Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
chore(release): v17.1.0 (#1184)
Beenu Arora1b8bc2d4afd4
diff --git a/.github/release-packages.yml b/.github/release-packages.ymlindex 5f40a97f7..76322e40c 100644--- a/.github/release-packages.yml+++ b/.github/release-packages.yml@@ -78,48 +78,27 @@ packages:registry: pypidirectory: packages/aisoc-sandboxinstall: pip install aisoc-sandbox- published: false- reason: >-- No pending trusted publisher is registered on PyPI and the- `AISOC_PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING` repository variable is unset, so the- upload step does not run. See- docs/operations/publishing.md#one-time-setup-pypi.+ published: true- name: aisoc-cliregistry: pypidirectory: packages/aisoc-cliinstall: pip install aisoc-cli- published: false- reason: >-- No pending trusted publisher is registered on PyPI and- `AISOC_PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING` is unset. See- docs/operations/publishing.md#one-time-setup-pypi.+ published: true- name: aisoc-sdkregistry: pypidirectory: packages/sdk-pyinstall: pip install aisoc-sdk- published: false- reason: >-- No pending trusted publisher is registered on PyPI and- `AISOC_PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING` is unset. See- docs/operations/publishing.md#one-time-setup-pypi.+ published: true- name: aisoc-plugin-sdkregistry: pypidirectory: packages/plugin-sdk-pyinstall: pip install aisoc-plugin-sdk- published: false- reason: >-- No pending trusted publisher is registered on PyPI and- `AISOC_PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING` is unset. See- docs/operations/publishing.md#one-time-setup-pypi.+ published: true- name: aisoc-detectionsregistry: pypidirectory: packages/aisoc-detections- published: false- reason: >-- No pending trusted publisher is registered on PyPI and- `AISOC_PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING` is unset. See- docs/operations/publishing.md#one-time-setup-pypi.+ published: truediff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex ee8491374..26f158e2f 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,6 +7,35 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]+## [17.1.0] - 2026-10-07++### Security++- **GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2 (High, CWE-347): the audit trail could be forged by+ an unauthenticated caller.** `AuditMiddleware` decoded the request's Bearer+ token with signature verification disabled and wrote its claims into the+ per-tenant tamper-evident audit chain on every mutating request — before+ authentication ran, and regardless of whether it failed. A self-crafted JWT+ got 401 from the route and still planted `actor_email` / `tenant_id` of the+ attacker's choosing into any known tenant's chain, reproduced against a+ production-mode stack with every migration applied: the forged entry landed+ at `chain_index` 0 while a no-credential control wrote nothing. The+ middleware now audits only the verified principal authentication records on+ `request.state`; a request that fails authentication writes no audit row. A+ sibling sweep confirmed this was the only live instance of trusting an+ unverified token. Reported by [@cqliuke](https://github.com/cqliuke) through+ private vulnerability reporting; affects every release up to and including+ 17.0.0. See the published advisory:+ [GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/security/advisories/GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2).+ (#1182)+- **Dependency floors for a fresh batch of npm advisories, plus multidict.**+ `compression` ≥ 1.8.2, `shell-quote` ≥ 1.11, `source-map-js` ≥ 1.2.2,+ `tinypool` ≥ 2.1.2 and `proxy-addr` ≥ 2.0.8 across all four npm install+ roots (root workspace, `apps/mobile`, `services/mcp/cursor-extension`,+ `services/realtime`), and `multidict` 6.9.1 in the three Python lockfiles+ that pin it. These advisories published after v17.0.0 and were failing+ Trivy and security-audit on every open pull request. (#1180)+### Added- Admin Users administration: a console-only **Settings → Users** screen(admin nav, hidden entirely for viewer/infosec) with server-side@@ -33,6 +62,9 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0(`tests/test_sso_enterprise_policy.py`) locking the least-privilegevocabulary, the fail-closed gates, and the off-by-default flag.+Both blocks land the reviewed scope of #1179 by+[@alexmateescu](https://github.com/alexmateescu), merged via #1183 with the+author's commits preserved.### Fixed@@ -55,6 +87,66 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0and a case-workspace mock missing the `getTimeline`/`reopen` stubsupstream components now call. Type-check is clean and the full consolesuite (838 tests) passes on the branch.+- **Fresh installs no longer risk a zero-permission administrator.**+ Migration `091` stops bulk-seeding an `infosec` row into every tenant's+ `roles` table: a tenant's first `roles` row flips permission resolution+ from the static map to the database, and a seeded row with no grants+ resolved every user of that tenant — including break-glass admin — to zero+ permissions. `093` repairs already-seeded deployments and backfills role+ labels; the canonical `infosec` definition lives in `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` /+ `GRANTABLE_ROLES`, which assignment validates against, so nothing in+ `roles` is needed for it to be assignable. (#1183)+- **`optional_user` forwarded the wrong argument slot**, turning every+ anonymous dashboard poll into a 500. (#1183)+- **Enrichment merges kept only the top-scoring source's WHOIS and dropped+ DNS records entirely.** `mergeResults` copied `Whois` only inside the+ max-risk branch, so a source that answered with WHOIS but not the highest+ risk score lost it whenever two or more sources returned; `DNSRecords`+ were never merged at all. WHOIS now falls back to the first source that+ has one (the highest-risk source still wins when it does), and DNS records+ are union-merged and deduplicated in order. Community contribution. (#1178)+- **The grading-integrity gate locked itself out after a merge burst.** Its+ staleness check queried *successful* push runs only and read "none of the+ newest five is for a recent commit" as a stale API snapshot — but a+ workflow genuinely failing on 30+ consecutive commits produces the same+ signature, and for `grading-integrity.yml` itself the condition was+ self-locking: each push run failing the check was the reason no recent+ successful run existed. `main` was red on it for two days with no commit+ able to fix it. Freshness is now proven by push runs of any conclusion+ (a failed run for a recent commit proves the read is fresh; on a push+ event the run executing the gate is itself the proof) while only+ successes are graded; the genuine stale-snapshot refusal is preserved,+ and four of the five new tests fail on the previous code. (#1181)+- **Six repairs to what the v17 follow-on landed with**, two of them runtime+ bugs: the `SSO_LOCAL_ADMIN_ONLY` gate tested membership against a+ *function object* (`user.role not in wildcard_roles`), so password+ sign-in answered 500 instead of applying the policy; two `logger.warning`+ calls in `cases.py` passed a keyword stdlib logging rejects, raising+ inside their own `except` blocks; plus a dead `StepKind.WARNING` branch,+ a shadowed duplicate `period` field, a `str` assigned into a `CaseStatus`+ field, and seven mypy `union-attr` findings. (#1160)+- **The release step that moves the `stable` Helm chart channel had never+ once worked.** It read the channel with `helm show chart --version stable`,+ but `--version` takes a semver *constraint*, so helm rejected the channel+ name client-side before any network call — in 457 ms, with `2>/dev/null`+ hiding the message and `pipefail` carrying the failure out. (#1129, #1130)++### Changed++- The four OpenTelemetry modules move to 1.47.0 together. (#1175)+- Storybook group to 10.6.1 (test-runner 0.26.0); the bump pulls esbuild+ 0.28.2 alongside the override-pinned 0.28.1, now recorded in the toolchain+ gate's expected set with the gate's own self-test fixtures updated to+ match. (#1146)+- GitHub Actions pins move to their v7 majors, including the last floating+ tags. (#1149, #1176)+- Two consolidated Dependabot waves — 19 bumps with the recorded reason+ fastapi cannot move, then seven more — plus `@types/node` 26.6.4.+ (#1161, #1174, #1148)+- The SCIM contract gate now sees derived-role declarations+ (`ROLE_PERMISSIONS["infosec"] = …` assigned by subscript), so it no longer+ reports a role that resolves to 18 permissions as granting nothing; the+ committed OpenAPI spec was regenerated alongside. (6fc5719a)## [17.0.0] - 2026-10-05diff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 6ba257603..00cd0d061 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@**An open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center.** It ingests your security telemetry, detects and correlates threats, investigates them with AI agents whose reasoning is fully auditable, and proposes responses a human approves.-[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT) [](CHANGELOG.md) [](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/ci.yml)+[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT) [](CHANGELOG.md) [](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/ci.yml)[](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/codeql.yml) [](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/beenuar/AiSOC) [](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/blob/main/apps/web/public/papers/aisoc-technical-guide.pdf)**[Technical Guide (PDF)](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/blob/main/apps/web/public/papers/aisoc-technical-guide.pdf)** · [Docs](https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/) · [Architecture](docs/architecture/README.md) · [What actually works](docs/audit/REPOSITORY_REALITY.md) · [Discussions](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/discussions)@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Agents triage alerts and investigate incidents. What they can and cannot do:| Per-tenant detection tuning in the live engine | Stable | Live Postgres: tuning written changes what the engine fires, with a negative control | Yes || Scheduled connectors | Stable | Live scheduler polls a stub vendor into ingest, with a negative control | Yes || UEBA | Stable | Live Postgres: migrations, scoring, persistence, isolation, with a negative control | Yes, `full` profile |-| Package distribution (npm/PyPI) | Ready, unpublished | `release.yml` builds and packs all eight on every tag | Install from source — the upload is blocked on registry credentials, which is an account action |+| Package distribution (npm/PyPI) | Beta | The five PyPI packages resolve at the tree's versions, checked against the live registries in both directions with a self-test; the npm half has no registry state to verify | `pip install aisoc-sandbox` (and the other four) works today; the three npm packages still need the first-upload `NPM_TOKEN`, an account action |## What AiSOC is notdiff --git a/RELEASES.md b/RELEASES.mdindex de138d53e..53cbb5af3 100644--- a/RELEASES.md+++ b/RELEASES.md@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@This file mirrors what used to live in the "What's new" section of [`README.md`](README.md). The complete, machine-readable inventory (with file paths, env-var diffs, and per-release test counts) lives in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).-> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v17.0.0`, released 2026-10-05. **One breaking change and one number that changes meaning without erroring** — the second is the one to read twice. `POST /api/v1/detection-loop/suggest` and its two `GET /detection-loop/suggestions` reads are removed with their three schemas; no migration is needed because none of them ever worked, since they queried `aisoc_alerts`, `aisoc_detection_rules` and `alerts.evidence`, none of which any migration creates. The governed equivalent is `POST /api/v1/detection-proposals`. The quieter change: **`alerts.total` on `/metrics/dashboard` now counts open work** — `new`, `triaging`, `in_progress` — rather than every alert ever received, and the severity counts beside it are scoped the same way, because the console labels them *Active Alerts* and *Critical — Require immediate action*. A tenant who had resolved everything was still shown their entire historical intake as outstanding, and the number only ever rose. Closed work is now reported separately as `alerts.resolved`. **Every approval was failing**: the dispatch built its principal from two attributes `CurrentUser` has never defined, so the actions service received an empty permission list and refused, while the approval row recorded the decision — the action never ran, for any role, including platform admin. **You can now choose where the model runs**: `make up` is unchanged (CPU, no account, no key), `make up-gpu` layers an NVIDIA device reservation onto the bundled Ollama, and `make up-host-llm` uses an Ollama you already run — the only route to a GPU on Apple Silicon, since Docker Desktop cannot pass Metal into a Linux container. `GET /api/v1/llm/runtime` reports where the model *actually* is by asking Ollama rather than reading the compose file back, because a reservation is a request and a model can still land on the CPU; it answers `unknown` for an idle instance rather than guessing. `POST /api/v1/llm/credentials/test` places one real one-token call, so a revoked key is found at the moment you save it instead of surfacing later as triage quietly falling back. Closed cases can be reopened through `POST /api/v1/cases/{id}/reopen` with a recorded reason; `PATCH` stays forward-only, which is what makes "this case was closed" mean something. Investigations now reason over the alerts' real `raw_event` payloads instead of a restated title, and the groundedness gate covers that path too — refusing to score an empty evidence set rather than demoting everything and appearing to catch hallucination. A period-over-period delta of `-93.75` rendered as `-9375%`; the global time-window selector drove no fetch at all. The chart publishes as **`7.4.0`**. Everything below describes v16.0.1 and earlier, which this release does not change.+> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v17.1.0`, released 2026-10-07. **A security release plus the first community-built console surface; no breaking changes.** It closes **[GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/security/advisories/GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2)**, a high-severity audit-trail forgery reported by [cqliuke](https://github.com/cqliuke): the audit middleware decoded the request's Bearer token with signature verification **off** and wrote its claims into the per-tenant tamper-evident audit chain before authentication ran — so an unauthenticated caller with a self-crafted JWT got 401 from the route and still planted any actor and any known tenant id into that tenant's chain. Reproduced against a production-mode stack (forged entry at `chain_index` 0; a no-credential control wrote nothing); the middleware now audits only the verified principal, and a failed authentication writes no row. **If your deployment's audit chain feeds compliance evidence, upgrade** — entries written by unauthenticated requests before this release are indistinguishable from real ones by content alone, so treat chain position and request logs as the tie-breaker. The feature half is the reviewed scope of a community PR by [alexmateescu](https://github.com/alexmateescu): an admin-only **Settings → Users** screen (server-side pagination/search, multi-role assignment with a live effective-permissions preview, enable/disable with session revocation, audited permanent delete guarded against self-delete and last-admin lockout), an editable Roles & Permissions catalog, and a feature-flagged enterprise SSO wave (off by default; JIT lands as `viewer`, admin is unreachable from SSO without an explicit allowlisted group mapping). Migration `091` no longer bulk-seeds a role row into every tenant — the write that could resolve a fresh install's every user, break-glass admin included, to **zero permissions** — and `093` repairs deployments the old seed already touched. Also in: threat-intel enrichment no longer drops WHOIS from non-top-scoring sources and now union-merges DNS records; the grading-integrity gate can no longer lock itself out after a merge burst (it read "no recent successful run" as a stale API read, which its own failures then perpetuated for two days); and the release step that moves the `stable` chart channel ran for the first time ever (`--version` takes a semver constraint, so `--version stable` had failed client-side on every release since the step existed). The chart publishes as **`7.5.0`**. Everything below describes v17.0.0 and earlier, which this release does not change.+>+> **Previously:** AiSOC was on `v17.0.0`, released 2026-10-05. **One breaking change and one number that changes meaning without erroring** — the second is the one to read twice. `POST /api/v1/detection-loop/suggest` and its two `GET /detection-loop/suggestions` reads are removed with their three schemas; no migration is needed because none of them ever worked, since they queried `aisoc_alerts`, `aisoc_detection_rules` and `alerts.evidence`, none of which any migration creates. The governed equivalent is `POST /api/v1/detection-proposals`. The quieter change: **`alerts.total` on `/metrics/dashboard` now counts open work** — `new`, `triaging`, `in_progress` — rather than every alert ever received, and the severity counts beside it are scoped the same way, because the console labels them *Active Alerts* and *Critical — Require immediate action*. A tenant who had resolved everything was still shown their entire historical intake as outstanding, and the number only ever rose. Closed work is now reported separately as `alerts.resolved`. **Every approval was failing**: the dispatch built its principal from two attributes `CurrentUser` has never defined, so the actions service received an empty permission list and refused, while the approval row recorded the decision — the action never ran, for any role, including platform admin. **You can now choose where the model runs**: `make up` is unchanged (CPU, no account, no key), `make up-gpu` layers an NVIDIA device reservation onto the bundled Ollama, and `make up-host-llm` uses an Ollama you already run — the only route to a GPU on Apple Silicon, since Docker Desktop cannot pass Metal into a Linux container. `GET /api/v1/llm/runtime` reports where the model *actually* is by asking Ollama rather than reading the compose file back, because a reservation is a request and a model can still land on the CPU; it answers `unknown` for an idle instance rather than guessing. `POST /api/v1/llm/credentials/test` places one real one-token call, so a revoked key is found at the moment you save it instead of surfacing later as triage quietly falling back. Closed cases can be reopened through `POST /api/v1/cases/{id}/reopen` with a recorded reason; `PATCH` stays forward-only, which is what makes "this case was closed" mean something. Investigations now reason over the alerts' real `raw_event` payloads instead of a restated title, and the groundedness gate covers that path too — refusing to score an empty evidence set rather than demoting everything and appearing to catch hallucination. A period-over-period delta of `-93.75` rendered as `-9375%`; the global time-window selector drove no fetch at all. The chart publishes as **`7.4.0`**. Everything below describes v16.0.1 and earlier, which this release does not change.>> **Previously:** AiSOC was on `v16.0.1`, released 2026-10-04. **A security release, no breaking changes.** It closes **GHSA-4gx4-x7gm-4xq8**, a high-severity privilege escalation reported by [HaiND](https://github.com/Haind03): the check that decides whether a caller may *confer* authority read the caller's static role, while the check that admits a caller to the route read its database-resolved permissions. Those are two different answers whenever a tenant uses database-backed RBAC — which is the configuration where it matters, since narrowing an account is what those tables are for. A `tenant_admin` deliberately restricted to `users:write` still carried 28 permissions statically and could grant itself the other 27. **If you use the `roles` and `user_roles` tables to restrict accounts, upgrade.** Deployments with no RBAC rows were never exposed, because the static map was already the correct answer for them. The report named one route; the resolver is shared, so five more had it — authoring a role, re-permissioning one, creating a user, delegating to a child tenant, and minting an API key, that last needing no target user and yielding a durable credential. `scripts/check_role_grant_scope.py` gains a direction that fails CI when a grant is measured against the wrong authority; its previous directions passed on the vulnerable tree because they asked only whether a route *reached* the chokepoint, and all six did. Also raises `serialize-javascript` to `>=7.1.2` and `http-cache-semantics` to `>=4.3.0`. The chart publishes as **`7.3.1`**. Everything below describes v16.0.0 and earlier, which this release does not change.>@@ -14,10 +16,33 @@ This file mirrors what used to live in the "What's new" section of [`README.md`]## What's new-`VERSION` is `17.0.0`. The **v17.0.0** release (2026-10-05) removes three+`VERSION` is `17.1.0`. The **v17.1.0** release (2026-10-07) is a security+release plus the first community-built console surface, with no breaking+changes. The security half closes+[GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/security/advisories/GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2)+(High, CWE-347): the audit middleware decoded the request's Bearer token+with signature verification off and wrote its claims into the per-tenant+tamper-evident audit chain before authentication ran, so an unauthenticated+caller could plant any actor and any known tenant id into that tenant's+chain while the route itself answered 401. The middleware now audits only+the verified principal, and a failed authentication writes nothing. The+feature half lands the reviewed scope of a community PR: an admin-only+**Settings → Users** screen with multi-role assignment and a live+effective-permissions preview, an editable Roles & Permissions catalog, and+a feature-flagged enterprise SSO wave that is off by default and JIT-lands+as `viewer`. Migration `091` no longer bulk-seeds a role row into every+tenant (the write that could resolve a fresh install to zero permissions,+break-glass admin included) and `093` repairs deployments the old seed+touched. Enrichment keeps WHOIS from non-top-scoring sources and+union-merges DNS records; the grading-integrity gate no longer locks itself+out after a merge burst; and the `stable` Helm chart channel moved for the+first time ever, because the step that moves it had failed client-side on+every release since it existed. The chart publishes as `7.5.0`.++Before it, the **v17.0.0** release (2026-10-05) removed three`/detection-loop/suggest*` routes that never worked — they queried threerelations no migration creates, so every caller was already receiving an-error — and changes one number's meaning without erroring, which is the+error — and changed one number's meaning without erroring, which is thechange to read twice: **`alerts.total` on `/metrics/dashboard` now countsopen work rather than every alert ever received**, with the severity countsbeside it scoped the same way. A panel charting cumulative intake from thatdiff --git a/VERSION b/VERSIONindex aac58983e..d9e58927a 100644--- a/VERSION+++ b/VERSION@@ -1 +1 @@-17.0.0+17.1.0diff --git a/apps/docs/docs/console/users-administration.md b/apps/docs/docs/console/users-administration.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..ca2d11bf0--- /dev/null+++ b/apps/docs/docs/console/users-administration.md@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@+---+id: users-administration+title: Users administration+sidebar_label: Users administration+---++# Users administration++The **Settings → Users** screen: who is in the tenant, what they hold, and+every control an administrator has over both. Added in v17.1.0.++Only administrators see it — the navigation entry is hidden entirely for+`viewer` and `infosec`, and every route behind it enforces `roles:write`+server-side, so hiding the menu is cosmetics rather than the control.++## The screen++A server-side paginated, searchable, filterable list over+`GET /api/v1/admin/users`. Each row carries the identity, active state,+role pills, and last-activity. From a row an administrator can:++- **Assign roles** — a checkbox modal (multi-role) with a **live+ effective-permissions preview**: it shows the union of permissions the+ selection resolves to *before* you commit, read from the real catalog+ (`GET /api/v1/rbac/roles`), so what you grant is what you saw. A `reason`+ is required and lands verbatim in the audit log. Granting a role you do+ not hold yourself is refused server-side — a granter can only confer+ what it has.+- **Enable / disable** — disabling also revokes the user's sessions, so+ "disabled" means *now*, not "after their token expires".+- **Delete permanently** — guarded three ways: a mandatory reason, a typed+ confirmation of the target's email, and a final confirm. Deleting+ yourself is refused, and so is any write that would leave the tenant+ with no active administrator.++## Delete is audit-safe++A user row can actually be deleted — migration `094` rewrote the one+`RESTRICT` foreign key (`compliance_evidence.collected_by`) to+`ON DELETE SET NULL`, the same retention model every other actor column+already used. The audit row for the deletion snapshots the full identity,+so attribution survives the row: compliance evidence outlives its+collector as "unknown collector" rather than blocking the deletion.++## The role model++| Role | Label | How it is acquired | What it holds |+|---|---|---|---|+| `viewer` | Regular User | SSO JIT default; manual assignment | Read-only across alerts, cases, dashboards, detections, reports. No mutations. |+| `infosec` | Infosec Analyst | Manual assignment or an explicit IdP group mapping | Viewer plus triage, case work, playbook execution, threat-intel and detection writes, lake queries, investigations. No user/role/SSO/settings/credential doors. |+| `admin` | Platform Administrator | Local break-glass (`bootstrap_admin`) or assignment by an existing admin | `*` — everything in the tenant. Unreachable from SSO without an explicit allowlisted group mapping. |++All three are system roles: the console labels them `protected ·+non-deletable` and the API refuses to edit or delete them. The **Roles &+Permissions** screen beside Users edits custom roles against the same+catalog.