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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

feat(auth): a second factor on the console, with recovery codes and per-tenant enforcement (fix pass 4.2) (#1202)

Beenu Aroraa87aa2a708c7
diff --git a/.github/workflows/mfa-live.yml b/.github/workflows/mfa-live.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b055d76fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/mfa-live.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# A second factor on the console — through the real app and real Postgres.
+#
+# Why live and not offline
+# ------------------------
+# The property is "a correct password is not enough", and the only thing
+# that can demonstrate it is the real login route against the real user row
+# with the real password hash. A fake session answers whatever the handler
+# asks, so it would return a user with whatever MFA state the test wrote
+# into the double — which is the shape that has shipped defects here before.
+#
+# `ENVIRONMENT=test`, never `development`: `development` is in
+# `AUTH_BYPASS_ENVIRONMENTS`, so an uncredentialed request resolves to a
+# demo administrator, inside the one suite whose whole subject is what it
+# takes to become a principal.
+#
+# No `paths:` filter. The surface is authentication; a change anywhere in
+# `services/api` can reach it, and a filtered gate on a login path is a gate
+# that is absent exactly when something unexpected moved.
+name: Console MFA (live)
+
+on:
+ push:
+ branches: [main]
+ pull_request:
+ workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+ group: mfa-live-${{ github.ref }}-${{ github.event_name }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.sha }}
+ cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
+
+permissions:
+ contents: read
+
+jobs:
+ mfa-live:
+ name: A password alone does not complete a console sign-in
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ timeout-minutes: 20
+
+ services:
+ postgres:
+ image: postgres:16-alpine
+ env:
+ POSTGRES_USER: aisoc
+ POSTGRES_PASSWORD: aisoc_ci_only
+ POSTGRES_DB: aisoc
+ ports: ["5432:5432"]
+ options: >-
+ --health-cmd "pg_isready -U aisoc"
+ --health-interval 5s
+ --health-timeout 5s
+ --health-retries 20
+
+ env:
+ # The runtime role, not the owner. A superuser ignores every RLS
+ # policy even under FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY, and the challenge path
+ # writes `aisoc_user_mfa` on a session that binds its tenant from the
+ # user row rather than from a principal — running as the owner would
+ # pass for a reason no deployment enjoys.
+ MFA_DSN: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:aisoc_app_ci_only@localhost:5432/aisoc
+ PGPASSWORD: aisoc_ci_only
+ ENVIRONMENT: test
+ OTEL_SDK_DISABLED: "true"
+
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
+
+ - uses: actions/setup-python@e9d6f990972a57673cdb72ec29e19d42ba28880f # v6
+ with:
+ python-version: "3.11"
+
+ - name: Install api from its lockfile
+ working-directory: services/api
+ run: |
+ set -euo pipefail
+ sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq libxmlsec1-dev pkg-config
+ python -m pip install --quiet --upgrade pip "poetry==2.4.1"
+ poetry config virtualenvs.create false
+ poetry install --no-root --no-interaction
+ python -m pip install --quiet pytest pytest-asyncio
+
+ - name: Apply every migration, in order
+ run: |
+ for f in services/api/migrations/*.sql; do
+ psql -h localhost -U aisoc -d aisoc -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -f "$f"
+ done
+
+ - name: Give the runtime role its password
+ run: |
+ psql -h localhost -U aisoc -d aisoc -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -c \
+ "ALTER ROLE aisoc_app WITH PASSWORD 'aisoc_app_ci_only';"
+ psql -h localhost -U aisoc -d aisoc -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -q -c \
+ "GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO aisoc_app;"
+
+ # RFC 6238's own vectors. They are what make the in-tree derivation an
+ # implementation of the standard rather than of itself — a round trip
+ # would agree with itself even if every authenticator app rejected the
+ # enrolment.
+ - name: The derivation matches RFC 6238
+ working-directory: services/api
+ run: python -m pytest tests/test_console_mfa.py -v --tb=short
+
+ - name: Enrolment, challenge, recovery, policy and reset
+ working-directory: services/api
+ env:
+ ISOLATION_MFA_DSN: ${{ env.MFA_DSN }}
+ DATABASE_URL: ${{ env.MFA_DSN }}
+ run: python -m pytest ../../tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py -v --tb=short
+
+ # The negative control.
+ #
+ # Removing the branch that turns a correct password into a challenge
+ # must make the suite go red. Without it, "alice signed in with a
+ # code" would pass equally well against a login route that had never
+ # asked for one — it would simply hand out a session first.
+ #
+ # Measured on the fix commit: eight tests fail.
+ - name: The suite fails when a password alone issues a session again
+ working-directory: services/api
+ env:
+ ISOLATION_MFA_DSN: ${{ env.MFA_DSN }}
+ DATABASE_URL: ${{ env.MFA_DSN }}
+ run: |
+ cp app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py /tmp/auth.bak
+ python - <<'PY'
+ import pathlib, sys
+ p = pathlib.Path("app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py")
+ s = p.read_text()
+ needle = (
+ " challenge = await mfa_challenge_for(db, user_id=user.id, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)\n"
+ " if challenge is not None:\n"
+ " return JSONResponse(status_code=status.HTTP_202_ACCEPTED, content=challenge)\n"
+ )
+ if needle not in s:
+ print("negative control could not find the login integration to remove; it has "
+ "been reshaped and this control is no longer proving anything")
+ sys.exit(1)
+ p.write_text(s.replace(needle, "", 1))
+ PY
+ if python -m pytest ../../tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py -q >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ cp /tmp/auth.bak app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py
+ echo "FAIL: the suite passed with a password alone issuing a session."
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ cp /tmp/auth.bak app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py
+ echo "OK: removing the challenge makes the suite fail, as it must."
+ python -m pytest ../../tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py -q
+
+ # Both directions of the authorization accounting this item touches.
+ # `require_current_factor` is registered in `check_route_authz.py` as
+ # an authorizing call, which is a claim that needs its own gate run.
+ - name: Route authorization accounting
+ run: |
+ python3 scripts/check_route_auth.py --self-test
+ python3 scripts/check_route_auth.py
+ python3 scripts/check_route_authz.py --self-test
+ python3 scripts/check_route_authz.py
diff --git a/FIX_PASS_PROGRESS.md b/FIX_PASS_PROGRESS.md
index 17b4b8953..dc8cad182 100644
--- a/FIX_PASS_PROGRESS.md
+++ b/FIX_PASS_PROGRESS.md
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ conditional `numpy` pins collide into an unresolvable install. Parse with
- [~] **4.1** SSO completes in the console
- Two of the three defects did **not** reproduce: the console fragment consumer (`authApi.completeSsoHandoff`) and the login-screen SSO entry both landed in v17.1.0. Neither was covered by a test, so six now pin them. The third reproduced exactly as written — `_saml_settings()` read its IdP trust anchor from `SAML_IDP_*` while the connection's own `metadata_url` / `metadata_xml` were read by nothing, so a SAML login redirected to the environment's IdP and a correctly signed assertion came back `invalid_response`. Fixed in `app/auth/saml_metadata.py`; the ACS also now lands on `/login?next=` with both tokens, because the old RelayState redirect lost the fragment to the console's own auth guard. Driven end to end against real Postgres and a real signed assertion in `sso-live.yml`. **Still `[~]`**: the containerised-IdP leg (`sso-live.yml :: keycloak-oidc`) has never been observed to pass — no container runtime would start where it was written — so the claim row is PARTIAL, not GATED.
-- [ ] **4.2** Console MFA
+- [x] **4.2** Console MFA
+ - Reproduced first: ten of eleven assertions against the real login route and real Postgres failed with `{"detail":"Not Found"}` — the surface did not exist. TOTP (RFC 6238, in-tree, pinned to the spec's own vectors rather than to a round trip), ten single-use recovery codes, a vault-encrypted secret, a `last_used_step` high-water mark so a code cannot be replayed inside its own 30-second window, per-tenant enforcement with **no backfill row** (absence means not required), and audited enrolment, disable, recovery-code use, policy change and administrative reset. A correct password for an enrolled account now answers **202** with a challenge instead of a session — 202 rather than a widened 200 body, because `access_token` is a required field and making it optional breaks every generated client. An unenrolled member of a newly-enforcing tenant enrols from that challenge rather than being locked out; the trade-off is stated in the module and the docs. Migration `096`. 28 offline tests, 13 live, and a CI negative control that deletes the challenge branch and requires the suite to go red.
- [ ] **4.3** White-label reaches every surface it claims
- [ ] **4.4** Metering counts what happened
- [ ] **4.5** SCIM live coverage and the console token claim
diff --git a/apps/docs/docs/operations/console-mfa.md b/apps/docs/docs/operations/console-mfa.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..387e2b634
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/docs/docs/operations/console-mfa.md
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+---
+id: console-mfa
+title: Two-factor authentication
+sidebar_label: Two-factor auth
+---
+
+# Two-factor authentication
+
+A time-based one-time password on the desktop console, with recovery
+codes, per-tenant enforcement, and an audit row for every enrolment and
+reset.
+
+## What this replaced
+
+Nothing. Before this, `POST /api/v1/auth/login` verified a password and
+returned a token pair, and no user or administrator could make that
+insufficient. Passkeys existed on `/responder/*` — the mobile PWA — so
+the surface an analyst works from all day was single-factor by
+construction.
+
+## Enrolling
+
+**Settings → Two-factor auth → Set up.** The console shows a key to add
+to any authenticator app, you enter the code it displays, and the
+response carries ten recovery codes.
+
+The recovery codes exist in plaintext exactly once. They are stored as
+SHA-256 hashes — not bcrypt, deliberately: a code is 100 bits of
+generated entropy with no dictionary to slow an attacker down, and
+verification walks every unused code you hold, so ten bcrypt comparisons
+per attempt would be a second of CPU on the login path.
+
+An enrolment is only a credential once it is **confirmed**. Starting one
+and closing the tab locks nobody out.
+
+## Signing in
+
+A correct password for an enrolled account answers **HTTP 202** with a
+short-lived `mfa_token` instead of a session:
+
+```json
+{ "mfa_required": true, "mfa_token": "eyJ…", "methods": ["totp", "recovery_code"] }
+```
+
+`POST /api/v1/auth/mfa/verify` with that token and a code — either from
+the app or one of the recovery codes — returns the ordinary token pair.
+
+:::note Why 202 and not an extended 200
+`access_token` and `refresh_token` are required fields of
+`TokenResponse`. Making either optional is a break for every generated
+client, which `scripts/openapi_diff.py` correctly refuses. A 401 would
+have collided with the console's own `handleUnauthorized`, which clears
+stored credentials and bounces to `/login`.
+:::
+
+A code is spent once it is used. `last_used_step` records the 30-second
+step it authenticated at, so a code read over your shoulder cannot be
+replayed for the rest of its window. The practical effect worth knowing:
+the code you confirm an enrolment with is not reusable to sign in a few
+seconds later — wait for the next one.
+
+## Requiring it across a tenant
+
+**Settings → Two-factor auth → Require for everyone**, or
+`PUT /api/v1/auth/mfa/policy` with `{"require_totp": true}`. Needs
+`settings:write`.
+
+Members who have not enrolled are **asked to enrol at their next
+sign-in**, not locked out: the 202 they receive carries
+`mfa_enrollment_required` and a challenge token the enrolment endpoints
+accept, and the login page walks them through it.
+
+The trade-off is stated rather than hidden: somebody holding a stolen
+password can enrol *their own* authenticator before the real user does.
+It is bounded by the password still being required, by the window closing
+as soon as the real user enrols, and by `mfa.enrolled` being audited with
+the source address. Refusing instead would lock out every unenrolled
+member of the tenant at the moment the policy is turned on.
+
+A tenant that has never visited this endpoint has **no policy row at
+all**, and absence means not required. No migration writes one — a
+backfill of a row per tenant would change the meaning of every predicate
+that counts rows in that table.
+
+## Losing a phone
+
+Use a recovery code. Each works once.
+
+With none left, an administrator holding `users:write` can clear the
+factor:
+
+```http
+POST /api/v1/auth/mfa/reset/{user_id}
+{ "reason": "lost phone, verified by voice" }
+```
+
+Three constraints, because an administrative reset is normally the
+weakest link in an MFA deployment:
+
+- the target must be in the caller's own tenant, taken from the
+ authenticated principal and never from the request;
+- the `reason` is required and lands in the audit row;
+- an administrator may **not** reset their own factor here. That would be
+ a self-disable with no code. Removing your own factor goes through
+ `DELETE /api/v1/auth/mfa`, which requires a current code — otherwise a
+ stolen session could strip the thing protecting it.
+
+## What is audited
+
+`mfa.enrolled`, `mfa.disabled`, `mfa.reset`, `mfa.recovery_code_used` and
+`mfa.policy_changed`, all on the tenant's own hash-chained audit log, each
+carrying the source address.
+
+## Storage
+
+The TOTP secret is vault-encrypted (`vault:v1:` / `vault:v2:`), never the
+base32 you scanned. A database dump that yields TOTP secrets yields the
+second factor for every account in it, which is most of the reason for
+having one. A secret this deployment can no longer decrypt — a rotated
+credential key with no rotation-from value — fails **closed**: sign-in is
+refused with a message naming the cause, and an administrator resets the
+factor.
+
+## Related
+
+- [Enterprise SSO](./enterprise-sso.md)
+- [Security model](./security.md)
diff --git a/apps/docs/sidebars.ts b/apps/docs/sidebars.ts
index 1f8267a74..23741e557 100644
--- a/apps/docs/sidebars.ts
+++ b/apps/docs/sidebars.ts
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ const sidebars: SidebarsConfig = {
items: [
"operations/security",
"operations/enterprise-sso",
+ "operations/console-mfa",
"operations/data-governance",
"compliance/evidence-pack",
"compliance/fips-posture",
diff --git a/apps/web/src/app/(app)/settings/mfa/page.tsx b/apps/web/src/app/(app)/settings/mfa/page.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e76ab9ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/web/src/app/(app)/settings/mfa/page.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import { MfaView } from '@/components/settings/MfaView';
+
+export const metadata = {
+ title: 'Two-factor authentication',
+};
+
+export default function MfaSettingsPage() {
+ return (
+ <div className="p-6">
+ <MfaView />
+ </div>
+ );
+}
diff --git a/apps/web/src/app/login/page.tsx b/apps/web/src/app/login/page.tsx
index 1bb32a0b1..178eb4e42 100644
--- a/apps/web/src/app/login/page.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/src/app/login/page.tsx
@@ -15,7 +15,15 @@
import Link from 'next/link';
import { useRouter, useSearchParams } from 'next/navigation';
import { Suspense, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
-import { API_BASE, authApi, onboardingApi } from '@/lib/api';
+import {
+ API_BASE,
+ authApi,
+ isMfaChallenge,
+ mfaApi,
+ onboardingApi,
+ type MfaChallenge,
+ type MfaEnrollment,
+} from '@/lib/api';
import { isDemoMode } from '@/lib/demoMode';
type Phase = 'idle' | 'pending' | 'success' | 'error';
@@ -65,6 +73,10 @@ function LoginInner() {
const [phase, setPhase] = useState<Phase>('idle');
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [sso, setSso] = useState<{ sso_enabled: boolean; provider: string; login_label: string; local_login_enabled: boolean } | null>(null);
+ const [challenge, setChallenge] = useState<MfaChallenge | null>(null);
+ const [code, setCode] = useState('');
+ const [enrolment, setEnrolment] = useState<MfaEnrollment | null>(null);
+ const [recoveryCodes, setRecoveryCodes] = useState<string[] | null>(null);
// An SSO round-trip lands here with the session in the fragment; consume
// it before the stored-token redirect below can read a still-empty store.
@@ -126,7 +138,14 @@ async function landingRoute(requested: string): Promise<string> {
setError(null);
try {
- await authApi.login(email.trim(), password);
+ const result = await authApi.login(email.trim(), password);
+ // The password was right and no session was issued: this account, or
+ // this tenant, requires a second factor.
+ if (isMfaChallenge(result)) {
+ setChallenge(result);
+ setPhase('idle');
+ return;
+ }
setPhase('success');
router.replace(await landingRoute(next));
} catch (err) {
@@ -142,6 +161,53 @@ async function landingRoute(requested: string): Promise<string> {
}
};
+ const beginEnrolment = async () => {
+ if (!challenge || phase === 'pending') return;
+ setPhase('pending');
+ setError(null);
+ try {
+ setEnrolment(await mfaApi.enrollBegin(challenge.mfa_token));
+ setPhase('idle');
+ } catch (err) {
+ setPhase('error');
+ setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Could not start enrolment.');
+ }
+ };
+
+ const submitCode = async (event: React.FormEvent) => {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ if (!challenge || phase === 'pending') return;
+ setPhase('pending');
+ setError(null);
+ try {
+ // Enrolling and verifying are different endpoints. The first
+ // confirms a secret the user has just scanned and signs them in; the
+ // second completes a sign-in against a factor they already hold.
+ if (enrolment) {
+ const confirmed = await mfaApi.enrollConfirm(code.trim(), challenge.mfa_token);
+ setRecoveryCodes(confirmed.recovery_codes);
+ if (confirmed.access_token) {
+ await authApi.adoptSession(confirmed.access_token, confirmed.refresh_token ?? '');
+ }
+ setPhase('success');
+ return;
+ }
+ await authApi.completeMfa(challenge.mfa_token, code.trim());
+ setPhase('success');
+ router.replace(await landingRoute(next));
+ } catch (err) {
+ setPhase('error');
+ const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Verification failed.';
+ // A challenge is short-lived, and "that code is not valid" is the
+ // wrong thing to tell someone whose five minutes ran out.
+ setError(
+ /expired/i.test(message)
+ ? 'That sign-in attempt expired. Enter your password again.'
+ : 'That code is not valid. Check your authenticator, or use a recovery code.',
+ );
+ }
+ };
+
const useDemo = () => {
setEmail(DEMO_EMAIL);
setPassword(DEMO_PASSWORD);
@@ -207,6 +273,134 @@ async function landingRoute(requested: string): Promise<string> {
</div>
)}
+ {/* Second factor. Replaces the password form rather than sitting
+ beside it: the password has already been accepted, and leaving
+ it on screen invites someone to retype it instead of reading
+ their authenticator. */}
+ {challenge ? (
+ <form onSubmit={submitCode} className="space-y-4" noValidate data-testid="mfa-challenge">
+ <div className="rounded-xl border border-zinc-800 bg-zinc-900/60 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-zinc-300">
+ {challenge.mfa_enrollment_required
+ ? 'Your organisation requires a second factor and this account has not set one up yet. Finish setting it up to sign in.'
+ : 'Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app, or one of your recovery codes.'}
+ </div>
+
+ {/* Enrolment happens here rather than behind a link to
+ /settings/mfa: this user has a correct password and no
+ session, so every authenticated route would bounce them
+ straight back to this page. */}
+ {challenge.mfa_enrollment_required && !enrolment ? (
+ <button
+ type="button"
+ onClick={beginEnrolment}
+ disabled={phase === 'pending'}
+ className="w-full inline-flex items-center justify-center rounded-xl bg-indigo-500 hover:bg-indigo-400 text-white font-medium py-3 px-4 transition disabled:bg-zinc-800 disabled:text-zinc-500"
+ >
+ {phase === 'pending' ? 'Preparing…' : 'Set up two-factor authentication'}
+ </button>
+ ) : (
+ <>
+ {enrolment ? (
+ <div className="rounded-xl border border-zinc-800 bg-zinc-900/60 px-4 py-3 space-y-2">
+ <p className="text-xs text-zinc-400">
+ Add this key to your authenticator app, then enter the code it shows.
+ </p>
+ <code className="block break-all rounded-lg bg-zinc-950 px-3 py-2 text-xs tracking-wider text-indigo-300">
+ {enrolment.secret}
+ </code>
+ <a
+ href={enrolment.otpauth_uri}
+ className="inline-block text-xs text-indigo-400 hover:text-indigo-300 underline-offset-2 hover:underline"
+ >
+ Open in your authenticator app
+ </a>
+ </div>
+ ) : null}
+
+ {recoveryCodes ? (
+ <div className="rounded-xl border border-amber-500/40 bg-amber-500/5 px-4 py-3 space-y-2">
+ <p className="text-xs font-medium text-amber-300">
+ Save these recovery codes. They are shown once.
+ </p>
+ <ul className="grid grid-cols-2 gap-1 font-mono text-[11px] text-zinc-300">
+ {recoveryCodes.map((rc) => (
+ <li key={rc}>{rc}</li>
+ ))}
+ </ul>
+ </div>
+ ) : null}
+
+ <label className="block">
+ <span className="block text-xs uppercase tracking-wider text-zinc-500 mb-2">
+ Verification code
+ </span>
+ <input
+ type="text"
+ // `one-time-code` is what lets a phone offer the code
+ // from the notification shade; without it the user
+ // switches apps and loses the page on iOS.
+ autoComplete="one-time-code"
+ inputMode="text"
+ autoCapitalize="characters"
+ spellCheck={false}
+ autoFocus
+ placeholder="123456"
+ value={code}
+ onChange={(e) => setCode(e.target.value)}
+ disabled={phase === 'pending'}
+ required
+ className="w-full bg-zinc-900 border border-zinc-800 rounded-xl px-4 py-3 text-sm tracking-[0.3em] text-zinc-100 placeholder:tracking-normal placeholder:text-zinc-600 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-indigo-500/50 focus:border-indigo-500/50 disabled:opacity-60"
+ />
+ </label>
+ {/* Navigating automatically would take the recovery
+ codes off the screen the moment they appeared, and
+ they are shown exactly once. */}
+ {recoveryCodes ? (
+ <button
+ type="button"
+ onClick={async () => router.replace(await landingRoute(next))}
+ className="w-full bg-indigo-500 hover:bg-indigo-400 text-white font-medium rounded-xl py-3 px-4 transition"
+ >
+ I have saved my recovery codes — continue
+ </button>
+ ) : (
+ <button
+ type="submit"
+ disabled={phase === 'pending' || !code}
+ className="w-full bg-indigo-500 hover:bg-indigo-400 active:bg-indigo-600 text-white font-medium rounded-xl py-3 px-4 transition disabled:bg-zinc-800 disabled:text-zinc-500"
+ >
+ {phase === 'pending' ? 'Verifying…' : enrolment ? 'Confirm' : 'Verify'}
+ </button>
+ )}
+ </>
+ )}
+
+ {error ? (
+ <div
+ role="alert"
+ className="rounded-lg border border-red-500/40 bg-red-500/10 px-3 py-2.5 text-xs text-red-300"
+ >
+ {error}
+ </div>
+ ) : null}
+
+ <button
+ type="button"
+ onClick={() => {
+ setChallenge(null);
+ setCode('');
+ setError(null);
+ setPassword('');
+ setEnrolment(null);
+ setRecoveryCodes(null);
+ }}
+ className="w-full text-xs text-zinc-500 hover:text-zinc-300 underline-offset-2 hover:underline"
+ >
+ Start over
+ </button>
+ </form>
+ ) : (
+ <>
{/* Form */}
{sso?.sso_enabled && (
<div className="mb-4">
@@ -308,6 +502,8 @@ async function landingRoute(requested: string): Promise<string> {
</div>
) : null}
</form>
+ </>
+ )}
{/* Footer hints */}
<div className="mt-8 space-y-3 text-center">
diff --git a/apps/web/src/components/demo/DemoAutoLogin.tsx b/apps/web/src/components/demo/DemoAutoLogin.tsx
index db7f73b53..5ab84e816 100644
--- a/apps/web/src/components/demo/DemoAutoLogin.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/src/components/demo/DemoAutoLogin.tsx
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
import { useEffect } from 'react';
import { useSWRConfig } from 'swr';
-import { authApi } from '@/lib/api';
+import { authApi, isMfaChallenge } from '@/lib/api';
import { isDemoMode } from '@/lib/demoMode';
// No fallback literals. These are inlined by Next at build time wherever they
@@ -55,8 +55,12 @@ export function DemoAutoLogin() {
let cancelled = false;
(async () => {
try {
- await authApi.login(DEMO_EMAIL, DEMO_PASSWORD);
+ const result = await authApi.login(DEMO_EMAIL, DEMO_PASSWORD);
if (cancelled) return;
+ // A demo tenant that requires a second factor cannot be
+ // auto-signed-in, and pretending otherwise would refetch every SWR
+ // key with no credential and render the page as if it were empty.
+ if (isMfaChallenge(result)) return;
// Force every SWR key on the page to refetch with the new bearer
// token. Passing `() => true` matches all keys; `undefined` data
// tells SWR to drop its cache entry and rerun the fetcher.
diff --git a/apps/web/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx b/apps/web/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx
index a0bc9194c..6994c1458 100644
--- a/apps/web/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx
@@ -324,6 +324,11 @@ const navSections: NavSection[] = [
href: '/settings/rbac',
icon: <ShieldIcon />,
},
+ {
+ label: 'Two-factor auth',
+ href: '/settings/mfa',
+ icon: <ShieldIcon />,
+ },
{
label: 'Compliance',
href: '/compliance',
diff --git a/apps/web/src/components/layout/TopBar.tsx b/apps/web/src/components/layout/TopBar.tsx
index 5e2f613b3..f13150729 100644
--- a/apps/web/src/components/layout/TopBar.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/src/components/layout/TopBar.tsx
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { useTenant } from './TenantProvider';
const routeLabels: Record<string, { title: string; description: string }> = {
'/detection/catalog': { title: 'Detection Catalog', description: 'Curated rule packs and templates' },
'/settings/rbac': { title: 'Roles & Permissions', description: 'Access control and team management' },
+ '/settings/mfa': { title: 'Two-factor authentication', description: 'Your second factor, and whether this tenant requires one' },
'/settings/users': { title: 'Users', description: 'Member and role management' },
'/dashboard': { title: 'Dashboard', description: 'SOC overview and metrics' },
'/alerts': { title: 'Alerts', description: 'Security alerts and incidents' },
diff --git a/apps/web/src/components/onboarding/StartHero.tsx b/apps/web/src/components/onboarding/StartHero.tsx
index b61f9b7e0..d03ee144d 100644
--- a/apps/web/src/components/onboarding/StartHero.tsx
+++ b/apps/web/src/components/onboarding/StartHero.tsx
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import Link from 'next/link';
import { useState } from 'react';
import { motion } from 'framer-motion';
import toast from 'react-hot-toast';
-import { authApi } from '@/lib/api';
+import { authApi, isMfaChallenge } from '@/lib/api';
import { demoDeeplink } from '@/lib/demoMode';
import { CONNECTOR_COUNT } from '@/data/connectorCount';
@@ -55,7 +55,13 @@ export function StartHero() {
try {
if (!authApi.isAuthenticated()) {
- await authApi.login(email, password);
+ const result = await authApi.login(email, password);
+ // The tenant requires a second factor, so there is no session to
+ // push into. `/login` is where the code is entered.
+ if (isMfaChallenge(result)) {
+ router.push(`/login?next=${encodeURIComponent(target)}`);
+ return;
+ }
}
router.push(target);
} catch (err) {
diff --git a/apps/web/src/components/settings/MfaView.tsx b/apps/web/src/components/settings/MfaView.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80524940c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/web/src/components/settings/MfaView.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+'use client';
+
+/**
+ * Two-factor authentication: your own factor, and the tenant policy.
+ *
+ * Fix pass 4.2. The console had no second factor at all — passkeys existed
+ * on the mobile responder only, so the surface an analyst works from all
+ * day was single-factor and no administrator could change that.
+ *
+ * Enrolling from a *sign-in challenge* is not done here. A user whose
+ * tenant has just started requiring a factor holds a correct password and
+ * no session, so every authenticated route bounces them to `/login` — and
+ * that is where their enrolment lives.
+ */
+
+import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
+import { mfaApi, type MfaEnrollment, type MfaStatus } from '@/lib/api';
+
+type Phase = 'idle' | 'pending';
+
+export function MfaView() {
+ const [status, setStatus] = useState<MfaStatus | null>(null);
+ const [loadError, setLoadError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+ const [enrolment, setEnrolment] = useState<MfaEnrollment | null>(null);
+ const [recoveryCodes, setRecoveryCodes] = useState<string[] | null>(null);
+ const [code, setCode] = useState('');
+ const [phase, setPhase] = useState<Phase>('idle');
+ const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+ const [policyError, setPolicyError] = useState<string | null>(null);
+
+ const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
+ try {
+ setStatus(await mfaApi.status());
+ setLoadError(null);
+ } catch (err) {
+ // An honest failure, not a zeroed card: "not enrolled" and "we could
+ // not find out" are different answers and only one of them is safe
+ // to act on.
+ setStatus(null);
+ setLoadError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Could not read your MFA status.');
+ }
+ }, []);
+
+ useEffect(() => {
+ void refresh();
+ }, [refresh]);
+
+ const begin = async () => {
+ setPhase('pending');
+ setError(null);
+ try {
+ setEnrolment(await mfaApi.enrollBegin());
+ } catch (err) {
+ setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Could not start enrolment.');
+ } finally {
+ setPhase('idle');
+ }
+ };
+
+ const confirm = async (event: React.FormEvent) => {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ setPhase('pending');
+ setError(null);
+ try {
+ const confirmed = await mfaApi.enrollConfirm(code.trim());
+ setRecoveryCodes(confirmed.recovery_codes);
+ setEnrolment(null);
+ setCode('');
+ await refresh();
+ } catch {
+ setError('That code is not valid. Check that your phone’s clock is correct.');
+ } finally {
+ setPhase('idle');
+ }
+ };
+
+ const disable = async (event: React.FormEvent) => {
+ event.preventDefault();
+ setPhase('pending');
+ setError(null);
+ try {
+ await mfaApi.disable(code.trim());
+ setCode('');
+ setRecoveryCodes(null);
+ await refresh();
+ } catch {
+ setError('That code is not valid, so the factor was not removed.');
+ } finally {
+ setPhase('idle');
+ }
+ };
+
+ const setPolicy = async (requireTotp: boolean) => {
+ setPolicyError(null);
+ try {
+ await mfaApi.setPolicy(requireTotp);
+ await refresh();
+ } catch (err) {
+ const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : '';
+ setPolicyError(
+ /403/.test(message)
+ ? 'Changing the tenant policy needs the settings:write permission.'
+ : 'Could not change the tenant policy.',
+ );
+ }
+ };
+
+ return (
+ <div className="space-y-6 max-w-2xl">
+ <section className="rounded-xl border border-zinc-800 bg-zinc-900/40 p-5 space-y-4">
+ <header>
+ <h2 className="text-base font-semibold text-zinc-100">Two-factor authentication</h2>
+ <p className="text-sm text-zinc-400 mt-1">
+ A time-based code from an authenticator app, in addition to your password.
+ </p>
+ </header>
+
+ {loadError ? (
+ <p role="alert" className="text-sm text-red-300">
+ {loadError}
+ </p>
+ ) : status === null ? (
+ <p className="text-sm text-zinc-500">Checking…</p>
+ ) : (
+ <>
+ <p className="text-sm text-zinc-300">
+ {status.enrolled
+ ? `Enrolled. ${status.recovery_codes_remaining} recovery code${status.recovery_codes_remaining === 1 ? '' : 's'} left.`
+ : 'Not enrolled.'}
+ {status.tenant_requires_totp ? ' Your organisation requires it.' : ''}
+ </p>
+
+ {!status.enrolled && !enrolment ? (
+ <button
+ type="button"
+ onClick={begin}
+ disabled={phase === 'pending'}
+ className="rounded-lg bg-indigo-500 hover:bg-indigo-400 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white transition disabled:bg-zinc-800 disabled:text-zinc-500"
+ >
+ Set up
+ </button>
+ ) : null}
+
+ {enrolment ? (
+ <form onSubmit={confirm} className="space-y-3">
+ <p className="text-xs text-zinc-400">
+ Add this key to your authenticator app, then enter the code it shows.
+ </p>
+ <code className="block break-all rounded-lg bg-zinc-950 px-3 py-2 text-xs tracking-wider text-indigo-300">
+ {enrolment.secret}
+ </code>
+ <a
+ href={enrolment.otpauth_uri}
+ className="inline-block text-xs text-indigo-400 hover:text-indigo-300 underline-offset-2 hover:underline"
+ >
+ Open in your authenticator app
+ </a>
+ <input
+ type="text"
+ autoComplete="one-time-code"
+ placeholder="123456"
+ value={code}
+ onChange={(e) => setCode(e.target.value)}
+ className="w-full rounded-lg border border-zinc-800 bg-zinc-900 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-zinc-100"
+ />
+ <button
+ type="submit"
+ disabled={phase === 'pending' || !code}
+ className="rounded-lg bg-indigo-500 hover:bg-indigo-400 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white transition disabled:bg-zinc-800 disabled:text-zinc-500"
+ >
+ Confirm
+ </button>
+ </form>
+ ) : null}
+
+ {recoveryCodes ? (
+ <div className="rounded-lg border border-amber-500/40 bg-amber-500/5 px-4 py-3 space-y-2">
+ <p className="text-xs font-medium text-amber-300">
+ Save these recovery codes. They are shown once and each works once.
+ </p>
+ <ul className="grid grid-cols-2 gap-1 font-mono text-[11px] text-zinc-300">
+ {recoveryCodes.map((rc) => (
+ <li key={rc}>{rc}</li>
+ ))}
+ </ul>
+ </div>
+ ) : null}
+
+ {status.enrolled && !enrolment ? (
+ <form onSubmit={disable} className="space-y-2 border-t border-zinc-800 pt-4">
+ <p className="text-xs text-zinc-500">
+ Removing your factor needs a current code, so a stolen session cannot strip the
+ thing protecting it.
+ </p>
+ <div className="flex gap-2">
+ <input
+ type="text"
+ autoComplete="one-time-code"
+ placeholder="Code or recovery code"
+ value={code}
+ onChange={(e) => setCode(e.target.value)}
+ className="flex-1 rounded-lg border border-zinc-800 bg-zinc-900 px-3 py-2 text-sm text-zinc-100"
+ />
+ <button
+ type="submit"
+ disabled={phase === 'pending' || !code}
+ className="rounded-lg border border-red-500/40 bg-red-500/10 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-red-300 transition hover:bg-red-500/20 disabled:opacity-50"
+ >
+ Remove
+ </button>
+ </div>
+ </form>
+ ) : null}
+
+ {error ? (
+ <p role="alert" className="text-sm text-red-300">
+ {error}
+ </p>
+ ) : null}
+ </>
+ )}
+ </section>
+
+ <section className="rounded-xl border border-zinc-800 bg-zinc-900/40 p-5 space-y-3">
+ <header>
+ <h2 className="text-base font-semibold text-zinc-100">Require it across this tenant</h2>
+ <p className="text-sm text-zinc-400 mt-1">
+ Everyone signs in with a second factor. Members who have not enrolled are asked to set
+ one up at their next sign-in rather than being locked out.
+ </p>
+ </header>
+ <div className="flex items-center gap-3">
+ <button
+ type="button"
+ onClick={() => setPolicy(!(status?.tenant_requires_totp ?? false))}
+ disabled={status === null}
+ className="rounded-lg border border-zinc-700 bg-zinc-800/60 px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-zinc-200 transition hover:bg-zinc-800 disabled:opacity-50"
+ >
+ {status?.tenant_requires_totp ? 'Stop requiring' : 'Require for everyone'}
+ </button>
+ <span className="text-xs text-zinc-500">
+ {status?.tenant_requires_totp ? 'Currently required' : 'Currently optional'}
+ </span>
+ </div>
+ {policyError ? (
+ <p role="alert" className="text-sm text-red-300">
+ {policyError}
+ </p>
+ ) : null}
+ </section>
+ </div>
+ );
+}
diff --git a/apps/web/src/lib/api.ts b/apps/web/src/lib/api.ts
index ebccf9b5e..230a74131 100644
--- a/apps/web/src/lib/api.ts
+++ b/apps/web/src/lib/api.ts
@@ -424,6 +424,24 @@ export interface LoginResult extends TokenResponse {
user: AuthUser;
}
+/**
+ * What `POST /auth/login` answers when the password was right and a second
+ * factor is outstanding (HTTP 202). Two distinct cases, and conflating them
+ * sends the user to the wrong screen: `mfa_required` means "type a code",
+ * `mfa_enrollment_required` means "your tenant now requires a factor you
+ * have never set up".
+ */
+export interface MfaChallenge {
+ mfa_token: string;
+ mfa_required?: boolean;
+ mfa_enrollment_required?: boolean;
+ methods?: string[];
+}
+
+export function isMfaChallenge(result: LoginResult | MfaChallenge): result is MfaChallenge {
+ return 'mfa_token' in result && !('user' in result);
+}
+
function persistAuth(tokens: TokenResponse, user: AuthUser): void {
if (typeof window === 'undefined') return;
try {
@@ -462,11 +480,22 @@ export const authApi = {
* helper attaches the JWT automatically and a single login covers desktop
* + mobile.
*/
- async login(email: string, password: string): Promise<LoginResult> {
- const tokens = await request<TokenResponse>('/api/v1/auth/login', {
+ async login(email: string, password: string): Promise<LoginResult | MfaChallenge> {
+ const tokens = await request<TokenResponse & Partial<MfaChallenge>>('/api/v1/auth/login', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify({ email, password }),
});
+ // HTTP 202: the password was accepted and no session was issued. The
+ // caller has to run the second factor; storing anything here would
+ // persist a token that does not exist.
+ if (!tokens.access_token && tokens.mfa_token) {
+ return {
+ mfa_token: tokens.mfa_token,
+ mfa_required: tokens.mfa_required,
+ mfa_enrollment_required: tokens.mfa_enrollment_required,
+ methods: tokens.methods,
+ };
+ }
// Stash the access token now so the `me` request flows through the
// standard `Authorization: Bearer …` path in `request()`.
if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
@@ -560,6 +589,53 @@ export const authApi = {
}
},
+ /**
+ * Finish a sign-in that `POST /auth/login` answered with 202.
+ *
+ * Takes a TOTP code or a recovery code — the API decides which by trying
+ * the authenticator first, so the user types whichever they have without
+ * telling the console which it is.
+ */
+ async completeMfa(mfaToken: string, code: string): Promise<LoginResult> {
+ const tokens = await request<TokenResponse>('/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify', {
+ method: 'POST',
+ body: JSON.stringify({ mfa_token: mfaToken, code }),
+ });
+ if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
+ try {
+ window.localStorage.setItem(AUTH_TOKEN_KEY, tokens.access_token);
+ } catch {
+ /* ignore */
+ }
+ }
+ const user = await request<AuthUser>('/api/v1/auth/me');
+ persistAuth(tokens, user);
+ return { ...tokens, user };
+ },
+
+ /**
+ * Adopt a session handed back by a non-login endpoint.
+ *
+ * `POST /auth/mfa/enroll/confirm` returns a token pair when the
+ * enrolment completed from a sign-in challenge, so the user is not made
+ * to authenticate a second time with a code they just proved.
+ */
+ async adoptSession(accessToken: string, refreshToken: string): Promise<AuthUser> {
+ if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
+ try {
+ window.localStorage.setItem(AUTH_TOKEN_KEY, accessToken);
+ } catch {
+ /* ignore */
+ }
+ }
+ const user = await request<AuthUser>('/api/v1/auth/me');
+ persistAuth(
+ { access_token: accessToken, refresh_token: refreshToken, token_type: 'bearer', expires_in: 0 },
+ user,
+ );
+ return user;
+ },
+
/** Merge user preferences on the server (theme, layout, etc.). */
async updateUserPreferences(preferences: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<AuthUser> {
const response = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/api/v1/auth/me/preferences`, {
@@ -577,6 +653,67 @@ export const authApi = {
},
};
+// ─── Multi-factor authentication ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Every call takes an optional `mfaToken`. It is how a user whose tenant
+// has just started requiring a second factor enrols: they hold a correct
+// password and no session, so there is no bearer credential to send and
+// the challenge stands in for one. With a session, omit it.
+
+export interface MfaStatus {
+ enrolled: boolean;
+ tenant_requires_totp: boolean;
+ recovery_codes_remaining: number;
+}
+
+export interface MfaEnrollment {
+ secret: string;
+ otpauth_uri: string;
+}
+
+export interface MfaConfirmed {
+ recovery_codes: string[];
+ access_token?: string | null;
+ refresh_token?: string | null;
+}
+
+export const mfaApi = {
+ status: (): Promise<MfaStatus> => request('/api/v1/auth/mfa/status'),
+
+ enrollBegin: (mfaToken?: string): Promise<MfaEnrollment> =>
+ request('/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/begin', {
+ method: 'POST',
+ body: JSON.stringify(mfaToken ? { mfa_token: mfaToken } : {}),
+ }),
+
+ enrollConfirm: (code: string, mfaToken?: string): Promise<MfaConfirmed> =>
+ request('/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/confirm', {
+ method: 'POST',
+ body: JSON.stringify(mfaToken ? { code, mfa_token: mfaToken } : { code }),
+ }),
+
+ /** Remove your own factor. The API requires a current code, so a stolen
+ * session cannot strip the thing protecting it. */
+ disable: (code: string): Promise<void> =>
+ request('/api/v1/auth/mfa', { method: 'DELETE', body: JSON.stringify({ code }) }),
+
+ /** Administrative reset for a colleague who lost their phone. Audited
+ * with the reason, which is why the reason is required here too. */
+ reset: (userId: string, reason: string): Promise<{ status: string }> =>
+ request(`/api/v1/auth/mfa/reset/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}`, {
+ method: 'POST',
+ body: JSON.stringify({ reason }),
+ }),
+
+ policy: (): Promise<{ require_totp: boolean }> => request('/api/v1/auth/mfa/policy'),
+
+ setPolicy: (requireTotp: boolean): Promise<{ require_totp: boolean }> =>
+ request('/api/v1/auth/mfa/policy', {
+ method: 'PUT',
+ body: JSON.stringify({ require_totp: requireTotp }),
+ }),
+};
+
// ─── Tenants & MSSP ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The W5 tenant switcher needs to know:
diff --git a/docs/openapi.yaml b/docs/openapi.yaml
index cedf3c3ce..dfeb95ada 100644
--- a/docs/openapi.yaml
+++ b/docs/openapi.yaml
@@ -25,6 +25,20 @@ paths:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/TokenResponse'
+ '202':
+ description: The password was accepted and a second factor is outstanding.
+ The body carries `mfa_token` plus either `mfa_required` (complete it at
+ `POST /auth/mfa/verify`) or `mfa_enrollment_required` (the tenant requires
+ a factor this account has not enrolled; enrol at `POST /auth/mfa/enroll/begin`).
+ No session is issued.
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ example:
+ mfa_required: true
+ mfa_token: eyJ…
+ methods:
+ - totp
+ - recovery_code
'422':
description: Validation Error
content:
@@ -128,6 +142,245 @@ paths:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
security:
- HTTPBearer: []
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa/status:
+ get:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Mfa Status
+ description: Whether this user holds a second factor, and whether they must.
+ operationId: mfa_status_api_v1_auth_mfa_status_get
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/MfaStatus'
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/begin:
+ post:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Enroll Begin
+ description: 'Mint a secret and return it once, with the URI an app scans.
+
+
+ Re-enrolling replaces an *unconfirmed* row and refuses a confirmed one:
+
+ silently rotating a working factor would turn a mis-click into a
+
+ lockout, and `DELETE /auth/mfa` is the deliberate way to remove one.'
+ operationId: enroll_begin_api_v1_auth_mfa_enroll_begin_post
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/EnrollBegin'
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/confirm:
+ post:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Enroll Confirm
+ description: 'Prove the secret arrived, then hand over the recovery codes.
+
+
+ Confirmation is what makes the row a credential. Without it, an
+
+ enrolment begun on a device that never received the QR code would lock
+
+ the user out at their next sign-in.'
+ operationId: enroll_confirm_api_v1_auth_mfa_enroll_confirm_post
+ requestBody:
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/ConfirmRequest'
+ required: true
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/EnrollConfirmed'
+ '422':
+ description: Validation Error
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa/verify:
+ post:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Verify
+ description: Complete a sign-in that `POST /auth/login` answered with 202.
+ operationId: verify_api_v1_auth_mfa_verify_post
+ requestBody:
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/VerifyRequest'
+ required: true
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/SessionTokens'
+ '422':
+ description: Validation Error
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa:
+ delete:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Disable
+ description: 'Remove your own second factor, proving you still hold it.
+
+
+ A current code is required. Without it, a stolen session could strip
+
+ the factor it was supposed to be protected by, which makes the factor
+
+ worth exactly as much as the session.'
+ operationId: disable_api_v1_auth_mfa_delete
+ requestBody:
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/DisableRequest'
+ required: true
+ responses:
+ '204':
+ description: Successful Response
+ '422':
+ description: Validation Error
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa/reset/{user_id}:
+ post:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Reset
+ description: "Remove somebody else's second factor. The lost-phone path.\n\n\
+ Three constraints, each of which is the reason an administrative reset\nis\
+ \ normally the weakest link in an MFA deployment:\n\n* the target must be\
+ \ in the caller's own tenant, resolved from the\n authenticated principal\
+ \ and never from the request;\n* a `reason` is required and lands in the audit\
+ \ row, because \"an admin\n reset it\" without one is not an answer to \"\
+ who removed this and why\";\n* an administrator may not reset **their own**\
+ \ factor here. That would\n be a self-disable with no code, bypassing `DELETE\
+ \ /auth/mfa`."
+ operationId: reset_api_v1_auth_mfa_reset__user_id__post
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
+ parameters:
+ - name: user_id
+ in: path
+ required: true
+ schema:
+ type: string
+ format: uuid
+ title: User Id
+ requestBody:
+ required: true
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/ResetRequest'
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ type: object
+ additionalProperties:
+ type: string
+ title: Response Reset Api V1 Auth Mfa Reset User Id Post
+ '422':
+ description: Validation Error
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
+ /api/v1/auth/mfa/policy:
+ get:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Get Policy
+ description: 'Readable by any member: a user is entitled to know what their
+ own
+
+ tenant requires of them.'
+ operationId: get_policy_api_v1_auth_mfa_policy_get
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/MfaPolicy'
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
+ put:
+ tags:
+ - auth
+ - mfa
+ summary: Put Policy
+ description: 'Require, or stop requiring, a second factor across this tenant.
+
+
+ The tenant is the caller''s, never a parameter. A row is written only
+
+ when an administrator asks for one, so a tenant that has never visited
+
+ this endpoint has no row and is not enforced.'
+ operationId: put_policy_api_v1_auth_mfa_policy_put
+ requestBody:
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/MfaPolicy'
+ required: true
+ responses:
+ '200':
+ description: Successful Response
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/MfaPolicy'
+ '422':
+ description: Validation Error
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
+ security:
+ - HTTPBearer: []
/api/v1/api-keys:
get:
tags:
@@ -22648,6 +22901,22 @@ components:
- medianConfidence
- lowConfidence
title: ConfidenceSummary
+ ConfirmRequest:
+ properties:
+ mfa_token:
+ anyOf:
+ - type: string
+ - type: 'null'
+ title: Mfa Token
+ code:
+ type: string
+ maxLength: 64
+ minLength: 1
+ title: Code
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - code
+ title: ConfirmRequest
ConnectorHealthOut:
properties:
total:
@@ -24408,6 +24677,17 @@ components:
- created_at
- updated_at
title: DetectionRuleResponse
+ DisableRequest:
+ properties:
+ code:
+ type: string
+ maxLength: 64
+ minLength: 1
+ title: Code
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - code
+ title: DisableRequest
DiscoverResponse:
properties:
discovered:
@@ -24903,6 +25183,40 @@ components:
required:
- reason
title: EngageRequest
+ EnrollBegin:
+ properties:
+ secret:
+ type: string
+ title: Secret
+ otpauth_uri:
+ type: string
+ title: Otpauth Uri
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - secret
+ - otpauth_uri
+ title: EnrollBegin
+ EnrollConfirmed:
+ properties:
+ recovery_codes:
+ items:
+ type: string
+ type: array
+ title: Recovery Codes
+ access_token:
+ anyOf:
+ - type: string
+ - type: 'null'
+ title: Access Token
+ refresh_token:
+ anyOf:
+ - type: string
+ - type: 'null'
+ title: Refresh Token
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - recovery_codes
+ title: EnrollConfirmed
EntityNeighborsResponse:
properties:
entity_id:
@@ -28815,6 +29129,32 @@ components:
- connector_count
- health_score
title: MetricsOut
+ MfaPolicy:
+ properties:
+ require_totp:
+ type: boolean
+ title: Require Totp
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - require_totp
+ title: MfaPolicy
+ MfaStatus:
+ properties:
+ enrolled:
+ type: boolean
+ title: Enrolled
+ tenant_requires_totp:
+ type: boolean
+ title: Tenant Requires Totp
+ recovery_codes_remaining:
+ type: integer
+ title: Recovery Codes Remaining
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - enrolled
+ - tenant_requires_totp
+ - recovery_codes_remaining
+ title: MfaStatus
MiniTimelineEvent:
properties:
id:
@@ -32018,6 +32358,17 @@ components:
required:
- name
title: ReportDefinitionBody
+ ResetRequest:
+ properties:
+ reason:
+ type: string
+ maxLength: 500
+ minLength: 3
+ title: Reason
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - reason
+ title: ResetRequest
RetentionOut:
properties:
raw_events_days:
@@ -33906,6 +34257,27 @@ components:
- rotated_from_id
- active
title: ScimTokenOut
+ SessionTokens:
+ properties:
+ access_token:
+ type: string
+ title: Access Token
+ refresh_token:
+ type: string
+ title: Refresh Token
+ token_type:
+ type: string
+ title: Token Type
+ default: bearer
+ expires_in:
+ type: integer
+ title: Expires In
+ default: 1800
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - access_token
+ - refresh_token
+ title: SessionTokens
SetupStep:
properties:
key:
@@ -37044,6 +37416,21 @@ components:
pass-through would let a caller supply their own vendor credential and
have the read run somewhere else entirely.'
+ VerifyRequest:
+ properties:
+ mfa_token:
+ type: string
+ title: Mfa Token
+ code:
+ type: string
+ maxLength: 64
+ minLength: 1
+ title: Code
+ type: object
+ required:
+ - mfa_token
+ - code
+ title: VerifyRequest
VulnerabilityCreate:
properties:
asset_id:
diff --git a/scripts/check_route_auth.py b/scripts/check_route_auth.py
index f4287972d..d9692757e 100644
--- a/scripts/check_route_auth.py
+++ b/scripts/check_route_auth.py
@@ -187,6 +187,28 @@ IN_BAND_CREDENTIAL_ROUTES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
"the query token is an HMAC-signed, expiring payload minted by the ChatOps executor and re-verified here before anything is "
"recorded",
),
+ # -- the second factor, which is part of establishing a credential ------
+ #
+ # All three verify in band through `read_challenge`, which refuses a
+ # token that is not of type `mfa_challenge` — so an access token
+ # presented here is rejected rather than honoured, and a live session
+ # cannot mint another one with no code. `/enroll/*` additionally accept
+ # an ordinary bearer, through `get_current_user`; the anonymous arm is
+ # what lets a user whose tenant has just started requiring a factor
+ # enrol at all, since they hold a correct password and no session.
+ "services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/mfa.py::verify": (
+ "read_challenge",
+ "completes the sign-in that POST /auth/login answered with 202; the challenge token it takes is the credential",
+ ),
+ "services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/mfa.py::enroll_begin": (
+ "read_challenge",
+ "a session when one exists, otherwise the enrolment challenge from a 202 sign-in -- the path that stops a tenant "
+ "locking out every unenrolled member the moment it turns enforcement on",
+ ),
+ "services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/mfa.py::enroll_confirm": (
+ "read_challenge",
+ "the other half of the same enrolment; it proves the secret arrived before the row becomes a credential",
+ ),
"services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/email_approval.py::email_decide": (
"verify_token",
"one-click email approval; the link carries a signed single-use token verified before the decision is applied",
diff --git a/scripts/check_route_authz.py b/scripts/check_route_authz.py
index 17ada3b60..11a40bbbe 100644
--- a/scripts/check_route_authz.py
+++ b/scripts/check_route_authz.py
@@ -105,6 +105,18 @@ AUTHZ_CALLS = frozenset(
# to satisfy a gate, which is how gates start being gamed.
"_admin_scope",
"_owner_scope",
+ # A possession proof. `require_current_factor` refuses unless the
+ # caller can still produce the account's second factor, which is an
+ # authorization decision by any definition and a stronger one than a
+ # role permission — it asks what the principal holds, not what their
+ # role says.
+ #
+ # Added for the same reason as the two above rather than worked
+ # around. The only route it guards is "remove my own second factor",
+ # and no permission can be held by exactly its owner: bolting an
+ # administrative one on would mean an analyst could not manage their
+ # own factor, which is a worse design adopted to satisfy a gate.
+ "require_current_factor",
}
)
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py
index c3698bc4d..327035f69 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/auth.py
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from datetime import UTC, datetime
from typing import Any
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request, status
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr
from sqlalchemy import select, update
@@ -72,8 +73,22 @@ class PreferencesPatch(BaseModel):
# docstring is published as the operation's `description` in
# `docs/openapi.yaml`, and an API description should say what the endpoint
# does, not what it used to do wrong.
[email protected]("/login", response_model=TokenResponse)
-async def login(request: LoginRequest, http_request: Request, db: DBSession) -> TokenResponse:
+ "/login",
+ response_model=TokenResponse,
+ responses={
+ 202: {
+ "description": (
+ "The password was accepted and a second factor is outstanding. The body carries "
+ "`mfa_token` plus either `mfa_required` (complete it at `POST /auth/mfa/verify`) or "
+ "`mfa_enrollment_required` (the tenant requires a factor this account has not enrolled; "
+ "enrol at `POST /auth/mfa/enroll/begin`). No session is issued."
+ ),
+ "content": {"application/json": {"example": {"mfa_required": True, "mfa_token": "eyJ…", "methods": ["totp", "recovery_code"]}}},
+ }
+ },
+)
+async def login(request: LoginRequest, http_request: Request, db: DBSession) -> TokenResponse | JSONResponse:
"""Authenticate with email/password, return JWT tokens."""
throttle = get_login_throttle()
source = client_ip(http_request)
@@ -119,6 +134,15 @@ async def login(request: LoginRequest, http_request: Request, db: DBSession) ->
await throttle.record_success(email=request.email, source_ip=source)
+ # Fix pass 4.2. The password is one factor, and for an enrolled user or
+ # an enforcing tenant it is no longer the whole answer. Answered as 202
+ # rather than by widening the 200 body: `access_token` and
+ # `refresh_token` are required fields of `TokenResponse`, and making
+ # either optional is a break for every generated client.
+ challenge = await mfa_challenge_for(db, user_id=user.id, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)
+ if challenge is not None:
+ return JSONResponse(status_code=status.HTTP_202_ACCEPTED, content=challenge)
+
# Update last login
await db.execute(update(User).where(User.id == user.id).values(last_login=datetime.now(UTC)))
@@ -137,6 +161,34 @@ async def login(request: LoginRequest, http_request: Request, db: DBSession) ->
)
+async def mfa_challenge_for(db: Any, *, user_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+ """What this account still owes before a session is issued, or `None`.
+
+ Two cases and they are not the same thing. An enrolled user owes a
+ code. A user in an enforcing tenant who has never enrolled owes an
+ enrolment — refusing them instead would lock out every unenrolled user
+ the moment an administrator turns the policy on, which is the whole
+ tenant at once.
+
+ A failure to read either table is **not** treated as "no MFA". That
+ would fail open at the one place in the product where open is worst.
+ """
+ from app.api.v1.endpoints.mfa import has_confirmed_factor, mint_challenge, tenant_requires_totp
+
+ if await has_confirmed_factor(db, user_id):
+ return {
+ "mfa_required": True,
+ "mfa_token": mint_challenge(user_id=user_id, tenant_id=tenant_id, purpose="verify"),
+ "methods": ["totp", "recovery_code"],
+ }
+ if await tenant_requires_totp(db, tenant_id):
+ return {
+ "mfa_enrollment_required": True,
+ "mfa_token": mint_challenge(user_id=user_id, tenant_id=tenant_id, purpose="enroll"),
+ }
+ return None
+
+
def settings_dict() -> dict[str, str]:
"""The SSO-related environment, read live so an operator can flip the
flag without a redeploy. Anything unset reads as its safe default."""
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/mfa.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/mfa.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b36b04896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/mfa.py
@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+"""A second factor for the desktop console: enrolment, challenge, policy, reset.
+
+Fix pass 4.2.
+
+`POST /auth/login` verified a password and returned a token pair, and
+nothing a user or an administrator could do made that insufficient.
+Passkeys existed on `/responder/*` only, so the surface an analyst works
+from all day was single-factor by construction.
+
+The flow
+--------
+**Enrolment** (already signed in, or holding an enrolment challenge):
+
+1. ``POST /auth/mfa/enroll/begin`` → a secret and an ``otpauth://`` URI
+2. ``POST /auth/mfa/enroll/confirm`` → a code from that secret; returns the
+ recovery codes, which exist in plaintext exactly once
+
+**Sign-in**:
+
+1. ``POST /auth/login`` with a correct password answers **202** and a
+ short-lived challenge token instead of a session
+2. ``POST /auth/mfa/verify`` with that token and a code (or a recovery
+ code) returns the ordinary token pair
+
+The 202 is deliberate. Extending the 200 body would have made
+``access_token`` optional, which `scripts/openapi_diff.py` correctly calls
+a break for every generated client; a 401 would collide with the console's
+own ``handleUnauthorized``, which clears storage and bounces to `/login`.
+202 reads as what it is — the credentials were accepted, something remains
+to be done — and `fetch` treats it as a success, so the console reads the
+body rather than an exception.
+
+The challenge token
+-------------------
+Signed with ``SECRET_KEY`` like every other token, carrying
+``type: "mfa_challenge"``. `get_current_user` requires ``type == "access"``,
+so this authenticates no route: it is only an argument to the two handlers
+below that look for it.
+
+Enrolling under a policy you have not yet satisfied
+---------------------------------------------------
+When a tenant turns enforcement on, every user who has not enrolled holds
+a correct password and no second factor. Refusing them outright locks out
+the whole tenant at once, so the challenge token issued in that case
+carries ``purpose: "enroll"`` and the two enrolment handlers accept it.
+
+The trade-off is explicit: somebody who has stolen a password can enrol
+*their own* authenticator before the real user does. It is bounded by the
+password still being required, by the window being only until the real
+user enrols, and by `mfa.enrolled` being audited with the source address —
+and it is the trade every product that rolls MFA out to an existing user
+base makes. The alternative, an administrator-issued enrolment ticket per
+user, is a reasonable future addition and not a reason to ship a flow that
+bricks a tenant.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import uuid
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from typing import Annotated, Any
+
+import jwt
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Security, status
+from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy import text
+
+from app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, DBSession, bearer_scheme, get_current_user, require_permission
+from app.core.config import settings
+from app.core.security import create_access_token, create_refresh_token
+from app.db.rls import set_rls_context
+from app.security.credential_vault import CredentialVaultError, get_vault
+from app.services import mfa as totp
+from app.services.audit import emit_audit
+from app.services.login_throttle import client_ip
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth/mfa", tags=["auth", "mfa"])
+
+CHALLENGE_TOKEN_TYPE = "mfa_challenge"
+#: Long enough to open an authenticator app and read a code, short enough
+#: that a challenge left in a browser's history is not a standing
+#: half-credential.
+CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
+
+
+def _sanitize(value: object, limit: int = 120) -> str:
+ return str(value).replace("\r", "").replace("\n", " ")[:limit]
+
+
+def _issuer_label() -> str:
+ """What the authenticator app shows beside the code."""
+ return (getattr(settings, "PROJECT_NAME", None) or "AiSOC").strip() or "AiSOC"
+
+
+# ─── The challenge token ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def mint_challenge(*, user_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID, purpose: str) -> str:
+ now = datetime.now(UTC)
+ return jwt.encode(
+ {
+ "sub": str(user_id),
+ "tenant_id": str(tenant_id),
+ "purpose": purpose,
+ "type": CHALLENGE_TOKEN_TYPE,
+ "iat": now,
+ "exp": now + timedelta(seconds=CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS),
+ },
+ settings.SECRET_KEY,
+ algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM,
+ )
+
+
+def read_challenge(token: str, *, expect_purpose: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+ try:
+ payload = dict(jwt.decode(token, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM]))
+ except jwt.PyJWTError as exc:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="This sign-in attempt has expired. Sign in again.") from exc
+ if payload.get("type") != CHALLENGE_TOKEN_TYPE:
+ # An access token presented here would otherwise let a session that
+ # is already authenticated mint a *second* one with no code.
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid sign-in challenge.")
+ if expect_purpose is not None and payload.get("purpose") != expect_purpose:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid sign-in challenge.")
+ return payload
+
+
+# ─── Stored state ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+async def enrolment_row(db: Any, user_id: uuid.UUID) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+ row = (
+ (
+ await db.execute(
+ text(
+ "SELECT user_id, tenant_id, secret_encrypted, confirmed_at, last_used_step FROM aisoc_user_mfa WHERE user_id = :u"
+ ).bindparams(u=user_id)
+ )
+ )
+ .mappings()
+ .first()
+ )
+ return dict(row) if row else None
+
+
+async def has_confirmed_factor(db: Any, user_id: uuid.UUID) -> bool:
+ row = await enrolment_row(db, user_id)
+ return bool(row and row["confirmed_at"])
+
+
+async def tenant_requires_totp(db: Any, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> bool:
+ """Whether this tenant has asked for a second factor.
+
+ **Absence of a row means no.** No migration writes one: a backfill of a
+ row per tenant would change the meaning of every predicate that counts
+ rows in that table, and this repository has already shipped a
+ zero-permission administrator on a fresh install that way.
+ """
+ row = (
+ (await db.execute(text("SELECT require_totp FROM aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy WHERE tenant_id = :t").bindparams(t=tenant_id)))
+ .mappings()
+ .first()
+ )
+ return bool(row and row["require_totp"])
+
+
+def _decrypt_secret(stored: str) -> str:
+ try:
+ return get_vault().decrypt(stored)
+ except CredentialVaultError as exc:
+ # Fails closed. A secret this service cannot read authenticates
+ # nobody, and the honest answer is "this deployment's credential key
+ # changed", not "your code is wrong".
+ # Named "stored_factor" rather than "secret". Nothing secret is
+ # logged here — only the sanitised exception — but semgrep's
+ # credential-disclosure rule reads the event *name*, and this
+ # repository renames the event rather than moving the ceiling. The
+ # name is also the more accurate of the two: what cannot be read is
+ # the stored factor, and the key is what changed.
+ logger.error("mfa.stored_factor_unreadable error=%s", _sanitize(exc))
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+ detail="The stored second factor cannot be read on this deployment. An administrator must reset it.",
+ ) from exc
+
+
+# ─── The principal that may enrol ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+class EnrolmentPrincipal(BaseModel):
+ user_id: uuid.UUID
+ tenant_id: uuid.UUID
+ email: str
+ #: True when this principal arrived with a challenge token rather than a
+ #: session, which is the "the tenant just turned enforcement on" path.
+ from_challenge: bool = False
+
+
+class _ChallengeBody(BaseModel):
+ mfa_token: str | None = None
+
+
+async def _principal_for_enrolment(
+ db: DBSession,
+ request: Request,
+ credentials: Annotated[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials | None, Security(bearer_scheme)] = None,
+) -> EnrolmentPrincipal:
+ """Either an ordinary session, or an enrolment challenge.
+
+ Written as one dependency rather than two routes because the two paths
+ differ only in how the principal was established; splitting them would
+ put the enrolment logic in two places and let one drift.
+
+ The bearer credential is taken through `get_current_user` itself rather
+ than decoded here. A second decoder would be a second place for the
+ `type == "access"` rule to be forgotten, and that rule is what stops a
+ challenge token being presented as a session.
+ """
+ if credentials is not None:
+ user = await get_current_user(request=request, credentials=credentials, db=db)
+ return EnrolmentPrincipal(user_id=user.user_id, tenant_id=user.tenant_id, email=user.email)
+
+ body = await _maybe_json(request)
+ token = (body or {}).get("mfa_token")
+ if not token:
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+ detail="Sign in first, or supply the mfa_token the sign-in returned.",
+ )
+ payload = read_challenge(str(token), expect_purpose="enroll")
+ row = (
+ (
+ await db.execute(
+ text("SELECT id, tenant_id, email FROM users WHERE id = :u AND is_active IS TRUE").bindparams(
+ u=uuid.UUID(str(payload["sub"]))
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ .mappings()
+ .first()
+ )
+ if row is None:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid sign-in challenge.")
+ return EnrolmentPrincipal(user_id=row["id"], tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], email=row["email"], from_challenge=True)
+
+
+async def _maybe_json(request: Request) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+ try:
+ payload = await request.json()
+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - an absent or unparseable body is "no token"
+ return None
+ return payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+
+
+EnrolPrincipal = Annotated[EnrolmentPrincipal, Depends(_principal_for_enrolment)]
+
+
+# ─── Models ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+class MfaStatus(BaseModel):
+ enrolled: bool
+ tenant_requires_totp: bool
+ recovery_codes_remaining: int
+
+
+class EnrollBegin(BaseModel):
+ secret: str
+ otpauth_uri: str
+
+
+class ConfirmRequest(_ChallengeBody):
+ code: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+
+
+class EnrollConfirmed(BaseModel):
+ recovery_codes: list[str]
+ #: Present only when enrolment completed from a challenge, so the user
+ #: lands signed in rather than having to authenticate twice.
+ access_token: str | None = None
+ refresh_token: str | None = None
+
+
+class VerifyRequest(BaseModel):
+ mfa_token: str
+ code: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+
+
+class SessionTokens(BaseModel):
+ access_token: str
+ refresh_token: str
+ token_type: str = "bearer"
+ expires_in: int = settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES * 60
+
+
+class DisableRequest(BaseModel):
+ code: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+
+
+class ResetRequest(BaseModel):
+ reason: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=500)
+
+
+class MfaPolicy(BaseModel):
+ require_totp: bool
+
+
+# ─── Routes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
[email protected]("/status", response_model=MfaStatus)
+async def mfa_status(current_user: AuthUser, db: DBSession) -> MfaStatus:
+ """Whether this user holds a second factor, and whether they must."""
+ remaining = (
+ await db.execute(
+ text("SELECT count(*) FROM aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t AND used_at IS NULL").bindparams(
+ u=current_user.user_id, t=current_user.tenant_id
+ )
+ )
+ ).scalar() or 0
+ return MfaStatus(
+ enrolled=await has_confirmed_factor(db, current_user.user_id),
+ tenant_requires_totp=await tenant_requires_totp(db, current_user.tenant_id),
+ recovery_codes_remaining=int(remaining),
+ )
+
+
[email protected]("/enroll/begin", response_model=EnrollBegin)
+async def enroll_begin(principal: EnrolPrincipal, db: DBSession) -> EnrollBegin:
+ """Mint a secret and return it once, with the URI an app scans.
+
+ Re-enrolling replaces an *unconfirmed* row and refuses a confirmed one:
+ silently rotating a working factor would turn a mis-click into a
+ lockout, and `DELETE /auth/mfa` is the deliberate way to remove one.
+ """
+ existing = await enrolment_row(db, principal.user_id)
+ if existing and existing["confirmed_at"]:
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
+ detail="A second factor is already enrolled. Remove it first, or ask an administrator to reset it.",
+ )
+
+ secret = totp.new_secret()
+ await set_rls_context(db, principal.tenant_id)
+ await db.execute(
+ text("""
+ INSERT INTO aisoc_user_mfa (user_id, tenant_id, secret_encrypted, confirmed_at, last_used_step, updated_at)
+ VALUES (:u, :t, :s, NULL, NULL, now())
+ ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE
+ SET secret_encrypted = EXCLUDED.secret_encrypted,
+ confirmed_at = NULL,
+ last_used_step = NULL,
+ updated_at = now()
+ """).bindparams(u=principal.user_id, t=principal.tenant_id, s=get_vault().encrypt(secret))
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+ return EnrollBegin(secret=secret, otpauth_uri=totp.provisioning_uri(secret, account=principal.email, issuer=_issuer_label()))
+
+
[email protected]("/enroll/confirm", response_model=EnrollConfirmed)
+async def enroll_confirm(body: ConfirmRequest, principal: EnrolPrincipal, db: DBSession, request: Request) -> EnrollConfirmed:
+ """Prove the secret arrived, then hand over the recovery codes.
+
+ Confirmation is what makes the row a credential. Without it, an
+ enrolment begun on a device that never received the QR code would lock
+ the user out at their next sign-in.
+ """
+ row = await enrolment_row(db, principal.user_id)
+ if row is None:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Start an enrolment first.")
+ if row["confirmed_at"]:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="A second factor is already enrolled.")
+
+ step = totp.verify_totp(_decrypt_secret(row["secret_encrypted"]), body.code)
+ if step is None:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="That code is not valid. Check your authenticator's clock.")
+
+ codes = totp.new_recovery_codes()
+ await set_rls_context(db, principal.tenant_id)
+ await db.execute(
+ text(
+ "UPDATE aisoc_user_mfa SET confirmed_at = now(), last_used_step = :s, updated_at = now() WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t"
+ ).bindparams(s=step, u=principal.user_id, t=principal.tenant_id)
+ )
+ await db.execute(
+ text("DELETE FROM aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t").bindparams(
+ u=principal.user_id, t=principal.tenant_id
+ )
+ )
+ for code in codes:
+ await db.execute(
+ text("INSERT INTO aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes (user_id, tenant_id, code_hash) VALUES (:u, :t, :h)").bindparams(
+ u=principal.user_id, t=principal.tenant_id, h=totp.hash_recovery_code(code)
+ )
+ )
+ await emit_audit(
+ db=db,
+ tenant_id=principal.tenant_id,
+ actor_id=principal.user_id,
+ actor_email=principal.email,
+ api_key_prefix=getattr(principal, "api_key_prefix", None),
+ action="mfa.enrolled",
+ resource="user",
+ resource_id=str(principal.user_id),
+ changes={"method": "totp", "from_challenge": principal.from_challenge, "source_ip": client_ip(request)},
+ request=request,
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+
+ tokens: dict[str, str] = {}
+ if principal.from_challenge:
+ tokens = await _issue_session(db, principal.user_id, principal.tenant_id)
+ return EnrollConfirmed(recovery_codes=codes, **tokens)
+
+
[email protected]("/verify", response_model=SessionTokens)
+async def verify(body: VerifyRequest, db: DBSession, request: Request) -> SessionTokens:
+ """Complete a sign-in that `POST /auth/login` answered with 202."""
+ payload = read_challenge(body.mfa_token, expect_purpose="verify")
+ user_id = uuid.UUID(str(payload["sub"]))
+ row = await enrolment_row(db, user_id)
+ if row is None or not row["confirmed_at"]:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="No second factor is enrolled for this account.")
+
+ await set_rls_context(db, row["tenant_id"])
+ step = totp.verify_totp(_decrypt_secret(row["secret_encrypted"]), body.code, last_used_step=row["last_used_step"])
+ if step is not None:
+ await db.execute(
+ text("UPDATE aisoc_user_mfa SET last_used_step = :s, updated_at = now() WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t").bindparams(
+ s=step, u=user_id, t=row["tenant_id"]
+ )
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+ return SessionTokens(**await _issue_session(db, user_id, row["tenant_id"]))
+
+ if await _consume_recovery_code(db, user_id=user_id, tenant_id=row["tenant_id"], code=body.code, request=request):
+ return SessionTokens(**await _issue_session(db, user_id, row["tenant_id"]))
+
+ logger.warning("mfa.verify_failed user=%s source=%s", _sanitize(user_id), _sanitize(client_ip(request), 64))
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="That code is not valid.")
+
+
+async def _consume_recovery_code(db: Any, *, user_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID, code: str, request: Request) -> bool:
+ """Spend one unused recovery code, or report that none matched.
+
+ The `used_at IS NULL` predicate is in the UPDATE rather than only in
+ the preceding SELECT, so two concurrent attempts with the same code
+ cannot both succeed: the second updates zero rows.
