Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into depth/7.3-aitm
Beenu Arora2db25e65ad34
diff --cc DEPTH_PROGRESS.mdindex d585503db,5567c305c..cfe6ac465--- a/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md+++ b/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md@@@ -442,51 -725,9 +725,58 @@@ endpoint produces once triage falls thr| 2026-10-09 | 3.2 | Ordered and unordered sequences in the windowed engine; all four translatable Sigma correlation types compile, seven refusal reasons recorded. No upstream correlation rule exists in this tree to import (D8), so the corpus is first-party and labelled as such. || 2026-10-09 | 4.1 | Reproduced: `check_cloud_native_collection.py` on the unmodified tree reported all three collection paths absent. Implemented `aws_cloudtrail_s3` (SQS-notified S3 objects; management events, data events and VPC flow logs; delete-after-emit), `gcp_pubsub` (REST pull on a log-sink subscription; ack-after-read) and `azure_event_hubs` (Capture blobs over the Data Lake Gen2 JSON API, with a focused Avro OCF reader). Negative controls recorded in the PR: deleting the SQS message before the object is read, acknowledging the Pub/Sub batch before it is built, ignoring the Avro union branch index, and ignoring the flow-log header line each fail a named test, and all were restored. Connectors suite 1014 -> 1098 passed. || 2026-10-09 | 3.1 | All 74 decided. 50 translated into `wd-*` rules derived from each original's own clauses and replayed through the real engine (162 assertions); 24 refused with a reason across five kinds. `MAX_UNREACHABLE` 119 → 45, published executable 2,603 → 2,529, windowed 18 → 68. Three findings recorded as D4–D6 below. |+ | 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | parity 4.1's containerised-IdP leg **observed to pass**, both halves: `keycloak-oidc` verifies a real `id_token` against Keycloak's published JWKS with an audience-mismatch negative control, and `keycloak-saml` walks the whole SP-initiated flow to the real ACS and signs `[email protected]` in as `infosec`, with an untrusted-key control answering 400. Run `38124780886`, as `ENVIRONMENT=test` against the DML-only `aisoc_app` role. The SSO claim row moves PARTIAL → GATED on that evidence. Building it found two shipped defects no self-authored provider could expose: `resolve_saml_connection` bound `:i` untyped so `:i IS NULL` raised on asyncpg, and Keycloak's default role-list mapper emits one `<Attribute Name="Role">` per role, which python3-saml refuses. |+ | 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | WebAuthn as a console second factor and MFA enforced per role. Fixing the branch's own gates found three `passkey_credentials` reads scoped by user id alone on a tenant-scoped table, and a permission-model violation where the MFA policy route imported `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` directly; the role *vocabulary* now has one owner in `role_grants.known_roles()`. 23 of 23 live cases pass against real Postgres, and deleting the login integration fails 14 of them — measured, where the workflow had said eight. |+ | 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | An enforced audit retention window with a re-anchored checkpoint, ADR-0011, and 12 live cases. Writing them found that migration `111` declared `ON DELETE CASCADE` on the checkpoint table and then made the cascade impossible; and, separately, that `audit_log`'s own trigger from migration `101` blocks `DELETE FROM tenants` for every tenant that has written a row, so tenant deletion is impossible on `main`. Reproduced and filed as #1330 rather than fixed here. |+ | 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | Opt-in per-tenant limit enforcement (migration `113`, D12), wired to `POST /connectors` and `POST /tenants/me/users` through one helper, with `GET`/`PUT /usage/enforcement` as the operator surface. Nine live cases, half of them positive controls: a guard that never refuses fails 1, a guard stuck closed fails 4. |+ | 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | axe extended to the case list and case workspace, the two of parity 4.7's five views that were left out. Four real defects found and fixed: two `<select>` controls with no accessible name (one of them the control that writes a case's status), two indistinguishable `<aside>` landmarks, and panel headings at `h3` directly under the page's `h1`. |++++| 2026-10-11 | 7.3 | Reproduced: `OktaConnector.normalize()` returned `None` for `session_id`, `src_asn`, `user_agent`, `client_browser` and `mfa_satisfied` on a System Log row carrying all five, so the family had nothing to group by and could not have been written. Same