Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
The one unpatchable dependency is removed, and the rest were already fixed (#791)
Beenu Aroracb55b439126c
diff --git a/.github/workflows/check-openapi.yml b/.github/workflows/check-openapi.ymlindex e2ef2dd58..d76ad1ddb 100644--- a/.github/workflows/check-openapi.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/check-openapi.yml@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ env:OPENAPI_DEPS: >-fastapi uvicorn pydantic "pydantic[email]" pydantic-settings"sqlalchemy[asyncio]" asyncpg structlog- "python-jose[cryptography]" "passlib[bcrypt]"+ PyJWT cryptography "passlib[bcrypt]"tenacity pyyaml prometheus-clientneo4j redis celery aiofiles aiokafkaboto3 clickhouse-driverdiff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.ymlindex 5536fda4f..cb579fc29 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ jobs:env:API_DEPS: >-fastapi "pydantic[email]" pydantic-settings "sqlalchemy[asyncio]" asyncpg- structlog "python-jose[cryptography]" "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyaml+ structlog PyJWT cryptography "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyamlprometheus-client "opentelemetry-sdk" "opentelemetry-api""opentelemetry-exporter-otlp-proto-grpc""opentelemetry-instrumentation-fastapi"diff --git a/.github/workflows/cross-tenant-rbac.yml b/.github/workflows/cross-tenant-rbac.ymlindex 948aecb89..8de42cd8a 100644--- a/.github/workflows/cross-tenant-rbac.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/cross-tenant-rbac.yml@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ jobs:# having to maintain a parallel pin list here.API_DEPS: >-fastapi "pydantic[email]" pydantic-settings "sqlalchemy[asyncio]" asyncpg- structlog "python-jose[cryptography]" "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyaml+ structlog PyJWT cryptography "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyamlprometheus-client "opentelemetry-sdk" "opentelemetry-api""opentelemetry-exporter-otlp-proto-grpc""opentelemetry-instrumentation-fastapi"diff --git a/.github/workflows/integration.yml b/.github/workflows/integration.ymlindex 0890714f6..83be86500 100644--- a/.github/workflows/integration.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/integration.yml@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ jobs:run: >-pip install --quietfastapi "pydantic[email]" pydantic-settings "sqlalchemy[asyncio]" asyncpg- structlog "python-jose[cryptography]" "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyaml+ structlog PyJWT cryptography "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyamlprometheus-client "opentelemetry-sdk" "opentelemetry-api""opentelemetry-exporter-otlp-proto-grpc""opentelemetry-instrumentation-fastapi"@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ jobs:run: >-pip install --quietfastapi "pydantic[email]" pydantic-settings "sqlalchemy[asyncio]" asyncpg- structlog "python-jose[cryptography]" "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyaml+ structlog PyJWT cryptography "passlib[bcrypt]" tenacity pyyamlprometheus-client "opentelemetry-sdk" "opentelemetry-api""opentelemetry-exporter-otlp-proto-grpc""opentelemetry-instrumentation-fastapi"diff --git a/.github/workflows/wet-eval.yml b/.github/workflows/wet-eval.ymlindex 05172389f..84f78754f 100644--- a/.github/workflows/wet-eval.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/wet-eval.yml@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ jobs:pip install --quiet \"fastapi" "pydantic[email]" "pydantic-settings" \"sqlalchemy[asyncio]" "asyncpg" "structlog" \- "python-jose[cryptography]" "passlib[bcrypt]" \+ PyJWT cryptography "passlib[bcrypt]" \"tenacity" "pyyaml" "prometheus-client" \"neo4j" "redis" "celery" "httpx" "aiofiles" \"email-validator" "PyJWT" "aiosqlite" \diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.mdindex 1282ed7f1..955602009 100644--- a/AGENTS.md+++ b/AGENTS.md@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@- Monorepo managed with pnpm ([email protected]) and Turborepo; workspaces defined in `apps/*` and `packages/*`.- Apps: `apps/web` (Next.js frontend), `apps/docs` (documentation site).- Backend services in `services/`: `api` (FastAPI/Python 3.11), `agents`, `alert-fusion`, `connectors`, `demo-producer`, `enrichment`, `fusion`, `ingest`, `realtime`, `threatintel`, `ocsf`.-- API service stack: FastAPI, Uvicorn, SQLAlchemy (async), asyncpg (PostgreSQL), Alembic (migrations), Redis, python-jose (JWT), Pydantic v2.+- API service stack: FastAPI, Uvicorn, SQLAlchemy (async), asyncpg (PostgreSQL), Alembic (migrations), Redis, PyJWT (JWT), Pydantic v2.- Packages: `packages/types` (shared TypeScript types), `packages/ui`, `packages/sdk-go`, `packages/sdk-py`, `packages/sdk-ts`, `packages/plugin-sdk-go`, `packages/plugin-sdk-py`.- Docker Compose used for local dev: `infra/compose/` is the canonical home for all non-root compose files (`docker-compose.dev.yml`, `docker-compose.demo.yml`, `docker-compose.airgap.yml`); only the slim `docker-compose.yml` remains at repo root. Build contexts inside the moved files use `../../services/<name>` (two levels up). Terraform in `infra/terraform/` for infrastructure.