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Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
"""Optional shared-secret auth for the threat-actor attribution HTTP surface.
The ``threatintel`` service runs inside the cluster's private network, so by
default the ``/api/v1/actors/*`` endpoints accept internal calls without
authentication (their historical behaviour). When an operator exposes the
service beyond that perimeter — or runs it in an MSSP / multi-tenant
deployment — they set ``AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN``; the endpoints then
require ``Authorization: Bearer <token>``, compared in constant time.
This mirrors two existing conventions in the codebase:
* the ingest ``k8s-audit`` shared-secret gate — a header token compared with
``subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`` (here: :func:`hmac.compare_digest`), and
* the actions->api ``AISOC_API_SERVICE_TOKEN`` inter-service token.
Resolves the ``[#TODO-attribution-rbac]`` caveat in
``docs/threat-actor-attribution.md``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hmac
import structlog
from fastapi import Header, HTTPException, status
from app.config import settings
logger = structlog.get_logger(__name__)
_BEARER_PREFIX = "bearer "
# Warn at most once per process so an exposed-but-unauthenticated deployment
# is visible in logs without flooding them on every request.
_warned_unconfigured = False
def _expected_token() -> str:
return (getattr(settings, "AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN", "") or "").strip()
async def require_actor_auth(authorization: str | None = Header(default=None)) -> None:
"""FastAPI dependency gating the ``/api/v1/actors/*`` endpoints.
* Token unset → allow (internal-only default), warning once so operators
who have exposed the service notice it is unauthenticated.
* Token set → require a matching ``Authorization: Bearer <token>``,
constant-time compared; missing or wrong → ``401``.
"""
expected = _expected_token()
if not expected:
global _warned_unconfigured
if not _warned_unconfigured:
logger.warning(
"actor_auth.unconfigured",
detail=(
"AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN is unset; /api/v1/actors/* "
"is unauthenticated. Set it (and configure the investigation "
"agent with the same value) before exposing the service "
"beyond the private network."
),
)
_warned_unconfigured = True
return
presented = ""
if authorization and authorization.lower().startswith(_BEARER_PREFIX):
presented = authorization[len(_BEARER_PREFIX) :].strip()
if not presented or not hmac.compare_digest(presented, expected):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="invalid or missing bearer token",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)