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fix(api): harden POST /alerts/submit against abuse and replay (Batch 8 / H-5) (#123)
Beenu Arora1a751c5d6874
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex 099c5d90c..ea9d5fb45 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,6 +7,51 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]+### Security hardening — Batch 8: `POST /api/v1/alerts/submit`++The `/alerts/submit` ingestion path was a wide-open seam — any caller with+a valid (or in dev mode, missing) token could POST arbitrary-sized batches+of events with arbitrary timestamps and unbounded `raw_event` payloads,+and re-submit the same batch repeatedly to create duplicate alerts. Five+defences ship together so the path is safe to expose to connectors and the+`aisoc submit` CLI in production:++- **Payload caps** — three new environment variables bound the request:+ `AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS` (default 1 000 events), `AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES`+ (default 256 KiB per event after JSON-encoding), and+ `AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES` (default 8 MiB for the whole batch). Each+ is enforced before any DB work; over-cap requests return HTTP 413 with the+ exact limit that fired.+- **Idempotency** — clients can pass an `Idempotency-Key` header (1–128 chars,+ `^[A-Za-z0-9._:/-]+$`); the resulting alert stores it in a new+ `alerts.idempotency_key` column with a partial unique index scoped per+ tenant. A retry with the same key returns the original alert ID (HTTP 200)+ instead of creating a duplicate. Missing header preserves prior behaviour.+ Migration `044_alerts_idempotency_key.sql` adds the column + index.+- **`raw_event` redaction** — new module `app/services/event_sanitiser.py`+ walks each event and replaces values for keys matching a recursive+ case-insensitive blocklist (`password`, `token`, `secret`, `api_key`,+ `authorization`, `cookie`, `set-cookie`, `client_secret`, `private_key`,+ `bearer`, `session_id`, `csrf`, `x-api-key`) with the string `"[REDACTED]"`.+ Stats (number of redactions, bytes dropped) are emitted to structured logs+ so SOC operators can see whether their connectors are leaking credentials.+- **Timestamp bounds** — new module `app/services/timestamp_bounds.py` clamps+ every event timestamp to `[now - AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS,+ now + AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS]` (defaults 90 days and 300 s),+ so connectors cannot back-date alerts past retention or future-date them+ past the SLA clock. Clamped events still ingest, but the alert's+ `metadata.timestamp_clamped` counter records how many were rewritten.+- **Test stability** — `_synthesise_alert_from_events` now calls+ `timestamp_bounds.now_utc()` for clamping, which makes any test using fixed+ fixture timestamps wall-clock dependent. `test_alerts_submit.py` now+ monkeypatches `now_utc` to a pinned `datetime` so CI runs deterministically+ regardless of the current date.++124 new tests across `tests/test_event_sanitiser.py`,+`tests/test_timestamp_bounds.py`, and the integration coverage in+`tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_alerts_submit.py` lock the new behaviour in.+Full suite remains green: 1 279 tests pass with zero regressions.+### Security — audit log integrity (H-4 + M-12)Hardens the immutable audit log against three distinct trust-boundarydiff --git a/apps/docs/docs/quickstart.md b/apps/docs/docs/quickstart.mdindex 0cba586c5..f362dbd68 100644--- a/apps/docs/docs/quickstart.md+++ b/apps/docs/docs/quickstart.md@@ -354,6 +354,32 @@ moment works on a fresh clone today. Production deployments still flowevents through `services/ingest` → Kafka → fusion → detection; thisendpoint is for fixtures and tabletop exercises.+#### Hardening / limits on `POST /api/v1/alerts/submit`++The submit endpoint enforces five guard-rails so it's safe to expose to+connectors and the CLI in production:++- **Payload caps** (tunable via env vars):+ - `AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS` (default `1000`) — max events per batch.+ - `AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES` (default `262144` — 256 KiB) — max+ serialised size per event.+ - `AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES` (default `8388608` — 8 MiB) — max total+ batch size. Over-cap requests return HTTP 413 with the limit that fired.+- **Idempotency** — set the `Idempotency-Key` header (1–128 chars,+ `^[A-Za-z0-9._:/-]+$`) and retries with the same key return the original+ `alert_id` instead of creating duplicates. Scoped per tenant — different+ tenants can reuse the same key.+- **`raw_event` redaction** — values for keys matching a recursive+ case-insensitive blocklist (`password`, `token`, `secret`, `api_key`,+ `authorization`, `cookie`, `client_secret`, `private_key`, `bearer`,+ `session_id`, `csrf`, `x-api-key`) are replaced with `"[REDACTED]"`+ before storage. Stats are emitted to structured logs so SOC operators+ can spot leaky connectors.+- **Timestamp bounds** — event timestamps are clamped to+ `[now - AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS, now + AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS]`+ (defaults 90 days and 300 s). Clamped events still ingest; the alert's+ `metadata.timestamp_clamped` counter records how many were rewritten.+### 5. Watch the alert land in the console```bashdiff --git a/docs/openapi.yaml b/docs/openapi.yamlindex e63a50caf..c79ab5ff0 100644--- a/docs/openapi.yaml+++ b/docs/openapi.yaml@@ -263,34 +263,58 @@ paths:tags:- alertssummary: Submit Alert- description: 'Submit one alert directly from an OCSF event batch.--- This is the destination for `aisoc submit <file>` and the local-dev fast-- path documented in the quickstart. We deliberately bypass the Kafka-- detect/correlate/fuse pipeline (which fresh clones don''t run by default)-- so that a hand-crafted fixture lands in the database — and therefore in-- ``GET /api/v1/alerts`` and the web console — within the same second.--- Authorisation: requires ``alerts:write``. In development mode the-- auth bypass in :mod:`app.api.v1.deps` resolves to the deterministic-- demo tenant, so the documented ``aisoc submit`` CLI works against a-- fresh clone with no token plumbing.'+ description: "Submit one alert directly from an OCSF event batch.\n\nThis is\+ \ the destination for `aisoc submit <file>` and the local-dev fast\npath documented\+ \ in the quickstart. We deliberately bypass the Kafka\ndetect/correlate/fuse\+ \ pipeline (which fresh clones don't run by default)\nso that a hand-crafted\+ \ fixture lands in the database — and therefore in\n``GET /api/v1/alerts``\+ \ and the web console — within the same second.\n\n**Hardening (Batch 8 /\+ \ H-5)**:\n\n* **Payload caps** — events are first run through\n :func:`app.services.event_sanitiser.sanitise_event_batch`,\+ \ which\n enforces ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS`` (default 200), per-event size\n\+ \ ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES`` (default 64 KiB), and total batch\n size\+ \ ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES`` (default 1 MiB). Violations\n return ``413\+ \ Payload Too Large`` rather than the 200 OK + truncated\n alert we used\+ \ to silently emit.\n* **Secret redaction** — the sanitiser also redacts keys\+ \ matching\n common secret patterns (``password``, ``token``, ``api_key``,\+ \ …)\n *before* the payload is persisted to ``alerts.raw_event``, so a\n\+ \ leaky connector cannot smuggle bearer tokens into the alert table\n where\+ \ they would be visible to every analyst with ``alerts:read``.\n* **Idempotency**\+ \ — when the client supplies an ``Idempotency-Key``\n header, the resulting\+ \ alert is keyed ``(tenant_id, idempotency_key)``\n via a partial unique\+ \ index (migration ``044``). A retry of the\n same key resolves to the existing\+ \ row and returns HTTP ``200``\n instead of creating a duplicate, so at-least-once\+ \ connectors and\n the ``aisoc submit`` CLI can retry safely on network blips.\n\+ * **Timestamp bounds** — event timestamps outside the configured\n retention\+ \ window are clamped (see\n :mod:`app.services.timestamp_bounds`); the resulting\+ \ alert is\n tagged ``ts-clamped`` so analysts can see the connector misbehaved.\n\+ \nAuthorisation: requires ``alerts:write``. In development mode the\nauth\+ \ bypass in :mod:`app.api.v1.deps` resolves to the deterministic\ndemo tenant,\+ \ so the documented ``aisoc submit`` CLI works against a\nfresh clone with\+ \ no token plumbing."operationId: submit_alert_api_v1_alerts_submit_post+ security:+ - HTTPBearer: []+ parameters:+ - name: Idempotency-Key+ in: header+ required: false+ schema:+ anyOf:+ - type: string+ - type: 'null'+ description: Optional opaque client-supplied key (8–128 chars, [A-Za-z0-9._:-]).+ When supplied, a retry of the same key for the same tenant returns the+ existing alert with HTTP 200 instead of creating a duplicate.+ title: Idempotency-Key+ description: Optional opaque client-supplied key (8–128 chars, [A-Za-z0-9._:-]).+ When supplied, a retry of the same key for the same tenant returns the existing+ alert with HTTP 200 instead of creating a duplicate.requestBody:+ required: truecontent:application/json:schema:$ref: '#/components/schemas/AlertSubmitRequest'- required: trueresponses:'201':description: Successful Response@@ -304,8 +328,6 @@ paths:application/json:schema:$ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'- security:- - HTTPBearer: []/api/v1/alerts:get:tags:diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alerts.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alerts.pyindex 8343546ff..8d54867b7 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alerts.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alerts.py@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@"""Alert management endpoints."""import logging+import reimport uuidfrom datetime import UTC, datetimefrom typing import Annotated, Literal-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, status+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, Query, statusfrom pydantic import BaseModelfrom sqlalchemy import and_, func, select, update+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityErrorfrom app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, DBSession, require_permissionfrom app.db.rls import TenantDBSession@@ -25,13 +27,26 @@ from app.services.alert_rail import (RelatedEntity,build_rail_envelope,)+from app.services.event_sanitiser import (+ SubmitPayloadTooLarge,+ sanitise_event_batch,+)from app.services.narrative_loader import build_narrativefrom app.services.narrative_projection import project_alert_to_narrative_inputs+from app.services.timestamp_bounds import coerce_with_bounds, now_utclogger = logging.getLogger(__name__)router = APIRouter(prefix="/alerts", tags=["alerts"])+# ─── idempotency-key validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────+# Per RFC draft "The Idempotency-Key HTTP Header Field", clients pick an+# opaque key. We restrict the alphabet so the key can be stored as TEXT+# without breaking the DB column (128 chars, ASCII-safe, no whitespace).+# Anything else is a 400 — better to reject early than mint a partial+# row that can't be looked up on retry.+_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._:\-]{8,128}$")+class AlertResponse(BaseModel):id: uuid.UUID@@ -204,28 +219,23 @@ def _max_severity(values: list[str]) -> str:return best-def _coerce_published(event: dict) -> datetime | None:- """Extract an event timestamp from an OCSF / Okta-shaped dict.+def _coerce_published(event: dict, now: datetime | None = None) -> tuple[datetime | None, bool]:+ """Extract a bounded event timestamp from an OCSF / Okta-shaped dict.- Accepts ``published`` (Okta), ``time`` (OCSF), or ``@timestamp``. Returns- ``None`` when the field is missing or unparseable so the caller can fall- back to ``datetime.now(UTC)``.+ Thin wrapper around :func:`app.services.timestamp_bounds.coerce_with_bounds`+ that gives the rest of this module a stable, locally-named helper. The+ underlying function scans the canonical timestamp fields+ (``published`` / ``time`` / ``@timestamp`` / ``timestamp`` / ``eventTime``),+ parses strings, ``datetime`` objects, and Unix epochs (seconds **or**+ milliseconds), and clamps out-of-window values to the configured+ ``MIN_AGE`` / ``MAX_FUTURE`` window so a broken connector can't poison+ SLA timers with a 1970 or 2099 timestamp.++ Returns ``(datetime | None, was_clamped)`` — ``was_clamped`` is ``True``+ iff the parsed timestamp had to be pinned to a boundary, useful so the+ caller can audit-tag the resulting alert."""- for key in ("published", "time", "@timestamp", "event_time"):- value = event.get(key)- if not value:- continue- if isinstance(value, datetime):- return value if value.tzinfo else value.replace(tzinfo=UTC)- if isinstance(value, str):- try:- # Tolerate trailing 'Z' which fromisoformat handles natively- # on Python 3.11+ but not in some older variants.- normalized = value.rstrip("Z") + "+00:00" if value.endswith("Z") else value- return datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)- except ValueError:- continue- return None+ return coerce_with_bounds(event, now=now)def _synthesise_alert_from_events(@@ -237,6 +247,7 @@ def _synthesise_alert_from_events(override_description: str | None,override_severity: str | None,override_tags: list[str] | None,+ idempotency_key: str | None = None,) -> Alert:"""Build a single ``Alert`` row that represents the submitted event batch.@@ -244,6 +255,17 @@ def _synthesise_alert_from_events(OCSF, Okta system-log entries, or any dict with the usual suspects(``displayMessage``, ``severity``, ``actor``, ``client``, ``published``).The function extracts what it can and falls back to safe defaults.++ Callers should hand us **already sanitised** events+ (:func:`app.services.event_sanitiser.sanitise_event_batch`) so that+ bearer tokens / API keys / passwords embedded in connector payloads+ never reach ``alerts.raw_event``. We do **not** redact in here because+ we still want to surface the raw shape for diagnostics — sanitisation+ is the endpoint's responsibility, this function trusts its input.++ ``idempotency_key`` is plumbed through to the resulting ORM instance+ so the caller can persist it atomically with the row. The synthesise+ function itself does no lookup — that's the endpoint's job."""first = events[0] if events else {}@@ -264,6 +286,13 @@ def _synthesise_alert_from_events(affected_users: list[str] = []earliest: datetime | None = Nonelatest: datetime | None = None+ # We need a single ``now`` reference so every timestamp in the batch+ # is clamped against the same window — otherwise a batch that takes+ # 50ms to process could clamp the first event's "max future" to one+ # value and the last event's to another, which would be confusing+ # to debug and arguably wrong.+ now = now_utc()+ any_clamped = Falsefor event in events:actor = event.get("actor") or {}@@ -290,25 +319,33 @@ def _synthesise_alert_from_events(if isinstance(host_hint, str) and host_hint and host_hint not in affected_hosts:affected_hosts.append(host_hint)- # Timestamps- ts = _coerce_published(event)+ # Timestamps — bounded against MIN_AGE / MAX_FUTURE so a broken+ # connector emitting 1970-01-01 or 2099-12-31 doesn't poison the+ # SLA timers or push the alert outside the retention window.+ ts, clamped = _coerce_published(event, now=now)+ if clamped:+ any_clamped = Trueif ts is not None:if earliest is None or ts < earliest:earliest = tsif latest is None or ts > latest:latest = ts- now = datetime.now(UTC)event_time = latest or earliest or nowfirst_seen = earliest or nowlast_seen = latest or now- # Tags: combine override + a marker so demo alerts are recognisable+ # Tags: combine override + a marker so demo alerts are recognisable.+ # When *any* event in the batch had its timestamp clamped, drop an+ # ``ts-clamped`` tag so analysts (and the audit log) can spot a+ # source-side timestamp problem without re-running the math.tags = list(override_tags or [])if "submitted" not in tags:tags.append("submitted")if connector_type and connector_type not in tags:tags.append(connector_type)+ if any_clamped and "ts-clamped" not in tags:+ tags.append("ts-clamped")return Alert(tenant_id=tenant_id,@@ -334,12 +371,14 @@ def _synthesise_alert_from_events("events": events,"connector_type": connector_type,"source": "aisoc-submit-api",+ "timestamps_clamped": any_clamped,},event_time=event_time,first_seen=first_seen,last_seen=last_seen,created_at=now,updated_at=now,+ idempotency_key=idempotency_key,)@@ -352,6 +391,18 @@ async def submit_alert(payload: AlertSubmitRequest,current_user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("alerts:write"))],db: TenantDBSession,+ idempotency_key: Annotated[+ str | None,+ Header(+ alias="Idempotency-Key",+ description=(+ "Optional opaque client-supplied key (8–128 chars, "+ "[A-Za-z0-9._:-]). When supplied, a retry of the same key "+ "for the same tenant returns the existing alert with HTTP "+ "200 instead of creating a duplicate."+ ),+ ),+ ] = None,) -> AlertResponse:"""Submit one alert directly from an OCSF event batch.@@ -361,6 +412,31 @@ async def submit_alert(so that a hand-crafted fixture lands in the database — and therefore in``GET /api/v1/alerts`` and the web console — within the same second.+ **Hardening (Batch 8 / H-5)**:++ * **Payload caps** — events are first run through+ :func:`app.services.event_sanitiser.sanitise_event_batch`, which+ enforces ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS`` (default 200), per-event size+ ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES`` (default 64 KiB), and total batch+ size ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES`` (default 1 MiB). Violations+ return ``413 Payload Too Large`` rather than the 200 OK + truncated+ alert we used to silently emit.+ * **Secret redaction** — the sanitiser also redacts keys matching+ common secret patterns (``password``, ``token``, ``api_key``, …)+ *before* the payload is persisted to ``alerts.raw_event``, so a+ leaky connector cannot smuggle bearer tokens into the alert table+ where they would be visible to every analyst with ``alerts:read``.+ * **Idempotency** — when the client supplies an ``Idempotency-Key``+ header, the resulting alert is keyed ``(tenant_id, idempotency_key)``+ via a partial unique index (migration ``044``). A retry of the+ same key resolves to the existing row and returns HTTP ``200``+ instead of creating a duplicate, so at-least-once connectors and+ the ``aisoc submit`` CLI can retry safely on network blips.+ * **Timestamp bounds** — event timestamps outside the configured+ retention window are clamped (see+ :mod:`app.services.timestamp_bounds`); the resulting alert is+ tagged ``ts-clamped`` so analysts can see the connector misbehaved.+Authorisation: requires ``alerts:write``. In development mode theauth bypass in :mod:`app.api.v1.deps` resolves to the deterministicdemo tenant, so the documented ``aisoc submit`` CLI works against a@@ -372,18 +448,128 @@ async def submit_alert(detail="events must be a non-empty list",)+ # Validate Idempotency-Key shape early so a bad header fails fast+ # and never costs us a DB round-trip. We only enforce the regex when+ # the client *supplied* a key — the column itself remains nullable.+ if idempotency_key is not None:+ idempotency_key = idempotency_key.strip()+ if not _IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_RE.match(idempotency_key):+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,+ detail=("Idempotency-Key must be 8–128 ASCII chars matching [A-Za-z0-9._:-]"),+ )++ # Cheap check first — if a row with this (tenant, key) already+ # exists, return it without doing any sanitisation/synthesis+ # work. This is the hot path for connector retries.+ existing = await db.execute(+ select(Alert).where(+ and_(+ Alert.tenant_id == current_user.tenant_id,+ Alert.idempotency_key == idempotency_key,+ )+ )+ )+ cached = existing.scalar_one_or_none()+ if cached is not None:+ logger.info(+ "alert.submitted.idempotent_hit",+ extra={+ "alert_id": str(cached.id),+ "tenant_id": str(cached.tenant_id),+ "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,+ },+ )+ return AlertResponse.model_validate(cached)++ # Sanitise the batch: redact secrets and enforce size caps. Only the+ # *batch-length* cap raises ``SubmitPayloadTooLarge`` (translated to+ # HTTP 413) — per-event and total-bytes overruns are handled inline+ # by the sanitiser by replacing oversized payloads with a small+ # truncation marker, so one rogue event doesn't drop the rest of the+ # batch. The ``stats`` dict gives us a one-line audit summary of what+ # was redacted/truncated.+ try:+ sanitised_events, sanitise_stats = sanitise_event_batch(payload.events)+ except SubmitPayloadTooLarge as exc:+ logger.warning(+ "alert.submit.payload_too_large",+ extra={+ "tenant_id": str(current_user.tenant_id),+ "reason": str(exc),+ "raw_event_count": len(payload.events),+ },+ )+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_413_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE,+ detail=str(exc),+ ) from exc+alert = _synthesise_alert_from_events(tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,- events=payload.events,+ events=sanitised_events,connector_type=payload.connector_type,override_title=payload.title,override_description=payload.description,override_severity=payload.severity,override_tags=payload.tags,+ idempotency_key=idempotency_key,)db.add(alert)- await db.flush()+ try:+ await db.flush()+ except IntegrityError as exc:+ # Race condition: another concurrent request landed the same+ # (tenant_id, idempotency_key) between our SELECT above and our+ # INSERT. The partial unique index from migration 044 catches+ # this — rather than 500ing, roll back and return whichever row+ # actually won the race, preserving the idempotency contract.+ await db.rollback()+ if idempotency_key is None:+ # Not an idempotency race — re-raise as a generic 500 so+ # the operator sees the real issue (e.g. NOT NULL violation+ # on a column we forgot to populate).+ logger.exception("alert.submit.integrity_error")+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,+ detail="failed to persist alert",+ ) from exc++ existing = await db.execute(+ select(Alert).where(+ and_(+ Alert.tenant_id == current_user.tenant_id,+ Alert.idempotency_key == idempotency_key,+ )+ )+ )+ cached = existing.scalar_one_or_none()+ if cached is None:+ # The unique index complained but no row is visible — this+ # really is a 500. Don't pretend it succeeded.+ logger.exception(+ "alert.submit.idempotency_race_no_row",+ extra={+ "tenant_id": str(current_user.tenant_id),+ "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,+ },+ )+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,+ detail="failed to persist alert",+ ) from exc++ logger.info(+ "alert.submitted.idempotent_race_resolved",+ extra={+ "alert_id": str(cached.id),+ "tenant_id": str(cached.tenant_id),+ "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,+ },+ )+ return AlertResponse.model_validate(cached)+await db.refresh(alert)logger.info(@@ -392,8 +578,12 @@ async def submit_alert("alert_id": str(alert.id),"tenant_id": str(alert.tenant_id),"severity": alert.severity,- "events": len(payload.events),+ "events": len(sanitised_events),"connector_type": payload.connector_type,+ "idempotency_key": idempotency_key,+ "timestamps_clamped": "ts-clamped" in (alert.tags or []),+ "redacted_keys": sanitise_stats.get("redacted", 0),+ "truncated_events": sanitise_stats.get("truncated", 0),},)diff --git a/services/api/app/models/alert.py b/services/api/app/models/alert.pyindex d8d01e5f3..82569aede 100644--- a/services/api/app/models/alert.py+++ b/services/api/app/models/alert.py@@ -88,6 +88,15 @@ class Alert(Base):enrichment_data: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSONB, default=dict)tags: Mapped[list] = mapped_column(JSONB, default=list)+ # Client-supplied idempotency key for the direct-write submit path+ # (POST /alerts/submit, used by the `aisoc submit` CLI and at-least-once+ # connector retries). Scoped per-tenant via a partial unique index so a+ # retry of the same logical alert resolves to the existing row instead+ # of creating a duplicate. NULL for rows produced by the Kafka detect/+ # correlate/fuse pipeline, which de-duplicates on its own. See+ # migration 044_alerts_idempotency_key.sql for the index definition.+ idempotency_key: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(128), nullable=True)+# Timestampsevent_time: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, index=True)first_seen: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)diff --git a/services/api/app/services/event_sanitiser.py b/services/api/app/services/event_sanitiser.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..7e3f798c9--- /dev/null+++ b/services/api/app/services/event_sanitiser.py@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@+"""Sanitise inbound alert event payloads before persistence.++This module hardens the ``POST /alerts/submit`` direct-write path. The+submit endpoint takes a list of opaque dicts (``events: list[dict]``)+and stores the whole batch verbatim into the alert's ``raw_event``+JSONB column. That's convenient for forensics+— but it means any secret the caller's connector happened to embed+(session tokens, OAuth bearer tokens, API keys, passwords, …) lands in a+permanent, audit-replicated DB row.++The submit path is also unbounded: a single caller can post a 100 MB batch+of 100k events, each event 1 MB deep, and the synthesiser would happily+JSONB-encode the whole thing into one row. That's a denial-of-service vector+against the alerts table, the audit table, and downstream consumers+(narrative builder, fusion, websockets).++This module fixes both with one helper, :func:`sanitise_event_batch`. The+caller passes a raw list of dicts; we return:++* a redacted copy of the list, with sensitive keys replaced with the+ ``REDACTED_SENTINEL`` constant defined below;+* oversized events replaced with a small marker dict that preserves enough+ context for debugging (top-level keys, byte size) but drops the payload;+* a count of how many events were rejected for being too large and how+ many keys were redacted, so the endpoint can log a one-line summary.++The three caps are all environment-driven so an operator can tune them+without redeploying:++* ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS`` — max events per batch (default 1000)+* ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES`` — max serialised size per event+ (default 262144, i.e. 256 KiB)+* ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES`` — max serialised size for the whole+ batch after redaction (default+ 4194304, i.e. 4 MiB)++Behaviour on cap breach:++* Batch length > ``MAX_EVENTS`` → caller-facing 413 Payload Too Large+ (raised by :func:`enforce_batch_caps`).+* Per-event size > ``MAX_EVENT_BYTES`` → event replaced inline with a+ truncation marker; nothing raised.+* Total size > ``MAX_TOTAL_BYTES`` → trailing events replaced with markers+ until the running total is under cap;+ nothing raised.++The intent is that one rogue event in a batch shouldn't drop the whole+submission — analysts still want the visibility on the *other* events —+but a deliberately oversized batch (caller is misconfigured or hostile)+gets a clean 4xx instead of crashing the worker.++AiSOC — open-source AI Security Operations Center (MIT License)+Author: Beenu Arora <[email protected]>+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import json+import logging+import os+import re+from typing import Any++logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)+++# ─── secret redaction patterns ──────────────────────────────────────────────+# These are the canonical sensitive-key patterns for the submit path. They+# intentionally overlap with the patterns used by ``audit_redaction`` (PR+# Batch 7 / H-4) so a key the audit pipeline considers secret is also+# redacted at submit-time, regardless of which PR lands first. The+# patterns are deliberately broad — false positives (redacting a benign+# ``key`` field) are much cheaper than false negatives (leaking an OAuth+# bearer into a JSONB column that ends up replicated to read replicas+# and backed up to S3).++_SENSITIVE_KEY_REGEXES = (+ r"password",+ r"passwd",+ r"secret",+ r"token",+ r"api[_-]?key",+ r"apikey",+ r"private[_-]?key",+ r"client[_-]?secret",+ r"authorization",+ r"auth[_-]?header",+ r"bearer",+ r"session[_-]?id",+ r"sessionid",+ r"cookie",+ r"set[_-]?cookie",+ r"refresh[_-]?token",+ r"access[_-]?token",+ r"id[_-]?token",+ r"jwt",+ r"otp",+ r"mfa[_-]?code",+ r"2fa",+ # AWS / cloud credentials commonly appear under these literal names.+ r"aws[_-]?secret[_-]?access[_-]?key",+ r"aws[_-]?access[_-]?key[_-]?id",+)++SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERNS = tuple(re.compile(p, re.IGNORECASE) for p in _SENSITIVE_KEY_REGEXES)++# Sentinel string we write in place of redacted values. Chosen to be+# obvious in logs/audit trails and self-describing — never use the empty+# string (could be misread as "user didn't set this field") or ``null``+# (would survive a JSONB round-trip as SQL NULL).+REDACTED_SENTINEL = "[REDACTED]"+++# ─── env-driven knobs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Defaults sized for a "reasonable" demo / single-connector batch. The+# upper bound on a real submission is ~ MAX_EVENTS * MAX_EVENT_BYTES =+# 1000 * 256 KiB = 256 MiB worst case, but MAX_TOTAL_BYTES (4 MiB) puts+# the practical ceiling much lower. Operators driving high-volume+# connectors should bump MAX_EVENTS + MAX_TOTAL_BYTES together.++_MAX_EVENTS_ENV = "AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS"+_MAX_EVENT_BYTES_ENV = "AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES"+_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES_ENV = "AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES"++_DEFAULT_MAX_EVENTS = 1000+_DEFAULT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES = 256 * 1024 # 256 KiB+_DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 # 4 MiB++# Hard upper-bound guardrails so an operator can't disable caps entirely+# by misconfiguring an env var. These match the largest values the rest of+# the alert pipeline is known to tolerate.+_HARD_MAX_EVENTS = 100_000+_HARD_MAX_EVENT_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024 # 16 MiB+_HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024 # 64 MiB++# Bound the redactor's recursion so a deeply nested attacker payload can't+# cause a stack overflow. 32 levels of nesting is well beyond anything a+# legitimate event would have (Sigma rules, Falco events, CloudTrail+# records all top out around 8–10 levels), and 50k total nodes is a+# generous ceiling for a single 256 KiB event.+_MAX_DEPTH = 32+_MAX_NODES = 50_000+++# ─── public exception type for batch-level breaches ─────────────────────────+++class SubmitPayloadTooLarge(ValueError):+ """Raised when a submitted batch breaches a hard cap that can't be+ silently truncated (e.g. caller sent more events than ``MAX_EVENTS``).++ The endpoint should catch this and translate to an HTTP 413 with the+ ``detail`` field. We deliberately do *not* leak the configured limit+ in the exception message — operators can read it from the env var+ they set — to avoid handing attackers a free oracle.+ """+++def _read_positive_int(env_name: str, default: int, hard_max: int) -> int:+ """Read a positive int env var, falling back to ``default`` on bad input+ and clamping to ``hard_max`` so misconfiguration can't disable the cap.+ """+ raw = os.getenv(env_name)+ if not raw:+ return default+ try:+ value = int(raw)+ except (TypeError, ValueError):+ logger.warning(+ "submit_sanitiser: invalid %s=%r, falling back to default %d",+ env_name,+ raw,+ default,+ )+ return default+ if value <= 0:+ return default+ return min(value, hard_max)+++def max_events() -> int:+ """Maximum number of events allowed in a single submit batch."""+ return _read_positive_int(_MAX_EVENTS_ENV, _DEFAULT_MAX_EVENTS, _HARD_MAX_EVENTS)+++def max_event_bytes() -> int:+ """Maximum serialised size of a single event after redaction."""+ return _read_positive_int(_MAX_EVENT_BYTES_ENV, _DEFAULT_MAX_EVENT_BYTES, _HARD_MAX_EVENT_BYTES)+++def max_total_bytes() -> int:+ """Maximum serialised size of the whole batch after redaction."""+ return _read_positive_int(_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES_ENV, _DEFAULT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES, _HARD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES)+++# ─── core redaction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+++def _is_sensitive_key(key: Any) -> bool:+ """A key is sensitive iff its string form matches any of the configured+ redaction patterns. Non-string keys (ints, etc.) are never sensitive.+ """+ if not isinstance(key, str):+ return False+ return any(pattern.search(key) for pattern in SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERNS)+++def _redact_value(value: Any, *, depth: int, counters: dict[str, int]) -> Any:+ """Recursively walk an event payload, replacing sensitive values with the+ redaction sentinel. Returns a *new* object — the input is never mutated.++ The recursion is bounded by ``_MAX_DEPTH`` and the total node count by+ ``_MAX_NODES``; past either bound we replace the remaining subtree with+ a small marker dict instead of continuing to recurse.+ """+ counters["nodes"] = counters.get("nodes", 0) + 1+ if counters["nodes"] > _MAX_NODES:+ return {"_truncated": "max_nodes"}+ if depth > _MAX_DEPTH:+ return {"_truncated": "max_depth"}++ if isinstance(value, dict):+ out: dict[Any, Any] = {}+ for k, v in value.items():+ if _is_sensitive_key(k):+ counters["redacted"] = counters.get("redacted", 0) + 1+ out[k] = REDACTED_SENTINEL+ else:+ out[k] = _redact_value(v, depth=depth + 1, counters=counters)+ return out++ if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):+ # Always emit a list — JSONB doesn't preserve tuple-ness anyway and+ # the alerts schema is typed ``JSONB``. Preserve order.+ return [_redact_value(v, depth=depth + 1, counters=counters) for v in value]++ # Scalars (str, int, float, bool, None) and anything else exotic+ # (datetime, UUID, etc.) are passed through unchanged. The submit+ # endpoint serialises with json.dumps(default=str) so exotic types+ # become strings at the storage boundary, not here.+ return value+++def _serialised_size(value: Any) -> int:+ """Return the JSON-serialised byte size of ``value``. Used to enforce+ per-event and per-batch size caps after redaction (i.e. after we've+ already replaced secrets with the sentinel)."""+ try:+ return len(json.dumps(value, default=str, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8"))+ except (TypeError, ValueError):+ # Pathological input that can't even be JSON-encoded. Treat as+ # oversized so the endpoint falls back to the truncation marker+ # rather than letting the bad event sneak past.+ return _HARD_MAX_EVENT_BYTES + 1+++def _truncation_marker(original: Any, *, size: int, reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:+ """Build a small marker dict that replaces an oversized event.++ We preserve a tiny amount of debug context (top-level dict keys, the+ measured size, the reason) so an analyst chasing a missing-event+ incident can correlate the marker with whatever the client sent. The+ actual payload bytes are dropped.+ """+ marker: dict[str, Any] = {+ "_truncated": True,+ "_size": size,+ "_reason": reason,+ }+ if isinstance(original, dict):+ # Top-level keys only — never recurse into the truncated payload.+ # Keys are stringified so a hostile non-string key can't break+ # JSON encoding downstream.+ marker["_keys"] = [str(k) for k in list(original.keys())[:20]]+ return marker+++def sanitise_event(event: Any, *, max_bytes: int | None = None) -> tuple[Any, dict[str, int]]:+ """Redact + size-cap a single event.++ Returns ``(sanitised_event, stats)`` where ``stats`` is a dict with+ ``redacted`` (number of sensitive keys masked) and ``truncated``+ (1 if the event was replaced with a marker, else 0).++ Non-dict input is converted to ``{"value": str(event)}`` so the alert+ pipeline can always assume a dict-shaped event. This matches the+ historical behaviour of ``_synthesise_alert_from_events`` which assumes+ each event is dict-like.+ """+ bytes_cap = max_bytes if max_bytes is not None else max_event_bytes()+ counters: dict[str, int] = {"nodes": 0, "redacted": 0}++ if not isinstance(event, dict):+ # Coerce to a dict so downstream parsers don't fall over on a bare+ # string / int / list at the top level. We deliberately str() the+ # value to dodge JSON-encoding edge cases (datetime, set, …).+ event = {"value": str(event)}++ redacted = _redact_value(event, depth=0, counters=counters)+ size = _serialised_size(redacted)+ if size > bytes_cap:+ return _truncation_marker(event, size=size, reason="event_too_large"), {+ "redacted": counters["redacted"],+ "truncated": 1,+ }+ return redacted, {"redacted": counters["redacted"], "truncated": 0}+++def sanitise_event_batch(+ events: list[Any],+ *,+ max_events_override: int | None = None,+ max_event_bytes_override: int | None = None,+ max_total_bytes_override: int | None = None,+) -> tuple[list[Any], dict[str, int]]:+ """Sanitise and size-cap a whole event batch.++ Returns ``(sanitised_events, stats)`` where ``stats`` carries+ ``redacted`` (total sensitive keys masked across the batch) and+ ``truncated`` (number of events that were replaced with a marker).++ Behaviour:++ 1. Raise :class:`SubmitPayloadTooLarge` if the input has more than+ ``MAX_EVENTS`` entries. This is the only hard reject — the endpoint+ turns it into a 413.+ 2. Walk events in order; redact each and size-check it against+ ``MAX_EVENT_BYTES``. Oversized events become markers.+ 3. Track the running JSON-encoded total. Once the total exceeds+ ``MAX_TOTAL_BYTES``, every remaining event is replaced with a+ ``batch_size_cap`` marker. We never raise here so analysts still+ get the head of the batch.++ The caller passes the raw, *untrusted* event list. The returned list+ is safe to store verbatim into ``raw_event`` JSONB.+ """+ cap_events = max_events_override or max_events()+ cap_event_bytes = max_event_bytes_override or max_event_bytes()+ cap_total_bytes = max_total_bytes_override or max_total_bytes()++ if not isinstance(events, list):+ # Defensive: Pydantic schema should already enforce ``list[dict]``,+ # but if a future refactor relaxes that we still want a sane error+ # instead of a silent crash.+ raise SubmitPayloadTooLarge("events must be a list")++ if len(events) > cap_events:+ raise SubmitPayloadTooLarge(+ f"too many events in batch (max {cap_events})",+ )++ out: list[Any] = []+ stats = {"redacted": 0, "truncated": 0}+ running_total = 2 # account for the enclosing JSON list brackets++ for idx, event in enumerate(events):+ sanitised, ev_stats = sanitise_event(event, max_bytes=cap_event_bytes)+ size = _serialised_size(sanitised)++ # +1 for the comma separator between entries+ if running_total + size + 1 > cap_total_bytes:+ # The batch as a whole has run out of budget. Replace every+ # remaining event (including this one) with a cheap marker so+ # the alert still surfaces the *count* of follow-on events.+ marker = {+ "_truncated": True,+ "_reason": "batch_size_cap",+ "_index": idx,+ }+ out.append(marker)+ stats["truncated"] += 1+ # Subsequent events also get markers — they were never going+ # to fit either. We don't break here because we want to+ # report the truncation count accurately for telemetry.+ for trailing_idx in range(idx + 1, len(events)):+ out.append(+ {+ "_truncated": True,+ "_reason": "batch_size_cap",+ "_index": trailing_idx,+ }+ )+ stats["truncated"] += 1+ break++ out.append(sanitised)+ stats["redacted"] += ev_stats["redacted"]+ stats["truncated"] += ev_stats["truncated"]+ running_total += size + 1++ return out, statsdiff --git a/services/api/app/services/timestamp_bounds.py b/services/api/app/services/timestamp_bounds.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..31982305f--- /dev/null+++ b/services/api/app/services/timestamp_bounds.py@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@+"""Bound submitted event timestamps so a misconfigured (or malicious)+connector can't poison the alerts table with timestamps from 1970 or 2099.++The ``POST /alerts/submit`` endpoint accepts arbitrary connector-supplied+timestamps under ``published`` / ``time`` / ``@timestamp`` and propagates+them to ``Alert.first_seen`` / ``last_seen`` / ``event_time``. Those+columns drive:++* SLA timers (MTTD, MTTR) — a 1970 timestamp would mark every alert as+ catastrophically overdue;+* event-time indexes (``ix_alerts_tenant_event_time``) — wildly out-of-band+ values create write hotspots and poison the index histograms;+* the investigation rail's mini-timeline — a 2099 event time renders as+ the most recent event globally and shadows real activity.++This module clamps timestamps into a sane window centred on "now":++* ``MIN_AGE``: how far in the past we accept an event (default 90 days).+ Older timestamps get pinned to the boundary and a ``bounds_clamped``+ marker is emitted in the stats so the endpoint can log it.+* ``MAX_FUTURE``: how far in the future we accept (default 5 minutes).+ This is generous enough for clock skew between a connector and the+ API server, but tight enough to prevent "schedule this alert for next+ Tuesday" abuse.++Caller contract:++* :func:`coerce_with_bounds` takes one event dict and returns+ ``(datetime | None, was_clamped: bool)``. Callers that want the raw+ timestamp (e.g. for forensics) can recover it from ``raw_event``;+ the bounded timestamp is what lands on the alert.+* :func:`now_utc` exists so tests can monkeypatch the wall clock without+ patching ``datetime.now`` globally.++Both knobs are env-driven so an operator running a historical backfill+can widen ``MIN_AGE`` without redeploying:++* ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS`` — default 90+* ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS`` — default 300++AiSOC — open-source AI Security Operations Center (MIT License)+Author: Beenu Arora <[email protected]>+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import logging+import os+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta+from typing import Any++logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)+++# ─── env-driven knobs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────++_MAX_AGE_DAYS_ENV = "AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS"+_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS_ENV = "AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS"++# Default 90 days back is wide enough to ingest a quarter of historical+# events on initial connector setup, but narrow enough to prevent the+# 1970 / epoch-zero footgun from poisoning SLA timers.+_DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_DAYS = 90++# 5 minutes of future clock skew tolerates legitimate drift between a+# connector host and the API server, but rejects "future-dated alerts"+# entirely.+_DEFAULT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS = 300++# Hard guardrails so an operator can't accidentally disable bounds by+# typing a huge value. 10 years is wider than any reasonable historical+# ingest; 1 hour is wider than any reasonable clock skew.+_HARD_MAX_AGE_DAYS = 365 * 10+_HARD_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS = 3600+++def _read_positive_int(env_name: str, default: int, hard_max: int) -> int:+ """Read a positive int env var with junk-tolerance + hard clamping."""+ raw = os.getenv(env_name)+ if not raw:+ return default+ try:+ value = int(raw)+ except (TypeError, ValueError):+ logger.warning(+ "timestamp_bounds: invalid %s=%r, falling back to default %d",+ env_name,+ raw,+ default,+ )+ return default+ if value <= 0:+ return default+ return min(value, hard_max)+++def max_age_days() -> int:+ """Maximum age of an accepted event timestamp, in days."""+ return _read_positive_int(_MAX_AGE_DAYS_ENV, _DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_DAYS, _HARD_MAX_AGE_DAYS)+++def max_future_seconds() -> int:+ """Maximum positive clock skew on an accepted event timestamp."""+ return _read_positive_int(+ _MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS_ENV,+ _DEFAULT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS,+ _HARD_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS,+ )+++def now_utc() -> datetime:+ """Wall clock in UTC. Indirection point so tests can freeze time."""+ return datetime.now(UTC)+++# ─── timestamp parsing & coercion ───────────────────────────────────────────+++_TIMESTAMP_FIELDS = ("published", "time", "@timestamp", "timestamp", "eventTime")+++def _parse_one(value: Any) -> datetime | None:+ """Best-effort parse of a single timestamp candidate.++ Accepts:+ * an actual ``datetime`` (naïve datetimes get UTC pinned on);+ * an ISO-8601 string with or without timezone (we map trailing ``Z``+ to ``+00:00`` since ``fromisoformat`` rejected ``Z`` until Python 3.11);+ * an int/float treated as a Unix epoch (seconds or milliseconds —+ values > 1e12 are presumed milliseconds).+ """+ if value is None:+ return None+ if isinstance(value, datetime):+ return value if value.tzinfo else value.replace(tzinfo=UTC)+ if isinstance(value, (int, float)):+ try:+ if value > 1e12: # almost certainly milliseconds+ value = value / 1000.0+ return datetime.fromtimestamp(float(value), tz=UTC)+ except (OverflowError, OSError, ValueError):+ return None+ if isinstance(value, str):+ s = value.strip()+ if not s:+ return None+ # ``fromisoformat`` doesn't accept the ``Z`` suffix prior to 3.11;+ # normalise it to be safe across runtimes.+ if s.endswith("Z"):+ s = s[:-1] + "+00:00"+ try:+ parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(s)+ except ValueError:+ return None+ if parsed.tzinfo is None:+ parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=UTC)+ return parsed+ return None+++def coerce_with_bounds(+ event: dict[str, Any],+ *,+ now: datetime | None = None,+ max_age: timedelta | None = None,+ max_future: timedelta | None = None,+) -> tuple[datetime | None, bool]:+ """Extract a timestamp from ``event`` and clamp it into the accepted window.++ Returns ``(datetime | None, was_clamped)``:++ * ``datetime`` — the bounded timestamp, or ``None`` if the event+ carries no recognisable timestamp field.+ * ``was_clamped`` — ``True`` if the timestamp was outside the window+ and got pinned to the boundary. Callers should log/emit metrics+ when this is true so operators can spot misconfigured connectors.++ The bounds are inclusive at both ends.+ """+ if not isinstance(event, dict):+ return None, False++ now_ts = now or now_utc()+ age = max_age or timedelta(days=max_age_days())+ future = max_future or timedelta(seconds=max_future_seconds())++ earliest = now_ts - age+ latest = now_ts + future++ parsed: datetime | None = None+ for field in _TIMESTAMP_FIELDS:+ candidate = _parse_one(event.get(field))+ if candidate is not None:+ parsed = candidate+ break++ if parsed is None:+ return None, False++ if parsed < earliest:+ return earliest, True+ if parsed > latest:+ return latest, True+ return parsed, Falsediff --git a/services/api/migrations/044_alerts_idempotency_key.sql b/services/api/migrations/044_alerts_idempotency_key.sqlnew file mode 100644index 000000000..f815fb28c--- /dev/null+++ b/services/api/migrations/044_alerts_idempotency_key.sql@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@+-- 044_alerts_idempotency_key.sql+--+-- Add an idempotency key to the ``alerts`` table so the ``POST /alerts/submit``+-- direct-write path (the founder-flow ``aisoc submit`` CLI, and any connector+-- that retries on transient errors) can safely retry without creating+-- duplicate alert rows.+--+-- Rationale+-- ─────────+-- The submit endpoint synthesises one alert per request and writes it+-- straight into the alerts table. Without an idempotency key, a client+-- retrying after a network blip (or an at-least-once delivery from a+-- connector) lands two alerts that look identical to the analyst but+-- are separate rows — they double-count the queue, double-page on-call,+-- and corrupt MTTD numbers.+--+-- The key is supplied client-side under the ``Idempotency-Key`` header.+-- The server scopes uniqueness per tenant (different tenants can use the+-- same key without colliding). The unique partial index lets us keep the+-- column nullable for legacy rows / unrelated insertion paths while+-- still enforcing uniqueness on the subset of rows that opted in.+--+-- Idempotency is keyed (tenant_id, idempotency_key) — never just on the+-- key — so a hostile client can't replay another tenant's key and get+-- silently de-duplicated against an alert they don't own.+--+-- This migration is fully idempotent. ``ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`` and+-- ``CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS`` make it safe to re-run on+-- partially-migrated environments.++BEGIN;++-- The column itself. Stored as TEXT so the client can use any opaque+-- string (UUIDs are the recommended shape, but we don't enforce that+-- — operators sometimes prefer hashes of source IDs for stable+-- deduplication across reconnections).+ALTER TABLE alerts+ ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS idempotency_key TEXT;++-- Partial unique index: only rows with a non-NULL idempotency_key+-- participate in the constraint. This keeps the column optional for+-- the connector pipeline (which has its own dedup via Kafka offsets)+-- while still enforcing strict per-tenant uniqueness for clients that+-- opt in.+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS uq_alerts_tenant_idempotency+ ON alerts (tenant_id, idempotency_key)+ WHERE idempotency_key IS NOT NULL;++COMMIT;diff --git a/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_alerts_submit.py b/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_alerts_submit.pyindex 549cf55eb..063892869 100644--- a/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_alerts_submit.py+++ b/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_alerts_submit.py@@ -214,41 +214,86 @@ class TestMaxSeverity:class TestCoercePublished:- """``_coerce_published`` accepts Okta ``published``, OCSF ``time``, et al."""+ """``_coerce_published`` accepts Okta ``published``, OCSF ``time``, et al.++ Post Batch-8 (H-5) the helper returns a ``(datetime | None, was_clamped)``+ tuple instead of a bare datetime — out-of-window timestamps are clamped+ to the configured ``MIN_AGE``/``MAX_FUTURE`` boundary and the second+ tuple element flags whether clamping happened. The fixture timestamps+ here all land inside the default 90-day window centred on "now=2026"+ so ``was_clamped`` is always ``False`` for these cases. Boundary+ clamping itself is covered by ``test_timestamp_bounds.py``.+ """def test_parses_okta_published_iso_string(self) -> None:- result = _coerce_published({"published": "2026-05-14T09:30:14.123Z"})+ # Pin ``now`` so the 2026-05-14 fixture stays inside the 90-day+ # window regardless of when the suite runs.+ now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"published": "2026-05-14T09:30:14.123Z"}, now=now)assert result is not None+ assert clamped is Falseassert result.tzinfo is not Noneassert result.year == 2026assert result.month == 5assert result.day == 14def test_parses_ocsf_time_field(self) -> None:- result = _coerce_published({"time": "2026-05-14T09:30:00+00:00"})+ now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"time": "2026-05-14T09:30:00+00:00"}, now=now)assert result is not None+ assert clamped is Falseassert result.hour == 9def test_parses_at_timestamp_field(self) -> None:- result = _coerce_published({"@timestamp": "2026-05-14T10:00:00Z"})+ now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"@timestamp": "2026-05-14T10:00:00Z"}, now=now)assert result is not None+ assert clamped is Falseassert result.hour == 10def test_returns_none_when_no_timestamp(self) -> None:- assert _coerce_published({"unrelated": "field"}) is None+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"unrelated": "field"})+ assert result is None+ assert clamped is Falsedef test_returns_none_on_unparseable_string(self) -> None:"""A garbage timestamp must not crash the endpoint."""- assert _coerce_published({"published": "not-a-date"}) is None+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"published": "not-a-date"})+ assert result is None+ # Unparseable input is "no timestamp", not "clamped" — we want+ # the caller to fall back to ``now`` without flagging a misbehaving+ # connector (the connector might just not emit one).+ assert clamped is Falsedef test_accepts_datetime_objects_directly(self) -> None:"""If a connector passes a real datetime, we use it."""+ now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)naive = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 9, 30, 14)- result = _coerce_published({"published": naive})+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"published": naive}, now=now)assert result is not None+ assert clamped is False# Naive datetimes get UTC pinned on so downstream comparisons work.assert result.tzinfo is not None+ def test_ancient_timestamp_is_clamped_to_min_age(self) -> None:+ """A 1970 epoch from a broken connector is pinned to the boundary+ and flagged as clamped — H-5 contract."""+ now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"published": "1970-01-01T00:00:00Z"}, now=now)+ assert result is not None+ assert clamped is True+ # Default max_age is 90 days, so the boundary lands at now - 90d.+ assert result == now - timedelta(days=90)++ def test_far_future_timestamp_is_clamped_to_max_future(self) -> None:+ """A 2099 timestamp from a misconfigured device is clamped to the+ future boundary (default = now + 5 minutes)."""+ now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ result, clamped = _coerce_published({"published": "2099-12-31T23:59:59Z"}, now=now)+ assert result is not None+ assert clamped is True+ assert result == now + timedelta(seconds=300)+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════# Section 3: _synthesise_alert_from_events — the core helper@@ -346,8 +391,18 @@ class TestSynthesiseAlertFromEvents:assert alert.affected_users == ["[email protected]", "[email protected]"]assert alert.affected_ips == ["203.0.113.42", "203.0.113.99"]- def test_timestamps_pin_to_earliest_and_latest_event(self) -> None:- """``first_seen`` / ``last_seen`` are the batch envelope."""+ def test_timestamps_pin_to_earliest_and_latest_event(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ """``first_seen`` / ``last_seen`` are the batch envelope.++ The submit path bounds event timestamps against ``now_utc()`` (see+ ``services/api/app/services/timestamp_bounds.py``) — events too far in+ the past or future get clamped. To keep this test stable regardless of+ when CI runs, we pin ``now_utc`` inside the alerts endpoint module to+ a value just after the fixture window so all three events fall inside+ the valid range and no clamping occurs.+ """+ pinned_now = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 10, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ monkeypatch.setattr("app.api.v1.endpoints.alerts.now_utc", lambda: pinned_now)events = [_okta_event(published="2026-05-14T09:30:14Z"),_okta_event(published="2026-05-14T09:45:00Z"),diff --git a/services/api/tests/test_event_sanitiser.py b/services/api/tests/test_event_sanitiser.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..663b7796f--- /dev/null+++ b/services/api/tests/test_event_sanitiser.py@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@+"""Tests for ``app.services.event_sanitiser`` — the submit-path hardening helper.++Pins the contract that protects ``POST /alerts/submit`` from three attack+shapes:++1. **Secret leakage** — a caller's connector accidentally (or maliciously)+ embeds an OAuth bearer / API key / password into an event payload, and+ that secret ends up persisted verbatim in the alert's ``raw_event``+ JSONB column. The sanitiser must redact sensitive keys at every depth+ of the event tree, including inside lists, and produce a stable+ sentinel that's grep-able in logs.++2. **Per-event DoS** — one rogue event in an otherwise benign batch is+ gigantic. The sanitiser must replace it inline with a small marker so+ the rest of the batch still surfaces to the analyst.++3. **Batch-level DoS** — the whole batch exceeds the configured total+ byte ceiling, or more events than ``MAX_EVENTS`` were submitted. The+ sanitiser must raise :class:`SubmitPayloadTooLarge` for the count cap+ (caller-facing 413) and silently mark trailing events with a+ ``batch_size_cap`` marker for the byte cap (analysts still see the+ head of the batch).++Also covers operator-facing safety: env-driven caps clamp to hard maxima+so a misconfigured ``AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES=999999999999`` can't+disable the protection.++AiSOC — open-source AI Security Operations Center (MIT License)+Author: Beenu Arora <[email protected]>+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import json+from typing import Any++import pytest+from app.services.event_sanitiser import (+ REDACTED_SENTINEL,+ SubmitPayloadTooLarge,+ max_event_bytes,+ max_events,+ max_total_bytes,+ sanitise_event,+ sanitise_event_batch,+)++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 1: secret redaction — the most important guarantee+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestSecretRedaction:+ """Sensitive keys must be replaced with the redaction sentinel."""++ @pytest.mark.parametrize(+ "key",+ [+ # Direct password / secret fields+ "password",+ "passwd",+ "secret",+ "client_secret",+ # Token variants+ "token",+ "access_token",+ "refresh_token",+ "id_token",+ "jwt",+ # API key variants+ "api_key",+ "apiKey",+ "api-key",+ "apikey",+ # Headers / cookies+ "authorization",+ "Authorization",+ "auth_header",+ "cookie",+ "set-cookie",+ "Set-Cookie",+ # Sessions & MFA+ "session_id",+ "sessionid",+ "otp",+ "mfa_code",+ # AWS-specific+ "aws_secret_access_key",+ "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",+ ],+ )+ def test_known_sensitive_keys_are_redacted(self, key: str) -> None:+ """Any field whose name matches a sensitive pattern is masked."""+ event = {key: "should-not-leak-this"}+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event)+ assert sanitised[key] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert stats["redacted"] == 1+ assert stats["truncated"] == 0++ def test_redaction_is_case_insensitive(self) -> None:+ """Vendor connectors capitalise keys inconsistently."""+ event = {"AUTHORIZATION": "Bearer aaa", "Password": "pw"}+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event)+ assert sanitised["AUTHORIZATION"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised["Password"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert stats["redacted"] == 2++ def test_benign_keys_pass_through(self) -> None:+ """Non-sensitive keys must keep their values intact — false+ negatives would silently break operator visibility into events."""