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armgit / AiSOC

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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

fix(agents,api): send real alert payload to investigation; stop fabricated evidence

Alexandru Mateescu128ebb0af658
diff --git a/services/agents/app/investigator/forensic_agent.py b/services/agents/app/investigator/forensic_agent.py
index 9809a83fb..f232595ea 100644
--- a/services/agents/app/investigator/forensic_agent.py
+++ b/services/agents/app/investigator/forensic_agent.py
@@ -54,11 +54,27 @@ async def _llm_forensic(state: InvestigatorState) -> dict[str, Any]:
max_depth=2,
)
+ # The original alert payload is the ONLY primary evidence this agent
+ # has; it used to be absent from the prompt entirely, which is how a
+ # run on an empty payload produced a confident fictional timeline.
+ raw_alert_blob = summarize_structure_for_llm(
+ dict(state.raw_alert or {}),
+ label="raw_alert",
+ max_lines=80,
+ max_depth=3,
+ )
+ evidence_available = bool((state.raw_alert or {}).get("alerts")
+ or (state.enrichment_cache or {}))
+
prompt = (
f"Alert summary:\n{safe_summary}\n\n"
+ f"Original alert data:\n{raw_alert_blob}\n\n"
f"Recon findings:\n{safe_recon}\n"
f"MITRE techniques: {safe_mitre}\n\n"
f"Enrichment data (sample):\n{enrichment_blob}"
+ + ("" if evidence_available else
+ "\n\nWARNING: no alert payload, no enrichment, no lake results "
+ "were retrieved. Produce only an inconclusive analysis.")
)
bundle_append = format_bundle_prompt_append(state.context_bundle)
if bundle_append:
@@ -150,7 +166,7 @@ async def run_forensic(state_dict: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
llm_result = await _llm_forensic(state)
- state.forensic = ForensicFindings(
+ findings = ForensicFindings(
timeline=llm_result.get("timeline", []),
artefacts=llm_result.get("artefacts", []),
root_cause_hypothesis=llm_result.get("root_cause_hypothesis", ""),
@@ -159,11 +175,44 @@ async def run_forensic(state_dict: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
summary=llm_result.get("summary", ""),
)
- # Cite each forensic artefact as evidence for downstream replay
+ # Honesty gate: an analysis built on zero retrieved evidence is a
+ # hypothesis factory, not a forensic result. Strip invented artefacts,
+ # cap confidence, and mark the run inconclusive so the report and the
+ # UI cannot present fiction as fact (2026-10 live incident: a run over
+ # an empty raw_alert "found" C:\\Windows\\Temp\\malware.exe).
+ has_primary = bool((state.raw_alert or {}).get("alerts")
+ or (state.raw_alert or {}).get("title")
+ or (state.raw_alert or {}).get("full_log"))
+ has_enriched = bool(state.enrichment_cache)
+ if not has_primary and not has_enriched:
+ findings = findings.model_copy(update={
+ "artefacts": [],
+ "confidence": min(findings.confidence, 0.1),
+ "root_cause_hypothesis": (
+ "INCONCLUSIVE - no alert payload or retrieved evidence was "
+ "available to this investigation; any finding would be "
+ "speculation."
+ ),
+ "summary": (
+ "Automated forensic analysis inconclusive: zero evidence "
+ "retrieved. Manual review with the Wazuh locator on the "
+ "case is required."
+ ),
+ })
+ state.log(
+ StepKind.WARNING if hasattr(StepKind, "WARNING") else StepKind.DECISION_REASON,
+ "ForensicAgent",
+ "inconclusive: zero evidence retrieved; artefacts suppressed",
+ )
+ state.forensic = findings
+
+ # Cite forensic artefacts for downstream replay. Provenance is the
+ # model's inference, not a retrieved observation - say so, otherwise
+ # the audit log launders fabricated artefacts into "evidence_cited".
for artefact in state.forensic.artefacts[:50]:
state.log_evidence(
agent="ForensicAgent",
- evidence_kind="artefact",
+ evidence_kind="artefact_hypothesis",
ref=str(artefact),
weight=state.forensic.confidence,
)
diff --git a/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py b/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py
index 532c0a849..1e09e111e 100644
--- a/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py
+++ b/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py
@@ -359,6 +359,15 @@ Respond ONLY with a JSON object matching this schema:
"""
