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armgit / AiSOC

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Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.

The dependency audit never looked at the second pnpm install root (#833)

Beenu Arorae92f8188ce70
diff --git a/.github/workflows/attribution.yml b/.github/workflows/attribution.yml
index a777ed75b..9da76be48 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/attribution.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/attribution.yml
@@ -15,7 +15,15 @@ name: Attribution
# skips is indistinguishable from a gate that passes.
on:
+ # `edited` matters because the body is half of what this gate reads. Without
+ # it the default types (opened, synchronize, reopened) mean a body edited to
+ # add an attribution footer after the last push is never re-checked — and a
+ # body corrected after a failure cannot be revalidated, because re-running a
+ # `pull_request` job replays the original event payload rather than fetching
+ # the current body. That is how this gate first caught a footer the tooling
+ # appends at PR-creation time: the only way to clear it was another push.
pull_request:
+ types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, edited]
push:
branches: [main]
workflow_dispatch:
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 166c623ed..5be21badf 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -152,6 +152,29 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
### Fixed
+- **The dependency audit only ever looked at one of the repository's two pnpm
+ install roots.** `run_pnpm_audit` ran `pnpm audit` in the repo root and
+ nowhere else, so `apps/mobile` — a deliberately separate install root, with
+ its own `pnpm-workspace.yaml` so its installs stop rewriting the root lock —
+ was never scanned. Two high-severity advisories stood open there while the
+ `security-audit` job reported a clean workspace, which is the same shape as
+ the stale `poetry.lock` that once dropped `services/slack-bot` and hid eleven
+ advisories. Install roots are now discovered from the tree (every directory
+ holding a `pnpm-lock.yaml`), each is audited, and a finding names the root it
+ came from rather than a generic "pnpm workspace". A tree with no lockfile
+ anywhere is recorded as a coverage gap instead of reported as clean.
+
+ The two advisories it surfaced (`GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq`, `GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr`
+ in `image-size`) are suppressed with an expiry rather than fixed, because no
+ fix is reachable: `apps/mobile` resolves `image-size 1.2.1` solely through
+ `metro 0.83.3`, no patched 1.x exists, every metro release through 0.87.1
+ still requires `^1.0.2`, and `image-size` 2.x drops the callable default
+ export `metro/src/Assets.js` calls — so an override would break asset
+ resolution at bundle time rather than bump a version. Dependabot's updater
+ reaches the same verdict independently (`security_update_not_possible`).
+ Both are denial-of-service only and build-time, reachable only from an image
+ already committed to this repository.
+
- **AI triage could not reach a model in the default deployment, and it was
not a missing key.** `docker-compose.yml` set `LLM_GATEWAY_URL` on the `api`
and `agents` services. Nothing read it. Both resolvers honoured only
diff --git a/scripts/security_audit.py b/scripts/security_audit.py
index 34765a3c0..cea249397 100644
--- a/scripts/security_audit.py
+++ b/scripts/security_audit.py
@@ -164,7 +164,29 @@ def is_ignored(tool: str, vuln_ids: list[str], ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Ignore
# ─── pnpm scanner ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def classify_pnpm_audit(audit_json: dict[str, Any], ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:
+def pnpm_install_roots(repo_root: Path) -> list[str]:
+ """Every directory holding its own ``pnpm-lock.yaml``, relative to the repo root.
+
+ Read from the tree rather than listed, because a listed set is the artefact
+ that drifts. ``apps/mobile`` is a deliberately separate install root — it
+ has its own ``pnpm-workspace.yaml`` so its installs stop rewriting the root
+ lock — and auditing only the repo root never saw it. Two high-severity
+ advisories stood open there while this arm reported a clean workspace.
+ """
+ proc = subprocess.run(
+ ["git", "ls-files", "-z", "*pnpm-lock.yaml"],
+ cwd=repo_root,
+ capture_output=True,
+ text=True,
+ )
+ return sorted({str(Path(p).parent) for p in proc.stdout.split("\0") if p})
+
+
+def classify_pnpm_audit(
+ audit_json: dict[str, Any],
+ ignores: list[Ignore],
+ location: str = "pnpm workspace",
+) -> Report:
"""Classify pnpm audit JSON into a Report using native severity."""
report = Report()
@@ -181,7 +203,7 @@ def classify_pnpm_audit(audit_json: dict[str, Any], ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Re
severity=severity,
vuln_id=all_ids[0] if all_ids else str(advisory.get("id", "unknown")),
package=advisory.get("module_name", "unknown"),
- location="pnpm workspace",
+ location=location,
title=advisory.get("title") or advisory.get("overview") or "",
)
@@ -194,8 +216,29 @@ def classify_pnpm_audit(audit_json: dict[str, Any], ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Re
def run_pnpm_audit(repo_root: Path, ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:
- """Run pnpm audit with fallback registry on 403."""
