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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

fix: address maintainer review blockers

Alexandru Mateescu240ecbf484c5
diff --git a/.env.bak-202610021531 b/.env.bak-202610021531
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-# AiSOC Environment Variables
-# Copy this file to .env and fill in your values
-#
-# ╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
-# ║ YOU DO NOT HAVE TO EDIT THIS FILE TO GET A WORKING STACK. ║
-# ║ ║
-# ║ make up creates .env from this template and fills the four ║
-# ║ generated secrets — AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY, SECRET_KEY, ║
-# ║ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN, AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN — with ║
-# ║ real random values. ║
-# ║ make env does only that, if you want to look before you start. ║
-# ║ ║
-# ║ Those three ship EMPTY here rather than as `replace-me-…` prose. A ║
-# ║ placeholder is not a neutral default: a non-empty AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY ║
-# ║ that is not a valid Fernet key made every connector save answer HTTP 500, ║
-# ║ so copying this template used to break the product while skipping the copy ║
-# ║ left it working. `scripts/check_env_placeholders.py` now fails on any ║
-# ║ placeholder shipped here, and `make doctor` reports them in your .env. ║
-# ║ ║
-# ║ Optional, and worth setting: ║
-# ║ OPENAI_API_KEY a hosted provider key for better AI triage. CORE ║
-# ║ ships a local model, so this is an upgrade, not a ║
-# ║ requirement — see "AI / LLM" below. ║
-# ║ POSTGRES_PASSWORD the dev default works out of the box; change it for ║
-# ║ anything shared. ║
-# ╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
-
-# ─── Image Pinning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Tag pulled by every `image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-*:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}`
-# in docker-compose.yml. Docker pulls this tag on first boot and skips the
-# local build (~90 s vs ~15 min). Pin to a release tag (e.g. v12.0.0) for
-# reproducible deploys; leave as `latest` to track the newest release.
-AISOC_VERSION=latest
-
-# What `pull_policy:` resolves to for every first-party image. `missing` means
-# "use what is local if there is one", which is right for an immutable release
-# tag and wrong for `latest`, which is republished on every merge — so
-# `make up` refreshes the images itself whenever AISOC_VERSION names a moving
-# tag, and skips it when the tag is pinned.
-#
-# Set this to `never` on an air-gapped host: Compose then refuses to contact a
-# registry, and `make up` skips its refresh for the same reason. `always` makes
-# Compose itself re-check on every container start.
-# AISOC_PULL_POLICY=never
-
-# ─── Core Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# `development` enables the dev auth bypass in services/api/app/api/v1/dev_auth.py.
-# Set `production` for anything network-reachable; docker-compose.yml reads this
-# value, so changing it here is enough.
-# Production is the default because the value of this variable used to
-# decide whether an uncredentialed request was served as an administrator.
-# For the developer conveniences, layer the overlay rather than editing
-# this line: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f infra/compose/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
-ENVIRONMENT=production
-LOG_LEVEL=info
-
-# HS256 signing key for console sessions, shared by the API and the connectors
-# service. Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py` — see the
-# note on AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY below for why a placeholder is not used.
-SECRET_KEY=1fd76079684f5b19cb24294429815bcbd570131b30f65d89edf6368b07e8b7d0
-
-# Base URL `make bootstrap` prints as the sign-in address, and the origin the
-# console is reached on. Leave it at the default for a laptop; set it to the
-# address operators actually browse to for anything else, or the printed
-# credential arrives with the wrong URL beside it.
-AISOC_CONSOLE_URL=http://localhost:3000
-
-# ─── Where the stack is reachable from ────────────────────────────────────────
-# Every host port is published to 127.0.0.1 by default, which is right for a
-# laptop and fatal for a server: nothing outside the machine can reach it,
-# including the browser you meant to use.
-#
-# Set this to publish the console on all interfaces. It is the only port a
-# browser needs — the console proxies to the API, the agents service and the
-# realtime gateway over the internal network — so the datastores and the
-# development passwords in this file stay on loopback.
-#
-# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-#
-# Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front before exposing it to a network
-# you do not control. See apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.
-AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-
-# Moves EVERY published port, datastores included. Only for an isolated
-# network: it hands Postgres, Redis, Kafka and Neo4j — with the development
-# passwords in this file — to anything that can route to the host.
-# AISOC_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-
-# Whether this deployment is a demo. Read at run time by both the API and the
-# console, and reported at GET /api/runtime-config so it can be checked from
-# outside rather than inferred from the page. Leave false unless you are
-# running a public demo; `make demo` is the opt-in that loads synthetic data.
-AISOC_DEMO_MODE=false
-
-# Shared HS256 secret used ONLY for short-lived realtime WS/SSE tickets
-# (Issue #239). The API mints tickets at `POST /api/v1/realtime/ticket` and the
-# Node realtime service (`services/realtime`) verifies them on every WebSocket
-# upgrade and SSE request — both sides MUST read the same value. This is
-# intentionally separate from SECRET_KEY so the realtime edge can be rotated
-# independently and a leaked ticket can never forge a full API session.
-#
-# `make up` generates this. There is no development fallback any more: both
-# sides used to fall back to a constant committed to this repository, and no
-# manifest passed either the real secret or the variable the production check
-# read, so that constant was the effective key in every deployment. Unset, the
-# ticket endpoint fails closed (503) and realtime rejects every connection.
-AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET=U_XjLpDZdXAj8zOYhL5Hv8eN3UOeTkUD6Ws_0dPsDLk
-
-# HS256 key for the session tokens the SAML and OIDC callbacks issue, and the
-# bearer that guards /metrics. Both are generated by `make env`. The API
-# refuses to boot without them now that ENVIRONMENT defaults to production:
-# in a development-class environment `enforce_secure_defaults` only warns,
-# which is why neither was generated before.
-JWT_SECRET=6zbpUL_SA81S17OmYi56IWMCyUBtNJKBigUqsCmyC9E
-METRICS_TOKEN=7cUq7f5gLU-8rrVkd8b0bY8cZsMT2a4hu0qExcwe1HI
-# Time-to-live (seconds) for minted realtime tickets. Kept short so a leaked
-# ticket is only briefly useful; the frontend re-mints on every (re)connect.
-# Clamped to a 60s ceiling by the ticket endpoint regardless of this value.
-AISOC_REALTIME_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS=60
-
-# Application-layer encryption key for connector credentials and other
-# secret payloads stored in Postgres.
-#
-# LEAVE THIS EMPTY. `make up`, `make env` and `./install.sh` all run
-# `scripts/ensure_env.py`, which writes a freshly generated key here the first
-# time. Generating it by hand works too:
-# python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
-#
-# It ships empty rather than as a `replace-me-…` string on purpose. A non-empty
-# value that is not a valid Fernet key is *worse* than no value: the vault takes
-# its development path only when the key is empty, so a placeholder reached
-# `Fernet()`, raised, and turned every connector save into an HTTP 500 —
-# minutes after `cp .env.example .env`, with nothing linking the two. Empty is a
-# value the vault understands.
-#
-# Treat a real value like a database password: never commit it, never reuse it
-# across environments, never share it.
-AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY=n-NAjH2x0NgryRcZrvSrQH-rp66MsI1HxDQr09j6L5w=
-# Comma-separated list of previous credential keys to support zero-downtime
-# rotation. Leave blank unless you are mid-rotation.
-AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM=
-
-# Internal URL the API uses to reach the connectors microservice for
-# catalog lookups and "Test connection" actions in the click-and-connect
-# wizard. ``http://connectors:8003`` is correct for docker-compose;
-# use ``http://localhost:8088`` when running the API on the host while
-# connectors is exposed via the docker-compose port forward.
-CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL=http://connectors:8003
-CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=15
-
-# ─── Database ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Two roles, and the distinction is load-bearing rather than tidy.
-#
-# aisoc owner. Superuser (the postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER one),
-# owns every table, applies the migration chain. No service
-# connects as it.
-# aisoc_app runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, so
-# that the schema's row-level-security policies apply to it. A
-# superuser ignores those policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL
-# SECURITY, which is why running the services as `aisoc` left all
-# 92 of them filtering nothing.
-#
-# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is the owner's; AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD is the runtime role's.
-# Both are interpolated by docker-compose.yml, so changing them here rotates
-# them across the stack. They are deliberately different values: they are
-# different privilege levels.
-#
-# Empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`, like the secrets
-# above. This file used to ship `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=aisoc_dev_secret`, and
-# `docker-compose.prod.yml` guarded it with
-# `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the development default is a published literal}` —
-# a guard that rejects an *empty* variable and cannot look at a value, so the
-# one input its message named was the one input it accepted. A production
-# stack booted on a password printed in this repository while the file said
-# it could not. `preflight-secrets` in that file now refuses the value, and
-# shipping these empty means a fresh install never has one to refuse.
-POSTGRES_PASSWORD=440c43cf18f78e66a2885f12480c7551c934331b5a88eedc
-AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD=03b5366c74c98fde62b1656d433f367e7cff75035d82cf4c
-
-# What every service connects as.
-DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc
-
-# DDL only: `python -m app.scripts.run_migrations` uses this and nothing else
-# does. Leave it unset and migrations fall back to DATABASE_URL, which is
-# correct for a deployment that has not split the roles and fails loudly
-# ("permission denied for schema public") on one that has.
-# aisoc-db-role: owner — the migration chain applies DDL; the runtime role holds none
-DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc
-
-# Generated alongside the Postgres pair, and referenced rather than repeated:
-# these two used to spell the password out inside the DSN, so rotating
-# REDIS_PASSWORD left a stale copy here that still worked.
-REDIS_PASSWORD=12b5ff3f51c1cbb8a68b887b73ff3368cc3b30a4fa9b693d
-CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=61dd17f85342f5f3a4850dab1da5a13a4c1bd682dd3dc70b
-REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@localhost:6379/0
-CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}@localhost:8123/aisoc
-
-# ─── Messaging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS=localhost:9092
-
-# ─── Search ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-OPENSEARCH_URL=http://localhost:9200
-QDRANT_URL=http://localhost:6333
-
-# ─── AI / LLM ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Empty, and empty is a working configuration: CORE ships Ollama with a small
-# local model, so a default install does real AI triage with no key at all. Set
-# a hosted provider key here to upgrade the quality — the gateway picks it up
-# and routes the aliases to the hosted model instead.
-#
-# It is empty rather than `sk-your-…-here` because a bogus key is not the same
-# as no key: the gateway would send it upstream, get a 401, and the deployment
-# would look configured while producing nothing.
-OPENAI_API_KEY=
-# OPENAI_MODEL affects the "explain this alert" / BYOK path only. Task workloads
-# (triage, recon, investigation, copilot, summary, report, NL) request a logical
-# alias instead — see the LLM gateway block below.
-#
-# It ships as an alias, not a concrete model, because the default deployment
-# routes through the bundled gateway and the gateway 400s anything
-# infra/litellm/config.yaml does not define. It used to read
-# `gpt-4-turbo-preview`, which no gateway config here has ever defined, and the
-# auto-triage worker treated it as a per-tenant BYOK override — so it replaced
-# `aisoc-triage` on the highest-volume path in the product.
-# scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py fails the build if this names a model the
-# gateway does not define. Set a concrete model only when calling a provider
-# directly (see "ENABLE LIVE LLM" option (b) below).
-OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary
-
-# ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ───────────────────────────────────────
-# Since #478 AiSOC asks for a logical task alias (aisoc-triage,
-# aisoc-investigation, …) for every live LLM call — there is no hardcoded default
-# model. The alias → real-model map lives in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so you
-# swap local/hosted models there without changing AiSOC. The gateway service is
-# defined in docker-compose.yml.
-#
-# Key that AiSOC uses to authenticate to the gateway (also LiteLLM's admin key):
-LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=sk-aisoc-local
-# In-network URL of the gateway. docker-compose.yml sets this on the api and
-# agents services, and both resolvers READ it — `resolve_base_url()` returns it
-# for any aisoc-<role> alias, and `resolve_api_key()` returns LITELLM_MASTER_KEY
-# to pair with it. That wire was missing: compose set this variable, the
-# resolvers deliberately ignored it in favour of OPENAI_BASE_URL (which nothing
-# set), and so the product's headline capability could not reach a model in the
-# default deployment.
-LLM_GATEWAY_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1
-#
-# ENABLE LIVE LLM:
-# (a) Through the gateway — the default, and already wired. Put your real
-# provider key in OPENAI_API_KEY above (the gateway reads it) and bring up
-# the `full` profile, which is where the litellm service lives:
-# docker compose --profile full up -d
-# Nothing else to set. To point at a gateway somewhere else, or to send a
-# different bearer, set OPENAI_BASE_URL/OPENAI_API_KEY and they win.
-# (b) Direct to a provider, no gateway — pin each task role to a concrete
-# model. A concrete pin is NOT rerouted to the gateway, so this keeps
-# working with LLM_GATEWAY_URL set:
-# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini
-# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_INVESTIGATION=gpt-4o
-# OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini # the BYOK/explain path, direct too
-# With neither configured, AiSOC uses its deterministic offline path — which
-# reports zero model calls and zero tokens rather than pretending to triage.
-
-# ─── Threat Intelligence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Open-source / community feeds (work out of the box, no key required for some)
-TAXII_FEEDS=https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/taxii/,enterprise-attack,,
-MISP_URL=
-MISP_API_KEY=
-OTX_API_KEY=
-CISA_KEV_ENABLED=true
-ABUSE_CH_ENABLED=true
-
-# Free / freemium enrichment (recommended for everyone)
-VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY=
-ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=
-GREYNOISE_API_KEY=
-SHODAN_API_KEY=
-URLSCAN_API_KEY=
-IPINFO_API_TOKEN=
-
-# ─── Commercial threat intelligence (optional) ────────────────────────────────
-# Cyble Vision — actor, malware, vulnerability, dark-web, brand-risk feeds
-# Provision a key from https://cyble.com/cyble-vision/
-CYBLE_VISION_API_KEY=
-CYBLE_VISION_BASE_URL=https://api.cyble.com/v2
-CYBLE_VISION_TENANT_ID=
-CYBLE_VISION_FEEDS=indicators,actors,vulnerabilities,leaks,brand
-CYBLE_HUNT_API_KEY=
-
-# Recorded Future
-RECORDED_FUTURE_API_KEY=
-
-# Mandiant Threat Intelligence (formerly FireEye iSIGHT)
-MANDIANT_API_KEY=
-MANDIANT_API_SECRET=
-
-# Crowdstrike Falcon Intelligence (separate from the EDR connector)
-CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_ID=
-CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_SECRET=
-
-# Anomali ThreatStream
-ANOMALI_USERNAME=
-ANOMALI_API_KEY=
-ANOMALI_BASE_URL=https://api.threatstream.com
-
-# IBM X-Force Exchange
-XFORCE_API_KEY=
-XFORCE_API_PASSWORD=
-
-# Flashpoint
-FLASHPOINT_API_KEY=
-
-# Intel 471
-INTEL471_USERNAME=
-INTEL471_API_KEY=
-
-# DomainTools Iris
-DOMAINTOOLS_USERNAME=
-DOMAINTOOLS_API_KEY=
-
-# RiskIQ / Microsoft Defender External ATP
-RISKIQ_USERNAME=
-RISKIQ_API_KEY=
-
-# ─── Connectors ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# CrowdStrike Falcon
-CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID=
-CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET=
-CROWDSTRIKE_BASE_URL=https://api.crowdstrike.com
-
-# Splunk
-SPLUNK_HOST=
-SPLUNK_PORT=8089
-SPLUNK_TOKEN=
-SPLUNK_SCHEME=https
-SPLUNK_VERIFY_SSL=true
-
-# AWS Security Hub
-AWS_REGION=us-east-1
-AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
-AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
-
-# Okta
-OKTA_DOMAIN=
-OKTA_API_TOKEN=
-
-# Microsoft Sentinel
-AZURE_TENANT_ID=
-AZURE_CLIENT_ID=
-AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET=
-AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=
-AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP=
-AZURE_WORKSPACE_NAME=
-
-# ─── Frontend ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Where the console proxies browser requests. The browser itself never uses
-# these: the bundle calls same-origin paths like /api/v1/alerts and the Next.js
-# server forwards them, which is why one image works on localhost, on a LAN
-# address and behind a reverse proxy without rebuilding, and why there is no
-# CORS configuration to get wrong.
-#
-# The defaults are the Compose service names and are right for the bundled
-# stack. Change them when the API lives somewhere else — a different Compose
-# project, another host, or an existing deployment.
-AISOC_API_URL=http://api:8000
-AISOC_AGENTS_URL=http://agents:8084
-AISOC_REALTIME_URL=http://realtime:4000
-
-# NEXT_PUBLIC_* is NOT listed here on purpose.
-#
-# Next.js inlines every NEXT_PUBLIC_* value into the JavaScript bundle when the
-# image is *built*, so setting one in this file has no effect on the image
-# `docker compose up` pulls. This file used to list NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL,
-# NEXT_PUBLIC_REALTIME_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL, which meant an operator
-# pointing the console at their own host edited three variables, restarted,
-# saw no change, and had nothing telling them the settings were inert. Use the
-# three AISOC_*_URL values above; they are read at container start.
-#
-# To bypass the proxy and have the browser call another origin directly you
-# have to rebuild the image with --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=… and take on
-# the CORS configuration that comes with it.
-
-# Override the docs site base URL (default: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs).
-# Set this when serving docs from a custom domain like https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs.
-# NEXT_PUBLIC_DOCS_URL=https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs
-
-# ─── Service-to-service auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Shared bearer token for backend services that are NOT reachable from the
-# browser (connectors, purple-team, honeytokens, ueba). Those surfaces execute
-# privileged work — purple-team can start adversary-emulation operations against
-# live hosts — and they fail closed: with no token configured and AISOC_DEV_MODE
-# unset, they answer 503 rather than serving the route openly.
-#
-# Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`. It is not optional
-# in practice: the API presents it when it proxies the connector catalog and
-# "Test connection" to the connectors service, so a blank value on one side and
-# a configured secret on the other is a 401 the wizard used to report as the
-# bare string "Connection test failed".
-#
-# `ingest` and `connectors` use it for the same purpose on the push path, and
-# there AISOC_DEV_MODE does NOT cover it: POST /v1/ingest is a write into
-# tenant-owned data and has no dev-mode shortcut. A direct curl/script push
-# uses a per-tenant token from `make ingest-token` instead and needs nothing
-# here. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.
-AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN=t0K34vZQE5T0MpeicQyZp4w6Js_8eISs38Kd5WMYy2c
-#
-# The actions service gets its own, because it is the one that can isolate a
-# host or disable an account and should not share a credential with the
-# read-mostly services above. `make up` generates it. Without it the actions
-# service answers 503 on every mutating route, which is deliberate: it used to
-# answer 200 to anyone who could reach the port.
-AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN=B0N61vx6KgsmcH3UoZuKtIgd5Ot2uI_djKu1M-qiB6A
-#
-# The agents service gets its own too, and it is the one that could not fall
-# back: eight modules in `services/agents` present it as
-# `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context routes, and
-# `service_token_valid` on the API verifies THIS variable and no other — it
-# does not accept AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN. Nothing generated it and no manifest
-# passed it, so organisation memory, tenant skills, recent dispositions,
-# identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP toolset, the playbook
-# action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off on every default install, each
-# logging a `no_service_token` warning and returning an empty result that
-# reads exactly like "this tenant has none".
-#
-# The same value is verified in the other direction: the API posts a replay to
-# the agents service as a bearer, and `app.security.tenant_scope` resolves
-# `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` ahead of the shared one. `make up` generates it
-# and compose passes it to both.
-AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN=sCn5w7PhzIJVvY5_5gIZZDlswDbqCxSe63Wd54fWZyM
-
-# Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out routes (API/agents -> realtime),
-# sent as the x-internal-token header. `make up` generates it. The guard used
-# to treat an unset value as authorized, and nothing set it.
-REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN=j3gjCbBj8yHEdE9BS8mQvlD0cR_waYn6Oc4YKzafuak
-# Optional per-service overrides, if you'd rather not share one secret. Each
-# is read ahead of AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN by the service it names, on both the
-# presenting and the verifying side, so setting one narrows a single hop.
-# `scripts/check_service_token_wiring.py` asserts every one of these that
-# production code reads is listed here — four were not, which is how an
-# operator would go looking for a variable the code uses and find nothing.
-# AISOC_PURPLE_TEAM_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_HONEYTOKENS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_UEBA_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_INGEST_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_FUSION_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-#
-# Bearer the agents service presents to the ChatOps fan-out (slack-bot).
-# Unset means no ChatOps notification is sent; the approval is still durable
-# and visible in the console.
-AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN=wXugJXuZwACNxpoQfeyNoV048qLTZQUfPNDz4UOUTfU
-
-# Canonical agents -> core API credential (DB-backed aisoc_ key, minted 2026-10-02)
-AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY=aisoc_517c15dcbf96ea8ba64b64a92682ce276b3700e5ecb56ab4
diff --git a/.env.bak.1790944801 b/.env.bak.1790944801
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ff5308f9..000000000
--- a/.env.bak.1790944801
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,452 +0,0 @@
-# AiSOC Environment Variables
-# Copy this file to .env and fill in your values
-#
-# ╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
-# ║ YOU DO NOT HAVE TO EDIT THIS FILE TO GET A WORKING STACK. ║
-# ║ ║
-# ║ make up creates .env from this template and fills the four ║
-# ║ generated secrets — AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY, SECRET_KEY, ║
-# ║ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN, AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN — with ║
-# ║ real random values. ║
-# ║ make env does only that, if you want to look before you start. ║
-# ║ ║
-# ║ Those three ship EMPTY here rather than as `replace-me-…` prose. A ║
-# ║ placeholder is not a neutral default: a non-empty AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY ║
-# ║ that is not a valid Fernet key made every connector save answer HTTP 500, ║
-# ║ so copying this template used to break the product while skipping the copy ║
-# ║ left it working. `scripts/check_env_placeholders.py` now fails on any ║
-# ║ placeholder shipped here, and `make doctor` reports them in your .env. ║
-# ║ ║
-# ║ Optional, and worth setting: ║
-# ║ OPENAI_API_KEY a hosted provider key for better AI triage. CORE ║
-# ║ ships a local model, so this is an upgrade, not a ║
-# ║ requirement — see "AI / LLM" below. ║
-# ║ POSTGRES_PASSWORD the dev default works out of the box; change it for ║
-# ║ anything shared. ║
-# ╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
-
-# ─── Image Pinning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Tag pulled by every `image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-*:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}`
-# in docker-compose.yml. Docker pulls this tag on first boot and skips the
-# local build (~90 s vs ~15 min). Pin to a release tag (e.g. v12.0.0) for
-# reproducible deploys; leave as `latest` to track the newest release.
-AISOC_VERSION=latest
-
-# What `pull_policy:` resolves to for every first-party image. `missing` means
-# "use what is local if there is one", which is right for an immutable release
-# tag and wrong for `latest`, which is republished on every merge — so
-# `make up` refreshes the images itself whenever AISOC_VERSION names a moving
-# tag, and skips it when the tag is pinned.
-#
-# Set this to `never` on an air-gapped host: Compose then refuses to contact a
-# registry, and `make up` skips its refresh for the same reason. `always` makes
-# Compose itself re-check on every container start.
-# AISOC_PULL_POLICY=never
-
-# ─── Core Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# `development` enables the dev auth bypass in services/api/app/api/v1/dev_auth.py.
-# Set `production` for anything network-reachable; docker-compose.yml reads this
-# value, so changing it here is enough.
-# Production is the default because the value of this variable used to
-# decide whether an uncredentialed request was served as an administrator.
-# For the developer conveniences, layer the overlay rather than editing
-# this line: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f infra/compose/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
-ENVIRONMENT=production
-LOG_LEVEL=info
-
-# HS256 signing key for console sessions, shared by the API and the connectors
-# service. Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py` — see the
-# note on AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY below for why a placeholder is not used.
-SECRET_KEY=1fd76079684f5b19cb24294429815bcbd570131b30f65d89edf6368b07e8b7d0
-
-# Base URL `make bootstrap` prints as the sign-in address, and the origin the
-# console is reached on. Leave it at the default for a laptop; set it to the
-# address operators actually browse to for anything else, or the printed
-# credential arrives with the wrong URL beside it.
-AISOC_CONSOLE_URL=http://localhost:3000
-
-# ─── Where the stack is reachable from ────────────────────────────────────────
-# Every host port is published to 127.0.0.1 by default, which is right for a
-# laptop and fatal for a server: nothing outside the machine can reach it,
-# including the browser you meant to use.
-#
-# Set this to publish the console on all interfaces. It is the only port a
-# browser needs — the console proxies to the API, the agents service and the
-# realtime gateway over the internal network — so the datastores and the
-# development passwords in this file stay on loopback.
-#
-# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-#
-# Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front before exposing it to a network
-# you do not control. See apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.
-AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-
-# Moves EVERY published port, datastores included. Only for an isolated
-# network: it hands Postgres, Redis, Kafka and Neo4j — with the development
-# passwords in this file — to anything that can route to the host.
-# AISOC_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-
-# Whether this deployment is a demo. Read at run time by both the API and the
-# console, and reported at GET /api/runtime-config so it can be checked from
-# outside rather than inferred from the page. Leave false unless you are
-# running a public demo; `make demo` is the opt-in that loads synthetic data.
-AISOC_DEMO_MODE=false
-
-# Shared HS256 secret used ONLY for short-lived realtime WS/SSE tickets
-# (Issue #239). The API mints tickets at `POST /api/v1/realtime/ticket` and the
-# Node realtime service (`services/realtime`) verifies them on every WebSocket
-# upgrade and SSE request — both sides MUST read the same value. This is
-# intentionally separate from SECRET_KEY so the realtime edge can be rotated
-# independently and a leaked ticket can never forge a full API session.
-#
-# `make up` generates this. There is no development fallback any more: both
-# sides used to fall back to a constant committed to this repository, and no
-# manifest passed either the real secret or the variable the production check
-# read, so that constant was the effective key in every deployment. Unset, the
-# ticket endpoint fails closed (503) and realtime rejects every connection.
-AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET=U_XjLpDZdXAj8zOYhL5Hv8eN3UOeTkUD6Ws_0dPsDLk
-
-# HS256 key for the session tokens the SAML and OIDC callbacks issue, and the
-# bearer that guards /metrics. Both are generated by `make env`. The API
-# refuses to boot without them now that ENVIRONMENT defaults to production:
-# in a development-class environment `enforce_secure_defaults` only warns,
-# which is why neither was generated before.
-JWT_SECRET=6zbpUL_SA81S17OmYi56IWMCyUBtNJKBigUqsCmyC9E
-METRICS_TOKEN=7cUq7f5gLU-8rrVkd8b0bY8cZsMT2a4hu0qExcwe1HI
-# Time-to-live (seconds) for minted realtime tickets. Kept short so a leaked
-# ticket is only briefly useful; the frontend re-mints on every (re)connect.
-# Clamped to a 60s ceiling by the ticket endpoint regardless of this value.
-AISOC_REALTIME_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS=60
-
-# Application-layer encryption key for connector credentials and other
-# secret payloads stored in Postgres.
-#
-# LEAVE THIS EMPTY. `make up`, `make env` and `./install.sh` all run
-# `scripts/ensure_env.py`, which writes a freshly generated key here the first
-# time. Generating it by hand works too:
-# python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
-#
-# It ships empty rather than as a `replace-me-…` string on purpose. A non-empty
-# value that is not a valid Fernet key is *worse* than no value: the vault takes
-# its development path only when the key is empty, so a placeholder reached
-# `Fernet()`, raised, and turned every connector save into an HTTP 500 —
-# minutes after `cp .env.example .env`, with nothing linking the two. Empty is a
-# value the vault understands.
-#
-# Treat a real value like a database password: never commit it, never reuse it
-# across environments, never share it.
-AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY=n-NAjH2x0NgryRcZrvSrQH-rp66MsI1HxDQr09j6L5w=
-# Comma-separated list of previous credential keys to support zero-downtime
-# rotation. Leave blank unless you are mid-rotation.
-AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM=
-
-# Internal URL the API uses to reach the connectors microservice for
-# catalog lookups and "Test connection" actions in the click-and-connect
-# wizard. ``http://connectors:8003`` is correct for docker-compose;
-# use ``http://localhost:8088`` when running the API on the host while
-# connectors is exposed via the docker-compose port forward.
-CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL=http://connectors:8003
-CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=15
-
-# ─── Database ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Two roles, and the distinction is load-bearing rather than tidy.
-#
-# aisoc owner. Superuser (the postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER one),
-# owns every table, applies the migration chain. No service
-# connects as it.
-# aisoc_app runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, so
-# that the schema's row-level-security policies apply to it. A
-# superuser ignores those policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL
-# SECURITY, which is why running the services as `aisoc` left all
-# 92 of them filtering nothing.
-#
-# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is the owner's; AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD is the runtime role's.
-# Both are interpolated by docker-compose.yml, so changing them here rotates
-# them across the stack. They are deliberately different values: they are
-# different privilege levels.
-#
-# Empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`, like the secrets
-# above. This file used to ship `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=aisoc_dev_secret`, and
-# `docker-compose.prod.yml` guarded it with
-# `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the development default is a published literal}` —
-# a guard that rejects an *empty* variable and cannot look at a value, so the
-# one input its message named was the one input it accepted. A production
-# stack booted on a password printed in this repository while the file said
-# it could not. `preflight-secrets` in that file now refuses the value, and
-# shipping these empty means a fresh install never has one to refuse.
-POSTGRES_PASSWORD=440c43cf18f78e66a2885f12480c7551c934331b5a88eedc
-AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD=03b5366c74c98fde62b1656d433f367e7cff75035d82cf4c
-
-# What every service connects as.
-DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc
-
-# DDL only: `python -m app.scripts.run_migrations` uses this and nothing else
-# does. Leave it unset and migrations fall back to DATABASE_URL, which is
-# correct for a deployment that has not split the roles and fails loudly
-# ("permission denied for schema public") on one that has.
-# aisoc-db-role: owner — the migration chain applies DDL; the runtime role holds none
-DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc
-
-# Generated alongside the Postgres pair, and referenced rather than repeated:
-# these two used to spell the password out inside the DSN, so rotating
-# REDIS_PASSWORD left a stale copy here that still worked.
-REDIS_PASSWORD=12b5ff3f51c1cbb8a68b887b73ff3368cc3b30a4fa9b693d
-CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=61dd17f85342f5f3a4850dab1da5a13a4c1bd682dd3dc70b
-REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@localhost:6379/0
-CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}@localhost:8123/aisoc
-
-# ─── Messaging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS=localhost:9092
-
-# ─── Search ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-OPENSEARCH_URL=http://localhost:9200
-QDRANT_URL=http://localhost:6333
-
-# ─── AI / LLM ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Empty, and empty is a working configuration: CORE ships Ollama with a small
-# local model, so a default install does real AI triage with no key at all. Set
-# a hosted provider key here to upgrade the quality — the gateway picks it up
-# and routes the aliases to the hosted model instead.
-#
-# It is empty rather than `sk-your-…-here` because a bogus key is not the same
-# as no key: the gateway would send it upstream, get a 401, and the deployment
-# would look configured while producing nothing.
-OPENAI_API_KEY=
-# OPENAI_MODEL affects the "explain this alert" / BYOK path only. Task workloads
-# (triage, recon, investigation, copilot, summary, report, NL) request a logical
-# alias instead — see the LLM gateway block below.
-#
-# It ships as an alias, not a concrete model, because the default deployment
-# routes through the bundled gateway and the gateway 400s anything
-# infra/litellm/config.yaml does not define. It used to read
-# `gpt-4-turbo-preview`, which no gateway config here has ever defined, and the
-# auto-triage worker treated it as a per-tenant BYOK override — so it replaced
-# `aisoc-triage` on the highest-volume path in the product.
-# scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py fails the build if this names a model the
-# gateway does not define. Set a concrete model only when calling a provider
-# directly (see "ENABLE LIVE LLM" option (b) below).
-OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary
-
-# ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ───────────────────────────────────────
-# Since #478 AiSOC asks for a logical task alias (aisoc-triage,
-# aisoc-investigation, …) for every live LLM call — there is no hardcoded default
-# model. The alias → real-model map lives in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so you
-# swap local/hosted models there without changing AiSOC. The gateway service is
-# defined in docker-compose.yml.
-#
-# Key that AiSOC uses to authenticate to the gateway (also LiteLLM's admin key):
-LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=sk-aisoc-local
-# In-network URL of the gateway. docker-compose.yml sets this on the api and
-# agents services, and both resolvers READ it — `resolve_base_url()` returns it
-# for any aisoc-<role> alias, and `resolve_api_key()` returns LITELLM_MASTER_KEY
-# to pair with it. That wire was missing: compose set this variable, the
-# resolvers deliberately ignored it in favour of OPENAI_BASE_URL (which nothing
-# set), and so the product's headline capability could not reach a model in the
-# default deployment.
-LLM_GATEWAY_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1
-#
-# ENABLE LIVE LLM:
-# (a) Through the gateway — the default, and already wired. Put your real
-# provider key in OPENAI_API_KEY above (the gateway reads it) and bring up
-# the `full` profile, which is where the litellm service lives:
-# docker compose --profile full up -d
-# Nothing else to set. To point at a gateway somewhere else, or to send a
-# different bearer, set OPENAI_BASE_URL/OPENAI_API_KEY and they win.
-# (b) Direct to a provider, no gateway — pin each task role to a concrete
-# model. A concrete pin is NOT rerouted to the gateway, so this keeps
-# working with LLM_GATEWAY_URL set:
-# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini
-# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_INVESTIGATION=gpt-4o
-# OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini # the BYOK/explain path, direct too
-# With neither configured, AiSOC uses its deterministic offline path — which
-# reports zero model calls and zero tokens rather than pretending to triage.
-
-# ─── Threat Intelligence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Open-source / community feeds (work out of the box, no key required for some)
-TAXII_FEEDS=https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/taxii/,enterprise-attack,,
-MISP_URL=
-MISP_API_KEY=
-OTX_API_KEY=
-CISA_KEV_ENABLED=true
-ABUSE_CH_ENABLED=true
-
-# Free / freemium enrichment (recommended for everyone)
-VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY=
-ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=
-GREYNOISE_API_KEY=
-SHODAN_API_KEY=
-URLSCAN_API_KEY=
-IPINFO_API_TOKEN=
-
-# ─── Commercial threat intelligence (optional) ────────────────────────────────
-# Cyble Vision — actor, malware, vulnerability, dark-web, brand-risk feeds
-# Provision a key from https://cyble.com/cyble-vision/
-CYBLE_VISION_API_KEY=
-CYBLE_VISION_BASE_URL=https://api.cyble.com/v2
-CYBLE_VISION_TENANT_ID=
-CYBLE_VISION_FEEDS=indicators,actors,vulnerabilities,leaks,brand
-CYBLE_HUNT_API_KEY=
-
-# Recorded Future
-RECORDED_FUTURE_API_KEY=
-
-# Mandiant Threat Intelligence (formerly FireEye iSIGHT)
-MANDIANT_API_KEY=
-MANDIANT_API_SECRET=
-
-# Crowdstrike Falcon Intelligence (separate from the EDR connector)
-CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_ID=
-CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_SECRET=
-
-# Anomali ThreatStream
-ANOMALI_USERNAME=
-ANOMALI_API_KEY=
-ANOMALI_BASE_URL=https://api.threatstream.com
-
-# IBM X-Force Exchange
-XFORCE_API_KEY=
-XFORCE_API_PASSWORD=
-
-# Flashpoint
-FLASHPOINT_API_KEY=
-
-# Intel 471
-INTEL471_USERNAME=
-INTEL471_API_KEY=
-
-# DomainTools Iris
-DOMAINTOOLS_USERNAME=
-DOMAINTOOLS_API_KEY=
-
-# RiskIQ / Microsoft Defender External ATP
-RISKIQ_USERNAME=
-RISKIQ_API_KEY=
-
-# ─── Connectors ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# CrowdStrike Falcon
-CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID=
-CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET=
-CROWDSTRIKE_BASE_URL=https://api.crowdstrike.com
-
-# Splunk
-SPLUNK_HOST=
-SPLUNK_PORT=8089
-SPLUNK_TOKEN=
-SPLUNK_SCHEME=https
-SPLUNK_VERIFY_SSL=true
-
-# AWS Security Hub
-AWS_REGION=us-east-1
-AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
-AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
-
-# Okta
-OKTA_DOMAIN=
-OKTA_API_TOKEN=
-
-# Microsoft Sentinel
-AZURE_TENANT_ID=
-AZURE_CLIENT_ID=
-AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET=
-AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=
-AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP=
-AZURE_WORKSPACE_NAME=
-
-# ─── Frontend ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Where the console proxies browser requests. The browser itself never uses
-# these: the bundle calls same-origin paths like /api/v1/alerts and the Next.js
-# server forwards them, which is why one image works on localhost, on a LAN
-# address and behind a reverse proxy without rebuilding, and why there is no
-# CORS configuration to get wrong.
-#
-# The defaults are the Compose service names and are right for the bundled
-# stack. Change them when the API lives somewhere else — a different Compose
-# project, another host, or an existing deployment.
-AISOC_API_URL=http://api:8000
-AISOC_AGENTS_URL=http://agents:8084
-AISOC_REALTIME_URL=http://realtime:4000
-
-# NEXT_PUBLIC_* is NOT listed here on purpose.
-#
-# Next.js inlines every NEXT_PUBLIC_* value into the JavaScript bundle when the
-# image is *built*, so setting one in this file has no effect on the image
-# `docker compose up` pulls. This file used to list NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL,
-# NEXT_PUBLIC_REALTIME_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL, which meant an operator
-# pointing the console at their own host edited three variables, restarted,
-# saw no change, and had nothing telling them the settings were inert. Use the
-# three AISOC_*_URL values above; they are read at container start.
-#
-# To bypass the proxy and have the browser call another origin directly you
-# have to rebuild the image with --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=… and take on
-# the CORS configuration that comes with it.
-
-# Override the docs site base URL (default: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs).
-# Set this when serving docs from a custom domain like https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs.
-# NEXT_PUBLIC_DOCS_URL=https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs
-
-# ─── Service-to-service auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Shared bearer token for backend services that are NOT reachable from the
-# browser (connectors, purple-team, honeytokens, ueba). Those surfaces execute
-# privileged work — purple-team can start adversary-emulation operations against
-# live hosts — and they fail closed: with no token configured and AISOC_DEV_MODE
-# unset, they answer 503 rather than serving the route openly.
-#
-# Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`. It is not optional
-# in practice: the API presents it when it proxies the connector catalog and
-# "Test connection" to the connectors service, so a blank value on one side and
-# a configured secret on the other is a 401 the wizard used to report as the
-# bare string "Connection test failed".
-#
-# `ingest` and `connectors` use it for the same purpose on the push path, and
-# there AISOC_DEV_MODE does NOT cover it: POST /v1/ingest is a write into
-# tenant-owned data and has no dev-mode shortcut. A direct curl/script push
-# uses a per-tenant token from `make ingest-token` instead and needs nothing
-# here. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.
-AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN=t0K34vZQE5T0MpeicQyZp4w6Js_8eISs38Kd5WMYy2c
-#
-# The actions service gets its own, because it is the one that can isolate a
-# host or disable an account and should not share a credential with the
-# read-mostly services above. `make up` generates it. Without it the actions
-# service answers 503 on every mutating route, which is deliberate: it used to
-# answer 200 to anyone who could reach the port.
-AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN=B0N61vx6KgsmcH3UoZuKtIgd5Ot2uI_djKu1M-qiB6A
-#
-# The agents service gets its own too, and it is the one that could not fall
-# back: eight modules in `services/agents` present it as
-# `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context routes, and
-# `service_token_valid` on the API verifies THIS variable and no other — it
-# does not accept AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN. Nothing generated it and no manifest
-# passed it, so organisation memory, tenant skills, recent dispositions,
-# identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP toolset, the playbook
-# action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off on every default install, each
-# logging a `no_service_token` warning and returning an empty result that
-# reads exactly like "this tenant has none".
-#
-# The same value is verified in the other direction: the API posts a replay to
-# the agents service as a bearer, and `app.security.tenant_scope` resolves
-# `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` ahead of the shared one. `make up` generates it
-# and compose passes it to both.
-AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN=sCn5w7PhzIJVvY5_5gIZZDlswDbqCxSe63Wd54fWZyM
-
-# Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out routes (API/agents -> realtime),
-# sent as the x-internal-token header. `make up` generates it. The guard used
-# to treat an unset value as authorized, and nothing set it.
-REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN=j3gjCbBj8yHEdE9BS8mQvlD0cR_waYn6Oc4YKzafuak
-# Optional per-service overrides, if you'd rather not share one secret. Each
-# is read ahead of AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN by the service it names, on both the
-# presenting and the verifying side, so setting one narrows a single hop.
-# `scripts/check_service_token_wiring.py` asserts every one of these that
-# production code reads is listed here — four were not, which is how an
-# operator would go looking for a variable the code uses and find nothing.
-# AISOC_PURPLE_TEAM_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_HONEYTOKENS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_UEBA_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_INGEST_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_FUSION_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-# AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN=
-#
-# Bearer the agents service presents to the ChatOps fan-out (slack-bot).
-# Unset means no ChatOps notification is sent; the approval is still durable
-# and visible in the console.
-AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN=wXugJXuZwACNxpoQfeyNoV048qLTZQUfPNDz4UOUTfU
diff --git a/docker-compose.override.yml b/docker-compose.override.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f12e54cae..000000000
--- a/docker-compose.override.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-services:
- agents:
- environment:
- # Agent tools authenticate to the core API with get_current_user, which
- # accepts only JWTs or DB-backed aisoc_-prefixed API keys - never the
- # raw AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN (that fails JWT decode with 401
- # 'Could not validate credentials'). Use a minted aisoc_ API key from
- # .env (scopes: connectors:read, actions:read, lake:query).
- AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY: ${AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY:-}
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml
index 2ebd386e6..afd8fdfae 100644
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -826,13 +826,6 @@ services:
- ollama_data:/root/.ollama
ports:
- "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:11434:11434"
- deploy:
- resources:
- reservations:
- devices:
- - driver: nvidia
- count: 1
- capabilities: [gpu]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "ollama list >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1"]
interval: 10s
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml.bak.20261002-115859 b/docker-compose.yml.bak.20261002-115859
deleted file mode 100644
index 5c61519d8..000000000
--- a/docker-compose.yml.bak.20261002-115859
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1564 +0,0 @@
-###############################################################################
-# AiSOC - AI Security Operations Center
-# Docker Compose - Full Development Stack
-# AiSOC — open-source under MIT License
-#
-# SECURITY NOTE
-# -------------
-# All host port publishings below are bound to 127.0.0.1 so a default
-# `docker compose up` does NOT expose Postgres / Kafka / OpenSearch /
-# Neo4j / Redis (with their development passwords) to the network the
-# host is attached to. This is intentional: the same passwords ship in
-# every clone of this repo.
-#
-# DEPLOYING ON A HOST THAT IS NOT YOUR LAPTOP
-# -------------------------------------------
-# Loopback is the right default and the wrong one for a server: it makes a
-# single-host install unreachable from anywhere, including from the browser
-# you intended to use it from. Set ONE variable in .env:
-#
-# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0
-#
-# That publishes the console on every interface and leaves everything else —
-# Postgres, Redis, Kafka, Neo4j and their shipped development passwords — on
-# loopback where they belong. One port is enough because the console proxies
-# to every other service over the internal network, so the browser only ever
-# talks to the console's own origin.
-#
-# `AISOC_BIND_ADDR` moves ALL of the bindings, including the datastores. It
-# exists for an isolated network where that is what you want. On anything
-# routable it hands out the passwords in this file, so reach for the console
-# variable first and put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front.
-#
-# Per-service overrides still work through a docker-compose.override.yml, and
-# there the list MUST be tagged `!override`:
-#
-# services:
-# postgres:
-# ports: !override
-# - "0.0.0.0:5432:5432"
-#
-# The tag is not optional. Compose *appends* sequences when it merges, so an
-# override without it publishes both the old binding and the new one — the
-# 127.0.0.1 binding stays, and on a port that was already taken the conflict
-# is still there. It looks like it worked and it did nothing. Use
-# `ports: !reset []` to stop publishing a service on the host entirely.
-#
-# Rotate the password while you're there.
-#
-# TWO DATABASE ROLES
-# ------------------
-# `aisoc` owner / migrations. Superuser, because POSTGRES_USER is what the
-# postgres image makes it. Applies the migration chain. NO SERVICE
-# CONNECTS AS THIS ROLE.
-# `aisoc_app` runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, and
-# row-level security applies to it. Every service's DATABASE_URL.
-#
-# Until this split, every service ran as `aisoc`, and a superuser ignores RLS
-# policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY — so all 92 policies in the
-# schema filtered nothing. See services/api/migrations/061_runtime_app_role.sql.
-#
-# Every service below runs as the scoped role. Nothing needs a cross-tenant
-# role: the policies are `tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id()
-# IS NULL`, so ingest, fusion, the retention purge and the schedulers — none of
-# which bind a tenant — keep seeing every tenant's rows. The per-service
-# reasoning is tabulated in apps/docs/docs/operations/security.md.
-###############################################################################
-
-networks:
- aisoc:
- driver: bridge
-
-volumes:
- tempo_data:
- postgres_data:
- redis_data:
- kafka_data:
- zookeeper_data:
- zookeeper_log:
- clickhouse_data:
- opensearch_data:
- qdrant_data:
- neo4j_data:
- neo4j_logs:
- # ~2 GB of model weights. Named so `make down` keeps them and only
- # `make clean` re-downloads.
- ollama_data:
-
-services:
-
- # ─── Infrastructure ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
- postgres:
- image: postgres:16-alpine
- container_name: aisoc-postgres
- environment:
- # The OWNER / migration role. Superuser, because that is what the
- # postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER, and it is what applies the chain.
- # No service connects as this role — see the DATABASE_URL entries below.
- POSTGRES_DB: aisoc
- POSTGRES_USER: aisoc
- POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}
- # The RUNTIME role's credential. `zz_runtime_role_password.sh` applies it
- # on first boot, after 061_runtime_app_role.sql has created the role with
- # DML-only grants. Rotate it the same way you rotate POSTGRES_PASSWORD;
- # the two are deliberately different values because they are different
- # privilege levels.
- AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:5432:5432"
- volumes:
- - postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
- # The init hooks: 10_ applies the migration chain, 20_ gives the runtime
- # role its password. They live in one directory because Docker cannot
- # create a mountpoint inside a bind mount — binding a single file into a
- # bound `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` fails the container at startup.
- # Only runs when the data directory is empty; an upgrade in place is
- # covered by app.scripts.run_migrations instead.
- - ./infra/postgres/initdb:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro
- - ./services/api/migrations:/aisoc/migrations:ro
- networks:
- - aisoc
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U aisoc"]
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 5
-
- redis:
- image: redis:7-alpine
- container_name: aisoc-redis
- command: redis-server --appendonly yes --requirepass ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:6379:6379"
- volumes:
- - redis_data:/data
- networks:
- - aisoc
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "-a", "${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}", "ping"]
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 5
-
- zookeeper:
- image: confluentinc/cp-zookeeper:7.5.0
- container_name: aisoc-zookeeper
- environment:
- ZOOKEEPER_CLIENT_PORT: 2181
- ZOOKEEPER_TICK_TIME: 2000
- # Kafka keeps its cluster id in `kafka_data`, which IS persisted, and
- # takes the authoritative one from ZooKeeper, which was not. So the
- # second `up` on a kept volume generated a fresh cluster id and the
- # broker refused to join it:
- #
- # InconsistentClusterIdException: The Cluster ID <new> doesn't match
- # stored clusterId Some(<old>) in meta.properties
- #
- # `make down && make up` — documented as "stop the stack, keep the data"
- # — therefore could not bring Kafka back, and every service that depends
- # on it stayed in `created`. Only `make clean`, which deletes the data,
- # recovered. Persisting both halves of the pair is the fix; persisting
- # neither would also be consistent, but it would discard the event log
- # on every restart.
- volumes:
- - zookeeper_data:/var/lib/zookeeper/data
- - zookeeper_log:/var/lib/zookeeper/log
- networks:
- - aisoc
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD", "nc", "-z", "localhost", "2181"]
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 5
-
- kafka:
- image: confluentinc/cp-kafka:7.5.0
- container_name: aisoc-kafka
- depends_on:
- zookeeper:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9092:9092"
- environment:
- KAFKA_BROKER_ID: 1
- KAFKA_ZOOKEEPER_CONNECT: zookeeper:2181
- KAFKA_ADVERTISED_LISTENERS: PLAINTEXT://kafka:29092,PLAINTEXT_HOST://localhost:9092
- KAFKA_LISTENER_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MAP: PLAINTEXT:PLAINTEXT,PLAINTEXT_HOST:PLAINTEXT
- KAFKA_INTER_BROKER_LISTENER_NAME: PLAINTEXT
- KAFKA_OFFSETS_TOPIC_REPLICATION_FACTOR: 1
- KAFKA_AUTO_CREATE_TOPICS_ENABLE: "true"
- KAFKA_LOG_RETENTION_HOURS: 168
- networks:
- - aisoc
- volumes:
- - kafka_data:/var/lib/kafka/data
- # Memory caps surface OOMKiller events as a clear container exit instead of
- # silent broker rebalances. Tune up if you raise KAFKA_HEAP_OPTS.
- mem_limit: 1536m
- mem_reservation: 1g
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD", "kafka-broker-api-versions", "--bootstrap-server", "localhost:9092"]
- interval: 15s
- timeout: 10s
- retries: 5
-
- kafka-ui:
- # full profile — Kafka topic browser. A debugging convenience, not a pipeline component.
- profiles: ["full"]
- image: provectuslabs/kafka-ui:latest
- container_name: aisoc-kafka-ui
- depends_on:
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8090:8080"
- environment:
- KAFKA_CLUSTERS_0_NAME: local
- KAFKA_CLUSTERS_0_BOOTSTRAPSERVERS: kafka:29092
- networks:
- - aisoc
-
- clickhouse:
- # full profile — Event lake. Backs /lake/sql and the hunt surface; alerting does not read it.
- profiles: ["full"]
- image: clickhouse/clickhouse-server:23.8
- container_name: aisoc-clickhouse
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8123:8123"
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9000:9000"
- volumes:
- - clickhouse_data:/var/lib/clickhouse
- - ./services/api/clickhouse:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro
- environment:
- CLICKHOUSE_DB: aisoc
- CLICKHOUSE_USER: aisoc
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}
- CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT: 1
- networks:
- - aisoc
- ulimits:
- nofile:
- soft: 262144
- hard: 262144
- mem_limit: 1g
- mem_reservation: 768m
-
- opensearch:
- # full profile — Full-text search over archived events. No CORE code path queries it.
- profiles: ["full"]
- image: opensearchproject/opensearch:2.11.0
- container_name: aisoc-opensearch
- environment:
- - cluster.name=aisoc-cluster
- - node.name=aisoc-node-1
- - discovery.type=single-node
- - bootstrap.memory_lock=true
- - OPENSEARCH_JAVA_OPTS=-Xms512m -Xmx512m
- - DISABLE_INSTALL_DEMO_CONFIG=true
- - DISABLE_SECURITY_PLUGIN=true
- ulimits:
- memlock:
- soft: -1
- hard: -1
- volumes:
- - opensearch_data:/usr/share/opensearch/data
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9200:9200"
- networks:
- - aisoc
- healthcheck:
- # Without this the only condition a dependant can express is
- # `service_started`, which is true the instant the container exists —
- # including for the ~40s before the node listens, and for a node that
- # is about to die. threatintel aborts its lifespan when this port does
- # not answer, so it needs the stronger condition.
- test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -fsS http://localhost:9200/_cluster/health || exit 1"]
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 12
- start_period: 60s
- # A 512m heap is not a 512m process. OpenSearch 2.11 loads ~20 bundled
- # plugins (knn, ml, security-analytics, performance-analyzer) and settles
- # at ~1.05GB RSS with this heap — measured, steady-state, single node,
- # no indices. At `mem_limit: 1g` it was OOM-killed during bootstrap every
- # time (exit 137, OOMKilled=true, ~10s in), so the full profile shipped a
- # store that could never start.
- mem_limit: 2g
- mem_reservation: 1g
-
- qdrant:
- # CORE — the store `services/threatintel` writes collected indicators to,
- # and the one the console's /threat-intel page is served from. It moved in
- # with threatintel: see that service's comment for the reasoning.
- #
- # Measured: 245 MB image, 79 MiB RSS with the two threat-intel collections
- # created. It is by a wide margin the cheapest of the four stores — the
- # next one up, OpenSearch, is 2 GB of image and ~1.05 GB resident — which
- # is why it is the one CORE takes.
- image: qdrant/qdrant:v1.7.0
- container_name: aisoc-qdrant
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:6333:6333"
- volumes:
- - qdrant_data:/qdrant/storage
- networks:
- - aisoc
- healthcheck:
- # threatintel creates its collections at startup, so it needs the store
- # answering rather than merely existing. The image ships neither curl nor
- # wget; `/proc/net/tcp` is what is left, and a listener on 6333 (hex
- # 18BD) is the thing being asserted.
- test: ["CMD-SHELL", "grep -q ':18BD' /proc/net/tcp || exit 1"]
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 12
- start_period: 20s
-
- neo4j:
- # full profile — Entity graph. Backs graph traversals and blast radius, not alert generation.
- profiles: ["full"]
- image: neo4j:5.15-community
- container_name: aisoc-neo4j
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:7474:7474" # HTTP browser
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:7687:7687" # Bolt
- environment:
- NEO4J_AUTH: neo4j/${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}
- NEO4J_PLUGINS: '["apoc"]'
- NEO4J_dbms_security_procedures_unrestricted: apoc.*
- NEO4J_dbms_memory_heap_initial__size: 256m
- NEO4J_dbms_memory_heap_max__size: 512m
- volumes:
- - neo4j_data:/data
- - neo4j_logs:/logs
- networks:
- - aisoc
- mem_limit: 1g
- mem_reservation: 768m
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:7474 || exit 1"]
- interval: 15s
- timeout: 10s
- retries: 10
-
- # ─── Application Services ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
- api:
- build:
- context: ./services/api
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-core-api:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-api
- depends_on:
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8000:8000"
- environment:
- # Two roles, on purpose. DATABASE_URL is the runtime role: DML only, and
- # row-level security applies to it. DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL is the owner,
- # used by `app.scripts.run_migrations` for DDL and nothing else. Running
- # the service as the owner is what made all 92 RLS policies inert, since
- # a superuser ignores them even under FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY.
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # Read by the migration runner to (re)apply the runtime role's password
- # on an existing data volume, where the postgres init hook never fires.
- AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/0
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- # The lake client reads these five, not CLICKHOUSE_URL — nothing under
- # services/api/app reads that name at all. Supplying only the URL left
- # the settings at their defaults (localhost:9000, user `default`, no
- # password), so /lake/sql answered every query with
- # `Connection refused (localhost:9000)` while fusion archived to the
- # same store perfectly well over the native port.
- CLICKHOUSE_HOST: clickhouse
- CLICKHOUSE_PORT: 9000
- CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE: aisoc
- CLICKHOUSE_USER: aisoc
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}
- OPENSEARCH_URL: http://opensearch:9200
- QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333
- # The API owns the vault write path; the connectors service reads with
- # the same key. Passing it to one and not the other means a credential
- # saved in the console can never be decrypted at poll time.
- AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:-}
- AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM:-}
- NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687
- NEO4J_USER: neo4j
- NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}
- # Was a bare literal, so a SECRET_KEY set in .env was ignored and the
- # JWT signing key silently stayed on the dev default. It also has to
- # match whatever the connectors service verifies with, or the console
- # token the API forwards there fails its signature check.
- SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-dev_secret_key_change_in_production}
- # The API mints realtime tickets and calls realtime's /internal/* routes,
- # so it needs the same two secrets the realtime container reads. Neither
- # was passed to either side before, which is why both guards there were
- # running on a published constant or not running at all.
- AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:-}
- # Both are required for the API to boot now that ENVIRONMENT defaults
- # to production, and neither was interpolated here — so a value in .env
- # could not reach the container, which is the same shape that once left
- # AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN unreachable to this one service.
- METRICS_TOKEN: ${METRICS_TOKEN:-}
- JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-}
- REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}
- # The credential this service presents when it proxies the connector
- # catalog and "Test connection" to the connectors service.
- # `_service_token()` in app/api/v1/endpoints/connectors.py reads
- # AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN then AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN — and compose
- # interpolated the shared token into connectors, ueba, honeytokens and
- # purple-team but not into the one service that has to *send* it. There
- # is no `env_file` here either, so a value in .env could not reach it by
- # any route. The catalog call was answered 401 on every request and fell
- # back to the bundled copy; the fix that made the proxy read the right
- # variable shipped against a variable nothing ever set.
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- # The agents service's credential, on the verifying side. `alert_writeback
- # .service_token_valid` reads this and only this — it does NOT fall back
- # to AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN — so the internal context routes the agents
- # service calls (`/feedback/context-statements`,
- # `/tenant-skills/resolved/active`, `/kb/runbooks/for-triage`,
- # `/feedback/recent-dispositions`, `/graph/identity-context`, the MCP
- # registry and `/alerts/{id}/source-writeback`) refuse every caller until
- # it is set. Must match the value on `agents`.
- AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL: ${CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL:-http://connectors:8003}
- # Where GET /api/v1/threat-intel/indicators is served from. The console
- # has called that path since the IOC inbox shipped and nothing answered
- # it; threatintel is in CORE now and this is the wire.
- THREATINTEL_SERVICE_URL: ${THREATINTEL_SERVICE_URL:-http://threatintel:8005}
- AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- # Printed by `make bootstrap` as the sign-in address and used as the
- # console's public origin. Read from os.environ by
- # app/scripts/bootstrap_admin.py, which no compose service set — so any
- # deployment that is not a laptop printed the wrong address.
- AISOC_CONSOLE_URL: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
- # Was a bare literal, so `.env`'s documented ENVIRONMENT was ignored and
- # `production` changed nothing — including the dev auth bypass in
- # app/api/v1/dev_auth.py, which could not be switched off from .env at all.
- ENVIRONMENT: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}
- # The bundled Postgres and Kafka serve no certificates, and
- # ENVIRONMENT now defaults to production — where a cleartext transport
- # is a boot refusal, not a warning. Without these two the documented
- # `make up` fails on a machine where there is nothing to fix, which is
- # exactly how a security default gets patched out downstream. Stated
- # here, in the file that chooses it, rather than weakened in the code
- # that enforces it: a real deployment that leaves either unset is
- # refused at boot.
- AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_DB: "1"
- AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_KAFKA: "1"
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-info}
- # Issue #478 — LiteLLM gateway. This service's live LLM endpoints
- # (translation, hunts, KB, phishing, NL-detection) route here by default:
- # `app.services.model_aliases.resolve_base_url` reads LLM_GATEWAY_URL for
- # any aisoc-<role> alias. It was previously read by nothing, so the
- # variable was set, documented, and dead — every alias went to the
- # provider default and 404'd. OPENAI_BASE_URL still overrides it.
- LLM_GATEWAY_URL: http://litellm:4000/v1
- # The bearer that pairs with the URL above. Without it AiSOC would send a
- # provider key to the gateway, which rejects it as an invalid proxy token.
- LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:-sk-aisoc-local}
- OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}
- # services/actions — where an approved response action is executed.
- # The API had no pointer to it at all: the one endpoint that called it
- # read the URL from os.environ and fell back to `aisoc-actions`, which
- # is the container_name, not the DNS name on this network.
- AISOC_ACTIONS_BASE_URL: http://actions:8085
- AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- # Phase 2.6 — use /readyz, not /health, so the orchestrator
- # only routes traffic once the lifespan has finished wiring
- # Postgres, Redis, Kafka, Qdrant, and Neo4j. (Not OpenSearch: this
- # service constructs no OpenSearch client. `services/threatintel` is
- # the only consumer of that store.)
- # /livez is what the restart policy looks at via `pgrep`-style
- # checks; we don't need a separate compose healthcheck for it
- # because the process being up implies it's alive.
- healthcheck:
- test:
- - CMD-SHELL
- - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8000/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 30
- start_period: 60s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- ingest-worker:
- build:
- context: ./services/ingest
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-ingest:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-ingest
- depends_on:
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8081:8080"
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9090:9090"
- environment:
- # Interpolated, not a literal. `.env.example` tells an operator that
- # setting ENVIRONMENT=production is enough, and for every other service
- # it is. This one pinned `development`, and `envmode.Current()` reads
- # ENV *before* ENVIRONMENT — so ingest stayed dev-mode however the
- # operator set it, and `JWT_SECRET must be set in non-development
- # environments` never fired on the one service taking events off the
- # network.
- ENV: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}
- # The bundled Postgres and Kafka serve no certificates, and
- # ENVIRONMENT now defaults to production — where a cleartext transport
- # is a boot refusal, not a warning. Without these two the documented
- # `make up` fails on a machine where there is nothing to fix, which is
- # exactly how a security default gets patched out downstream. Stated
- # here, in the file that chooses it, rather than weakened in the code
- # that enforces it: a real deployment that leaves either unset is
- # refused at boot.
- AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_DB: "1"
- AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_KAFKA: "1"
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- HTTP_PORT: 8080
- METRICS_PORT: 9090
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/1
- # The inbox webhook routes (/v1/inbox/*) mount only when this is set,
- # and no compose file set it, so the documented "push events straight
- # from your SIEM" path was unreachable on every local and CI stack.
- # This is a pgx DSN and is deliberately distinct from the SQLAlchemy
- # DATABASE_URL the Python services use.
- # sslmode=disable is correct *here* and nowhere else: the bundled
- # Postgres serves no certificate, so requiring TLS would break the
- # documented first run on a machine where there is nothing to fix.
- # A production deployment that leaves this is reported at boot by
- # warn_if_insecure_defaults, which also reports an *unset* sslmode —
- # libpq reads that as `prefer`, which downgrades to cleartext without
- # a log line, and is therefore worse than the honest `disable` below.
- DATABASE_DSN: postgres://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc?sslmode=disable
- LOG_LEVEL: info
- # A bare literal, and a published one: `dev_secret_key_change_in_production`
- # is in INSECURE_SECRET_KEY_DEFAULTS, so anyone who read this repository
- # held the key this service verified with. Interpolated now, and `make
- # env` generates it.
- JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-}
- # /v1/ingest requires a credential. Two shapes are accepted: a
- # per-tenant push token minted with `make ingest-token` (resolved
- # through DATABASE_DSN above), and this shared service token, which
- # `connectors` presents when it polls on behalf of many tenants.
- # Empty by default — with it unset the connector-poll path is refused
- # and only minted tokens work. The same variable must be set on the
- # `connectors` service. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- ATTCK_DATA_PATH: /app/data/enterprise-attack.json
- # Graph-at-ingest needs Neo4j, which is a `full`-profile service. It is
- # off in CORE and switched on by the `full` overlay. It used to be
- # hardcoded "true" with a hard `depends_on: neo4j`, which is why the
- # minimal stack could not start without the graph database.
- AISOC_GRAPH_ENABLED: "${AISOC_GRAPH_ENABLED:-false}"
- AISOC_NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687
- AISOC_NEO4J_USER: neo4j
- AISOC_NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- enrichment:
- # full profile — Fuse-time threat-intel and vulnerability enrichment. Alerts fire without it.
- profiles: ["full"]
- build:
- context: ./services/enrichment
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-enrichment:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-enrichment
- depends_on:
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8080:8082"
- environment:
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/2
- VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY: ${VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY:-}
- ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY: ${ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY:-}
- GREYNOISE_API_KEY: ${GREYNOISE_API_KEY:-}
- SHODAN_API_KEY: ${SHODAN_API_KEY:-}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- fusion:
- build:
- context: ./services/fusion
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-fusion:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-fusion
- depends_on:
- # Postgres was missing here, so during a cold boot fusion tried to write
- # alerts before the database accepted connections and logged the failure
- # exactly once.
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8003:8003"
- environment:
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/3
- # `tenant_scope` refuses outright when neither a console secret nor a
- # service token is configured and dev mode is off, and this service
- # received none of the three — the same trio `connectors` and
- # `threatintel` already carry.
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-}
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # The ClickHouse event lake is a `full`-profile capability: it backs
- # /lake/sql and the hunt surface, not alerting. CORE runs without it and
- # the writer disables itself.
- AISOC_LAKE_WRITER_ENABLED: "${AISOC_LAKE_WRITER_ENABLED:-false}"
- CLICKHOUSE_HOST: clickhouse
- CLICKHOUSE_PORT: "9000"
- CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE: aisoc
- CLICKHOUSE_USER: aisoc
- CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}
- # Fusion defaulted to http://localhost:8082, which inside its own
- # container is fusion itself — so fuse-time enrichment always failed and
- # the failure was swallowed at DEBUG. `enrichment` is a `full`-profile
- # service; in CORE this resolves to nothing and enrichment is skipped,
- # which is the same outcome as before but now deliberate.
- ENRICHMENT_SERVICE_URL: ${ENRICHMENT_SERVICE_URL:-http://enrichment:8082}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- agents:
- build:
- context: ./services/agents
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-agents:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-agents
- depends_on:
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8001:8084"
- environment:
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/4
- CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000
- # Phase B1 — auto-triage every fused alert off the Kafka stream (copilot:
- # read-only triage, no response dispatch). Degrades to deterministic
- # triage when no LLM key is set.
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- KAFKA_TOPIC_ALERTS_FUSED: aisoc.alerts.fused
- QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333
- NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687
- NEO4J_USER: neo4j
- NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}
- OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}
- ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
- # BYOK / "explain this alert" only — never a task role. A task role asks
- # `app.llm.model_pins` for its aisoc-<role> alias, and this leaking into
- # that path is what replaced `aisoc-triage` with a model the gateway does
- # not define. Defaults to the summary alias so the explain path resolves
- # at the gateway too; set a concrete model only for direct-to-provider.
- OPENAI_MODEL: ${OPENAI_MODEL:-aisoc-summary}
- # Issue #478 — the LiteLLM gateway (below) is the single entry point for
- # live LLM calls. `app.llm.factory.resolve_base_url` reads this for any
- # aisoc-<role> alias, so the default deployment reaches the gateway with
- # no further configuration; OPENAI_BASE_URL still overrides it, and a
- # concrete AISOC_MODEL_PIN_<ROLE> is left pointing at its provider.
- LLM_GATEWAY_URL: http://litellm:4000/v1
- # The bearer that pairs with the URL above — see the api service.
- LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:-sk-aisoc-local}
- ATTCK_DATA_PATH: /app/data/enterprise-attack.json
- # Where to post an approval card when triage raises one. Unset means
- # no ChatOps notification; the approval is still durable and visible in
- # the console and the responder app. slack-bot is a `chatops`-profile
- # service, so this only resolves when that profile is up.
- AISOC_SLACK_BOT_URL: ${AISOC_SLACK_BOT_URL:-}
- AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}
- # Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out. `app/playbook/engine.py`
- # reads it to publish step progress; unset, realtime refuses the call
- # and a running playbook is invisible in the console.
- REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}
- # The three below are the same trio `connectors` and `threatintel`
- # already carry, and this service had none of them. `tenant_scope`
- # refuses outright when neither a console secret nor a service token is
- # configured *and* dev mode is off — which is what every tenant-scoped
- # route here answered: 503, with no credential material to verify
- # against and nothing in the image supplying any.
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-}
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- # The agents service's own service credential, used in both directions:
- # presented as `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context
- # routes, and verified by `app.security.tenant_scope` when the API calls
- # back (it resolves `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` before the shared one).
- #
- # Eight modules in this service read it and nothing produced it, so on a
- # default install organisation memory, tenant skills, recent
- # dispositions, identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP
- # toolset, the playbook action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off —
- # each logging its own `no_service_token` warning and returning empty.
- # `make env` generates it; it must match the value on `api` below.
- AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- # ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ─────────────────────────────────────
- # Single entry point for every live LLM call. AiSOC requests a logical task
- # alias (aisoc-triage, aisoc-investigation, …); the mapping alias → real model
- # lives entirely in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so operators swap local/hosted
- # models without touching AiSOC. Per-task latency/tokens/cost/errors are
- # exported on /metrics (scraped as job `aisoc-litellm`). Lightweight and inert
- # unless a service is pointed at it via OPENAI_BASE_URL — see the note on the
- # `agents` service above.
- ollama:
- # CORE — the model behind the gateway.
- #
- # The gateway shipped in CORE and the models it pointed at did not: every
- # alias resolved to a hosted provider, so the default install could route a
- # key it did not have and otherwise did no AI at all. This closes that: a
- # clone with no account produces a real triage verdict, from a real model,
- # with real token counts.
- #
- # Promoted from infra/compose/docker-compose.airgap.yml, where this exact
- # pairing has been proven end to end. The model is pinned rather than
- # floating on `latest` for the same reason every other image here is.
- #
- # Measured: 6.92 GB image — by some distance the largest thing in CORE —
- # 2.02 GB of weights in the volume, and 9.6 MiB resident when idle.
- #
- # Quoting the idle figure alone would be the misleading half of the truth:
- # the model is mapped in on first inference and the container measured
- # 2.96 GiB while serving. That is what moved the README's memory figure to
- # 8 GB, not the idle number.
- image: ollama/ollama:0.6.7
- container_name: aisoc-ollama
- volumes:
- - ollama_data:/root/.ollama
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:11434:11434"
- deploy:
- resources:
- reservations:
- devices:
- - driver: nvidia
- count: 1
- capabilities: [gpu]
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD-SHELL", "ollama list >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1"]
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 18
- start_period: 30s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- ollama-pull:
- # One-shot: pull the pinned model, then exit. A cache hit is a no-op, so
- # this costs one `ollama list` on every `up` after the first.
- #
- # litellm waits on `service_completed_successfully` here rather than on
- # ollama's health: a gateway that is up before the weights exist answers the
- # first triage request with "model not found", and the first request is the
- # one a new user makes.
- image: ollama/ollama:0.6.7
- container_name: aisoc-ollama-pull
- depends_on:
- ollama:
- condition: service_healthy
- entrypoint: ["ollama", "pull", "${AISOC_LLM_LOCAL_MODEL:-llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M}"]
- environment:
- OLLAMA_HOST: http://ollama:11434
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: "no"
-
- litellm:
- # CORE, deliberately — see docs/decisions/0006-llm-gateway-in-core.md.
- #
- # This was `profiles: ["full"]` on the reasoning that the gateway is "only
- # needed when a provider key is configured". The reasoning skipped a step:
- # a CORE deployment *with* a key could not use it either, because every
- # `aisoc-<role>` alias resolves nowhere except here. So the documented
- # default install — what `make up` starts and what the quickstart walks a
- # new evaluator through — could not do AI triage at all, and the profile
- # table said it did "triage".
- #
- # With no key it boots, serves its seven aliases and answers /health;
- # AiSOC's deterministic path is unchanged and still honest. Measured cost:
- # a 1.67 GB image idling at ~451 MiB, which is why the RAM figure in the
- # README moved rather than staying put.
- #
- # It is also the only party that can say what a call cost — the real
- # figure comes off its response headers — so leaving it out of CORE left
- # the default install's cost dashboard permanently unmeasurable.
- image: ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:main-stable
- container_name: aisoc-litellm
- command: ["--config", "/etc/litellm/config.yaml", "--port", "4000"]
- volumes:
- - ./infra/litellm/config.yaml:/etc/litellm/config.yaml:ro
- depends_on:
- ollama-pull:
- condition: service_completed_successfully
- environment:
- # Clients authenticate to the gateway with this key (AiSOC sends it as its
- # OPENAI_API_KEY when OPENAI_BASE_URL points here). Override in .env.
- LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:-sk-aisoc-local}
- # Which backend every alias resolves to. infra/litellm/config.yaml reads
- # these through `os.environ/...` instead of naming a model inline, so the
- # local→hosted upgrade is three variables in .env rather than an edit to a
- # mounted config file.
- #
- # The defaults are the bundled local model, which is what makes AI triage
- # work in a default `make up` with no account and no key. Set
- # OPENAI_API_KEY plus these two to openai/gpt-4o-mini and openai/gpt-4o —
- # and clear AISOC_LLM_API_BASE — to route to a hosted provider instead.
- AISOC_LLM_MODEL_FAST: ${AISOC_LLM_MODEL_FAST:-ollama_chat/llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M}
- AISOC_LLM_MODEL_DEEP: ${AISOC_LLM_MODEL_DEEP:-ollama_chat/llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M}
- # `-` and not `:-`, deliberately: an operator moving to a hosted provider
- # sets AISOC_LLM_API_BASE= (empty) in .env, and `:-` would helpfully undo
- # that by substituting the Ollama address back in.
- AISOC_LLM_API_BASE: ${AISOC_LLM_API_BASE-http://ollama:11434}
- # Upstream provider keys the aliases resolve against (os.environ/... in the
- # config). Empty is fine — the local model answers instead.
- OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}
- ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:4000:4000"
- healthcheck:
- test:
- - CMD-SHELL
- - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:4000/health/liveliness',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"
- interval: 15s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 10
- start_period: 30s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- osquery-tls:
- build:
- context: ./services/osquery-tls
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-osquery-tls:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-osquery-tls
- depends_on:
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- # Host port 8007 was previously colliding with the `ueba` service's
- # 127.0.0.1:8007 binding; remapped to 8091 here. UEBA still owns 8007.
- #
- # The container side was 8007 too, and nothing has ever listened there:
- # this service's Dockerfile runs uvicorn on 9001 and EXPOSEs 9001. The
- # published port therefore resolved to a closed socket, and because the
- # service had no healthcheck either, the container still read as
- # `running`. Found by adding the healthcheck below and watching it sit
- # at `starting` against a port with no server on it.
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8091:9001"
- profiles:
- - osquery
- environment:
- # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages
- # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and
- # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is
- # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL
- DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api
- # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own
- # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.
- AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}
- AISOC_OSQUERY_TLS_ENROLL_SECRET: ${AISOC_OSQUERY_TLS_ENROLL_SECRET:-change-me-in-production}
- # `tenant_scope` refuses outright when neither a console secret nor a
- # service token is configured and dev mode is off, and this service
- # received none of the three — the same trio `connectors` and
- # `threatintel` already carry.
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-}
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- # The ingest service is registered as `ingest-worker` in this compose
- # file; the previous `http://ingest:8080` would not resolve via DNS.
- AISOC_INGEST_BASE_URL: http://ingest-worker:8080
- # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when
- # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose
- # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.
- healthcheck:
- test:
- - CMD-SHELL
- - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:9001/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 20
- start_period: 90s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- actions:
- # Response execution, and the only service that holds the read-only vendor
- # verbs an investigation pivots through.
- #
- # This was `profiles: ["full", "chatops"]` on the reasoning that nothing in
- # CORE dispatches to it. Two things were wrong with that. The `api` service
- # in CORE already sets AISOC_ACTIONS_BASE_URL to this hostname, so the
- # live-actions surface was enabled and pointed at a name that does not
- # resolve; and the investigation agent's vendor read tools dispatch here,
- # so on the default profile the agent had no way to reach a customer's EDR
- # or IdP at all. Measured cost of moving it: 48.3 MiB resident, 539 MB of
- # image. See docs/decisions/0007-connectors-and-actions-in-core.md.
- #
- # No `profiles:` key rather than a longer list: a service in no profile is
- # included in every profile run, so `chatops` still gets it and
- # slack-bot's dependency still renders.
- build:
- context: ./services/actions
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-actions:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-actions
- depends_on:
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8002:8085"
- environment:
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/5
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000
- # Must match AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN on the api and slack-bot
- # services. Unset in dev, where AISOC_DEV_MODE relaxes the check;
- # require_service_auth returns 503 on every mutating route without it
- # in any other environment, which is the intended failure.
- AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- connectors:
- # Scheduled vendor polling, the 84-connector registry, and the fan-out
- # target for federated SIEM search.
- #
- # This was `profiles: ["full"]` on the reasoning that CORE accepts events
- # over the ingest HTTP API instead. That is true of ingest and says nothing
- # about the other two jobs: `api` in CORE sets CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL to
- # this hostname and AISOC_FEATURE_FED_SEARCH defaults on, so federated
- # search fanned out to a name that does not resolve. Measured cost of
- # moving it: 76.5 MiB resident, 586 MB of image. See
- # docs/decisions/0007-connectors-and-actions-in-core.md.
- #
- # The poll scheduler is per-instance, so a fresh install schedules nothing
- # until an operator saves a connector.
- build:
- context: ./services/connectors
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-connectors:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-connectors
- depends_on:
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8088:8003"
- environment:
- # app/scripts/serve.py binds PORT, defaulting to 8087. The mapping above
- # publishes container port 8003, so leaving PORT unset put the listener
- # on a port nothing forwards to: `connectors:8003` was refused from
- # inside the network and the published host port answered nothing.
- PORT: 8003
- # Without one of these the tenant-scope dependency fails closed and
- # every route answers 503, including the catalog the API proxies — so
- # the console silently fell back to the 26-entry catalog bundled in the
- # API image instead of the 84 connectors the registry actually has.
- SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-dev_secret_key_change_in_production}
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- # The third way this service answered 503 to everything. `SECRET_KEY`'s
- # compose default is one of INSECURE_SECRET_DEFAULTS, so
- # `resolve_console_secret()` returns "" for it; with AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN
- # also blank, `require_console_or_service_auth` has no credential
- # material at all and fails closed — correctly. The dev-mode escape that
- # exists for exactly this case was set on actions, ueba, honeytokens,
- # purple-team and slack-bot, and not on connectors. Dev mode only applies
- # when nothing is configured, so once `make env` generates a real
- # AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN this flag stops having any effect.
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- ENVIRONMENT: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}
- # The bundled Postgres and Kafka serve no certificates, and
- # ENVIRONMENT now defaults to production — where a cleartext transport
- # is a boot refusal, not a warning. Without these two the documented
- # `make up` fails on a machine where there is nothing to fix, which is
- # exactly how a security default gets patched out downstream. Stated
- # here, in the file that chooses it, rather than weakened in the code
- # that enforces it: a real deployment that leaves either unset is
- # refused at boot.
- AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_DB: "1"
- AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_KAFKA: "1"
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/6
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000
- # The scheduler decrypts stored connector credentials through the vault
- # and refuses to start without this key. .env.example documents it as
- # one of the three required values, but no compose service forwarded it,
- # so setting it had no effect and every deployment lost the scheduler to
- # `connector.scheduler.start_failed` — while the container still
- # reported itself started.
- AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:-}
- AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM:-}
- CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID: ${CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID:-}
- CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET:-}
- AWS_REGION: ${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}
- AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID:-}
- AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:-}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- threatintel:
- # CORE — the only thing in the default install that puts *real*, externally
- # sourced security data in front of a new user on day one.
- #
- # `app/clients/cisa_kev.py` fetches the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
- # catalog: authoritative, public, and needing no API key. It has been wired
- # as a scheduled handler the whole time and sat in a profile nobody starting
- # out runs. Meanwhile the console shipped a /threat-intel page calling
- # `/api/v1/threat-intel/indicators`, which had nothing behind it in CORE and
- # was for a while filled with five invented IOCs. The missing feed and the
- # fabrication were the same hole: there was no real data to show, so
- # something invented some.
- #
- # Measured: 1.4 GB image, 219 MiB RSS steady state.
- build:
- context: ./services/threatintel
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-threatintel:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-threatintel
- depends_on:
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- qdrant:
- condition: service_healthy
- # OpenSearch is deliberately NOT a dependency any more. It was one because
- # the lifespan called os_store.initialize() without a try/except, so an
- # unreachable node killed the container — which made a `full`-profile store
- # a hard requirement of a CORE service. Both that call and the pipeline's
- # bulk index are best-effort now: with OpenSearch present you additionally
- # get full-text IOC search, and without it the feeds still write to Qdrant,
- # which is what the console reads. `make up-full` starts it and this
- # service picks it up on its next restart.
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8005:8005"
- environment:
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/7
- # This service reads OPENSEARCH_HOST/PORT. It was given OPENSEARCH_URL,
- # which its Settings has no field for and `extra="ignore"` discards, so
- # the connection worked only because the defaults happened to match the
- # compose service name. Set what is actually read.
- OPENSEARCH_HOST: opensearch
- OPENSEARCH_PORT: 9200
- QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333
- NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687
- NEO4J_USER: neo4j
- NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}
- # Same credential the API presents when it proxies /threat-intel/indicators.
- SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-dev_secret_key_change_in_production}
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- MISP_URL: ${MISP_URL:-}
- MISP_API_KEY: ${MISP_API_KEY:-}
- OTX_API_KEY: ${OTX_API_KEY:-}
- TAXII_URL: ${TAXII_URL:-}
- TAXII_USERNAME: ${TAXII_USERNAME:-}
- TAXII_PASSWORD: ${TAXII_PASSWORD:-}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- ueba:
- # full profile — Behavioural baselining. Consumes its own topic; see docs/audit/REPOSITORY_REALITY.md.
- profiles: ["full"]
- build:
- context: ./services/ueba
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-ueba:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-ueba
- depends_on:
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8007:8004"
- environment:
- # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages
- # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and
- # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is
- # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL
- DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api
- # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own
- # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.
- AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/8
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- CLICKHOUSE_URL: http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}@clickhouse:8123/aisoc
- CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when
- # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose
- # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.
- healthcheck:
- test:
- - CMD-SHELL
- - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8004/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 20
- start_period: 90s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- honeytokens:
- # Gated behind the `extras` profile: image isn't published to GHCR yet, so
- # `aisoc serve` skips it by default. Opt in with `--profile extras`.
- # `pull_policy: build` used to be the only thing that worked here,
- # because the image this names had never been published; it is in the
- # publish matrix now, so `--profile extras` pulls like every other
- # service instead of spending ten minutes building one.
- profiles: ["extras"]
- build:
- context: ./services/honeytokens
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-honeytokens:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-honeytokens
- depends_on:
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8008:8005"
- environment:
- # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages
- # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and
- # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is
- # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL
- DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api
- # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own
- # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.
- AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/9
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when
- # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose
- # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.
- healthcheck:
- test:
- - CMD-SHELL
- - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8005/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 20
- start_period: 90s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- purple-team:
- # Gated behind the `extras` profile: image isn't published to GHCR yet, so
- # `aisoc serve` skips it by default. Opt in with `--profile extras`.
- # `pull_policy: build` used to be the only thing that worked here,
- # because the image this names had never been published; it is in the
- # publish matrix now, so `--profile extras` pulls like every other
- # service instead of spending ten minutes building one.
- profiles: ["extras"]
- build:
- context: ./services/purple-team
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-purple-team:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-purple-team
- depends_on:
- postgres:
- condition: service_healthy
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8006:8006"
- environment:
- # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages
- # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and
- # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is
- # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.
- DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL
- DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc
- # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api
- # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own
- # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.
- AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/10
- CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000
- ATTCK_DATA_PATH: /app/data/enterprise-attack.json
- AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when
- # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose
- # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.
- healthcheck:
- test:
- - CMD-SHELL
- - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8006/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"
- interval: 10s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 20
- start_period: 90s
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- realtime:
- build:
- context: ./services/realtime
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-realtime:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-realtime
- depends_on:
- redis:
- condition: service_healthy
- kafka:
- condition: service_healthy
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8086:4000"
- environment:
- KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092
- REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379
- REDIS_PASSWORD: ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}
- PORT: 4000
- # Both are generated by `make up`. Neither was passed to this container
- # before, which is what made the ticket verifier fall back to a constant
- # published in this repository and the /internal/* guard treat every
- # caller as authorized.
- AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:-}
- REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- # ChatOps adapter. Holds no state — forwards `/aisoc …` slash commands and
- # approval-card button clicks to services/api and services/actions. Runs
- # under the `chatops` profile so a default `docker compose up` doesn't fail
- # when the operator has not yet provisioned a Slack app or service tokens.
- slack-bot:
- build:
- context: ./services/slack-bot
- dockerfile: Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-slack-bot:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-slack-bot
- depends_on:
- - api
- - actions
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8009:8089"
- profiles:
- - chatops
- environment:
- SLACK_BOT_TOKEN: ${SLACK_BOT_TOKEN:-}
- SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET: ${SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET:-}
- AISOC_API_BASE_URL: http://api:8000
- AISOC_ACTIONS_BASE_URL: http://actions:8085
- AISOC_API_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SLACK_API_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SLACK_ACTIONS_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEFAULT_TENANT_ID: ${AISOC_DEFAULT_TENANT_ID:-00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}
- AISOC_WEB_BASE_URL: ${AISOC_WEB_BASE_URL:-http://localhost:3000}
- AISOC_SLACK_BOT_PORT: 8089
- AISOC_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: 10
- # Proactive approval cards. Empty channel disables posting, which is
- # the right default: a bot that posts into a channel nobody chose is
- # worse than one that posts nowhere.
- SLACK_APPROVALS_CHANNEL: ${SLACK_APPROVALS_CHANNEL:-}
- # Shared with the agents service, which calls /internal/approval-card.
- AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}
- AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}
- # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the
- # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It
- # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.
- AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- web:
- build:
- context: .
- dockerfile: apps/web/Dockerfile
- image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-web:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}
- pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}
- container_name: aisoc-web
- depends_on:
- - api
- - realtime
- ports:
- # The console has its own bind address because it is the only port a
- # browser needs. Everything it talks to — the API, the agents service,
- # the realtime gateway — is reached through this server's same-origin
- # proxy on the internal network, so exposing AiSOC to a single host's
- # LAN means publishing one port, not fourteen.
- #
- # AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0 # reachable at http://<host>:3000
- #
- # Falls back to AISOC_BIND_ADDR and then to loopback, so the default
- # install is still reachable only from the machine it runs on. Put it
- # behind a reverse proxy with TLS before anything hostile can route to
- # it; see apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.
- - "${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}}:3000:3000"
- environment:
- # Where this server proxies to. These are read at container start by
- # apps/web/docker-entrypoint.sh, which re-points the compiled rewrite
- # table at them — so unlike the NEXT_PUBLIC_* pair that used to sit
- # here, they take effect on a pulled image.
- API_URL: ${AISOC_API_URL:-http://api:8000}
- AGENTS_URL: ${AISOC_AGENTS_URL:-http://agents:8084}
- REALTIME_URL: ${AISOC_REALTIME_URL:-http://realtime:4000}
- # NOTE: do not add NEXT_PUBLIC_* here. Next inlines those into the
- # JavaScript bundle at `next build` time, so on the pulled image this
- # service runs they are read by nothing. NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL and
- # NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL were set here and did exactly nothing; an operator
- # pointing the console at their own host edited them, saw no change,
- # and had no way to tell the setting was inert. The browser needs no
- # absolute URL at all — the bundle calls same-origin paths and this
- # server proxies them onward.
- AISOC_DEMO_MODE: ${AISOC_DEMO_MODE:-false}
- NODE_ENV: production
- networks:
- - aisoc
- restart: unless-stopped
-
- # ─── Observability ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
- prometheus:
- image: prom/prometheus:v2.48.0
- container_name: aisoc-prometheus
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9091:9090"
- volumes:
- - ./infra/docker/prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml:ro
- # Phase 2.4 — alert rules mounted as a directory so adding a
- # new rule file under `infra/docker/alerts/` is picked up on
- # next `docker compose restart prometheus` (or a SIGHUP).
- - ./infra/docker/alerts:/etc/prometheus/alerts:ro
- # Phase 2.4 — Prometheus needs to reach the Alertmanager service
- # before it can forward alerts. The `depends_on` keeps `docker
- # compose up monitoring` healthy on cold boot — without it,
- # Prometheus logs "level=warn ... alertmanager_url=... err=lookup"
- # for the first ~30s of every restart.
- depends_on:
- - alertmanager
- networks:
- - aisoc
- profiles:
- - monitoring
-
- # Phase 2.4 — in-cluster Alertmanager. Receives firing alerts
- # from Prometheus, groups + deduplicates them per
- # `infra/docker/alertmanager.yml`, and forwards them to the
- # configured receivers. The dev stack ships with a no-op webhook
- # receiver that points at the API's `/internal/alerts/sink`
- # endpoint (which logs the payload); production operators replace
- # the receiver block with PagerDuty / Slack / Opsgenie. The
- # `monitoring` profile keeps it out of `docker compose up`'s
- # default surface so a stock `aisoc serve` doesn't fail when the
- # operator hasn't provisioned downstream alerting.
- alertmanager:
- image: prom/alertmanager:v0.27.0
- container_name: aisoc-alertmanager
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9094:9093"
- volumes:
- - ./infra/docker/alertmanager.yml:/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml:ro
- command:
- - '--config.file=/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml'
- - '--storage.path=/alertmanager'
- # External URL is what Alertmanager uses to render deep-links
- # in notification templates (e.g. "Silence in Alertmanager").
- # Port 9094 here matches the host-side mapping so the link
- # works from a browser on the operator's laptop.
- - '--web.external-url=http://localhost:9094'
- # NOTE: The Alertmanager binary does NOT substitute shell-style
- # env vars in `alertmanager.yml`. To change receivers per
- # environment, mount a different config file (production
- # deployments do this through Helm values templating).
- networks:
- - aisoc
- profiles:
- - monitoring
-
- # ── Tracing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- # The services default OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT to
- # http://otel-collector:4317 and no collector shipped in any compose file,
- # so out of the box every span went into a connection error. That is worse
- # than having no tracing at all: the code looks instrumented, the logs fill
- # with export failures, and nobody can tell whether a missing trace means a
- # missing span or a missing collector.
- #
- # Scope, stated because the docs previously overstated it: api, agents,
- # ueba and honeytokens are instrumented. ingest (Go) and realtime
- # (TypeScript) are not, and they are the two ends of the Kafka spine.
