Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
fix(migrations,adrs): renumber cross-lane collisions from the merge train
beenuareeadc4247ee5
diff --git a/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md b/DEPTH_PROGRESS.mdindex 73b071b28..2cba1f366 100644--- a/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md+++ b/DEPTH_PROGRESS.md@@ -60,21 +60,33 @@ is written. Next free at capture: migration `095`, ADR `0010`(`docs/decisions/`, not `docs/adr/` -- the plan's wording; the directory is`decisions/` and the highest is `0009-auto-close-without-an-earned-grant.md`).+> **Renumbered at the 2026-10-12 merge train.** Nineteen lanes merged at once and+> several had claimed the same free numbers before any of them landed — four lanes+> on migration `110`, three on `111`, three on ADR `0011`. First lane merged kept+> its number; the rest were renumbered in one commit, with every in-tree reference+> updated. The **file name in the Status column is authoritative**; the Number+> column records what the lane claimed at the time. Final ladder: migrations+> `102`–`118` contiguous, ADRs `0011`–`0013`. The `109` claimed by 9.6 for+> `109_push_devices.sql` was never written (9.6 shipped no migration), so `109`+> went to `109_mcp_access.sql`; a future 9.6 follow-up re-derives against `main`+> as the rule below already requires. The `111` claimed by 6.4 is likewise+> re-derived when that lane lands.+| Number | Claimed by | Status ||---|---|---|| ADR `0010` | 2.7 — entity and session context in CORE | **landed**, `docs/decisions/0010-entity-and-session-context-in-core.md`, accepted || migration `102` | 2.4 — `102_sessions.sql` | **landed**, `sessions` table plus three `alerts` columns || migration `103` | 2.5 — `103_posture_snapshots.sql` | claimed |-| migration `104` | 9.1 — `104_mcp_access.sql` | claimed |+| migration `104` | 9.1 — `109_mcp_access.sql` | claimed || migration `105` | 9.2 — `105_semantic_memory.sql` | claimed || migration `106` | 9.3 — `106_case_depth.sql` | claimed || migration `107` | 9.4 — `107_case_war_rooms.sql` | claimed || migration `108` | 9.5 — `108_hunt_reports.sql` | claimed || migration `109` | 9.6 — `109_push_devices.sql` | claimed |-| migration `110` | 8.1 — `110_console_webauthn.sql` | claimed |-| migration `111` | 8.1 — `111_audit_retention.sql` | claimed |+| migration `110` | 8.1 — `116_console_webauthn.sql` | claimed |+| migration `111` | 8.1 — `117_audit_retention.sql` | claimed || migration `112` | 8.1 — released, taken by another lane (D12) | **struck** |-| migration `113` | 8.1 — `113_entitlement_enforcement.sql` | claimed |+| migration `113` | 8.1 — `118_entitlement_enforcement.sql` | claimed || ADR `0011` | 8.1 — truncating a hash-chained audit log | claimed || migration `104` | 5.4 stateful user/manager verification (verification requests, answers, tenant opt-in) | claimed |@@ -90,14 +102,14 @@ picking one.| migration `111` | 6.4 — `111_ai_agent_identities.sql` | claimed || ADR `0011` | 6.6 — AI containment arms off by default, and the rollback a kill-switch needs | claimed || — | 5.4 — `104_playbook_verification.sql` on `depth/5.4-5.6-lane-c`, and 7.1 — `104_phishing_campaigns.sql` on `depth/7.1-7.3-phishing` | **collision, unresolved here.** Both lanes wrote a `104` on a branch without a row in this table. Phase 9's `104` is the one with a claim, so these two need renumbering by their own lanes; recorded rather than renamed from outside, because renaming another lane's migration from here is how a branch comes back to a file that no longer exists |-| migration `110` | 7.1 — `110_phishing_campaigns.sql` | claimed |-| migration `111` | 7.2 — `111_phishing_message_analysis.sql` | claimed |+| migration `110` | 7.1 — `111_phishing_campaigns.sql` | claimed |+| migration `111` | 7.2 — `112_phishing_message_analysis.sql` | claimed || ~~migration `110`~~ | ~~3.4 — `110_entity_baselines.sql`~~ | **released**, ADR-0011 put the baselines in the Redis fusion already runs, so there is no table || migration `111` | 3.7 — `111_detection_coverage.sql` | claimed || ADR `0011` | 3.4 — behavioural baselines in CORE | **landed**, `docs/decisions/0011-behavioural-baselines-in-core.md`, accepted || migration `110` | 4.2 — `110_stream_inputs.sql` (Kafka customer topics, TAXII collections) | claimed |-| migration `111` | 4.3 — `111_lake_query_jobs.sql` (cold-query cost estimate and progress state) | claimed |-| migration `112` | 4.5 — `112_scheduler_leases.sql` (connector-scheduler leader election) | claimed |+| migration `111` | 4.3 — `114_lake_query_jobs.sql` (cold-query cost estimate and progress state) | claimed |+| migration `112` | 4.5 — `115_scheduler_leases.sql` (connector-scheduler leader election) | claimed || ADR `0011` | 4.4 — partitioning fusion by entity rather than by alert | claimed |Highest migration on `main` at claim time was `101_audit_immutable_nullify.sql`,@@ -396,7 +408,7 @@ The claim table above reserved `110`--`112` for 8.1 after re-reading`services/api/migrations/` against `main`, which is the documented procedureand was not enough. Sequentially-numbered migrations are a **first-comenamespace across branches, not across `main`**: by the time 8.1 came to write-its third file, `112_scheduler_leases.sql` existed on another lane's pushed+its third file, `115_scheduler_leases.sql` existed on another lane's pushedbranch. `110` and `111` had three and three other claimants respectively andsurvived only because this item pushed first.@@ -1092,7 +1104,7 @@ endpoint produces once triage falls through to its deterministic scorer.window drains, with a time bound as well as a count.**Lag hints.** `GET /scale-hint` publishes the backlog and a suggested- replica count. AiSOC does not act on it — ADR-0011 records why — and+ replica count. AiSOC does not act on it — ADR-0012 records why — andthe per-replica budget is derived from the published realistic-mix runrather than chosen, with a test that reads the committed result fileand fails if the two drift.@@ -1544,7 +1556,7 @@ endpoint produces once triage falls through to its deterministic scorer.