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fix(war-rooms): a reason code in the invite list, and a line-scoped SSRF suppression behind the fullmatch
Beenu Aroraed4ca7f72e2f
diff --git a/services/slack-bot/app/war_room.py b/services/slack-bot/app/war_room.pyindex b49d0f331..8e05a3ca1 100644--- a/services/slack-bot/app/war_room.py+++ b/services/slack-bot/app/war_room.py@@ -204,7 +204,12 @@ async def open_war_room(if "already_in_channel" in str(exc):invited.append(user)continue- not_invited.append({"user": user, "reason": str(exc)[:200]})+ # A reason code, not `str(exc)`. The Slack SDK's error carries+ # the whole API response, and this list is returned to the+ # caller and rendered in the console — so the same rule as the+ # create failure above applies, and `py/stack-trace-exposure`+ # was right to report the earlier form.+ not_invited.append({"user": user, "reason": slack_reason(exc)})header = (f"*AiSOC case {body.case_number or body.case_id[:8]}* — {body.title or 'untitled'}\n"diff --git a/services/slack-bot/tests/test_war_room.py b/services/slack-bot/tests/test_war_room.pyindex cbc4052e9..a75e34346 100644--- a/services/slack-bot/tests/test_war_room.py+++ b/services/slack-bot/tests/test_war_room.py@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ class TestOpen:# Named, so the console can say which people were not added rather# than reporting a generic failure for a room that is open.assert [row["user"] for row in body["not_invited"]] == ["UGONE"]+ # A reason code, not the API response: this list is rendered in the+ # console, and `str(exc)` from the Slack SDK carries everything the+ # API said.+ assert body["not_invited"][0]["reason"] == "user_not_found"def test_someone_already_in_the_channel_counts_as_invited(self, monkeypatch) -> None:fake = FakeClient(invite_fails={"UALREADY1"})diff --git a/services/teams-bot/app/war_room.py b/services/teams-bot/app/war_room.pyindex 430bd1237..f43ff1232 100644--- a/services/teams-bot/app/war_room.py+++ b/services/teams-bot/app/war_room.py@@ -262,8 +262,16 @@ async def post_to_war_room(async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_TIMEOUT) as http:token = await _graph_token(tenant, client_id, secret, http)+ # `channel_id` has already been through `require_channel_id`, which+ # is a `fullmatch` on the exact shape Graph issues, and it is then+ # percent-encoded with `safe=''`. CodeQL's taint tracker does not+ # follow a guard across a function boundary — the documented+ # behaviour that cost four attempts elsewhere in this tree — so the+ # suppression sits on the reported line and nowhere else. Any+ # *other* URL built from a request in this file still fails the+ # query.res = await http.post(- f"{GRAPH}/teams/{team_id}/channels/{quote(channel_id, safe='')}/messages",+ f"{GRAPH}/teams/{team_id}/channels/{quote(channel_id, safe='')}/messages", # codeql[py/partial-ssrf]headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},json={"body": {"content": body.text}},)