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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into depth/9.6-native-responder
Beenu Arora57c66ef6334e
diff --cc .github/workflows/ci.ymlindex 2225fcae2,31cae7ca8..ce24e26d9--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml@@@ -701,16 -701,18 +701,31 @@@ jobsrun: python3 scripts/check_cloud_native_collection.py --self-test- name: Cloud-native collection gaterun: python3 scripts/check_cloud_native_collection.py++<<<<<<< HEAD+ # Depth 9.6. Voice input transcribes on the device and sends text, and+ # "no audio leaves the device" is a claim a comment cannot carry. This+ # refuses any capture API or binary request body under+ # apps/mobile/src. Also wired into mobile.yml, which only runs when+ # that app changes — here it is unconditional, because a claim this+ # strong should not be graded by a path filter.+ - name: No audio egress gate — self-test+ run: python3 scripts/check_no_audio_egress.py --self-test+ - name: No audio egress gate+ run: python3 scripts/check_no_audio_egress.py++=======+ # Depth 9.2. The probe set behind the recall measurement has to stay+ # usable: every probe must name an item that is in the corpus, the+ # probes must stay low-overlap with their answers (a probe written in+ # the document's own words hands the lexical baseline a score it could+ # not earn on a real question), and the baseline must still be a real+ # retriever rather than a stub. The scorer itself runs too: with no+ # embedding backend on a runner it prints "not measured" and exits 0,+ # which is the honest row and also proves the refusal path works.+ - name: Memory recall scorer — self-test+ run: python3 scripts/score_memory_recall.py --self-test+ - name: Memory recall scorer+ run: python3 scripts/score_memory_recall.py++>>>>>>> origin/main# One layer in from the name: the profile gate asks whether a connector# reaches a normalization path, this asks which OCSF class it reaches# when it gets there. The class uid divided by a thousand is thediff --cc DEPTH_PROGRESS.mdindex d6ef08d53,52b94ffa9..92df71b56--- a/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md+++ b/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md@@@ -467,7 -500,7 +534,11 @@@ invented fields on the first run of th| Date | Item | What happened ||---|---|---|++<<<<<<< HEAD+| 2026-10-11 | 9.6 | Reproduced: `grep -c 'eas build|gradlew|xcodebuild|expo prebuild' .github/workflows/mobile.yml` returned **0** and the workflow actively *required* the README to say no device build had happened; `grep -rni 'speech|voice' apps/mobile/src apps/mobile/app` returned **0**; and `services/realtime/src/push.ts` sent every record through `webpush.sendNotification`, so a native token was accepted and could never be delivered to. Built the Android APK job, the simulator job, the on-device voice module and the APNs/FCM sender. Negative control: removing the on-device refusal so the cloud recogniser could be used fails two of the eight voice tests. The README guard was inverted rather than deleted — "we added a build so the honesty check is no longer needed" is how an ungated claim comes back. |++=======+ | 2026-10-11 | 9.2 | Reproduced: `knowledge_base.py` searched with `to_tsvector`/`plainto_tsquery` and nothing else; `grep -rn qdrant services/api/app/` found only the migration runner and the tenant-deletion sweep, no recall path; and no memory row anywhere carried an author, a source, a scope, an expiry or a state. Built the store of record, the Qdrant index over it, the conflict state machine, the case-closure writer and the recall scorer. Two negative controls recorded in the PR: restoring last-write-wins on a contradiction fails three tests, and restoring vector truncation fails one. The measurement is negative and is published as such — see D11, which also records that it caught the truncation defect. |++>>>>>>> origin/main| 2026-10-07 | 0.1 | This file created at base commit `1b8bc2d4`. || 2026-10-07 | 0.2 | Every figure re-derived. Two matched exactly (detections, unreachable families); executor arms measured 74 against a captured 73; the cloud/identity/SaaS/code figure measured 395 against a captured 461 on a grouping the plan does not pin, recorded above. Two measurement caveats found: executable and quarantined overlap by 1,724 rules, and the "69% Windows" figure does not reproduce from the index. || 2026-10-09 | 4.3 | Reproduced: `check_retention_window.py` on the unmodified tree reported six problems — the lake deleting at 90 days against a 3,650-day cap, no `MODIFY TTL` migration, tiering deleting at 90, and the purge worker calling neither `alerts_under_legal_hold` nor `may_purge` and reporting nothing withheld. Fixed all but the cold-query bullet. Four negative controls recorded in the PR, including the positive control: a purge stuck closed withholds every tenant and fails four of the eight hold tests, which is the only thing that separates a working control from commendable caution. One pre-existing test (`test_storage_tiering.py`) pinned the 90-day tiering DELETE and now reads the shared constant; `test_retention_worker.py`'s session double could not answer the new holds query, so the worker failed closed and five of its cases failed — the double was taught the query rather than the fail-closed behaviour relaxed. |