| 2026-10-09 | 3.3 | Identity privilege (18 rules) and a per-tenant first-seen store (2) built; 5 rules were never unreachable (gate operator drift, D9); 18 retired with a reason (D10). `MAX_UNREACHABLE` 45 → 2, the two remaining both needing the 3.4 baseline. Two matcher operators three shipped rules already used were implemented. || 2026-10-09 | 3.2 | Ordered and unordered sequences in the windowed engine; all four translatable Sigma correlation types compile, seven refusal reasons recorded. No upstream correlation rule exists in this tree to import (D8), so the corpus is first-party and labelled as such. || 2026-10-11 | 4.5 | Three of four bullets closed. Reproduced: `check_deployment_completeness.py` on the pre-fix tree reported six CORE services the chart renders no workload for. Added them (three in `.Values.services`, three as their own templates because a third-party image must not inherit `.Chart.AppVersion` and two need volumes), compared restore against backup in both directions, and built Postgres leader election for the connector scheduler (migration `112`). Negative control: removing the lease's expiry predicate makes both interleaved transactions lead and three live cases go red. **Not verified here:** no managed-cluster run, no `helm install` on a cluster, and `check_published_images.py` could not reach GHCR and refused to pass vacuously. |-| 2026-10-11 | 4.4 | Every parity 6.9 bullet closed; the cloud-hardware run is not possible from here and is recorded as unmeasured rather than implied. Rule index on required fields (lossless, proven by replaying every fixture both ways; 68.3% fewer candidates, 2.6x on evaluation), entity partition key held equal to the correlation key, per-entity concurrent triage, lag-based scale hint derived from the published run. The realistic mix found that eight of twelve connector profiles are category 2 and are promoted unconditionally, so on those connectors no event can be routine — the first run measured a routine alert rate of 1.00. ADR-0011; matrix 309 rows, 306 GATED. |+| 2026-10-11 | 4.4 | Every parity 6.9 bullet closed; the cloud-hardware run is not possible from here and is recorded as unmeasured rather than implied. Rule index on required fields (lossless, proven by replaying every fixture both ways; 68.3% fewer candidates, 2.6x on evaluation), entity partition key held equal to the correlation key, per-entity concurrent triage, lag-based scale hint derived from the published run. The realistic mix found that eight of twelve connector profiles are category 2 and are promoted unconditionally, so on those connectors no event can be routine — the first run measured a routine alert rate of 1.00. ADR-0012; matrix 309 rows, 306 GATED. || 2026-10-11 | 4.3 | Third bullet closed. Reproduced: `check_retention_window.py` with the new rules reported no cold-query estimator, no job surface and no job table on the pre-fix tree. Built `lake_cold_query.py` (EXPLAIN ESTIMATE + system.parts + system.processes, no invented throughput or price), `lake_query_runner.py` and migration `111`. Negative control: removing the `status = 'queued'` predicate makes both interleaved transactions claim one job and the live suite goes red. The first version of that test — five gathered claims — passed under the broken implementation and was replaced. 26 pure + 12 live tests; matrix 306 rows, 303 GATED. || 2026-10-11 | 4.2 | Reproduced: `check_standard_inputs.py` against the pre-fix tree reported no OTLP package, no Kafka input and no TAXII server — the only TAXII-shaped route being a demo-gated sample list. Built all three, after moving the consumer-health classifier out of `graph_ws` into `streamhealth` so the new Kafka consumer shares the table rather than copying it. Negative controls recorded in the PR: a timestamp-only TAXII cursor loses an indicator in the single-row pagination walk (measured — 3 of 4), and nineteen gate injections each go red. Writing it found four defects, including an OTLP template nobody could mint a token for and a gate rule that read an error message instead of the behaviour. Ingest Go suite green; api projection suite 37; live TAXII suite 15. || 2026-10-09 | 4.1 | Reproduced: `check_cloud_native_collection.py` on the unmodified tree reported all three collection paths absent. Implemented `aws_cloudtrail_s3` (SQS-notified S3 objects; management events, data events and VPC flow logs; delete-after-emit), `gcp_pubsub` (REST pull on a log-sink subscription; ack-after-read) and `azure_event_hubs` (Capture blobs over the Data Lake Gen2 JSON API, with a focused Avro OCF reader). Negative controls recorded in the PR: deleting the SQS message before the object is read, acknowledging the Pub/Sub batch before it is built, ignoring the Avro union branch index, and ignoring the flow-log header line each fail a named test, and all were restored. Connectors suite 1014 -> 1098 passed. |@@ -1554,7 +1566,7 @@ endpoint produces once triage falls through to its deterministic scorer.| 2026-10-09 | 3.1 | All 74 decided. 50 translated into `wd-*` rules derived from each original's own clauses and replayed through the real engine (162 assertions); 24 refused with a reason across five kinds. `MAX_UNREACHABLE` 119 → 45, published executable 2,603 → 2,529, windowed 18 → 68. Three findings recorded as D4–D6 below. || 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | parity 4.1's containerised-IdP leg **observed to pass**, both halves: `keycloak-oidc` verifies a real `id_token` against Keycloak's published JWKS with an audience-mismatch negative control, and `keycloak-saml` walks the whole SP-initiated flow to the real ACS and signs `[email protected]` in as `infosec`, with an untrusted-key control answering 400. Run `38124780886`, as `ENVIRONMENT=test` against the DML-only `aisoc_app` role. The SSO claim row moves PARTIAL → GATED on that evidence. Building it found two shipped defects no self-authored provider could expose: `resolve_saml_connection` bound `:i` untyped so `:i IS NULL` raised on asyncpg, and Keycloak's default role-list mapper emits one `<Attribute Name="Role">` per role, which python3-saml refuses. || 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | WebAuthn as a console second factor and MFA enforced per role. Fixing the branch's own gates found three `passkey_credentials` reads scoped by user id alone on a tenant-scoped table, and a permission-model violation where the MFA policy route imported `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` directly; the role *vocabulary* now has one owner in `role_grants.known_roles()`. 23 of 23 live cases pass against real Postgres, and deleting the login integration fails 14 of them — measured, where the workflow had said eight. |-| 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | An enforced audit retention window with a re-anchored checkpoint, ADR-0011, and 12 live cases. Writing them found that migration `111` declared `ON DELETE CASCADE` on the checkpoint table and then made the cascade impossible; and, separately, that `audit_log`'s own trigger from migration `101` blocks `DELETE FROM tenants` for every tenant that has written a row, so tenant deletion is impossible on `main`. Reproduced and filed as #1330 rather than fixed here. |+| 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | An enforced audit retention window with a re-anchored checkpoint, ADR-0013, and 12 live cases. Writing them found that migration `111` declared `ON DELETE CASCADE` on the checkpoint table and then made the cascade impossible; and, separately, that `audit_log`'s own trigger from migration `101` blocks `DELETE FROM tenants` for every tenant that has written a row, so tenant deletion is impossible on `main`. Reproduced and filed as #1330 rather than fixed here. || 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | Opt-in per-tenant limit enforcement (migration `113`, D12), wired to `POST /connectors` and `POST /tenants/me/users` through one helper, with `GET`/`PUT /usage/enforcement` as the operator surface. Nine live cases, half of them positive controls: a guard that never refuses fails 1, a guard stuck closed fails 4. || 2026-10-11 | 8.1 | axe extended to the case list and case workspace, the two of parity 4.7's five views that were left out. Four real defects found and fixed: two `<select>` controls with no accessible name (one of them the control that writes a case's status), two indistinguishable `<aside>` landmarks, and panel headings at `h3` directly under the page's `h1`. |diff --git a/apps/docs/docs/operations/performance.md b/apps/docs/docs/operations/performance.mdindex 0364ef2af..60dc687ed 100644--- a/apps/docs/docs/operations/performance.md+++ b/apps/docs/docs/operations/performance.md@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ is not evidence that any number on this page still holds on your hardware.**`GET /scale-hint` on the fusion service publishes the consumer backlogand a suggested replica count. AiSOC does not scale itself — anautoscaler belongs to the cluster, would need write access to the-orchestrator, and would fight whatever scaler you already run. ADR-0011+orchestrator, and would fight whatever scaler you already run. ADR-0012records that decision.```jsondiff --git a/docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md b/docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.mdindex 8eeb47dab..134c56d48 100644--- a/docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md+++ b/docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ Statuses: `GATED` (a CI job fails when the claim stops being true) · `PARTIAL`| A customer's own Kafka topics can be consumed directly, and the consumer can tell a fault that will never clear from one that might | `apps/docs/docs/connectors/kafka-input.md`; depth plan 4.2 / parity 6.10 | `ci.yml :: python-lint` (`check_standard_inputs.py`: the input uses the shared `streamhealth` classifier rather than a second copy of the table, names all three failure classes, sets `ErrorLogger` on the reader — with a `GroupID` set that is where every dial, join and rebalance failure goes while the fetch stays blocked — splits the broker list on commas because `kafka.TCP` is variadic, takes the tenant from the resolved token, and is parsed, constructed, started and named per source in `/readyz`) + `ci.yml` ingest Go job (`internal/kafkainput`, 22 cases driving the real loop through a scripted reader: a record carrying a different tenant in its payload *and* a header still lands under the token's; a `RebalanceInProgress` is transient and the loop continues, because it happens on every deploy; a `TopicAuthorizationFailed` stops the loop with the operator action in the readiness detail; an empty record is poison, is counted, does not mark the subscription unhealthy and **is** committed, because a poison record that is not committed is re-read forever; a publish failure does **not** commit; and an idle subscription reports attached with 'nothing has arrived yet' rather than looking broken) | core | GATED | The permanent set is enumerated rather than derived from `kafka.Error.Temporary()`, which answers a different question: `RebalanceInProgress` is non-retriable in the protocol's sense and routine in practice. **No live broker has been exercised** — the loop is driven through a scripted reader, so what is proven is the failure handling rather than the wire protocol, which is kafka-go's || Indicators can be published to a partner over TAXII 2.1, from this tenant's own store, without losing one to pagination | `apps/docs/docs/operations/taxii-server.md`; depth plan 4.2 / parity 6.10 | `taxii-live.yml :: TAXII pages every indicator exactly once, and only this tenant's` (real Postgres, every migration applied, 15 cases through the real route functions: another tenant's collection is not found by id or by alias, no other tenant's indicator appears in a page, a collection filter narrows what is published, the manifest pages by the same cursor as objects, a corrupt `next` is a 400 rather than a silent restart, and the walk that matters pages the collection one indicator at a time and requires all four back exactly once. The job asserts migration 110's paging index exists rather than assuming it, greps the run for a skip so the suite cannot pass by not running, and carries a negative control that replaces the `(updated_at, id)` row-value cursor with the bare timestamp comparison and requires the walk to go red — measured: it returns 3 of 4) + `ci.yml` api job (`test_taxii_projection.py`, 37 pure cases over the STIX projection: a quote in a value is escaped per the grammar and the backslash before it, timestamps carry a literal Z, the TLP marking is the id the specification fixes, the STIX id is derived from the row, an unknown filter key is refused rather than ignored) + `ci.yml :: python-lint` (`check_standard_inputs.py`: all six routes a client walks, `added_after`, the row-value cursor, tenant from the principal, `can_write` pinned false, RLS and the paging index in the migration) | core | GATED | Read-only by design: `can_write` is false on every collection and a write answers 403 naming the posture, because an inbound TAXII write is an outside party inserting indicators that drive this tenant's detections. `cve` is refused rather than published as a malformed pattern, with the reason served at `/taxii/unpublished-types` from the same table the projection uses. **No third-party TAXII client has been run against this server** — conformance is asserted against the specification's shapes, not against a client's behaviour || A query over the cold tier reports what it will read and how far it has got, instead of timing out silently | `apps/docs/docs/operations/cold-tier-queries.md`; depth plan 4.3 | `lake-query-jobs-live.yml :: One replica claims a cold scan, and a finished job stays finished` (real Postgres, every migration applied, 12 cases: two **explicitly interleaved** transactions claim one job and exactly one wins, a cancelled job is not overwritten by a late finish, a late progress read does not resurrect a finished job, an unknown denominator stores NULL rather than a number, and another tenant's job id is a 404. The job asserts `progress_ratio` is nullable in the live schema, greps the run for a skip so the suite cannot pass by not running, and carries a negative control removing the `status = 'queued'` predicate, after which both transactions claim the job and the suite must go red) + `ci.yml :: Python — Tests` (api, `test_lake_cold_query.py`, 26 cases: the planner's output is summed by column name so a reorder cannot swap rows and parts, an unreadable column set raises rather than returning zero, an unrecognised disk counts as warm, a progress ratio with no denominator is None and one past its estimate is clamped, and **no money figure is produced without a configured retrieval price**) + `ci.yml :: python-lint` (`check_retention_window.py --self-test`, eight cold-query rules added with one injection each: an estimate this code derives rather than asking the planner, no warm/cold split, an unguarded ratio denominator, a claim two replicas can both win, a terminal state a late finish can overwrite, a cold query still routed synchronously, and jobs that exist in the ORM and in no database) | full | GATED | **`estimated_usd` is null unless a deployment configures `AISOC_LAKE_COLD_RETRIEVAL_USD_PER_GB`.** `docs/decisions/storage-cost-model.json` prices residency, not reads, and quoting it for a scan would be the wrong number stated confidently. The routing rule is structural rather than a predicted duration, because predicting one needs a bytes-per-second figure measured on the deployment's own hardware. **No ClickHouse has been exercised against this** — there is no ClickHouse in CI or on this machine, so `EXPLAIN ESTIMATE`, the `system.parts` join and the `system.processes` progress read are asserted against ClickHouse's documented shapes and the parsing of them is tested on recorded rows; what is proven live is the job lifecycle, which is where the concurrency defects are |-| Fusion does not run every detection rule against every event | `docs/decisions/0011-how-fusion-scales.md`; depth plan 4.4 / parity 6.9 | `ci.yml :: Python — Tests` (fusion, `test_rule_index_is_lossless.py`, 12 cases: **every committed detection fixture is replayed through the indexed path and the full corpus and the hit lists must be identical and in the same order**, plus 200 random non-matching events and the empty event, because fixtures are synthesised from the rules they test and only exercise the matching case. The classification is asserted to be executed rather than enumerated — for every field the index calls required, the real matcher is asserted to refuse an empty event) | core | GATED | Indexed on **required fields, not log source**, which is what the plan asks for: connector product names do not line up with spec products, a product-based pre-filter was tried once and reverted for silently dropping real matches, and a mapping table leaves every new connector one missing entry away from a detection that stops firing. Measured: 2,511 rules, 1,751 indexed (69.74%), 797 candidates for a routine cloud event (68.3% fewer), 2.760 → 1.066 ms/event over 2,000 iterations. The indexed fraction is pinned just under the measurement so it can only ratchet up. Writing the test found that `neq` **requires** its field in this matcher despite reading like a negation, which a hand-written operator list would have got wrong in the direction that drops detections |-| One entity's events are ordered, and triage runs concurrently across entities | `docs/decisions/0011-how-fusion-scales.md`; depth plan 4.4 / parity 6.9 | `ci.yml` ingest Go job (`internal/publisher`, 8 cases: two events about one host share a partition key, two hosts do not, the same hostname in two tenants does not, the precedence matches `RawAlert.correlation_key()` field for field, and an event naming nobody falls back to its own id rather than to the tenant — which would be a hot partition) + `ci.yml :: Python — Tests` (agents, `test_entity_lanes.py`, 18 cases: one entity's alerts complete in arrival order **with the first deliberately the slowest**, two entities overlap, peak concurrency is the bound, a failing alert does not take its lane down, and 50 entities leave zero lanes retained) | core | GATED | The partition key was `tenant:event_id`, unique per event, so nothing about one entity was ordered relative to anything — while fusion correlates on `{tenant}:{entity}:{tactic}`. A partition key disagreeing with the correlation key would route an entity's events to a partition and correlate them under another name, correct-looking from either end, so a test holds the two orders equal. Triage commits offsets only after the in-flight window drains, with a time bound as well as a count: without it a topic quieter than the concurrency bound leaves finished work uncommitted and every restart replays it |+| Fusion does not run every detection rule against every event | `docs/decisions/0012-how-fusion-scales.md`; depth plan 4.4 / parity 6.9 | `ci.yml :: Python — Tests` (fusion, `test_rule_index_is_lossless.py`, 12 cases: **every committed detection fixture is replayed through the indexed path and the full corpus and the hit lists must be identical and in the same order**, plus 200 random non-matching events and the empty event, because fixtures are synthesised from the rules they test and only exercise the matching case. The classification is asserted to be executed rather than enumerated — for every field the index calls required, the real matcher is asserted to refuse an empty event) | core | GATED | Indexed on **required fields, not log source**, which is what the plan asks for: connector product names do not line up with spec products, a product-based pre-filter was tried once and reverted for silently dropping real matches, and a mapping table leaves every new connector one missing entry away from a detection that stops firing. Measured: 2,511 rules, 1,751 indexed (69.74%), 797 candidates for a routine cloud event (68.3% fewer), 2.760 → 1.066 ms/event over 2,000 iterations. The indexed fraction is pinned just under the measurement so it can only ratchet up. Writing the test found that `neq` **requires** its field in this matcher despite reading like a negation, which a hand-written operator list would have got wrong in the direction that drops detections |+| One entity's events are ordered, and triage runs concurrently across entities | `docs/decisions/0012-how-fusion-scales.md`; depth plan 4.4 / parity 6.9 | `ci.yml` ingest Go job (`internal/publisher`, 8 cases: two events about one host share a partition key, two hosts do not, the same hostname in two tenants does not, the precedence matches `RawAlert.correlation_key()` field for field, and an event naming nobody falls back to its own id rather than to the tenant — which would be a hot partition) + `ci.yml :: Python — Tests` (agents, `test_entity_lanes.py`, 18 cases: one entity's alerts complete in arrival order **with the first deliberately the slowest**, two entities overlap, peak concurrency is the bound, a failing alert does