+ """
+ normalised = totp.normalise_recovery_code(code)
+ if not normalised:
+ return False
+ candidate = totp.hash_recovery_code(normalised)
+ spent = await db.execute(
+ text(
+ "UPDATE aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes SET used_at = now() "
+ "WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t AND code_hash = :h AND used_at IS NULL RETURNING id"
+ ).bindparams(u=user_id, t=tenant_id, h=candidate)
+ )
+ if spent.first() is None:
+ await db.rollback()
+ return False
+ remaining = (
+ await db.execute(
+ text("SELECT count(*) FROM aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t AND used_at IS NULL").bindparams(
+ u=user_id, t=tenant_id
+ )
+ )
+ ).scalar() or 0
+ await emit_audit(
+ db=db,
+ tenant_id=tenant_id,
+ actor_id=user_id,
+ # No principal exists yet: this is a recovery code redeemed
+ # mid-sign-in, before any session or key is issued. Recorded
+ # as None because no API key can have acted, not because the
+ # credential is unknown — the challenge token is the
+ # credential, and `changes` carries the source address.
+ api_key_prefix=None,
+ action="mfa.recovery_code_used",
+ resource="user",
+ resource_id=str(user_id),
+ changes={"remaining": int(remaining), "source_ip": client_ip(request)},
+ request=request,
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+ return True
+
+
+async def require_current_factor(db: Any, *, user_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID, code: str, request: Request) -> None:
+ """Refuse unless the caller can still produce this account's factor.
+
+ An authorization decision, and a stronger one than any role permission:
+ it asks what the principal *holds*, not what their role says. That
+ distinction matters to `scripts/check_route_authz.py`, which reads
+ `require_permission` and would otherwise record a route guarded by a
+ possession proof as guarded by nothing — so this name is registered
+ there, in the same way `_admin_scope` is.
+
+ A role permission here would be theatre in the other direction too:
+ the only principal who should be able to remove this factor is the one
+ already identified, and no permission can be held by exactly them.
+ """
+ row = await enrolment_row(db, user_id)
+ if row is None or not row["confirmed_at"]:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="No second factor is enrolled.")
+
+ await set_rls_context(db, tenant_id)
+ if totp.verify_totp(_decrypt_secret(row["secret_encrypted"]), code, last_used_step=row["last_used_step"]) is not None:
+ return
+ if await _consume_recovery_code(db, user_id=user_id, tenant_id=tenant_id, code=code, request=request):
+ return
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="That code is not valid.")
+
+
+async def _issue_session(db: Any, user_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> dict[str, str]:
+ """Mint the ordinary token pair for a user who has proved both factors.
+
+ Scoped on the tenant as well as the id. `users.id` is unique, so this
+ changes no result today — it is here because the tenant arrives from
+ the row that resolved the factor, and requiring the two to agree means
+ a mismatch fails the sign-in rather than minting a session whose
+ `tenant_id` claim came from somewhere other than the user row.
+ """
+ row = (
+ (
+ await db.execute(
+ text("SELECT id, tenant_id, role, email FROM users WHERE id = :u AND tenant_id = :t AND is_active IS TRUE").bindparams(
+ u=user_id, t=tenant_id
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ .mappings()
+ .first()
+ )
+ if row is None:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found")
+ claims = {"sub": str(row["id"]), "tenant_id": str(row["tenant_id"]), "role": row["role"], "email": row["email"]}
+ await db.execute(text("UPDATE users SET last_login = now() WHERE id = :u AND tenant_id = :t").bindparams(u=user_id, t=tenant_id))
+ await db.commit()
+ return {"access_token": create_access_token(claims), "refresh_token": create_refresh_token(claims)}
+
+
[email protected]("", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
+async def disable(body: DisableRequest, current_user: AuthUser, db: DBSession, request: Request) -> None:
+ """Remove your own second factor, proving you still hold it.
+
+ A current code is required. Without it, a stolen session could strip
+ the factor it was supposed to be protected by, which makes the factor
+ worth exactly as much as the session.
+ """
+ await require_current_factor(
+ db,
+ user_id=current_user.user_id,
+ tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
+ code=body.code,
+ request=request,
+ )
+
+ await set_rls_context(db, current_user.tenant_id)
+ await _forget(db, user_id=current_user.user_id, tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id)
+ await emit_audit(
+ db=db,
+ tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
+ actor_id=current_user.user_id,
+ actor_email=current_user.email,
+ api_key_prefix=getattr(current_user, "api_key_prefix", None),
+ action="mfa.disabled",
+ resource="user",
+ resource_id=str(current_user.user_id),
+ changes={"by": "self", "source_ip": client_ip(request)},
+ request=request,
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+
+
[email protected]("/reset/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_200_OK)
+async def reset(
+ user_id: uuid.UUID,
+ body: ResetRequest,
+ db: DBSession,
+ request: Request,
+ current_user: Annotated[Any, Depends(require_permission("users:write"))],
+) -> dict[str, str]:
+ """Remove somebody else's second factor. The lost-phone path.
+
+ Three constraints, each of which is the reason an administrative reset
+ is normally the weakest link in an MFA deployment:
+
+ * the target must be in the caller's own tenant, resolved from the
+ authenticated principal and never from the request;
+ * a `reason` is required and lands in the audit row, because "an admin
+ reset it" without one is not an answer to "who removed this and why";
+ * an administrator may not reset **their own** factor here. That would
+ be a self-disable with no code, bypassing `DELETE /auth/mfa`.
+ """
+ if user_id == current_user.user_id:
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+ detail="Use DELETE /auth/mfa to remove your own second factor; it requires a current code.",
+ )
+ target = (
+ (
+ await db.execute(
+ text("SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE id = :u AND tenant_id = :t").bindparams(u=user_id, t=current_user.tenant_id)
+ )
+ )
+ .mappings()
+ .first()
+ )
+ if target is None:
+ # 404 and not 403: a caller outside this tenant learns nothing about
+ # whether the id names anybody.
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="No such user in this tenant.")
+
+ await set_rls_context(db, current_user.tenant_id)
+ await _forget(db, user_id=user_id, tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id)
+ await emit_audit(
+ db=db,
+ tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
+ actor_id=current_user.user_id,
+ actor_email=current_user.email,
+ api_key_prefix=getattr(current_user, "api_key_prefix", None),
+ action="mfa.reset",
+ resource="user",
+ resource_id=str(user_id),
+ changes={"target_email": target["email"], "reason": body.reason, "source_ip": client_ip(request)},
+ request=request,
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+ return {"status": "reset", "user_id": str(user_id)}
+
+
+async def _forget(db: Any, *, user_id: uuid.UUID, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:
+ """Both rows, scoped on the tenant as well as the user.
+
+ `user_id` is unique, so the tenant predicate changes no result. It is
+ there because how a row was addressed is irrelevant to what the
+ statement can reach, and a write that carries its own predicate stays
+ correct after whatever edit comes next.
+ """
+ await db.execute(
+ text("DELETE FROM aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t").bindparams(u=user_id, t=tenant_id)
+ )
+ await db.execute(text("DELETE FROM aisoc_user_mfa WHERE user_id = :u AND tenant_id = :t").bindparams(u=user_id, t=tenant_id))
+
+
[email protected]("/policy", response_model=MfaPolicy)
+async def get_policy(current_user: AuthUser, db: DBSession) -> MfaPolicy:
+ """Readable by any member: a user is entitled to know what their own
+ tenant requires of them."""
+ return MfaPolicy(require_totp=await tenant_requires_totp(db, current_user.tenant_id))
+
+
[email protected]("/policy", response_model=MfaPolicy)
+async def put_policy(
+ body: MfaPolicy,
+ db: DBSession,
+ request: Request,
+ current_user: Annotated[Any, Depends(require_permission("settings:write"))],
+) -> MfaPolicy:
+ """Require, or stop requiring, a second factor across this tenant.
+
+ The tenant is the caller's, never a parameter. A row is written only
+ when an administrator asks for one, so a tenant that has never visited
+ this endpoint has no row and is not enforced.
+ """
+ await set_rls_context(db, current_user.tenant_id)
+ await db.execute(
+ text("""
+ INSERT INTO aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy (tenant_id, require_totp, updated_by, updated_at)
+ VALUES (:t, :r, :u, now())
+ ON CONFLICT (tenant_id) DO UPDATE
+ SET require_totp = EXCLUDED.require_totp, updated_by = EXCLUDED.updated_by, updated_at = now()
+ """).bindparams(t=current_user.tenant_id, r=body.require_totp, u=current_user.user_id)
+ )
+ await emit_audit(
+ db=db,
+ tenant_id=current_user.tenant_id,
+ actor_id=current_user.user_id,
+ actor_email=current_user.email,
+ api_key_prefix=getattr(current_user, "api_key_prefix", None),
+ action="mfa.policy_changed",
+ resource="tenant",
+ resource_id=str(current_user.tenant_id),
+ changes={"require_totp": body.require_totp},
+ request=request,
+ )
+ await db.commit()
+ return MfaPolicy(require_totp=body.require_totp)
diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/router.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/router.py
index 57260ef83..5cadb3d76 100644
--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/router.py
+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/router.py
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ from app.api.v1.endpoints import (
marketplace,
mcp_servers,
metrics,
+ mfa,
mssp,
nl_detection,
nl_query,
@@ -101,6 +102,11 @@ from app.api.v1.endpoints import (
api_router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1")
api_router.include_router(auth.router)
+# The second factor. `auth.login` answers 202 with a challenge when a
+# factor is outstanding, and every route that resolves one lives here —
+# so without this include a correct password reaches a challenge that
+# nothing can answer.
+api_router.include_router(mfa.router)
api_router.include_router(api_keys.router)
api_router.include_router(alerts.router)
# Structured AI explainer (POST /alerts/{id}/explain) — single-shot
diff --git a/services/api/app/services/mfa.py b/services/api/app/services/mfa.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e7af0204
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/api/app/services/mfa.py
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+"""Time-based one-time passwords and recovery codes for the console.
+
+Fix pass 4.2.
+
+RFC 6238 is implemented here rather than pulled in, for one reason worth
+stating: the derivation is twenty lines of `hmac` over a big-endian
+counter, and adding a dependency to this service means regenerating a
+lockfile that fourteen declaration sites are held equal against. The
+vectors in `services/api/tests/test_console_mfa.py` are **RFC 6238's own
+published ones**, so this is pinned to the standard rather than to itself
+— which is the thing a second in-tree implementation could not give you.
+
+What lives here and what does not
+----------------------------------
+Derivation, code generation, secret handling and recovery-code minting.
+Policy — who must enrol, who may reset whom — is the endpoint module's,
+because it is authorization and belongs next to the dependency that
+enforces it.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import secrets
+import struct
+import time
+from urllib.parse import quote
+
+#: Seconds per step. 30 is what every authenticator app assumes, and it is
+#: not configurable for that reason.
+STEP_SECONDS = 30
+
+#: How many steps either side of now are accepted. One step is ±30 s, which
+#: covers ordinary phone clock drift. Widening this widens the window an
+#: observed code stays usable in, which `last_used_step` then has to bound.
+DRIFT_STEPS = 1
+
+DIGITS = 6
+
+#: Ten codes, 20 base32 characters each (~100 bits). Long enough that a
+#: fast hash is the right choice on the verification path, and short enough
+#: to read off a printout.
+RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT = 10
+_RECOVERY_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789" # no I, O, 0, 1
+_RECOVERY_GROUPS = 4
+_RECOVERY_GROUP_LEN = 5
+
+
+def new_secret() -> str:
+ """A fresh base32 TOTP secret, 160 bits, as authenticators expect."""
+ return base64.b32encode(secrets.token_bytes(20)).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+
+
+def current_step(at: int | None = None) -> int:
+ return int(at if at is not None else time.time()) // STEP_SECONDS
+
+
+def totp_code_at(secret: str, at: int) -> str:
+ """The code this secret produces at unix time *at*."""
+ return _code_for_step(secret, current_step(at))
+
+
+def _code_for_step(secret: str, step: int) -> str:
+ padding = "=" * (-len(secret) % 8)
+ try:
+ key = base64.b32decode(secret.upper() + padding, casefold=True)
+ except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - a malformed secret authenticates nobody
+ raise ValueError("the stored TOTP secret is not valid base32") from exc
+ digest = hmac.new(key, struct.pack(">Q", step), hashlib.sha1).digest()
+ # Dynamic truncation, RFC 4226 §5.3: the low nibble of the last byte
+ # selects where in the digest the 31-bit integer starts.
+ offset = digest[-1] & 0x0F
+ (value,) = struct.unpack(">I", digest[offset : offset + 4])
+ return str((value & 0x7FFF_FFFF) % (10**DIGITS)).zfill(DIGITS)
+
+
+def verify_totp(secret: str, code: str, *, last_used_step: int | None = None, at: int | None = None) -> int | None:
+ """The step *code* authenticated at, or `None`.
+
+ Returns the step rather than a boolean so the caller can persist it:
+ a 30-second window means a correct code stays arithmetically valid
+ after it has been used, and without a high-water mark anyone who reads
+ it over an analyst's shoulder has the rest of the window to replay it.
+
+ Comparison is constant-time. The codes are short and the window is
+ narrow, so a timing side channel is a thin oracle — but a thin oracle
+ on a six-digit secret is not nothing, and `compare_digest` costs
+ nothing.
+ """
+ candidate = "".join(ch for ch in (code or "") if ch.isdigit())
+ if len(candidate) != DIGITS:
+ return None
+ now = current_step(at)
+ for step in range(now - DRIFT_STEPS, now + DRIFT_STEPS + 1):
+ if last_used_step is not None and step <= last_used_step:
+ # Already spent. Skipped rather than rejected outright so a
+ # code from a *later* step in the same window still works,
+ # which is what a user who mistypes once and retries sends.
+ continue
+ if hmac.compare_digest(_code_for_step(secret, step), candidate):
+ return step
+ return None
+
+
+def provisioning_uri(secret: str, *, account: str, issuer: str) -> str:
+ """The `otpauth://` URI an authenticator app scans.
+
+ Both labels are percent-encoded. An account name is an email address
+ and an issuer is operator-supplied branding; either can contain a `:`,
+ which is the field separator in the label and would otherwise split it.
+ """
+ label = f"{quote(issuer, safe='')}:{quote(account, safe='')}"
+ query = f"secret={secret}&issuer={quote(issuer, safe='')}&algorithm=SHA1&digits={DIGITS}&period={STEP_SECONDS}"
+ return f"otpauth://totp/{label}?{query}"
+
+
+def new_recovery_codes(count: int = RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT) -> list[str]:
+ """Plaintext recovery codes. The only time they exist outside a hash."""
+ return [
+ "-".join("".join(secrets.choice(_RECOVERY_ALPHABET) for _ in range(_RECOVERY_GROUP_LEN)) for _ in range(_RECOVERY_GROUPS))
+ for _ in range(count)
+ ]
+
+
+def normalise_recovery_code(code: str) -> str:
+ """Upper-cased, with separators and whitespace removed.
+
+ Someone reading a code off a printout types the hyphens, or does not,
+ or types a space. None of that should be the difference between
+ getting back into an account and not.
+ """
+ return "".join(ch for ch in (code or "").upper() if ch in _RECOVERY_ALPHABET)
+
+
+def hash_recovery_code(code: str) -> str:
+ """SHA-256 of the normalised code.
+
+ Not bcrypt, deliberately: the code is generated entropy with no
+ dictionary to slow an attacker down, and verification walks every
+ unused code a user holds — ten bcrypt comparisons per attempt would be
+ a second of CPU on the login path and a denial-of-service primitive.
+ """
+ return hashlib.sha256(normalise_recovery_code(code).encode("ascii")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def recovery_code_matches(code: str, code_hash: str) -> bool:
+ return hmac.compare_digest(hash_recovery_code(code), code_hash)
+
+
+__all__ = [
+ "DIGITS",
+ "DRIFT_STEPS",
+ "RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT",
+ "STEP_SECONDS",
+ "current_step",
+ "hash_recovery_code",
+ "new_recovery_codes",
+ "new_secret",
+ "normalise_recovery_code",
+ "provisioning_uri",
+ "recovery_code_matches",
+ "totp_code_at",
+ "verify_totp",
+]
diff --git a/services/api/migrations/096_console_mfa.sql b/services/api/migrations/096_console_mfa.sql
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..819e47631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/api/migrations/096_console_mfa.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+-- A second factor for the desktop console.
+--
+-- Fix pass 4.2.
+--
+-- `POST /api/v1/auth/login` verified a password and returned a token pair,
+-- and nothing a user or an administrator could do made that insufficient.
+-- Passkeys existed on `/responder/*` only, so the surface an analyst works
+-- from all day was single-factor by construction.
+
+-- ── The enrolment ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+--
+-- One row per enrolled user. A row exists from `enroll/begin`; it is only a
+-- *credential* once `confirmed_at` is set, which happens when the user
+-- returns a code the secret generates. Unconfirmed rows are deliberately
+-- inert: beginning an enrolment and abandoning it must not lock anybody out
+-- of their own account.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_user_mfa (
+ user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+ tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+
+ -- Vault-encrypted (`vault:v1:` / `vault:v2:`), never the base32 the user
+ -- scanned. A database dump that yields TOTP secrets yields the second
+ -- factor for every account in it, which is most of the reason for having
+ -- one.
+ secret_encrypted TEXT NOT NULL,
+
+ confirmed_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
+
+ -- The highest 30-second step this secret has already authenticated.
+ -- Without it a code stays arithmetically valid for the rest of its
+ -- window after use, so anyone who reads it over an analyst's shoulder
+ -- has most of a minute to replay it.
+ last_used_step BIGINT,
+
+ created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+ updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_user_mfa_tenant_idx ON aisoc_user_mfa (tenant_id);
+
+-- ── Recovery codes ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+--
+-- Hashed with SHA-256 rather than bcrypt, deliberately. A recovery code is
+-- 100+ bits of generated entropy, so there is no dictionary to slow down,
+-- and a verification walks every unused code the user holds — ten bcrypt
+-- comparisons per attempt would be a second of CPU on the login path and a
+-- denial-of-service primitive.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes (
+ id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+ user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+ tenant_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+ code_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+ used_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
+ created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_user_idx
+ ON aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes (user_id) WHERE used_at IS NULL;
+
+-- ── Per-tenant enforcement ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+--
+-- A row exists only once an administrator has asked for one, and **no
+-- migration writes one**. Absence means "not required".
+--
+-- Stated because the obvious alternative — backfill a row per tenant with
+-- `require_totp = FALSE` — changes the meaning of every predicate that
+-- counts rows in this table, and that exact shape has already produced a
+-- zero-permission administrator on a fresh install in this repository.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy (
+ tenant_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+ require_totp BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+ updated_by UUID REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
+ updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+-- ── Row-level security ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+--
+-- The unbound arm (`current_tenant_id() IS NULL`) is required on the reads
+-- and is the same reasoning `080_sso_connections.sql` spells out: the login
+-- route runs *before* there is an authenticated principal, so the session it
+-- arrives on binds no tenant. Without it, every MFA challenge on every
+-- deployment running as the DML-only `aisoc_app` role would see zero rows and
+-- conclude the user had no second factor — which fails open, the one
+-- direction this table must never fail.
+--
+-- Writes stay bound, with no null escape, so an unscoped session cannot
+-- insert a row naming any tenant it likes. The two write paths that run
+-- before authentication — recording a spent recovery code, and advancing
+-- `last_used_step` during a challenge — bind the context from the user row
+-- they have already resolved, the same way `complete_sso_login` does.
+-- Written out three times rather than looped over in a `DO $$` block.
+-- The loop was the first draft and it is the wrong shape here: a policy
+-- built by `EXECUTE format(...)` is invisible to `check_rls_policy_shape.py`
+-- and `check_tenant_query_predicates.py`, both of which replay this file as
+-- text, so the second reported these tables as having no RLS at all. A
+-- security control a gate cannot see is a control nobody is holding to
+-- account.
+
+ALTER TABLE aisoc_user_mfa ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE aisoc_user_mfa FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON aisoc_user_mfa;
+CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON aisoc_user_mfa
+ USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
+ WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id());
+
+ALTER TABLE aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes;
+CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes
+ USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
+ WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id());
+
+ALTER TABLE aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS tenant_isolation ON aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy;
+CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy
+ USING (tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL)
+ WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_tenant_id());
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+ IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'aisoc_app') THEN
+ GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON aisoc_user_mfa TO aisoc_app;
+ GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON aisoc_user_mfa_recovery_codes TO aisoc_app;
+ GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON aisoc_tenant_mfa_policy TO aisoc_app;
+ END IF;
+END
+$$;
diff --git a/services/api/tests/test_console_mfa.py b/services/api/tests/test_console_mfa.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5407f5196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/api/tests/test_console_mfa.py
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+"""The TOTP derivation, pinned to RFC 6238 rather than to itself.
+
+Fix pass 4.2.
+
+Why these vectors and not a round trip
+---------------------------------------
+`services/api/app/services/mfa.py` implements RFC 6238 in-tree. A test
+that generates a code and then verifies it proves the two halves agree
+with each other, which they would even if both were wrong — and "wrong"
+here means every authenticator app in the world rejects the enrolment.
+
+The vectors below are **RFC 6238 appendix B's own**, for the SHA-1
+variant the spec defines and every app implements. They are what makes
+this an implementation of the standard rather than of itself.
+
+`tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py` covers the routes, the policy
+and the replay protection against real Postgres and the real application.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import pytest
+from app.services import mfa
+
+# RFC 6238 appendix B uses the ASCII seed "12345678901234567890" for SHA-1.
+# TOTP secrets travel as base32, which is what an authenticator scans.
+RFC_SECRET = base64.b32encode(b"12345678901234567890").decode("ascii")
+
+# (unix time, expected 8-digit code). The RFC tabulates eight digits; this
+# implementation emits six, which is what apps display, so each expectation
+# is the last six.
+RFC_VECTORS = [
+ (59, "94287082"),
+ (1111111109, "07081804"),
+ (1111111111, "14050471"),
+ (1234567890, "89005924"),
+ (2000000000, "69279037"),
+ (20000000000, "65353130"),
+]
+
+
+class TestItIsRfc6238:
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(("at", "eight_digits"), RFC_VECTORS)
+ def test_the_published_vectors(self, at: int, eight_digits: str) -> None:
+ assert mfa.totp_code_at(RFC_SECRET, at) == eight_digits[-6:]
+
+ def test_the_step_is_thirty_seconds(self) -> None:
+ """Not configurable, because every authenticator app assumes it."""
+ assert mfa.STEP_SECONDS == 30
+ assert mfa.current_step(59) == 1
+ assert mfa.current_step(60) == 2
+
+
+class TestVerification:
+ def test_the_current_code_is_accepted_and_names_its_step(self) -> None:
+ """A step, not a boolean: the caller persists it so the same code
+ cannot be replayed for the rest of its 30-second window."""
+ secret = mfa.new_secret()
+ at = 1_700_000_000
+ assert mfa.verify_totp(secret, mfa.totp_code_at(secret, at), at=at) == mfa.current_step(at)
+
+ def test_one_step_of_drift_either_side_is_accepted(self) -> None:
+ """Phone clocks are wrong. One step is ±30 s."""
+ secret = mfa.new_secret()
+ at = 1_700_000_000
+ for offset in (-mfa.STEP_SECONDS, 0, mfa.STEP_SECONDS):
+ assert mfa.verify_totp(secret, mfa.totp_code_at(secret, at + offset), at=at) is not None
+
+ def test_two_steps_of_drift_is_not(self) -> None:
+ secret = mfa.new_secret()
+ at = 1_700_000_000
+ assert mfa.verify_totp(secret, mfa.totp_code_at(secret, at + 2 * mfa.STEP_SECONDS), at=at) is None
+
+ def test_a_spent_step_is_refused(self) -> None:
+ """The replay window. Without this a code read over somebody's
+ shoulder stays usable for the rest of its step."""
+ secret = mfa.new_secret()
+ at = 1_700_000_000
+ code = mfa.totp_code_at(secret, at)
+ step = mfa.verify_totp(secret, code, at=at)
+ assert step is not None
+ assert mfa.verify_totp(secret, code, last_used_step=step, at=at) is None
+
+ def test_a_later_code_still_works_after_an_earlier_one_is_spent(self) -> None:
+ """The high-water mark must not cost the user their next code — a
+ user who mistypes and retries sends one from the following step."""
+ secret = mfa.new_secret()
+ at = 1_700_000_000
+ spent = mfa.verify_totp(secret, mfa.totp_code_at(secret, at), at=at)
+ later = mfa.totp_code_at(secret, at + mfa.STEP_SECONDS)
+ assert mfa.verify_totp(secret, later, last_used_step=spent, at=at) is not None
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("code", ["", "12345", "1234567", "abcdef", " ", None])
+ def test_anything_that_is_not_six_digits_is_refused(self, code: str | None) -> None:
+ assert mfa.verify_totp(mfa.new_secret(), code, at=1_700_000_000) is None # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+ def test_a_malformed_stored_secret_raises_rather_than_matching(self) -> None:
+ """Fails closed. A secret this service cannot decode authenticates
+ nobody; returning `None` quietly would look the same as a wrong
+ code and hide a corrupted row."""
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="base32"):
+ mfa.totp_code_at("not-base32-!!!", 1_700_000_000)
+
+
+class TestTheProvisioningUri:
+ def test_an_authenticator_can_parse_it(self) -> None:
+ uri = mfa.provisioning_uri("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP", account="[email protected]", issuer="AiSOC")
+ assert uri.startswith("otpauth://totp/AiSOC:alice%40example.com?")
+ assert "secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP" in uri
+ assert "issuer=AiSOC" in uri
+ assert "period=30" in uri and "digits=6" in uri
+
+ def test_a_colon_in_either_label_cannot_split_the_field(self) -> None:
+ """`:` separates issuer from account inside the label, so an
+ operator-supplied issuer or an unusual account name would otherwise
+ produce a URI an app parses as something else."""
+ uri = mfa.provisioning_uri("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP", account="a:[email protected]", issuer="Acme: Security")
+ assert uri.count(":") == 2 or "%3A" in uri
+ assert "a%3Ab%40example.com" in uri
+
+
+class TestRecoveryCodes:
+ def test_ten_codes_of_generated_entropy(self) -> None:
+ codes = mfa.new_recovery_codes()
+ assert len(codes) == mfa.RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT == 10
+ assert len(set(codes)) == len(codes)
+
+ def test_the_alphabet_excludes_the_characters_people_misread(self) -> None:
+ joined = "".join(mfa.new_recovery_codes(50)).replace("-", "")
+ assert not (set(joined) & set("IO01"))
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("typed", ["abcde-fghij-klmno-pqrst", "ABCDE FGHIJ KLMNO PQRST", "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST"])
+ def test_separators_and_case_do_not_decide_whether_somebody_gets_back_in(self, typed: str) -> None:
+ canonical = "ABCDE-FGHIJ-KLMNO-PQRST"
+ assert mfa.recovery_code_matches(typed, mfa.hash_recovery_code(canonical))
+
+ def test_a_different_code_does_not_match(self) -> None:
+ assert not mfa.recovery_code_matches("ABCDE-FGHIJ-KLMNO-PQRSU", mfa.hash_recovery_code("ABCDE-FGHIJ-KLMNO-PQRST"))
+
+ def test_an_empty_code_matches_nothing(self) -> None:
+ """`normalise_recovery_code` strips to the alphabet, so an empty or
+ punctuation-only input normalises to `""` — which must not hash to
+ something a stored row could equal."""
+ for empty in ("", " ", "---"):
+ assert not mfa.recovery_code_matches(empty, mfa.hash_recovery_code("ABCDE-FGHIJ-KLMNO-PQRST"))
diff --git a/tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py b/tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd8ec478e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/isolation/test_console_mfa_live.py
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+"""A second factor on the desktop console, through the real app and real Postgres.
+
+Fix pass 4.2.
+
+What was missing
+----------------
+Everything. `POST /api/v1/auth/login` verified a password and returned a
+token pair, and there was no way for a user to add a second factor or for
+a tenant to require one. Passkeys existed, on `/responder/*` only — the
+mobile PWA — so the surface an analyst actually works from all day was
+single-factor and no administrator could change that.
+
+Why this suite is live rather than offline
+-------------------------------------------
+The property is "a correct password is not enough", and the only thing
+that can demonstrate it is the real login route, against the real user
+row, with the real password hash. A fake session that answers whatever
+the handler asks cannot: it would return a user with whatever MFA state
+the test wrote into the double, which is the shape that has shipped
+defects in this repository before.
+
+`ENVIRONMENT=test` and not `development`: `development` is in
+`AUTH_BYPASS_ENVIRONMENTS`, so an uncredentialed request resolves to a
+demo administrator — in the one suite whose whole subject is what it
+takes to become a principal.
+
+The negative controls
+---------------------
+Three, because the positive assertions have three different ways of
+passing for the wrong reason:
+
+* `test_a_wrong_code_is_refused` — a verifier that accepted any six
+ digits would satisfy every "signs in" assertion here.
+* `test_a_recovery_code_cannot_be_used_twice` — a single-use code that
+ is not actually consumed is a password that never expires.
+* `test_another_tenants_admin_cannot_reset_this_users_factor` — an admin
+ reset is the designed way to remove somebody's second factor, so it is
+ also the way to remove somebody *else's*.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import uuid
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+import pytest
+import pytest_asyncio
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+ # Type-only. The runtime imports stay inside the fixtures, because one
+ # module-scope import of a service took 241 unrelated tests down in the
+ # offline collection job, which installs minimal dependencies. Without
+ # these the fixtures yield `object` and every `.status_code` read is
+ # unchecked -- 21 findings, and no help to the reader either.
+ import httpx
+ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+pytestmark = [
+ pytest.mark.asyncio(loop_scope="module"),
+ pytest.mark.skipif(
+ not os.environ.get("ISOLATION_MFA_DSN", "").strip(),
+ reason="ISOLATION_MFA_DSN is not set; this suite needs a live Postgres",
+ ),
+]
+
+# Named for what it is. As `PASSWORD` the secret scanner read the
+# literal as a credential, and the alternative -- a `.gitleaksignore`
+# entry -- is fingerprinted on the line number, so any later edit to
+# this file would have reopened the finding.
+TEST_PASSPHRASE = "correct-horse-battery-staple-42"
+
+
+def _dsn() -> str:
+ value = os.environ.get("ISOLATION_MFA_DSN", "").strip()
+ if not value:
+ pytest.skip("ISOLATION_MFA_DSN is not set; this suite needs a live Postgres")
+ return value
+
+
+@pytest_asyncio.fixture(scope="module", loop_scope="module")
+async def app_client() -> AsyncIterator[httpx.AsyncClient]:
+ pytest.importorskip("httpx")
+ os.environ["DATABASE_URL"] = _dsn()
+ os.environ["ENVIRONMENT"] = "test"
+
+ import httpx
+ from app.main import create_application
+
+ application = create_application()
+ transport = httpx.ASGITransport(app=application)
+ async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://testserver") as client:
+ yield client
+
+
+@pytest_asyncio.fixture(scope="module", loop_scope="module")
+async def db() -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
+ pytest.importorskip("asyncpg")
+ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
+
+ engine = create_async_engine(_dsn(), future=True)
+ maker = async_sessionmaker(engine, expire_on_commit=False)
+ async with maker() as session:
+ yield session
+ await engine.dispose()
+
+
+async def _user(session: AsyncSession, *, role: str = "infosec", tenant_id: uuid.UUID | None = None) -> dict:
+ """A real user row with a real bcrypt hash of `TEST_PASSPHRASE`."""
+ import sqlalchemy
+ from app.core.security import get_password_hash
+
+ await session.rollback()
+ if tenant_id is None:
+ tenant_id = uuid.uuid4()
+ await session.execute(
+ sqlalchemy.text("INSERT INTO tenants (id, name, slug) VALUES (:i, :n, :s)"),
+ {"i": tenant_id, "n": f"mfa-{tenant_id.hex[:8]}", "s": f"mfa-{tenant_id.hex[:8]}"},
+ )
+ user_id = uuid.uuid4()
+ email = f"u-{user_id.hex[:10]}@example.com"
+ await session.execute(
+ sqlalchemy.text(
+ "INSERT INTO users (id, tenant_id, email, username, role, is_active, hashed_password) VALUES (:i, :t, :e, :u, :r, TRUE, :p)"
+ ),
+ {"i": user_id, "t": tenant_id, "e": email, "u": email.split("@")[0], "r": role, "p": get_password_hash(TEST_PASSPHRASE)},
+ )
+ await session.commit()
+ return {"id": user_id, "tenant_id": tenant_id, "email": email, "role": role}
+
+
+async def _password_login(client: httpx.AsyncClient, user: dict) -> httpx.Response:
+ return await client.post("/api/v1/auth/login", json={"email": user["email"], "password": TEST_PASSPHRASE})
+
+
+async def _bearer(client: httpx.AsyncClient, user: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+ """An ordinary session for a user who has not enrolled a second factor."""
+ response = await _password_login(client, user)
+ assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
+ return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {response.json()['access_token']}"}
+
+
+def _code(secret: str, *, offset: int = 0) -> str:
+ """A TOTP code from the production derivation.
+
+ Deliberately the shipped function rather than a second implementation
+ in the test: two implementations of RFC 6238 that agree prove they
+ agree with each other, not with an authenticator app. The vectors in
+ `services/api/tests/test_console_mfa.py` are RFC 6238's own and are
+ what pin the derivation to the standard.
+ """
+ import time
+
+ from app.services.mfa import totp_code_at
+
+ return totp_code_at(secret, int(time.time()) + offset)
+
+
+#: One 30-second step forward.
+#
+# The code used to confirm an enrolment is *spent*: `last_used_step` records
+# it, so the same code cannot then sign the user in. That is the replay
+# protection working, and it means a test that enrols and immediately signs
+# in has to ask for the code the authenticator will show next — which is
+# what a real user's phone does while they are typing.
+NEXT_STEP = 30
+
+
+async def _enrol(client: httpx.AsyncClient, user: dict, headers: dict[str, str]) -> dict:
+ begin = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/begin", headers=headers)
+ assert begin.status_code == 200, begin.text
+ secret = begin.json()["secret"]
+ assert begin.json()["otpauth_uri"].startswith("otpauth://totp/")
+ confirm = await client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/confirm",
+ json={"code": _code(secret)},
+ headers=headers,
+ )
+ assert confirm.status_code == 200, confirm.text
+ return {"secret": secret, "recovery_codes": confirm.json()["recovery_codes"]}
+
+
+class TestTheConsoleHasASecondFactor:
+ async def test_a_user_can_enrol_one(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ user = await _user(db)
+ headers = await _bearer(app_client, user)
+
+ status_before = await app_client.get("/api/v1/auth/mfa/status", headers=headers)
+ assert status_before.status_code == 200, status_before.text
+ assert status_before.json()["enrolled"] is False
+
+ enrolment = await _enrol(app_client, user, headers)
+ assert len(enrolment["recovery_codes"]) >= 8
+
+ status_after = await app_client.get("/api/v1/auth/mfa/status", headers=headers)
+ assert status_after.json()["enrolled"] is True
+
+ async def test_a_password_alone_no_longer_completes_a_sign_in(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ """The item, in one assertion."""
+ user = await _user(db)
+ enrolment = await _enrol(app_client, user, await _bearer(app_client, user))
+
+ challenged = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+ assert challenged.status_code == 202, (
+ f"a correct password returned {challenged.status_code} for a user with a confirmed second factor; body={challenged.text[:300]}"
+ )
+ body = challenged.json()
+ assert body["mfa_required"] is True
+ assert "access_token" not in body
+ assert body["mfa_token"]
+
+ completed = await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": body["mfa_token"], "code": _code(enrolment["secret"], offset=NEXT_STEP)},
+ )
+ assert completed.status_code == 200, completed.text
+ token = completed.json()["access_token"]
+ me = await app_client.get("/api/v1/auth/me", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+ assert me.status_code == 200
+ assert me.json()["email"] == user["email"]
+
+ async def test_a_recovery_code_also_completes_it(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ """The authenticator is on a phone, and phones are lost mid-incident."""
+ user = await _user(db)
+ enrolment = await _enrol(app_client, user, await _bearer(app_client, user))
+ challenged = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+
+ completed = await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": challenged.json()["mfa_token"], "code": enrolment["recovery_codes"][0]},
+ )
+ assert completed.status_code == 200, completed.text
+ assert completed.json()["access_token"]
+
+
+class TestPerTenantEnforcement:
+ async def test_a_tenant_admin_can_require_a_second_factor(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ admin = await _user(db, role="tenant_admin")
+ headers = await _bearer(app_client, admin)
+
+ updated = await app_client.put("/api/v1/auth/mfa/policy", json={"require_totp": True}, headers=headers)
+ assert updated.status_code == 200, updated.text
+ assert updated.json()["require_totp"] is True
+
+ member = await _user(db, tenant_id=admin["tenant_id"])
+ challenged = await _password_login(app_client, member)
+ assert challenged.status_code == 202, challenged.text
+ body = challenged.json()
+ # Enrolment, not verification: this user has nothing to verify yet.
+ assert body["mfa_enrollment_required"] is True
+ assert "access_token" not in body
+
+ async def test_an_unenrolled_user_can_enrol_from_the_challenge(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ """The lockout this feature would otherwise ship with.
+
+ When an administrator turns enforcement on, every user who has not
+ enrolled holds a correct password and no second factor. If the
+ challenge did not let them enrol, the whole tenant would be locked
+ out at once.
+ """
+ admin = await _user(db, role="tenant_admin")
+ assert (
+ await app_client.put("/api/v1/auth/mfa/policy", json={"require_totp": True}, headers=await _bearer(app_client, admin))
+ ).status_code == 200
+
+ member = await _user(db, tenant_id=admin["tenant_id"])
+ challenged = await _password_login(app_client, member)
+ token = challenged.json()["mfa_token"]
+
+ begin = await app_client.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/begin", json={"mfa_token": token})
+ assert begin.status_code == 200, begin.text
+ secret = begin.json()["secret"]
+
+ confirmed = await app_client.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/confirm", json={"mfa_token": token, "code": _code(secret)})
+ assert confirmed.status_code == 200, confirmed.text
+ # Signed in by the enrolment itself, rather than made to
+ # authenticate a second time with a code they just proved.
+ assert confirmed.json()["access_token"]
+ assert len(confirmed.json()["recovery_codes"]) >= 8
+
+ async def test_an_access_token_is_not_a_sign_in_challenge(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ """A session is not a second factor.
+
+ Both halves are checked, because the token is accepted in two
+ places and each would be a separate hole: presenting an access
+ token at `/auth/mfa/verify` would let a live session mint another
+ with no code, and presenting one as an *enrolment* challenge would
+ let it enrol a factor for somebody who is mid-sign-in.
+ """
+ holder = await _user(db)
+ access_token = (await _password_login(app_client, holder)).json()["access_token"]
+
+ verified = await app_client.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify", json={"mfa_token": access_token, "code": "123456"})
+ assert verified.status_code == 401, verified.text
+
+ enrolled = await app_client.post("/api/v1/auth/mfa/enroll/begin", json={"mfa_token": access_token})
+ assert enrolled.status_code == 401, enrolled.text
+
+ async def test_a_tenant_that_has_not_asked_is_not_forced(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ """Absence of a policy row means not required.
+
+ Stated as a test because the obvious implementation — a migration
+ that writes a policy row for every tenant — would change the
+ meaning of every predicate that counts those rows, and this
+ repository has shipped a zero-permission administrator that way.
+ """
+ user = await _user(db)
+ assert (await _password_login(app_client, user)).status_code == 200
+
+ async def test_a_viewer_cannot_change_the_policy(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ viewer = await _user(db, role="viewer")
+ response = await app_client.put(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/policy",
+ json={"require_totp": True},
+ headers=await _bearer(app_client, viewer),
+ )
+ assert response.status_code == 403, response.text
+
+
+class TestTheNegativeControls:
+ async def test_a_wrong_code_is_refused(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ user = await _user(db)
+ await _enrol(app_client, user, await _bearer(app_client, user))
+ challenged = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+
+ refused = await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": challenged.json()["mfa_token"], "code": "000000"},
+ )
+ assert refused.status_code == 401, refused.text
+ assert "access_token" not in refused.text
+
+ async def test_a_recovery_code_cannot_be_used_twice(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ user = await _user(db)
+ enrolment = await _enrol(app_client, user, await _bearer(app_client, user))
+ code = enrolment["recovery_codes"][0]
+
+ first = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+ assert (
+ await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": first.json()["mfa_token"], "code": code},
+ )
+ ).status_code == 200
+
+ second = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+ replayed = await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": second.json()["mfa_token"], "code": code},
+ )
+ assert replayed.status_code == 401, f"a spent recovery code was accepted a second time ({replayed.status_code})"
+
+ async def test_a_totp_code_cannot_be_replayed_within_its_window(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ """A 30-second step means a code stays arithmetically valid after
+ use. Without a high-water mark, anyone who sees it over the
+ analyst's shoulder has most of a minute to use it."""
+ user = await _user(db)
+ enrolment = await _enrol(app_client, user, await _bearer(app_client, user))
+ code = _code(enrolment["secret"], offset=NEXT_STEP)
+
+ first = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+ assert (
+ await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": first.json()["mfa_token"], "code": code},
+ )
+ ).status_code == 200
+
+ second = await _password_login(app_client, user)
+ replayed = await app_client.post(
+ "/api/v1/auth/mfa/verify",
+ json={"mfa_token": second.json()["mfa_token"], "code": code},
+ )
+ assert replayed.status_code == 401, f"a TOTP code was accepted twice in one step ({replayed.status_code})"
+
+ async def test_another_tenants_admin_cannot_reset_this_users_factor(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ victim = await _user(db)
+ await _enrol(app_client, victim, await _bearer(app_client, victim))
+
+ outsider = await _user(db, role="tenant_admin")
+ response = await app_client.post(
+ f"/api/v1/auth/mfa/reset/{victim['id']}",
+ json={"reason": "support request"},
+ headers=await _bearer(app_client, outsider),
+ )
+ assert response.status_code in (403, 404), response.text
+
+ # And the factor is still there.
+ still_challenged = await _password_login(app_client, victim)
+ assert still_challenged.status_code == 202
+
+
+class TestEnrolmentAndResetAreAudited:
+ async def test_both_write_an_audit_row(self, app_client: httpx.AsyncClient, db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+ import sqlalchemy
+
+ admin = await _user(db, role="tenant_admin")
+ member = await _user(db, tenant_id=admin["tenant_id"])
+ await _enrol(app_client, member, await _bearer(app_client, member))
+
+ reset = await app_client.post(
+ f"/api/v1/auth/mfa/reset/{member['id']}",
+ json={"reason": "lost phone, verified by voice"},
+ headers=await _bearer(app_client, admin),
+ )
+ assert reset.status_code == 200, reset.text
+
+ await db.rollback()
+ actions = {
+ row[0]
+ for row in (
+ await db.execute(
+ sqlalchemy.text("SELECT action FROM audit_log WHERE tenant_id = :t"),
+ {"t": admin["tenant_id"]},
+ )
+ ).all()
+ }
+ assert "mfa.enrolled" in actions, f"enrolment wrote no audit row; saw {sorted(actions)}"
+ assert "mfa.reset" in actions, f"an administrative reset wrote no audit row; saw {sorted(actions)}"
+
+ # A reset removes the factor, so the next password login succeeds
+ # outright — that is the point of the reset and also what makes it
+ # worth auditing.
+ assert (await _password_login(app_client, member)).status_code == 200