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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

chore(release): v13.0.0 (#1060)

Beenu Arora2db6ce731ca8
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 2f6b1f676..da2a1f959 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -7,6 +7,75 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased]
+## [13.0.0] - 2026-09-29
+
+### BREAKING
+
+- **75 state-changing routes in `services/api` now require a permission they did not require before, and some of them refuse roles other than `viewer`.** That is the reason this is a major rather than the third patch in a day. v12.3.1 and v12.3.2 closed the same class of defect on nine and eleven routes, and both were patches because only `viewer` — a role holding five read permissions and no write of any kind — lost anything. This release is different: several surfaces move to `settings:write`, which `soc_analyst`, `soc_lead` and `threat_hunter` do **not** hold, so principals a deployment may reasonably consider legitimate will start receiving HTTP 403 where they previously received 200.
+
+ Read this before upgrading if your operators are not tenant administrators, or if you hold API keys with narrow scope lists.
+
+ | Surface | Now requires | Roles that lose access |
+ | --- | --- | --- |
+ | `POST/PATCH/DELETE /assets`, `POST /assets/vulnerabilities` | `settings:write` | `soc_analyst`, `soc_lead`, `threat_hunter`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /identity-graph/{nodes,edges,alert-links}` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /graph/entities/{host,user,alert,case}` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /posture/findings`, `…/{id}/suppress`, `…/{id}/resolve` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /posture/scan`, `POST /posture/destinations/preview` | `settings:read` | as above |
+ | `POST /easm/scan` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `PUT /deployment/config`, `POST /deployment/airgap/bundle` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /kb/ingest`, `DELETE /kb/documents/{id}` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /compliance/evidence/{id}/review` | `settings:write` | as above (including `soc_lead`, which may still *collect*) |
+ | `POST /marketplace/install`, `DELETE /marketplace/install` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /mssp/children/{id}/onboard`, `POST /mssp/organizations` | `settings:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /mssp/delegations`, `DELETE /mssp/delegations/{id}` | `users:write` | as above |
+ | `POST /community/publishers/keys`, `DELETE …/{fingerprint}`, `POST /community/plugins/publish`, `POST /community/plugins/{id}/install` | `plugins:admin` | every role except the wildcard `admin` / `platform_admin` — `plugins:admin` is not in `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` |
+ | `POST /community/playbooks/submit`, `POST /community/playbooks/{id}/install` | `playbooks:write` | `soc_analyst`, `soc_lead`, `threat_hunter`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /reports/templates`, `DELETE /reports/templates/{id}`, `POST /reports/generate`, `POST /compliance/evidence`, `POST /compliance/evidence/collect` | `reports:write` | `soc_analyst`, `threat_hunter`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /community/detections/publish`, `POST /community/detections/{id}/install`, and the eight MSSP rule-pack and rule-override routes | `rules:write` | `soc_analyst`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /threatintel/stix/indicators`, `…/bundles`, `…/misp/dry-run` | `threat_intel:write` | `soc_analyst`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /feedback/alert-override`, `POST /feedback/redisposition/apply` | `alerts:write` | `threat_hunter`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /phishing/submit`, `POST /phishing/{id}/retriage`, `POST /mssp/notes`, and the four `/insider-threat` writes | `cases:write` | `viewer` |
+ | `POST /hunts`, `PATCH /hunts/{id}`, `POST /hunts/{id}/run`, `POST /hunts/{id}/findings`, `POST /saved-hunts`, `DELETE /saved-hunts/{id}`, `POST /saved-hunts/{id}/run`, `POST /nl-query/translate`, `POST /nl-query/execute`, `POST /graph/investigate/query` | `lake:query` | `viewer`, `api_service` |
+ | `POST /nl-detection/translate`, `POST /translation/translate`, `POST /detection-loop/suggest` | `rules:read` | `soc_analyst`, `viewer` |
+ | `POST /identity-timeline/build` | `alerts:read` | no role — the refusal is against an API key scoped elsewhere |
+
+ **What to do.** If a legitimate operator is refused, grant them a role that holds the permission, or add the permission to a custom role through the RBAC tables (`roles` / `role_permissions`, migration 003) — `require_permission_db` consults those before falling back to the static map. If a machine credential is refused, add the permission to the key's `scopes`; `scopes` are an explicit list and a resource wildcard such as `settings:*` is honoured. Nothing here changes the permission *vocabulary*: every string used already existed and was already withheld from `viewer`, so no migration is required and no new permission needs defining.
+
+ **`docs/openapi.yaml` is unchanged** apart from one corrected description. Adding a dependency to a parameter that was already the authenticated principal alters neither the request schema nor the security scheme, so `scripts/openapi_diff.py` reports no breaking change. The break is in behaviour, which is exactly why it is announced here rather than inferred from the spec.
+
+### Security
+
+- **103 of 246 state-changing routes authenticated the caller and then checked nothing — 42% of the write surface. 75 of them now authorize.** `scripts/check_route_authz.py` had measured this since v12.3.1 and its comment called `MAX_UNAUTHORIZED` "a debt balance, not a target". This release works the balance down by resource area, per route, using only permissions that already existed. The routes are grouped by what the row they write *is*, not by which table it lands in, and every choice is recorded in the module it applies to.
+
+- **The MSSP write surface was the worst single module: seventeen identity-only routes.** `_require_own_child` answers whose child a tenant id is and says nothing about whether the caller may act on it, so a `viewer` sitting in a managing tenant could push a rule pack into a customer, grant itself a role inside one, adopt one, or delete a critical detection from one — GHSA-wj5c-88hg-5926's shape one tenant boundary further out. An `exclude` override is read back by the effective-rule resolver keyed on the **child's** tenant id and removes the rule from the ruleset their hunts run against, so the victim's only symptom is a hunt that stops matching.
+
+- **`POST /mssp/organizations` was an escalation into the one part of that module that *did* authorize.** The four routes under `/mssp/organizations` check `_admin_scope` — an organisation `owner`/`admin` role — and are correct. But founding an organisation makes the caller the `owner` that check accepts, and its docstring said the route was "available to any authenticated user", so a read-only role could mint itself an administering principal in one request and then grant org roles and per-tenant scope. It was found by the structural test asserting no state-changing route in the module is unguarded, not by reading the module, which is the argument for writing that test at all.
+
+- **`community.py` had the moderation step gated and the thing being moderated open.** `PUT /plugins/{id}/review` required `plugins:admin` and `PUT /playbooks/{id}/curate` required `playbooks:admin`, while the routes that *submitted* and *installed* required only a session — so a `viewer` could publish a signed plugin as the tenant and install one. Publishing and installing now take the permission that governs authoring that content type locally, on the principle that you should not be able to publish or install what you could not have written.
+
+- **`POST /feedback/alert-override` was not one wrong verdict.** It writes an alert's `disposition` *and* persists a per-signature prior into institutional memory, where a trusted benign prior auto-resolves matching repeat alerts without re-triage. Ungated it was a durable instruction to the platform to stop looking, writable by a read-only account. It now requires `alerts:write`, the same permission `alerts.py` already requires for the column it writes.
+
+- **Two outbound surfaces were reachable by a session alone.** `POST /easm/scan` runs passive reconnaissance and, when enabled, an active TCP connect probe against hosts the tenant claims; `scoped_tenant_or_403` answered *whose* estate, never whether this caller may probe it. The three `/threatintel/stix` writes mirror published indicators into a configured MISP instance under the tenant's credentials. `/misp/dry-run` takes the same permission as the live push rather than a read, because gating a rehearsal more weakly than the act is how a dry run becomes reconnaissance, and a test asserts the two never diverge.
+
+- **`DELETE /kb/documents/{id}` is wider than its path suggests** — it removes every chunk sharing the document's title, tenant-wide — and the agents service retrieves those documents during triage, so a document planted through `POST /kb/ingest` is a document the model is told to follow. Both now require `settings:write`.
+
+- **Compliance evidence collection and review take two *different* permissions.** `reports:write` collects, `settings:write` reviews, so a `soc_lead` can produce an evidence item and cannot accept it. One permission for both would let whoever produced an artefact sign it off, which is the whole point of the artefact. This is a role-level separation and deliberately weaker than the person-level separation of duties `services/actions` enforces on response approvals: migration 013's `aisoc_compliance_evidence` records `reviewed_by` and **no collector column at all**, so there is nobody to compare an approver against. Adding `collected_by` is the prerequisite for the stronger check and is not done here — a separation of duties cannot be evaluated against nobody, and claiming one that cannot fire would be worse than the coarse control.
+
+### Changed
+
+- `MAX_UNAUTHORIZED` **103 → 28**. The gate fails when the real count drops below the ceiling as well as when it rises, so the number moved with each of the five changes rather than in one edit at the end: 103 → 90 → 77 → 61 → 45 → 28.
+
+- **Two permission choices were rejected for causing an outage, and the rejections are pinned by tests rather than argued in prose.** `rules:write` for the hunt workbench would have locked out `soc_analyst`, which holds no `rules:*` permission at all and is the role the `/hunt` page exists for — the console's own client calls `saved-hunts` create/delete/run and `/nl-query/translate`. `settings:write` for `/insider-threat` would have taken watchlisting and indicator recording away from the analysts the module is for. The hunt surface takes `lake:query` (a hunt is a stored query and the run routes execute it, so authoring and running are one entitlement) and insider threat takes `cases:write`.
+
+- **Twenty-eight routes are deliberately still counted, each with a recorded reason.** Eight SCIM routes authenticate a `ScimPrincipal` — a purpose-bound provisioning credential with no role and no scopes, which `require_permission` cannot apply to; giving SCIM tokens scopes is a product decision. Four `/mssp/organizations` routes authorize through `_admin_scope`, the right vocabulary for a portfolio-scoped act and not interchangeable with a tenant role, since `create_organization` is self-service and an operator's founding member may hold any tenant role. Eleven are self-scoped to the caller's own row (`/saved-views`, `/passkeys`, `/push`, `PATCH /auth/me/preferences`, `PUT /oncall/me`). `POST /realtime/ticket` is session-bound and a permission would cut the live feed off from viewers who legitimately watch it. `/shifts` has an in-process mock store and lead-only versus analyst-wide is a product decision. `POST /kb/query` and `POST /community/plugins/{id}/rate` have no fitting permission in the vocabulary — every candidate is either held by every role including machine keys or restricted to tenant administrators — and choosing one on the strength of its role list rather than on what the route does would be reverse-engineering a permission from the answer. The last two are pinned *ungated* by tests, so changing them takes a decision and an edit rather than a drive-by.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Three new suites, 314 tests, prove every gated route in both directions: a principal *without* the permission is refused with `db.commit` never awaited, and a holder is admitted. The commit assertion is separate from the status code because a handler that writes before FastAPI serialises has already done the damage on a request that then returns 500, so `!= 200` is not evidence of a refusal — the defect v12.3.1 found on `remediation.py`. The permission is read out of the resolved dependency tree rather than the source, so the `Annotated[Any, require_permission("x")]` shape v12.3.2 fixed would report nothing here.
+
+- Measured against the pre-fix tree, the five suites fail **30 of 49**, **35 of 55**, **41 of 64**, **45 of 65** and **44 of 68**. The tests that pass on both trees are the entitled-caller and read cases, which is precisely why they are not the proof. `services/api` goes **3,537 → 3,819 passing** with no unrelated test moving, which is the signal that no permission was applied too broadly.
+
## [12.3.2] - 2026-09-29
### Security
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 10b8d8702..1d4f2f1cc 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
**An open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center.** It ingests your security telemetry, detects and correlates threats, investigates them with AI agents whose reasoning is fully auditable, and proposes responses a human approves.
[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-22c55e.svg?style=flat-square)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
-[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-12.3.2-f59e0b?style=flat-square)](CHANGELOG.md)
+[![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-13.0.0-f59e0b?style=flat-square)](CHANGELOG.md)
[![CI](https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/beenuar/AiSOC/ci.yml?branch=main&label=CI&style=flat-square)](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
[![CodeQL](https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/beenuar/AiSOC/codeql.yml?branch=main&label=CodeQL&style=flat-square)](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/codeql.yml)
[![OpenSSF Scorecard](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/badge)](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/beenuar/AiSOC)
diff --git a/RELEASES.md b/RELEASES.md
index db2cc9854..99cee843b 100644
--- a/RELEASES.md
+++ b/RELEASES.md
@@ -2,13 +2,58 @@
This file mirrors what used to live in the "What's new" section of [`README.md`](README.md). The complete, machine-readable inventory (with file paths, env-var diffs, and per-release test counts) lives in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).
-> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v12.3.2`, released 2026-09-29 — a second security patch the same day, and the reason is the same one v12.3.1 existed for: eleven more write routes were found declaring a permission that never ran. `Annotated[Any, require_permission("users:write")]` carries no `Depends()`, and FastAPI honours only `Annotated` metadata that is a `Depends` or a `FieldInfo` — everything else is silently dropped, so the check never happened and `current_user` degraded into a required query parameter. The tell was the status code: a `viewer` hitting these routes got **422, not 403**, which reads as a malformed request rather than a refusal. v12.3.1 was a security patch on top of v12.3.0, and the reason it exists separately is that a fix living on `main` is not a fix anyone has. Two reported advisories: a **critical** SQL injection in the osquery allowlist, where a denylist scanning rendered SQL for `--`, `/*` and `;` had never listed `'`, so a value could close a quoted literal and replace the WHERE clause — and reproducing it showed all six query templates were injectable, not the one reported, because the numeric parameters were never coerced either. Each parameter now declares what it is and anything else is refused rather than escaped, because an escaped path still reaches the endpoint, matches nothing, and reads to an operator as a clean host. The second is a **high** missing-authorization hole where every remediation write route authenticated and none authorized, so a `viewer` could raise the tenant to autonomy L4 and pre-approve a high blast-radius verb; the permission it needed already existed and was simply never enforced, which is the third time on this repository. The gate that should have caught it passed throughout, because it asks whether a route authenticates — so a second gate now asks whether it authorizes, and measures 103 of 246 state-changing routes making no authorization decision, as a ceiling that can only fall. Upgrading is `make up`. v12.3.0 (same day) closed six lettered sub-phases; its notes are below. None of the eight first-party npm/PyPI packages has been uploaded — the registries return 404 for all eight — and that remains credential-blocked rather than done. The latest GitHub release with notes and downloads: <https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/releases/latest>.
+> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v13.0.0`, released 2026-09-29. **It is a major because it breaks behaviour, not a schema:** 75 state-changing API routes now require a permission they did not require before, and unlike the two patches earlier the same day, some of them refuse roles other than `viewer` — several surfaces move to `settings:write`, which `soc_analyst`, `soc_lead` and `threat_hunter` do not hold, so operators who are not tenant administrators will meet HTTP 403 where they previously got 200. The `### BREAKING` section of [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md) lists every affected route, the permission it now takes, the roles that lose it, and what to do; `docs/openapi.yaml` is unchanged apart from one corrected description, which is exactly why the break is announced rather than left to be inferred from the spec. What it fixes is the debt the previous two patches measured but did not work down: `scripts/check_route_authz.py` reported **103 of 246 state-changing routes in `services/api` authenticating the caller and then checking nothing** — 42% of the write surface — and that figure is now **28**, every remaining route carrying a recorded reason. The worst module was MSSP, where `_require_own_child` established whose child a tenant was and nothing established whether the caller could act on it, so a `viewer` in a managing tenant could push a rule pack into a customer, grant itself a role inside one, or delete a critical detection from one. `community.py` had the moderation step gated and the thing being moderated open. Every permission used already existed and was already withheld from `viewer`, so there is no migration and no new permission to define. Upgrading is `make up`. v12.3.2 earlier the same day was the second security patch of the day: eleven more write routes were found declaring a permission that never ran. `Annotated[Any, require_permission("users:write")]` carries no `Depends()`, and FastAPI honours only `Annotated` metadata that is a `Depends` or a `FieldInfo` — everything else is silently dropped, so the check never happened and `current_user` degraded into a required query parameter. The tell was the status code: a `viewer` hitting these routes got **422, not 403**, which reads as a malformed request rather than a refusal. v12.3.1 was a security patch on top of v12.3.0, and the reason it exists separately is that a fix living on `main` is not a fix anyone has. Two reported advisories: a **critical** SQL injection in the osquery allowlist, where a denylist scanning rendered SQL for `--`, `/*` and `;` had never listed `'`, so a value could close a quoted literal and replace the WHERE clause — and reproducing it showed all six query templates were injectable, not the one reported, because the numeric parameters were never coerced either. Each parameter now declares what it is and anything else is refused rather than escaped, because an escaped path still reaches the endpoint, matches nothing, and reads to an operator as a clean host. The second is a **high** missing-authorization hole where every remediation write route authenticated and none authorized, so a `viewer` could raise the tenant to autonomy L4 and pre-approve a high blast-radius verb; the permission it needed already existed and was simply never enforced, which is the third time on this repository. The gate that should have caught it passed throughout, because it asks whether a route authenticates — so a second gate now asks whether it authorizes, and measures 103 of 246 state-changing routes making no authorization decision, as a ceiling that can only fall. Upgrading is `make up`. v12.3.0 (same day) closed six lettered sub-phases; its notes are below. None of the eight first-party npm/PyPI packages has been uploaded — the registries return 404 for all eight — and that remains credential-blocked rather than done. The latest GitHub release with notes and downloads: <https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/releases/latest>.
---
## What's new
-`VERSION` is `12.3.2`. The **v12.3.2** release (2026-09-29) wires eleven
+`VERSION` is `13.0.0`. The **v13.0.0** release (2026-09-29) works the
+identity-only route debt down from **103 to 28** across five reviewed changes
+by resource area, using only permissions that already existed in
+`ROLE_PERMISSIONS`. It is a major because the break is behavioural: several
+surfaces move to `settings:write`, which `soc_analyst`, `soc_lead` and
+`threat_hunter` do not hold, so this is the first of these three releases where
+a principal other than `viewer` loses access. Read the `### BREAKING` section
+of [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md) before upgrading — it names every route, the
+permission it now requires, the roles that lose it, and the two ways to restore
+access (a role that holds the permission, or the permission added to a custom
+role or an API key's `scopes`). Two permission choices were rejected for
+causing an outage rather than fixing a hole, and the rejections are pinned by
+tests: `rules:write` on the hunt workbench would have locked out
+`soc_analyst`, the role the `/hunt` page exists for, and `settings:write` on
+`/insider-threat` would have taken watchlisting away from the analysts the
+module is for.
+
+**v13.0.0 highlights (September 29, 2026)**
+- **75 routes gated, 28 deliberately left.** The remainder is not a backlog
+ with no owner: eight SCIM routes authenticate a purpose-bound provisioning
+ credential that has no role for `require_permission` to consult, four
+ `/mssp/organizations` routes authorize through an organisation owner/admin
+ check that a tenant role cannot substitute for, eleven are self-scoped to
+ the caller's own row, and the last five carry a stated product question.
+ `POST /kb/query` and `POST /community/plugins/{id}/rate` are pinned
+ *ungated* by tests, so changing them takes a decision.
+- **`POST /mssp/organizations` was an escalation into the part of that module
+ that did authorize.** Founding an organisation makes the caller the `owner`
+ that `_admin_scope` accepts, and the route was open to any authenticated
+ user, so a read-only role could mint itself an administering principal in
+ one request. It was found by a structural test asserting no state-changing
+ route in the module is unguarded, not by reading the module.
