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fix(ci): make cosign image signing idempotent and transient-proof (#1433)
Beenu Arorae460dd9ce97d
diff --git a/.github/workflows/publish-images.yml b/.github/workflows/publish-images.ymlindex ace0a95e4..46c0bd4aa 100644--- a/.github/workflows/publish-images.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/publish-images.yml@@ -450,7 +450,45 @@ jobs:- name: Sign image (cosign keyless)env:DIGEST: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }}- run: cosign sign --yes "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}"+ # Hardened against the two ways one signing can observe itself and+ # fail, the second of which reddened the 2026-10-21 main publish on+ # `api` and `honeytokens`:+ #+ # * A job rerun after a *later* step failed re-signs a digest that+ # already carries this repository's valid signature. Verify-first+ # makes that a skip instead of a second signature.+ # * Rekor can accept the entry while the client times out and+ # retries the identical payload, which answers 409+ # createLogEntryConflict against the step's own first POST and+ # aborts before the registry attachment is written — measured: the+ # conflicting entry's integratedTime (17:19:28Z) sat inside the+ # failing step's own 17:19:24–:56 window, and `cosign verify`+ # found no registry signature on the digest afterwards. A fresh+ # attempt uses a fresh ephemeral key and cannot conflict, so retry+ # once; the trailing verify turns "the artifact ended up signed+ # anyway" into a pass and anything else stays a hard failure.+ run: |+ set -euo pipefail+ verify() {+ cosign verify \+ --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/" \+ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \+ "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}" >/dev/null 2>&1+ }+ if verify; then+ echo "already signed by this repository's workflows; skipping re-sign of ${DIGEST}"+ exit 0+ fi+ if cosign sign --yes "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}"; then+ exit 0+ fi+ echo "first sign attempt failed; retrying once with a fresh ephemeral key"+ sleep 10+ if cosign sign --yes "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}"; then+ exit 0+ fi+ echo "second sign attempt failed; accepting only if a valid signature exists"+ verify- name: Attach CycloneDX SBOM attestationenv:diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.ymlindex 4fa45cc8c..cba0d162d 100644--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml@@ -782,7 +782,44 @@ jobs:- name: Sign image (cosign keyless)env:DIGEST: ${{ steps.manifest.outputs.digest }}- run: cosign sign --yes "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}"+ # Hardened against the two ways one signing can observe itself and+ # fail (mirrors publish-images.yml, where the second was measured):+ #+ # * A job rerun after a *later* step failed re-signs a digest that+ # already carries this repository's valid signature. Verify-first+ # makes that a skip instead of a second signature.+ # * Rekor can accept the entry while the client times out and+ # retries the identical payload, which answers 409+ # createLogEntryConflict against the step's own first POST and+ # aborts before the registry attachment is written (measured on+ # the 2026-10-21 main publish: the conflicting entry's+ # integratedTime sat inside the failing step's own window, and the+ # digest had no registry signature afterwards). A fresh attempt+ # uses a fresh ephemeral key and cannot conflict, so retry once;+ # the trailing verify turns "the artifact ended up signed anyway"+ # into a pass and anything else stays a hard failure.+ run: |+ set -euo pipefail+ verify() {+ cosign verify \+ --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/" \+ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \+ "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}" >/dev/null 2>&1+ }+ if verify; then+ echo "already signed by this repository's workflows; skipping re-sign of ${DIGEST}"+ exit 0+ fi+ if cosign sign --yes "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}"; then+ exit 0+ fi+ echo "first sign attempt failed; retrying once with a fresh ephemeral key"+ sleep 10+ if cosign sign --yes "${{ matrix.image }}@${DIGEST}"; then+ exit 0+ fi+ echo "second sign attempt failed; accepting only if a valid signature exists"+ verify- name: Attach CycloneDX SBOM attestationenv: