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security(api): harden /fusion + /cases proxy endpoints against SSRF and log injection
Beenu Aroraa589d2662ab6
diff --git a/.gitleaksignore b/.gitleaksignorenew file mode 100644index 000000000..4ea404d34--- /dev/null+++ b/.gitleaksignore@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@+# gitleaks ignore list+#+# Each entry is a triaged false-positive. New entries MUST include a comment+# explaining why the match is benign. If a finding cannot be justified, do not+# add it here -- rotate the secret and remove the leak from the source.+#+# Format: <absolute_or_repo_relative_path>:<rule-id>:<line>++# Positive test fixture for the `jwt-none-alg` detection rule. This file is+# *expected* to contain a JWT with `alg: none` because the detection engine+# runs against it as ground truth.+detections/fixtures/positive/jwt-none-alg.json:jwt:2++# Render IaC env-var keys (`AISOC_DISABLE_NEO4J`, `AISOC_DISABLE_QDRANT`).+# The generic-api-key rule fires on the long key name; the value is "true",+# not a secret.+infra/render/render.yaml:generic-api-key:70+infra/render/render.yaml:generic-api-key:124++# Detection rule literal: `count_5min_per_ip_gt: 30` matches the heuristic.+# This is a rule definition, not a credential.+scripts/detection_specs_part3_application.py:generic-api-key:61++# Detection rule positive sample: an `alg: none` JWT used to validate the+# matching detection rule. Same fixture pattern as jwt-none-alg.json.+scripts/detection_specs_part2.py:jwt:1111++# Pre-generated Fernet key used as a deterministic test default in+# `test_security_defaults.py`. Real deployments inject AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY+# as a secret at runtime; this value is *never* used outside tests.+services/api/tests/test_security_defaults.py:generic-api-key:34diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.pyindex befe31560..f4fae8a20 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport loggingimport os+import reimport uuidfrom datetime import UTC, datetimefrom typing import Any, Literal+from urllib.parse import quoteimport httpxfrom fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Response, status@@ -46,6 +48,26 @@ _AGENTS_URL = (or "http://agents:8084").rstrip("/")+# Tight allowlist for proxied request paths. We only ever proxy to a fixed+# upstream (`_AGENTS_URL`) on a known set of investigation routes, so the+# path must be a pure relative path — no scheme, no host, no control bytes,+# no traversal sequences. This neutralises partial-SSRF (an attacker cannot+# redirect the request to a different host) and log-injection (the path+# can never contain CR/LF or other control characters).+_SAFE_PROXY_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9_\-./%]*$")+++def _validate_agents_path(path: str) -> str:+ """Reject any proxied path that isn't a tightly constrained relative path."""+ if (+ not isinstance(path, str)+ or not _SAFE_PROXY_PATH_RE.match(path)+ or ".." in path+ or path.startswith("//") # protocol-relative URL+ ):+ raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid_request_path")+ return path+# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────# Pydantic schemas# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -835,13 +857,14 @@ async def update_task(async def _agents_proxy(method: str, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Response:- url = f"{_AGENTS_URL}{path}"+ safe_path = _validate_agents_path(path)+ url = f"{_AGENTS_URL}{safe_path}"timeout = kwargs.pop("timeout", 30.0)try:async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout) as client:return await client.request(method, url, **kwargs)except httpx.HTTPError as exc:- logger.exception("Agents service request failed: %s %s", method, url)+ logger.exception("Agents service request failed: %s %s", method, safe_path)raise HTTPException(status_code=503,detail=f"Agents service unavailable: {exc}",@@ -902,12 +925,25 @@ async def case_investigation_run(run_id: str,user: AuthUser,) -> dict[str, Any]:- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{run_id}")+ # URL-encode the user-supplied run_id so it cannot inject `/`, `?`, `#`,+ # CR/LF, or other URL syntax into the proxied path.+ safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")if resp.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)return resp.json()+# Filename sanitiser for Content-Disposition: keep only safe ASCII so the+# header cannot be split with CR/LF and the value renders consistently.+_SAFE_FILENAME_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]")+++def _safe_filename_segment(value: str) -> str:+ """Reduce an identifier to a Content-Disposition-safe filename segment."""+ return _SAFE_FILENAME_RE.sub("_", value)[:64] or "unknown"++@router.get("/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}/report.pdf",summary="Download investigation PDF report",@@ -917,16 +953,19 @@ async def case_investigation_pdf(run_id: str,user: AuthUser,) -> Response:- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{run_id}/report.pdf")+ safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf")if resp.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)+ safe_case_id = _safe_filename_segment(case_id)+ safe_run_id_filename = _safe_filename_segment(run_id)return Response(content=resp.content,media_type=resp.headers.get("content-type", "application/pdf"),headers={"Content-Disposition": resp.headers.get("content-disposition",- f'attachment; filename="case-{case_id}-{run_id}.pdf"',+ f'attachment; filename="case-{safe_case_id}-{safe_run_id_filename}.pdf"',),},)diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/fusion.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/fusion.pyindex 1a3fe7a00..73f7a8110 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/fusion.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/fusion.py@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport loggingimport os+import refrom typing import Any+from urllib.parse import quotefrom uuid import UUIDimport httpx@@ -45,19 +47,39 @@ _FUSION_URL = (or "").rstrip("/")+# Tight allowlist for proxied request paths. We only ever proxy to a fixed+# upstream (`_FUSION_URL`) on a known set of routes, so the path must be a+# pure relative path with no scheme, host, control characters, or traversal+# sequences. This neutralises partial-SSRF (an attacker cannot redirect the+# request elsewhere) and log-injection (the path can never contain CR/LF).+_SAFE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9_\-./%]*$")+++def _validate_proxy_path(path: str) -> str:+ """Reject any proxied path that isn't a tightly constrained relative path."""+ if (+ not isinstance(path, str)+ or not _SAFE_PATH_RE.match(path)+ or ".." in path+ or path.startswith("//") # protocol-relative URL+ ):+ raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid_request_path")+ return path+async def _proxy_get(path: str, params: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:"""Forward GET to fusion if configured. Return None on transport error."""if not _FUSION_URL:return None+ safe_path = _validate_proxy_path(path)try:async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0) as client:- resp = await client.get(f"{_FUSION_URL}{path}", params=params or {})+ resp = await client.get(f"{_FUSION_URL}{safe_path}", params=params or {})if resp.status_code >= 500:logger.warning("Fusion upstream returned %s for %s; falling back to stub",resp.status_code,- path,+ safe_path,)return Noneif resp.status_code == 404:@@ -172,8 +194,12 @@ async def entity_risk_detail() -> dict[str, Any]:if entity_type == "ip":entity_type = "src_ip"+ # URL-encode user-controlled path segments so they cannot inject `/`,+ # `?`, `#`, or other URL syntax into the proxied path.+ safe_type = quote(entity_type, safe="")+ safe_value = quote(entity_value, safe="")upstream = await _proxy_get(- f"/entity-risk/{entity_type}/{entity_value}",+ f"/entity-risk/{safe_type}/{safe_value}",params={"tenant_id": str(tenant_id)},)if upstream is not None: