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Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
fix(ci): pin Trivy to a release that still exists; sync published gate counts
Beenu Aroraa1e241b8aee4
diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.ymlindex 8b953d3a0..9556fa020 100644--- a/.github/workflows/security.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml@@ -10,7 +10,11 @@ name: Security# * gitleaks — the whole tree was triaged and every finding is either# fixed or recorded in .gitleaksignore with a written reason, so a# new finding is genuinely new;-# * Trivy — HIGH/CRITICAL with a fix available, currently zero.+# * Trivy — HIGH/CRITICAL with a fix available, currently zero. It+# was reporting zero before this too, but for the wrong reason:+# the pinned release had been deleted upstream, so the download+# 404'd, the scan ran a binary that was not there, and+# continue-on-error turned the whole thing green.# - OBSERVE gates (report, do not fail yet): Semgrep, checkov, tfsec.# These are not observe-mode because nobody has looked. They were run# against this tree and the counts are: Semgrep 92 (35 at ERROR),@@ -144,17 +148,24 @@ jobs:# marketplace action: the action's version tags proved unreliable and# this is the form that has stayed working.#- # `set -e` matters now that this blocks — the previous `set -uo- # pipefail` let a failed download fall through to a `trivy` that was- # not there, and with --exit-code 0 the job reported success either- # way. Install failure must fail the job.+ # `set -e` and `--fail` matter now that this blocks. The previous+ # `set -uo pipefail` with no `--fail` wrote the 404 body into the+ # tarball, `tar` failed, and the scan then invoked a `trivy` that did+ # not exist — which `continue-on-error` reported as success. That is+ # not hypothetical: the pin was 0.55.2 and **Trivy had deleted that+ # release**, so this job downloaded nothing and scanned nothing while+ # reporting green. Upstream prunes old releases, so a pin here rots on+ # their schedule rather than ours; when it 404s, move it to a tag that+ # still exists and re-measure before trusting the result.- name: Install Trivyrun: |set -euo pipefail- VERSION=0.55.2- curl -sSL --fail --retry 5 --retry-delay 5 --retry-all-errors \- "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${VERSION}/trivy_${VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz" \- -o /tmp/trivy.tgz+ VERSION=0.74.0+ url="https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${VERSION}/trivy_${VERSION}_Linux-64bit.tar.gz"+ if ! curl -sSL --fail --retry 5 --retry-delay 5 --retry-all-errors "$url" -o /tmp/trivy.tgz; then+ echo "::error title=trivy::could not download $url — Trivy prunes old releases, so check whether v${VERSION} still exists and bump the pin"+ exit 1+ fitar -xzf /tmp/trivy.tgz -C /tmp trivy/tmp/trivy --versiondiff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 6e9411000..d561b7060 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ make demo## Connect real dataTwo ways in. Push, from anything that can make an HTTP request. The tenant-comes from the credential, not from a header — mint one with-`make ingest-token` ([how it works](https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs/operations/ingest-authentication)):+comes from the credential, not from a header, so mint one first with+`make ingest-token`:```bashcurl -X POST http://localhost:8081/v1/ingest/batch \diff --git a/apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.md b/apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.mdindex a87a50ba4..612fa9993 100644--- a/apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.md+++ b/apps/docs/docs/compliance/evidence-pack.md@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ and says so.| Prompt-injection resistance | 32-payload adversarial corpus with a recall floor and a false-positive ceiling | `services/agents/tests/adversarial/` || Claim-to-gate traceability | Every product claim mapped to the CI job that fails when it stops being true | `docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md` |-The last row is the one worth reading first. It is the honest index: 131 rows+The last row is the one worth reading first. It is the honest index: 132 rows`GATED`, 8 `PARTIAL` with the specific gap named, and a ratchet that refusesto let a row sit at `NO GATE`.