+- **Compliance evidence collection and review now take two different
+ permissions**, so a `soc_lead` can produce an evidence item and cannot
+ accept it. That is a role-level separation and weaker than the person-level
+ separation of duties `services/actions` enforces on response approvals —
+ migration 013 records `reviewed_by` and no collector column, so there is
+ nobody to compare an approver against, and the stronger check is not
+ claimed anywhere.
+- **314 new tests, per route and in both directions.** Against the pre-fix
+ tree the five suites fail 30/49, 35/55, 41/64, 45/65 and 44/68; `services/api`
+ goes 3,537 → 3,819 passing with no unrelated test moving.
+
+**v12.3.2 highlights (September 29, 2026)**
+
+The **v12.3.2** release wires eleven
`require_permission` dependencies that FastAPI had been discarding, found
by sweeping the sibling modules for the omission behind
GHSA-wj5c-88hg-5926. The **v12.3.1** release earlier the same day is a
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 1701b30e1..02161ca86 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-12.3.2
+13.0.0
diff --git a/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json b/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json
index 61fcbd106..458087c90 100644
--- a/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json
+++ b/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
"rows": [
{
"date": "2026-09-29",
- "agent_version": "v12.3.2",
- "commit_sha": "2eaebcbc",
+ "agent_version": "v13.0.0",
+ "commit_sha": "0f13e0fa",
"substrate": true,
"eval_mode": "substrate-only",
"mitre_accuracy": 0.97,
diff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt
index 372424178..7b7fa49b9 100644
--- a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt
+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
<!-- Generated by scripts/generate_llms_txt.py. Do not edit by hand; run the script and commit the result. -->
> AiSOC is an open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center, MIT
-> licensed and maintained by the AiSOC community. Version 12.3.2.
+> licensed and maintained by the AiSOC community. Version 13.0.0.
> Repository: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC. Documentation: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/.
This file exists so an automated reader can answer questions about AiSOC
diff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms.txt
index 4ca27b115..32ccdb77f 100644
--- a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt
+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms.txt
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
> security telemetry from 84 first-party connectors, normalises it to OCSF,
> correlates it into alerts, and runs LLM agents that triage and investigate them.
> Every agent decision is written to an investigation ledger, so the reasoning
-> behind a verdict can be replayed step by step. MIT licensed. Current version 12.3.2.
+> behind a verdict can be replayed step by step. MIT licensed. Current version 13.0.0.
AiSOC is built and maintained by the AiSOC community. It is a complete SOC
platform rather than a single tool: ingestion, detection, correlation, agent
diff --git a/apps/web/package.json b/apps/web/package.json
index 9268bbead..74abf79a4 100644
--- a/apps/web/package.json
+++ b/apps/web/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "@aisoc/web",
- "version": "12.3.2",
+ "version": "13.0.0",
"private": true,
"description": "AiSOC SOC Console - Next.js 14 Frontend",
"license": "MIT",
diff --git a/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md b/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md
index 546dbfb94..f68bf22d5 100644
--- a/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md
+++ b/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# AiSOC v8 — progress tracker
**Last updated:** 2026-09-29
-**Current release:** `v12.3.2` (2026-09-29) · **Next:** unscheduled.
+**Current release:** `v13.0.0` (2026-09-29) · **Next:** unscheduled.
Packaging is no longer named against a version: it slipped v8.0 to v8.1 to
v8.2 for the same reason each time, and the blocker is registry credentials
rather than code. Each major since v10.0 has been a major for the same kind of
diff --git a/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml b/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml
index 78cae779f..416dc2add 100644
--- a/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml
+++ b/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ version: 5.9.2
# exists for no image, so every pod of a default install would have gone to
# ImagePullBackOff. scripts/check_published_images.py resolves it the same
# way the templates do and fails when it names nothing.
-appVersion: "v12.3.2"
+appVersion: "v13.0.0"
keywords:
- security