None:
"""Checked at use rather than by a sweep: a background job that
revokes grants is a job that can be down, and a grant
outliving its window because a worker crashed is the failure
JIT elevation exists to remove."""
effective = effective_permissions(
frozenset({"cases:read"}),
[PrivilegeGrant(permissions=("actions:isolate",), expires_at=NOW - timedelta(seconds=1))],
now=NOW,
)
assert "actions:isolate" not in effective
def test_a_revoked_grant_adds_nothing_even_inside_its_window(self) -> None:
effective = effective_permissions(
frozenset(),
[
PrivilegeGrant(
permissions=("actions:isolate",),
expires_at=NOW + timedelta(hours=1),
revoked_at=NOW - timedelta(minutes=5),
)
],
now=NOW,
)
assert "actions:isolate" not in effective
def test_elevation_never_removes_a_standing_permission(self) -> None:
base = frozenset({"cases:read", "cases:write"})
assert base.issubset(effective_permissions(base, [], now=NOW))