- lockfile = repo_root / "pnpm-lock.yaml"
+ """Audit every pnpm install root in the tree, not only the repo root."""
+ roots = pnpm_install_roots(repo_root)
+ merged = Report()
+ if not roots:
+ # Zero install roots is not zero workspaces vulnerable. Without this the
+ # arm prints "pnpm: 0 findings" over a tree with no lockfile in it,
+ # which is the sentence a clean audit also prints.
+ merged.unscanned.append(f"no pnpm-lock.yaml anywhere in {repo_root} — NOTHING was scanned")
+ return merged
+
+ for rel in roots:
+ label = "pnpm workspace" if rel == "." else f"pnpm workspace {rel}"
+ part = run_pnpm_audit_at(repo_root / rel, label, ignores)
+ merged.findings.extend(part.findings)
+ merged.ignored.extend(part.ignored)
+ merged.warnings.extend(part.warnings)
+ merged.unscanned.extend(part.unscanned)
+ return merged
+
+
+def run_pnpm_audit_at(root: Path, label: str, ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:
+ """Run pnpm audit in one install root, with fallback registry on 403."""
+ lockfile = root / "pnpm-lock.yaml"
if not lockfile.is_file():
# `pnpm audit` in a directory with no lockfile has nothing to resolve
# and can still answer with an empty advisory set. Refuse instead:
@@ -213,7 +256,7 @@ def run_pnpm_audit(repo_root: Path, ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:
proc = subprocess.run(
["pnpm", "audit", "--json"],
- cwd=repo_root,
+ cwd=root,
env=env,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
@@ -233,13 +276,13 @@ def run_pnpm_audit(repo_root: Path, ignores: list[Ignore]) -> Report:
# as a coverage gap rather than a warning for the same reason the
# Python arm does it: a warning still exits 0, so the job would
# report "pnpm: 0 findings" having scanned nothing at all.
- report.unscanned.append("pnpm workspace: audit returned unparseable output — NOT scanned")
+ report.unscanned.append(f"{label}: audit returned unparseable output — NOT scanned")
return report
- return classify_pnpm_audit(data, ignores)
+ return classify_pnpm_audit(data, ignores, label)
report = Report()
- report.unscanned.append("pnpm workspace: audit failed on every registry — NOT scanned")
+ report.unscanned.append(f"{label}: audit failed on every registry — NOT scanned")
return report
diff --git a/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt b/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt
index 2c5c3f616..705127ce8 100644
--- a/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt
+++ b/scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt
@@ -91,3 +91,38 @@
# Add entries back only with a justification that names the version actually
# resolved and the fix that is genuinely out of reach. An expiry is a
# re-review date, not a snooze.
+
+# ── 2026-09-24 — apps/mobile, a second install root the audit never saw ──────
+# The two image-size entries below look like the pair dismissed above and are a
+# different case. That one was @docusaurus/mdx-loader holding ^2.0.2 in the root
+# workspace, where 2.0.4 is a drop-in. This one is metro, and the fix really is
+# out of reach:
+#
+# • apps/mobile resolves image-size 1.2.1, pulled only by metro 0.83.3.
+# • No patched 1.x exists — 1.2.1 is the last 1.x and the fix landed in 2.0.3.
+# • Every metro release through the current latest (0.87.1) still declares
+# image-size ^1.0.2.
+# • metro/src/Assets.js calls the callable default export at lines 68 and 173
+# — `(0, _imageSize.default)(content)` — which image-size 2.x replaced with
+# named exports. An override here does not bump a version, it breaks asset
+# resolution at bundle time.
+# • Dependabot's own updater reaches the same verdict independently:
+# security_update_not_possible, latest-resolvable 1.2.1,
+# lowest-non-vulnerable 2.0.3, conflicting-dependencies [].
+#
+# Both advisories are denial of service only (CVSS A:H, C:N/I:N) via infinite
+# loops in the JXL/HEIF and ICNS parsers. Reaching them needs a malicious image
+# inside this repository's own asset tree, which presupposes commit access, and
+# the impact is a hung developer bundler. No runtime, server or user-input path
+# reaches this code.