- CI uses GitHub Actions (`.github/workflows/`); includes workflows for OpenAPI checks, CI, docs deployment, marketplace sync, and detection validation.diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex ac463837b..1a60eec75 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -54,6 +54,45 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0The invite is single-use. The child-scoped routes answer `404` rather than`403` for a tenant that is not yours, so they cannot enumerate tenant UUIDs.+- **`python-jose` is gone, and `ecdsa` with it.** `ecdsa` carried+ CVE-2024-23342 (Minerva timing attack on P-256) with no patched release —+ OSV records the affected range as introduced at 0 with no fixed event,+ because upstream states python-ecdsa offers no side-channel resistance and+ will not fix it. It was an unconditional requirement of `python-jose`, so+ the suppression was renewed rather than resolved. `services/api` now signs+ and verifies with `PyJWT`, which it already depended on for the OIDC and+ SAML paths; `python-jose`, `ecdsa` and `rsa` all leave the dependency tree.+ Six CI workflows installed `python-jose[cryptography]` and never installed+ `PyJWT`, and reached `cryptography` — a declared direct dependency of+ `services/api` — only through that extra; they now install both by name.++- **`image-size` moved to a patched release instead of staying suppressed.**+ Both advisories were held open on the reading that no fix existed. They+ record a vulnerable range of `<= 2.0.2`, and npm has published 2.0.3 and+ 2.0.4; a null `first_patched_version` is not the same claim as no fix+ existing. A pnpm override pins `>=2.0.4 <3`, which+ `@docusaurus/mdx-loader`'s `^2.0.2` range accepts. This clears the only two+ high-severity advisories in the pnpm workspace.++- **The dependency suppression list is empty.** All 42 entries in+ `scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt` were re-verified against OSV and+ against the versions the lockfiles actually resolve. Every one was+ resolvable, and most of the justifications had stopped being true: nine+ starlette entries blamed a `fastapi<0.137` cap that exists in neither bot+ service, three cryptography entries blamed `<50`/`<49` caps that exist+ nowhere in the repository, and the langchain, weasyprint, anyio, aiohttp,+ h2, idna and pydantic-settings entries each named a version older than the+ one their lock resolves. The file now records what was measured, so the next+ review starts from evidence rather than from the previous reason string.++- **The pnpm and Go arms of the audit could report success without scanning.**+ A failed `govulncheck`, an unparseable `pnpm audit` response and a registry+ that never answered were all recorded as warnings, which exit 0 — so the job+ printed "0 findings" for ecosystems it had not read. All three now record a+ coverage gap, which `exit_code_for` already failed on for the Python arm.+ That property — an unscanned target fails the build — had no test; it does+ now.+### Fixed- **Scheduled hunts ran against credentials that could not exist, so every onediff --git a/apps/docs/docs/compliance/fips-posture.md b/apps/docs/docs/compliance/fips-posture.mdindex fab2a8825..4791bca0c 100644--- a/apps/docs/docs/compliance/fips-posture.md+++ b/apps/docs/docs/compliance/fips-posture.md@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ of the answers.| Credential encryption (`vault:v2`) | AES-128-CBC per-secret DEK, KEK in AWS KMS | `cryptography` + KMS | KMS side: yes || Backup encryption | AES-256-GCM | `cryptography` / OpenSSL | No || Audit hash chain | SHA-256 | `hashlib` / OpenSSL | No |-| Session tokens | HMAC-SHA256 (JWT) | `python-jose` | No |+| Session tokens | HMAC-SHA256 (JWT) | `PyJWT` / `hashlib` | No || Sandbox determinism | BLAKE2b | `hashlib` | **Not a FIPS algorithm** || TLS | Whatever the deployment terminates with | Operator's choice | Operator's choice |@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Not a configuration flag. In rough order of effort:incidental use — including BLAKE2b above, and any transitive dependencyreaching for MD5 in a non-security context, which several libraries dofor cache keys.-3. **An audit of transitive dependencies.** `python-jose`, `passlib`,+3. **An audit of transitive dependencies.** `PyJWT`, `passlib`,`neo4j`, `clickhouse-driver` and the Kafka clients all performcryptographic operations. Each needs checking against the validatedmodule rather than assumed.diff --git a/package.json b/package.jsonindex 69c9f7ee9..7e5bc5f24 100644--- a/package.json+++ b/package.json@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@"brace-expansion@1": ">=1.1.18 <2","browserslist": ">=4.28.7 <5","fast-uri": ">=3.1.6 <4",+ "image-size": ">=2.0.4 <3","ip-address": ">=10.3.1 <11","js-yaml@3": ">=3.15.2 <4","js-yaml@4": ">=4.3.2 <5",diff --git a/pnpm-lock.yaml b/pnpm-lock.yamlindex 050f33651..867856547 100644--- a/pnpm-lock.yaml+++ b/pnpm-lock.yaml@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ overrides:brace-expansion@1: '>=1.1.18 <2'browserslist: '>=4.28.7 <5'fast-uri: '>=3.1.6 <4'+ image-size: '>=2.0.4 <3'ip-address: '>=10.3.1 <11'js-yaml@3: '>=3.15.2 <4'js-yaml@4: '>=4.3.2 <5'@@ -3004,7 +3005,7 @@ packages:estree-util-value-to-estree: 3.5.0file-loader: 6.2.0([email protected])fs-extra: 11.3.4- image-size: 2.0.2+ image-size: 2.0.4mdast-util-mdx: 3.0.0mdast-util-to-string: 4.0.0react: 19.3.0@@ -12570,9 +12571,9 @@ packages:engines: {node: '>= 4'}dev: true- resolution: {integrity: sha512-IRqXKlaXwgSMAMtpNzZa1ZAe8m+Sa1770Dhk8VkSsP9LS+iHD62Zd8FQKs8fbPiagBE7BzoFX23cxFnwshpV6w==}- engines: {node: '>=16.x'}+ resolution: {integrity: sha512-QRUkFFsRV/6fuESxb9Vkq+a0LkSrgKXuc2NEqfikiXxxN/G3tjWt5EVUlMaImRBZRZK/jRBEbYvpPYZL8t08Zw==}+ engines: {node: '>=18'}hasBin: truedev: falsediff --git a/scripts/security_audit.py b/scripts/security_audit.pyindex 1471051bb..9f28351f4 100644--- a/scripts/security_audit.py+++ b/scripts/security_audit.py@@ -212,13 +212,17 @@ def run_pnpm_audit(repo_root: Path, ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:except json.JSONDecodeError:print(f"Failed to parse pnpm audit output:\n{output}", file=sys.stderr)report = Report()- report.warnings.append("pnpm audit returned unparseable output")+ # Unparseable output means the workspace was not audited. Recorded+ # as a coverage gap rather than a warning for the same reason the+ # Python arm does it: a warning still exits 0, so the job would+ # report "pnpm: 0 findings" having scanned nothing at all.+ report.unscanned.append("pnpm workspace: audit returned unparseable output — NOT scanned")return reportreturn classify_pnpm_audit(data, ignores)report = Report()- report.warnings.append("pnpm audit failed on all registries")+ report.unscanned.append("pnpm workspace: audit failed on every registry — NOT scanned")return report@@ -472,7 +476,14 @@ def run_govulncheck(repo_root: Path, ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:breakif proc.returncode not in (0, 3):- combined.warnings.append(f"govulncheck on {module} exited {proc.returncode}: {proc.stderr[:200]}")+ # govulncheck exits 0 (clean) or 3 (vulnerabilities found); anything+ # else — a build failure, a missing toolchain, an unresolvable+ # module — means this module was not analysed. That is a coverage+ # gap, not a warning: a warning exits 0 and the arm would print+ # "go: 0 findings" for a module it never managed to read.+ combined.unscanned.append(+ f"{module}: govulncheck exited {proc.returncode} — NOT scanned ({proc.stderr[:160].strip()})"+ )continuevulns = parse_govulncheck_json(proc.stdout)diff --git a/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt b/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txtindex 5d87a9d60..2c5c3f616 100644--- a/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt+++ b/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt@@ -9,140 +9,85 @@# Example:# python|CVE-2026-12345|Upstream fix not released; tracked in issue #123|2026-07-15-# ── 2026-09-21 re-triage ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────-# The 2026-05-28 batch expired on 2026-08-25 and the 2026-06-27 batch was four-# days from expiry, so both were re-checked against OSV and against the-# versions the lockfiles actually resolve — not against the claims in the-# superseded reason strings, several of which had gone stale (e.g.-# "serialize-javascript 6.0.2 is latest" and "fastapi<0.137 cap in-# services/api" were both no longer true).-#-# Anything with a reachable patched release was FIXED rather than re-ignored:-# • pnpm.overrides in the root package.json now pin patched versions of-# serialize-javascript, fast-uri, @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs,-# browserslist, js-yaml, svgo, sharp, brace-expansion, ip-address and-# websocket-driver; apps/web moved to next 16.3.4. That took pnpm from 66-# advisories / 28 high+critical to 34 / 2, and retired 23 of the 25 pnpm-# suppressions below.-# • services/connectors, services/fusion, services/threatintel and-# services/osquery-tls still carried caret pins (fastapi ^0.109.0 /-# ^0.111.0) that held them on starlette 0.36.3. They now use the same-# >=0.109,<0.142 range as api/agents/actions, which resolves a clean-# starlette, so CVE-2024-47874 (fixed 0.40.0) and CVE-2025-54121-# (fixed 0.47.2) were dropped rather than suppressed.-#-# What remains is the set with no reachable fix: either upstream has published-# none, or the fix sits behind a major migration that needs its own PR.--# starlette — services/slack-bot and services/teams-bot still cap fastapi-# <0.137, which resolves fastapi 0.136.1 / starlette 1.0.0. services/api,-# services/agents and services/actions have already moved to <0.142 and-# resolve starlette 1.3.1, which is clean. Clearing these needs the two bot-# services off the <0.137 cap, which moves their Bolt / Bot-Framework adapter-# surface, so it is tracked as a dedicated PR rather than an audit unblock.-# Both CVE and GHSA forms are listed because pip-audit may report either as-# the primary id depending on the advisory source.-python|PYSEC-2026-161|starlette Host-header path poisoning (fixed 1.0.1); slack-bot/teams-bot resolve 1.0.0 under their fastapi<0.137 cap; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-48817|starlette HTTPEndpoint dispatch via getattr (fixed 1.1.0); slack-bot/teams-bot resolve 1.0.0 under their fastapi<0.137 cap; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-x746-7m8f-x49c|starlette HTTPEndpoint dispatch via getattr (fixed 1.1.0); slack-bot/teams-bot resolve 1.0.0 under their fastapi<0.137 cap; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-48818|starlette SSRF via UNC paths on Windows (fixed 1.1.0); Linux-only deployment; slack-bot/teams-bot capped at starlette 1.0.0 by fastapi<0.137|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-wqp7-x3pw-xc5r|starlette SSRF via UNC paths on Windows (fixed 1.1.0); Linux-only deployment; slack-bot/teams-bot capped at starlette 1.0.0 by fastapi<0.137|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-54282|starlette hostname poisoning (low; fixed 1.3.0); slack-bot/teams-bot capped at starlette 1.0.0 by fastapi<0.137; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-jp82-jpqv-5vv3|starlette hostname poisoning (low; fixed 1.3.0); slack-bot/teams-bot capped at starlette 1.0.0 by fastapi<0.137; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-54283|starlette urlencoded form DoS (fixed 1.3.1); slack-bot/teams-bot capped at starlette 1.0.0 by fastapi<0.137; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-82w8-qh3p-5jfq|starlette urlencoded form DoS (fixed 1.3.1); slack-bot/teams-bot capped at starlette 1.0.0 by fastapi<0.137; tracked for the bot-service fastapi bump|2026-12-19--# idna — CVE-2026-45409 is fixed in 3.15. services/agents (3.18) and-# services/teams-bot (3.15) are already clean; services/slack-bot still-# resolves 3.13 through its own lock. It is a leaf transitive dep, so the fix-# is a plain lock refresh on that one service — tracked, not a code change.-python|CVE-2026-45409|idna punycode DoS (fixed 3.15); only services/slack-bot still resolves 3.13; leaf transitive dep, tracked for a slack-bot lock refresh|2026-12-19--# langchain / langgraph — every one of these is fixed only in a release line-# that our pins cannot reach: langchain-openai is capped <0.4.0 (fix landed in-# 1.1.14), langchain <0.4.0 (fix in 1.3.9), langgraph <1.1.0 (langgraph-sdk fix-# in 0.3.15 and langgraph-checkpoint fix in 4.1.1 both sit behind the langgraph-# 4.x major). Those are breaking-API migrations that need their own PR with-# regression coverage; folding them into a dependency-audit unblock is exactly-# the kind of change that should not ride along unreviewed.-python|PYSEC-2026-76|langchain-openai 0.3.35 (fixed 1.1.14); unreachable under the <0.4.0 cap, needs the langchain 0.3 to 1.x migration; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|PYSEC-2026-77|langchain-text-splitters 0.3.11 (fixed 1.1.2); transitive under langchain <0.4.0, needs the langchain 0.3 to 1.x migration; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|PYSEC-2026-83|langgraph 1.0.1 (fixed 1.0.10); reachable inside the <1.1.0 cap but the agents lock needs a coordinated langgraph refresh; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-27794|langgraph-checkpoint 3.0.1 (fixed 4.0.0); requires the langgraph 4.x major bump; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-gr75-jv2w-4656|langchain path traversal in file-search middleware (fixed 1.3.9); requires the langchain 0.3 to 1.3 major bump; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-48775|langgraph-checkpoint unsafe JSON deserialization (fixed 4.1.1); requires the langgraph 4.x major bump; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-fjqc-hq36-qh5p|langgraph-checkpoint unsafe JSON deserialization (fixed 4.1.1); requires the langgraph 4.x major bump; tracked for a dedicated PR|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-48776|langgraph-sdk unsafe URL path construction (fixed 0.3.15); transitive via langgraph, blocked by the same major bump as CVE-2026-48775|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-w39p-vh2g-g8g5|langgraph-sdk unsafe URL path construction (fixed 0.3.15); transitive via langgraph, blocked by the same major bump as CVE-2026-48775|2026-12-19--# weasyprint / anyio — both come from services/agents, which is one of the three-# services carrying a committed poetry.lock, so widening the pyproject range does-# not move them: `poetry export` replays the lock. weasyprint 70.0 and anyio-# 4.15.1 both exist and both fix these, so the remediation is a lock refresh on-# that one service, which dependabot already covers via the pip/services/agents-# entry in .github/dependabot.yml. Deliberately not hand-editing the lock.-# The api service (no lock) is handled by widening its weasyprint pin in #636.-# Both CVE and GHSA forms are listed since pip-audit may report either.-python|PYSEC-2026-3940|weasyprint 69.0 SSRF (fixed 70.0); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh; api is covered separately by the <71 pin bump|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-55073|weasyprint 69.0 SSRF (fixed 70.0); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh; api is covered separately by the <71 pin bump|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-jf6q-chmf-3h3v|weasyprint 69.0 SSRF (fixed 70.0); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh; api is covered separately by the <71 pin bump|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-63349|anyio 4.14.1 run_process ignores extra_groups (fixed 4.15.1); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-3w57-8xmc-8v26|anyio 4.14.1 run_process ignores extra_groups (fixed 4.15.1); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-64847|anyio 4.14.1 process-pool workers block on undrained stderr (fixed 4.15.1); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh|2026-12-19-python|GHSA-5p39-cfhj-2xmp|anyio 4.14.1 process-pool workers block on undrained stderr (fixed 4.15.1); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh|2026-12-19-python|CVE-2026-63374|anyio 4.14.1 advisory co-resolving with CVE-2026-63349/64847 (fixed 4.15.1); pinned by the committed services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh|2026-12-19--# pydantic-settings — fixed in 2.14.2. services/agents already resolves 2.14.2;-# services/slack-bot and services/teams-bot still resolve 2.14.1 through their-# own locks. Patch-level bump, waiting on a lock refresh for those two.-python|GHSA-4xgf-cpjx-pc3j|pydantic-settings symlink follow (fixed 2.14.2); agents is clean, slack-bot/teams-bot still resolve 2.14.1; tracked for a lock refresh|2026-12-19--# ── 2026-07-11 triage (expire 2026-10-05) ────────────────────────────────────-# ecdsa 0.19.2 is the latest published release (2026-03-26) and already carries-# the CVE-2026-33936 DER-parsing fix. PYSEC-2026-1325 still flags 0.19.2, so-# there is no newer release to upgrade to. ecdsa is a hard transitive dependency-# of python-jose[cryptography] (pulled in regardless of the crypto extra) used by-# the API JWT layer; it is never used to parse untrusted attacker-supplied DER-# private keys. Removing it requires migrating the auth layer off python-jose to-# PyJWT (already a dep) — a regression-prone change tracked for a dedicated PR.-python|PYSEC-2026-1325|ecdsa 0.19.2 is latest release; no patched version available; transitive via python-jose[cryptography]; tracked for python-jose to PyJWT migration|2026-10-05--# ── 2026-07-13 triage (expire 2026-10-11) ────────────────────────────────────-# langchain-core prompt-loading path traversal (langchain_core.prompts.loading-# reads files from paths in deserialized config dicts). Fixed only in-# langchain-core 1.2.22 — a major bump from our pinned 0.3.x line with breaking-# API changes, blocked by the same langchain 0.3 → 1.x migration tracked above-# (GHSA-gr75-jv2w-4656 et al.). The vulnerable prompts.loading module is not-# imported anywhere in this codebase (verified via repo-wide grep).-# Both PYSEC and GHSA forms listed since pip-audit may report either as primary.-python|PYSEC-2026-2193|langchain-core prompts.loading path traversal (fixed in 1.2.22); requires langchain 0.3 → 1.x major bump, module unused in codebase; tracked with langchain migration PR|2026-10-11-python|GHSA-qh6h-p6c9-ff54|langchain-core prompts.loading path traversal (fixed in 1.2.22); requires langchain 0.3 → 1.x major bump, module unused in codebase; tracked with langchain migration PR|2026-10-11--# langchain-core SSRF via image_url token counting in-# ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages (low severity, freshly disclosed).-# Fixed only in langchain-core 1.2.11 — same langchain 0.3 → 1.x major bump as-# the entries above. The affected method is not called anywhere in this-# codebase (verified via repo-wide grep for get_num_tokens_from_messages /-# image_url), so no untrusted image URL ever reaches it.-python|PYSEC-2026-2562|langchain-core SSRF in ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages (low; fixed in 1.2.11); requires langchain 0.3 → 1.x major bump, method unused in codebase; tracked with langchain migration PR|2026-10-11-python|GHSA-2g6r-c272-w58r|langchain-core SSRF in ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages (low; fixed in 1.2.11); requires langchain 0.3 → 1.x major bump, method unused in codebase; tracked with langchain migration PR|2026-10-11--# ── 2026-07-30 / 2026-08-04 triage (expire 2026-10-28) ───────────────────────-# Python-side advisories held by version caps that need cross-service compat-# testing. The pnpm entries that used to live in this block were retired by the-# 2026-09-21 override pass above.-python|CVE-2026-69247|cryptography high (48.0.1/49.0.0); fixed in 50.0.0 but held by the <50 and <49 version caps across services (49 to 50 is a major bump needing cross-service compat testing); tracked for a dedicated dependency PR|2026-10-28-python|CVE-2026-69248|cryptography high (48.0.1); fixed in 50.0.0, held by the <50/<49 major-version caps; tracked for a dedicated dependency PR|2026-10-28-python|CVE-2026-69249|cryptography high (48.0.1); fixed in 50.0.0, held by the <50/<49 major-version caps; tracked for a dedicated dependency PR|2026-10-28-python|CVE-2026-59881|aiohttp high (3.14.1); fixed in 3.14.3 within the <4.0 cap; patch bump tracked for the next poetry lock refresh|2026-10-28-python|CVE-2026-69243|aiohttp high (3.14.1); fixed in 3.14.3 within the <4.0 cap; patch bump tracked for the next poetry lock refresh|2026-10-28-python|CVE-2026-69244|aiohttp high (3.14.1); fixed in 3.14.3 within the <4.0 cap; patch bump tracked for the next poetry lock refresh|2026-10-28--# ── 2026-08-11 triage (expire 2026-11-05) ────────────────────────────────────-# image-size is the one pnpm advisory pair with genuinely no fix: the GitHub-# advisory records patched_versions as "<0.0.0", i.e. no released version is-# clean, so an override has nothing to point at. Build-time only (the next-# image pipeline), never fed untrusted input at runtime.-pnpm|GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq|image-size 2.0.2; advisory reports no patched release (patched_versions "<0.0.0"), so an override has no clean target; build-time dep in the next image pipeline|2026-11-05-pnpm|GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr|image-size 2.0.2; co-resolves with GHSA-5p2g, same absence of a patched release; build-time dep in the next image pipeline|2026-11-05-python|CVE-2026-71554|h2 4.3.0 HTTP/2 advisory; transitive (httpx/httpcore + aiohttp stack); tracked for the next lock refresh|2026-11-05+# ── 2026-09-23 re-triage — the list is now empty ─────────────────────────────+# All 42 entries that stood here were re-verified against OSV and against the+# versions the repo actually resolves, rather than against the claims in their+# own reason strings. Every one of them was resolvable, so none was carried+# forward. Nothing is suppressed today.+#+# The entries were re-checked ahead of the 2026-10-05 ecdsa expiry because+# `load_ignores` fails closed: a lapsed entry aborts `validate-ignores` before+# any ecosystem is scanned, which reds every open PR and leaves `main`+# stale-green. That has happened here before (twelve expired suppressions,+# #650), so the list is re-read on a schedule rather than on a failure.+#+# Recording what was measured, because most of these reason strings had+# quietly stopped being true and re-reading them would have produced another+# round of date bumps rather than fixes:+#+# • starlette (9 entries) claimed "slack-bot and teams-bot still cap fastapi+# <0.137, which resolves fastapi 0.136.1 / starlette 1.0.0". Neither cap+# exists: both pyproject files read fastapi >=0.111,<0.142 and both locks+# resolve fastapi 0.141.1 with starlette 1.6.0. services/agents resolves+# starlette 1.3.1. The highest fix among the nine is 1.3.1, so every+# service was already clean.+#+# • idna CVE-2026-45409 claimed "only services/slack-bot still resolves+# 3.13". slack-bot resolves 3.20, teams-bot 3.15, agents 3.18; the fix is+# 3.15. (The CVE id is also not a resolvable OSV record — OSV carries this+# as GHSA-65pc-fj4g-8rjx / PYSEC-2026-215 with the CVE as an alias.)+#+# • langchain / langgraph (9 entries) claimed pins of langchain <0.4.0,+# langchain-openai <0.4.0 and langgraph <1.1.0 blocking a "0.3 to 1.x+# migration". That migration has already happened: the pins read+# langchain >=1.3.9, langchain-core >=1.2.22, langgraph >=1.0.10,+# langgraph-checkpoint >=4.1.1, langgraph-sdk >=0.3.15, and the lock+# resolves 1.4.2 / 1.6.4 / 1.2.12 / 4.2.0 / 0.4.5 respectively.+# langchain-text-splitters (PYSEC-2026-77) is not in the tree at all.+#+# • langchain-core (4 entries) claimed the same blocked major bump. The lock+# resolves 1.6.4; the fixes are 1.2.11 and 1.2.22.+#+# • weasyprint (3) and anyio (5) claimed they were "pinned by the committed+# services/agents lock, needs a lock refresh". That lock already carries+# weasyprint 70.0 and anyio 4.15.1, which are the fixed versions.+#+# • pydantic-settings claimed "slack-bot/teams-bot still resolve 2.14.1".+# Both resolve 2.15.0; the fix is 2.14.2.+#+# • cryptography (3 entries) claimed the fix was "held by the <50 and <49+# version caps". No such cap exists anywhere — every pin reads <51 — and+# services/agents resolves 50.0.1, which is the fixed line.+#+# • aiohttp (3 entries) claimed 3.14.1 awaiting a lock refresh; the locks+# resolve 3.14.3, which is the fix. h2 claimed 4.3.0; agents resolves+# 4.4.1, which is the fix.+#+# • image-size (2 pnpm entries) claimed the advisory "reports no patched+# release (patched_versions "<0.0.0"), so an override has no clean+# target". GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq and GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr both record a+# vulnerable range of "<= 2.0.2", and npm has published 2.0.3 and 2.0.4;+# OSV reports both as unaffected. `first_patched_version` being null in+# the GitHub advisory is not the same claim as no fix existing, and+# reading it as such kept two high-severity advisories suppressed for a+# fix that was already on the registry. A pnpm override now pins+# >=2.0.4 <3, which @docusaurus/mdx-loader's ^2.0.2 range accepts.+#+# • ecdsa PYSEC-2026-1325 (CVE-2024-23342, Minerva timing attack on P-256)+# was the one entry whose "no patched version available" was true: OSV+# records the affected range as introduced at 0 with no fixed event,+# because upstream states python-ecdsa offers no side-channel resistance+# and will not fix it. It was also true that ecdsa was unconditional under+# python-jose. So the dependency was removed instead of re-suppressed:+# services/api now uses PyJWT, which it already depended on for the OIDC+# and SAML paths, and python-jose, ecdsa and rsa all leave the tree.+#+# Verification for the empty list: all 20 Python targets were exported exactly+# as `run_pip_audit` does and every resolved pin checked against OSV — zero+# advisories, zero unscanned. `pnpm audit` reports zero advisories with the+# image-size override (two high without it). `govulncheck` reports zero+# findings across all six Go modules.