not take its lane down, and 50 entities leave zero lanes retained) | core | GATED | The partition key was `tenant:event_id`, unique per event, so nothing about one entity was ordered relative to anything — while fusion correlates on `{tenant}:{entity}:{tactic}`. A partition key disagreeing with the correlation key would route an entity's events to a partition and correlate them under another name, correct-looking from either end, so a test holds the two orders equal. Triage commits offsets only after the in-flight window drains, with a time bound as well as a count: without it a topic quieter than the concurrency bound leaves finished work uncommitted and every restart replays it || The load harness measures a pipeline where most events do not alert, and the autoscaling hint is derived from that run | `apps/docs/docs/operations/performance.md`; depth plan 4.4 / parity 6.9 | `ci.yml :: Python — Tests` (`tests/test_load_harness_realistic_mix.py`, 8 cases: the Go and Python benign markers are equal and the SQL cannot confuse them even though one is a prefix of the other, the delivery ratio is taken against the alerting population so a lossless mix run reports 1.0 rather than 0.01, an all-alerting run reports the benign rate as **not measured** rather than 0.0, a result file written before the mix existed still grades, and a ceiling on an unmeasured rate fails rather than passes) + fusion `test_scale_hint.py` (13 cases, including one that **reads the committed result file** and fails if `PUBLISHED_REPLICA_EPS` drifts from the run it names) + `check_perf_results.py` (every committed result carries its hardware, its date and the not-an-SLO label) | core | GATED | Published run: 6,000 events saturating at 1-in-100, **0 of 5,940 routine events raised an alert**, 0 missing, 0 duplicates, p95 event-to-alert 1,195 ms, ingest 122.6 events/s. The first attempt measured a routine alert rate of **1.00** — the load path's undeclared connector type falls to a generic profile filed as class 2001, and the promoter promotes category 2 unconditionally, so on eight of the twelve declared profiles no event can be routine. **No cloud-hardware run exists**: no instance has been provisioned for this project, so the plan's 5,000 events/s target is an aim rather than a result and the page says so with the command that would close it. The published run also predates the rule index — it ran against the published images — which the page states || `helm install` brings up every CORE service, and a restore covers everything the backup writes | `infra/helm/aisoc/values.yaml`; depth plan 4.5 / parity 6.8 | `ci.yml :: python-lint` (`check_deployment_completeness.py --self-test` then the gate: every profile-less service in `docker-compose.yml` must have a chart workload or a **named reason** not to, in both directions, and every `backup_*` function must have a `restore_*` counterpart and the reverse. Nine injected violations, one per rule, including a CORE service the chart drops and a component backed up but not restorable) | core | GATED | The chart declared **seven** application services against CORE's sixteen: no response execution, no connector polling, no threat-intel store, no LLM gateway, no local model, no vector store — and `helm install` reported success, because nothing compared the two files. `litellm`, `ollama` and `qdrant` are deliberately outside `.Values.services`: that map defaults every image tag to `.Chart.AppVersion`, and tagging a third-party image with AiSOC's version renders perfectly and pulls a tag that does not exist. **`helm install` has not been run on a cluster from CI** — the gate is static, `helm lint` and `helm template` are the dynamic checks that exist, and the kind install remains the open half of this row's claim || Two connector-scheduler replicas cannot both poll every vendor | `services/connectors/app/leader_lease.py`; depth plan 4.5 / parity 6.8 | `scheduler-lease-live.yml :: Two replicas cannot both poll every vendor` (real Postgres, every migration applied, 13 cases: a free lease taken once, a held lease not stealable, an expired one taken over, a process paused past its own expiry unable to resume and renew, the term advancing on takeover and **not** on renewal, and a release letting the next replica in without waiting out the lease. The decisive case interleaves two transactions explicitly rather than racing them, because a race between coroutines on one loop passes under a SELECT-then-UPDATE as well — measured on this repository's own lake-job claim. The job asserts the lease table exists, greps the run for a skip, and carries a negative control removing the expiry predicate, after which three cases go red) | core | GATED | A Postgres lease rather than a Kubernetes Lease, because the scheduler also runs under Compose, under `make up` and in a systemd unit, and an election that only works on Kubernetes is off wherever most first runs happen. Off by default and enabled in the Helm values, which is where a second replica is possible. A follower **removes** its poll jobs rather than declining to add more: a replica that loses leadership while holding jobs keeps polling, which is the same double-poll with the replica now reporting itself as a follower |@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Statuses: `GATED` (a CI job fails when the claim stops being true) · `PARTIAL`| Detections can be backtested over historical lake data before promotion | README (detection engineering) | `ci.yml` api job (`test_backtest.py` — bounded/allow-listed SQL construction with injection-sanitised source filter, lake-row→event mapping with JSON payload expansion, exact would-fire count + hit-rate + samples; `test_backtest_gate.py` — opt-in `AISOC_BACKTEST_MAX_HIT_RATE` /decide gate) + web type-check (rule-editor backtest panel) + `isolation-live.yml` (`tests/isolation/test_backtest_lake_live.py` — the real `fetch_lake_events` against ClickHouse 23.8, table built from `clickhouse/001_init.sql` and rows seeded through the production `lake_writer.event_to_row`) | full | GATED (the gap this row used to name was wrong: nothing ran the live fetch, and the tenant-scoping path existed twice — `detection_rules.py` carried its own near-identical copy, now deleted, with a test asserting exactly one definition survives. The live path exposed a defect no unit could: the writer stores OCSF `raw_data` into a column named `raw_payload` and `rows_to_events` expanded neither, so the payload expansion its docstring promises had never run on a real lake row. `services/api/app/services/backtest.py` was also absent from the workflow's path filter, so a change to the function under test did not trigger the job) | — || Asking the affected person, then their manager, is a workflow a playbook branches on — not a message that is sent and forgotten | `services/agents/app/playbook/verification.py`; `playbooks/packs/v1/suspicious-signin/user-verification-containment.playbook.json`; depth plan 5.4 | `ci.yml :: python-lint` (`check_stateful_verification.py --self-test` then the gate: the answer is HMAC-signed over token, answer **and** stage — so a link minted for the subject stops verifying once the question escalates — compared with `compare_digest`; an unanswered prompt escalates to the manager and then resumes with `timed_out`, a value a playbook can read; the confirmed-true-positive refusal is checked **before** the opt-in, because that rule has no opt-out and the other order would let a tenant opt into messaging a compromised account; and `aisoc_verification_policies` has a writer, since a control that fails closed with no way to switch it on is a feature that reads as broken. Eleven injected violations, one per rule) + `ci.yml` agents job (`test_playbook_verification.py`, 20 cases driving the real engine end to end: ask, pause, signed answer, branch, approval — and the stale-link case, where the subject's own `denied` link is refused after the escalation and a manager-stage one is accepted) + `verification-live.yml` (`test_verification_pause_live.py`, 12 cases against real Postgres with every migration applied, because only a real transaction can show that the conditional UPDATEs claim a row once and that migration 102's CHECK admits all five outcomes the code writes) | core | GATED | — || The retention window a tenant chooses is the one the lake honours, and a legal hold outranks it | `services/api/app/services/retention.py`; `services/api/clickhouse/001_init.sql`; depth plan 4.3 | `ci.yml :: python-lint` (`check_retention_window.py --self-test` then the gate: the table TTL, the tiering DELETE and `MAX_LAKE_DAYS` are held to one number at or above 400 days, a `MODIFY TTL` migration exists so an existing volume converges — `001_init.sql` runs only on a fresh one — and the purge worker reads the holds in force, decides through `may_purge`, and reports what it withheld. Eight injected violations, one per rule) + `ci.yml` api job (`test_retention_legal_hold.py`, 13 cases driving the worker against recording doubles. **Half of them are the positive control**, because a purge stuck closed withholds everything on every deployment and passes every "did the hold work" assertion perfectly: a tenant with no hold is asserted to still lose its aged rows, and a hold on one tenant is asserted not to freeze another. Proven against the pre-fix worker, where five fail) | core | PARTIAL (the lake half is static: ClickHouse enforces a table TTL during merges and no test in CI watches a row survive past day 90 on a real server, so what is gated is that the three numbers agree and that the migration exists, not that ClickHouse honoured it. The purge half is gated against doubles rather than live Postgres and ClickHouse. And a hold currently stops the whole tenant's sweep rather than only its own subjects, because both purges are bulk statements — recorded as follow-up rather than approximated) | a live-store retention test |-| The audit retention window a tenant configures is enforced, and the surviving chain still verifies | `docs/decisions/0011-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md`; `services/api/app/workers/retention_purge.py`; depth plan 8.1 | `audit-retention-live.yml :: audit-retention-live` (`tests/isolation/test_audit_retention_live.py`, 12 cases against real Postgres as the DML-only `aisoc_app` role: the window removes the rows past it, the checkpoint agrees with the rows it describes from both sides, the remainder replays clean from the anchor, a direct DELETE and a hand-set purge flag are both refused by privilege, and the checkpoint is itself immutable. The job reads the DELETE privilege out of the catalogue, refuses a run that skipped a case, and carries a negative control that ignores the anchor and requires the suite to go red) | core | GATED | `retention_policies.audit_days` was storable since the table existed and purged by nothing, because `audit_log` is an append-only hash chain: delete the oldest rows and `verify_chain_breaks`, which replays from `prev_hash = NULL`, reports a mismatch at index 0 — an intact chain reads as tampered with, which is the worst outcome for a control whose only job is to tell those apart. Migration `111` adds `audit_retention_truncate`, a `SECURITY DEFINER` function that writes a checkpoint (the cutoff, the window, the count, the hash of the last row removed and the predecessor the oldest survivor names) and only then deletes, in one transaction; the verifier re-anchors on it. The application role holds **no DELETE on `audit_log`**, so the function is the only path rather than the intended one — the trigger's transaction-local setting is a second control, but a custom GUC can be set by anybody. **Does not unblock tenant deletion**: `audit_log`'s trigger from migration `101` refuses the cascade from `tenants` too, so `DELETE FROM tenants` raises for any tenant that has written a row. Pre-existing, tracked separately, and the checkpoint table deliberately does not repeat it |+| The audit retention window a tenant configures is enforced, and the surviving chain still verifies | `docs/decisions/0013-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md`; `services/api/app/workers/retention_purge.py`; depth plan 8.1 | `audit-retention-live.yml :: audit-retention-live` (`tests/isolation/test_audit_retention_live.py`, 12 cases against real Postgres as the DML-only `aisoc_app` role: the window removes the rows past it, the checkpoint agrees with the rows it describes from both sides, the remainder replays clean from the anchor, a direct DELETE and a hand-set purge flag are both refused by privilege, and the checkpoint is itself immutable. The job reads the DELETE privilege out of the catalogue, refuses a run that skipped a case, and carries a negative control that ignores the anchor and requires the suite to go red) | core | GATED | `retention_policies.audit_days` was storable since the table existed and purged by nothing, because `audit_log` is an append-only hash chain: delete the oldest rows and `verify_chain_breaks`, which replays from `prev_hash = NULL`, reports a mismatch at index 0 — an intact chain reads as tampered with, which is the worst outcome for a control whose only job is to tell those apart. Migration `111` adds `audit_retention_truncate`, a `SECURITY DEFINER` function that writes a checkpoint (the cutoff, the window, the count, the hash of the last row removed and the predecessor the oldest survivor names) and only then deletes, in one transaction; the verifier re-anchors on it. The application role holds **no DELETE on `audit_log`**, so the function is the only path rather than the intended one — the trigger's transaction-local setting is a second control, but a custom GUC can be set by anybody. **Does not unblock tenant deletion**: `audit_log`'s trigger from migration `101` refuses the cascade from `tenants` too, so `DELETE FROM tenants` raises for any tenant that has written a row. Pre-existing, tracked separately, and the checkpoint table deliberately does not repeat it || Detections can be authored in Python (`def rule(event)`) with a fixture gate | README (detection engineering) | `python-detections.yml` (`aisoc_detections.runner` fails a blind rule that misses a positive or a noisy one that fires on a negative; every bundled detection must ship ≥1 positive + ≥1 negative case) + `test_framework.py` (fail-closed evaluate, metadata validation) | core | GATED | - || AI Detection Builder: NL → rule + AUTO-generated fixtures → non-circular eval-gate → governed proposal | README (detection engineering) | `ci.yml` api job (`test_ai_detection_builder.py` — fixtures are DERIVED from the generated rule's own selection, not invented, and genuinely pass the non-circular gate: fires on the positive, quiet on the negative) | core | GATED | - || No-code / simple detection builder compiles to a valid rule | README (detection engineering) | `ci.yml` web type-check + lint (`SimpleRuleBuilder.tsx` `buildSigma` compiles field/operator/value rows to Sigma, dropped into the governed editor) | core | GATED | - |diff --git a/docs/decisions/0011-how-fusion-scales.md b/docs/decisions/0012-how-fusion-scales.mdsimilarity index 98%rename from docs/decisions/0011-how-fusion-scales.mdrename to docs/decisions/0012-how-fusion-scales.mdindex bffc39169..cd199eed0 100644--- a/docs/decisions/0011-how-fusion-scales.md+++ b/docs/decisions/0012-how-fusion-scales.md@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-# ADR-0011: How fusion scales — required-field indexing and entity partitioning+# ADR-0012: How fusion scales — required-field indexing and entity partitioning- **Status:** accepted- **Date:** 2026-10-11diff --git a/docs/decisions/0011-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md b/docs/decisions/0013-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.mdsimilarity index 99%rename from docs/decisions/0011-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.mdrename to docs/decisions/0013-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.mdindex 4803c9e20..4fcabd52a 100644--- a/docs/decisions/0011-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md+++ b/docs/decisions/0013-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@-# ADR-0011: truncating a hash-chained audit log, without making an intact chain look tampered with+# ADR-0013: truncating a hash-chained audit log, without making an intact chain look tampered with- **Status:** accepted- **Date:** 2026-10-11diff --git a/docs/decisions/README.md b/docs/decisions/README.mdindex 3295b38be..f322f2569 100644--- a/docs/decisions/README.md+++ b/docs/decisions/README.md@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ ADRs are immutable once accepted. If a decision changes, write a new ADR that su| [ADR-0009](./0009-auto-close-without-an-earned-grant.md) | Whether a tenant with no closure policy may auto-close | proposed | 2026-10-04 || [ADR-0010](./0010-entity-and-session-context-in-core.md) | Entity and session context in CORE is a Postgres store; Neo4j stays in `full` | accepted | 2026-10-11 || [ADR-0011](./0011-behavioural-baselines-in-core.md) | Behavioural baselines in CORE are a fusion module; the UEBA service stays in `full` | accepted | 2026-10-11 |-| [ADR-0011](./0011-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md) | Truncating a hash-chained audit log without making an intact chain look tampered with | accepted | 2026-10-11 |+| [ADR-0012](./0012-how-fusion-scales.md) | How fusion scales — required-field indexing, entity partitioning, and a scale hint the cluster acts on | accepted | 2026-10-11 |+| [ADR-0013](./0013-truncating-a-hash-chained-audit-log.md) | Truncating a hash-chained audit log without making an intact chain look tampered with | accepted | 2026-10-11 |## Authoring conventionsdiff --git a/scripts/check_deployment_completeness.py b/scripts/check_deployment_completeness.pyindex 9f4d7aa5e..0216f90cd 100644--- a/scripts/check_deployment_completeness.py+++ b/scripts/check_deployment_completeness.py@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ BACKUP_SH = Path("scripts/backup.sh")RESTORE_SH = Path("scripts/restore.sh")LEASE_PY = Path("services/connectors/app/leader_lease.py")SCHEDULER_PY = Path("services/connectors/app/scheduler.py")-LEASE_MIGRATION = Path("services/api/migrations/112_scheduler_leases.sql")+LEASE_MIGRATION = Path("services/api/migrations/115_scheduler_leases.sql")#: Compose services the chart is not expected to render, with the reason.#:diff --git a/scripts/check_retention_window.py b/scripts/check_retention_window.pyindex d5df41268..2d0e503e4 100644--- a/scripts/check_retention_window.py+++ b/scripts/check_retention_window.py@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LAKE_MIGRATIONS = Path("services/api/app/db/lake_migrations.py")COLD_QUERY_PY = Path("services/api/app/services/lake_cold_query.py")JOB_RUNNER_PY = Path("services/api/app/services/lake_query_runner.py")LAKE_ENDPOINT = Path("services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/lake.py")-JOB_MIGRATION = Path("services/api/migrations/111_lake_query_jobs.sql")+JOB_MIGRATION = Path("services/api/migrations/114_lake_query_jobs.sql")#: The floor the plan names. A deployment that cannot keep a year and a bit#: cannot answer "show me this account's activity over the last auditdiff --git a/scripts/check_standard_inputs.py b/scripts/check_standard_inputs.pyindex ac2b7921b..5bde91795 100644--- a/scripts/check_standard_inputs.py+++ b/scripts/check_standard_inputs.py@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ INBOX_ENDPOINT = Path("services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/inbox.py")TAXII_SERVICE = Path("services/api/app/services/taxii.py")TAXII_ENDPOINT = Path("services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/taxii.py")-TAXII_MIGRATION = Path("services/api/migrations/110_taxii_collections.sql")+TAXII_MIGRATION = Path("services/api/migrations/113_taxii_collections.sql")API_ROUTER = Path("services/api/app/api/v1/router.py")#: The template the OTLP receiver projects through. Named here rather thandiff --git a/services/api/app/models/mcp_access.py b/services/api/app/models/mcp_access.pyindex 6583da69e..c0f3a118e 100644--- a/services/api/app/models/mcp_access.py+++ b/services/api/app/models/mcp_access.py@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@"""ORM models for the inbound MCP surface — tool grants and call approvals.-Depth plan 9.1 (parity 6.6); migration ``104_mcp_access.sql`` carries the+Depth plan 9.1 (parity 6.6); migration ``109_mcp_access.sql`` carries thereasoning for each column.Not to be confused with :mod:`app.models.mcp_server`, which is the *outbound*diff --git a/services/api/migrations/104_mcp_access.sql b/services/api/migrations/109_mcp_access.sqlsimilarity index 99%rename from services/api/migrations/104_mcp_access.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/109_mcp_access.sqlindex f4c6b13d3..f8d058889 100644--- a/services/api/migrations/104_mcp_access.sql+++ b/services/api/migrations/109_mcp_access.sql@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@--- 104_mcp_access.sql — who may call which MCP tool, and the queue that holds+-- 109_mcp_access.sql — who may call which MCP tool, and the queue that holds-- the ones a key alone is not enough for.---- Depth plan 9.1 (parity 6.6). `services/mcp` was stdio-only: an MCP hostdiff --git a/services/api/migrations/110_phishing_campaigns.sql b/services/api/migrations/111_phishing_campaigns.sqlsimilarity index 99%rename from services/api/migrations/110_phishing_campaigns.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/111_phishing_campaigns.sqlindex d598ddc7c..7c1969a4f 100644--- a/services/api/migrations/110_phishing_campaigns.sql+++ b/services/api/migrations/111_phishing_campaigns.sql@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@--- 110_phishing_campaigns.sql — reported-message intake, campaign grouping and+-- 111_phishing_campaigns.sql — reported-message intake, campaign grouping and-- the per-recipient purge ledger.---- Depth plan 7.1 (gap-closure Phase 10, parity 6.4). Phishing submissions havediff --git a/services/api/migrations/111_phishing_message_analysis.sql b/services/api/migrations/112_phishing_message_analysis.sqlsimilarity index 98%rename from services/api/migrations/111_phishing_message_analysis.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/112_phishing_message_analysis.sqlindex 0db7b65c6..cdd03b1af 100644--- a/services/api/migrations/111_phishing_message_analysis.sql+++ b/services/api/migrations/112_phishing_message_analysis.sql@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@--- 111_phishing_message_analysis.sql — the headers a reported message carried,+-- 112_phishing_message_analysis.sql — the headers a reported message carried,-- and whether anything actually examined it.---- Depth plan 7.2. The submissions table has held an `indicators` JSONB arraydiff --git a/services/api/migrations/110_taxii_collections.sql b/services/api/migrations/113_taxii_collections.sqlsimilarity index 100%rename from services/api/migrations/110_taxii_collections.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/113_taxii_collections.sqldiff --git a/services/api/migrations/111_lake_query_jobs.sql b/services/api/migrations/114_lake_query_jobs.sqlsimilarity index 100%rename from services/api/migrations/111_lake_query_jobs.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/114_lake_query_jobs.sqldiff --git a/services/api/migrations/112_scheduler_leases.sql b/services/api/migrations/115_scheduler_leases.sqlsimilarity index 100%rename from services/api/migrations/112_scheduler_leases.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/115_scheduler_leases.sqldiff --git a/services/api/migrations/110_console_webauthn.sql b/services/api/migrations/116_console_webauthn.sqlsimilarity index 100%rename from services/api/migrations/110_console_webauthn.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/116_console_webauthn.sqldiff --git a/services/api/migrations/111_audit_retention.sql b/services/api/migrations/117_audit_retention.sqlsimilarity index 100%rename from services/api/migrations/111_audit_retention.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/117_audit_retention.sqldiff --git a/services/api/migrations/113_entitlement_enforcement.sql b/services/api/migrations/118_entitlement_enforcement.sqlsimilarity index 100%rename from services/api/migrations/113_entitlement_enforcement.sqlrename to services/api/migrations/118_entitlement_enforcement.sqldiff --git a/services/fusion/app/api/router.py b/services/fusion/app/api/router.pyindex 97d69dad3..6c6929490 100644--- a/services/fusion/app/api/router.py+++ b/services/fusion/app/api/router.py@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ async def scale_hint():"""Lag-based autoscaling signal (parity 6.9 / depth 4.4).AiSOC publishes this and does not act on it. An autoscaler belongs to- the cluster, not to the application; ADR-0011 records why, and+ the cluster, not to the application; ADR-0012 records why, and`apps/docs/docs/operations/performance.md` shows the KEDA`ScaledObject` that consumes it.diff --git a/services/fusion/app/services/detection_engine.py b/services/fusion/app/services/detection_engine.pyindex b27241821..edc5833d1 100644--- a/services/fusion/app/services/detection_engine.py+++ b/services/fusion/app/services/detection_engine.py@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ table would leave every new connector one missing entry away from adetection that stops firing. The index is on required fields instead,which is strictly more selective *and* provably lossless: ``match_when``is an AND at the top level, so a rule that requires a field an event does-not carry cannot match it, whatever the product names say. ADR-0011+not carry cannot match it, whatever the product names say. ADR-0012records the decision.The engine is pure and synchronous; the consumer calls it inline.diff --git a/services/fusion/app/services/scale_hint.py b/services/fusion/app/services/scale_hint.pyindex 8f8de4025..491e2be50 100644--- a/services/fusion/app/services/scale_hint.py+++ b/services/fusion/app/services/scale_hint.py@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@AiSOC publishes a signal. It does not scale itself.-That is a decision rather than an omission, and ADR-0011 records it: an+That is a decision rather than an omission, and ADR-0012 records it: anautoscaler belongs to the cluster, not to the application. A platformthat scaled its own deployments would need write access to theorchestrator, would fight whatever HPA or KEDA scaler the operatordiff --git a/services/fusion/app/workers/consumer.py b/services/fusion/app/workers/consumer.pyindex 026eb31ba..7aa40b72c 100644--- a/services/fusion/app/workers/consumer.py+++ b/services/fusion/app/workers/consumer.py@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ class FusionWorker:async def scale_hint(self) -> dict:"""The autoscaling signal, for an operator's HPA or KEDA scaler.- AiSOC publishes this and does not act on it; ADR-0011 records+ AiSOC publishes this and does not act on it; ADR-0012 recordswhy. The per-replica budget is derived from the publishedrealistic-mix run rather than chosen, so the number relates to ameasurement someone can go and check.