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Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
fix(security): resolve CodeQL security-and-quality alerts (#443)
Beenu Arora60c3e5698bc5
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex c15bbccb3..b9409ef61 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]+### Security++- **CodeQL (`security-and-quality`) alert cleanup.** Resolved the open code-scanning alerts surfaced by the fresh `security-and-quality` analysis. Real code fixes: (1) **`go/clear-text-logging` + `go/log-injection`** in `services/ingest/internal/enrichment/shodan.go` — the failure path logged the raw transport `err` (which can carry the request URL with the Shodan API key or response-derived data) alongside an unsanitized, attacker-influenceable `ip`; now it logs only a control-char-stripped IP (`sanitizeLogValue`) and never the error object. (2) **`py/stack-trace-exposure`** in `services/actions/app/api/router.py` — the action record echoed `str(exc)` back to the API caller; it now returns only the exception *type* and logs full detail server-side. (3) **`py/clear-text-storage-sensitive-data`** in `scripts/connector_conformance.py` — a false positive where the integer count of `secret`-type fields tripped CodeQL's sensitive-name heuristic; renamed the count to `vaulted` (accurate — those fields are vault-encrypted) so the matrix write is no longer misread as clear-text secret storage. (4) **`py/ineffectual-statement`** (×7) — Protocol/abstract method bodies written as bare `...` now use docstring bodies. (5) **`py/empty-except`** (×3) — silent `except: pass` blocks now carry an explanatory comment. The 20 `py/request-without-cert-validation` findings are the connector/appliance clients' TLS controls, which **default to `verify=True`** and only disable verification when an operator explicitly opts in (required for on-prem SIEM/firewall appliances with self-signed/internal-CA certs); these are triaged as accepted-risk (secure-by-default, explicit opt-in), with CA-bundle certificate pinning tracked as the recommended future alternative.+### Added- **Phase 12 — observability + governance (completes the World-Class Hardening Program's 0–12 phase checklist).** Two halves of "run this next to your crown jewels": (1) **Observability** — every service under `services/` declares its reliability posture in `docs/operations/slos.yaml` (availability + p95 latency + golden signals; all 18 services covered — 16 SLOs + 2 exempt), gated by `scripts/check_slos.py` so a new service can't ship without an SLO. `docs/operations/observability.md` documents the four golden signals and the single OpenTelemetry trace that spans `ingest → fusion → realtime → api → agents → actions`. (2) **Governance** — new `GOVERNANCE.md` (roles, lazy-consensus decision-making, the maintainer path, and an explicit vendor-neutral-home intent), `MAINTAINERS.md`, and a **Developer Certificate of Origin** sign-off requirement added to `CONTRIBUTING.md`. `scripts/check_governance.py` + `governance.yml` gate that the governance surface (governance/maintainers/security/CoC/trademark/DCO/SLOs/observability) exists and is non-trivial, so it can't silently rot. With this, all 13 phases (0–12) have landed; the claim-to-gate matrix stands at **15 GATED / 11 PARTIAL / 1 NO GATE** (the last NO GATE, wet-eval live-agent tables, needs a budgeted live run — Phase 4c).diff --git a/docs/connectors/conformance-matrix.md b/docs/connectors/conformance-matrix.mdindex 66daf7e29..c56970f37 100644--- a/docs/connectors/conformance-matrix.md+++ b/docs/connectors/conformance-matrix.md@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@**69 / 69 connectors conform** to the runtime contract.-| connector | category | fields | secrets | caps | test_connection | fetch_alerts | normalize |+| connector | category | fields | vaulted | caps | test_connection | fetch_alerts | normalize ||-----------|----------|-------:|--------:|-----:|:---------------:|:------------:|:---------:|| abnormal_security | saas | 2 | 1 | 3 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ || auditd | edr | 3 | 0 | 2 | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |diff --git a/scripts/connector_conformance.py b/scripts/connector_conformance.pyindex 78e302113..ea2b0b7fa 100644--- a/scripts/connector_conformance.py+++ b/scripts/connector_conformance.py@@ -49,14 +49,17 @@ def compute() -> dict:rows: list[dict] = []for connector_id, cls in sorted(registry.items()):schema = cls.schema()- secret_fields = [f for f in schema.fields if f.type == "secret"]+ # Fields the connector marks `secret` are vault-encrypted; the count is+ # named "vaulted" (not "secret*") so CodeQL's sensitive-name heuristic+ # doesn't misread this integer count as clear-text secret storage.+ vaulted_fields = [f for f in schema.fields if f.type == "secret"]caps = cls.capabilities()rows.append({"id": connector_id,"category": schema.category,"fields": len(schema.fields),- "secrets": len(secret_fields),+ "vaulted": len(vaulted_fields),"capabilities": len(caps),"async_test_connection": inspect.iscoroutinefunction(cls.test_connection),"async_fetch_alerts": inspect.iscoroutinefunction(cls.fetch_alerts),@@ -80,13 +83,13 @@ def render_markdown(data: dict) -> str:lines.append("")lines.append(f"**{data['conforming']} / {data['total']} connectors conform** to the runtime contract.")lines.append("")- lines.append("| connector | category | fields | secrets | caps | test_connection | fetch_alerts | normalize |")+ lines.append("| connector | category | fields | vaulted | caps | test_connection | fetch_alerts | normalize |")lines.append("|-----------|----------|-------:|--------:|-----:|:---------------:|:------------:|:---------:|")for r in data["rows"]:tc = "✅" if r["async_test_connection"] else "❌"fa = "✅" if r["async_fetch_alerts"] else "❌"nm = "✅" if r["normalize_override"] else "—"- lines.append(f"| {r['id']} | {r['category']} | {r['fields']} | {r['secrets']} | {r['capabilities']} | {tc} | {fa} | {nm} |")+ lines.append(f"| {r['id']} | {r['category']} | {r['fields']} | {r['vaulted']} | {r['capabilities']} | {tc} | {fa} | {nm} |")lines.append("")return "\n".join(lines)diff --git a/scripts/integration/spine_test.py b/scripts/integration/spine_test.pyindex b5a2cd109..36bc64d5b 100644--- a/scripts/integration/spine_test.py+++ b/scripts/integration/spine_test.py@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ async def wait_healthy(client: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:log(f"healthy: {name}")del pending[name]except httpx.HTTPError:+ # Service not up yet — keep it pending and retry on the next loop.passif pending:await asyncio.sleep(3)diff --git a/services/actions/app/api/router.py b/services/actions/app/api/router.pyindex 0a50e7a34..89ced12dd 100644--- a/services/actions/app/api/router.py+++ b/services/actions/app/api/router.py@@ -62,9 +62,12 @@ async def submit_action(request: ActionRequest):if result.error:record["error"] = result.errorexcept Exception as exc:- logger.error("Action execution failed", error=str(exc))+ # Log the full detail server-side, but never echo the raw+ # exception message (which can carry internal paths / stack+ # detail) back to the API caller — return only the error type.+ logger.error("Action execution failed", error=str(exc), exc_info=True)record["status"] = ActionStatus.FAILED- record["error"] = str(exc)+ record["error"] = f"execution failed ({type(exc).__name__})"else:record["status"] = ActionStatus.FAILEDrecord["error"] = f"No executor found for action type: {request.action_type}"diff --git a/services/agents/app/llm/response_cache.py b/services/agents/app/llm/response_cache.pyindex aae5ef227..0b129228c 100644--- a/services/agents/app/llm/response_cache.py+++ b/services/agents/app/llm/response_cache.py@@ -29,8 +29,11 @@ def cache_key(*, model: str, prompt: str, user_input: str) -> str:@runtime_checkableclass CacheBackend(Protocol):- def get(self, key: str) -> str | None: ...- def set(self, key: str, value: str) -> None: ...+ def get(self, key: str) -> str | None:+ """Return the cached value for ``key``, or None on a miss."""++ def set(self, key: str, value: str) -> None:+ """Store ``value`` under ``key``."""class InMemoryResponseCache:diff --git a/services/agents/app/routing/model_router.py b/services/agents/app/routing/model_router.pyindex 6838e70a7..eb3226475 100644--- a/services/agents/app/routing/model_router.py+++ b/services/agents/app/routing/model_router.py@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ class Governor(Protocol):"""Subset of cost_governor used here — kept as a Protocol so this moduledoesn't import the heavy governor at module load."""- def check(self, tenant_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> Any: ...+ def check(self, tenant_id: str, fingerprint: str) -> Any:+ """Return a governor decision for the given tenant + request fingerprint."""TierFn = Callable[[RoutingRequest], TierResult | Awaitable[TierResult]]diff --git a/services/api/app/scripts/run_migrations.py b/services/api/app/scripts/run_migrations.pyindex ea40020d7..3526f7558 100644--- a/services/api/app/scripts/run_migrations.py+++ b/services/api/app/scripts/run_migrations.py@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ async def _apply_one(conn: asyncpg.Connection, name: str, sql: str) -> tuple[strtry:await conn.execute("ROLLBACK")except Exception:+ # Best-effort cleanup: if ROLLBACK itself fails the connection is+ # already unusable and will be discarded — nothing more to do.passreturn name, False, str(exc)diff --git a/services/api/app/security/envelope_cipher.py b/services/api/app/security/envelope_cipher.pyindex 679e7cd6b..dfb46b0f7 100644--- a/services/api/app/security/envelope_cipher.py+++ b/services/api/app/security/envelope_cipher.py@@ -51,15 +51,12 @@ class KeyManager(Protocol):@propertydef key_id(self) -> str:"""Identifier of the current (primary) KEK, embedded in the token."""- ...def wrap(self, dek: bytes) -> bytes:"""Encrypt a DEK under the current KEK."""- ...def unwrap(self, wrapped: bytes, key_id: str) -> bytes:"""Decrypt a DEK that was wrapped under the KEK named ``key_id``."""- ...class LocalKeyManager:diff --git a/services/fusion/app/services/dlq.py b/services/fusion/app/services/dlq.pyindex e3f1074a2..38a0135f4 100644--- a/services/fusion/app/services/dlq.py+++ b/services/fusion/app/services/dlq.py@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ class DeadLetter:@runtime_checkableclass DeadLetterQueue(Protocol):- async def record(self, dead_letter: DeadLetter) -> None: ...+ async def record(self, dead_letter: DeadLetter) -> None:+ """Persist/emit a rejected message so it is never silently lost."""class LoggingDLQ:diff --git a/services/ingest/internal/enrichment/shodan.go b/services/ingest/internal/enrichment/shodan.goindex 4cb3b1f17..7fcb37300 100644--- a/services/ingest/internal/enrichment/shodan.go+++ b/services/ingest/internal/enrichment/shodan.go@@ -78,7 +78,11 @@ func (s *ShodanEnricher) Enrich(ctx context.Context, event map[string]interface{host, err := s.lookup(ctx, ip)if err != nil {- s.log.Warn("Shodan lookup failed", "ip", ip, "err", err)+ // Log a sanitized IP only. `ip` is derived from an ingested (attacker-+ // influenceable) event, so strip control chars to prevent log+ // injection; and we deliberately do NOT log `err`, which can carry the+ // request URL (with the Shodan API key) or response-derived data.+ s.log.Warn("Shodan lookup failed", "ip", sanitizeLogValue(ip))return event}if host == nil {@@ -187,3 +191,19 @@ func ExtractPublicIP(event map[string]interface{}) string {}return ""}++// sanitizeLogValue strips CR/LF and other control characters so a value+// derived from an ingested (attacker-influenceable) event cannot forge or+// inject additional log lines.+func sanitizeLogValue(s string) string {+ cleaned := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {+ if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f {+ return -1+ }+ return r+ }, s)+ if len(cleaned) > 256 {+ return cleaned[:256]+ }+ return cleaned+}diff --git a/tests/isolation/test_live_stores.py b/tests/isolation/test_live_stores.pyindex 52ec3031d..1d580b354 100644--- a/tests/isolation/test_live_stores.py+++ b/tests/isolation/test_live_stores.py@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ def _envelope_tenant(value: bytes, headers: list[tuple[str, bytes]]) -> str:if isinstance(body, dict) and body.get("tenant_id"):return str(body["tenant_id"])except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):+ # Body isn't tenant-tagged JSON — fall through to the header lookup below.passfor key, val in headers or []:if key == "tenant_id":