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security(codeql): fix py/log-injection in alert_explain + py/unused-global in vendor sync (#98)
Beenu Arorab383da37fd41
diff --git a/scripts/sync_vendored_nl_query.py b/scripts/sync_vendored_nl_query.pyindex 76fcf8bbf..f04d42dc0 100755--- a/scripts/sync_vendored_nl_query.py+++ b/scripts/sync_vendored_nl_query.py@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ def _check() -> int:if not filecmp.cmp(src, dst, shallow=False):drift.append(f" - out of date: {name}")+ for name in VENDORED_ONLY:+ if not (VENDORED_DIR / name).is_file():+ drift.append(f" - missing vendored-only file: {name}")+# Make sure no stray extra .py files snuck into the vendored tree.vendored_pyfiles = {p.name for p in VENDORED_DIR.iterdir() if p.is_file() and p.suffix == ".py"}extra_py = vendored_pyfiles - set(SYNCED_FILES)@@ -123,8 +127,7 @@ def _sync() -> int:print(f"removing stale {path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}")path.unlink()- print("\nDone. Don't forget to commit the changes under "- "services/api/app/_vendor/nl_query/.")+ print("\nDone. Don't forget to commit the changes under services/api/app/_vendor/nl_query/.")return 0diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alert_explain.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alert_explain.pyindex 649de5f05..793e15674 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alert_explain.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/alert_explain.py@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, statusfrom sqlalchemy import selectfrom app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, require_permission+from app.core.logging import safe_log_valuefrom app.db.rls import TenantDBSessionfrom app.models.alert import Alertfrom app.services.alert_explain import (@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ async def _acquire_or_429(# error envelope so retry-after semantics survive the 429.logger.info("explain.rate_limited tenant_id=%s cost=%.2f remaining=%.2f retry_after=%.2fs",- tenant_id,+ safe_log_value(tenant_id),cost,decision.remaining,decision.retry_after_seconds,@@ -174,11 +175,15 @@ async def explain_alert(# errors, etc. — so reaching this branch means something# unexpected (e.g. database read failure mid-explain) blew up.# Log loudly and return a 502 so the client can retry; we do- # *not* expose the exception text to the caller.+ # *not* expose the exception text to the caller. Tenant/alert+ # IDs are UUIDs in practice but they originate from the request,+ # so we route them through ``safe_log_value`` to neutralise any+ # CR/LF injection attempt before they hit the log stream+ # (CWE-117 / CodeQL ``py/log-injection``).logger.exception("explain.failed tenant=%s alert=%s",- current_user.tenant_id,- alert_id,+ safe_log_value(current_user.tenant_id),+ safe_log_value(alert_id),)raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_502_BAD_GATEWAY,@@ -215,11 +220,16 @@ async def explain_alert(# Audit-log failures must never break the explain response.# We log a warning so ops can investigate, but we do not# propagate — the user already got their answer.+ # Sanitise every interpolated value: tenant_id/alert_id come+ # from the request and ``exc`` may carry arbitrary text+ # (e.g. database constraint messages). ``safe_log_value``+ # escapes CR/LF/NUL/ESC and truncates, defending against+ # CWE-117 (CodeQL ``py/log-injection``).logger.warning("explain.audit_failed tenant=%s alert=%s error=%s",- current_user.tenant_id,- alert_id,- exc,+ safe_log_value(current_user.tenant_id),+ safe_log_value(alert_id),+ safe_log_value(exc),)return _explanation_to_payload(explanation)