+#
+# Why they were invisible rather than accepted is the part worth keeping:
+# `pnpm audit` ran only at the repo root, and apps/mobile is a deliberately
+# separate install root, so this arm reported a clean workspace while two high
+# advisories stood open. run_pnpm_audit now discovers every directory holding a
+# pnpm-lock.yaml, so a third install root is covered the day it appears rather
+# than the day someone remembers it exists.
+#
+# Retire these when metro adopts image-size >= 2.0.3.
+pnpm|GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq|apps/mobile resolves image-size 1.2.1 through metro 0.83.3; no 1.x fix exists, metro through 0.87.1 still requires ^1.0.2, and image-size 2.x drops the callable default export metro calls in Assets.js. DoS-only and build-time, reachable only from an image already committed to this repo|2026-12-23
+pnpm|GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr|apps/mobile resolves image-size 1.2.1 through metro 0.83.3; no 1.x fix exists, metro through 0.87.1 still requires ^1.0.2, and image-size 2.x drops the callable default export metro calls in Assets.js. DoS-only and build-time, reachable only from an image already committed to this repo|2026-12-23
diff --git a/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py b/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py
index c43f48a9f..775361d7d 100644
--- a/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py
+++ b/scripts/tests/test_security_audit.py
@@ -544,6 +544,74 @@ class TestNothingToScanIsNotACleanScan:
assert report.unscanned, "no pnpm-lock.yaml must be a coverage gap"
assert exit_code_for(report) == 1
+ def test_pnpm_audits_every_install_root_not_only_the_repo_root(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path):
+ """A second install root must be audited, and its findings must name it.
+
+ ``apps/mobile`` keeps its own ``pnpm-workspace.yaml`` so its installs
+ stop rewriting the root lock. Auditing only the repo root therefore
+ never reached it, and this arm reported a clean workspace while two
+ high-severity advisories stood open there.
+ """
+ (tmp_path / "pnpm-lock.yaml").write_text("lockfileVersion: '6.0'\n")
+ nested = tmp_path / "apps" / "mobile"
+ nested.mkdir(parents=True)
+ (nested / "pnpm-lock.yaml").write_text("lockfileVersion: '6.0'\n")
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(
+ security_audit,
+ "pnpm_install_roots",
+ lambda root: [".", "apps/mobile"],
+ )
+
+ audited: list[Path] = []
+
+ def fake_at(root: Path, label: str, ignores):
+ audited.append(root)
+ report = Report()
+ if label.endswith("apps/mobile"):
+ report.findings.append(
+ Finding(
+ tool="pnpm",
+ severity="high",
+ vuln_id="GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq",
+ package="image-size",
+ location=label,
+ title="denial of service",
+ )
+ )
+ return report
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(security_audit, "run_pnpm_audit_at", fake_at)
+
+ report = run_pnpm_audit(tmp_path, [])
+
+ assert audited == [tmp_path, tmp_path / "apps/mobile"], "both install roots must be audited"
+ assert len(report.findings) == 1
+ assert report.findings[0].location == "pnpm workspace apps/mobile", (
+ "a finding must name the install root it came from, not a generic 'pnpm workspace'"
+ )
+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 1
+
+ def test_pnpm_install_roots_are_read_from_the_tree(self, tmp_path: Path):
+ """Discovery is structural, so a new install root needs no edit here."""
+ import subprocess
+
+ subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)
+ (tmp_path / "pnpm-lock.yaml").write_text("lockfileVersion: '6.0'\n")
+ nested = tmp_path / "apps" / "mobile"
+ nested.mkdir(parents=True)
+ (nested / "pnpm-lock.yaml").write_text("lockfileVersion: '6.0'\n")
+ subprocess.run(["git", "add", "-A"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)
+
+ assert security_audit.pnpm_install_roots(tmp_path) == [".", "apps/mobile"]
+
+ def test_pnpm_refuses_a_tree_with_no_install_root_at_all(self, tmp_path: Path):
+ """Zero install roots is not zero workspaces vulnerable."""
+ report = run_pnpm_audit(tmp_path, [])
+
+ assert report.unscanned, "a tree with no lockfile anywhere must be a coverage gap"
+ assert exit_code_for(report) == 1
+
def test_python_refuses_a_tree_with_no_manifests(self, tmp_path: Path):
report = run_pip_audit(tmp_path, [])