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fix(ci): the fourth grading's residue — two refusal shapes and a stale projection
beenuar7cd5f5879142
diff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txtindex a39f4047e..53116b90f 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt@@ -220,12 +220,12 @@ Read more: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs/connectors## Detection content-- **Executable rules: 2511.** These are the rules the detection engine+- **Executable rules: 2535.** These are the rules the detection engineloads from its compiled ruleset. Only these can fire.-- **Rule files on disk: 6991.** The remainder is imported and+- **Rule files on disk: 7015.** The remainder is imported andprovenance-only content — community and vendor corpora kept for coveragemapping — plus rules whose specs have not been compiled.-- **Windowed rules: 72**, in a separate engine. Most count events or+- **Windowed rules: 76**, in a separate engine. Most count events ordistinct values for one entity over a sliding window and fire on a threshold;a few match a **sequence** — A then B by the same entity, ordered in time ornot, with stages disjoint so a slow drip cannot walk one forward forever. Somediff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms.txtindex 965fa2aaa..69b23bc10 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms.txt@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ Key facts a summary should get right:so a first run shows real data and AI triage without signing up for anything.`make up-full` is 22 long-running services and adds the event lake,entity graph, full-text search and enrichment.-- **Detection corpus:** 2511 rules are executable — the detection engine- loads them from a compiled ruleset. 6991 rule files exist on disk in total;+- **Detection corpus:** 2535 rules are executable — the detection engine+ loads them from a compiled ruleset. 7015 rule files exist on disk in total;the difference is imported and provenance-only content that never fires. Cite- 2511, not 6991. "Executable" means each rule was replayed through+ 2535, not 7015. "Executable" means each rule was replayed througha real connector and the real engine and watched to fire; it does not mean the- rule detects an attack. A further 72 rules run in a separate windowed+ rule detects an attack. A further 76 rules run in a separate windowedengine that counts across events or matches a sequence; report that figurebeside the executable one, never added to it.- **The executable figure can go down, and has.** Rules that named a field nodiff --git a/tests/isolation/test_autonomy_promotion_live.py b/tests/isolation/test_autonomy_promotion_live.pyindex 353101fb9..a1eb87103 100644--- a/tests/isolation/test_autonomy_promotion_live.py+++ b/tests/isolation/test_autonomy_promotion_live.py@@ -585,8 +585,12 @@ class TestTheTransitionsAreInTheHashChainedLog:"""The plan asks for the hash-chained log, so being append-only is the claim.A grant an operator can quietly remove the record of is a grant with- no audit trail. The trigger refuses the DELETE, and this asserts the- refusal rather than assuming it.+ no audit trail. Two layers refuse the DELETE and either one proves+ the claim: migration 117 revokes DELETE on `audit_log` from the+ runtime role outright (`permission denied`, the arm this suite hits+ because it connects as `aisoc_app`), and the trigger behind it+ answers `immutable` for any role that does hold the privilege. This+ asserts the refusal rather than assuming it."""async with probe() as (session, tenant_id, user_id):from sqlalchemy import text@@ -595,7 +599,7 @@ class TestTheTransitionsAreInTheHashChainedLog:await _record(session, tenant_id, count=20, verdict=FALSE_POSITIVE, disposition=FALSE_POSITIVE, resolved_at=base)await _promote(session, tenant_id, user_id, override=True, override_reason="Pilot")- with pytest.raises(Exception, match="immutable"):+ with pytest.raises(Exception, match="immutable|permission denied"):await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE tenant_id = :t"), {"t": tenant_id})await session.rollback()diff --git a/tests/isolation/test_verification_pause_live.py b/tests/isolation/test_verification_pause_live.pyindex ef9ecf70b..c1fb974e0 100644--- a/tests/isolation/test_verification_pause_live.py+++ b/tests/isolation/test_verification_pause_live.py@@ -281,26 +281,24 @@ async def test_the_policy_table_is_tenant_scoped_and_default_deny(pool: object)tenant_a,)- # A non-superuser, because RLS is bypassed by the owner and by a- # superuser — the exact mistake that made 92 policies decorative in- # this repository once already.- async with pool.acquire() as conn: # type: ignore[attr-defined]- # Created if absent rather than dropped and recreated: the role- # holds grants, so `DROP ROLE` fails on the second run of this- # suite against the same database and the failure reads as a- # tenancy problem rather than as test housekeeping.- await conn.execute(- "DO $$ BEGIN "- "IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'lanec_reader') THEN "- "CREATE ROLE lanec_reader LOGIN PASSWORD 'lanec_reader_pw'; END IF; END $$"+ # A fresh connection on the suite's own DSN, which in CI is the DML-only+ # runtime role `aisoc_app`. The table is FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY, so the+ # only roles RLS cannot bind are superusers and BYPASSRLS holders — the+ # exact mistake that made 92 policies decorative in this repository once+ # already. That property is proved rather than assumed: a DSN quietly+ # re-pointed at a superuser would turn both assertions below into+ # tautologies, and the suite must fail loudly instead. (An earlier+ # revision created a dedicated reader role here, which needs CREATEROLE —+ # a privilege the runtime role rightly does not hold.)+ reader = await asyncpg.connect(_dsn())+ try:+ caps = await reader.fetchrow("SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user")+ assert caps is not None and not caps["rolsuper"] and not caps["rolbypassrls"], (+ "the suite DSN resolves to a role RLS cannot bind (superuser or BYPASSRLS), "+ "so this test would prove nothing — point ISOLATION_VERIFICATION_DSN at a "+ "plain DML role such as aisoc_app")- await conn.execute("GRANT SELECT ON aisoc_verification_policies TO lanec_reader")- await conn.execute("GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO lanec_reader")- dsn = _dsn()- reader_dsn = dsn.replace("postgres:lanec@", "lanec_reader:lanec_reader_pw@").replace("postgres@", "lanec_reader@")- reader = await asyncpg.connect(reader_dsn)- try:await reader.execute("SELECT set_config('app.current_tenant_id', $1, false)", tenant_b)rows = await reader.fetch("SELECT alert_class FROM aisoc_verification_policies")assert rows == [], "tenant B read tenant A's verification policy"