- otel-collector:
- image: otel/opentelemetry-collector-contrib:0.109.0
- container_name: aisoc-otel-collector
- command: ["--config=/etc/otel/collector.yaml"]
- depends_on:
- - tempo
- volumes:
- - ./infra/docker/otel/collector.yaml:/etc/otel/collector.yaml:ro
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:4317:4317"
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:4318:4318"
- healthcheck:
- test: ["CMD", "/otelcol-contrib", "--version"]
- interval: 30s
- timeout: 5s
- retries: 3
- networks:
- - aisoc
- profiles:
- - monitoring
-
- tempo:
- image: grafana/tempo:2.6.0
- container_name: aisoc-tempo
- command: ["-config.file=/etc/tempo/tempo.yaml"]
- user: "0:0"
- volumes:
- - ./infra/docker/otel/tempo.yaml:/etc/tempo/tempo.yaml:ro
- - tempo_data:/var/tempo
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:3200:3200"
- networks:
- - aisoc
- profiles:
- - monitoring
-
- grafana:
- image: grafana/grafana:10.2.0
- container_name: aisoc-grafana
- depends_on:
- - prometheus
- - tempo
- ports:
- - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:3001:3000"
- # Default admin password is intentionally weak for the dev compose stack;
- # the 127.0.0.1 binding above keeps the dashboard off the LAN. Override
- # GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD in production deployments (helm/terraform).
- environment:
- GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-admin}
- volumes:
- - ./infra/docker/grafana:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro
- networks:
- - aisoc
- profiles:
- - monitoring
diff --git a/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py b/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py
index 1e09e111e..ce8434b85 100644
--- a/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py
+++ b/services/agents/app/llm/prompt_registry.py
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ def default_registry() -> PromptRegistry:
reg.register("insider_threat.system", "1", _INSIDER_THREAT_SYSTEM)
reg.register("phishing.system", "1", _PHISHING_SYSTEM)
reg.register("recon.system", "1", _RECON_SYSTEM)
- reg.register("forensic.system", "1", _FORENSIC_SYSTEM)
+ reg.register("forensic.system", "2", _FORENSIC_SYSTEM)
reg.register("responder.system", "1", _RESPONDER_SYSTEM)
reg.register("report_writer.system", "1", _REPORT_WRITER_SYSTEM)
reg.register("playbook_drafter.system", "1", _PLAYBOOK_DRAFTER_SYSTEM)
diff --git a/services/agents/app/llm/prompts.lock.json b/services/agents/app/llm/prompts.lock.json
index 94be40b64..71c9ed426 100644
--- a/services/agents/app/llm/prompts.lock.json
+++ b/services/agents/app/llm/prompts.lock.json
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
"version": "1"
},
"forensic.system": {
- "sha256": "f2eb47f8a0c9bb7d5d1f30c5569bdd698a0f961d22b10f0fd6b6e9470464e928",
- "version": "1"
+ "sha256": "3084c2e15386500b1c61e741b01ef36456e6b6a1ddfde4f6c51e103e9ac2472a",
+ "version": "2"
},
"hunt.system": {
"sha256": "cb7225c08a170bf2511ec0a04936cf91fd83dce38659f72de872481c217e5dd5",
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/approvals.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/approvals.py
index 08bc5be14..4c5022849 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/approvals.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/approvals.py
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ from sqlalchemy import and_, func, select
from app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, require_permission
from app.core.config import settings
-from app.core.security import ROLE_PERMISSIONS, has_permission
from app.db.rls import TenantDBSession
from app.models.responder import AgentApproval
from app.services.actions_client import ActionsServiceError, decide_action, submit_action
@@ -329,7 +328,9 @@ async def _dispatch_decision(
"user_id": str(user.user_id),
"tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id),
"email": getattr(user, "email", None),
- "roles": [role] if role else (list(getattr(user, "roles", []) or []) if not role else []),
+ # Singular on this class; sent as a list because that is the shape
+ # `services/actions` reads.
+ "roles": [user.role] if user.role else [],
"permissions": permissions,
}
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py
index dc9def0ff..6a286dbfa 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py
@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@ import httpx
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Response, status
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, PlainTextResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
-from sqlalchemy import text
-from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy import select, text
from app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, DBSession, require_permission
from app.core.logging import safe_log_value
@@ -141,11 +140,6 @@ def _status_transition_ok(current: str, target: str) -> bool:
return target in _TRANSITIONS.get(current, set())
-class ReopenCaseRequest(BaseModel):
- reason: str = Field(..., min_length=3, max_length=500)
- target_status: Literal["new", "triaged", "investigating"] = "investigating"
-
-
class CreateCaseRequest(BaseModel):
title: str = Field(..., min_length=3)
description: str | None = None
@@ -724,7 +718,11 @@ async def update_case(
if not _status_transition_ok(existing.status, body.status):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=422,
- detail=f"Invalid status transition: {existing.status} → {body.status}. Allowed: {sorted(_TRANSITIONS.get(existing.status, set())) or 'none'}; reopening requires the reopen action.",
+ detail=(
+ f"Invalid status transition: {existing.status} → {body.status}. "
+ f"Allowed: {sorted(_TRANSITIONS.get(existing.status, set())) or 'none'}; "
+ "backwards moves require POST /cases/{id}/reopen."
+ ),
)
now = datetime.now(UTC)
@@ -907,68 +905,6 @@ def case_queue_for(case_row: Any, queues: list[Any]) -> Any:
queues,
)
[email protected]("/{case_id}/reopen", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Reopen a case")
-async def reopen_case(
- case_id: str,
- body: ReopenCaseRequest,
- db: DBSession,
- user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],
-) -> CaseResponse:
- """Explicit reopen — the sanctioned backwards status move.
-
- PATCH /cases/{id} is forward-only by design (see _status_transition_ok);
- this endpoint is the 'reopen action' its 422 refers to. It resets the
- future-stage timestamps so the reopened case reads cleanly on the board,
- and records a timeline event.
- """
- import json as _json
-
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- existing = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT status FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not existing:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- if _status_transition_ok(existing.status, body.target_status):
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=422,
- detail=f"{existing.status} → {body.target_status} is a forward transition; use PATCH /cases/{case_id}.",
- )
-
- now = datetime.now(UTC)
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- "UPDATE aisoc_cases SET status = :status, reopened_at = :now, "
- "triaged_at = NULL, resolved_at = NULL, closed_at = NULL, updated_at = :now "
- "WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id RETURNING *"
- ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, status=body.target_status, now=now)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if row is None:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- try:
- await db.execute(
- text(
- "INSERT INTO case_timeline_events (case_id, tenant_id, event_type, actor_type, summary, detail) "
- "VALUES (:case_id, :tenant_id, 'status_change', 'user', :summary, CAST(:detail AS JSONB))"
- ).bindparams(
- case_id=cid,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- summary=f"Case reopened: {existing.status} → {body.target_status}",
- detail=_json.dumps({"reason": body.reason, "from": existing.status, "to": body.target_status}),
- )
- )
- await db.commit()
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("cases.reopen.timeline_event_failed case=%s", cid)
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
- return _row_to_case(row)
-
-
@router.post("/{case_id}/alerts", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Link alerts to a case")
async def add_alerts(
case_id: str, body: AddAlertsRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
@@ -1648,14 +1584,17 @@ async def case_investigate(
try:
st_row = (
await db.execute(
- text("SELECT status FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
+ text(
+ "SELECT status FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id"
+ ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
)
).fetchone()
if st_row and st_row.status != "investigating" and _status_transition_ok(st_row.status, "investigating"):
await db.execute(
- text("UPDATE aisoc_cases SET status = 'investigating', updated_at = :now WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(
- id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, now=datetime.now(UTC)
- )
+ text(
+ "UPDATE aisoc_cases SET status = 'investigating', updated_at = :now "
+ "WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id"
+ ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, now=datetime.now(UTC))
)
await db.commit()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — never block the launch on the status bump
@@ -1666,7 +1605,7 @@ async def case_investigate(
"POST",
f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigate",
json={
- "alert_summary": body.alert_summary or (raw_alert_payload.get("alerts", [{}])[0].get("title") if raw_alert_payload.get("alerts") else ""),
+ "alert_summary": summary,
"raw_alert": raw_alert_payload,
"tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id),
},
@@ -1952,7 +1891,11 @@ async def case_investigation_pdf(
user: AuthUser,
) -> Response:
safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")
- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf", headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)})
+ resp = await _agents_proxy(
+ "GET",
+ f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf",
+ headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)},
+ )
if resp.status_code >= 400:
raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)
safe_case_id = _safe_filename_segment(case_id)
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py.bak.1790945982 b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py.bak.1790945982
deleted file mode 100644
index 8e9d21727..000000000
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py.bak.1790945982
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1478 +0,0 @@
-"""First-class case management (tier2-cases).
-
-Implements the full case lifecycle: new → triaged → investigating → contained →
-resolved → closed. Each case aggregates multiple alerts, maintains an observable
-graph, evidence chain, and MITRE ATT&CK coverage map.
-
-Tenant isolation
-----------------
-Every query in this module is scoped by ``tenant_id = user.tenant_id``. The
-``aisoc_cases`` table has carried a ``tenant_id`` column since migration 012
-but the API historically did not filter by it, allowing any authenticated
-caller to read or mutate another tenant's cases just by guessing a UUID (or
-by guessing the short ``INC-001`` form). Companion tables
-(``aisoc_case_comments``, ``aisoc_case_tasks``) gained a ``tenant_id``
-column in migration 044 and are backfilled from their parent case so the
-same RLS predicate applies uniformly.
-
-The ``_resolve_case_id`` helper is also tenant-scoped — looking up
-``INC-001`` for tenant A must never return tenant B's INC-001.
-
-Endpoints
----------
-* ``GET /cases`` List cases (filterable by status/severity/assignee).
-* ``POST /cases`` Create a new case.
-* ``GET /cases/{id}`` Retrieve a case.
-* ``PATCH /cases/{id}`` Update case fields (status, severity, assignee, …).
-* ``POST /cases/{id}/alerts`` Link alerts to a case.
-* ``POST /cases/{id}/observables`` Add / update observable graph nodes/edges.
-* ``POST /cases/{id}/comments`` Add a comment / timeline entry.
-* ``GET /cases/{id}/comments`` List comments for a case.
-* ``GET /cases/{id}/evidence`` Export the evidence chain as a structured report.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import logging
-import os
-import re
-import uuid
-from datetime import UTC, datetime
-from typing import Annotated, Any, Literal
-from urllib.parse import quote
-
-import httpx
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Response, status
-from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, PlainTextResponse
-from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
-from sqlalchemy import text
-
-from app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, DBSession, require_permission
-from app.core.logging import safe_log_value
-from app.services.case_fanout import (
- FanoutResult,
- fanout_create_case,
- fanout_status_change,
-)
-from app.services.case_postmortem import build_case_postmortem
-from app.services.case_postmortem_html import render_case_postmortem_html
-from app.services.case_summary import build_case_summary
-from app.services.case_summary_html import render_case_summary_html
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-router = APIRouter(prefix="/cases", tags=["cases"])
-
-# The agents service owns the actual investigation orchestrator (Pillar-1).
-# We keep the route surface on `/cases/{id}/investigate` and
-# `/cases/{id}/investigations/{run_id}` for the web console and proxy through
-# to the agents service so the front end has a single, stable API origin.
-_AGENTS_URL = (os.getenv("AGENTS_SERVICE_URL") or os.getenv("AGENTS_API_URL") or "http://agents:8084").rstrip("/")
-
-# Tight allowlist for proxied request paths. We only ever proxy to a fixed
-# upstream (`_AGENTS_URL`) on a known set of investigation routes, so the
-# path must be a pure relative path — no scheme, no host, no control bytes,
-# no traversal sequences. This neutralises partial-SSRF (an attacker cannot
-# redirect the request to a different host) and log-injection (the path
-# can never contain CR/LF or other control characters).
-_SAFE_PROXY_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9_\-./%]*$")
-
-
-def _validate_agents_path(path: str) -> str:
- """Reject any proxied path that isn't a tightly constrained relative path."""
- if (
- not isinstance(path, str) or not _SAFE_PROXY_PATH_RE.match(path) or ".." in path or path.startswith("//") # protocol-relative URL
- ):
- raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid_request_path")
- return path
-
-
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Pydantic schemas
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-CaseStatus = Literal["new", "triaged", "investigating", "contained", "resolved", "closed"]
-CaseSeverity = Literal["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]
-
-# Valid forward-only state transitions
-_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {
- "new": {"triaged"},
- "triaged": {"investigating"},
- "investigating": {"contained", "resolved"},
- "contained": {"resolved"},
- "resolved": {"closed"},
- "closed": set(),
-}
-
-
-class CreateCaseRequest(BaseModel):
- title: str = Field(..., min_length=3)
- description: str | None = None
- severity: CaseSeverity = "medium"
- assignee: str | None = None
- alert_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(default_factory=list)
- mitre_techniques: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
- compliance_frameworks: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
- tags: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
- sla_due_at: datetime | None = None
- # Workstream 8 — bidirectional ITSM. When the operator selects one or
- # more connector instances at create time, the API fans the new case
- # out to those external systems and persists the linkage in
- # ``case_external_refs``. Connector instances must be tenant-owned,
- # enabled, and declare ``Capability.PUSH_CASE`` (e.g. Jira,
- # ServiceNow). Empty list = case stays AiSOC-only.
- push_to_connector_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(default_factory=list)
-
-
-class UpdateCaseRequest(BaseModel):
- title: str | None = None
- description: str | None = None
- severity: CaseSeverity | None = None
- status: CaseStatus | None = None
- assignee: str | None = None
- mitre_techniques: list[str] | None = None
- compliance_frameworks: list[str] | None = None
- tags: dict[str, str] | None = None
- sla_due_at: datetime | None = None
-
-
-class AddAlertsRequest(BaseModel):
- alert_ids: list[uuid.UUID]
-
-
-class ObservableNode(BaseModel):
- id: str
- kind: Literal["ip", "user", "host", "domain", "hash", "file", "process", "alert"]
- value: str
- tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
-
-
-class ObservableEdge(BaseModel):
- source: str
- target: str
- relation: str
-
-
-class UpdateObservablesRequest(BaseModel):
- nodes: list[ObservableNode] = Field(default_factory=list)
- edges: list[ObservableEdge] = Field(default_factory=list)
-
-
-class AddCommentRequest(BaseModel):
- body: str = Field(..., min_length=1)
- is_system: bool = False
-
-
-class CaseResponse(BaseModel):
- id: uuid.UUID
- case_number: str | None = None
- title: str
- description: str | None
- severity: str
- status: str
- assignee: str | None
- mitre_techniques: list[str]
- alert_ids: list[uuid.UUID]
- observable_graph: dict[str, Any]
- evidence_chain: list[dict[str, Any]]
- compliance_frameworks: list[str]
- opened_at: datetime
- triaged_at: datetime | None
- resolved_at: datetime | None
- closed_at: datetime | None
- created_at: datetime
- updated_at: datetime
- created_by: str | None
- tags: dict[str, Any]
- sla_due_at: datetime | None
- # Workstream 8 — populated only by ``POST /cases`` (create-time
- # fan-out) and ``PATCH /cases/{id}`` when ``status`` is changed.
- # The list is per-connector-instance and includes failures so the
- # UI can show "Jira ✓ · ServiceNow ✗ (timeout)" beside the case
- # without a follow-up GET. ``None`` (default) means "no fan-out
- # was attempted on this call" and is distinct from ``[]`` ("fan-out
- # was attempted but no connectors were selected").
- fanout_results: list[FanoutResult] | None = None
-
-
-class CommentResponse(BaseModel):
- id: uuid.UUID
- case_id: uuid.UUID
- author: str | None
- body: str
- is_system: bool
- created_at: datetime
-
-
-class EvidenceReport(BaseModel):
- case_id: uuid.UUID
- title: str
- severity: str
- status: str
- alert_count: int
- mitre_techniques: list[str]
- compliance_frameworks: list[str]
- evidence_chain: list[dict[str, Any]]
- generated_at: datetime
-
-
-# Timeline / tasks
-TaskStatus = Literal["todo", "in_progress", "done"]
-
-
-class TimelineEvent(BaseModel):
- id: str
- type: str # 'created' | 'status_change' | 'comment' | 'alert_linked' | 'task'
- timestamp: datetime
- title: str
- description: str | None = None
- actor: str | None = None
-
-
-class TimelineResponse(BaseModel):
- events: list[TimelineEvent]
-
-
-class CreateTaskRequest(BaseModel):
- title: str = Field(..., min_length=1)
- status: TaskStatus = "todo"
- assignee: str | None = None
- due_at: datetime | None = Field(None, alias="dueAt")
-
- model_config = {"populate_by_name": True}
-
-
-class UpdateTaskRequest(BaseModel):
- title: str | None = None
- status: TaskStatus | None = None
- assignee: str | None = None
- due_at: datetime | None = Field(None, alias="dueAt")
-
- model_config = {"populate_by_name": True}
-
-
-class TaskResponse(BaseModel):
- id: str
- title: str
- status: TaskStatus
- assignee: str | None = None
- due_at: datetime | None = Field(None, alias="dueAt")
- created_at: datetime = Field(..., alias="createdAt")
-
- model_config = {"populate_by_name": True}
-
-
-def _row_to_task(row: Any) -> TaskResponse:
- return TaskResponse(
- id=str(row.id),
- title=row.title,
- status=row.status,
- assignee=row.assignee,
- dueAt=row.due_at,
- createdAt=row.created_at,
- )
-
-
-# Investigation proxy schemas (forwarded to the agents service).
-class InvestigateRequest(BaseModel):
- alert_summary: str | None = ""
-
-
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Helpers
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def _coerce_mitre(values: Any) -> list[str]:
- """Normalize mitre_techniques to a list of technique IDs.
-
- Accepts list[str] or list[dict] like ``{"id": "T1041", "name": "..."}``.
- Older seed fixtures stored objects; newer ones store flat IDs.
- """
- if not values:
- return []
- out: list[str] = []
- for item in values:
- if isinstance(item, str):
- out.append(item)
- elif isinstance(item, dict):
- tid = item.get("id") or item.get("technique_id") or item.get("name")
- if tid:
- out.append(str(tid))
- return out
-
-
-def _coerce_tags(value: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
- """aisoc_cases.tags is JSONB which may be an object or array."""
- if isinstance(value, dict):
- return value
- if isinstance(value, list):
- return {"labels": [str(v) for v in value]}
- return {}
-
-
-def _row_to_case(row: Any) -> CaseResponse:
- return CaseResponse(
- id=row.id,
- case_number=getattr(row, "case_number", None),
- title=row.title,
- description=row.description,
- severity=row.severity,
- status=row.status,
- assignee=row.assignee,
- mitre_techniques=_coerce_mitre(row.mitre_techniques),
- alert_ids=list(row.alert_ids or []),
- observable_graph=dict(row.observable_graph or {}),
- evidence_chain=list(row.evidence_chain or []),
- compliance_frameworks=list(row.compliance_frameworks or []),
- opened_at=row.opened_at,
- triaged_at=row.triaged_at,
- resolved_at=row.resolved_at,
- closed_at=row.closed_at,
- created_at=row.created_at,
- updated_at=row.updated_at,
- created_by=row.created_by,
- tags=_coerce_tags(row.tags),
- sla_due_at=row.sla_due_at,
- )
-
-
-async def _resolve_case_id(case_id: str, db: Any, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> uuid.UUID:
- """Resolve a case identifier (UUID **or** human-readable case_number) to a UUID
- scoped to the caller's tenant.
-
- The web console and demo deeplinks use short identifiers like ``INC-001``,
- while the database primary key is a UUID. Accepting both forms here keeps
- the API ergonomic without forcing the front end to do a separate lookup.
-
- Tenant scoping is enforced in both branches:
-
- * For the UUID branch we return the parsed UUID without touching the DB;
- callers must still apply ``WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id`` in their own
- query, which they all do. (We don't probe existence here because every
- caller does its own SELECT and would issue a redundant round-trip.)
- * For the ``case_number`` branch we look up the row with
- ``WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id AND case_number = :case_number`` so an
- attacker can't enumerate another tenant's INC-NNN identifiers.
-
- Raises ``404`` if the identifier doesn't match either form within the
- caller's tenant.
- """
- case_id = (case_id or "").strip()
- if not case_id:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- # Try UUID first — that's the canonical form. Tenant scoping is enforced
- # by the per-endpoint queries that consume the returned UUID, so we
- # don't need a DB round-trip just to validate the format.
- try:
- return uuid.UUID(case_id)
- except (ValueError, AttributeError):
- pass
-
- # Fall back to case_number lookup. Use a parameterized query — never
- # interpolate the raw string into SQL — and scope by tenant so the
- # short-id form can't be used as a cross-tenant oracle.
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- "SELECT id FROM aisoc_cases WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id AND case_number = :case_number ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1"
- ).bindparams(tenant_id=tenant_id, case_number=case_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- return row.id
-
-
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Endpoints
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
[email protected]("", response_model=list[CaseResponse], summary="List cases")
-async def list_cases(
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
- status_filter: str | None = Query(None, alias="status"),
- severity: str | None = Query(None),
- assignee: str | None = Query(None),
- limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=500),
- offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
-) -> list[CaseResponse]:
- # Tenant scoping is non-optional. The aisoc_cases table has carried a
- # tenant_id column since migration 012; until P2-W1 the API simply
- # ignored it, exposing every tenant's caseload to every authenticated
- # caller. Anchor the WHERE clause on tenant_id so the filter is always
- # present even when the operator passes no other filters.
- where_clauses = ["tenant_id = :tenant_id"]
- params: dict[str, Any] = {
- "limit": limit,
- "offset": offset,
- "tenant_id": user.tenant_id,
- }
- if status_filter:
- where_clauses.append("status = :status")
- params["status"] = status_filter
- if severity:
- where_clauses.append("severity = :severity")
- params["severity"] = severity
- if assignee:
- where_clauses.append("assignee = :assignee")
- params["assignee"] = assignee
-
- q = f"""
- SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases
- WHERE {" AND ".join(where_clauses)}
- ORDER BY created_at DESC
- LIMIT :limit OFFSET :offset
- """
- try:
- rows = await db.execute(text(q).bindparams(**params))
- return [_row_to_case(r) for r in rows.fetchall()]
- except Exception as exc:
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
-
[email protected]("", response_model=CaseResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, summary="Create case")
-async def create_case(
- body: CreateCaseRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
-) -> CaseResponse:
- import json as _json
-
- case_id = uuid.uuid4()
- now = datetime.now(UTC)
- # Note: PostgreSQL ``::type`` casts inside text() confuse SQLAlchemy's
- # bind-parameter parser; use ``CAST(:param AS TYPE)`` so the bind survives
- # the round-trip (see also Batch 2 / hunts.py for the same gotcha).
- q = text("""
- INSERT INTO aisoc_cases (
- id, tenant_id, title, description, severity, status, assignee,
- mitre_techniques, alert_ids, compliance_frameworks, tags,
- sla_due_at, opened_at, created_at, updated_at, created_by
- ) VALUES (
- :id, :tenant_id, :title, :description, :severity, 'new', :assignee,
- CAST(:mitre AS JSONB), CAST(:alert_ids AS UUID[]),
- CAST(:frameworks AS TEXT[]), CAST(:tags AS JSONB),
- :sla, :now, :now, :now, :user
- ) RETURNING *
- """).bindparams(
- id=case_id,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- title=body.title,
- description=body.description,
- severity=body.severity,
- assignee=body.assignee,
- mitre=_json.dumps(body.mitre_techniques),
- alert_ids=list(map(str, body.alert_ids)) or [],
- frameworks=body.compliance_frameworks or [],
- tags=_json.dumps(body.tags),
- sla=body.sla_due_at,
- now=now,
- user=getattr(user, "email", None) or "system",
- )
- try:
- row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()
- if row is None:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error: INSERT returned no row")
- await db.commit()
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
- response = _row_to_case(row)
-
- # Workstream 8 — fan out to operator-selected ITSM connectors. The
- # case is already persisted (commit above) so a flaky Jira can't
- # block the create. ``fanout_create_case`` swallows per-backend
- # errors into the FanoutResult.status field; we only need to
- # commit the ``case_external_refs`` writes it staged.
- if body.push_to_connector_ids:
- try:
- results = await fanout_create_case(
- db,
- case_row=row,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- connector_ids=body.push_to_connector_ids,
- pushed_by=getattr(user, "email", None),
- )
- await db.commit()
- response.fanout_results = results
- except Exception:
- # Persistence of external refs failed but the AiSOC case
- # itself is fine; surface the partial result and move on.
- logger.exception("cases.create.fanout_persistence_failed case=%s", row.id)
- await db.rollback()
- response.fanout_results = []
-
- return response
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Get case")
-async def get_case(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> CaseResponse:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- return _row_to_case(row)
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Update case")
-async def update_case(
- case_id: str, body: UpdateCaseRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
-) -> CaseResponse:
- import json as _json
-
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- existing = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT status FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not existing:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- if body.status and body.status != existing.status:
- allowed = _TRANSITIONS.get(existing.status, set())
- if body.status not in allowed:
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=422,
- detail=f"Invalid status transition: {existing.status} → {body.status}. Allowed: {sorted(allowed) or 'none'}",
- )
-
- now = datetime.now(UTC)
- sets = ["updated_at = :now"]
- params: dict[str, Any] = {
- "id": cid,
- "now": now,
- "tenant_id": user.tenant_id,
- }
-
- if body.title is not None:
- sets.append("title = :title")
- params["title"] = body.title
- if body.description is not None:
- sets.append("description = :description")
- params["description"] = body.description
- if body.severity is not None:
- sets.append("severity = :severity")
- params["severity"] = body.severity
- if body.assignee is not None:
- sets.append("assignee = :assignee")
- params["assignee"] = body.assignee
- if body.sla_due_at is not None:
- sets.append("sla_due_at = :sla")
- params["sla"] = body.sla_due_at
- if body.mitre_techniques is not None:
- sets.append("mitre_techniques = CAST(:mitre AS JSONB)")
- params["mitre"] = _json.dumps(body.mitre_techniques)
- if body.compliance_frameworks is not None:
- sets.append("compliance_frameworks = CAST(:frameworks AS TEXT[])")
- params["frameworks"] = body.compliance_frameworks
- if body.tags is not None:
- sets.append("tags = CAST(:tags AS JSONB)")
- params["tags"] = _json.dumps(body.tags)
-
- if body.status:
- sets.append("status = :status")
- params["status"] = body.status
- ts_col = {"triaged": "triaged_at", "resolved": "resolved_at", "closed": "closed_at"}.get(body.status)
- if ts_col:
- sets.append(f"{ts_col} = :now")
-
- q = text(f"UPDATE aisoc_cases SET {', '.join(sets)} WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id RETURNING *").bindparams(**params)
- try:
- row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()
- if row is None:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- await db.commit()
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
- response = _row_to_case(row)
-
- # Workstream 8 — if the operator changed status, project the
- # transition onto every connector this case is already linked to.
- # ``fanout_status_change`` no-ops when the case has no
- # ``case_external_refs`` rows yet, so the call is cheap for
- # AiSOC-only cases.
- if body.status and body.status != existing.status:
- try:
- results = await fanout_status_change(
- db,
- case_row=row,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- old_status=existing.status,
- new_status=body.status,
- pushed_by=getattr(user, "email", None),
- )
- if results:
- await db.commit()
- response.fanout_results = results
- except Exception:
- logger.exception("cases.update.fanout_persistence_failed case=%s", row.id)
- await db.rollback()
- response.fanout_results = []
-
- # WS-D2 — when a case enters its terminal lifecycle stages, drop a
- # system note pointing to the auto-summary artifact. The summary
- # itself is generated on-demand by GET /cases/{id}/summary, so this
- # is a cheap, idempotent breadcrumb rather than a heavy precompute.
- if body.status in {"resolved", "closed"}:
- try:
- await _emit_summary_breadcrumb(
- db,
- case_id=row.id,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- status=body.status,
- )
- except Exception: # pragma: no cover — defensive: never block status change.
- logger.exception("cases.update.summary_breadcrumb_failed case=%s", row.id)
- await db.rollback()
-
- return response
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/alerts", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Link alerts to a case")
-async def add_alerts(
- case_id: str, body: AddAlertsRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
-) -> CaseResponse:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- ids_str = [str(a) for a in body.alert_ids]
- q = text("""
- UPDATE aisoc_cases
- SET alert_ids = array(SELECT DISTINCT unnest(alert_ids || CAST(:new_ids AS UUID[]))),
- updated_at = now()
- WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id
- RETURNING *
- """).bindparams(id=cid, new_ids=ids_str, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- try:
- row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()
- if not row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- await db.commit()
- return _row_to_case(row)
- except HTTPException:
- raise
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/observables", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Update observable graph")
-async def update_observables(
- case_id: str, body: UpdateObservablesRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
-) -> CaseResponse:
- import json as _json
-
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- existing = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT observable_graph FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(
- id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id
- )
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not existing:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- graph: dict[str, Any] = dict(existing.observable_graph or {})
- nodes = graph.get("nodes", [])
- edges = graph.get("edges", [])
-
- existing_ids = {n["id"] for n in nodes}
- for n in body.nodes:
- if n.id not in existing_ids:
- nodes.append(n.model_dump())
- else:
- nodes = [n.model_dump() if x["id"] == n.id else x for x in nodes]
-
- edge_keys = {(e["source"], e["target"]) for e in edges}
- for e in body.edges:
- if (e.source, e.target) not in edge_keys:
- edges.append(e.model_dump())
-
- graph = {"nodes": nodes, "edges": edges}
- q = text(
- "UPDATE aisoc_cases SET observable_graph = CAST(:g AS JSONB), updated_at = now() "
- "WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id RETURNING *"
- ).bindparams(id=cid, g=_json.dumps(graph), tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- try:
- row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()
- await db.commit()
- return _row_to_case(row)
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/comments", response_model=CommentResponse, status_code=201, summary="Add comment")
-async def add_comment(
- case_id: str, body: AddCommentRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
-) -> CommentResponse:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- exists = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not exists:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- comment_id = uuid.uuid4()
- now = datetime.now(UTC)
- # Stamp the row with tenant_id so the comment table is independently
- # tenant-scoped — see migration 044.
- q = text("""
- INSERT INTO aisoc_case_comments
- (id, case_id, tenant_id, author, body, is_system, created_at)
- VALUES
- (:id, :case_id, :tenant_id, :author, :body, :sys, :now)
- RETURNING *
- """).bindparams(
- id=comment_id,
- case_id=cid,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- author=getattr(user, "email", None) or "system",
- body=body.body,
- sys=body.is_system,
- now=now,
- )
- try:
- row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()
- if row is None:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error: INSERT returned no row")
- await db.commit()
- return CommentResponse(
- id=row.id,
- case_id=row.case_id,
- author=row.author,
- body=row.body,
- is_system=row.is_system,
- created_at=row.created_at,
- )
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/comments", response_model=list[CommentResponse], summary="List case comments")
-async def list_comments(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> list[CommentResponse]:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- rows = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_case_comments WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id ORDER BY created_at").bindparams(
- id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id
- )
- )
- ).fetchall()
- return [
- CommentResponse(id=r.id, case_id=r.case_id, author=r.author, body=r.body, is_system=r.is_system, created_at=r.created_at)
- for r in rows
- ]
-
-
-# Alias `/notes` → `/comments` so the web console (which calls `/notes` for the
-# "Add Note" affordance) hits the same backing store. Keeping both routes
-# avoids a behavior change for any existing integration that already speaks
-# `/comments`.
[email protected]("/{case_id}/notes", response_model=list[CommentResponse], summary="List case notes (alias of /comments)")
-async def list_notes(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> list[CommentResponse]:
- return await list_comments(case_id, db, user)
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/notes", response_model=CommentResponse, status_code=201, summary="Add case note (alias of /comments)")
-async def add_note(
- case_id: str, body: AddCommentRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]
-) -> CommentResponse:
- return await add_comment(case_id, body, db, user)
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/evidence", response_model=EvidenceReport, summary="Export evidence chain report")
-async def evidence_report(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> EvidenceReport:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- return EvidenceReport(
- case_id=row.id,
- title=row.title,
- severity=row.severity,
- status=row.status,
- alert_count=len(row.alert_ids or []),
- mitre_techniques=_coerce_mitre(row.mitre_techniques),
- compliance_frameworks=list(row.compliance_frameworks or []),
- evidence_chain=list(row.evidence_chain or []),
- generated_at=datetime.now(UTC),
- )
-
-
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Timeline
-#
-# A flattened activity stream that the case workspace renders on the right.
-# We synthesize the timeline from the case's own state transitions, linked
-# alerts, comments, and tasks so the front end gets one unified view without
-# orchestrating four separate calls.
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/timeline", response_model=TimelineResponse, summary="Case activity timeline")
-async def case_timeline(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> TimelineResponse:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- case_row = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not case_row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- events: list[TimelineEvent] = []
-
- # Case creation event
- events.append(
- TimelineEvent(
- id=f"case-{case_row.id}-created",
- type="created",
- timestamp=case_row.created_at,
- title="Case opened",
- description=case_row.title,
- actor=case_row.assignee,
- )
- )
-
- # Status / severity reflection (we only surface the latest snapshot here;
- # full audit history is available via the audit log endpoints).
- if case_row.updated_at and case_row.updated_at != case_row.created_at:
- events.append(
- TimelineEvent(
- id=f"case-{case_row.id}-status",
- type="status_change",
- timestamp=case_row.updated_at,
- title=f"Status: {case_row.status}",
- description=f"Severity {case_row.severity}",
- actor=case_row.assignee,
- )
- )
-
- # Comments
- comment_rows = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- "SELECT id, author, body, is_system, created_at "
- "FROM aisoc_case_comments "
- "WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "
- "ORDER BY created_at"
- ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchall()
- for c in comment_rows:
- events.append(
- TimelineEvent(
- id=f"comment-{c.id}",
- type="comment",
- timestamp=c.created_at,
- title="System note" if c.is_system else "Comment",
- description=(c.body or "")[:280],
- actor=c.author,
- )
- )
-
- # Linked alerts (best-effort — we tolerate a missing alerts table)
- for alert_id in list(case_row.alert_ids or [])[:25]:
- try:
- a = (
- # Tenant-scoped as defence in depth. Reaching this loop already
- # required a tenant-scoped case, but the predicate costs
- # nothing and a poisoned ``alert_ids`` array would otherwise
- # hydrate another tenant's alert title into this timeline.
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT id, title, severity, created_at FROM aisoc_alerts WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(
- id=alert_id,
- tenant_id=str(user.tenant_id),
- )
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if a:
- events.append(
- TimelineEvent(
- id=f"alert-{a.id}",
- type="alert_linked",
- timestamp=a.created_at or case_row.created_at,
- title=f"Alert linked: {a.title}",
- description=f"Severity {a.severity}",
- actor=None,
- )
- )
- except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — alerts table may not exist in some demos
- continue
-
- # Tasks
- try:
- task_rows = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- "SELECT id, title, status, assignee, created_at "
- "FROM aisoc_case_tasks "
- "WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "
- "ORDER BY created_at"
- ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchall()
- for t in task_rows:
- events.append(
- TimelineEvent(
- id=f"task-{t.id}",
- type="task",
- timestamp=t.created_at,
- title=f"Task ({t.status}): {t.title}",
- description=None,
- actor=t.assignee,
- )
- )
- except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — table created by migration 027; tolerate absence
- logger.exception("aisoc_case_tasks not available; skipping task events")
-
- events.sort(key=lambda e: e.timestamp)
- return TimelineResponse(events=events)
-
-
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Tasks
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/tasks", response_model=list[TaskResponse], summary="List case tasks")
-async def list_tasks(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> list[TaskResponse]:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- exists = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not exists:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
- rows = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- "SELECT id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at "
- "FROM aisoc_case_tasks "
- "WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "
- "ORDER BY created_at"
- ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchall()
- return [_row_to_task(r) for r in rows]
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/tasks", response_model=TaskResponse, status_code=201, summary="Create task")
-async def create_task(
- case_id: str,
- body: CreateTaskRequest,
- db: DBSession,
- user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],
-) -> TaskResponse:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- exists = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not exists:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- task_id = uuid.uuid4()
- now = datetime.now(UTC)
- try:
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- """
- INSERT INTO aisoc_case_tasks
- (id, case_id, tenant_id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at, updated_at, created_by)
- VALUES
- (:id, :case_id, :tenant_id, :title, :status, :assignee, :due_at, :now, :now, :created_by)
- RETURNING id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at
- """
- ).bindparams(
- id=task_id,
- case_id=cid,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- title=body.title,
- status=body.status,
- assignee=body.assignee,
- due_at=body.due_at,
- now=now,
- created_by=getattr(user, "email", None) or "system",
- )
- )
- ).fetchone()
- await db.commit()
- return _row_to_task(row)
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/tasks/{task_id}", response_model=TaskResponse, summary="Update task")
-async def update_task(
- case_id: str,
- task_id: uuid.UUID,
- body: UpdateTaskRequest,
- db: DBSession,
- user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],
-) -> TaskResponse:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- sets: list[str] = []
- params: dict[str, Any] = {
- "id": task_id,
- "case_id": cid,
- "tenant_id": user.tenant_id,
- "now": datetime.now(UTC),
- }
- if body.title is not None:
- sets.append("title = :title")
- params["title"] = body.title
- if body.status is not None:
- sets.append("status = :status")
- params["status"] = body.status
- if body.assignee is not None:
- sets.append("assignee = :assignee")
- params["assignee"] = body.assignee
- if body.due_at is not None:
- sets.append("due_at = :due_at")
- params["due_at"] = body.due_at
- if not sets:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="No fields to update.")
- sets.append("updated_at = :now")
-
- try:
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- f"""
- UPDATE aisoc_case_tasks
- SET {", ".join(sets)}
- WHERE id = :id AND case_id = :case_id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id
- RETURNING id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at
- """
- ).bindparams(**params)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Task not found.")
- await db.commit()
- return _row_to_task(row)
- except HTTPException:
- raise
- except Exception as exc:
- await db.rollback()
- logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")
- raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc
-
-
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Investigation proxy
-#
-# The investigation orchestrator lives in the agents service. The web console
-# only knows about /api/v1/cases/{id}/..., so we proxy through and keep the
-# external API surface stable.
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-async def _agents_proxy(method: str, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Response:
- safe_path = _validate_agents_path(path)
- url = f"{_AGENTS_URL}{safe_path}"
- timeout = kwargs.pop("timeout", 30.0)
- try:
- async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout) as client:
- return await client.request(method, url, **kwargs)
- except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
- logger.exception(
- "agents_proxy.request_failed",
- extra={
- "method": safe_log_value(method),
- "path": safe_log_value(safe_path),
- },
- )
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=503,
- detail=f"Agents service unavailable: {exc}",
- ) from exc
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/investigate", summary="Launch investigation for case")
-async def case_investigate(
- case_id: str,
- body: InvestigateRequest,
- db: DBSession,
- user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- exists = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not exists:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- # Forward the authenticated tenant so the agents service attributes the run
- # to the real tenant instead of falling back to the "default" placeholder,
- # which the demo seed no longer maps to any tenant (issue #601). The ledger
- # is scoped by tenant_id, so without this the whole run is never persisted.
- resp = await _agents_proxy(
- "POST",
- f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigate",
- json={"alert_summary": body.alert_summary or "", "tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id)},
- )
- if resp.status_code >= 400:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)
- return resp.json()
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/investigations", summary="List investigation runs for a case")
-async def list_case_investigations(
- case_id: str,
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
- """List all investigation runs for a case.
-
- The agents service is the source of truth. When it's unreachable we return
- an empty list rather than 503 so the case detail page still renders.
- """
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- try:
- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigations")
- if resp.status_code == 404:
- return {"runs": []}
- if resp.status_code >= 400:
- return {"runs": []}
- return resp.json()
- except HTTPException:
- # Agents service unavailable — render a soft-empty list instead of 503.
- return {"runs": []}
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}", summary="Get investigation run")
-async def case_investigation_run(
- case_id: str,
- run_id: str,
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
- """One investigation run belonging to this case, in the caller's tenant."""
- # Scoping kept out of the docstring because FastAPI publishes that verbatim
- # in docs/openapi.yaml, and the rationale is for the next maintainer rather
- # than for API consumers.
- #
- # This handler took no database session and never read `user.tenant_id`:
- # `case_id` was declared and never used, and `run_id` alone was proxied to
- # the agents service, so any authenticated user could read any run by id
- # across tenants (GHSA-x2gf-3p79-wvgm). The sibling list route two
- # functions up already resolved the case against the caller's tenant.
- #
- # Both halves below are needed. Resolving the case proves the caller may
- # see *this case*; checking the run belongs to it proves the id in the path
- # is not somebody else's run smuggled under a case the caller does own.
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- # URL-encode the user-supplied run_id so it cannot inject `/`, `?`, `#`,
- # CR/LF, or other URL syntax into the proxied path.
- safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")
- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")
- if resp.status_code >= 400:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)
- run = resp.json()
-
- # A run that names a different case is not this case's run. Compared as
- # strings because the agents service echoes whatever case id it was given.
- run_case_id = run.get("case_id")
- if run_case_id is not None and str(run_case_id) != str(cid):
- raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Investigation run not found for this case")
- return run
-
-
- "/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}/report.md",
- response_class=PlainTextResponse,
- summary="Markdown incident report for one investigation run",
-)
-async def case_investigation_report_md(
- case_id: str,
- run_id: str,
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
-) -> PlainTextResponse:
- """The Markdown report the case workspace renders."""
- # `CaseWorkspace.tsx` fetched this from two places and the route did not
- # exist, so the report pane was permanently empty. The agents service has
- # served `/api/v1/investigations/{run_id}/report.md` all along; nothing
- # proxied it.
- #
- # Scoped in the same two steps as the sibling route above, and for the
- # same reason: that one shipped without them and any authenticated user
- # could read any run by id across tenants (GHSA-x2gf-3p79-wvgm).
- # Resolving the case proves the caller may see this case; checking the
- # run belongs to it proves the id in the path is not somebody else's run
- # smuggled under a case the caller does own.
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")
-
- meta = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")
- if meta.status_code >= 400:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=meta.status_code, detail=meta.text)
- run_case_id = meta.json().get("case_id")
- if run_case_id is not None and str(run_case_id) != str(cid):
- raise HTTPException(
- status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
- detail="Investigation run not found for this case",
- )
-
- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.md")
- if resp.status_code >= 400:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)
- return PlainTextResponse(content=resp.text, media_type="text/markdown; charset=utf-8")
-
-
-# Filename sanitiser for Content-Disposition: keep only safe ASCII so the
-# header cannot be split with CR/LF and the value renders consistently.
-_SAFE_FILENAME_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]")
-
-
-def _safe_filename_segment(value: str) -> str:
- """Reduce an identifier to a Content-Disposition-safe filename segment."""
- return _SAFE_FILENAME_RE.sub("_", value)[:64] or "unknown"
-
-
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# WS-D2 — auto-summary artifact at investigation close.
-# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-# We keep the breadcrumb body in one place so the system note stays uniform
-# across deployments — easier to grep, easier to redact in CI exports.
-_SUMMARY_BREADCRUMB_BODY = (
- "Case auto-summary generated. Download from "
- "/api/v1/cases/{case_id}/summary?format=html "
- "(or ?format=json for the structured payload). "
- "For the blameless retrospective, fetch "
- "/api/v1/cases/{case_id}/postmortem?format=html. "
- "Print either page (Ctrl/Cmd-P → Save as PDF) for the runbook archive."
-)
-
-
-async def _emit_summary_breadcrumb(
- db: Any,
- *,
- case_id: uuid.UUID,
- tenant_id: uuid.UUID | str,
- status: str,
-) -> None:
- """Drop a system comment pointing to the on-demand summary endpoint.
-
- Idempotent on repeated status changes — we re-emit only when transitioning
- *into* a terminal state, never on noop updates. The body intentionally
- avoids embedding tenant-specific URLs so the artifact link still works
- behind reverse proxies that rewrite the host.
- """
- body = _SUMMARY_BREADCRUMB_BODY.format(case_id=case_id) + f" (status={status})"
- await db.execute(
- text(
- """
- INSERT INTO aisoc_case_comments
- (id, case_id, tenant_id, author, body, is_system, created_at)
- VALUES (:id, :case_id, :tenant_id, :author, :body, true, :now)
- """
- ).bindparams(
- id=uuid.uuid4(),
- case_id=case_id,
- tenant_id=tenant_id,
- author="aisoc",
- body=body,
- now=datetime.now(UTC),
- )
- )
- await db.commit()
-
-
- "/{case_id}/summary",
- summary="Download the per-case auto-summary (JSON or HTML)",
- response_model=None,
-)
-async def case_auto_summary(
- case_id: str,
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
- format: Literal["json", "html"] = Query(
- "json",
- description=(
- "Response format. ``json`` returns the structured CaseAutoSummary; "
- "``html`` returns a print-ready report (use the browser's "
- "Save-as-PDF affordance for archival)."
- ),
- ),
-) -> Any:
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- summary = await build_case_summary(db, cid, user.tenant_id)
- if summary is None:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- if format == "html":
- rendered = render_case_summary_html(summary)
- case_label = summary.case.case_number or str(summary.case.case_id)[:8]
- filename = _safe_filename_segment(f"case-{case_label}-summary") + ".html"
- return HTMLResponse(
- content=rendered,
- headers={"Content-Disposition": f'inline; filename="{filename}"'},
- )
-
- return summary
-
-
- "/{case_id}/postmortem",
- summary="Download the per-case blameless post-mortem (JSON or HTML)",
- response_model=None,
-)
-async def case_auto_postmortem(
- case_id: str,
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
- format: Literal["json", "html"] = Query(
- "json",
- description=(
- "Response format. ``json`` returns the structured CasePostmortem; "
- "``html`` returns a print-ready blameless retrospective (use the "
- "browser's Save-as-PDF affordance for the runbook archive)."
- ),
- ),
-) -> Any:
- """Generate a deterministic blameless post-mortem for one case.
-
- Distinct from ``/summary``: the summary is a snapshot of *what the case
- looks like right now*; the post-mortem is a retrospective oriented around
- *what happened, when did we find out, what did we do, and what should we
- change*. Both are deterministic — same case state in, same artefact out.
- """
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- postmortem = await build_case_postmortem(db, cid, user.tenant_id)
- if postmortem is None:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- if format == "html":
- rendered = render_case_postmortem_html(postmortem)
- case_label = postmortem.case.case_number or str(postmortem.case.case_id)[:8]
- filename = _safe_filename_segment(f"case-{case_label}-postmortem") + ".html"
- return HTMLResponse(
- content=rendered,
- headers={"Content-Disposition": f'inline; filename="{filename}"'},
- )
-
- return postmortem
-
-
- "/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}/report.pdf",
- summary="Download investigation PDF report",
-)
-async def case_investigation_pdf(
- case_id: str,
- run_id: str,
- user: AuthUser,
-) -> Response:
- safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")
- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf")
- if resp.status_code >= 400:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)
- safe_case_id = _safe_filename_segment(case_id)
- safe_run_id_filename = _safe_filename_segment(run_id)
- return Response(
- content=resp.content,
- media_type=resp.headers.get("content-type", "application/pdf"),
- headers={
- "Content-Disposition": resp.headers.get(
- "content-disposition",
- f'attachment; filename="case-{safe_case_id}-{safe_run_id_filename}.pdf"',
- ),
- },
- )
-
-
[email protected]("/{case_id}/related", summary="List related cases (by alert/observable overlap)")
-async def list_related_cases(
- case_id: str,
- db: DBSession,
- user: AuthUser,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
- """Return other cases that share alerts or observables with this case.
-
- This is intentionally a lightweight heuristic — we look for cases that
- overlap on `alert_ids` or share an observable IP/host. It's the smallest
- thing the case detail page needs to stop 404'ing.
- """
- cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)
- row = (
- await db.execute(
- text("SELECT alert_ids, observable_graph FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(
- id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id
- )
- )
- ).fetchone()
- if not row:
- raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")
-
- alert_ids = list(row.alert_ids or [])
- related: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-
- if alert_ids:
- rows = (
- await db.execute(
- text(
- """
- SELECT id, case_number, title, severity, status, created_at
- FROM aisoc_cases
- WHERE id <> :id
- AND tenant_id = :tenant_id
- AND alert_ids && CAST(:alerts AS UUID[])
- ORDER BY created_at DESC
- LIMIT 20
- """
- ).bindparams(
- id=cid,
- tenant_id=user.tenant_id,
- alerts=[str(a) for a in alert_ids],
- )
- )
- ).fetchall()
- for r in rows:
- related.append(
- {
- "id": str(r.id),
- "case_number": r.case_number,
- "title": r.title,
- "severity": r.severity or "medium",
- "status": r.status or "new",
- "created_at": r.created_at.isoformat() if r.created_at else None,
- "reason": "shared_alerts",
- }
- )
-
- return {"related": related}
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/insights.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/insights.py
index 410dea158..573f28b4d 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/insights.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/insights.py
@@ -48,11 +48,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import uuid
-
-def _tid(t):
- """Bind a native UUID for raw SQL on uuid-typed columns (asyncpg)."""
- return t if isinstance(t, uuid.UUID) else uuid.UUID(str(t))
-
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from typing import Literal
@@ -68,6 +63,11 @@ from app.services import case_status
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+def _tid(t):
+ """Bind a native UUID for raw SQL on uuid-typed columns (asyncpg)."""
+ return t if isinstance(t, uuid.UUID) else uuid.UUID(str(t))
+
router = APIRouter(prefix="/insights", tags=["insights"])
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/metrics.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/metrics.py
index c4f93bb58..44e48de36 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/metrics.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/metrics.py
@@ -146,14 +146,18 @@ class MitreCoverage(BaseModel):
class FunnelDeltas(BaseModel):
- """Period-over-period percentage deltas for the funnel KPI bar."""
+ """Period-over-period percentage deltas for the funnel KPI bar.
- events_of_interest: float
- correlation_instances: float
- alerts_generated: float
- signal_to_noise: float
- mttd_seconds: float
- analyst_queue_depth: float
+ ``None`` means the previous window was empty — no baseline exists, and
+ the UI renders that as "no baseline" instead of a misleading 0%.
+ """
+
+ events_of_interest: float | None = None
+ correlation_instances: float | None = None
+ alerts_generated: float | None = None
+ signal_to_noise: float | None = None
+ mttd_seconds: float | None = None
+ analyst_queue_depth: float | None = None
class FunnelMetrics(BaseModel):
@@ -333,6 +337,9 @@ async def get_dashboard_metrics(
}
window_delta, trend_trunc = _period_map[period]
window_start = now - window_delta
+ # One window predicate for every windowed count below, so no tile can
+ # silently answer for a different period than the selector says.
+ _in_window = Alert.created_at >= window_start
# ── Alert counts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Unresolved only. See `_count_alerts_by_status`: these tiles are labelled
@@ -417,7 +424,9 @@ async def get_dashboard_metrics(
# Count alerts per connector_type
source_counts_rows = (
await db.execute(
- select(Alert.connector_type, func.count().label("cnt")).where(and_(Alert.tenant_id == tenant_id, _in_window)).group_by(Alert.connector_type)
+ select(Alert.connector_type, func.count().label("cnt"))
+ .where(and_(Alert.tenant_id == tenant_id, _in_window))
+ .group_by(Alert.connector_type)
)
).all()
source_count_map: dict[str, int] = {row.connector_type: row.cnt for row in source_counts_rows if row.connector_type}
@@ -444,7 +453,9 @@ async def get_dashboard_metrics(
# jsonb_array_elements_text + GROUP BY in the same SELECT 500s on some
# Postgres builds.
tactic_rows = (
- await db.execute(select(Alert.mitre_tactics).where(and_(Alert.tenant_id == tenant_id, Alert.mitre_tactics.isnot(None), _in_window)))
+ await db.execute(
+ select(Alert.mitre_tactics).where(and_(Alert.tenant_id == tenant_id, Alert.mitre_tactics.isnot(None), _in_window))
+ )
).all()
tactic_counts: dict[str, int] = {}
@@ -461,12 +472,11 @@ async def get_dashboard_metrics(
# ── trend over the selected period ────────────────────────────────────────
# Bucket by hour inside a day-scale window; `1h` still buckets by hour.
- trend_start = now - window
- bucket_fn = "minute" if period == "1h" else "hour"
+ trend_start = window_start
trend_rows = (
await db.execute(
select(
- func.date_trunc(bucket_fn, Alert.created_at).label("bucket"),
+ func.date_trunc(trend_trunc, Alert.created_at).label("bucket"),
Alert.severity,
func.count().label("cnt"),
)
@@ -501,7 +511,6 @@ async def get_dashboard_metrics(
topMitre=top_mitre,
alertsTrend=alerts_trend,
threatsBySource=threats_by_source,
- period=period,
)
@@ -863,15 +872,17 @@ async def get_alert_trend(
# ──────────────────────────── v1.5 funnel endpoint ────────────────────────────
-def _pct_delta(current: float, previous: float) -> float:
+def _pct_delta(current: float, previous: float) -> float | None:
"""Compute period-over-period percentage change.
- Returns 0.0 when the previous value is zero (avoids `inf`). Otherwise:
+ Returns ``None`` when the previous window was empty: there is no
+ baseline, and rendering `0.0` would claim "flat" where the honest
+ answer is "unknown". The UI renders None as "no baseline". Otherwise:
((current - previous) / previous) * 100, rounded to 2 decimals.
"""
if previous == 0:
- return 0.0
+ return None
return round(((current - previous) / previous) * 100.0, 2)
@@ -1220,7 +1231,7 @@ async def get_funnel_metrics(
``deltas`` compares the current window to the immediately preceding window
of the same length (e.g. for ``period=24h`` we compare to the 24h ending
24h ago). Values are percentage changes rounded to two decimals; a delta
- of ``0.0`` means "no meaningful baseline" (the previous window was empty).
+ of ``None`` means "no baseline" (the previous window was empty).
"""
delta = _FUNNEL_PERIOD_MAP[period]
now = datetime.now(UTC)