Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into depth/9.1-mcp-http
Beenu Aroracb1b089f743d
diff --cc DEPTH_PROGRESS.mdindex 6af95780d,5567c305c..cbc6153a2--- a/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md+++ b/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md@@@ -527,7 -714,7 +741,9 @@@ endpoint produces once triage falls thr| Date | Item | What happened ||---|---|---|+ | 2026-10-11 | 9.3 | Reproduced: the alert merge columns had zero writers outside the ORM model; `grep -rn custom_field services/api` and `grep -rn workload` (excluding workload *identities*) both counted zero; and `grep -rn bulk apps/web/src/components/alerts` found only unrelated comments, so the only bulk verb in the product was `POST /alerts/bulk-close` with no console surface at all. The two-case-table trap named in the brief was already closed by migration 083 and `check_one_case_table.py` reports OK, so `aisoc_cases` is the table this item deepens. Three negative controls recorded in the PR and wired into the live workflow. The live suite found a real defect on its first run: `aisoc_cases.alert_ids` is `uuid[]` while `ioc_ids` and `artifact_ids` beside it are JSONB, and the merge statement had assumed JSONB. |+++| 2026-10-11 | 9.1 | Reproduced: on `origin/main` the greps for `StreamableHTTP` in `services/mcp/src/`, for `aisoc-mcp` in `docker-compose.yml` and `infra/helm/`, for a per-tenant tool grant in `services/api/app/`, and for an `mcp:` audit action all counted **zero**, and `check_mcp_over_http.py` reported seven problems. Built the HTTP transport, the authorize/complete pair, the tenant grant table, the approval queue bound to a call's arguments, and the generated tool catalogue held in parity with the TypeScript registry. Four negative controls recorded in the PR; one of them found a hole in the new gate itself, which reported `http.ts` for reading the process-wide API key when the only mention was a comment saying it deliberately does not — the detector now strips comments before matching, and refuses a `{...cfg}` spread as well, because a spread is correct today and a credential fallback the day somebody reorders the literal. || 2026-10-11 | 9.2 | Reproduced: `knowledge_base.py` searched with `to_tsvector`/`plainto_tsquery` and nothing else; `grep -rn qdrant services/api/app/` found only the migration runner and the tenant-deletion sweep, no recall path; and no memory row anywhere carried an author, a source, a scope, an expiry or a state. Built the store of record, the Qdrant index over it, the conflict state machine, the case-closure writer and the recall scorer. Two negative controls recorded in the PR: restoring last-write-wins on a contradiction fails three tests, and restoring vector truncation fails one. The measurement is negative and is published as such — see D11, which also records that it caught the truncation defect. || 2026-10-07 | 0.1 | This file created at base commit `1b8bc2d4`. || 2026-10-07 | 0.2 | Every figure re-derived. Two matched exactly (detections, unreachable families); executor arms measured 74 against a captured 73; the cloud/identity/SaaS/code figure measured 395 against a captured 461 on a grouping the plan does not pin, recorded above. Two measurement caveats found: executable and quarantined overlap by 1,724 rules, and the "69% Windows" figure does not reproduce from the index. |