_FORENSIC_SYSTEM = r"""You are the ForensicAgent of an AI Security Operations Centre.
+HARD RULES:
+- Work ONLY from the alert payload, enrichment and lake data provided.
+- NEVER invent file paths, registry keys, timestamps, users or hosts that
+ do not appear in the input data. Example values in this prompt are
+ FORMAT ILLUSTRATIONS, never findings.
+- Timeline entries must use timestamps taken from the provided data only.
+- If the provided data contains no concrete artefacts or event details,
+ return empty timeline/artefacts, confidence <= 0.1, and state the
+ analysis is inconclusive due to missing evidence.
Given a security alert and its enrichment data, produce:
1. A chronological timeline of events (at most 15 entries).
2. A list of forensic artefacts (file paths, registry keys, network indicators).
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py
index 65cd67b33..df84b31ce 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py
@@ -1500,13 +1500,14 @@ async def case_investigate(
user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],
) -> dict[str, Any]:
cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- exists = (
+ case_row = (
await db.execute(
- text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
+ text("SELECT alert_ids FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
)
).fetchone()
- if not exists:
+ if not case_row:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
+ case_alert_ids = [str(a) for a in (case_row.alert_ids or [])]
# The evidence, assembled server-side from the case's own alerts rather
# than taken from the caller. The console was sending the literal string
@@ -1531,10 +1532,56 @@ async def case_investigate(
# is scoped by tenant_id, so without this the whole run is never persisted.
# Service-token path requires the acting tenant on the header, not just
# in the body: tenant_scope refuses a service token with no tenant.
+ # The agents service stores raw_alert on the run and every downstream
+ # agent reads it; forwarding {} meant the forensic/report models got an
+ # empty payload and filled the gap with fabricated artefacts
+ # (C:\\Windows\\Temp\\malware.exe and friends). Load the case's linked
+ # alerts and pass their real content, truncated so the prompt stays
+ # bounded and free of multi-MB raw blobs.
+ raw_alert_payload: dict[str, Any] = {}
+ try:
+ if case_alert_ids:
+ rows = (
+ await db.execute(
+ text(
+ "SELECT id, title, description, severity, connector_type, "
+ "affected_ips, affected_hosts, affected_users, event_time, raw_event "
+ "FROM alerts WHERE id::text = ANY(:ids) AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "
+ "ORDER BY event_time DESC LIMIT 3"
+ ).bindparams(ids=case_alert_ids, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
+ )
+ ).mappings().all()
+ alerts_out = []
+ for r in rows:
+ raw = r["raw_event"] if isinstance(r["raw_event"], dict) else {}
+ full_log = raw.get("full_log") or ""
+ alerts_out.append(
+ {
+ "id": str(r["id"]),
+ "title": r["title"],
+ "description": (r["description"] or "")[:1000],
+ "severity": r["severity"],
+ "source": r["connector_type"],
+ "affected_ips": list(r["affected_ips"] or [])[:20],
+ "affected_hosts": list(r["affected_hosts"] or [])[:20],
+ "affected_users": list(r["affected_users"] or [])[:20],
+ "event_time": r["event_time"].isoformat() if r["event_time"] else None,
+ "full_log": str(full_log)[:4000],
+ }
+ )
+ if alerts_out:
+ raw_alert_payload = {"alerts": alerts_out}
+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - never block launch on enrichment
+ logger.warning("investigate.launch.raw_alert_enrichment_failed", case_id=str(cid), exc_info=True)
+
resp = await _agents_proxy(
"POST",
f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigate",
- json={"alert_summary": body.alert_summary or "", "tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id)},
+ json={
+ "alert_summary": body.alert_summary or (raw_alert_payload.get("alerts", [{}])[0].get("title") if raw_alert_payload.get("alerts") else ""),
+ "raw_alert": raw_alert_payload,
+ "tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id),
+ },
headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)},
)
if resp.status_code >= 400: