Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
chore(release): v12.3.1 (#1049)
Beenu Aroraa2d146bcd2aa
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex ac77165ea..5d5a1ad51 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,6 +7,15 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]+## [12.3.1] - 2026-09-29++### Security++- **SQL injection in the osquery allowlist (GHSA-p37g-cjqx-56hq, critical).** `render_query()` interpolated caller-supplied values into osquery SQL with `str.format_map()` and then scanned the result for `--`, `/*` and `;`. A denylist enumerates what is forbidden, so what it failed to enumerate was permitted: `'` was absent from the list and `recent_files` wraps `directory` in single quotes, so `' OR 1=1 OR directory='` closed the literal and replaced the WHERE clause. Reproducing it found two holes the report did not name — the numeric parameters were never coerced either, so `LIMIT {limit}` took `1 UNION SELECT …` verbatim and `WHERE pid = {pid}` took `1 OR 1=1`, which means **all six templates were injectable, not the one reported**, and a fix scoped to the named parameter would have left the rest open. Each parameter now declares what it *is* — a bounded whole number, or an absolute filesystem path — and a value that is not that is refused. Binding was checked first and is unavailable: FleetDM and osctrl both take a finished SQL string over REST and expose no bind channel, so making the dangerous value unrepresentable is the control. Refusing rather than escaping is deliberate — an escaped path is still a path, it reaches the endpoint, matches nothing and returns zero rows, and on a forensic query that is indistinguishable from a clean host. A new property-based suite over every template and every parameter fails 25 of 70 against the pre-fix tree and passes 70/70 after; the `services/actions` suite goes 998 → 1,068.+- **Missing function-level authorization on remediation writes (GHSA-wj5c-88hg-5926, high).** Every route in `remediation.py` depended on `get_current_user` and none on `require_permission`, so a `viewer` could raise the tenant's autonomy tier to L4, pre-approve a high blast-radius verb with no expiry, and suppress a containment verb mid-incident. `settings:write` already existed and was already withheld from `viewer`; it was simply never enforced here — the third time on this repository, after nine `cases` write routes and three MSSP permissions with no reader. It is now enforced on **all six routes**, including `DELETE /whitelist/{id}`, which the advisory does not mention and which was open on the same terms. `actions:execute` was the other candidate and is the wrong one: `soc_lead` and `soc_analyst` hold it, so it would let the principal who dispatches an action pre-approve its own future dispatches.+- **A second defect surfaced while reproducing the one above: the handler commits before FastAPI serialises the response.** The policy write landed on a request that returned **HTTP 500**, because these schemas declare `changed_at`/`created_at` as `str` while the columns are `DateTime` and Pydantic v2 does not coerce between them. So every response on that router raised `ResponseValidationError` *after* committing — which is why the regression tests assert the transaction did not commit rather than checking a status code. A test asserting `!= 200` would have passed against a successful attack. The annotations are corrected.+- **`scripts/check_route_authz.py`** — the advisory asked for a regression gate, and `check_route_auth.py` already existed and passed on every one of these routes while the vulnerability was live, because it asks whether a route *authenticates*. Authentication had been standing in for authorization. The new gate asks the other question and measures **246 state-changing routes in `services/api`, 143 of which authorize and 103 of which authenticate and make no authorization decision** (106 before this change). It resolves the three indirections that hide enforcement — an `Annotated` alias, a dependency helper, and a helper called from the handler body — so an already-gated route is not miscounted, and it refuses an empty corpus rather than crediting a tree it failed to scan. It is a ceiling rather than a list, because most of the 103 are not defects and enumerating them would be a list of excuses that is wrong within a week: the ceiling cannot rise, and it fails as *stale* if the real count drops below it, so the number only ever moves toward zero. Its self-test strips the permissions from this module and requires the count to go 103 → 106.+## [12.3.0] - 2026-09-29### Addeddiff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 24efd704b..26f9bc321 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@**An open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center.** It ingests your security telemetry, detects and correlates threats, investigates them with AI agents whose reasoning is fully auditable, and proposes responses a human approves.[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)-[](CHANGELOG.md)+[](CHANGELOG.md)[](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/ci.yml)[](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/codeql.yml)[](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/beenuar/AiSOC)diff --git a/RELEASES.md b/RELEASES.mdindex d5d9c3cdf..bbbbb622c 100644--- a/RELEASES.md+++ b/RELEASES.md@@ -2,16 +2,34 @@This file mirrors what used to live in the "What's new" section of [`README.md`](README.md). The complete, machine-readable inventory (with file paths, env-var diffs, and per-release test counts) lives in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).-> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v12.3.0`, released 2026-09-29 — the release that closed six lettered sub-phases, and every one of them was the same shape: a mechanism built in an earlier phase, tested, and pointed at almost nothing. The registry that pins the prompts a model receives held 3 of 22 and now holds all 22, so a prompt can no longer be reworded without a lock change and an eval re-grade. Approvals raised in the console and never answered waited forever on a column nothing swept, and now expire to a safe default read back from the other half of the system rather than restated. Dead letters became replayable from the Kafka offset the consumer used to discard, re-validated by the same validator that refused them. The ingest checkpoint stopped being a duck-typed optional method that 83 of 84 connectors silently lacked and became a declared contract. A storage cost model whose only reader was the gate that checked it now reports a tenant's projected $/mo beside its LLM $/mo. And the demo stack gained a time budget, which is what found a port probe that let Docker start Postgres with no network attached while three health checks read green — 3m06s to 1m39s once it was fixed. There is **no BREAKING section this time**; upgrading is `make up`. Both grading-integrity controls are now required rather than advisory, taking branch protection to 24 contexts, and only the two that actually report on a pull request were added, because GitHub counts a skipped required check as passing. Every product claim is backed by a failing CI test (claim-to-gate matrix at this cut: 239 rows — 239 GATED / 0 PARTIAL / 0 NO GATE, counted by `scripts/check_claim_gate_matrix.py`, which is the figure to recount rather than to quote). None of the eight first-party npm/PyPI packages has been uploaded — the registries still return 404 for all eight — and that remains credential-blocked rather than done. The latest GitHub release with notes and downloads: <https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/releases/latest>.+> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v12.3.1`, released 2026-09-29 — a security patch on top of v12.3.0, and the reason it exists separately is that a fix living on `main` is not a fix anyone has. Two reported advisories: a **critical** SQL injection in the osquery allowlist, where a denylist scanning rendered SQL for `--`, `/*` and `;` had never listed `'`, so a value could close a quoted literal and replace the WHERE clause — and reproducing it showed all six query templates were injectable, not the one reported, because the numeric parameters were never coerced either. Each parameter now declares what it is and anything else is refused rather than escaped, because an escaped path still reaches the endpoint, matches nothing, and reads to an operator as a clean host. The second is a **high** missing-authorization hole where every remediation write route authenticated and none authorized, so a `viewer` could raise the tenant to autonomy L4 and pre-approve a high blast-radius verb; the permission it needed already existed and was simply never enforced, which is the third time on this repository. The gate that should have caught it passed throughout, because it asks whether a route authenticates — so a second gate now asks whether it authorizes, and measures 103 of 246 state-changing routes making no authorization decision, as a ceiling that can only fall. Upgrading is `make up`. v12.3.0 (same day) closed six lettered sub-phases; its notes are below. None of the eight first-party npm/PyPI packages has been uploaded — the registries return 404 for all eight — and that remains credential-blocked rather than done. The latest GitHub release with notes and downloads: <https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/releases/latest>.---## What's new-`VERSION` is `12.3.0`. The **v12.3.0** release (2026-09-29) is a feature-release with no breaking changes: six lettered sub-phases closed, plus the-publish-signal and digest honesty fixes and two CI controls promoted from-advisory to required.+`VERSION` is `12.3.1`. The **v12.3.1** release (2026-09-29) is a security+patch: two reported advisories fixed, no feature change and nothing breaking.+It follows v12.3.0 the same day because a fix that sits on `main` is not a fix+anyone running the published images has.++**v12.3.1 highlights (September 29, 2026)**+- **GHSA-p37g-cjqx-56hq (critical) — SQL injection in the osquery allowlist.**+ A denylist that scanned rendered SQL for `--`, `/*` and `;` had never+ listed `'`. All six templates were injectable, not the one reported, since+ the numeric parameters were never coerced. Parameters now declare a type+ and anything else is refused, not escaped.+- **GHSA-wj5c-88hg-5926 (high) — missing function-level authorization.** Every+ remediation write route authenticated and none authorized, so a `viewer`+ could raise the tenant to L4 and pre-approve a high blast-radius verb. Now+ enforced on all six routes, including one the advisory does not name.+- **The router also committed before serialising**, returning HTTP 500 on a+ write that had already landed — so the regression tests assert the+ transaction did not commit rather than checking a status code.+- **A gate that asks whether a route authorizes**, not merely whether it+ authenticates: 103 of 246 state-changing routes make no authorization+ decision, recorded as a ceiling that can only fall.+**v12.3.0 highlights (September 29, 2026)**- **Six deferrals closed, one recurring shape.** 8b (every shipped promptdiff --git a/VERSION b/VERSIONindex 4d23cb8e0..9c028e25d 100644--- a/VERSION+++ b/VERSION@@ -1 +1 @@-12.3.0+12.3.1diff --git a/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json b/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.jsonindex 9f02052ba..1bdad2406 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json+++ b/apps/docs/static/data/scoreboard.json@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@"rows": [{"date": "2026-09-29",- "agent_version": "v12.3.0",- "commit_sha": "a4747831",+ "agent_version": "v12.3.1",+ "commit_sha": "0e3a3866","substrate": true,"eval_mode": "substrate-only","mitre_accuracy": 0.97,diff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txtindex e05f8969a..6f9b456a4 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms-full.txt@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@<!-- Generated by scripts/generate_llms_txt.py. Do not edit by hand; run the script and commit the result. -->> AiSOC is an open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center, MIT-> licensed and maintained by the AiSOC community. Version 12.3.0.+> licensed and maintained by the AiSOC community. Version 12.3.1.> Repository: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC. Documentation: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/.This file exists so an automated reader can answer questions about AiSOCdiff --git a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt b/apps/docs/static/llms.txtindex 3fbf7f75a..f375201bb 100644--- a/apps/docs/static/llms.txt+++ b/apps/docs/static/llms.txt@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@> security telemetry from 84 first-party connectors, normalises it to OCSF,> correlates it into alerts, and runs LLM agents that triage and investigate them.> Every agent decision is written to an investigation ledger, so the reasoning-> behind a verdict can be replayed step by step. MIT licensed. Current version 12.3.0.+> behind a verdict can be replayed step by step. MIT licensed. Current version 12.3.1.AiSOC is built and maintained by the AiSOC community. It is a complete SOCplatform rather than a single tool: ingestion, detection, correlation, agentdiff --git a/apps/web/package.json b/apps/web/package.jsonindex a8ca1a791..d0dafb23a 100644--- a/apps/web/package.json+++ b/apps/web/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "@aisoc/web",- "version": "12.3.0",+ "version": "12.3.1","private": true,"description": "AiSOC SOC Console - Next.js 14 Frontend","license": "MIT",diff --git a/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml b/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yamlindex 623f1a408..873a76221 100644--- a/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml+++ b/infra/helm/aisoc/Chart.yaml@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ apiVersion: v2name: aisocdescription: AiSOC - the open-source, AI-native Security Operations Centertype: application-version: 5.9.0+version: 5.9.1# Used as the image tag wherever a `tag:` in values.yaml is left empty, so# it has to be a tag the registry actually holds — it read "5.2.0", which# exists for no image, so every pod of a default install would have gone to# ImagePullBackOff. scripts/check_published_images.py resolves it the same# way the templates do and fails when it names nothing.-appVersion: "v12.3.0"+appVersion: "v12.3.1"keywords:- security