shape as the `outcome` hoist in #1279 -- the engine flattens `raw_event` one level and `authenticationContext` arrives as a dict. Hoisted the session, network and client fields on Okta and Entra, then wrote four rules grouping by **session** rather than by user: three distinct-value rules at threshold 2 and one ordered sequence at critical. Fixtures hand-authored from an Okta System Log row and a Graph `signIn` resource; the negative twin inverts only the clause each rule is about. Windowed 72 -> 76; executable detections unchanged at 2,511, because a windowed rule is not in that corpus. Negative controls: removing the `session_id` hoist reds 4 connector tests; switching one rule's `group_by` to `actor_email` reds 2 engine tests. Two findings recorded as D-7.3a (the threshold engine windows by arrival and only sequences window by event time) and D-7.3b (the reported-message link is deferred with a reason). |++### D-7.3a -- The threshold engine windows by arrival, not by event time++Found by a test that failed. An earlier version of+`test_a_replay_outside_the_sequence_window_does_not_fire` fed two events whose+`event_time` fields were two hours apart and expected the threshold rules to+stay quiet. They fired, because `_evaluate_thresholds` scores each Redis+member with `time.time()` while `_evaluate_sequences` reads+`parse_event_time`. Both events arrived in the same second, so the window+never moved.++This is recorded rather than patched. Arrival-time scoring is what makes a+threshold cheap, and a connector polling a vendor every five minutes delivers+a burst whose arrival order is the only clock fusion has for it. The+consequence is specific and worth knowing: **the one-hour figure on the three+`wd-aitm-*` threshold rules is a budget on ingestion, not on the vendor's+timestamps.** A replay that happened an hour ago and is polled now lands in+the same window as the sign-in. For this family that direction is the safe+one -- it widens rather than narrows -- but a future rule whose correctness+depends on the vendor's clock needs a sequence, not a threshold.++### D-7.3b -- The reported-message half of 7.3 is deferred, with the reason++The plan's 7.3 asks for the session-reuse family "plus the link from a+reported message whose URL precedes that sign-in". The session half is+implemented and gated. The link is not, and inventing it would have been+worse than deferring it.++The obstacle is not effort, it is that nothing can feed it today. The+reported-message URLs live in `aisoc_phishing_submissions` in `services/api`+(depth 7.1), and the windowed engine consumes Kafka events in+`services/fusion`; fusion has no read of the API's tables and should not grow+one for a detection. The alternative -- staging a *gateway's* phishing+verdict instead of AiSOC's own reported-message corpus -- was examined and+refused: the one secure-email-gateway connector in the tree, `proofpoint`,+fetches `/v2/siem/messages/blocked` only, so it never sees a click, and its+`normalize()` emits neither the recipient nor the URL. Hoisting fields for an+event the connector does not fetch is a rule that cannot fire wearing a rule+that can.++What would close it, in the order it has to happen: `proofpoint` (or a+`netskope` / `zscaler` web arm) fetching click events and emitting+`recipient`, `url` and the gateway's classification; then a sequence rule+staging that click and the MFA-satisfied sign-in by the same principal. The+AiSOC-authored half -- joining a tenant's *own* reported-message URLs to a+sign-in -- belongs in the API beside the campaign store rather than in+fusion, as an enrichment on the alert the session rules raise.diff --cc ROADMAP.mdindex 0ed1c578e,d029c22f9..a16d78c2c--- a/ROADMAP.md+++ b/ROADMAP.md@@@ -45,7 -45,7 +45,9 @@@ A proof-first, security-first program t- **Phase D (breadth):** D1 eight connectors (QRadar/Exabeam/Securonix/Devo/Netskope/Windows-Sysmon/Zeek-Suricata/syslog-CEF) · D2 AI/LLM-usage audit connector + `llm-*` detections + hot/cold lake tiering · D3 live-vendor mock-server smoke.- **Phase E (prove it):** E1 CI-gated benchmark scoreboard tied to a deterministic live-agent MITRE-accuracy run.+ The claim-to-gate matrix stands at **302 rows — 300 GATED / 2 PARTIAL / 0 NO GATE**. Two rows are PARTIAL. "The retention window a tenant chooses is the one the lake honours" stays PARTIAL until a live ClickHouse test watches a row survive past the old 90-day boundary. "Cloud-native collection" stays PARTIAL until a capture recorded from a live Event Hub replaces the fixture synthesised from the Avro specification. "SSO completes a sign-in" was the third, and depth 8.1 closed it by building the gate it named rather than by relabelling: `sso-live.yml` now stands up a containerised Keycloak and both legs have been observed to pass — `keycloak-oidc` takes a real `id_token` through `_verify_id_token` against the provider's published JWKS, and `keycloak-saml` walks the whole SP-initiated flow to the real ACS. Every other product claim is backed by a failing test, none is a named deferral either, and the ratchet (`MAX_NO_GATE=0`) forbids any regression. Every PARTIAL row was closed by building the gate it named, never by relabelling. The last two rested on the live-agent eval workflow, which this file said had simply never run: the real reason was that its live path imported a class that exists nowhere in `services/agents`, so its first dispatch failed in 92 seconds and every later one would have. With that fixed the workflow measures, and the groundedness floor is **0.40 over a deterministic 10-incident slice**, derived from ten runs across two environments rather than chosen — seven local runs returning 0.5561 to four decimal places, three GitHub-runner runs returning 0.5821, 0.5329 and 0.5933. Every one is a locally-served `qwen2.5:0.5b`; no hosted provider has been exercised and the floor describes none. Count the table rows with `python3 scripts/check_claim_gate_matrix.py` rather than trusting a figure quoted in prose — this line has gone stale before. The six lettered deferrals are scoped in [`docs/audit/DEFERRED_SUBPHASES.md`](docs/audit/DEFERRED_SUBPHASES.md).+++The claim-to-gate matrix stands at **303 rows — 300 GATED / 3 PARTIAL / 0 NO GATE**. Three rows are PARTIAL. "The retention window a tenant chooses is the one the lake honours" stays PARTIAL until a live ClickHouse test watches a row survive past the old 90-day boundary. "Cloud-native collection" stays PARTIAL until a capture recorded from a live Event Hub replaces the fixture synthesised from the Avro specification. And "SSO completes a sign-in": fix pass 4.1 drove both handlers end to end against real Postgres and real signed assertions, and it stays PARTIAL until the containerised-IdP leg of `sso-live.yml` has been observed to pass, because the identity providers in that suite are trust material this repository authors. Every other product claim is backed by a failing test, none is a named deferral either, and the ratchet (`MAX_NO_GATE=0`) forbids any regression. Every PARTIAL row was closed by building the gate it named, never by relabelling. The last two rested on the live-agent eval workflow, which this file said had simply never run: the real reason was that its live path imported a class that exists nowhere in `services/agents`, so its first dispatch failed in 92 seconds and every later one would have. With that fixed the workflow measures, and the groundedness floor is **0.40 over a deterministic 10-incident slice**, derived from ten runs across two environments rather than chosen — seven local runs returning 0.5561 to four decimal places, three GitHub-runner runs returning 0.5821, 0.5329 and 0.5933. Every one is a locally-served `qwen2.5:0.5b`; no hosted provider has been exercised and the floor describes none. Count the table rows with `python3 scripts/check_claim_gate_matrix.py` rather than trusting a figure quoted in prose — this line has gone stale before. The six lettered deferrals are scoped in [`docs/audit/DEFERRED_SUBPHASES.md`](docs/audit/DEFERRED_SUBPHASES.md).## v4.0 — Shippeddiff --cc apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.mdindex fb5e360ec,7890b5387..d7f443afd--- a/apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.md+++ b/apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.md@@@ -34,7 -34,7 +34,9 @@@ and says so| Claim-to-gate traceability | Every product claim mapped to the CI job that fails when it stops being true | `docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md` |The last row is the one worth reading first. It is the honest index: 300 rows+ `GATED`, 2 `PARTIAL`, and a ratchet that refuses to let a row sit at+++`GATED`, 3 `PARTIAL`, and a ratchet that refuses to let a row sit at`NO GATE`. Re-read the figure from the table rather than from here — a countcopied into prose goes stale in silence, which is why`scripts/readme_gates.py` cross-checks this sentence against the matrix.diff --cc docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.mdindex b27373f72,712149e18..11b7d497b--- a/docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md+++ b/docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md@@@ -316,7 -315,7 +316,9 @@@ Statuses: `GATED` (a CI job fails when- Total: 302- GATED: 300+ - PARTIAL: 2+++- PARTIAL: 3- NO GATE: 0Counts come from `scripts/check_claim_gate_matrix.py`, which is also the gate. Recompute