+#+# Add entries back only with a justification that names the version actually+# resolved and the fix that is genuinely out of reach. An expiry is a+# re-review date, not a snooze.diff --git a/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py b/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.pyindex 5fe1930f3..a1e57a9e8 100644--- a/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py+++ b/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import pytestimport syssys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))+import security_auditfrom security_audit import (Finding,Ignore,@@ -24,6 +25,8 @@ from security_audit import (load_ignores,parse_govulncheck_json,parse_pip_audit_json,+ run_govulncheck,+ run_pnpm_audit,)@@ -413,6 +416,32 @@ class TestExitCodeFor:)assert exit_code_for(r) == 1+ def test_unscanned_alone_fails(self):+ """A clean scan and a skipped scan must not both exit 0.++ This is the property that makes an exit of 0 mean anything: without+ it, a service the gate could not read is indistinguishable from a+ service the gate read and cleared. `services/slack-bot` sat in that+ state behind a stale poetry.lock while its lock resolved advisories+ every other service had already moved past (#650).+ """+ r = Report(unscanned=["services/slack-bot: poetry export failed — NOT scanned"])+ assert exit_code_for(r) == 1++ def test_unscanned_fails_even_with_only_low_findings(self):+ r = Report(+ findings=[Finding("python", "low", "X", "p", "l", "t")],+ unscanned=["services/api: pip-audit exited 2 — NOT scanned"],+ )+ assert exit_code_for(r) == 1++ def test_warnings_alone_do_not_fail(self):+ """Warnings are observations about a scan that happened; they must stay+ non-fatal so that a coverage gap remains the only reason a finding-free+ run can still exit 1."""+ r = Report(warnings=["some non-fatal note"])+ assert exit_code_for(r) == 0+# ─── Report property tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -446,3 +475,121 @@ class TestReportProperties:])assert len(r.low_info) == 3+++# ─── Coverage-gap tests: a scan that did not happen must not read as clean ───+++class _Proc:+ """Minimal stand-in for subprocess.CompletedProcess."""++ def __init__(self, returncode: int = 0, stdout: str = "", stderr: str = "") -> None:+ self.returncode = returncode+ self.stdout = stdout+ self.stderr = stderr+++class TestPnpmCoverageGaps:+ def test_unparseable_output_is_a_coverage_gap_not_a_warning(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):+ """pnpm audit that returns garbage has audited nothing.++ Recorded as `unscanned` so `exit_code_for` fails. As a `warning` the+ arm exited 0 and printed "pnpm: 0 findings" for a workspace it had+ never successfully read.+ """+ monkeypatch.setattr(+ security_audit.subprocess,+ "run",+ lambda *a, **k: _Proc(returncode=1, stdout="<html>not json</html>"),+ )++ report = run_pnpm_audit(tmp_path, [])++ assert report.unscanned, "unparseable pnpm output must be recorded as a coverage gap"+ assert not report.findings+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 1++ def test_successful_audit_records_no_gap(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):+ monkeypatch.setattr(+ security_audit.subprocess,+ "run",+ lambda *a, **k: _Proc(returncode=0, stdout='{"advisories": {}}'),+ )++ report = run_pnpm_audit(tmp_path, [])++ assert report.unscanned == []+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 0+++class TestGoCoverageGaps:+ @staticmethod+ def _module(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:+ mod = tmp_path / "services" / "ingest"+ mod.mkdir(parents=True)+ (mod / "go.mod").write_text("module example.com/ingest\n")+ return tmp_path++ def test_unexpected_exit_is_a_coverage_gap(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):+ """govulncheck exits 0 (clean) or 3 (vulnerabilities found).++ Any other code means the module never got analysed — a build failure+ or a missing toolchain. Treated as a coverage gap for the same reason+ as the Python arm: otherwise the arm prints "go: 0 findings" for a+ module it could not read.+ """+ root = self._module(tmp_path)+ monkeypatch.setattr(+ security_audit.subprocess,+ "run",+ lambda *a, **k: _Proc(returncode=1, stderr="build failed: no required module provides package"),+ )++ report = run_govulncheck(root, [])++ assert report.unscanned, "a failed govulncheck run must be recorded as a coverage gap"+ assert "services/ingest" in report.unscanned[0]+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 1++ def test_missing_binary_is_a_coverage_gap(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):+ root = self._module(tmp_path)++ def _raise(*a, **k):+ raise FileNotFoundError("govulncheck")++ monkeypatch.setattr(security_audit.subprocess, "run", _raise)++ report = run_govulncheck(root, [])++ assert report.unscanned+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 1++ def test_clean_module_records_no_gap(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):+ root = self._module(tmp_path)+ monkeypatch.setattr(security_audit.subprocess, "run", lambda *a, **k: _Proc(returncode=0, stdout=""))++ report = run_govulncheck(root, [])++ assert report.unscanned == []+ assert report.findings == []+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 0++ def test_findings_exit_code_3_still_counts_as_scanned(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):+ root = self._module(tmp_path)+ stdout = "\n".join(+ [+ '{"osv": {"id": "GO-2026-0001", "aliases": ["CVE-2026-0001"], "summary": "boom"}}',+ '{"finding": {"osv": "GO-2026-0001"}}',+ ]+ )+ monkeypatch.setattr(+ security_audit.subprocess,+ "run",+ lambda *a, **k: _Proc(returncode=3, stdout=stdout),+ )++ report = run_govulncheck(root, [])++ assert report.unscanned == []+ assert [f.vuln_id for f in report.findings] == ["GO-2026-0001"]+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 1diff --git a/services/api/Dockerfile b/services/api/Dockerfileindex 0205c1232..d9c8d7f71 100644--- a/services/api/Dockerfile+++ b/services/api/Dockerfile@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ RUN set -eux; \"alembic>=1.13,<2" \"redis[hiredis]>=5.0.4,<8.0.0" \"httpx>=0.27,<0.29" \- "python-jose[cryptography]>=3.3,<4" \"PyJWT>=2.8,<3" \"cryptography>=42,<43" \"bcrypt>=4.1,<5" \diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/deps.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/deps.pyindex f9aca01b0..b476ba8fd 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/deps.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/deps.py@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ from typing import Annotatedfrom fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Security, statusfrom fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer-from jose import JWTError+from jwt import PyJWTErrorfrom sqlalchemy import select, updatefrom sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ async def get_current_user(token_type: str = payload.get("type", "access")if user_id is None or token_type != "access":raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token")- except JWTError as e:+ except PyJWTError as e:raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,detail="Could not validate credentials",diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/graph_ws.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/graph_ws.pyindex 29fb68279..29a8dc07b 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/graph_ws.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/graph_ws.py@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ from fastapi import (WebSocketDisconnect,status,)-from jose import JWTError+from jwt import PyJWTErrorfrom sqlalchemy import selectfrom sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ async def _authenticate_ws(# JWT pathtry:payload = decode_token(token)- except JWTError:+ except PyJWTError:await websocket.close(code=status.WS_1008_POLICY_VIOLATION, reason="invalid token")return Nonesub = payload.get("sub")diff --git a/services/api/app/core/security.py b/services/api/app/core/security.pyindex aa863fe88..d26ba33b0 100644--- a/services/api/app/core/security.py+++ b/services/api/app/core/security.py@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedeltafrom typing import Anyimport bcrypt-from jose import jwt+import jwtfrom app.core.config import settingsdiff --git a/services/api/pyproject.toml b/services/api/pyproject.tomlindex 6e9f5c4f3..bacf9b9e5 100644--- a/services/api/pyproject.toml+++ b/services/api/pyproject.toml@@ -20,8 +20,13 @@ asyncpg = ">=0.29.0,<0.32"alembic = "^1.13.1"redis = { version = ">=5.0.4,<9.0.0", extras = ["hiredis"] }httpx = ">=0.27,<0.29"-python-jose = { version = "^3.3.0", extras = ["cryptography"] }-PyJWT = "^2.8.0" # Used by OIDC and SAML auth flows (separate from python-jose)+# PyJWT is the only JWT implementation in this service: first-party access and+# refresh tokens, realtime tickets, and the OIDC / SAML assertion paths. It+# replaced python-jose, whose unconditional `ecdsa` requirement carried+# CVE-2024-23342 (Minerva timing attack on P-256) with no patched release+# upstream — the maintainers state python-ecdsa offers no side-channel+# resistance and will not fix it. Nothing here needed jose's JWE/JWS surface.+PyJWT = "^2.8.0"cryptography = ">=42,<51" # Direct dep for credential vault Fernetbcrypt = ">=4.1.2,<6.0.0" # Used directly by app.core.security (passlib is no longer compatible with bcrypt >= 4)python-multipart = ">=0.0.9,<0.0.33"diff --git a/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_realtime_ticket.py b/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_realtime_ticket.pyindex 4cd074320..321aba408 100644--- a/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_realtime_ticket.py+++ b/services/api/tests/api/v1/endpoints/test_realtime_ticket.py@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@ from __future__ import annotationsimport uuid+import jwtimport pytestfrom app.api.v1.deps import CurrentUserfrom app.api.v1.endpoints import realtime as realtime_epfrom app.core.config import DEV_REALTIME_TICKET_SECRET, Settings, realtime_ticket_secret, warn_if_insecure_defaultsfrom app.core.security import REALTIME_TICKET_AUDIENCEfrom fastapi import HTTPException-from jose import jwt# A real 64-char secret used across the "happy path" tests — anything outside# INSECURE_SECRET_KEY_DEFAULTS and non-empty resolves as configured.@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ async def test_mint_rejects_foreign_audience(configured):"""A ticket scoped to the realtime edge must not validate for any otheraudience — guards against a stolen ticket being replayed at the API."""ticket = await realtime_ep.mint_realtime_ticket(_user())- with pytest.raises(jwt.JWTError):+ with pytest.raises(jwt.PyJWTError):jwt.decode(ticket.token,_REAL_SECRET,