++Deny-by-default: once a tenant has any role rows, permissions resolve+exclusively from the database (`user_roles → role_permissions →+permissions`); the static map is consulted only during bootstrap, before a+tenant has roles at all.++## How SSO interacts with manual assignment++JIT-provisioned users land as `viewer`. With the default+`group_role_mode: first_login_only`, IdP groups set the role **once**, at+creation — after that, this screen is the source of truth and a manual+change survives every subsequent sign-in. See+[Enterprise SSO](../operations/enterprise-sso.md) for the connection-level+policy (`allowed_email_domains`, `jit_provisioning`, group mapping rules).++## Audit++Every mutation on this surface — role change, enable/disable, delete —+writes a hash-chained audit row with the acting credential, the old and new+state, and the required reason. Since v17.1.0 the audit chain records only+the **verified** principal: a request that fails authentication writes+nothing ([GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/security/advisories/GHSA-w4r8-969c-67p2)).diff --git a/apps/docs/docs/operations/enterprise-sso.md b/apps/docs/docs/operations/enterprise-sso.mdindex 29e4e0167..ac252ee53 100644--- a/apps/docs/docs/operations/enterprise-sso.md+++ b/apps/docs/docs/operations/enterprise-sso.md@@ -9,6 +9,20 @@ sidebar_label: Enterprise SSOSAML and OIDC sign-in, and the connection record that makes eitherwork.+## Off by default++The whole surface sits behind `SSO_ENABLED` (default `false`). The login+screen asks `GET /api/v1/auth/sso/status` and renders the SSO button only+when the flag is on and an enabled connection exists, so a deployment that+has configured nothing shows nothing. After a successful callback the+browser lands on `/login?next=…` with the tokens in the **fragment** —+destination guards used to drop the fragment, which is v17.1.0's reason the+callback lands there and nowhere else.++For a lockout drill there is `SSO_LOCAL_ADMIN_ONLY`: password sign-in stays+open for wildcard roles only, so a broken IdP cannot strand the break-glass+administrator, and everyone else keeps going through the IdP.+:::warning If you tried this before and it 403'dYou were not doing it wrong. `aisoc_sso_connections` was created by amigration and **written by nothing** — no API, no console, no script.@@ -41,9 +55,11 @@ POST /api/v1/sso-connections"display_name": "Example Corp","enabled": false,"default_role": "viewer",+ "allowed_email_domains": ["example.com"],+ "jit_provisioning": true,+ "group_role_mode": "first_login_only","group_role_mapping": {- "soc-analysts": "soc_analyst",- "soc-leads": "soc_lead"+ "soc-analysts": "infosec"}}```@@ -52,6 +68,33 @@ Create it **disabled**, check the mapping, then enable it. A disabledconnection does not resolve, so sign-ins keep failing the same wayuntil you are ready.+### The provisioning policy (v17.1.0)++Three per-connection fields decide who gets created and what they hold:++- **`allowed_email_domains`** is enforced at the provisioning chokepoint —+ an assertion whose verified email is outside the list authenticates+ nobody, however valid the token.+- **`jit_provisioning`** controls whether an unknown identity becomes a+ user at all. When it does, the account lands as **`viewer`**; nothing an+ IdP says can mint anything stronger than the mapping below allows.+- **`group_role_mode`** defaults to **`first_login_only`**: IdP groups set+ the role once, at creation, and administrators own every change after+ it. The alternative keeps re-asserting the mapping on each login — pick+ it only if the IdP is the system of record for roles, because an admin's+ manual correction will not survive the next sign-in.++SSO logins, provisioning events and admin role changes are all audited;+role changes additionally require a `reason` and refuse to demote the last+active administrator.++The example maps to `infosec` — the analyst/hunter role with no+user/role/settings/credential doors — because it is the strongest role a+mapping should normally confer. Legacy names like `soc_analyst` or+`soc_lead` name no catalog row (migration `093` moves users holding one to+`viewer` and reports the count), so a mapping to them provisions the+default role, not the role you meant.+### What is refused**A mapping to `admin` or `platform_admin`.** v14.0.0 made thosediff --git a/apps/docs/sidebars.ts b/apps/docs/sidebars.tsindex de7948003..1f8267a74 100644--- a/apps/docs/sidebars.ts+++ b/apps/docs/sidebars.ts@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ const sidebars: SidebarsConfig = {"console/public-replay","console/tenant-skills","console/triage-context",+ "console/users-administration",],},{diff --git a/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json b/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.jsonindex 0744e5870..5770a9fbb 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json+++ b/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@"_readme": "Append-only public benchmark scoreboard. Each row is one eval run. Substrate rows (no LLM, deterministic) are marked substrate:true and MUST NOT be quoted as live agent performance. Wet-eval rows (substrate:false) are appended by the T5.5 weekly CI workflow once it lands. Newest row first.","rows": [{- "date": "2026-10-04",- "agent_version": "v17.0.0",- "commit_sha": "641f1b0f",+ "date": "2026-10-07",+ "agent_version": "v17.1.0",+ "commit_sha": "90ea2fda","substrate": true,"eval_mode": "substrate-only","mitre_accuracy": 0.97,diff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txtindex 794b11521..cad8c0e92 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@<!-- Generated by scripts/generate_llms_txt.py. Do not edit by hand; run the script and commit the result. -->> AiSOC is an open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center, MIT-> licensed and maintained by the AiSOC community. Version 17.0.0.+> licensed and maintained by the AiSOC community. Version 17.1.0.> Repository: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC. Documentation: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/.This file exists so an automated reader can answer questions about AiSOCdiff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms.txtindex 4e8698e04..23ffddcfb 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms.txt@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@> security telemetry from 84 first-party connectors, normalises it to OCSF,> correlates it into alerts, and runs LLM agents that triage and investigate them.> Every agent decision is written to an investigation ledger, so the reasoning-> behind a verdict can be replayed step by step. MIT licensed. Current version 17.0.0.+> behind a verdict can be replayed step by step. MIT licensed. Current version 17.1.0.AiSOC is built and maintained by the AiSOC community. It is a complete SOCplatform rather than a single tool: ingestion, detection, correlation, agentdiff --git a/apps/web/package.json b/apps/web/package.jsonindex 2338ddbb7..94ae4f609 100644--- a/apps/web/package.json+++ b/apps/web/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "@aisoc/web",- "version": "17.0.0",+ "version": "17.1.0","private": true,"description": "AiSOC SOC Console - Next.js 14 Frontend","license": "MIT",diff --git a/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml b/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yamlindex 93c854e30..a548ec50b 100644--- a/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml+++ b/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ type: application# the chart refuses grants it used to accept (see the v14.0.0 BREAKING# section), and the chart's major is the only coordinate a consumer pulling# `oci://ghcr.io/beenuar/charts/aisoc` sees before they install it.-version: 7.4.0+version: 7.5.0# Used as the image tag wherever a `tag:` in values.yaml is left empty, so# it has to be a tag the registry actually holds — it read "5.2.0", which# exists for no image, so every pod of a default install would have gone to# ImagePullBackOff. scripts/check_published_images.py resolves it the same# way the templates do and fails when it names nothing.-appVersion: "v17.0.0"+appVersion: "v17.1.0"keywords:- securitydiff --git a/scripts/readme_gates.py b/scripts/readme_gates.pyindex 51d9336d8..8c7197873 100644--- a/scripts/readme_gates.py+++ b/scripts/readme_gates.py@@ -57,7 +57,13 @@ README = REPO_ROOT / "README.md"# carries a "Coming … in v8.0" guard.KNOWN_UNPUBLISHED = {"npm": {"@aisoc/mcp", "@aisoc/sdk", "aisoc-cli"},- "pypi": {"aisoc-cli", "aisoc-plugin-sdk", "aisoc-sdk", "aisoc-sandbox"},+ # The five PyPI packages left this set on 2026-10-07: pending trusted+ # publishers were registered, AISOC_PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING was set, and+ # the v17.0.0 tag performed the first uploads — all five now resolve at+ # the tree's versions, enforced both ways by+ # scripts/check_published_packages.py. The npm three still need the+ # first-upload NPM_TOKEN (an account action), so they stay.+ "pypi": set(),}# Maximum number of lines we promise to keep the README at.