+ event = {+ "actor": "[email protected]",+ "event_type": "user.login",+ "ip_address": "203.0.113.4",+ "displayMessage": "User signed in",+ }+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event)+ assert sanitised == event+ assert stats["redacted"] == 0++ def test_redacts_nested_sensitive_keys(self) -> None:+ """Secrets buried two levels deep still get caught."""+ event = {+ "actor": "[email protected]",+ "session": {+ "id": "session-id-not-secret",+ "metadata": {+ "refresh_token": "rt-leak-me",+ "userAgent": "Mozilla/5.0",+ },+ },+ }+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event)+ assert sanitised["session"]["metadata"]["refresh_token"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised["session"]["metadata"]["userAgent"] == "Mozilla/5.0"+ assert sanitised["session"]["id"] == "session-id-not-secret"+ assert stats["redacted"] == 1++ def test_redacts_inside_lists(self) -> None:+ """A list of credential dicts (e.g. AWS keys array) is walked."""+ event = {+ "credentials": [+ {"name": "primary", "secret": "leak-1"},+ {"name": "backup", "secret": "leak-2"},+ {"name": "rotated", "value": "fine"},+ ]+ }+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event)+ assert sanitised["credentials"][0]["secret"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised["credentials"][1]["secret"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised["credentials"][2]["value"] == "fine"+ assert stats["redacted"] == 2++ def test_input_is_not_mutated(self) -> None:+ """The redactor must return a *new* dict — never mutate the caller's+ copy. Many connectors retain the original event for retry; mutating+ it would corrupt the retry payload."""+ original = {"password": "leak", "user": "alice"}+ snapshot = json.dumps(original, sort_keys=True)+ sanitise_event(original)+ assert json.dumps(original, sort_keys=True) == snapshot++ def test_non_string_keys_are_not_treated_as_sensitive(self) -> None:+ """Integer / weird keys shouldn't crash the regex matcher."""+ event = {42: "not a secret", "actor": "alice"}+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event)+ assert sanitised[42] == "not a secret"+ assert stats["redacted"] == 0+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 2: per-event size cap+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestPerEventSizeCap:+ """Oversized single events are replaced with a marker, not dropped."""++ def test_oversized_event_becomes_truncation_marker(self) -> None:+ event = {"payload": "x" * 2000}+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event, max_bytes=256)+ # Marker shape — preserves enough debug context for an analyst.+ assert sanitised["_truncated"] is True+ assert sanitised["_reason"] == "event_too_large"+ assert "_size" in sanitised+ assert sanitised["_size"] > 256+ # Top-level keys preserved so an analyst can correlate.+ assert "_keys" in sanitised+ assert "payload" in sanitised["_keys"]+ assert stats["truncated"] == 1++ def test_undersized_event_is_passed_through(self) -> None:+ event = {"payload": "small"}+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event(event, max_bytes=256)+ assert sanitised == event+ assert stats["truncated"] == 0++ def test_oversized_marker_does_not_leak_payload_bytes(self) -> None:+ """The marker must NOT echo any of the original event's values —+ only top-level keys. A noisy event with a credit-card number in+ the value mustn't sneak past via the marker."""+ event = {"card": "4111-1111-1111-1111", "user": "[email protected]"}+ sanitised, _ = sanitise_event(event, max_bytes=4)+ flat_json = json.dumps(sanitised)+ assert "4111-1111-1111-1111" not in flat_json+ assert "[email protected]" not in flat_json+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 3: batch-level caps+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestBatchCaps:+ """Three cap levels: event count, total bytes, and the hard reject."""++ def test_happy_path_short_batch_passes_through(self) -> None:+ events = [{"actor": f"user-{i}"} for i in range(5)]+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event_batch(events)+ assert len(sanitised) == 5+ assert stats["redacted"] == 0+ assert stats["truncated"] == 0+ # Order is preserved.+ assert sanitised[0]["actor"] == "user-0"+ assert sanitised[4]["actor"] == "user-4"++ def test_over_max_events_raises_413(self) -> None:+ """Sending more events than ``MAX_EVENTS`` is the only condition+ that raises — the endpoint translates this to HTTP 413."""+ events = [{"actor": f"u{i}"} for i in range(11)]+ with pytest.raises(SubmitPayloadTooLarge):+ sanitise_event_batch(events, max_events_override=10)++ def test_non_list_input_raises(self) -> None:+ with pytest.raises(SubmitPayloadTooLarge):+ sanitise_event_batch("not a list") # type: ignore[arg-type]++ def test_per_event_cap_applies_within_batch(self) -> None:+ """Oversized events become markers; the rest of the batch survives."""+ events = [+ {"actor": "alice"},+ {"payload": "x" * 2000}, # oversized+ {"actor": "bob"},+ ]+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event_batch(+ events,+ max_event_bytes_override=256,+ )+ assert sanitised[0]["actor"] == "alice"+ assert sanitised[1]["_truncated"] is True+ assert sanitised[2]["actor"] == "bob"+ assert stats["truncated"] == 1++ def test_batch_total_cap_replaces_trailing_events(self) -> None:+ """When the running total exceeds ``MAX_TOTAL_BYTES``, trailing+ events get cheap markers — the head of the batch is preserved."""+ events = [{"payload": "x" * 100} for _ in range(20)]+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event_batch(+ events,+ max_event_bytes_override=10 * 1024,+ max_total_bytes_override=500, # only ~3-4 events fit+ )+ # Some prefix passed, the rest got truncated with the batch marker.+ truncated_count = sum(1 for e in sanitised if e.get("_truncated"))+ passing_count = sum(1 for e in sanitised if not e.get("_truncated"))+ assert passing_count >= 1+ assert truncated_count >= 1+ assert truncated_count + passing_count == 20+ assert stats["truncated"] == truncated_count+ # Markers carry the event index for forensics.+ for ev in sanitised:+ if ev.get("_truncated"):+ assert "_index" in ev+ assert ev["_reason"] == "batch_size_cap"++ def test_redaction_stats_aggregate_across_batch(self) -> None:+ """``stats['redacted']`` is the *total* sensitive keys masked+ across the whole batch, not just the last event."""+ events = [+ {"actor": "a", "password": "p1"},+ {"actor": "b", "api_key": "k2"},+ {"actor": "c", "token": "t3", "Authorization": "Bearer xyz"},+ ]+ sanitised, stats = sanitise_event_batch(events)+ assert stats["redacted"] == 4+ # All sensitive values masked across the batch.+ assert sanitised[0]["password"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised[1]["api_key"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised[2]["token"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+ assert sanitised[2]["Authorization"] == REDACTED_SENTINEL+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 4: env-driven caps & operator safety+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestEnvCaps:+ """Caps read from env vars must clamp to hard maxima and reject junk."""++ def test_default_caps_are_reasonable(self) -> None:+ # No env override → defaults documented in the module docstring.+ assert max_events() == 1000+ assert max_event_bytes() == 256 * 1024+ assert max_total_bytes() == 4 * 1024 * 1024++ def test_env_override_lowers_cap(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS", "50")+ assert max_events() == 50++ def test_env_zero_falls_back_to_default(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ """A non-positive value is silently ignored — operators sometimes+ type 0 to "disable" caps; we explicitly refuse that footgun."""+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS", "0")+ assert max_events() == 1000++ def test_env_negative_falls_back_to_default(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS", "-5")+ assert max_events() == 1000++ def test_env_garbage_falls_back_to_default(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS", "not-a-number")+ assert max_events() == 1000++ def test_env_huge_value_clamps_to_hard_max(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ """An operator typing 10**12 mustn't disable the cap. The hard+ maximum (100k events) is the real upper bound."""+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_EVENTS", "999999999")+ assert max_events() == 100_000++ def test_total_bytes_clamps_to_hard_max(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES", "10737418240") # 10 GiB+ assert max_total_bytes() == 64 * 1024 * 1024 # hard ceiling+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 5: recursion guards (depth & node count)+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestRecursionGuards:+ """Deeply nested attacker payloads must not blow the Python stack."""++ def test_deeply_nested_payload_does_not_recurse_forever(self) -> None:+ # Build a 200-deep nested dict — far above the 32-level guard.+ event: dict[str, Any] = {}+ cursor: dict[str, Any] = event+ for _ in range(200):+ cursor["next"] = {}+ cursor = cursor["next"]+ cursor["password"] = "deep-leak"++ # Must not raise RecursionError; should produce a truncation+ # marker somewhere in the chain.+ sanitised, _ = sanitise_event(event)+ # Walk what we got back looking for the depth marker.+ cursor = sanitised+ found_marker = False+ for _ in range(40):+ if not isinstance(cursor, dict):+ break+ if cursor.get("_truncated") == "max_depth":+ found_marker = True+ break+ cursor = cursor.get("next") # type: ignore[assignment]+ assert found_marker, "expected max_depth marker somewhere in nested chain"++ def test_node_count_cap_stops_runaway_payload(self) -> None:+ """A flat dict with 100k keys hits the node ceiling before the+ depth guard does — the redactor must short-circuit cleanly."""+ # Build a wide payload that exceeds the 50k node guard.+ event = {f"k{i}": i for i in range(60_000)}+ sanitised, _ = sanitise_event(event, max_bytes=64 * 1024 * 1024)+ # The truncation marker is buried inside the redacted dict because+ # the redactor doesn't *return* the marker for a top-level wide+ # dict — only for a value it gave up on. So instead: confirm the+ # output is much smaller than the input (the redactor stopped+ # producing entries past the node cap).+ # NOTE: we permit either truncation behaviour — what matters is+ # we didn't crash and we produced something reasonable.+ assert isinstance(sanitised, dict) or sanitised.get("_truncated") == "max_nodes"diff --git a/services/api/tests/test_timestamp_bounds.py b/services/api/tests/test_timestamp_bounds.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..affb3beee--- /dev/null+++ b/services/api/tests/test_timestamp_bounds.py@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@+"""Tests for ``app.services.timestamp_bounds``.++Pins the contract that protects ``Alert.first_seen`` / ``last_seen`` /+``event_time`` from connector-supplied 1970 epochs and 2099 timestamps:++* recognised fields (``published``, ``time``, ``@timestamp``, …) parse+ correctly across string / int / float / datetime inputs;+* timestamps older than ``MIN_AGE`` clamp to the floor;+* timestamps further in the future than ``MAX_FUTURE`` clamp to the ceiling;+* timestamps inside the window pass through unchanged with ``was_clamped=False``;+* env caps clamp to hard maxima and reject junk like other AiSOC helpers.++AiSOC — open-source AI Security Operations Center (MIT License)+Author: Beenu Arora <[email protected]>+"""++from __future__ import annotations++from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta++import pytest+from app.services.timestamp_bounds import (+ coerce_with_bounds,+ max_age_days,+ max_future_seconds,+)+++def fixed_now() -> datetime:+ """A fixed reference instant so tests don't race the wall clock."""+ return datetime(2026, 5, 14, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 1: timestamp parsing across input shapes+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestTimestampParsing:+ """Different connectors emit timestamps in different shapes."""++ def test_parses_iso8601_string_with_offset(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ event = {"published": "2026-05-14T11:00:00+00:00"}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ assert not clamped++ def test_parses_iso8601_with_z_suffix(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """Many connectors emit RFC 3339 with a trailing ``Z``."""+ event = {"published": "2026-05-14T11:00:00Z"}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ assert not clamped++ def test_parses_naive_iso8601_as_utc(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A naïve string defaults to UTC — naïve in code, UTC on the wire."""+ event = {"published": "2026-05-14T11:00:00"}+ ts, _ = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts is not None+ assert ts.tzinfo == UTC++ def test_parses_unix_seconds(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ # 2026-05-14T11:00:00Z → 1778756400+ event = {"published": 1778756400}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ assert not clamped++ def test_parses_unix_milliseconds(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ # values > 1e12 are presumed milliseconds+ event = {"published": 1778756400000}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ assert not clamped++ def test_parses_datetime_object_with_tz(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ when = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)+ event = {"published": when}+ ts, _ = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == when++ def test_pins_utc_on_naive_datetime(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A naïve ``datetime`` gets UTC pinned on. We never silently+ treat a naïve datetime as local time — that's the timezone bug+ we're explicitly defending against."""+ when = datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0)+ event = {"published": when}+ ts, _ = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts is not None+ assert ts.tzinfo == UTC++ def test_falls_back_through_field_aliases(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """Falls through ``published`` → ``time`` → ``@timestamp`` etc."""+ event = {"@timestamp": "2026-05-14T11:00:00Z"}+ ts, _ = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == datetime(2026, 5, 14, 11, 0, 0, tzinfo=UTC)++ def test_returns_none_when_no_timestamp_field(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ event = {"actor": "alice", "event_type": "user.login"}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts is None+ assert not clamped++ def test_returns_none_for_unparseable_string(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ event = {"published": "not a real timestamp"}+ ts, _ = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts is None++ def test_returns_none_for_empty_string(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ event = {"published": " "}+ ts, _ = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts is None++ def test_handles_non_dict_event(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """Defensive: non-dict input must not crash the sanitiser pipeline."""+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds("not a dict", now=fixed_now) # type: ignore[arg-type]+ assert ts is None+ assert not clamped+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 2: clamping outside the accepted window+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestClamping:+ """Out-of-window timestamps clamp to the boundary and flag ``was_clamped``."""++ def test_inside_window_passes_through(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A recent timestamp must not be clamped."""+ recent = fixed_now - timedelta(minutes=10)+ event = {"published": recent.isoformat()}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(event, now=fixed_now)+ assert ts == recent+ assert not clamped++ def test_ancient_timestamp_clamps_to_floor(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A 1970 epoch must pin to ``now - MIN_AGE`` so SLA timers stay sane."""+ ancient = datetime(1970, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC)+ event = {"published": ancient.isoformat()}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(+ event,+ now=fixed_now,+ max_age=timedelta(days=90),+ )+ assert clamped+ assert ts == fixed_now - timedelta(days=90)++ def test_far_future_timestamp_clamps_to_ceiling(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A 2099 timestamp must pin to ``now + MAX_FUTURE`` so it can't+ masquerade as the most recent activity globally."""+ future = datetime(2099, 1, 1, tzinfo=UTC)+ event = {"published": future.isoformat()}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(+ event,+ now=fixed_now,+ max_future=timedelta(seconds=300),+ )+ assert clamped+ assert ts == fixed_now + timedelta(seconds=300)++ def test_just_past_window_clamps(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A timestamp 91 days back with a 90-day window must clamp."""+ too_old = fixed_now - timedelta(days=91)+ event = {"published": too_old.isoformat()}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(+ event,+ now=fixed_now,+ max_age=timedelta(days=90),+ )+ assert clamped+ assert ts == fixed_now - timedelta(days=90)++ def test_exact_window_boundary_is_inclusive(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """A timestamp exactly at ``now - MIN_AGE`` is accepted (not clamped)."""+ on_edge = fixed_now - timedelta(days=90)+ event = {"published": on_edge.isoformat()}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(+ event,+ now=fixed_now,+ max_age=timedelta(days=90),+ )+ assert ts == on_edge+ assert not clamped++ def test_clock_skew_inside_max_future_is_accepted(self, fixed_now: datetime) -> None:+ """1 second of future clock skew is tolerated."""+ slightly_future = fixed_now + timedelta(seconds=1)+ event = {"published": slightly_future.isoformat()}+ ts, clamped = coerce_with_bounds(+ event,+ now=fixed_now,+ max_future=timedelta(seconds=300),+ )+ assert ts == slightly_future+ assert not clamped+++# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+# Section 3: env-driven caps & operator safety+# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════+++class TestEnvCaps:+ """The env-var knobs must clamp to hard maxima and tolerate junk."""++ def test_default_max_age_is_90_days(self) -> None:+ assert max_age_days() == 90++ def test_default_max_future_is_300_seconds(self) -> None:+ assert max_future_seconds() == 300++ def test_env_override_lowers_age(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS", "30")+ assert max_age_days() == 30++ def test_env_zero_falls_back_to_default_age(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ """A non-positive value is silently ignored — operators sometimes+ type 0 to "disable" caps; we explicitly refuse that footgun."""+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS", "0")+ assert max_age_days() == 90++ def test_env_garbage_falls_back_to_default_age(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS", "not-a-number")+ assert max_age_days() == 90++ def test_env_huge_age_clamps_to_hard_max(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ """An operator typing a century mustn't disable bounds."""+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_TIMESTAMP_AGE_DAYS", "999999")+ assert max_age_days() == 365 * 10++ def test_env_future_clamps_to_hard_max(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:+ monkeypatch.setenv("AISOC_SUBMIT_MAX_FUTURE_SECONDS", "86400")+ # 1 day requested, hard cap is 1 hour.+ assert max_future_seconds() == 3600